IRAQ'S L-29: A BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE CHALLENGE TO US FORCES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772613
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02388
• Publication Date: June 1, 2001

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1,
A Biel gical and Chemical Warfare
Winn e Farm
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Intelligence Assessment
DCI Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms
Control
Iraq's L-29: A Biological and
Chemical Warfare Challenge
to US Forces
This paper was prepared by analysts in the Weapons
Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center.
Contributions were made by the Office of Near Eastern,
South Asian, and African Analysis. Comments and que-
ries are welcome and may be directed to
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WINPAC IA 2001-01811.1X
June 2001
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Key Key Findings (U)
Information available as
of] November 2000 was
used in this report. (U)
Iraq's L-29: A Biological and Chemical
Warfare Challenge to US Forces
We assess that Iraq has converted 10 L-29s, out-of-production Czech jet
trainers, to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)�probably for delivery of bio-
logical warfare (BW) or, less likely, chemical warfare (CW) agents. Multi-
ple sources indicate that the L-29 conversion program has been ongoing
since 1995 and that Iraq is prepared to use the L-29 today as a UAV,
although the crash of an L-29 UAV in October may have lessened the
regime's confidence in the system
Analysis of reporting from multiple sensitive sources since 1998 points to a
BCW delivery mission for the L-29.
� In early 1998, UNSCOM officials first learned of Iraqi efforts to convert
� the L-29 to a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV).
The L-29 with a BW agent payload would most likely be launched from
southeastern Iraq, threatening US forces and civilian targets in Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and the northern Persian Guff.
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� Should Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn perceive a threat to his regime's sur-
vival, we believe he would possibly use the L-29 to lash out at his enemies.
� We assess that the L-29 presents only a limited threat as a CW delivery
vehicle and only if flown accurately to a target and carrying close to the
assessed maximum payload.
Multiple sources indicate that work continued on the L-29 through at least
October 2000 and that Iraq may still be attempting to improve the capabili-
ties of the system. Since the crash of an L-29 in October 2000, very little
activity has been observed, suggesting that the program may be on hold
while correction measures are taken.
� Iraq is possibly considering conversion of additional, more capable air-
craft to UAVs for the same mission as the L-29; multiple sources suggest
that Iraq may be considering conversion of the L-39 jet trainer for this
purpose.
� It is possible that L-29 flight testing may also be related to other potential
missions for the L-29;
Although we are confident in our assessment of the L-29 as a BCW delivery
system, critical information gaps remain in our knowledge of its capabilities.
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� Although we have no information about the BCW agent delivery method
for the L-29, we suspect the use of spra tanks derived from the aircraft's
two external fuel tanks. Iraq is known to have done prior work to convert
similar tanks for this purpose for an earlier program.
� We also do not know the amount of BCW agent that the L-29 Would carry,
but in-depth technical analyses suggest that it can carry a maximum pay-
load of 500 kilograms.
� We do not know what type of BW or CW agent the L-29 is designed to
carry
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Contents
4 Page
Key Findings (U)
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Connection of the L-29 to a BCW Delivery Program
Other Potential Missions of the L-29 UAVs (U)
3
Operational Status of the L-29 UAVs (U)
3
Development of the L-29 UAV (U)
6
Number of Converted L-29s (U)
6
The L-29 UAV System (U)
6
Efforts To Upgrade the L-29 System (U)
8
� Range Extension Upgrade Programs
8
Other L-29 Flight Activities (U)
10
10
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Operational Employment of the L-29 UAV With a BCW Payload
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Is L-29 All There Is to This Program? (U)
19
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Possibility of Deception in the L-29 Program
19
Why Would Iraq Want To Pass Information About the L-29?
19
20
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What Is the Successor Program?
20
Appendix
Additional Data Related to the L-29 Program (U)
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Figure 1
Oraq: The L-29 "De!fin" Jet Trainer
The L-29 "Delfin" is an out-of-
production two-seat jet trainer
aircraft produced in large numbers
from 1961 to 1974 by the Czech
company Aero Vodochody National
Corporation. Iraq is believed to
have acquired approximately 100
L-29s during the 1970s and 1980s,
the majority of which either are
now destroyed or are derelict and
being cannibalized to provide
spare parts for the ew still
capable of flight.
