SOVIET AGRICULTURAL TRANSPORT: BOTTLENECKS TO CONTINUE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05818254
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
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• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2019
• Case Number: F-2015-01409
• Publication Date: April 1, 1987

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Soviet Agricultural Agricultural Transport:
Bottlenecks To Continue (u)
A Research Paper
-Secret-
SOV 87-10026
April 1987
Copy 5 28
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or Methods Involved
National Security
Unauthorized Disclosure
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Directorate ot
Intelligence
Soviet Agricultural Transport:
Bottlenecks To Continue (u)
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
Barbara Severin, Office of soviet Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Economic Performance
Division, SOYA,
CLIC
-Secret-
SOV 87-10026
April 1987
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Soviet Agricultural Transport:
Bottlenecks To Continue (u)
Summary
Information available
as of 30 September 1986
was used in this report.
Soviet agricultural losses are likely to remain large for the foreseeable
future because of the poor quality of rural transportation facilities and
inadequate investment resources to improve them. Failure to sharply
reduce these losses will cut the net gain from recent initiatives in the
agricultural sector�the intensive technology effort and improved feeding
practices�and keep the USSR in foreign grain markets. Indeed, the
ability to offload and transport large quantities of imported grain is the one
area of agricultural transport that has been substantially improved in
recent years.
Although Moscow's current policies are not sufficient to solve the agricul-
tural transportation problem�particularly on or near the farm�in the
1980s (and probably the 1990s), General Secretary Gorbachev is at least
starting the process of change. For example, the moderate effort to expand
rural roadbuilding and greater efforts to improve trucking and railroad
service will strengthen the foundation for small increases in food supplies in
the coming years, even in the absence of production increases. Moscow
should be able to make considerable progress in improving the transport of
domestic agricultural goods from major processing points and into urban
areas in the next few years. Investments are already being made in the pro-
duction of large trucks and truck-trailer combinations for off-farm haul-
age, specialized railroad cars for grain and fertilizer, and refrigerated
rolling stock for perishable produce and livestock products.
The new equipment will reduce the drag of agricultural shipments on
overall transport performance. To make the most of the equipment,
however, the Soviets must aggressively develop parallel infrastructure, such
as specialized loading and unloading equipment at transfer points and
sufficient storage capacity both at transfer points and at main storage
locations
Such improvements are especially important now because Gorbachev's
1986-90 plan promises farms substantially larger quantities of agrochemi-
cals, equipment, and other needed production resources. Although the
agricultural sector has received a large share of transport resources in the
past, growth in transport capacity has failed to keep pace with its
increasing demands. Transport carriers are already struggling to ship the
growing volumes of industrial materials necessary for modern and efficient
agricultural production.
ill
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SOV 87-10026
April 1987
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Even if more resources reach the fields and output is increased, the large
losses caused by inadequate transportation and storage�now some 20
percent of agricultural output�could prevent substantially larger quanti-
ties of farm products from reaching the consumer's table. Indeed, emphasis
in the 1986-90 plan on producing more high-quality but perishable foods�
such as meat, fruits, and vegetables�presents an even greater challenge to
the transport system than bulk crops such as grain.
We attribute the majority of these losses to the insufficient quantity and
poor quality of rural roads and poor vehicle servicing capabilities in rural
areas. More generally, chronic problems of poor work incentives and
inadequate investment in rural infrastructure are to blame. Although
Gorbachev is committed to increasing investment in rural infrastructure,
the overall needs are so vast that even strong emphasis on transportation
will only bring slow progress in reducing losses. Even though Moscow
claims each ruble invested in rural roads brings a 4-ruble return, a massive
infusion of resources would be required over the short run to improve the
roads; probably tens of billions of rubles ultimately will be necessary to
make real headway. Rural areas are not in a position to finance this kind of
investment themselves, and the Kremlin is unlikely to take on such a major
task since its limited investment funds are already earmarked for the high-
priority machine-building and energy sectors.
Agriculture has only about half the number of trucks Soviet planners feel
are required. Nonetheless, the sector already controls about one-fifth of the
nation's trucks and commands even more during the harvest season�
including some of the military's. Moreover, high turnover of the truck
stock, partly because of poor roads and limited servicing, has led to an even
greater demand for new trucks and intense competition with other truck
claimants
Agriculture has not been able to obtain a larger share of deliveries over the
past decade because developments in the trucking industry have empha-
sized production of heavy trucks for other users. For example, plans for
modernizing the Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant�whose vehicles make up
two-thirds of the agricultural fleet�slipped in priority behind those for
plants producing trucks for other uses over the last 10 years. The regime
may have concluded that fielding new, more efficient trucks for agriculture
was not prudent because achieving the intended productivity gains also
requires improvement of rural roads. Moscow now intends to carry out the
long-awaited modernization at Gor'kiy. The speed with which this program
is implemented will be a good indicator of the Kremlin's dedication to rural
development
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
The Increasing Burden of Agriculture on Transportation 1
The Cost of Inadequate Transport Facilities 3
The Main Problems
6
Inadequate Roads 6
Shortages of Transport Equipment 9
Inefficient Use of Trucks and Fuels 11
Coping With the Problems 11
The Official Line 11
Policies in Practice 12
Top Priority to Expediting Grain Imports 12
Solving Railroad Problems 13
Some Retrenchment on the Truck Issue 15
Roads�Still a Huge Problem 17
Outlook and Implications 18
V
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"ATM�
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
Soviet Agricultural Transport:
Bottlenecks To Continue (0
The Increasing Burden of Agriculture
on Transportation
Since the mid-1960s, agriculture's high priority has
resulted in a preferential claim on transport resources.
Leonid Brezhnev's decision in late 1964 to bolster
agriculture's priority for investment and material
resources led to a large and growing demand for
transportation services. This has resulted in a major
drain on the nation's transport resources�particular-
ly vehicles and fuels.' Increasing deliveries of machin-
ery and agrochemicals over the last two decades, often
from distant producers, expanded the need for long-
distance hauling by rail, and increasing applications
of chemical fertilizers and pesticides added to the
demand for trucks. For example, deliveries of chemi-
cal fertilizers to agriculture quadrupled from 1965 to
1985, while the use per hectare of land sown to grain
rose by roughly seven times. Gains in farm output
have also added to the burden on transportation,
albeit much less rapidly than deliveries of industrial
materials to the farms.2
Agricultural shipping now accounts for about 10
percent of all rail shipments (tons originated) and 16
percent of rail traffic (ton-kilometers) nationally (see
table 1). Every fourth ton of freight shipped on the
highways is for the agro-industrial complex, and one-
third of all highway traffic is agricultural. (u)
' The productivity of additional transport resources dedicated to
agriculture has been low. Rail and highway shipments for the so-
called agro-industrial complex (including shipments to as well as
from agriculture) increased by about 120 percent and 160 percent,
respectively, between 1965 and 1985. In contrast, farm output (net
of feed, seed, and waste) increased by only 35 percent during the
same period�and high-priority grain output by only about 70
percent. (u)
Deliveries of industrial goods to agriculture�largely machinery,
equipment, and agrochemicals�were equivalent to roughly 12
percent of the gross value of agricultural output (GVO) in 1959 but
accounted for an estimated 25 percent by 1982. In absolute terms,
deliveries of industrial goods and services grew by nearly four
times. In addition, the estimated share of farm output being
industrially processed increased from 40.4 percent of GVO in 1959
to 53.3 percent in 1982. In absolute terms, its value more than
doubled, from 31 billion rubles in 1959 to 68 billion rubles in 1982.
