<SANITIZED>

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02619164
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01443
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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EL SIGLO, Bogota, Colombia
7 March 1970
SOVIET SPIES IN AMERICA
By Eugene Carbonaro, for El. Biglo
(Mexico, March 6) The first editions of El Universal, Excelsior and other
important Mexican newspapers devoted from six to eight columns in their 4
March issues to give coverage to the spectacular flight of the Soviet typist,
Raya Kiselnikova, who escaped from the embassy of her country and sought po-
litical asylum from the Mexican government. Among other things, Miss
Kiselnikova confessed to the secret police of that country that four members
of the consular section, whose names she revealed in secret, spent only eight
hours per week in their job of issuing visas, while they spent the rest of
their time in secret operations involving Mexican workers and student orga-
nizations.
A couple of weeks earlier, the major presses of the country published
in clear form several UPI dispatches in which an account appeared of the
Colombian labor leaders Marco Tulio Cuevas and Jose Raquel Mercado, the're-
spective presidents of the important federations, UTC and CTC, having openly
denounced the Soviet Embassy in Bogota as a center of subversion and espionage
that was spreading its influence in the trade unions, and in the training of
several hundred Colombian students at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.
These are two more aspects to add to information coming from Europe, ac-
cording to which, in the course of the last four years -- from 1966 to 1969 --
one hundred sixty-two diplomats and high officials of Soviet and Bloc em-
bassies were expelled from Western countries to which they were accredited
because they were accused of interfering in internal affairs, of subversion
and;espionage. To merely mention the background of each one of these Commu-
nist agents would require a thick volume. To cite an example, in Mexico, it
is enough to note the expulsion, in March 1969, of the Russian "tourists"
Victor Manikoff and Vladimir Sergev, typical secret agents of the Kremlin.
The former had been arrested before, in May 1962, in Asuncion, on being sur-
prised in a blatant attempt to provoke rebellion among local workers; later
this dangerous individual also appeared in Buenos Aires, in the middle of
several rebellious unions that then existed in Argentina, but he was captured
by the police and summarily expelled. Naturally he carried no documents nor
papers of any kind and he could only be identified by his finger prints. In
July of 1966 Sergev secretly entered Brazilian territory. Expelled from there,
he suddenly dumped to Canada where there were indications that he was in effect
chief of the Soviet espionage network for all Latin America, notwithstanding
his designation as "Chief of the International Section of the Central Council
of the Labor Unien," a title of many words which is merely an attempt to de-
lude and deceive whoever listens to them.
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A well-known and honest newspaperman, Carlos Montiel, in an article pub-
lished February 21, 1969, in the newspaper La NaciOn of San Jose, under the
title "Two Russian Agitators Expelled from the Country," said that: "After
plotting from Ecuador the disturbances of Cali, Colombia to compensate for
the failure in bringing about student disorders in those two countries simi-
lar to those they provoked for the same time in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
and Uruguay, Sergev and Manikoff arrived in Mexico using tourist visas, in
order to appear January 15th at the Mexican Workers' Congress, a task they
were not able to complete because, working swiftly and surely, the Secretary
of Government expelled them from the country." Given these facts, the Colom-
bian labor leaders, Cuevas and Mercado, were right in alerting the authorities
and public opinion to the methods that Soviet secret agents use to disguise
themselves as "trade unionists" in order to complete their tasks.
The case of Sergev and ManikOff has been cited here a little extensively
with the aim of showing how much reason and truth helped Miss Raya Kiselnikova
-- who witnessed so much double-crossing, so much trickery and so much treason
in a noble and free country that welcomed them with open arms -- in deciding to
abandon her fellow countrymen and to seek political asylum in Mexico. Soviet
diplomats, in the literal sense of the word, do not exist. The Soviet diplo-
mat, before all else, is a man who has been trained to spy and to foment dis-
order anyplace in the world that is not his own country. Sergev travelled
with impugnity through Mexico, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay;
Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina, thanks to a tourist visa and to the collabora-
tion that he received in every cbuntry from h$s "diplomatic" countrymen. Now
is the time for the Latin American countries to begin thinking about the con-
sequences such cooperation and leniency will unquestionably bring them in the
future.
EL SIGLO, Bogota
7 March
Los Espias Sovieticos en America
(Mexico marzo 6) � Las. prt
mei-as plains de "El Univer-
sal", -Excelsior" y demOs im
portantes diarios de l\l'exico,
dcstinaron de 6 a 8 columnas
en sus cdiciones del cuatro de
los corrientes, para dar cucn
ta de la espectacular fuga do
Ia mccankrafa sovietiea Raya
quien escap6 de
Is embajada de su pals y PI-
di6 asilo politico al gobierno
de MOxico.
La senorita Eiselnikova, en
tre otras cosas, confeso a la
polca sccreta de este pals
.que cuatro miembros de la sec
'don consular, nombres
'revelo en secreto. atentlian so
.lo Dello lioras por semana sus
foncioncs expidiendo visas,
mientras riedicahan el resto de
su ticmpo a operaciones clan
deAinas on el seno de los sin
dicatos obreros y de las or.ga
sinciones estudiantiles mexi
cams.
Por
Un par de setnanas antes,
los principale.s rotativos del
pais publicaron on forma de;*
taeada imos clespachos de la
UPI on los quo t;t1 daba cuen
ta de que los lideres obreros
colombianos Marco 'folio Cue
was -y Jose Raquel Mercado,
presidentes de las importantes
federaciones UTC y CTC. ha-
hian denunciacio abiertainen�
le a la Minbajada Sovietica de:
Bogota como on eentro de sub
vcrOen y espionaje quo esta:
ha irradiando su influencia en
los sindicatos, y adiestrando
700 estudiantes colombianos
on la Universidad Patricio Lu
mumba de Moscii. ,
Estos son dos : 111 F�peCi03 3Sr,
-quo bay quo slimar a las info(
maciones proccdentes de Euro
pa, segfin las cuales on el cur
so de los idtimos cuatros aims
do 1.966 a 1969, ciento sesenta
y dos cliplomaticos y altos fuw.
cionario,s do las embajadas so
Carboisai.o. para EL SIGLO
apareci6 en BucAnos Aires tam
hien en medic) de unas revuel
tas sindicales quo por enton-
ees sacudian a la Argentina,
pero fue capturado por la poli
cia y expulsado sin contempla
ciones. Naturalmente, no lleva
ha documentos i papcles de
ninguna cla e y solo pitdo ser
identificados por sus hucllas
Vactilares. En julio de 11166,
Serge,/ se introdujo clandesti
�namente en territorio brasile
ro: Expulsado do alli, salt6 do
repente at Canada donde se ro
gistraron indicios de su esta
en ese e7.e pale en calidad cif je
Co de la red do espionaje so
vietico para toda America La
tina, no obstaste so investidu
ra de "Jae do la Seccion in
ternacional clel Consejo Cen-
tral de la Union Sindicalista"�
sombre do muchas palabras
con los quo se busca deslum-
brar v dvarmar a Quienes los
esciaari;
vieticas y de los paises do su
&Ulla, Nem expulsados de
los praises de. occidente donde
se,hallaban acreditados act' a
dos de intervencien en astintos
internos, subversion .y espiona
.je. Mencionar sperms ligera-
mente las historins protagoni
zadas por cada ono de estos,
.agentes comunistas, dcmanda
ria un grueso volumes.
Para citar us ejemplo, en:
Mexico, ba.sta recorclar Is ex-
pulsion de clue fueron objeto.
en este pals, en marzo de
1969, los "turistaA' nuns
Vic-
Lor Manikoff y Vladimir Ser-:
gcy caractcrizados agentes se:
cretos del Kremlin. El prime-
ro de los nombrados habia si,
do arrestado antes?,ei mayo'
de 1962, en Asuncion, al ser
sorprendido on us descarado'
intent� encarninado a prove-
car la rebelion de los sindica
Los obreros locales; pOsterior-
mente, el peligroso indiyiduo
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tin conocido y veraz perm.
dsta, Carlos Montiel, en ar-
ticulo publieado el 21 de fe-
brero de 1969 en el diario "La
Nacion". de San 'Josa ba'o el
titul� "Ns 4g1tadortia upta
?M Pals
Expuleados del airs
' interim; quo "dem& de fra-
guar desde el Ecuador los dii
turhios do Cali, Colombia, on
compenaacieri pot au fracaso.
para montar en esos dos pai-i
ses desordenes estudiantiles sc.!
mejantes a los quo _agitaron'
por esas mismas lechas a
jico, Brril, Argentina y Urn'
guay, llegaron a Mexico set.
gev_ y _Manikoff usando visas
�
de turismo, para presentarse
el 15 de enero en el "Congre
so de trabaiadores Alexica-
nos" proposito quo no pudic-
ron cumplir porque, ()brand�
con Weil* y oportudidlid, la
Secrctarla de Gobierno los ex
pulso del pair'. Dados estos an
tecedentes, razon tertian los di
rigentes obreros colombianos
Cuevas y -Mercado cuando aler.
taron a las autoridades y a la
opinion pUblica de su pals, so
hre los metodos quo utilizan
disfrazados d 'sindicalistas"
los agentes secretos sovieticOs
para curnplir au cometido.
El caso do Sergev y Mani-
koff ha sido citado aqui tin Po
co extensamente, con el pro-
posit� de derno.strar euants ra
aett y verdad !Haste a la senori
INA$4. Kicelnikova iufrri )111s,
tiacia de tanta doblez, de Unfia.
tramposeria y de tanta tat-
clan a un pa's noble y franc�
quo los acogia con los brazos
ahiertos, resolvid abanclonar a
sus compatriotas y pedir asito
politico a Mexico. Diplornati-
cos sovieticos, en el scntido Ii
total de la expresion, no exis
ten jams. El diplomatic� so
vietico, antes quo eso, es un
3
hombre quo ha Ei do adiestra
do para espiar v fornentar el
desorden en to.do Itigar del
mundo quo no sea su propia
patria. Sergev pane, su iinpuni
dad pot Ataxic�, Canada, _Cos
lanibia, Ecuador, Peril, Urn
guaY Bolivia Brasil y Argenti
na, gracias al visado turistico
y a la colaboracien quo reci-
1116 en todas partes de sus
compatriotas "diplomat
ya es hors de quo los Nimes
Latinoamericanos, sopongan
a meditar en las consection�
cies quo tratta condeseenden-
cla y blandura baba forrosa*.
niente de traerlea ci futuro.
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EL TIEMPO, Bogota, Colombia
7 March 1970
The Russian Embassies Are Spy Nests
Mexico City -- Raya Kiselnikova, blonde ex-secretary of the Soviet
Embassy here, who asked for asylum from the Mexican government on February
9th, affirmed that "Russia has a complete espionage network in Mexico."
Since she was granted asylum, the ex-secretary has been kept in seclusion
by the Interior Ministry of Mexico until yesterday (Wednesday, March 5),
when she held a press conference to explain the reasons why she defected
and sought asylum in Mexico.
The newspaper "El Universal" says that Miss Kiselnikova declared,
"Russia is spying in Mexico and is seeking to dominate this hemisphere.
The Russian diplomats have two missions: their usual, continuing diplo-
matic function and espionage work on the side."
She added that "they are interested in the political scene, the rela-
tions between parties, the student movement, the relations between the gov-
ernment and the people and whatever is of a military nature."
She mentioned Oleg M. Neichiporenko, second secretary of the embassy,
as chief of espionage operations in Mexico.
"When a person leaves Russia, he receives precise instructions not to
have any kind of relations or friendship with the Mexicans, who value highly
their freedom," Miss Kiselnikova said.
She said that all the embassy telephones, including private phones,
have listening devices to record conversations and that diplomats and em-
bassy personnel spy and inform on one another.
This lack of freedom, and the fact that she established a close friend-
ship with a Mexican impelled her to defect, the ex-secretary said.
She told the press that the common man could live happily in Russia,
but that intellectuals, especially the writers, poets and creative people,
are persecuted, except those who are so famous that the government would
get i3,o difficulty if it tried to persecute them.
"Although I know that my life is in danger and I know that I can be
kidnapped in order to be returned to Russia, I feel, and I have felt in the
last two weeks, more at peace than I ever have before. Now I am ready to
begin a new life, to work in freedom and to show that I am worthy of the
help that has been given to me. I sincerely hope that they [the Russians]
will let me live in peace," Miss Kiselnikova declared.
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EL TIEMPO , Bogota
7 March 1970
I Ciudad de Mexico, 6. � Ra-
ya Kiselnikova, rubia ex-secre-
taria de la embajada sovintica.
aqui. quien el 9 de febrero
pasado solicit() asiio at
gobier-
no de Mexico, afirme que "Ru-
sia tieriq una red mity comple
ta .de espionajc en Mexico". '
La ex-secretaria habia sido
.niantenida aislada per el mi-
' nisterio del Interior de Mexico
'desde que se le concedie asi-
lo, Easta ayeTTiilercoles),.
cuando convoce a una conic-,
rencia de prensa pain expliear,
las razones per las cuales de-i
sena y pidie asilo en Mexico.:
"Rusia espia en Mexico y.
�busca dominar este liemisfc-.
rio. Los diplomaticos rusos�
tienen dos ipisiones: su cargo
"LcisEl-iiiballegellifis Remus
sbn Allidos d Esp5as"
diplomatic� omen y corrien-
te y laborcs de esplonaje at
' margen", dice el diario "El 11-
' niversal". cite declare la se-
' iiorita Kiselnikova.
�
Mudd.) que "estan lnteresa-
'dos en el panorama politico.
las relaciones entre los parti-
dos, el rnovimiento estuciiantil,
las relaciones del gobierno con
el pueblo y cualquier cosa de
caracter
Mencione a Oleg N. Met,
chiporenko, segundo secretario
de la embajada, como jefe de
las operaciones de espionaje
en Mexico. I
Cuando una persona sale
de Rusia, recibe instrucciones
Precisaa de no tener ninguna
ciase de � relaciones ni amis-
tad con los mexicanos, quienes
aprecian altamcnte su liber-
tad", dijo la senorita Kiselni-
kova.