The L-29 has tapered wings and a
"T-tail" top-mounted horizontal
stabilizer above the vertical
stabilizer. The aircraft is equipped
with a single Walter (Motorlet)
M701 turbojet engine, an
electrically controlled and
hydraulically operated tricycle
landing gear system, and
mechanically operated primary
flight controls. A hardpoint with
associated pylon under each wing
allows for carriage of either
external ftiel tanks or weapons. (U)
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Specifications from the flight manual (except as noted)
Length: 10.8 m
Wingspan: 10.3m
Height: 3.1 m
(top of horizontal stabilizer)
Basic weight: 2,195 kg
Maximum takeoff gross 3,550 kg
weight (MTGW):
Maximum internal fuel load: 820 kg
Design external payload capability: 240 kg
(allows for 1.5 safety margin)
Maximum possible external 535 kg
payload capability (calculated):
(does not exceed MTGW; assumptions: full load of internal fuel,
no aircrew, no additional equipment, benign flight profile)
Maximum allowable airspeed: 820 km/h
(with drop tanks, below 700 m)
Maximum allowable mach: 0.7 mach
(with drop tanks, above 700 m)
Takeoff Speed: 176 km/h
(15� flaps, MTGW)
Takeoff Distance: 780 m
(15� flaps, MTGW, standard day, no wind)
Stall speed: 156 km/h
(no flaps, gear retracted, 3,000-kg aircraft weight)
Maximum aerodynamic range: 546-746 km
(internal fuel only. standard day conditions)
Maximum Endurance: 100 min
(standard day, sea level, internal fuel only)
Acceleration limitations:
Flight with asymmetrical
external loads:
+7.5 Gs, -3.5 Gs
Allowed
(no restrictions)
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Iraq's L-29: A Biological and
Chemical Warfare Challenge to
US Forces
Connection of the L-29 to a BCW Delivery
Program
Reporting on post-Gulf war work by Iraq to develop a
biological and chemical warfare (BCW) unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) first came to light in 1997.
� Iraqi opposition press reports from July 1997
claimed that Iraq's Military Industrial Committee
(MIC) had succeeded in converting the Polish M18
Dromader�a crop-spraying aircraft�into a "pilot-
less drone" for spraying BCW agents. This allega-
tion was repeated in Western press in November
1997, most likely based on the previous press
reporting.
� By early 1998, UNSCOM officials became aware of
Iraqi efforts to convert the Czech L-29 jet trainer to
an RPV and inspected the airbase where the conver-
sion was under way.
pNSCOM inspectors visited sites
associated with the L-29 project in July 1998 and
the Al-Faris Drones Directorate in September 1998.
1
iFigure 2
The L-29 Delfin Jet Trainer
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\ the Iraqis for-
ward deployed the L-29 during a period of heightened
tension with the United States.
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The L-29 is most likely a follow-on to Iraq's pre-Gulf
war work on a MiG-21 RPV to deliver a BW payload
as a line source via a spray tank, known as the Dhu-
Al-Faqar project (see appendix).
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The L-29 is not as effective a delivery aircraft as the
MiG-21�it is slower, which makes dissemination
less efficient, and it cannot carry as large of a payload
of BW or CW agent�but modeling of its potential
coverage area shows that it could have a greater
impact on military targets and cause a larger number
of collateral civilian casualties than a conventionally
armed aircraft. The L-29 would have a much greater
impact on targets when carrying BW agent then when
carrying CW agent.
Other Potential Missions of the L-29 UAVs (U)
Iraq may be considering
other missions for the L-29 UAV. These other mis-
sions would be in addition to, not in lieu of, the
primary role of BCW delivery and might include con-
ventional weapons delivery, operation as an ELINT
platform, and reconnaissance missions. '
the L-29 has conducted flight tests
using conventional munitions but not with uncon-
ventional weapons.
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he L,29 RPVs have had (b)(3)
communications monitoring and intercept equip-
ment installed on them. With this equipment, Iraq is
able to listen to allied aircraft comMunications traf-
fic. This equipment relays the intercepted communi-
cations to the ground and reports the frequencies
that allied aircraft are using for communications.
the L-29 has not been used (b)(3)
as a communications relay platform, although this is
a planned mission.
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Operational Status a the L-29 UAVs (U)
[raq was prepared(b)(3)
to use the L-29 in an operational role as an RPV as
early as November 1997. Although we assess that Iraq
will remain prepared to employ the L-29 until the air-
craft is replaced with a more capable system, a proba-
ble crash of an L-29 UAV in October 2000 will lessen
-the regime's confidence in the L-29 and might reduce
the chances that it will be selected in the future for an
operational mission.