Adding to on-farm transport needs was a 60-percent increase in the
value of farm production used internally, much of which is livestock
feed and seed. These shares are estimated from input-output data
(only available for benchmark years) and Soviet statistics on GVO
in comparable prices. (u)
1
Agriculture's burden on transport carriers is even
greater than these statistics imply. Long rail hauls,
particularly for grain and fertilizer, now average
about 1,000 kilometers (km) and involve a large
number of stations, yards, and men in forwarding
shipments. Such shipments also tie up scarce rolling
stock for long periods of time. Agricultural cargoes
also require special handling far beyond that required
for bulk industrial raw materials, which account for
the greatest share of rail traffic and a large share of
highway haulage. Some goods�such as grain�are
highly combustible and require extra caution in load-
ing and unloading. Other products�such as fruits
and vegetables�are easily bruised or damaged. All
agricultural goods require high standards of vehicle
cleanliness to avoid contamination. Finally, the sea-
sonality of agricultural production concentrates ship-
ments into brief periods. According to the Soviet
press, 38 to 40 percent of all agricultural rail ship-
ments occur during September to November, com-
pared with only 15 to 16 percent in May to July.
Nearly half of all agricultural highway shipments
occur in July to September and one-fourth during
October to December. In years of high crop yields�
for example, 1976, in which grain production in-
creased by 80 million metric tons over 1975�the
burden becomes almost unmanageable. (u)
The agricultural sector in the USSR is immense,
claiming roughly one-third of total annual investment
(including housing and services) and employing riearly
30 percent of the labor force.' Farm prodpction alone
claims about 20 percent of annual investment and 20
percent of the labor force in comparison with less than
5 percent of each in the United States. The USSR
farms about one-third more land than does the United
States, but the value of output per hectare in the
USSR averages only 56 percent of that in the United
States. (u)
'The agricultural sector includes not only farms but also several
branches of industry supplying farms with materials, such as
tractors and other farm machinery, repair services, and agrochemi-
cals, and branches of industry that process farm products. (u)
-Sceret
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Table 1
USSR: Total and Agricultural Transport Volumes, 1983 a
Total
Railroad
Highway
River
Maritime
Traffic (billion ton-kilometers)
5,251
3,600
486
273
892
Of which:
Agriculture
883
580
171
12
120
Shipments (million metric tons)
31,121
3,851
26,425
607
238
Of which:
Agriculture
7,144
376
6,700
38
30
Materials
NA
176
4,000
30
NA
Of which:
Fertilizer
NA
138
NA
NA
8b
Products a
NA
200
2,700
8
NA
Of which:
Grain
NA
135
NA
7
20
a Derived from Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1984, pp. 335,
338, 342, and various Soviet open-source publications such as
lzvestiya Timiryazevskoy sel'skokhozyaystvennoy akademii,
No. 4, 1985, p. 5.
b Includes other agricultural chemicals.
This table is Unclassified.
a Farm production in the USSR averages roughly 1 billion tons
annually. Many of these products, particularly feedstuffs, are
moved at least twice, substantially raising the tonnage figures.
Table 2
USSR: Estimated Truck Deliveries to Major Claimants, 1966-85
Thousand units
1966-70
1971-75
1976-80
1981-85
Total a
2,207
3,040
3,636
3,866
Military b
612
868
993
1,038
Civilian a
1,595
2,172
2,643
2,828
Common carrier d
191
341
383
424
Agriculture e
717
1,102
1,342
1,450
Other f
687
729
918
954
a Production minus net exports.
b Estimated.
a Total minus estimated military.
d Data for 1966-70 and 1971-75 are from Bronstein and Shulman,
Ekonomika avtomobil'nogo transporta, Moscow: Transport, 1976,
p. 79. Data for 1976-80 were calculated as the mean of reported
data for 1971-75 and estimated data for 1981-85. Data for 1981-85
were calculated as civilian deliveries minus the total of agriculture
and other.
e Data for 1966-70, 1971-75, and 1976-80 are from Ekonomiches-
kaya gazeta, No. 33, August 1982, p. 1. Data for 1981-85 are from
Planovoye khozyaystvo, No. 6, June 1986, pp. 17-26.
f Data for 1966-70, 1971-75, and 1976-80 were calculated as
civilian deliveries minus those to common carriers and agriculture.
Data for 1981-85 were calculated from estimates of deliveries to
departmental carriers minus deliveries to agriculture; the depart-
mental figures were derived from one claim that departmental
carriers represent 85 percent of the total (probably civil) truck fleet
(Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 3, March 1982, pp. 42-53).
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Figure 1
USSR: Estimated Truck Inventory
by Major Claimant, 1985
Percent
Other a 48.0
Total: 7.7 million
Agriculture 22.6
Military 16.9
Common carrier 12.5
a Includes the main industrial ministries and the
construction sector.
312387 4-87
Agriculture's 1.7 million trucks represent more than
one out of every five in the country (see figure 1).
Some two-thirds are on farms, and the remainder are
in organizations supplying and servicing farms and
processing farm products. The sector receives an even
larger share of truck deliveries than its inventory
share would imply because trucks are retired more
rapidly in the agricultural sector than in other sectors.
We estimate that, during the 1981-85 period, agricul-
ture received one-half of all trucks delivered to the
civilian economy (see table 2). According to a Soviet
automotive industry journal, however, only some 90
percent of these deliveries are new trucks. The re-
maining 10 percent probably include used military
trucks, perhaps left on farms after being used in the
harvest.
The agricultural sector also consumes much of the
nation's petroleum products�diesel fuel, gasoline,
and motor oils. Soviet authors estimate that, in the
early 1980s, the sector absorbed 40 to 45 percent of
3
the total diesel fuel, 30 to 35 percent of the gasoline,
and up to 50 percent of the motor oils. Nontransport
farm operations and farm production probably ac-
count for most of the diesel fuel and some of the
motor oil, but much of the gasoline goes for trucking
operations. The enormous tonnages moved to and
from the farm, as well as on the farm, suggest that
transport may claim as much as half of the total
agricultural allocation of oil products. According to
the Soviet press, the agricultural sector will continue
to receive 30 percent of the country's gasoline and 40
percent of the diesel fuel in support of the Food
Program.4
Despite the large volume of transport resources devot-
ed to agriculture, the administration of these re-
sources�especially of trucking�has been diffused
among several more or less autonomous organizations
(see inset), and development of the rural transport
network has not kept pace with the growth in demand.