Manifesto que todos los te-
lefonos de la embajada, inclu-
sive les privados tienen apa-
rates glue graban la conversa-
'e'en, y que los diplomaticos
el personal de la embajada es-
plan e informan entre si. .
� Esa falta de libertad, y el:
hecho de que trabo buena a-
misted con una persona en
Mexico, me impulsaron a do-
sonar, dijo la ex-secretaria.
Manifesto a ia prensa que el
hombre cormin podria vivir fe-
Hz en Rusia, pero,que los pen-
5
sadores, especialmente los es-
critores, poetas y gcntes crea-
Ova, son perseguidos, excepto
los que son suficientemente
famosos y que al castigarlos
podrian poner en dificultades
al gobierno. � .. �
�"Aunque se qua vida Cs.
'ti on pcligro. y se que piled�
set secuestrada pars scr de-
vuelta a Rusia, me siento.
me he sentido en las dos el-
limas sernanas. Inas tranquila
que nunca. Ahora estoy lista
a iniciar una nueva vida. a
trabajar en libertad y demos.
liar que merezco la ayuda que
se me ha dado. Sinceramente
deseo que ellos (los rusos) me
dejen vivir en par". declare la
senorita Kiselnikova.
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EL HERALDO, Mexico City
4 March 1970
COMPLETE ESPIONAGE NETWORK OF RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO
Ex-translator of Diplomatic Delegation Tells of Subversive Work and Seeks Asylum.
The life of Mexico is watched in all its aspects by Russian embassy per-
sonnel who, in addition to their official work, spy on each of the aspects of
national life: political, student, the governments relations with the people
and relations among political elements, as part of the plan for domination and
world influence that the Soviet Union has mapped out.
The one who carries out the principal functions of spying on Mexican life
it Yuriy Kupliakov, chief of the consular section of the embassy, who has at
his command all the diplomatic personnel working in a complete espionage net-
work to which they devote most of their time, and for which they have special
listening devices on all the telephones of the embassy and on those of some
important Mexican officials.
This was affirmed yesterday by Miss Raya Kiselnikova, ex-employee of the
commercial section of the Russian Embassy, in which she was employed as a trans-
lator, during a press conference in a well-known hotel here in order to acquaint
the Mexican public with the reality of her situation in the country which was
misrepresented some weeks ago by different news media when she asked for poli-
tical asylum in Mexico.
Amid television cameras, microphones and photographic flash bulbs, and
showing great calmness in her words and with great fluency in the Spanish
language, Miss Kiselnikova declared to the reporters present that the student
disturbances of 1968 were in large part influenced by Russian spies who tried
to control the movement, in order to use the existing crisis situation to arouse
popular reaction against the system of government.
Before the reporters' questions she declared that she had been in Mexico
two years, working as a translator, and that since her arrival in Mexico she
had been watched and prohibited from making contact with the Mexican people,
a rule that all Russian diplomats must obey. Inside the embassy, the atmos-
phere is one of uneasiness and watchfulness of one another among the .personnel.
For her, as a daughter of a man considered in his lifetime as a public enemy,
she was watched even more carefully on orders of the chief of the consular sec-
tion.
Two months ago, when she knew that she was going to be sent to Russia, as
punishment for her conduct not being in accord with Soviet political interests,
and where reprisals on her and her family could be expected, she was advised
by Mexican friends that she should seek asylum in Mexico. She added that her
wish to live in an atmosphere of freedom -- the freedom that she has known in
Mexico -- made her renounce her family,, her past life, her friends in exchange
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for the opportunity she has obtained to live with confidence and peacefulness,
a right that until a short while ago was forbidden to her.
The real situation in Mexico, that she now knows, is totally opposite
from what they led her to believe in her own country when she was preparing
for her assignment in this city, and that life in Russia does not have even
the leaot bit Of triad= atiOh ea elle bee von. The ihdObtritietiOn that the
Russian people receive from childhood precludes their rising up against the
system of life imposed by the government.
EL HERALDO, Mexico City
4 March 1970
Ex Traductora de esa Delegacion Diplornatica
Relata la Subversiva Labor y Pide Asilo
� La vide de Mexico, se
encuentra vigilada en todos
, sus aspectos por los miem-
bras de la embajada Rusa,
que adernes de costar con
,una misien oficial, espian
� cada uno de los aspectos de
la vida nacional, to politico,
la vida estudiantil, las
relaciones del gobierno y el
pueblo, las relaciones entre
los diversos politicos, como
parte del plan de dominio e
influencia mundial que se ha
train& la - Union Sovietica.
Quien ejerce las princi-
pales funciones como espia
de In vida do Mexico, es loud
Koupliakov, jefe de la sec-
elk consular de la emba-
jada, quien tiene a sus
ordenes a todo el personal
diplomatic� trabajando en
una completa red de es-
pionaje a la que dedican la
mayor parte del tiempo, y
para in que cuentan con
instalaciones especiales,
vigilancia en todos los
telefonos de las embajadas y
en algunos otros de fun-
cionarios mexicanos irn-
portantes.
Por ISABEL ZAMORANO
Asi lo afirme ayer la
senorita Raya Kiselnikova,
ex empleada de la seccien
comercial de la embajada
rusa, en la que desempenaba
el cargo de traductora,
durante una conferencia de
prensa que ofrecid en ,
conocido hotel de esta eluded
pare dar a conocer al pueblo
mexicana, la realidad de su
situacion en el pals, des- '
virtuada hace algunas se-
' manas por diversos erganos
informativos cuando pidie
� asilo territorial a Mexico.
Entre cameras de tele-
vision, micrefonos, y flashes
fotograficos, y demostrando
' una gran serenidad en sus
expresiones y un gran do-
minio del idiorna espanol, la
i senorita Kiselnikova,lingiiiq-
lita y modelo declare a los
' reporteros presentes, que los
problemas estudiantiles de "
' 1968, estuvieron in-
fluidos en gran parte
por los espies rusos que �
trataron de dontrOler el.i
movimiento, pare apro.
vechar la altuacion,degrisisi
7
existente en el pals y pro:4
vocar reacciones en el
pueblo, con trarias al sistema
de goblerno. ' 1
Ante las preguntas de los
reporteros, declare que ;
desde hace dos anos se en- I
cuentra en Mexico, desem-
pariando el cargo de traduc-
tora, desde su llegada a
Mexico, ha sido vigilada y se
le prohibie entrar en con-
tact� con el pueblo mexi-
tano, regla que deben
obedecer todos los di- .
plomaticos rusos. Dentro de
in embajada, el china es de ,
desconfianza y de vigilancia
de unos para otros. A ellii,�'
por ser hija de us hombre ,
considerado en vida como
enemigo pablico, se le vigila-
ba en forma mas estrecha
por ordenes del jefe de la d
secciOn consular.
Hace 'dos meses, cuando
� supo que iba a ser enviada a ,
Huta como castigo a su
conducta y por no convenir a
los intereses de la politica
sovietic.a y en donde le es-%
,,peraban represallas a elle,
a su familia, fue aconsejada
por amigos mexicanos de
que pidiera asilo territorial a
Mexico. Agrege, que sus
deseos de vivir en us clima
!de libertad, �la libertad
que ha conocido en Mexico�
in ha hecho renunciar a su
! familia, a su pasado his-
! terico, a sus amigos, en
,cambio, ha obtenido in
oportunidad de vivir con
confianza y tranquilidad,
derecho que haste hace poco
le estaba vedado.
Esta realidad mexicana
� que hay conoce, es to-
talmente opuesta a la que le
dieron a conocer en su pals
cuando se preparaba para
desempenar sus funciones en
esta ciudad, y senald quo la
vida en Rusia, esta excnta
haste en los mils minimos
detalles de la libertad que
,ella ha ganado. El adoc-
� trinamiento que recibe el
pueblo ruso desde nino, le
impide revelarse contra el
sistema de vide impuesto
el gobierno.
�
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EL SIGLO, Bogota, Colombia
2 March 1970
SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
by Eugene Carbonaro
In the space of the last four years, from 1966 to 1969, 162 officials
belonging to embassies of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries,
besides some authorized personnel, were expelled from the foreign countries
in which they were stationed, under accusation of espionage, various sub-
versive activities or simply undue interference in politics and internal
affairs.
Almost half of the individuals expelled, or some eighty of them, were
Soviet citizens with such varied assignments as ambassadors, ministers, com-
mercial attaches, janitors, drivers, cooks and embassy gardeners. Also
there were artists, "journalists" from TABS and NOVOSTI, delegates to youth
congresses and workers assemblies, "trade union" leaders, etc., etc. The
Venezuelan columnist Lorenzo Fernandez, in a paragraph welcomed by his Colom-
bian colleague Iader Giraldo, said, referring to the relations of his country
with the USSR, that "the danger. of establishing them would not be the ambas-
sador, a gentleman schooled in Soviet diplomacy, who would hold fine recep-
tions in his home, in order that our high livers could eat the best caviar
and drink the best vodka there. Rather -- says the Venezuela journalist --
the dangers lie in the chauffeur, the gardener, the cook and the fourth
secretary...."
The preceding anecdote is cleverly phrased, but it contains a mighty
truth applicable to all countries in the Soviet orbit. Their contribution
to global subversion is apparent in the following figures of persons expelled
from the western world, during the same period; 19 Czechs, 7 Cubans, 16 Chi-
nese, 25 East Germans, 9 North Koreans and 6 Poles.
According to the figures published by various periodicals and European
magazines, the secret activities of the diplomats and Soviet officials is a
growing phenomenon, the increase of which can be seen with perfect clarity
in the less developed areas of the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin
America. While in 1968 the figure of those expelled climbed to 30, in 1969
it went to 63.
The European counter-espionage services estimate that disguised Soviet
agents, who never are discovered, number far more than those who are caught
and over all are more skilful and are the true masters of their craft. Ac-
cording to the rigid code of espionage, whoever allows himself to be caught
is stupid and deserves no better fortune. Punishment acquires dramatic pro-
portions when it affects spies or Soviet agents, for the least stupid error
8
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can mean for them a shot in the back of the head or condemnation to forced
labor for life.
In spite of such drastic measures and the efforts which they make in
order to avoid mistakes, in the year 1969 the following Soviet officials were
discovered and expelled from countries where they were operating: Mikhail
Novikov, NOVOSTI correspondent in Ethiopia; Victor Kopitin, TASS correspondent
in Washington; Mikhail Dogomatikh, Pravda correspondent in Kenya; Alex Komiakov,
"press correspondent" in Beirut; Alex Puchov, "OIP" agent in Denmark; Victor
Matveyev, TASS correspondent in Ethiopia; Vladimir Sergeyev, "worker delegate"
in Mexico; Eugene Kochegarov, "trade unionist," presumed to be a member of the
International Union of Telecommunication Workers with headquarters in Geneva;
Victor Mednikov, "trade unionist" in Mexico; Vladimir Vasilev, Commercial
Attache in Lebanon; Genadi Federenko, Chief of the Commercial Section of the
Soviet Embassy in Vienna; Vladimir Sarayev, interpreter at the Permanent Soviet
Exposition in Ethiopia; Victor Yeleseyev, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy
in Kenya; Konstantin Monakov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Italy;
Vladimir Tiganov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in West Germany and
Igor Andreyev, member of the USSR mission at the United Nations.
These expulsions demonstrate that "peaceful coexistence" as predicated
by Moscow, are mere words. Soviet espionage is one of the great dangers of
the twentieth century as a powerful and growing element and a serious threat
to world peace.
EL SIGLO, Bogota
2 March 1970
El Espionaje:
So-vietico en
el SiPio X
iror EUGENIO CARBONARO,
I
En el lapso de los Ultimos.I
cuatro ado, de 1966 a 1969,
162 funcionarios de las emba.'i
jades sovieticas y do otros
pai-
sos socialistas, edemas de a]-
gun persona] calificado, fue-
ron expulsados de los liaises
-Lxtranjeros en. que' se encon-�
traban, bajO la 'acusation de
espidnaje, ,actividades ,subver�I
sivas diversas o simplemente,
por intervention indehida eu,.
politica y asuntos internos.-
Cast la railed de los indivi
-duos expulsados, oehenta, cram
ciudadanos soviet:lens investi-1
dos de cargos tan variados cry
roo embajadores, rainistros, -a-,
gregados comerciales, porte-!
ros, choferes, coeineros y jar
dineros de embajade.:artisias.i
"periodistas" de la TASS y de�
la Agenda Novosti, delegacies'
a congrcsos juveniles y �asam.
Oleas obreras, dirigentes "sin-
dicales",,ete., etc. El column's
ta venezolano Lorenzo Fermin.
du, en parrafo acogido por su
colcga colornhiano racier Giral
do, dijo, refiriendose a las re.
laciones de su pals con la
que "el peligro de enta-
Wallas no seria- el embajador
propiamentv dieho, un senor
formado dentro de la diplo.
'Dacia sovietica, que haria meg
nilicas recenelones:en su cE04.-
pare 'clue nuestra "highlile"
comIera alli el rile* cayiar y
bebiera el mejor Vodka. Alli-
-sentencia el !periodista ye-
nezolano--- los -petigros son el
el.ofer, el jardinero, el cocine-
ro o el cuarto seeretario...".
. La anterior anecdote es on
decir gracioso,, pero encierra
una verclacl de. a purio extensi-
ble tambien a todos los paisrs
de la &bite sovietlea. La con.
tribucidn de &Los a la subver-
Men mundial es patente en las
siguientes cifres de personas
expulsadas del mundo occiden-
tal, en el mismo lapso: checos
19, cubanos 7, chinos 16, ale.
manes orientalesTi cereanos 9,
poiacos 6, y alemanes �ilea;
tales 22.