�
L-29 RPVs were
deployed to Tallil Airbase in the southern no-fly
zone in November 1997,
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Deployment of L-29s to the southern
no-fly zone during a period of heightened tensions
suggests that Iraq was prepared to use the system at
that time.
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Regardless of intent, we judge the chances of success-
ful operational employment of this system as varying
from fair to good depending on operator currency and
skill level, flight profile (that is, altitude, range, and
speed), and control mode (that is, remote control or
autopilot control).
� Baghdad conducted
�`unmanned" flight tests on 13 April 1997, 1 June
1997, and 27 January 1998.
Having achieved a basic RPV capability fdr the L-29,
a logical next step would be to upgrade the system by
developing an autonomous flight capability. Contin-
ued flight-testing of the L-29 in July through at least
December 1998 may therefore have been for the pur-
pose of integration testing
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Development of the L-29 UAV (U)
the L-29 program�
officially called Al Bai'aa, which means "alle-
giance"�began at the urging of Saddam Husayn, who
proposed the development of a cruise missile�like
vehicle. Saddam entrusted his son Uday with execut-
ing the plan. Uday remained in charge until he was
shot in an assassination attempt in 1996, at which time
Gen. Muzahim Mus'ab Al-Tikriti, deputy director of
MIC, took over management of the program.
he existence of an
Iraqi program to refurbish and convert L-29s to UAVs,
with the work originally performed at the Aircraft
Maintenance Center (AMC)�also known as the Air-
craft Repair Factory�at Rasheed Airbase starting in
1993 and continuing there until at least mid-1996.
Number of Converted L-29s (U))
Although the exact number and current disposition of
these converted L-29s is unknown,
a total of 10 were planned, with from four
to six complete by 1998.
The L-29 UAV System (U)
A complete L-29 UAV system is comprised of the
L-29 air vehicle, an Italian manufactured Alamak
GCS, and a directional video receiver antenna
mounted on a boom truck. The boom truck is used to
increase video downlink reception range, according to
the Iraqis, but is not required for short-range opera-
tions. All system elements are highly mobile and can
be moved and easily hidden on short notice, as was
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demonstrated in December 1998 prior to Operation
Desert Fox.
Efforts To Upgrade the L-29 UAV System (U)
We assess that continued ground and flight activity
associated with the L-29 UAV since early 1998 is
associated with programs intended to upgrade the L-
29, as well as with training of ground control opera-
tors and with "test flight" requirements for possible
additional converted aircraft and for possible addi-
tional GCS units.
Range Extension Upgrade Programs
Status of Attempts To Develop an L-29 Autopilot.
The L-29 autopilot upgrade programs are for the
assessed purpose of increasing the range of the system
to beyond the line-of-sight (LOS) range limit of
approximately 125 km.
Definitions (U)
Autonomous flight. The air vehicle operates indepen-
dently of a remote operator (U)
OPV. An optionally piloted vehicle is an aircraft that
can be flown either manned or unmanned. In its
unmanned mode, it might operate either autono-
mously (UAV) or under positive remote control (RPV).
(U)
RPV. Remotely piloted vehicles are a subset of UAVs.
An RPV is a UAV that can only be flown under posi-
tive remote control. Remote control can be from a
GCS or another aircraft. (U)
Semiautonomous system. The air vehicle is launched
and/or landed via remote control but thereafter oper-
ates autonomously. (U)
UAV. An unmanned, aerial vehicle is an unmanned,
guided, air vehicle that is continuously self-propelled
and sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift.
This definition includes air vehicles capable of either
or both autonomous guidance, and man-in-the loop
(RPV) control. (U)
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Iraq is studying the idea of using retay(b1(3)(i)
aircraft to increase the control range of the L-29
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from the GCS.
By Novem-
ber 1998, the autopilOt was successfully used in two
unmanned test flights�on 1 March 1998 and 1 May
1998.
Possible Efforts To Develop an 0TH Link. Evidence
exists that Iraq is interested in developing an 0TH
link for the L-29, almost certainly to mitigate the cur-
rent L-29 LOS control range limitations.
� Iraq declared in its BW program "Full, Final and
Complete Declaration" (FFCD) that it had explored
the concept of MiG-21 RPV remote control from a
second aircraft and that it had flight-tested the
MiG-21 RPV in January 1991. Remote control by a
second aircraft would extend the LOS range of the
L-29.