This has given rise to bottlenecks that from time to
time require special effort by the military and indus-
trial sectors to overcome. During the harvest season,
for example, agriculture's claim on the national truck
fleet reportedly swells by 700,000 to 800,000 vehicles,
drawing them away from other sectors
The Cost of Inadequate Transport Facilities
The main cost of agriculture's overtaxed and underde-
veloped transport system is the enormous loss of farm
products and inputs that occurs during transportation
and storage. For example, in 1982, Brezhnev noted
that losses of grain run as high as 20 percent of the
annual harvest. This is equivalent to 90 percent of the
average annual volume of grain imported during
1981-85. An article in Literaturnaya gazeta�a Sovi-
et periodical known for provocative writing�noted
that losses of fruits, potatoes, and other vegetables
"along the way" amount to 30 to 50 percent of the
The Food Program, announced by Brezhnev in 1982, aims to
improve the entire chain of food production�from farm, through
processor, to consumer. (u)
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Transportation Players
Railroads dominate the long-distance haulage of raw
materials and equipment from producers to agricul-
tural areas; of agricultural products from procure-
ment sites to centralized storage, feeding, or process-
ing locations; and of processed foods to distributors.
The All-Union Ministry of Railways has some con-
trol in balancing the needs for agriculture against
other transport claimants, as well as planning, pro-
curing, and delivering the right mix of rolling stock�
from specially lined freight cars for hauling caustic
fertilizers to refrigerated cars for meat and other
perishables. (u)
Trucks predominate over shorter distances on or near
the farm. Unlike the rail system, the truck system is
highly fragmented; management and subordination
are vested in a number of entities:
� Glavagropromsnab, the Main Administration for
Technical Supplies and Services, was formed in late
1985 as part of Gosagroprom, the State Agro-
Industrial Committee, in which Gorbachev merged
six major entities. The full details of its structure
are not yet known but it appears to include at least
the following two organizations:
� Goskomsel'khortekhnika, the State Committee
for the Supply of Production Equipment for
Agriculture, largely controls deliveries of ma-
chinery and equipment, fuel, construction mate-
rials, and most other supplies to farms. Local
Sel'khortekhnika organizations operate trucks
and loan them for farm use.
� Soyuzsel'khozkhimiya, formed in 1979, com-
bined farm and Goskomsel'khortekhnika ele-
ments to create a unified, specialized service to
store, deliver, and apply agrochemicals. Al-
though several republics now have Agroproms-
nab departments, oblast and rayon level
(smaller administrative units) Sel'khortekhnika
and Sel'khozkhimiya departments are currently
operating under their original names.
� State and collective farms, which maintain large
truck inventories, are responsible for most on-farm
shipments and deliveries to procurement areas.
� Processing enterprises also have truck fleets and
haul raw materials for processing.
� Republic ministries of motor transport supply
trucks and drivers to farms and processing enter-
prises when needed. They also reportedly provide
centralized operational control of the many trucks,
drivers, and mechanics traditionally supplied by
industry and the military to meet the brief but great
need for additional transport during the harvest.
� RAPOs, the regional agro-industrial associations
set up under the Food Program, reportedly also
provide some weak administrative coordination of
these many transport authorities.
With so many players and conflicting ministerial ties,
it is not surprising that, during peak periods, harvest-
ed crops continue to spoil because the promised
transport is busy "someplace else."
River carriers are underdeveloped and largely insig-
nificant as carriers of agricultural products, although
they do move agricultural produce from the Cauca-
sus area to population centers along the Volga and
Don River systems. Maritime carriers also are rela-
tively unimportant for moving domestic agricultural
freight, although imports of agricultural products�
particularly grain and raw sugar�represent a sizable
share of the total shipments and traffic of the mari-
time fleet. (u)
4
(b)(3)
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Product Losses
Determining the extent of farm product losses attrib-
utable to transportation is difficult. Even Soviet
statisticians are unsure of the extent and causes of
these losses. In addition to transport constraints,
product losses can be the result of:
� Lack of processing capacity. Low investment priori-
ty has kept the food-processing industry from add-
ing sufficient capacity to handle the increasing
quantities of raw materials coming from the farm
and from reequipping facilities with modern ma-
chinery. Many steps in food processing are still
performed manually.
� Lack of proper storage facilities. Currently, agricul-
ture has only 36 percent of the storage space it
requires, according to an authoritative Soviet jour-
nal. The priority of grain vis-a-vis other crops is
evident in Soviet statements that nearly 70 percent
of the storage capacity needed for grain has been
built. Figures for potatoes and other vegetables and
for fruit are only 32 percent and 47 percent, respec-
tively. According to the Soviet technical press,
proper storage facilities�those that are air-sealed
and effectively prevent spoilage�exist for only 40
percent of silage and haylage, key livestock feeds.
� Lack of incentives. Little connection exists between
effort expended and reward gained�personal ini-
tiative is not encouraged, and a sense of personal
responsibility is nonexistent.
� Shortages of crates and containers. As many as 12
loading and unloading operations occur between
harvesting and delivery to the processor or consum-
er. Substantial waste results from excessive han-
dling and delay.
� Shortages of labor. Farm managers are loath to
send workers with trucks to carry goods beyond the
farm when they could more profitably be employed
on the farm. Receiving points traditionally are
undermanned and also suffer from a lack of auto-
mated materials-handling equipment.
agricultural losses much
lower than the general statements; average product
losses at the "stage of delivery of raw materials to
processing," presumably those that could be attribut-
ed to transportation, comprise 6.6 percent, and losses
of livestock, grapes, and vegetables, 10 to 12 percent.
Rates as low as these suggest a very limited defini-
tion of the delivery stage. The US Department of
Agriculture estimates that about 20 percent of all
fresh fruits and vegetables picked in the United
States never reach the consumer because of losses
related to natural ripening and aging, stresses such as
chilling, and insects and micro-organisms. Losses of
grain attributable to transport are estimated to be
less than 1 percent in the United States
harvest. The author described trucks loaded with fruit
standing idle for days and "juice running in the
street."