&gun cifras publieadas por
cliversos pernalicos y revisas
curopcos, las actividades clan.
destines de los cliplomaticoS y
luncionarios sovieticos es tin'
fenomeno en ereCimiento, Cu.
va intensificacion se observe
eon perfecta nitidez en los pai.
ses menos desarrollados del
Ccrcano Oriente, Asia, Africa (-1
y America Latina. Miebtraa 7
en 1968 la cilia de expulsados
ascendie a 30, en 1969 fie ya
de 64.,
Los servie-ios de contra-es.
pionaje europeos estlman quo
los agentes soVielicos
oman-
flados, quo nunea lle;:;an a ser
descubicrtos, son muchisirnos
mas que los que caen en sus
rcdes y sobre todo Inas habi-
IcS y vercladeros inaes,ros cu.
an oficio. El rigid� codigo do
los espies dice, de quien se
neja coger con las 'manos on
la mass, que es un estOpido
por lo taut() merecedor de
r4 5.uerte. La senteneia enginc.
re proporciones .dramaticas
cuando afecta a espies o agen-
tcs sovieticos, pues ta ineaor
'-'estifpidez puede significar pa.
;ra ellos un nalazo en la mica
:0 una condena a trabajos for.
-lades .de por vide.
A pesar de tan drasticas san
Clones y de los esfuerzos mic
hacen para no faller en sus
rmpresas, en el ano de 1969
fueron descutriertos y expulsa.
dos de los paises donde se ha.
Ilaban, los siguientes funciona.
-nos sovieticos: iNovi-
-soff, corresponsal de "Novas.
en Etiopia; Victor Kopitin,
corresponsal de la "Tass" en
Washington; Micail Dogoma-.
corresponsal del ura.to
"Pravda" en Kenya; Alex Ko-
intakoff, "eoiresponsal de pica
sa" en Beirut; Alex Pucnov,
agente de la "OIP" en Dina-
marca; Victor Matetiyev,
rresponsal de la "Tess" en
Etiopia; Viauirnir Svrgeyev�
"delegado (micro" en Atexico;
ugeny Kochegaroff,
itinto inienibio de la
Union Internacional de Traba-
jadores de teiccuinunicacio-
nes con secie on Clinebra;
Victor Mckinicolf, "sindica-
:ista", en Mexico;. 'Vladimir
Vasilev, Atache Coinercial en
Ia Rcpoblica del .Libano; GL-.
nodi r'ecleretilco, Jefe de la
SceceiOn Comercial de la ein.
4iajada soviolico en Viena; Via
Cirmir Serayt.v, interprete de
la ExposiciOn Perrnanente So-
vi.etica en Etiopia; Victor Ue.
Lseyev, primer secretario de
la -embajada sovielica en Ke-
nya; Constantin Monakoff, pri
,nier secretario de la embajada
,sovietica en Italia; Vladimir
Tiganollf, primer secretario de
la embajada sovietiea en Ale.
Mania Federal, e Igor Andre-
yev, miembre de la mision de
'la UliSS ante las Naciones
lUnidas.
Estes expulsiones demues-
Iran quo la "coexistencia peel.
flea" predicada por Moscii, son
'meras palahrerias. El espiona
je sovietico, es una de las pea-
rcs lacras dei siglo XX cornt,.
pocleroso factor .de distensio-
tics y grave amenaza pan la
jiaz mundiaI.
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SECRET
100-Year-Old Lenin Claims a new Victim? In the mysterious closed so-
ciety of the Soviet Union, firings of officials always give rise to a wide
range of speculation over whether the dismissals might be the prelude to a
large-scale purge. Such was the case with the recent ouster of the Soviet
Union's chief propagandist, Vladimir I. Stepakov, and three other highly
placed propaganda officials. No one knows for certain why Stepakov was
dismissed, but a very credible speculation is that the dullness of his
Lenin centennial propaganda and the boredom and cynicism it generated in
the Soviet public cost him his job. (See the attached reprints from Time
magazine, 20 April, and a New York Times article of 10 April.) [FYI: The
third article attached has been put together by Headquarters from four U.S.
Embassy dispatches of "Limited Official Use" classification, and attributed
to "Western news correspondents in Moscow." They may be used without re-
striction.]
Addendum for Lenin. In the attached reprint from Atlas, April 1970,
is a translation of an article which originally appeared in the newspaper
L'Espresso of Rome. It was an interview with the British authority on So-
viet affairs, Robert Conquest who speculates on what Lenin's reactions
would be were he alive today -- would he accept or reject the present So-
viet system? Conquest's analysis is highly useful for illustrating the
mediocrity of the present Soviet leadership and its detrimental effects
on the development of Soviet society. He does this by comparing the pre-
sent Soviet leaders with Lenin, but at the same time Conquest succeeds in
discrediting Lenin as well.
6
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NEW YORK TIMES,
10 April 1970
Moscow Drops Criticism Drive;
,Key Officials Reported Ousted,
' By nnlINARD GWERTZMAN
Ikprulki toYrkt New York TIIIVA
Mopcovi, April 9�The So-
viet Union Is nearing Lenin's
centenary with a sudden shift
In the political atmosphere that
has stirred an unusual amount
'of speculation in the Western
diplomatic community. '
!* With less than two weeks to
go before the anniversary cele-
brations, the Soviet press has
abruptly ended a three-month
campaign of criticism of a lag-
ging ,economy and has appar-
ently embarked on a more posi-
tive drive extolling model fac-
tories as examples.
f Western diplomats have heard
.that leading propaganda offi-
cials have been ousted for hav-
ing gone too far in the criticism
campaign. Others have said that
the officials were replaced as
part of a consolidation of the
entire propaganda apparatus
into a single agency.
-� [According to United Press
� International, the new propa-
ganda chief will be Stepan
V. Chervonenko, ambassador
, to Czechoslovakia. The news
agency said top Soviet of-
ficials in radio-television, pub-
lishing, and motion pictures
I 'had also been replaced.]
No changes have been o'ffi-
daily announced, hut Soviet
sources have acknowledged that
the party's propaganda' chief,
'Vladimir I. Stepakov, has been
named to fill the. long-vacant
post of ambassador to Commu-
nist China.
. The sudden shift in the in-
formation media combined with
the officially reported illnesses
of four members of the party's
ruling Politburo, has persuaded
some diplomats that something
unforeseen has happened. There
is speculation that Leonid I.
Brezhnev, the party leader, is
preparing the way for an im-
minent change in the make-up
of the Politburo. �
These diplomats and 'journal-
ists contend, more on the basis
of intuition than hard evidence,.
that Mr. Brezhnev ordered the'
change in political atmospher-
ics to prevent any politburo
changes from appearing as des-
perate acts to salvage the coun-
try from economic disaster.
But a majority of diplomats
seem to regard the new tone as
normal preliminaries for the
Lenin centenary on April 22,
when the party presumably will
stress the achievements of the
Soviet Union.,
They say that the logic of
events makes dramatic changes
before the Lenin celebrations
doubtful. They further contend
that there is no evidence to dis-
pute that Premier Aleksei N.
Kosygin, President Nikolai V.
Podgorny, Mikhail A. Suslov,
and Aleksandr N. Shelepin are
genuinely ill and perhaps rest-
ing for the celebrations, which!
will reach a high point on April'
21 with a Major meeting 'in'
Moscow.
These diplomats believe that
there will be some political
changes this year, probably by
the 'time of the 24th party cone,
gress, Neely to be held in Octo-
ber, They assert that it is the
style of the current leadership
to make changes in an orderly
fashion, unlike the unpredicta-
bility of past leaders, and the
party congressis the appropri-
ate place to caery them out.
It is regarded as virtually a
foregone conclusion that Arvid
Pelshe, at 70 the oldest man
on the Il-matt politburo; will
retire. Since Mr. Kosygin is 66,
Mr. Suslov 67, and Mr. Pod-
gorny 66, few'diplomats would
be surprised if any or all of
them chose to turn their, jobs
over to younger men.
Mr. Brezhnev is 64. but ap-
pears dynamic and not looking
for a rest.
Any changes in personnel
are not exnected to alter the
basic problems facing the So-
viet leadership. The most criti-
cal are in the economic sphere,
�the lack of dynamism lathe
economy, the slow adaption of
the system to technological
change, manpower problems.
and the inadequate supply of
consumer goo de and services.'
The recent prese campaign.
started at Mr. Brezhnevs ap-
parent initiative lane December,
underscored these problems
anew. But :there are signs that
the party prc..,og.ii!.13 went
further than Mr. Brezhnev in-
tended.
So ninny people and institu-
tions Were criticized that there
were signs of distillusionment
developing, some diplomats
said. Not only wee, grumbling
increasing, but many intellec-
tuals were spurred by .the
frankness of the criticism to
speak and write about what
they regarded as the basic
flaws in the system. ,
Propaganda Aides, Shifted
MOSCOW, April 9 (UPI) �
Nikolai N. Mesyatsev, former
director of Soviet radio and
television, has been named,
ambassador to Australia, diplo-
matic sourcs said today.
Mr. Mesyatsev was one of
four officials who last week
,were removed from key infor-
mation pests.
� The chairman 0: the propa-
ganda Department in the
party's ruling committee,
Vladimir S. Stepakov, was
named ambassadoe to Peking.
Diplomatic sources said he
would be replaced by Stepan
V. Chervonenko, a former
Ukrainian party secretary who
Is ambassador to Prague.
' Another official, Nikolai M.
Mikhailov, chairman of the
State Committee on Publishing,
kas retired on pension. He was
In effect the country's chief
literary and press censor.
A fourth propar�anda expert,
Aleksci V. Romanov, chairman'
'of the State Committee on
Cinematography, was also re-
moved to be appointed to an
undisclosed post.
The officials were reportd to
' have been removed because
they failed to cope with pro-
paganda connected with the
Lenin centenary celebrations.
1 (1Mri?,771171WT(HCO
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TIME MAGAZINE,
20 April, 1970
That Puzzling "Po!itburo Plague
THE Soviet Union commemorated In-
I ternational Health Day last week,
but the timing could hardly have been
worse. No fewer than five of the elev-
en full members of the Politburo were re-
ported to be incapacitated by various
ailments.
Confined to hospitals or to their homes
were Premier Aleksei Kosygin, President
Nikolai Podgorny, Communist Party
Ideologist Mikhail Suslov, Trade Union
Leader Alexander Shelepin and Deputy
Premier Dmitry Polyansky. Such wide-
spread contagion within the U.S.S.R.'s
ruling body�some spoke of the "Po-
litburo plague"�revived last month's ru-
mors of a Kremlin shake-up (TIME,
March 23). It is, of course, medically
possible (if statistically implausible) that
all are genuinely ill, especially in view
of the advanced age of some of the pa-
tients: Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov
are all over 65. But many analysts spec-
ulated that Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev,
lately seen to be fit and cheerful, was
consolidating his position, and that some,
if not all, of the disabled leaders were
suffering from maladies that were more
political than physiological.
Several experts in the West theorized
that a decision to oust some of the top
leaders has already been made, perhaps
at a secret Politburo meeting rumored
to have been held on or around March
30. After that date the five Politburo
members were conspicuously absent
from several state occasions and began
canceling travel plans. According to this
argument, the announcement of the oust-
ers, which must be formally approved
by the Central Committee, is being de-
layed until after next week's mammoth
Lenin centennial celebrations. Stories
are already circulating in Moscow that
a meeting of the committee for this pur-
pose may be imminent.
Under a Blanket. Speculation about
important shifts in the Kremlin was re-
inforced last week by the dismissal of
at least four top Soviet officials in chirge
of ideology, propaganda and culture.
Most notable was the demotion of Vla-
dimir Stepakov from head of the pow-
erful Agitation and Propaganda Depart-
ment of the Central Committee to the
ambassadorship in Peking.*
Amidst the ideological trumpetings
and fanfares preceding the Lenin an-
niversary, such a purge of the nation's
top ideologists sounded a discordant
note, to say the least. Some analysts
saw a connection between the dismissals
and the Politburo illnesses, especially
since sonic of those fired are associated
with Shclepin and all come under Sus-
lov's authority. In a biting analogy, Brit-
ish Sovictologist Leopold Labcdz ob-
served that "the dogs are fighting under
a blanket, but all we can see is the blan-
ket moving. We don't know which dog
has his teeth in which other dog." Oth-
er specialists point out that such clean
sweeps of party and government agen-
cies in the post-Stalin era have always
taken place after, not before a change
in the top leadership. Still others, how-
ever, believe that the propaganda of-
ficials were punished for failures, most
notably for so overselling the Lenin cel-
ebrations that they have become a bore
to many Russians.
Signs of trouble in the Kremlin be-
gan mounting after Dec. 15, when Brezh-
nev made a secret speech to the Cen-
tral Committee about the lagging So-
viet economy. Since his predecessor,
Nikita Khrushchev, was ousted prin-
cipally because of poor economic per- '
formance, Brezhnev took care to blame
economic planners and managers for
the failures. To many Sovietologists,
the postponement of the next Com-
munist Party Congress from this month
to an indeterminate date late in 1970
or even 1971 suggested high-level dis-
agreements. Said Yale's Wolfgang Le-
onhard: "It means either that the lead-
ers can't agree on policies or that there's
profound disarray in the Kremlin,"
4' Another official removed from his post was
Aleksci Romanov, chairman of the State Cin-
ematography Committee, better known as the
former Soviet intelligence officer who de-
nounced Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1945 and
was thus responsible for sending the great nov-
elist to prison and exile for eleven years.
2
11
There was some evidence that Brezh-
nev was trying to shore up his power.
He was the only Politburo member to re-
view the massive army maneuvers in
Byelorussia last month and was pho-
tographed with the Soviet Defense Min-
ister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, prom-
inently at his side. It seemed that, as
party General Secretary, he was as-
serting his position as first among equals
in the Politburo and pointing to the sup-
port he personally commands in the So-
viet army. Kremlinologists were also
struck by the fact that Brezhnev, on
his return to Moscow from a three-day
trip to Budapest last week, was met at
the railway station by Grechko, Mar-
shal Ivan Yakubovsky, Commander of
the Warsaw Pact forces, and Secret Po-
lice Chief Yuri Andropov. Such a turn-
out, which would ordinarily pass un-
observed, seemed to indicate the source
of Brezhnev's present strength.