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Other L-29 Flight Activities (U)
L-29 flight activity could be the result of numerous
other requirements. It is possible that new remote
operators are being trained, and it would be necessary
to maintain the proficiency of existing operators. At
least one acceptance "test flight," and possibly more
than one, would be required to confirm the
functionality of newly converted L-29 air vehicles and
to test the operational status of a possible new GCS. In
addition, it is probable that the Iraqis would flight-test
a BCW delivery system, once developed, on the L-29.
All of these other activities might already have
occurred but have not been identified as such.
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Operational Employment of the L-29 UAV
With a BCW Payload �
The L-29 with a CW, or more likely, BW agent pay-
load could be used to threaten civilian and military
facilities in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, as well as
US naval forces in the northern Persian Gulf. Israel is
considered a less likely target because of L-29 range
limitations and intervening terrain; also it is unlikely
that either Syria or Jordan would knowingly permit
overflight of an L-29 carrying BCW agents to strike
Israel.
Saddam would most likely use unmanned aircraft
delivering BCW agents to lash out at his enemies�
including deployed US military forces�should he
perceive a threat to his regime's survival. Although
use of such a system as anything other than a weapon
of last resort would carry extreme risk for Baghdad
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during a period when it claims to no longer possess
weapons of mass destruction. Over the longer term,
Saddam most likely perceives this system as part of a
strategic deterrent against future US military interven-
tion.
the
L-29 flight manual states that the aircraft can carry a
maximum payload of 240 kg�the approximate mass
of the two wing tanks when filled with 300 liters of
fuel. Analysis
based on L-29
airframe information from the L-29 flight manual
leads to our assessment that the aircraft could carry as
much as 500 kg of payload-250 kg on each hard-
point-
� The L-29 has a poor flightpath accuracy without a
precise guidance, navigation, and control system
installed�ruling out precision delivery of conven-
tional bombs or crashing the aircraft on a target.
� The relative ease with which an L-29 can be
detected and engaged suggests that it must be used
in a standoff attack to be survivable, an option avail-
able only with spray tanks if BW is used.
(b)(3)
The L-29 is most suitable as a delivery system for BW
rather than CW because of its relatively small pay- (b)(3)
load, lack of precision targeting, and yulnerability to
air defenses. An L-29 carrying CW agent could (b)(1)r
an effective weapon only if: (b)(3)
� The aircraft carries 430 kg�the assessed maximum
payload�of CW agent.
(b)(3)
� The aircraft impacts on the target with its CW agent (b)(3)
payload rather than spray the agent upwind of the
target, that is, functions as a point-source delivery
system rather than a line-source delivery system.
� A precise navigation and guidance system is inte-
grated into the flight control system, improving the
chances of accurately striking the intended target.
� The L-29 is used to attack an undefended or unsus-
pecting target.
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An L-29 delivering a payload of 430 kg of CW agent
- would at most contaminate several hundred square
meters at the target.
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The L-29 would most likely be launched from a pre-
pared field in southeastern Iraq, placing the launchsite
and GCS in proximity to likely targets in Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and the northern Gulf.
It is possible that the L-29 could be launched by a
GCS at one location (well away from the border or
coast) and then handed off to a second, forward
deployed GCS. Although testing of this capability has
not been observed, US UAV operators note that this is
not a difficult procedure as long as a reliable commu-
nication link exists between the two GCSs.
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Figure 8
Iraqi L-29 Unmanned Aircraft Likely Deoloyment
Area and Potential Range*
Black Sea
L-29
ANKARA
*
aerodynamic
range
520 to 746\Turkey
kilometers
Cyprus,
NIOQSJA
Mediterranean
Sea !
41.
Leba
BEI
Is
Tel Aviv-
;Yafo
S.
�
on
DAMASCUS
,*AMMAN
Jordan
De Facto
Boundary
Russia
Georgia
T'BILISI*
Caspian
Sea
Armenia Azerbaijan
YERE VAN
125-kilometer
data link range
Samarra'
East Airfieldi
BAGHDAD*
Iraq
125-kilometer
data link range
Tallil
Airfield 't
Al/Basrah
A, irfield
/ Ku
Egypt Saudi
Adroinistrati,t,
/
Boundary
Sudan
AKU
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
L-29'
aerodynamic
range
TEHRAN
4420 to 746
kilometers
Iran
Likely operational
deployment area
Nis
Persian
MANAMA /
DOHA /
Red Arabi RIYADH a* Oa r /113U DHA
� U.A.E.