Gorbachev himself described the potential payoff
from reducing agricultural losses in his report to the
27th CPSU Congress when he noted that the cost of
eliminating losses would be one-half to one-third the
cost of obtaining the same supply through additional
production. In June 1986 he stressed the need to "take
5
in without losses" all crops, and, in September, during
his walkabout in Krasnodar, he repeated the impor-
tance of reducing losses to the success of the Food
Program. Losses are caused by a number of factors,
especially inadequate transport and storage, which are
interdependent (see inset). (u)
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The distance that products have to move is a major
factor. Now retired Minister of Agriculture Valentin
Mesyats, in an interview last year, commented that,
when tomatoes are moved 25 km, 80 to 85 percent
remain in first-grade condition; when the distance is
100 km, only 40 percent do. Farm produce being
moved by rail frequently takes as much as 15 to 18
days to reach the delivery point, according to Soviet
authorities. Milk often has to be moved 200 km or
farther, even in hot weather, and cattle and hogs
being shipped to slaughter spend as many as three to
four days in transit. Refrigerated and ventilated
railcars and trucks are in short supply, and the use of
chemical preservatives is prohibited by Soviet law.
Product losses also extend to farm inputs. Failure to
deliver adequate quantities of agrochemicals, machin-
ery, spare parts, and other crucial resources to farms
on time seriously hampers achieving gains in crop
output. Not only are deliveries frequently too late to
enable field work to progress, but, according to the
Soviet press, the quantities finally delivered are often
less than needed�partly because of losses en route
and partly because of production constraints. More-
over, storage facilities for key materials such as
chemical fertilizers are inadequate. Construction of
new storage facilities has scarcely kept pace with
steadily increasing allocations. In 1983 a Politburo
discussion pointed out that only half as many depots
for chemical fertilizer storage existed as were needed
and that about one-tenth of the fertilizer allocated to
agriculture�over 2 million tons in nutrient content�
was being lost. Soviet scientists claim that each ton of
fertilizer nutrient produces 4 to 5 tons of grain.
Inadequate storage facilities at farm supply organiza-
tions and on farms contribute to problems resulting
from the highly seasonal nature of chemical fertilizer
shipments. More than half of these shipments are
concentrated in the March-May period for use with
emerging winter crops and spring plantings. At this
time the movement of fertilizer competes for rail
space and general purpose freight cars with the
seasonal surge in rail activity from delayed winter
shipments and the annual peak of shipments of con-
struction materials. A second peak occurs in
November-December, also a difficult period for the
railroads as they try to meet end-of-year delivery
targets.
-Semet�
The Main Problems
Inadequate Roads
An inadequate road network probably tops the list of
causes for agricultural losses by the transport system
(see figures 2 and 3). One Soviet writer in the early
1980s blamed "lack of roads"�probably meaning
both inadequate quantity and quality�for 5 to 7
billion rubles in agricultural losses annually, or 4 to 5
percent of the gross value of farm output as measured
by the USSR. Another blamed "lack of roads" for
crop losses equivalent to 7 to 8 percent of the gross
value of crop output. Despite a longstanding policy
aimed at encouraging rural roadbuilding, the USSR
reported that 11 percent of regional centers and 18
percent of collective and state farms in 1985 still had
no reliable link to the main road system. (u)
Increasing the traditionally low priority for off-farm
roads in rural areas would be difficult. Construction
and maintenance of off-farm roads are controlled by
the republic ministries of highways or their subordi-
nate trusts, which are already fully employed improv-
ing the inadequate stock of general purpose roads
connecting larger population centers! Moreover, for
over 25 years the responsibility of financing rural
roads has been placed mainly on the rural areas,
primarily on the farms themselves, which cannot meet
this extra burden, given their heavily strained re-
sources
Yet, even if the Soviets increased the resources devot-
ed to off-farm rural roads, the problem of losses would
be far from solved. A large share of the losses
probably results from the poor condition of on-farm
roads. A deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of
Ministers claimed in a 1986 article that his republic
There is no all-union ministry of highways, but the major
interrepublic road network�the Soviet equivalent of the US
defense highway system�enjoys national support for funding and
priority for materials. Although most of the roads in this system are
hard surfaced, many of them are only two lanes wide. (u)
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(b)(3)
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had 480,000 480,000 km of roads within farms, which is far
short of the 1.2 million km of on-farm roads the
Soviets claim are necessary in the republic.'
6 On-farm roads are far more important in the USSR than in the
United States. The average state farm in the USSR covers over 16
thousand hectares, and the average collective farm about 6.5
thousand hectares, as compared with average farm size of about
180 hectares in the United States. A state or collective farm may
include several villages, some with schools and other amenities,
such as small hospitals, farm-product processing facilities, and
other small-scale industries to produce construction materials and
consumer goods from local raw materials. (u)
Secret
Upgrading the road system on farms is a problem of
enormous magnitude. Only 59,000 km of the farm
roads in the RSFSR are hard surfaced.' The need for
hard-surfaced roads on RSFSR farms�estimated by
'"Hard surface" in Soviet parlance includes nearly any improved
surface beyond dirt. More than 80 percent of Soviet public roads
have been raised to this level. The Soviets use the more exclusive
term "modern surface" when surfaces are composed of concrete or
asphalt. Less than half of all public roads qualify for this descrip-
tion. (u)
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the Soviets at 600,000 km�exceeds the total stock of
hard-surfaced roads in the entire republic today. It is
also greater than the additions to the stock of hard-
surfaced roads nationally over the last 15 years,
during which Moscow made a major effort to improve
the national road system. Resources for rural road
construction are decentralized, making rapid improve-
ment similar to the national experience highly unlike-
ly.'
Development of hard-surfaced roads not only is im-
portant for reducing losses but also for reducing costs
of both inputs and products. For example, a Soviet
author claims that the use of hard-surfaced roads
instead of unsurfaced roads in rural areas increases
the amount vehicles can haul by 80 percent, increases
speed by a factor of 2 to 3, cuts fuel expenditures in
half, and greatly reduces expenses for vehicle repair.
(u)
The lack of adequate hard-surfaced roads is particu-
larly apparent in the flooded and boggy conditions
that prevail during the annual spring thaw. Although
few crops are moved at this time, supplies must be
delivered to farms; feed to animals; and live animals,
milk, and eggs to procurement and processing points.
According to the Soviet central press, "at times there
is nothing we can do about impassable roads, all
transport stands still except for a few powerful trac-
tors."
Shortages of Transport Equipment
Agricultural losses also result from an inadequate
supply of transport equipment in good repair. Al-
though the inventory of trucks in the agricultural
sector increased between 1970 and 1984 by nearly
600,000, to almost 1.7 million�or about three trucks
per 1,000 hectares of arable land�this is still less
than half the number that Soviet planners consider
necessary to avoid delays. Moreover, the rugged
The chief of the Main Administration for Capital Construction in
the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture in 1980 commented that
responsibility for only 20 to 25 percent of the total volume of road
construction on collective and state farms fell to organizations of
the republic highway ministry, which have the best network for
supplies of material, equipment, and skilled manpower. The rest of
the work�financing, material acquisition, and physical construc-
tion�fell on the shoulders of the republic Ministry of Agriculture
or on the farms themselves. (u)
9
treatment that trucks undergo because of poorly
surfaced or unsurfaced roads reduces the number in
working order. Difficulties in maintaining farm trucks
compound the problem. The nationwide shortage of
vehicle spare parts, repair and maintenance facilities,
and qualified repair personnel is far more pronounced
in rural areas than in cities. Farm trucks reportedly
are out of operation an average of at least 40 days
each year because of inadequate repair or servicing.