Kremlin Silence. One indication of a
possible change in leadership is that
the Kremlin has not moved to halt the
rumors by denying them. Another way
to quash the rumors would be to rouse
the sick Politburo members from their
beds long enough for them to gather at
some official occasion. Just such an oc-
casion was provided last week at a Krem-
lin party for Soviet cosmonauts. Only
one of the ailing leaders felt well enough,
in body or spirit, to put in an ap-
pearance. He was Shelcpin, who looked
pale and wan.
There is a possibility that the col-
lective leadership is still intact and that
the propaganda apparatus was reorga-
nized because of failures on the part of
specific officials rather than as part of
a titanic power struggle. In spite of dis-
agreements about who is doing what to
whom, however, most specialists in the
West agreed that something certainly
seemed to be brewing in the Kremlin.
They also agreed that a Kremlin shake-
up would not mean a drastic change in
the present rigid and repressive Soviet
;policies at home and in Eastern Eu-
rope, but simply a more vigorous ap-
plication of those policies. In other
words, even if there are major changes
in the cast, the new players are likely
to follow roughly the same script.
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"MNE OSTOLETILO"
With respect to the overblown and artificial fanfare surrounding the year-
long preparations for the Lenin Centenary, Western newspaper correspondents in
Moscow have noted the growing boredom of the general populace and the cynicism
of the educated Russian public. Some evidence of the apathy of the Soviet pub-
lic toward the Great Event:
Checking on Soviet press descriptions of huge enthusiastic crowds attend-
ing the Moscow Central Exhibit Hall (Manezh) display of 3,000 works by Moscow
artists honoring Lenin, reporters have repeatedly found it sparsely attended,
and, have ventured the guess that by the time the exhibit is over, there will
have been more paintings in Manezh than viewers.
* * *
The official Soviet news agency TASS boasted on 18 March this year that
there were 1,600 separate lecture series being conducted in Moscow on Lenin
themes. Considering the stereotyped, cliche-ridden nature of all verbis:ge con-
cerning Lenin this year, it is little wonder that on that same 18 March, G.N.
Golikov, a leading Party historian, giving a well-advertised lecture at the
Central Lecture Hall, drew an audience of ... 121 The only live aspect of the
event was the question period at the end of his presentation. (Golikov had
.made disparaging remarks about books by the eminent British historian E.H. Carr
and by former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, George Kennan):
Question: "You mentioned Carr, Kennan, Sukhanov and Milyukov. Are their
books published in the USSR?
Answer: (Hemming and hawing) "Milyukov and Sukhanov were translated at
one time into Russian in Berlin. We do not publish them here."
Question: "At the 1957 meeting of Communist Parties there were some refer-
ences to the applicability of Lenin's theories to the world as a whole.
Why were these dropped from the documents of the June 1969 meeting?
Answer: rya have to have both sets of documents in front of me to answer
your question."
* * *
On 21 November 1969, Soviet film director Yuri Karasev lectured on his
latest film about Lenin. In the course of it, several of the audience got up
and walked out and in the question and answer period which followed the lecture
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several needling questions were raised:
Question: "In your talk, you mentioned only Lenin's good points. Isn't
it true that in fact Lenin was a man like the rest of us, like you and me
with strengths and weaknesses?
Answer: "No! Lenin was not a man like you and me. Lenin had no weak
points...." (and he went on until the audience began to laugh at the ab-
surdity of the whole show).
A questioner asked why the fate of members of a political party, the So-
cialist Revolutionaries, in opposition to Lenin's Bolshevik Party had not
been shown in the film. After Karasev answered vaguely, someone shouted:
"What happened to [Socialist Revolutionary] Spiridonova?"
Answer: "She was also freed. In 1942 she was shot after being released
from prison (laughter in the hall). I don't really know too much about
it. Ah-h-h, the Germans shot her."
* * *
There is a Russian expression: "Mne nadoyelo" meaning "I'm fed up."
The Russians have now varied this to give expression to their disgust with
the Lenin Centenary hoopla: "Mhe ostoletilo" [from "sto" = 100 and "let"
= years] meaning 'I have been centenaried up to the ears."
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atlas/APRIL 1970
HAPPY BIRTHDAY, VLADIMIR!
An Assortment of thoughts on the state of the Soviet
Union upon the occasion of Lenin's 200th birthday.
WHAT WOULD LENIN THINK OF RUSSIA TODAY?
Translated from L'ESPRESSO, Rome
The Soviet Union will celebrate the centennial of Lenin's birth on
April 22. If there is any Westerner with the credentials to speculate
on what Lenin's feelings might be today, it is probably Britain's
Robert Conquest. He is a former professor of Soviet affairs at Colum-
bia University and the London School of Economics and the author
of a multitude of authoritative works, including Power and Policy in
the U.S.S.R. and Russia After Khrushchev. Francesco Russo, London
correspondent for Rome's popular weekly L'Espresso, talked with Con-
quest recently, leading off the interview with this tantalizing question:
Q. If Lenin were alive again to-
day, what would he be likely to
accept or reject in the present
Soviet system?
A. Of all the men who have ruled
Soviet Russia, the present lead-
ers are the lowest in caliber. Len-
in would recognize the incredible
mediocrity and narrowminded-
ness of the group of men in power
�and he certainly would never
approve of that, no matter what
he might think of everything else.
It is true that in the last year
of his life, when he was critically
ill, Lenin realized that some-
where a wrong turn had been
taken, although he put the blame
not on the dictatorship but on the
bureaucratization of the system.
But if Lenin were to return to-
day and see that fifty years after
the revolution the party had still
failed to put down democratic
roots, and that it continues to op-
erate as a mechanism whose
function is to impose the will of
a limited and mediocre group of
leaders, then I think he would
look at the situation from the
Marxist point of view.
It is true that Lenin himself
departed from classical Marxism
when he seized power because
Russia at that point did not have
the conditions that Marx had
said were necessary for a socialist
regime; that is, it had neither a
fully developed industry nor a
vast and politically educated pro-
letariat. Lenin recognized this
and said that he was assuming
power in Russia until all Europe
became socialist, an event he ex-
pected to take place within a year
or two. And Europe as a whole
had enough industry and a large
enough proletariat for a continen-
tal socialism, even if it included
underdeveloped sectors like Rus-
sia.
But Lenin did not relinquish
power when he saw that there
would be no European revolu-
tion; instead, gradually, he con-
ceived the idea of developing in-
dustry and the � proletariat from
above, in that way creating a
posteriori the conditions that
were supposed to have existed to
begin with.
Marxist or not, this was a new-
5
development. But today Lenin
would have to admit that both in-
dustry and proletariat have been
in existence for quite a while.
Therefore there is no longer any
need for this primitive form of
government. I don't think he
would speak one hundred per
cent as a "liberal," but I'm quite
sure he would think the Russian
proletariat was worthy of some
degree of political freedom.
Q. What would Lenin have
thought of Dubcek's experiment?
Doesn't the Czechoslovak "new
course" resemble the type of pro-
letarian democracy that he orig-
inally had in mind?
A. I think your question has two
aspects. If Lenin had regarded
Russia as the leader of the social-
ist world, he wouldn't have hesi-
tated to bring a rebellious social-
ist state into line with whatever
means was necessary. But there
is a possibility that Lenin might
have felt that the Soviet model
was no longer valid; in this case
he certainly would have disap-
proved of the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia.
The question that naturally oc-
curs here is this: was Dubcek
acting as a Leninist? I think that
Lenin would not have recognized
as his own the new type of com-
munism that was developing in
Czechoslovakia; we must remem-
ber that Lenin thought the com-
munist revolution in the West
would be achieved with parties
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of the Soviet type in every coun-
try, and it was according to this
idea that he divided the left all
over the world. Therefore he
would have concluded that Dub-
' cek's communism was different
from his and would have disap-
proved of Prague as well as of
Moscow. However, the riegenera-
tion of the Soviet system might
have led him to conclude that
Dubcek-style reforms were neces-
sary.
Q. What would Lenin have
thought of the treatment that
Pasternak, Daniel, Sinyaysky, Sol-
zenitsyn and so many other dis-
senting intellectuals in Russia
have suffered? You told me that
Lenin thought party literature
, should be subject to party con-'
trol,
A. Yes, party literature, but not
true and proper literature. When
the Soviet leaders quote Lenin to
justify the party's control of liter-
ature, they are cleverly manipu-
lating a quote out of context. Len-
in was talking only about propa-
ganda. He did not want to sub-
ject real literature to party con-
trol: the doctrine of socialist
realism was invented afterwards.
It is true that politics had abso-
lute priority for him, but, even so,
the arts were given a great deal
of freedom and at that time went
through a period of tremendous
experimentation.
Of course we mustn't forget
that Lenin was also capable of
falsehood, though always in the
party's interest, like a general ,
who spreads lies to win a cam-
paign. When involved In a con-
flict, he did not always play an
honest role; what mattered to
him was to win the argument,
not to stick to the truth. All this,
however, is very different from
the suppression of debate on the
most important political and so-
cial topic in Russia�that is, what
happened or could have happened
during Stalin's era. I don't think
Lenin would have tried to keep
secret a question so fundamental
to Russian life. Perhaps he would
have expelled from the party
all those who had compromised
themselves with the Stalinist re-
gime and then perhaps founded
another party. Not for moral rea-
sons but for intellectual and po-
litical ones.
Let us ask this: what responsi-
bility does Lenin bear for the per-
secution of the intellectuals? In
1918 Rosa Luxemburg told Lenin
From WIR BRUCKENBAUER, Zurich
6
he was making a big mistake in
supprelsing freedom of speech
and free elections. She was in
favor o these liberties, she said,
not for reasons of abstract jus-
tice, but because, without the
freedom to speak, to publish or to
read, 'life dies." This, in my opin-
ion, to return to my first point,
is why the quality of the Soviet
loaders has dropped so much In
the last fifty years. They have be-
come mentally paralyzed because
of the lack of antagonists able to
express themselves freely. Of
course Lenin put limits on free-
dom of expression. But his ac-
tions against the formation of
new groups date from after the
civil war. During the civil war
freedom of debate on political
questions was allowed within the
party, though once a political pol-
icy had been approved it had to
be accepted. At first dissident
groups were tolerated�they were
only forbidden afterwards. In any
case, it is very hard to deduce
from what he did then what he
would have done fifty years later.
Lenin was an intellectual: today
he would realize that something
is wrong and that Solzenitsyn is
telling the truth. Remember that
Lenin was never afraid of divid-
ing the party. When he was sure
he was right, he split the party
in two even when only ten were
on his side and fifty against. I
don't think he would recognize
the Bolshevik Party in today's
Communist Party in Russia. He
would think that the bureaucrati-
zation of the party which he de-
plored at the beginning had crys-
tallized into a "new class," to use
Djilas' expression,
Q. 'When the Soviet leaders pres-
ent themselves as the repository
of traditional Leninism, are they
consciously betraying Lenin, or
are they acting in good faith?
A. It's hard for me to guess what
is in the minds and consciences
of the Soviet leaders, But I think
that, all in all, they are in good
faith, which gives us an idea of
the level of their intelligence.
Their education and training is
inadequate in many areas.
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Q. China, of course, would be a
new phenomenon for Lenin.
A. I'd say that China is even
less Leninist than Russia. No !
matter what one says about Rus-
sia, the party is the dominant fac-
tor, as Lenin intended it to be;
even if it is a rusty, inadequate
machine, it works in the tradi-
tional manner of political power.
In China the Cultural Revolution
has reduced the state to the per-
sonal and charismatic dictator-
ship of Mao Tsetung, who has in
effect neutralized the party mech-
anism and instead built up his
Red Guards (they have nothing
in common with a Leninist party,
but are more like a youthful mil-
itia) and, in particular, the army.
The same thing has happened
in Cuba. Castro has the party,
but it doesn't do much more than
carry out administrative orders.
The real mechanism of power lies
in Castro himself when he ap-
peals to the masses over tele-
vision, and in the army and other
forces. Here again we have a
charismatic dictatorship. There
is also something of the sort in
the new so-called socialist coun-
tries like Algeria and Egypt.
Q. What is your evaluation of
Lenin as a politician and as an
interpreter of history? To what
extent did he contribute to the
creation of the world in which
we live?
A. I think that Lenin's main '
contribution was the centralized
totalitarian party. This new ma-
chine, or an imitation of it, holds
power in a great many countries.
In the past dictatorships were
temporary expedients, and par-
liamentary democracy was com-
monly held to be the most highly
evolved political system. This is
no longer so. Now the mystique
of the one-party state is wide-
spread. It is not just a means of
governing the state in a disci-
plined way, by a single authority;
it is a method that claims superi-
ority over the old democracy.
I believe that nowadays Lenin
exists in the popular imagination
as an alien figure, a man with a
rather curious but interesting ap-
pearance, with a face that drew
attention to itself�but mainly
as the romantic and utterly im-
placable enemy of capitalism.
But even here people disagree.
There are those who say that
capitalism has failed because all
that it has produced is a society
of consumption; but Lenin con-
sidered capitalism a failure be-
cause during his lifetime it was
unable to provide the worker
with a minimum of comfort or
convenience. Today the rich
young American student who de-
spises capitalism is alienated,
hates work, etc. These were not
the reasons for which Lenin
hated capitalism. The young rebel
of today detests institutions�he
is an anarchist. But Lenin was
the opposite of an anarchist. Of
course the young people make the
same mistake when they talk
about Chilna and Cuba. Cuba has
strict social discipline; it is an
intensely puritanical country.
Drugs are not allowed and, at the
University of Havana, not even
beards are permitted. But for to-
day's rebellious youth, Lenin is
no more than a figurehead and
not an object of much thought.