5.
Sea Fzcto....BolzdEz j Oman
5ah In
ma
400 Kilometers
400 Mlles
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative.
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the Iraqis may have reconsidered their initial deci-
b)(3)n not to use L-39s or MiGs.
Is L-29 All There Is to This Program? (U)
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The L-39 has three times the payload and
twice the speed and range capability 'of the L-29, and
pilot training using the aircraft takes place at Al Sahra
Airbase, a site already directly associated with the L-
29 project. In addition, (b)(3)
Iraq may have at least con- (b)(3)
sidered employing crop-dusters (either manned or
unmanned) as BCW delivery platforms. (b)(3)
If Iraq is pursuing conversion of additional aircraft to
UAVs, then it is possible that the continued L-29
ground and flight activity observed at Samarra East
Airbase could be intended to deceive and distract US
collection resources from this additional covert pro-
gram.
Possibility of Deception in the L-29 Program
It is possible that some of the activity that the US
Intelligence Community has observed related to the
L-29 program is part:of a deception campaign. A
deception cam,paign would focus intelligence atten-
tion on certain aspects of the project, serving the pur-
pose of denying access to other aspects or alternatives
to the program.
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19
Why Would Iraq Want To Pass Information About
the L-29?
Iraq is aware that the international community, and the
United States in particular, is very concerned about
Iraqi weapons development programs, especially in
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7CITIrMEGWEI
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the area of WMD. The Iraqis are aware that the L-29
program has been compromised to the West.
� In July 1998, UNSCOM conducted an inspection
mission to examine L-29�related sites.
� US forces bombed L-29�related sites during opera-
tion Desert Fox in late 1998.
� The L-29 program was reported in the German press
and on a US television news program in early 1998.
Iraq, realizing that the West knows about this pro-
gram, may want to keep foreign attention focused on
this project, while another more advanced successor
program is developed and hidden from foreign intelli-
gence services. The Iraqis may be directing attention
to the
L-29 program in the belief that if foreign intelligence
collectors can see an active program, they will be far
less likely to search for a successor program. It is also
possible that the continued ground and flight activity
at Samarra East Airbase could be intended to mask
another covert L-29�related site.
What Is the Successor Program?
Information could be directed at Western intelligence
agencies to mask some other activity or program.
Probable options include:
� Other L-29 testing, training, or deployment sites.
� Conversion of other aircraft into UAVs; the L-39
and MiG-21 are considered potential candidates.
� Development of a different BW delivery system.
The L-29 program most likely remains an active pro-
gram, capable of being used by Iraq in an operational
capacity. However, if Iraq is working on a successor
program, it is possible that Iraq would be willing to
use the L-29 as a bargaining chip to appear coopera-
tive with international arms inspection regimes in
order to achieve the lifting of sanctions. A likely sce-
nario would be that Iraq would "reveal" the L-29 pro-
gram to the UN Monitoring, Verification, and
Inspection Commission, the entity which has replaced
UNSCOM, and then offer to give it up in a show of
� good faith and cooperation.
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Conversion of the L-29 to an RPV�Not Difficult!
Conversion of the L-29 to an RPV would require engi-
neers and machinists with basic skill levels, as well as
servo-motors, receivers, and data link components
suitable for this purpose�no advanced skills, sophis-
ticated systems, or special tooling are required. Iraq
�possesses all of these requirements (see tables 4 and 5)
and may have first acquired the concept from Russia,
which has been converting L-29s to UAVs for many
years. The requisite engineering and machining exper-
tise, as well as suitable tooling and floor space, are
available at the AMC at Rasheed Airbase. In addition,
Iraq possesses a variety of out-of-operation aircraft,
missiles, and electronic equipment that can be canni-
balized or modified for this purpose
Flight Controls
The L-29, as well as the L-39, employs a mechanical
flight control system with control linkages running
from the control column and rudder pedals in the front
cockpit, underneath the aft cockpit, to the aircraft's
primary flight controls (ailerons, elevator, and rud-
der). Removal of the pilot seats would have allowed
the Iraqis easy access to these linkages, and servos
placed in either cockpit were connected to these link-
ages at joints in the linkages directly underneath each
cockpit
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