Many Soviet articles have focused on the supply of
inappropriate, broken, or otherwise unusable railway
and highway rolling stock for shipping agricultural
products and the misuse of specialized agricultural
rolling stock. The problems have sparked numerous
cartoon commentaries depicting freight cars and
trucks spewing grain through gaping holes or of
livestock and even logs being loaded into cars desig-
nated for grain (see figure 4). Sel'skaya zhizn', the
agricultural newspaper, reported that, during 1982 in
one area of the Ukraine, grain spillage equaled 1
kilogram per running meter of track "as far as one
could see." Fertilizers and fuels also leak in substan-
tial quantities from railcars. These problems arise
mainly from a lack of cars specially suited for ship-
ping bulk agricultural products and from improper
conversions of general purpose freight cars to agricul-
tural use. For example, workers often fail to install
grain panels before the cars are loaded. A chronic
lack of refrigerated trailers and railcars reduces quali-
ty and increases spoilage. According to Soviet esti-
mates, only about half of all rail-shipped perishables
are moved in refrigerated equipment. (u)
Transport also has been blamed for losses that affect
agriculture indirectly, for example, in the shipment of
raw materials to and output from fertilizer producers.'
One Soviet official lamented in 1982 that since 1976 a
total of 8 million tons of chemical fertilizers had been
lost because transport capacity was not available.
Inadequate loading capacity at ports on main rivers,
inadequate rail support, and insufficient storage were
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Grain cars being loaded with logs (left) and
livestock (right).
t.
11-
.a
-
-
Misuse of refrigerated trucks: "And you get to the
consumer on your own
Figure 4. USSR: Commentaries on agricultural transportation (u)
Poorly equipped trucks promote grain losses.
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reportedly to blame. Soviet
open sources during the same period confirm such
problems. As recently as mid-1985, a fertilizer com-
plex in Belorussia that produces 50 percent of the
USSR's potassium fertilizer was operating at only
one-third capacity because railcars were not available
to ship its product.
Inefficient Use of Trucks and Fuels
The Soviet press condemns agriculture for its ineffi-
cient use of trucks and fuels. We estimate that the
agricultural truck fleet is only about half as produc-
tive as the centrally directed common carrier fleet in
terms of annual per-truck shipment volumes and
probably less productive than the other notoriously
inefficient departmental carriers.' This stems in part
from the long downtimes caused by rugged treatment
and poor maintenance, which also contribute to exces-
sive fuel use. According to one Soviet author, unit fuel
consumption (grams of standard fuel per ton-
kilometer of traffic) by agricultural trucks is double
that of the common carrier fleet and 30 percent
higher than that of other departmental carriers.
In addition, past policies that focused on steadily
increasing the stock rather than on the productivity of
trucks have not encouraged efficient use of available
truck parts. Finally, the emphasis on developing large,
centralized facilities for processing agricultural prod-
ucts and on transferring short-haul transport from rail
to truck has added to the length of truck hauls,
further reducing productivity. In 1982 Gorbachev (as
the Politburo member responsible for agriculture)
declared that rational siting of meat-processing facili-
ties would preclude shipment of animals more than
150 km. Present facilities, however, are irregularly
distributed, and animals are often transported "liter-
ally thousands of kilometers." Soviet authors blame
centralization also for longer hauls of feeds, fertiliz-
ers, and equipment. In the Ukraine, for example, the
I� Departmental carriers are those owned and operated by plants or
individual ministries, including agriculture-related ministries. The
estimate is derived from Soviet statistics on truck shipment vol-
umes, which we believe exclude much of the on-farm haulage of
livestock feed and products such as manure that is done by both
truck and tractor. Even when crudely adjusted for these hauls, the
agricultural truck fleet is more inefficient than other carriers
11
average haul for agricultural equipment and supplies
was 40.4 km during 1981-83, as compared with only
23.5 km in 1966-70."
Coping With the Problems
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
The Official Line
Gorbachev has not provided a specific agenda for
dealing with the problems of agricultural transporta-
tion, but his major speeches and his 1986-90 economic
plan indicate he is committed to at least coming to
grips with the problems:2 In his report to the 27th
CPSU Congress in February 1986 and again in his
address to the Central Committee in June 1986,
Gorbachev ratified his predecessors' commitments to
reducing agricultural losses. Furthermore, many of
his speeches indicate that he intends to more aggres-
sively attack the problem of rural infrastructure,
especially by increasing investment in the so-called
nonproductive sphere. The most frequent item men-
tioned in this connection is rural housing, but the
rural road system also would be a major beneficiary. (b)(3)
Finally, the 1986-90 plan clearly continues support
for the broad transport directions outlined in the Food
Program, particularly deliveries of new transport
equipment to agriculture and the development of rural
transport (see inset).
Despite the consistency with which many of these
same policies have been restated over the years, the
record of Gorbachev's predecessors in improving over-
all agricultural transportation has been poor. This has
been because of the sheer vastness of the problem,
particularly in rural areas. Even a major effort to
II The Soviet press reports that some progress toward reducing
hauls has been made over the past few years with the construction
of new processing facilities closer to production sites. But the same
reports note that progress is slow. (u)
Sceret
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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The Food Program: The Transport Angle
Brezhnev's Food Program�promulgated in 1982�
has now survived into the third regime since his
death. General Secretary Gorbachev confirmed his
commitment to it in a speech at a Central Committee
meeting in April 1985, and the basic targets of the
program have been reflected in the goals of the 1986-
90 plan announced in late 1985. (u)
One of the program's more important tasks is to
reduce the chronic high losses of farm products,
which claim as much as 20 percent of total crops. In
large part, these losses result from lack of capacity
for the timely harvesting, transporting, storing, and
processing of farm products. If losses are not reduced
substantially, gains from other provisions of the
program will be undercut.