This, of course, does not apply
to authentic communists or to
real intellectuals, but it is true
that to many vague enemies of
society, Lenin is more of an ob-
ject of a superstitious cult than a
7
1,171,11.1.01
From AUX ECOUTES, Paris
genuine political figure�a cult
which is more characteristic of
the Middle Ages than of the mod-
ern world. But no one will take
his place�not Mao, Castro or
Guevara, and certainly not the
grey bureaucrats in Moscow. For
he represents an implacable force
against what the young people
consider to be the enemy of their
desires in life. By Francesco Russo
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SECRET
Cuba's Failure as a Socialist State. Against the backdrop of Cuba's
current all-out effort to harvest ten million tons of sugar, the attached
excerpts, with translation, of Reng Dumont's new book Is Cuba Socialist?
is of particular interest. (These first appeared in the 31 March issue of
Jeune Aft.l.que, with a brief introductory comment (also included) by the
Jeune Aftique economic editor, Gerard de Beaurepaire.) Dumont, who believes
in socialism, who was sympathetic to the Cuban revolution in the beginning
and who has studied closely the Cuban agricultural situation, has now de-
livered an indictment of the Cuban regime based on its mismanagement of the
economy, its dependence on the military complex as the most effective insti-
tution to run the country and the lack of any popular influence on the gov-
ernment. In agriculture especially, the author found that repeated mistakes,
inefficient methods and general lack of organization make a ten-million-ton
sugar harvest impossible. (According to a Havana Radio broadcast on 11 April,
the sugar harvest was then running behind schedule. The six-million-ton mark
was to have been reached by 3 April, and by 10 April it was still over
300,000 tons short of that figure.
3
SECRET
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JEUNE AFRIQUE � Paris
33. March 1970
par Rene Dumont
-02-E1=E 2ELZ. LPiE30?
Rene Dumont � qui a aujourd'hui soixante-
six ans � s'est mine de par le monde une
solide reputation de critique � et de c pessi-
miste Ses partis pris agacent. Ses conseils
exasperent. Si sa competence en agronomie
est mondialement reconnue, et respectee, ses
suggestions concernant la marche d'une &ono-
mie socialiste ou l'articulation des structures
de decision ont toujours rev.] un accueil�par-
tage. Apres � l'Afrique noire est mal partie �
� publie en 1962 � de nombreux, gouverne-
ments africains l'ont declare � persona non
�grata
A Cuba, Dumont est egalement attendu et
redoute. Fidel Castro l'a invite personnellement
trois fois : en 1960, en 1963 et, la derniere
fois, en juin 1969. Sur le point de repartir
pour Cuba. Dumont avait l'idee d'intituler son
second livre sur �l'experience cubaine : Cuba
ou les quatre periodes d'un socialisme origi-
nal �. Un mois plus tard, apres son etude sur
place, il changeait de titre : �Cuba est-il
socialiste ? �. Rene Dumont ne cherche pas
h le cacher. 11 est revenu decu, pessimiste,
inquiet pour l'avenir. S'il se range toujours
dans le camp des fideles de la revolution
cubaine, ii n'entend pas que le droit de cri-
tiquer ses amis lui soit contest&
En 1964, Rene Dumont dedicapit � aux Alge-
Hens � son premier livre sur Cuba (� Cuba,
socialisme et developpement �). En 1970, ii
n'est pas inutile que les Africains, qui cher-
chent toujours a s'inspirer du modele cubain,
lisent et meditent Cuba est-il socialiste? �,
paraitre ces iours-ci aux editions du Scull
, (collection Politique � � 248 pages - 5 F).
1 A travers ce !tyre � Oil se melent d'une
-naniere parfois trop touffue l'anecdote, l'ex-
perience vecue et le jugement de valleur �
Rene Dumont. a retrace la tentative de cons-
truction du socialisme a Cuba. depuis la period,:
de la rebellion genereuse et romantique
jusqu'a la periode actuelle, celle des dures
realites � en' passant par le stade de c la plani-
fication centralisee et bureaucratique � et celui
de la construction du communisme
Finalement, a la question qui est au cur du
probleme (1 Cuba est-il socialiste ? x.), Rene
Dumont � que l'on sent partage tout au long
de cette etude entre ses sympathies pour les
Cubains et son idealisme critique qu'il appelle
sa conscience professi,onnelle � repond par
des constatations que beaucoup trouvent tres
severes : l'economie se rnillitarise chaque jour
davantage, le culte de Fidel se transforme en
neo-stalinisme, une �te bienveillante� accu-
mule les privileges, etc.
De cc livre, c Jeune Afrique s'est assure la
possibilite d'en publier, le premier, de larges
extraits. U G. de Beaurepaire
1 ' I 1 1,VIP
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LES ELEFfizE 2E13
OG ET2 Mgrits
116
L'ichec des plans speciaux
La ferme d'Etat restait encore une exploitation agricole
diversifiee, par bien des traits traditionnelle. Cuba recherche
les formules d'exploitation des plus modernes, celles des
Etat.Unis, de l'agriculture industrielle a tits grande echelle,
pouvant utiliser notamment l'aviation (semis, epandages
d'engrais, d'herbicides, de pesticides...).
Vers la fin de 1967, il a donc ete decide d'elargir a l'eohelle
de touts rile la conception des plans specialises, dont nous
allons signaler des echecs. Apres 4'autonomie alimentaire
de chaque province, visant a reduire les transports et pertes
en route, on cherche a localiser chaque production a cote
de son usine de transformation, sinon de son port d'expor-
tation. On vise en somme la generalisation d'un complexe
de type � grande plantation de canne li�a sa centrale
sucriere �.
Nous avons d� note la priorite absolue accord& a la
canne a sucre ; viennent, en seconde ligne, la production lai.
tiers et les ceufs, a cote des plantations pour l'exportation :
surtout agrumes, cafe, ananas. En dernier lieu seulement
arrivent les cultures vivrieres pour l'alimentation locale, et
la production de viande. Sur ce canevas general, esquisse
par le bureau politique et precise par la junte centrale de
planification, tine carte de repartition des cultures dans toute
l'ile vient d'�e etablie, surtout stir la base de l'etude des
sols, du relief et de l'eau d'irrigation disponible...
L'histoire de ces � plans Fidel x, qui furent tous tres cott-
teux, est plutot tine longue suite d'echecs que de reussites.
Le plan horticole de .Pinares de Mayan i a eke &Ali stir des
terres ferrugineuscs, trop filtrantes, sujettes a l'erosion,
inaptes aux cultures maralcheres, qui sont en vole de late.
risation, qu'il ne faut pas toucher : les forets de pins sont idi
mieux a leur place. Le plan cafe de San Andres de Cai-
guanabo, province de Pinar del Rio, ou l'on se proposait de
passer tout de suite au communisme, a &hone. J'ai note
l'est de La Havane, stir des coteaux calcaires non irriga-
bles, des plantations de cafe qui ne recevaient guere plus
d'un metre de pluie, avec de trop longs mois de secheresse.
En 1969, j'ai retrouve pres de Bayamo des dizaines d'bec-�
.tares de vignes bien mal en point, car iilantees dans ces
2
argiks noires impermeables, oil nous noterons plus loin
l'echec des bananes et de la cantle a sucre. Pres de Sancti
Spiritus, des coteaux mieux drains etaient plantes en vigne,
mais lors de mon passage on avait mis pres d'un kilo
d'engrais a chaque pied, tout concentre contre le cep, ce
qui aIlait le briller a la premiere pluie. respare qu'on l'a
idepuis seme a la yoke, comme je Pai conseille, stir tout le
vignoble. En 1965, ce sont d'immenses elevages de c,hevres,
en 1966, de lapins, qui doivent etre ensuite plus ou moms
abandonnes. En 1967.1968 on plante a travers toute l'ile
des pois d'Angole, les Gandoul, qui ne donnent pas grand-
chose et que Ic Wail refuse; les hommes austi, quand on
leur en propose les grains. Le kudzu tropical ne donne pas
les rendements miracle que l'on avait espere...
(Chapitre Ii!, pp. 63, 64, 65 a 67.)
Insuffisance et precipitation
L'organisation de l'economie cubaine est Wile qu'il est
devenu a. peu pres impossible d'etablir des calculs eco-
nomiques assez valables pour mieux l'orienter, et tenter
d'esquisser un ordre de priorite plus rationnel des investis-
sements ; ce qui permettrait de maximiser la croissance de
la production. Ii me parait pour cela necessaire de dormer
tine autonomie comptable aux unites de production: puis
d'etablir des rapports de prix, interieurs et exterieurs, qui'
soient moms arbitraires ; ensuite attribuer un certain taux
d'intertt aux capitaux foumis aux entreprises... Pour la
production agricole, nous avons essaye de ,montrer, en
etudiant l'agriculture sovietique, la necessite economique
et sociale, pour eviter trop d'injustices, d'une rente fonciere,
qui chercherait ainsi a placer dans des situations moms'
injustes les travailleurs des entreprises ayant recu . des
terroirs avec conditions naturelles (sols, olimat, eaux..1) e\
\
economiques (debouches, infrastructure) tort variables.
Les plans agricoks cubains sont surtout etablis en objec.
tifs physiques, en hectares a planter et a semen Aussi la
qualite du travail n'a-t-elle pas ete, jusqu'it present, prise
suffisamment en consideration. Chemin s'affaire I alter vite,
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nu!..nte trop vile. ce qui l'obliee a tra.anivi Mai . IC3 l.vULD oreux a le preconiser des 1964, 'les facteurs de production
de production s'elevent, dans la mesure oU les erreurs s'ac-
cumulent. abaissant les rendements. Puisqu'on a refuse, sans
jastitication. la solution de la cooperative de production,
;::rsonne, en tant que groupe limitC, n'est directement inte-
resse a une meilleure efficience des entreprises d'Etat ; et_
cela se voit bien. Memo si les grands dirigeanrs oat generale-
ment une haute conscience de leur responsabilite nationale
et revolutionnaire, us satisfont du meme coup leur soif de
pouvoir. 'L'ouvrier, lui, souffre sous le dur soleil et dans son
baraquement mal aere ; surtout quand ii recoit de sa
4 Camille des lettres de plaintes, relatant les multiples diffi-
cult& de la vie quotiaienne ; alors il commence en-avoir
assez; et la production s'en ressent...
Un exemple l'Oriente. Cette province, qui constitue
le tiers de Cuba, devait fournir trois millions de tonnes de
sucre, 30 3/4 du total national. De belles plantations y oat
die realisees, mais ,beaucoup d'autres sont bien inegales,
tr.& sales cm mal placies ; de sorte que le rendement moyen
y sera inferieur a eelui de La Havane. On a plant& malgre
l'avis des paysans du lieu, des zones tellernent humides
que les boutures y scot mortes. Certaines de ces zones
d'argile noire semi-marecageuses furent replantees trois fois,
avant que l'on renonce devant une cotiteuse accumulation
d 'evidences.
Tout au long de la route centrale, le grand axe de Vile,
dans la basse vallee du Cauto, on pout Noir, non loin de ces
cannes en perdition, de vastes bananeraies en train de
mourir, egalement faute de drainage, en sols argileux. Des
1926. les nremieres etudes de sols faites a Cuba concluaient
�
ne convenaient guere qu'aux patures et aux rizieres.
On est enfin en train de les convertir en rizieres, apt& avoir
commis 'bien des fautes, qui eussent ete facilement evitables,
en demandant l'avis des vieux agronomes que l'on a mis sur
la touche, ou plus simplement des paysans.
Une grande partie des canneraies plantees on plaines plates
verraient leur rendement fortement augmente par un men-
leur drainage qui permettrait, en terre moyenne, de passer.
sOuvent de 35 a 60 tonnes de cantles par hectare, nous
dit Faustino Perez. Cela coOterait beaucoup moms cher a la
tonne que les cannes obtenues h plus grand travail dans les
plantations nouvelles ; surtout quand elles ant ete etablies
sur des terres vraiment marginales. Quand le drainage n'a
pas ete prevu, comme a la Centrale Naranjo, l'erosion a
sileneieusement ouvert de profonds ravins, qui vont goner
la recolte mecanique. Une partie des cannes tea pu etre
desherbee a temps; le citadin de Bayamo, mobilise pour les
biner, grince des dents, mais ne perd pas le setts de l'hu-
mour : � Qu'est-ce qu'il y a corn-me cantles, dans les mau-
vaises herbes, cette armee dit-il volontiers a ses amis,
quand apres une longue queue il pout enfin s'asseoir avec
eux au restaurant.
II y a certes dans cot objectif exaltant quelques resultats
positifs. On espere obtenir un effort exceptionnel. La meca-
nisation de la recolte de canne, le nettoyage par herbicides,
progressent ; tout eela permettra bientot de produire le
sucre, en supprimant Is durs travaux serviles. Cependant,
si cei objectif si ambitieux de 10 millions de tonnes avait
ete retarde de quelques annees, comme nous &ions nom-
�
disponibles auraient pu etre plus judicieusement affectes..
Nous le montrerons notamment a propos des primeurq
d'hiver ; mais les rizieres en ont ete egalement affectees.
(Chapitre V, pp. 101, 102, 199, 110, no
Une agriculture militarisee
L'agrieulnure cubaine est de plus en plus militarisee. Des
les debuts de la reforme agraire, l'artnee jouait un role
essential. Catte agriculture est desormais dirigee I partir
d'un poste de commandement puesto de mando � natio-
nal, dont j'ai vu le chantier...
Des puesto de mando analogues ont ete ou vont etre ,
etablis a l'echelon des provinces, des regions, des Plans.
Tante l'agriculture sera en quelque sorte codifide, et chaque
poste commence a recevoir, des unites de production pla-
cees sous ses ordres, certains renseignements journaliers,
hebdomadaires, mensuels, etc...; et ceci par diverses voies :
telephone, telex, radio, telegrammes, courtier. On s'inquiete
beaucoup, et a juste titre, de savoir quels sont les renseigne-
ments qui seront necessaires a tel ou tel echelon, A queile
cadence, et par quelle vole ii conviendra de les transmettre.