The Food Program deals with transportation directly
by providing explicit targets for increasing the supply
of specialized trucks and freight cars, other agricul-
tural equipment, and storage facilities. The pro-
gram's considerable attention to improving rural
infrastructure also in part reflects Moscow's desire to
reduce losses by improving farm-to-market transpor-
tation as well as by increasing on-farm storage and
processing facilities. It promises increased investment
in rural areas�largely to improve housing and living
conditions, but also to improve agricultural produc-
tivity. Better rural roads would reduce travel time for
farm workers, cut the need to use tractors for trans-
portation, improve truck productivity, and speed up
deliveries of both resources to farms and products to
consumers
solve it would result in only moderate gains. In
addition, emphasis in the 1986-90 agricultural pro-
gram on producing more high-quality but perishable
foods�such as meat, fruits, and vegetables�presents
an even greater challenge to the transport system than
bulk crops such as grain. (c NF)
Gorbachev probably will be the beneficiary of moves
begun by his predecessors to resolve some of the
agricultural transport problems. For example, consid-
erable improvements have been made in rail rolling
stock for expediting agricultural haulage. Such mea-
sures were taken during the late 1970s and early
1980s as part of a larger program to improve overall
rail service. Poor performance of the railroads con-
tributed to a general industrial slowdown in the Soviet
Union during that period
Policies In Practice
Top Priority to Expediting Grain Imports. Gorba-
chev strongly wants to reduce food imports, particu-
larly of grain. His predecessors also shared this hope,
but they nevertheless invested in improvements to
handle imports, perhaps recognizing that they would
always need some insurance against crop failures.
Ports on the Baltic and Black Seas and in the Soviet
Far East have been greatly upgraded since the com-
mitment was made in the early 1970s to limit the
impact of poor domestic grain crops on meat produc-
tion by importing substantial quantities of grain. The
total capacity of port offloading equipment has in-
creased steadily, allowing imports to rise from an
average of less than 4 million tons per year during
1966-70 to more than 45 million tons in calendar year
1984."
The USSR felt the squeeze of limited transport
facilities during the 1981/82 crop year, when a poor
grain crop led to then record grain purchases from the
West. Movement of the imports was hampered by
inadequate support from the domestic rail system.
Reports of 6- to 8-week delays for ships waiting to
discharge grain were common. During the 1984/85
crop year, however, Moscow was able to handle more
than 55 million tons of imports�roughly 20 percent
more than in 1981/82�with relative ease
The USSR has demonstrated the capability to import an average
of 5 to 6 million tons of grain per month for an extended period.
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Our analysis indicates that the temporary choke point
was relieved by broad improvement in the rail trans-
port system during the intervening years, the fielding
of greater numbers of specialized grain freight cars�
both new hoppers and specially equipped boxcars to
the ports, and some enhancement of port equipment.
In addition, in 1984/85 much more grain was moved
in larger ships-45,000 to 100,000 tons�thus reduc-
ing turnaround time and improving port productivi-
ty.I4
Despite plans to increase domestic grain production
substantially, the Soviets are continuing to improve
their ability to offload and move imports from major
ports. Moscow imported a substantial amount of new
offloading equipment in the early 1980s to expedite
grain handling either by replacing or augmenting the
existing equipment. In addition, two new grain han-
dling complexes are scheduled to come into service
during the 1986-90 period. Novotallinsk�an entirely
new port on Muuga Bay near Tallinn, Estonia�was
scheduled to bring its first 5 million tons of annual
offloading capacity into service late in 1986 at a
budgeted cost of 350 million rubles. The new port will
accommodate ships of up to 100,000 deadweight tons
at quayside. This is two and one-half times the
capacity of existing berths at Baltic ports and will
enable Moscow to avoid costly transloading to smaller
ships. A second new grain harbor with a capacity of
2.5 million tons is scheduled for construction at
Vostochnyy, a major port under development in the
Soviet Far East. (u)
Solving Railroad Problems. Gorbachev also has bene-
fited from past efforts to improve agricultural ship-
ments on the railroads. Although the upgrading of rail
service in the late 1970s and early 1980s probably
benefited the whole economy, agriculture was a major
gainer primarily because of the production of new
specialized rolling stock. Such improvements are con-
tinuing.77
In the 1981/82 crop year, the US partial embargo on grain sales
to the USSR forced the USSR to rely heavily on other countries
such as Argentina for needed grain. Because Argentina's grain
loading ports could not handle large ships, a major portion of that
grain was moved in smaller ships�averaging about 25,000 tons�
which tied up Soviet port facilities and reduced unloading efficien-
cy
13
The Soviet press claims that 60 percent of grain is
now delivered in specialized cars, about half in con-
verted boxcars and the rest in hopper and other grain
cars (see figure 5).15 Gorbachev's administration is
further expanding this use of dedicated equipment.
According to the Soviet press, production of special-
ized hoppers is to increase so that all grain shipments
in the future will be moved in them. The use of hopper
cars�which the Soviets equip with special loading
hatches on top�has reduced loading and unloading
times for bulk freight such as grain and fertilizer, thus
speeding up freight car turnaround times, an impor-
tant factor behind improved railroad performance.
The Soviets are also improving their stock of railcars
for the shipment of perishable agricultural products.
The Food Program envisaged delivery of 29,000 to
30,000 refrigerated and insulated cars during the
1980s.' To reach this target, planners called for an
increase in domestic production of 2,000 cars over the
previous 10 years, to probably 17,000 for 1981-90. On
the basis of reported orders for 6,000 refrigerated cars
from East Germany in 1981-85, we believe imports
during the decade will reach 12,000 cars an increase
of about 1,500 cars over the previous decade. We are
uncertain, however, whether domestic producers can
meet their targets.
"The Kremenchug Railroad Car Plant�the Soviets' main hopper-
car builder�moved a new 65-ton model into production in 1976
and then replaced this model with a 70-ton model in 1982. Soviet
claims indicate that capacity production will be 12,000 cars per
year, which will be used for grain, chemical fertilizers, and other
bulk loads, production of grain
hoppers began at the Stakhanov Railroad Car Plant (also known as
Kadiyevka) in 1979. In addition to new domestic production,
Moscow signed an agreement in 1981 to purchase 20,000 grain cars
from Romania by l985._________
6 Most of the Soviet refrigeratedstock is provided by the twin
plants Bryansk (in the Soviet Union) and VEB Waggonbau Dessau
(in East Germany). By the early 1980s, these plants had delivered
some 5,000 five-car refrigerated sections to Soviet railroads as well
as a sizable number of individual refrigerated cars. (u)
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Figure 5. Freight cars for agriculture (u)
Scerct
"ros� Specialized grain cars are
loaded quickly by automated
funnels. Unloading can be fast,
too, if storage or transloading
areas are constructed to take
advantage of their bottom dump
design.
To keep perishables fresh, the
railways rely on five-car
"refrigerator trains" � four
cars for perishables and one
for generator and crew.
Planners believe more "stand
alone" refrigeration units are
needed.