Probleme difficile : si l'on abuse du renseignement, les
cadres des unites de production seront nay& dans le papier,
comme ceux des granjas ; et ils n'auront plus assez de temps
pour le travail productif. Si le commandement n'a pas assez
d'elements d'information, ses decisions risquent d'�e Ma-
daptees a la situation reelle or c'est in/ qui decide, encore
..........
Cette structure militaire, et c'est la sa caracteristique essen-
tielle, ne fait pas assez confiance a la base. Trop de chases
sont decidees sur papier, d'en haut ; de sorte que les travail-
louts mobilises, embrigados, sont devenus des executants,
tout comme de simples soldats. Le chef d'un lot de riziere
� le sous-officier � tecoit des instructions sur tout cc qu'il
dolt faire jour par jour, depuis le jour J, -germination de la
variete de riz semee, jusqu'au jour J + 110 ou 120, date
prevue pour la moisson-battage.
L'agriculture cubaine realise pourtant un ensemble de
etches infiniment plus complexes que cellos d'une armee
du temps de paix. Cependant, une toile methode presenle
certains avantages : elle permet d'imposer une serie d'inno-
vations a tout le pays, d'un seul coup; sans avoir a obtenir,
par une persuasion parfois difficile, l'adhesion volontaire
d'une paysannerie comptant de nombreux entrepreneurs,
dont tous ne sont pas assez cultives pour en saisir vite
Pinteret. La dose d'engrais, le materiel, les techniques cultu-
tales, tout est decide a Pechelon technocratique �, qui
est cense etre bien au courant des techniques les plps
modernes...
On a d'abord elimine une agriculture capitaliste, qui ayait
bien des &faits (sous-emploi des terres et des hommeS),
mais disposait d'une structure assez efficace. L'agriculture
socialiste qui lui a succede, cello des .cooperatives et des
granjas, a mobilise toutes les ressources disponibles, s'est
equipee et surequipee, sans retrouver les memes eapacites
d'organisation du travail. Son (Thee est implIcitement
reconnu par la reorientation actuelle, Celle des plans sp6-
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aussi
lants materiels a
moms. Et finalernent, la societe militaire, le trait le plus
original de Cuba, s'est en quelque sorte imposee pour
remettre de l'ordre, car l'armee etait reste la mieux orga-
nisee de toutes les administrations. Devant les velleites de
fantaisie de Fidel, seul son frere Raul, qui le connait bien,
est capable de resister efficacement...
Ainsi s'impose peu a peu un certain aspect de cet homme
nouveau, qui nous &sit d� apparu sur les affiches a l'en-
tree de l'lle des Pins. L'homme nouveau, c'est le eoldat
modele, toujours entre les mains de ses chefs, decide a se
sacrifier, acceptant dans la joie toutes les difficultes, toutes
les missions. Ses chefs ont toujours raison, a Fidel ne se
, discute pas. � Changer l'homme, disait le Che D . Dominer
la nature, ajoute l'affiche. Mais ne cherche-t-on pas mainte-
nant a donziner l'homme ; si l'adulte y resiste, le jeune
l'accepte plus souvent. Quand le � Che a commence a
comprendre oit cela menait, une telle orientation n'a-t-elIF
pas contribue a sa decision de partir ?
(Chapitre VII, pp. 181, 182, 183, 184, 185.)
Au depart, le plus socialiste des regimes
Cuba etablit, a son depart, le plus socialiste des regimes
.xistants, avec plus d'enthousiasme populaire et de liberte
d'expression que dans le reste du camp ,socialiste. Les choses
ont, helas, bien change. Certes ii existe encore dans ce pays
de nombreux elements qui y favorisent la construction du
socialisme. Ii a solidement etabli son independance natl.�-
, nale, en rejetant la dependance yankee ; cependant ii depend
economiquernent de l'Union sovietique, cc qui lui facilite
une certaine forme de socialisme, mais ne lui permet pas
d'envisager n'importe quelle autre structure; et de se rap-
traditionnclle. Mais itablir des strucApproved for Release: 2019/07/03 CO2619164e l'ideologie chinoise. L'Etat y
d'abord indult la masse a travailler plutOt possede le pouvoir economique et politique, cc qui lui
pertnet de satisfaire en priorite nornbre de besoins collectifs.
Certaines realisations indtistrielles constituent un progress
tres marque (ciment, electricite, sucre). La peche progresse,
et l'importance dorm& par Fidel a l'irrigation est essentielle.
L'elevage, les fourrages, les plantations avancent en desor-
dre, mais avancent. Une partie des travailleurs maintient
leur enthousiasme, dans des conditions pourtant difficiles.
Mais cet Etat est-il vrainient entre les mains du peuple,
des travailleurs, des �pi:limos ? II paraitrait excessif de
Paffirmer. Tin groupe dirigeant s'est peu a peu degas& par
eliminations successives de'scertaines fractions, d'autres diri-
geants. Depuis 1959 il a a sa tete le meme chef, aussi incon-
teste ; et c'est justement que le bat peut le blesser le plus.
Car un pays, a mon avis, ne peut s'affirmer socialiste, des
que la contestation populaire n'y est plus guere possible. Ce
qui est du reste ure caracteristique commune, a des degres
divers, a tous les pays qui aujourd'hui se pretendent socia-
listes. Done le doute que nous fx)rtons sur le caractere
socialiste de Cuba s'etend a l'ensemble du camp socialiste:
cc qui ne lui fere pas plaisir I
La discipline s'impose, certes, pour assurer la perennite
dut developpement, laquelle exige une accumulation elargie,
d'autres disent d'enormes investissements. Ce qui entrain�
une austerite, qui serait plus acceptable si elle &sit vraiment
generalisee : ou alors, ne nous parlez plus de construire en
meme temps le communisme, si vous vous dites aussi tres
pragmatiques. Vous estimez necessaire de recompenser plus
les responsables les plus fideles, ceux qui sont charges de
faire travailler les autres.
Alors n'oubliez pas que les plus humbles travailleurs
seraient encore tires sensibles, eux aussi, au stade actuel, aux
stimulints materiels. Organises en petits collectifs de tra-
79,--nrThr
[fill t'L.
Fidel Castro explique souvent
qu'un homme tombe dans un �
puits, s'il fait un petit, un
moyen ou meme un grand
effort, n'en sortira jamais. II
n'y arrivera qu'au prix d'un
effort tout a fait extraordi-
naire. Et c'est justement cet
effort-la qu'il demande a son
peuple, puis exige de lui, en
vue de le sortir vite du puits
du sous-developpement...
Fidel Castro est une figure
historique, un personnage ex-
ceptionnel, qui a donne a sa
revolution et a son pays une
place extraordinaire, hors de
proportion avec l'importance
geographique de cc ,dernier.
En face de lui, jusqu'ici, deux
attitudes sont les plus cou-
rantes. Pour les Yankees et
TiLOLLI-JJ
leurs allies, pour le monde
qui se dit trop vite libre, que
rappellerais plutet le monde
riche, et que ses adversaires
appollent un peu schemati-
quement l'imperialisme, Fidel
est un ennemi dangereux, un
dictateur.
Pour les inconditionnels de
Cuba et surtout de l'exterieur,
domine un sentiment d'admi-
ration, pousse au �point gull
obnubile generalement tout
sens critique...
Fidel Castro n'a finalement
confiance qu'en lui, et ne salt
pas deleguer entieretnent les
responsabilites. II reste le chef
unique, il estime qu'il doit
tout voir par lui-meme, tout
rectifier. Certes, il est l'anima-
teur universel, ses objectifs
14
incitent a l'effort, ses discours
suscitent encore un certain
enthousiasme ; surtout aupres
de ses plus fidNes, les ouvriers
de la canne. Mais, quand ii
se met a promettre c la lune �,
6�11.1�01.2111
bien des auditeurs cubains
tournent le bouton de la,
radio, ils n'y croient plus. II
veut tout faire par lui-meme, ,
et il a trop d'idees a la fois,
bus les jours, a chaque ins- �
tant, qu'il voudrait mettre
execution, sans en bien voir
toutes les difficultes...
Beaucoup de ces projets
avaient une certaine valetir,
et les echecs tiennent au fait
ont 6te lances sur un
coup de tete du lido
maxim� du grand chef,
sans etudes prealables assez.
serieuses, trop vite a trop
grande �elle. Fide croit
tout savoir, en bien des do-
maines, mieux que les autres ;
et c'est son orgueil qui risque
un Jour de le perdre.
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Approved for Release. 2019/07/03 CO2619164 �
ciaux, que nous allons etudier. En para.., �... � _es mcapables de l'agriculture, quelle
r--
roffensive rovolutionnairc, void que s'esquisse la militari-
sation de toute l'eronomie eubaine.
Tous les poste importants sont desormais confies
l'armee ; toutes ies entreprises notables ont a leur tete un
commandant, un capitaine ou un premier lieutenant. La
.-cp4tition de cette prise en charge par l'arme,e semble bien
,Lvoir ete la mise en ceuvre, en octobre 1967, de cette brigade
� Che Guevara. Pres de mule tracteurs a chenilles, bulldozers
et tanks, regroupes dans les plais du Canto, recurent de
Casfro lui-memc, passant en re", debout dans son corn-
ri les troupes mecanisees, le signal du depart. Cette
h de va � tallier en pieces � son nouvel ennemi, la nature.
j t par terre indistinctement tout ce qui faisait le charme
d'e chante notamment par Christophe Colomb et par
A. Humboldt.
11 y a la une veritable prise de possession d'une agriculture
socialiste plutot mal en. point par l'armee, car celle-ci dirige
toute la motorisation. Ces 50 000 tracteurs plus ou moms
In
merveilleuse ecole de recrues cela peut nous fournir a, aurait
dit A peu pres un c�bre commandant. Des mars-avril 1968,
les chefs. de la maquinaria des granfas sont remplaces par
des lieutenants, et les tractoristes militarises ont des soldes
fixes (done suppression de i heures supplementaires), des
horaires ,militaires, vingt-cin4 jows de travail continu, sans
arret dominical, et cinq jc4frs de permission par tnois...
quand le travail le permettia:
Des &riles de tractoristes ou conducteurs d'engins sont
creees, qui sont aussi des &elks de jeunes recrues. On
laboure en quatrleme vitesse a pleins gaz, on cite des records
extraordinaires � vingt-quatre heures, puis soixante-douze
heures de travail continu I Les tanks, auxquels ont a ertleve
leurs tourelles, unis deux a deux par une lourde chaine, font
tomber bus les arbres, sans prendre garde a ceux qu'il
aurait Lilt] conserver. Mais le spectacle est grandiose. de ces
gros arbres tombant commelfetus de paille moms que,
trop resistants, us ne lass* caler meme les Si puissants
moteurs des chars sovietiqties. �
L'agriculture, en plus d'un probleme lancinant qu'on espere
resoudre, devient ainsi un magnifique terrain de manwuvre
pour l'armee. La militarisation est avancee pour resoudre
la pagaie generale, tout comme la resistance passive de la
fraction croissante de travailleurs reticents. La population
cubaine est de plus en plus soumise au parti et a l'armee,
qui deviennent d'autant plus difficiles a distinguer que l'uni-
forme les rapproche, gulls portent tous revolvers.
(Chapitre V, pp. 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148.)
Erip LI EH] 26171(2:13@
(322...13--J1j1192D
L'honnne nouveau, c'est le soldat
Alois, ces caracteres originaux du socialisme cubain, que
j'avais notes avec tant de plaisir en 1960 et en 1963, et que
jc suis venu rechercher a nouveau avec tant d'int6ret en
1969, nieme quand je n'etais pas d'accord avec certains
d'entre eux, que deviennent-ils ? Justifient-ils encore le pre-
mier titre prevu pour ce livre (1)? Les void qui se reduisent
essentiellement une societe plus militaire, ot Raul Castro
rappelle souvent le mot d'ordre de Farm& � Pour quoi
que ce soit, oii que ce soit et dans n'importe quelles circons-
lances, commandant en chef, h vos ordres. D...
Viennent ensuite les mobilisations agricoles, par lesquelles
Castro semble ficr de montrer aux pays de l'Est a gild point,
lui, ii peut se faire obeli% Puis les non-paiemcnts d'heures
supplementaires ; mais finalement tout cola se rapproche par
certains cotes du stalinisme, sans la meme terreur, trials avec
beaucoup de police. De ce stalinisme, nous retrouvons un
autre trait, la simplification de la theorie. La vision, que l'on
soupconne magnifique. Trials que l'on imagine malaisement,
(I) Avant le depart, j'avaiel'idee de l'intituler Cuba, on les Quatre
periodes d'un socialisme original. La poursuite de ['etude min.
amene b, an changer le titre, tnalheureusement.
5
de l'homme nouveau vivant dans une societe fraternelle, ii
n'y a pas besoin de rester longtemps a Cuba pour la voir
s'assombrir...
Deux mille ans de predication chretienne, dis-je
Mgr Zachi, qui represente le Vatican a Cuba et garde
les meilleures relations avec Fidel Castro (c'est aussi un
bon point pour ce dernier), en vue d'ameliorer l'homme,.
n'ont obtenu cependant que des resultats limites. a � Oh !
combien limit�! �, repond Monseigneur. J'ai d� lu que
nous &ions passes de rage des cavernes a cclui des caser-
nes ; et ce demier triomphe insoletnment a Cuba, avec les
affiches 'celebrant l'orgueil du pays, les petits � camillitos
(disciples de Camillo Cienfuegos), les cadets de l'ecole des
futurs officiers, sournis des l'enfance a une preparation
toute speciale, celle de futurs clirigeants et non pas scule-
ment de futurs combattants.
Une revolution pourrait esperer faire progresser l'homme
plus vile que le christianisme, qui est tot retombe dans le
conformisme constantinien : si die savait garder le meilleur
du c Che a, faire participer tout le monde. tout en degageant
la majorith des Cubains de leur indolence generalise; elle
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sanales...) et de distribution. ils auraient un inter& personnel
a les voir prosperer. tin tel socialisme serait rbien imparfait,
dites-vous, non suns raisons; rnais ii pourrait, lui, garnir
plus vite les tables et les armoires, ,ce qui importe beaucoup.
Et surtout accepter la critique, la lutte antibureaucratique,
qui pourrait prendre une forme adaptee a cc pays de revo-
lution culturelle.
Les elements socialistes nous apparaissent en recut tresP
marque A Cuba, surtout depuis que les Militaires y.ont pri(
la direction effective tie toute l'iconomio. La structure dc$
plans gants n'y permet guere une organisation efficiente
du travail. Les bataillons d'ouvriers et de materiel ne peu-
vent, dans un tel cadre, assurer la qualite du travail, ni le
plein emploi de couteux equipements. Les cadres sont de-
bordes, et pas toujours bien informes. Cuba produit de plus
en plus cher, accroit la demande d'effort et de sacrifices, en
mann temps que les privations. II n'arrive pas a remettre en
ordre son economie, malgre de constantes reorganisations.
� Pas de discussion democratique dans le parti �, me disent
moi, dont on connait pourtant bien la position, les plus
hauts responsables patiques cubains. Ii faut donc que cc
soit terriblement vrai. Les militaires eliminent des postes de
commande beaucoup de vieux communistes, dont je suis
loin d'approuver toutes les theses, mais qui cherchaient
souvent a freiner un certain nombre de leurs abus. Voici
Fidel Castro, commandant en chef des forces armees revo-
lutionnaires, dote d'un pouvoir personnel sans controle suf-
fisant. Nous avons u que cela l'a souvent conduit a des
improvisations hatives, a des generalisations prematurees,
des precipitations dangereuses, sinon a des erreurs econo-
miques caracteristiques.
Le refus d'analyses economiques serieuses empeche la
determination d'un meilleur ordre de priorite, trouble l'af- �
fectation la plus judicieuse d'une masse enorme d'investis-
sements, rendus de cc fait beaucoup moms efficients. Et sur-
tout les travailleurs deviennent plus reticents, cherchent a se
reposer, vont jusqu'a noyer les phares des tracteurs : car
beaucoup commencent a desesperer d'en sortir. � (Nene
idee a cu ma mere de me faire naltre dans cc fichu pays �,
criait, un soir de Pete 1969, cc jeune desespere, a la sortie
d'un cinema de La Havane.
Fidel ne se rend plus compte que d'une partie des diffi-
cultes, car son entourage n'ose plus tout lui rapporter. Ii lui
faudrait envisager une certaine limitation de ses pouvoirs,
avant qu'il ne soit trop tard. Cette reorganisation politique,
basee sur un controle effectif du parti par les travailleurs, du
comite central par le part', et de Castro par ledit comite,
me parait le prealable absolu, la condition essentielle du
red ressement econornique, base necessaire d'une reelle incle-
pendance cubaine. En donnant tous les pouvoirs a l'armee,
on affaiblit son economie, done finalement sa capacite de
defense nationale.
Oui, je le sais : tout ceci est facile a ecrire a la table d'un
vieux professeur de la vieille Europe, bien difficile a realiser
par ceux qui ont la responsabilite du pouvoir a La Havane.
Muchisimas gracias, Fidel, pour m'avoir donne la possibilite
d'une etude passionnante.
(Chapitre IX, pp. 233 a 236.)
� 1970 editions du Seug
6
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JEUNE AFRIQpE, Paris
31 March 1970
Dumont's 'Is Cuba Socialist?' Reviewed
Excerpts from forthcoming book
by Rene Dumont: "IS Cuba Socialist"
Rena Dumont, who is 66 today, has carved out a solid
world-wide reputation for himself as a "critic" and a
"pessimist." His prejudices irritate. His advice is
exasperating. While his competence in agronomy is rec-
ognized all over the world, and respected, his suggestions
as to the operation of a socialist economy or the articula-
tion of decision-making structures have consistently met
with a mixed reception. Since his "L'Afrique Noire Est
Mal Partie" [Black Africa Is Off to a Bad Starg came out
in 1962 he has been declared persona non grata by numer-
ous African governments.
In Cuba, Dumont is welcomed with eagerness, mixed with
a considerable dose of trepidation. Fidel Castro person-
ally has invited him there three times: in 1960, in 1963, .
and most recently in June 1969. As he was setting out for
Cuba, Dumont had tentatively entitled his second book on
Cuba,"Cuba, ou lea Quatres Periodes d'un Socialisme Originale"
guba, or the Four Phases of a New Socialismj A month
later, after his on-the-spot investigation, he had scrap-
ped that title for "Is Cuba Socialist?" Dumont makes no
effort to hide it. He came home disappointed, pessimistic,
uneasy over the future. While he is still in the camp of
those faithful to the Cuban revolution, he will not hear
of anyone's questioning his right to criticize his friends.
In 1964, Rene Dumont dedicated his first book on Cuba,
("Cuba, Socialisme et Developpement") to "the Algerians."
In 1970, it may be salutary for the Africans, who are still
trying to draw inspiration from the Cuban model, to read
and ponder Is Cuba Socialist? Seuil press is bringing it
out in the Politique series (248 pages, 5 francs).
In this book, which is a sometimes over-rich blond of
anecdote, first-hand experience, and value judgment, Rene
Dumont retraces the essay at building socialism in Cuba
from the era of "generous and romantic rebellion" to the
present period of "tough reality," passing through the
stage of "centralised bureaucratic planning" and that of
"building communism*"
In the end, Rene Dumont has in answer to the question that
lies at the heart of the problems Is Cuba socialist? You
feel that he is torn throughout the study between his syme
7
1�Pyr.'1�7TIrf.I.W1t7(7-nr(71V1.11.1,.'in";;I.vi"'
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pathies for the Cubans and the critical idealism he calla
his profesaional conscience, and the answer he comes up
with is one that many will find harsh indeed: the economy
is growing more militaristic with each passing day, the
cult of Fidel is turning into neodatalinism, a owelleine
taationees elite is piling up privileges, etc. -
Jowl'? Agrun has acquired the rights to publish the first
extensive excerpts of this book.
00 de Bourepaire
;pocial Plans 4,r4ljure
The state farm was still a diversified agricultural operation, and in
many ways a traditional one. Chba la looking for the very latest operating
formulas, those of the United States, for very large-scale industrial agricul-
ture, big enough to make use of aircraft for such operations as planting,
fertilising, weed. and pest-killing.
Toward the end of 1967, it was decided that the concept of the ape.
cialized plans should be broadened to embrace the entire Island. This is
the story of their failure. After the drive for making each province capable
of feeding itself, designed to cut losses by shortening shipping distances and
reducing losses en route, came an effort to grow each crop conveniently near
to its processing plant, if not to its port of export. The idea wee to goner.
aline the old vertical idea oil a ',big sugar plantation with its own sugar al1.11
We have already spoken of the absolute priority :iv:lamed to sugar cane..
Right behind it comes milk and egg production, planned Around exportuicrop
plantations of citrus fruits, coffee, and pineapple. In the very last place
come food crops for local supply and meat production. On the overall canvas,
sketched in by the political bureau and with the details filled In by the cen-
tral planning junta, they have just completed a crop*distribution map cover-
ing the whole island. It has been worked out primarily on the bads of a sure
vey of the soil, altitude, and available irrigation water supplies...
The history of these "Fidel Plana" all of which were very expensive,
Is the story of a long series of failures, rather than successes. The Pinares'
de Mayan l garden plan was located on iron-rich soil that was too permeable and
subject to erosion, quite unsuited to truck gardening, which Is fast turning
into laterite, and which must not be toucheds pine forests would do far better
here. The San Andres de Caiguanabo in Pinar del Rio province, where the idea
was to leap directly into communism, is a failure. To the east of Havana, I
saw unirrigable chalk cliffs planted with coffee which received a scant meter of
rainfall, doled out over endless months of drouth. In 1949, near Bayamo� I
found dozens of hectares of vinyards in very bad condition because they had
been planted in those black hardpan clay soils, the same kind, as we shall see
further on, as proved inhospitable to bananas and sugar cane. hear Sancti Spie
ritus there were some betteredrained slopes planted to vinyards, but when I
went through there they had just got through putting almost a kilo of fertilie
ser around each vine, but all of it concentrated around the trunk, which meant.
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that the vines would be badly burnt when the first rain came. I hope that they
have done some broadcast sowing of ground cover in the vinyard, as I advised
them to do. In 1965 there were starts at raising huge numbers of goats, and
in 1966 tbbbthingere the thing: both projects have been more or loss abandoned
since. In 1967 and 1968 the whole island Was planted to Angola peas, or Can.
doul, which did not turn out to be much, and whieh the livestock refused to
eat. So did the people, when the seedegrain was offered for eels in the market.
The tropical Xudsu peas did not produce the miracle yields that were touted for
them. (Cbapter 39 pp 63, 64, and 63e67.)
Eartagas end Rairt
The Cuban economy is so organised that it is impossible, or nearly so,
to formulate forecasts reliable enough to give it better orientation, or to
try to map out a more rational order of investment priority, which would make
it possible to boost production to the maximum. It seems to me that in order
to do this there must be some kind of bookkeeping independence for each unity
of production. Than there must be an established price ratio for the domestic
and foreign markets, and it must be less arbitrary than the present system.
After that, there should be a ceiling set for interest rates on capital made
available to businesses... 'For farm production, we have tried, by studying the
Soviet agricultural economy, to demonstrate the economic and social need for
a guaranteed income from farmland, In order to avoid too great injustice..
Such a subsidy would seek to make a little less unfair situation for farmers
on colaectives assigned lands with highly variable natural conditions (such
as soil, climate, water) and economic situations (such as market availability
and infrastructures).
Cuban agricultural plans are set Up chiefly with physical targets such
as so many hectares of land to plant and to sow. This moans that the quality
of the work done has not so far been taken adequately into consideration.
Everybody in eager to gat It done fast, even too fast, which perforce means
doing a sloppy Job. The Costs of production rise as mistakes pile up and
yields dwepdle. Since there is an unjustified refusal to consider the produce
tion cooperative solution, nobody in, limited group is directly interested
In greater efficiency for the stateerun enterprises, and this Is all too *vie
dent. Even though the top management people are generally highly aware of
their responsibility to the nation and Co the revolution, they are also setts.
fying their personal thirst for power. The worker, though, suffers under the
hot sun and in his airless barracks, particularly when he gets letters from
his family complaining about the manifold difficulties of everyday life. That
is when he begins to get sick of It all, and the effect of his disaffection
shows In the production figures.
One example is Oriente. This province, which covers a third of Cuba,
is supposed to provide three million tons of sugar, or 30 percent of the nae
tional total. There are 6000 splendid plantations there, but a groat many more
are far from that standard, either vary dirty or very poorly located. And as
a result the yield in Oriente is lover than that in La Habana. Against the ad.
vice of the peasants who know the land, they have planted sugar in areas so
damp that the seedlings died. Some of these semiemarshy black clay zones were
planted three times before the planners gave up in the face of � mounting pile
of costly evidence.
9
.77 IiTTI
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All along the central highway that runs the length of the island in
the low valley of the Couto, you can see, not far from the dying cane groves,
huge banana plantations that are drowning in undrained hard clay soil. As
early as 1926, the first soil surveys takenlin Cuba concluded that these black
and very clayey soils, with their poor drainage and high magnesium content, were
fit only for marginal pastures and rice paddies, Nov at last they are getting
around to planting rice there, after making a lot of mistakes that could easily
have been avoided by asking for advice from the agronomists made available to
them, or more simply by just asking the local peasants,
Most of the sugar cane planted on the flat plains would produce far
higher yields is there were better drainage, which, on average land, would boost
harvests from 35 tone per hectare to as much as 60 tons, Faustino Perez told us,
This would cost far less per ton than the cane grown with far more work on the
new plantations, particularly those that have been established on really mar.
ginal lands. When there has been no provision for drainage, as at the Naranjo
Center, erosion has crept in and silently carved deep ravines which are going
to cause trouble when they try to use machinerylin the harvest. Some of the
cane has not been weeded soon enough. A man from Sayan*, mobilised to weedtthe
cane fields, is none too happy about the job, but keeps his sense of humor all
the same: "What a lot of cane there is in the weeds this }mares he comments to
his friends when, after a long welt In line, he finally gets a seat with them
in the restaurant.
Of course, there are some good results from this heady objective. They
hope to get an all-out effort. Mechanization of cane harvesting and weed con-
trol with herbicides are making progress. All this will shortly make it pos.
sible to produce sugar without all this backbreaking manual labor. Meanwhile,
since this very ambitious target of a 10-million-ton harvest has been delayed
for several years, as a great many of us predicted it would be as early as 1964,
the available production factor, could have been distributed more judiciously.
We shall demonstrate this most dramatically in connection with winter vegetable
crops, but the rice paddies have also beertaffected, (Ch03, pp 101,102,109,1108
1114
Witsrited Agriculture
Cuban agriculture is becoming more and more militarized. From the very
beginning of land reform, the army has played an essential role. Agriculture
here is now run from a command post em guest* de mando am in the capital, and I
have seen it at work.,.
Similar command posts have been or will shortly be set up for every re.
glen, every province, every Flan. All farming will operate under some sort of
code, and each command post is beginning to receive from each production unit
under its orders certain information on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis.
The reports come in by telephone, telex, radio, telegram, and courier. There
Is considerable concern, and rightly so, over what information has to be sent
to such and such an echelon, and how that information ought to be sent. This
is a tough problem: if there is too much demand for information, the cadres
out in the production units will be drowned in paper work like those in the
granjas, and they will not have enough time loft over for productive work. If
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the comman&post does not get enough data, its decisions may well be unsuited
to the real situations but it is the puesto that makes the deelsion, and makes
it at considerable distance from the field.