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Although specialized freight cars are an important
ingredient for expediting agricultural shipments by
rail, Gorbachev's planners must be careful now to
provide the parallel infrastructure needed to make the
investment pay off. For example, although there are
clearly benefits to using specialized grain cars at main
Soviet ports, where modern loading and unloading
equipment is available, hundreds of domestic transfer
stations do not have comparable machinery and
equipment. One Soviet author claimed in 1983 that
some 40 percent of the stations responsible for accept-
ing "express grain trains" (dedicated unit trains) could
not unload specialized hopper cars. Providing such
machinery for hundreds of stations is costly. The
Soviet railway newspaper, Gudok, notes that half a
billion rubles was spent during 1981-84 to upgrade
equipment at railroad stations that handle agricultur-
al freight shipments. This is only a small share of the
19 billion rubles invested in the entire rail transporta-
tion network over the period, but it indicates that
some provision was made to provide supporting infra-
structure.
the Soviet open press sug-
gest that Moscow continues to be plagued by prob-
lems in moving key agricultural inputs from industry
to the farm. In particular, rail transport difficulties,
which have generally subsided over the past two to
three years, seem to persist for chemical fertilizer
producers, probably resulting largely from belated
development of specialized rolling stock. The Soviets
seem to be searching for the right design and materi-
als to build cars that can both carry corrosive chemi-
cals and have a reasonable life expectancy at a
reasonable cost. Moscow can only overcome these
types of technical problems by pouring more money
into domestic development of specialized cars or by
importing such cars from abroad. The freight car
producers to watch for such change are Bryansk for
refrigerator cars, Kremenchug for specialized hop-
pers, Stakhanov for a wide variety of specialized
models, Zhdanov for tank cars, and perhaps the new
Rautaruukki freight car plant in Finland for fertilizer
cars
15
Some Retrenchment on the Truck Issue. As the 1970s
unfolded, Moscow became more concerned about
resource constraints in general and, in turn, about
agriculture's continued dominance as a truck claim-
ant, especially when the needs of other, more efficient
users were being shortchanged. Truck allocations to
agriculture�both plans for future direct deliveries
and temporary allocations at harvest time�began to
change in the mid-1970s. For example, the automo-
tive industry over the last 10 years has favored the
development of heavy trucks, more appropriate for use
by general purpose trucking�particularly for inter-
city deliveries and the military than for agricul-
ture.'7 (u)
Plans have been on the drawing board for some time
to modernize the Gor'kiy Motor Vehicle Plant (GAZ),
whose medium-sized trucks make up two-thirds of the
agricultural truck fleet. But implementation has
lagged behind other higher priority automotive pro-
jects such as construction of the huge Kama River
truck plant (KamAZ) and Volga automobile plant and
the modernization of other truck factories such as the
ZIL plant. All these projects were primarily intended
for nonagricultural truck production. Work on the
Kutaisi truck plant, however�which reportedly will
produce 20,000 heavy truck-trailer combinations for
agriculture�has been pushed forward. And it ap-
pears GAZ's turn has come, according to a speech by
Yuriy Khristoradnov, chairman of the Gor'kiy Oblast
Party Committee, at the 27th CPSU Congress in
March 1986.77
The Soviet press suggests that increased use of new
Kutaisi and KamAZ truck-trailer combinations will
help expedite agricultural shipments. Although these
trucks could improve agricultural shipping, we do not
believe the Soviets intend the vehicles to greatly
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increase agriculture's overall truck productivity or
reduce its demand for trucks. The size of these rigs
suggests their advantage is in moving products on
relatively good roads from preliminary preparation
points (for example, threshing areas some 12 to 15 km
from the fields) to state receiving and processing
stations and trade enterprises, an effort that repre-
sents a fairly small share of all agricultural trucking."
Moreover, a further limitation on the use of modern
Soviet trucks for the farm was suggested by the Soviet
press in 1983. New KamAZ, Kutaisi, Ural, and ZIL
trucks require "intelligent operation," which "can be
achieved only with an adequate material and techni-
cal base for motor transport .. . [that] most collective
and state farms do not have.. . ." We interpret this to
mean that these trucks require more skills to operate
and maintain than did their predecessors.
Before Gorbachev's installation as General Secretary,
the leadership reduced the participation of at least
some nonagricultural sectors in harvest activities. The
Central Committee under Konstantin Chernenko dug
in its heels on the issue of military support for the
harvest and apparently decreed in March 1984 that
truck support to the harvest would henceforth be
denied. Soviet media reported that the Politburo had
spelled out certain unspecified measures to make
"more rational use" of motor transport in the harvest.
Recent press claims suggest that Moscow has been
partially successful in substituting civilian for military
trucks, at least in Kazakhstan. In 1980 Kazakhstan's
Ministry of Motor Transport reportedly supplied
about 12,000 of the 80,000 additional trucks needed
for the harvest; in 1985 the number had grown to
50,000 trucks. We believe a reduction in the number
of trucks formerly provided by the military could
account for most of this growth in civil deliveries.
According to a 1980 Soviet journal article, a deputy minister of
Motor Transport for the RSFSR claimed that only 140,000 to
145,000 vehicles are engaged in this part of harvest activity versus
the 450,000 trucks used to haul output from harvest units to
preliminary processing points. Heavy KamAZ trucks are not suited
for this latter�and larger part of�harvest activity, nor for the
other on-farm, nonharvest trucking that represents the greater
share of all agricultural trucking.
Soviet press statistics also suggest that, in the
RSFSR, an increase in truck productivity allowed a
reduction in the number of trucks used in the harvest.
The RSFSR, which reportedly had needed roughly
700,000 additional vehicles for the harvest, used 13
percent fewer trucks during the 1984 harvest than in
1980." The amount of agricultural products hauled
increased by 6 percent, while average daily shipments
per truck were up nearly 20 percent.
Although we do not foresee a major change in the
share of trucks allocated to agriculture under Gorba-
chev, we believe the need to improve their productivi-
ty and to save light fuels will force some improve-
ments in the structure and use of the fleet.
Gorbachev's regime appears better prepared than
previous regimes to do this, both on and off the farm.
We believe production of trucks for agriculture at the
Kutaisi plant will be increasing throughout 1986-90
and will be in full swing by 1990. The GAZ facility
finally appears to be in line for major investment
attention. The planned 1.2- to 1.4-billion-ruble face-
lift at GAZ will promote production of more fuel-
efficient trucks with slightly larger carrying capacity.
However, the GAZ reconstruction�planned to be
completed by 1990�probably will suffer from chron-
ic problems in keeping large capital projects on
schedule, and we believe the odds are that it will not
be finished by then. Hard currency problems may
further drag out the project by preventing Moscow
from getting needed equipment from the West. Still,
Moscow appears to hold in high esteem the techno-
logical innovations and new truck models intended for
GAZ and may take the steps necessary to ensure
completion of key portions of the project. The speed
with which this program is implemented will be a
good indicator of the Kremlin's dedication to rural
development.
The Kuban, a major grain-growing area in the RSFSR, tradition-
ally required an additional 12,000 trucks for the harvest, but in
1986 it needed only 3,000 more, according to an authoritative
Soviet journal. (u)
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It is is unclear what improvements will be made in the
supply of specialized trucks intended to support ex-
panded production of livestock products and other
perishable goods. The Food Program provided specific
goals for the delivery of specialized vehicles such as
livestock trucks, milk tankers, and refrigerated trucks.
However, the 1986-90 plan, while continuing the
spirit of support for specialized highway vehicles, did
not repeat these specific targets. We are uncertain
whether their absence reflects deemphasis, impracti-
cality of the original goals, or simply a continuation of
the gradual reduction of published statistics on trans-
port equipment that has taken place since 1982.
Roads�Still a Huge Problem. On the issue of im-
proving rural roads, Gorbachev faces his greatest
challenge in improving agricultural transportation.
Plans call for the building of 130,000 km of public
roads in rural areas and 150,000 km of paved on-farm
roads during the 1980s. Although we do not have
comparable figures for earlier years on a national
level, we believe these targets reflect a substantial
percentage increase and that Moscow will have trou-
ble reaching them. For example, during 1986-90 the
construction program for hard-surfaced, on-farm
roads in the RSFSR alone is said to represent a
doubling of the network there. Only 53,000 km of
paved, rural off-farm roads were to be constructed
during the 1981-85 plan period�leaving some 60
percent to be completed during 1986-90. Moreover,
the 1986-90 plan target for construction of paved on-
farm roads is 92,000 km�implying that more than 60
percent of the 1981-90 goal of 150,000 km remains to
be completed." The lack of statistics on investment in
and construction of roads precludes any assessment of
progress since 1980 toward these goals.
z� Assuming an absolute minimum definition of paved road�
improved dirt with some gravel surfacing�Soviet cost estimates
indicate that fulfilling goals for national rural and on-farm road
construction would require an investment of at least 2 billion rubles.
The sum could easily climb to four times that amount if additional
grading or improved surfacing is involved. The midpoint of these
estimates is consistent with planned allocations of 4.6 billion rubles
for rural public road construction in 1981-85, an increase of 40
percent over 1976-80 and one-fourth of total highway investment.
17
Although Moscow claims that each ruble invested in
rural roads provides a fourfold return in terms of
decreased product loss, wear and tear on trucks, and
fuel use, finding the rubles for construction, particu-
larly in the more remote areas, will continue to be a
major problem. The republic ministries of highways,
key players in local distribution of these funds, appear
to concentrate on road construction in and near the
larger populated points. Gorbachev is calling for a
38-percent increase in investment in rural infrastruc-
ture for 1986-90 over 1981-85; but it is not clear how
he will provide the funds, given the competing de-
mands of other priority programs, especially in ma-
chine building and energy. Moscow has been trying to
improve credit terms for local construction organiza-
tions�including those for on-farm roads�since at
least the early 1980s. Recently, Soviet journals also
have recommended that the responsibility for rural
road construction be expanded from the republic
highway ministries and farms to include all players in
the agro-industrial complex. Road construction, how-
ever, is not just a function of rubles; it requires men,
machinery, and construction materials. Probably the
most serious constraints are construction materials�
particularly crushed stone�and roadbuilding ma-
chinery.'
Even if Gorbachev is able to pull off the planned level
of rural construction, it will only be a start on solving
the road problem. For example, the stock of 118,000
km of hard-surfaced, on-farm roads planned for the
RSFSR by 1990 represents only 20 percent of the
600,000 km the Soviet press claims is required.
Consequently, the effort to improve and expand rural
roads must continue well into and probably beyond
the 1990s. This kind of long-range commitment will
require Gorbachev to support more thorough develop-
ment of the rural infrastructure. For example, ex-
panding the highway system multiplies the burden on
rural construction organizations by creating an even
larger stock of roads to be repaired and maintained.
Although Gorbachev is committed to improving rural
infrastructure, keeping these resources focused over a
long period of time will be a major challenge to his
planners.
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Outlook and Implications
Over the remaining years of the current five-year
plan, we expect the Soviets to make considerable
progress in improving off-farm transportation�at
least for the products of agriculture. The preparatory
investment has already been made to upgrade the rail
and highway rolling stock with specialized equipment
for carrying grain, perishable crops, animals, livestock
products, and processed foods. However, to improve
the delivery of inputs to agriculture�particularly
agrochemicals�Moscow must not only improve
transport but also storage capacity
Gorbachev must now direct resources to transport
problems in rural areas and on the farm. He has
promised investment increases for rural infrastruc-
ture, and his 1986-90 plan for highway building
emphasizes rural roads. Plans for automotive plants
imply increased investment for producing trucks suit-
ed for agricultural use. Plans for nonagricultural
truck production imply a shift to diesel engines, which
would lessen competition for the scarce gasoline need-
ed by most agricultural trucks. All of these "plans," if
implemented, imply a real improvement in the rural
transport situation.
However, as in the past when programs were devel-
oped for improving off-farm transportation, not all
plans for improvements on or near the farm will be
carried out. For example, the enormous investment
required to upgrade rural roads is a major obstacle for
the authorities. Moscow, with many high-priority
claimants for centralized investment funds, may not
be able to provide additional capital. Moreover, rural
construction, including road construction, has always
been difficult to manage because there are so many
participants. The confusion of the reorganization of
both the agricultural and construction sectors taking
place under Gorbachev is adding to the problem.
Scent
On the truck side, although the Gor'kiy Motor Vehi-
cle Plant�agriculture's main supplier�is next for
renovation, we believe it will be difficult for Soviet
planners to complete the project before the end of the
decade. Moscow's more general goal of making better
use of the existing truck fleet by improving the service
situation in rural areas�for example, providing addi-
tional spare parts and maintenance for agricultural
equipment�will also be very difficult to achieve.
Indeed, providing an adequate supply of vehicle ser-
vicing facilities has yet to be tackled effectively even
in major industrial areas.
On balance, we believe the Soviets will not be able to
solve their agricultural transport problems�particu-
larly those on or near the farm�in the remaining
years of the 1980s or, probably, in the 1990s. Never-
theless, even a moderate effort to expand rural road-
building and improve trucking and railroad service
would help ease the burden of agriculture on the
transport system and allow Moscow to slowly improve
food supplies in the coming years, even in the absence
of increases in production of farm products.
However, planners must be cautious that a restrained
or uncoordinated approach to improving agricultural
transportation does not backfire because of local
tendencies to ignore either unenforced or incompletely
laid out policy decrees from Moscow. Spotty progress,
particularly if not accompanied by comparable im-
provements in the handling, storage, and processing of
food products, would merely shift present bottlenecks
from one location to another. The most likely conse-
quence of a single-faceted approach, we believe,
would be a worsening of the transport and storage
network or of the crucial link between these�loading
and unloading capabilities. As a result, already high
losses probably would increase.
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