This military structure, and that is essentially what it is, does not
have enough confidence in the rank and file. Too many decisions are made on
paper, from above. Which means that the mobilised workers, put into brigadea,
have become mere carrierseout of orders, exacYly like privates. The boss of a
plot In a rice paddy �� the non-corn to. gets his orders as to what he is to do
day by day, from D-day when the kind of rice he has planted should germinate,
to Deday plus 110 or 120, when the rice is to be harvested and threshed.
And yet Cuban agriculture performs a group of tasks far more complex
than those of a peacetime army. Nevertheless, such a method has certain advane
tagoa. It makes it possible to impose a whole series of innovations on the
entire country at the same time, without waiting for sometimes difficult per.
suasion to achieve the voluntary cooperation of a peasantry with a number of
individual farmer.owners, all of whom are not sufficiently educated to grasp
the advantage of the innovation at once. The amount of fertiliser, the equip.
pent, the cultivation techniques �� everything is decided on tho "technocratic!'
level, where they are supposed to be thoroughly up-to-data on all the latest
techniques...
They began by eliminating capitalist agriculture, which had its faults
(including under-use of land and. men), but had a fairly efficient structure.
The socialist agriculture which has peplaced it, the agriculture of the coop.
eratives and the &manias, has mobilized all available resources, is equipped
and over-equipped, but has yet to find the same capacity for organising the
work. Its failure is Implicitly admitted by the current reorganisation under
the special plans* which we shall study shortly. .And in parallel with this*
within the framework of the revolutionary offensive, we see the formation of
milltarisation of the (satire Cuban economy.
All the important jobs are now held by the army. All the sizeable ope-
rations are headed by a major, a captain, or a first lieutenant. The dress
rehearsal for this army takeover was apparently staged in October 1907 by the
Che Guevara brigade. Almost a thousand tractors, bulldozers, and tanks assamb�
led in the Couto bottomlands In parade formation, got the go signal from Castro
himself as he reviewed them in his jeep. This brigade went out to cut its new
enemy, nature, to pieces, indiscriminately rolling over everything that gave
the island its charm, all that had enchanted men from Chriet4pher Columbus to
Alexander Humboldt.
This was a genuine takeover of 4 pretty shaky socialist agriculture by
the army, because the army controls all the motorised equipment. "What a mare,
velous training-school for rectults these 50,000 tractors, more or loss mistrea� k
ted by these ignorant agriculture people, would bee a famous commander must
have thought one day. Starting in March and /Orli 1968, the bosses of the
maquinaria on the granjas were replaced by lieutenants, and the militarised
tractor operators now have fixed wages (no more overtime), and work on a mi-
litary timetables 23 days straight work, no Sundays off, and 3 days leave per
month... when the work load allows it.
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Schools have been set up for tractor and machinery operators, which are
also schools for young recruits. They plow at full speed In fourth gear.
You hear about extraordinary records 24 hours, even 72 hours of continuous
work& Tanks vhose turrets have been removed are linked together two by two
with heavy chains, and simply maw down the trees* without a thought as to the
trees that should have been spared. But it is a great sight to see those big
trees topple like strawstacks except when an exceptionally sturdy one rolls
over even the mighty Soviet tanks.
Agriculture, in addition to a problem that they hope to solve, thus
becomes a magnificent maneuvering ground for the army. Militorisation is
sold as a solution to the general mass as well as to the passive resistance of
a growing proportion of silent workers. The Cuban people are increasingly �
subject to the party and to the army, and it is increasingly difficult to tell
the partyhmen from the army man, since they all carry revolvers, (Ch, 36 pp
1416 1426 1436 1466 1476 1486)
Ihp New Man Is the Soldier
What, then, has become of these original characters in Cuban socialism
who= I reported with such pleasure in 1960 and 1963* and whom I came back to
ace again with such greateexpectations in 1969, even though I did not agree
with some of them? Do they still justify the title I had tentatively chosen
for this book? (Bofors I left, I had planned to call it "Cuba, ou lee Quatro
Periodos de= socialism. original." Pursuit of the study unfortunately led
me to change that title.) Mere they are, essentially reduced to a more mill.
tary society, in which Raoul Castro often repeats the army's shibboleth: "For
whatever it may be, wherever it may be, and under any circumstances whatever0
we await your orders, Commanderoineehlefive
Then came the farm mobilizations, in witch Castro seems to use to show
the Eastern countries the kind of obedience HE can command. Then came the abol-
ition of overtime pay. And in the last analysis* it in all similar in some ways
to Stalinism, without the same kind of terror,,but with a lot of police And
we find another trait of Stalinism here in the simplification of theory.\ You
need not stay long in Cuba to see that vision, which you feel is magnificent,
though hard to Imagine, of the new man living in a fraternal society,blur and
grow dim...
"Teo thousand years of preaching Christianity," I said to Mgr. Zachi,
who represents the Vatican In Cuba and maintains cordial relations with Fidel
Castro (that, too, is a point for Castro)* "all to make INA betterm have pro.
ducod only limited results." "Oh, how limitedi" answered Monsignor. I read
somewhere that we had moved from the cave�man era into that of the barracks mane
And the barracks man guessers in triumph in Cuba, where the posters boaat of
national pride, and the little "camillitos," the disciples of Camillo Clen�
fuegos, the cadets in the school for future officers* are trained from child.
hood in very special courses designed to hake them the future rulers of their
country, not merely future fighting men,
A revolution might hope to make men progress faster than Christianity
did, which soon degenerated into Constantinian conformity. If it could keep
the best of 'oche," and make everybody participate as it weaned the majority of.
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Cubans away from their inborn !millions which is also traditional. But �stab.
liahing structures without material incentives had as its first result making
the masses work less, rather than more. And lastly* the military society, the
most striking trait in Cuba* was In a way inevitable in order to restore order,
because the army VAS the best organised of all the administrations. The &ay
man who can put up any effective resistance to Fidel Castro's imaginative
etilis is his brother Raoul, who knows him well.
And so, little by little, a certain aspect of this new man, whom we had
already seen a glimpse of on the posters at the entry to the Isle of Pines,
is imposed. The new man is the model soldier* always obedient to his leaders.,
determined to sacrifice himself, joyfully accepting all difficulties, randy
to take on any mission. His leaders are always right. "Fidel is not to be
argued about." Change people, said "Chess Dominate nature, adds the poster..
But are they not trying now to dominate the man? If the adult puts up some
resistance, the Child most often accepts it. When sCh" began to understand
where all this was leading, might not such a trend have oontributed to his
decision to leave?
(Chapter 7, pp 181, 182, 183, 184, 1834
a the stext, the meet,oetettatof RexlIps
When it began, Cuba set up the most socialist of existing regimes*
with more popular enthusiasm and more freedom of expression than in the rest
of the socialist camp. But alas* things have changed greatly. Of course there
are still a groat many factors in this country that favor the building of
coati:Mem. It has solidly established its national independance by rejecting
its dependance on the Yankees.. And yet it depends economically on the Soviet
Union, vfilch makes a certain form of socialism easy for it, but does not allow
it to consider any other structure and to draw closer, for example, to the
Chinese ideology. The state here has liednomic and political power, which enables
it to give top priority to satisfying a great many collective needs. Some of its
industrial achievements constitute very marked progress (cement, electricity,
sugar). Fishing is making progress, and the importance Fidel has given irrigation
is essential. Cattle raising, forage crops* and plantations are advancing in
disorder, but they are advancing. Some of the workers are still enthusiastic*
even under difficult conditions. But is this state really run by the people*
the workers, the oppressed? It would seem excessive to say so. Gradually a
ruling group has emerged* through successive elimination of certain factions
and of other leaders. The same leader has been at the mitten's head since 1959,
and still nobody has challenged him. And right there is the thing that hurts
most. Because* in my opinion, no country can call itself socialist if there is
almost no chance for the people to challenge their leader. And this is a trait
common to greater or lesser degree to all the countries which call themselves
socialist these days. Hence the doubts we feel as to Cuba's socialist charace
tar extends to the entire socialist camp. And that is not a thingsthat will
make us happyi
Diacipline is necessary* of course, to ensure continued development,
which requires increased savings #.0, some say enormous investmonta. And this
involves austerity* which would be more acceptable if it were truly generals
or else stop talking about building communism at the same time, if you also
call youselves very pragmatic. You feel it necessary to give greater rewards
to the most loyal loaders, those who are in charge of mating others work.
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In this case, do not forget that the humblest workers would also be very
sensitive, in the present phase, to material incentives. Organised into little
working collectives, into production units (agricultural, artisanal...) and
distribution units, they would have a personal interest in making them prosper.
This kind of socialism would be quite imperfect, you will says/and you would
be right. But it could fill the tables and the cupboards a lot faster, and
that is very important. And above all accept the standard of the struggle
against bureaucracy, which could take a form suitable to this country of cul�
tuna revolution.
We see the socialist elements in very marked retreat In Cuba, perticu�
long since the military have taken over effective managomont of the entire
economy. The giant plan structure scarcely permits an effective organisation
of labor. Battalions of workers and equipment, in such a structure, cannot
ensure the quality of work or full, use of costly equipment. The cadroa are -
in over their beads, and are not alvaya well informed. Cuba's production coats
are going higher and higher, and the demand effort and sacrifice is rising
at the same rate as privation. The country is not managing to put its economy
back in order, despite constant reorganization. �Nito democratic discussion in
the party,* 6 was told, despite their knowledge of ny position, by the highs,
oat.4anking Cuban politicians. That moans that it must be all too terribly
true. The military are ousting many old communists from their jobs. Although
I did not approve all their views by a long ihoi4 they often tried to put a
brake on some of the military's abuses. Look at Fidel Castro, commander-in.
.thief of the revolutionary armies, given personal power without sufficient
contool. We have aeon that this has often led him into hasty improvisations,
premature generalisations, and dangerous precioitation, if not into typical
economic errors.
The rejection of serious economic analysis prevents the ostablishmont
of a better order of priorities and hampers the most judicious posaiblo uso
of an enormous mass of investments, which are thus rendered far less efficient.
And most important, the workers are growing sullen, looking for a chance to
loaf, even going so faraas to break the headlights on the tractors, because
many of them are beginning to despair of things' ever getting any bettor. One
evening In the summer of 1969, a youngster coming out of a movie in Havana
cried, "What a fool my mother was to let me be born in this lousy countryin
Fidel Is no longer aware of more than' a part of his problems, because
those around him do not dare to tell him everything. Ho must start considering
aome degree of limitation of his own powers, before it Is too late. This poi.
litical crgrganisation basedoon real control of the party by the workers, of
the central committee by the party, and of Castro by the committee, seems to
me to be the sine qua non, the essential condition for recovery of economic
balance, which is the necessary foundation for real Cuban independence. By
giving all power to the army, it is weakening its economy, and, in the long
run, its capacity for national defame.
Yes, I know* all this is easy for an old professor to sit at a desk
in old Europe and write, but it la hard indeed to do for those who have the
responsibility for governing in Havana. Muchisimas gracias, Fidel, for
giving me a chance to do a fascinating study, (Chapter 9, Op 233436.)
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Fidel Castro often says that if a man who has fallen into a well makes
a little effort, a medium effort, or even a great effort, he will clover get
out. He can only get out by means of an utterly extraordinary effort. And
it is precisely that sort of effort which ha demands of his people and of
himself, in order to clamber out of the well of underwdevelopment.
Fidel Castro is an historic figure, an exceptions% parson, who has given
his country and his revolution an extraordinary place in hidtory, ono quite
out of proportion with its geographical importance. There are two common at.
titudes toward him today. For the Yankees and their allies, for the world that.
all too glibly calls itself free, and which I should rather call the rich
world, and which its enemies a little glibly coil imperialism* Fidel is a
dangerous enemy, a dictator.
For the unconditional supporters of Cuba, particularly those outside.
Cubs, the dominant fooling is one of admiration pualved to the point when) it
.generally blunts any critical sense...
In the last analysis, Didel Castro trusts nobody but himself, and he
cannot entirely delegate responsibility. He is still the sole leader. He
feels that he must see to everything himself, put everything to rights himsdaf�
Of course, he is the universal inspiration. His goals inspire people towwork,
his speeches still stir a dogreo of enthusiasm, particularly among those most
loyal to him, the sugar-cano workers. Out when he begins promising them tho
moon, many of his Cuban listeners simply twin off therradio.. They don't believe
it any more. Ha wants to do everything himself, and he has too many idoas at
one time, ovary day, ovary minute, all of which he wants Implemented right
then, without stopping to take a close look at all the difficulties involved.
Many of his projects had a certain value, and the failures failed because
they were Launched at the whim of the Wilder maxima.' without adequate prior
study, too feat and on too large a scale. Fidel thinks he knows everything In
many areas bettor than anybody else, end it is his pride that may one day prove
to go before his fall.
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Excerpts from t�
Arms
for the Third World
SOVIET MILITARY
AID DIPLOMACY
WYNFRED JOSHUA AND STEPHEN P. GIBERT
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS �
BALTIMORE AND LONDON
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CONTENTS
Preface
I. Soviet Military Aid in Iatemational Politics
Changing Soviet Images of International Politics ----------------2
Approaches and Scope antis Book
ix
2. The Middle East
The Middle East in -Soviet Foreign Policy
Soviet Arms Aid Relations with the Arab Nations
Patterns and Magnitude of Soviet Arms Aid ...........
The Aftermath of the lune 1967 War
3. Sub-Saharan Africa
Africa in Soviet Foreign Policy ..
Soviet Arms Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa
4
7
7
8
25
8. Challenge and Response: Soviet-American Military Aid Competition 127
Priority Regions in Soviet and American Military Aid Programs 129
The Sources of Military Aid 134
Foreign Policy Orientations of Military Aid Recipients 140
Twelve Years of Aid Competition 145
9, Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy in Perspective 149
Aid Patterns, Characteristics, and Themes 149
17 Achievements, Failures, and the Future of Arms Aid Diplomacy 154
Selected Bibliography 161
Index . ................ 167
31
31
33
Common Factors in Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy ....... 45
The Balance Sheet of Soviet Arms Aid to Africa . 50
4. South and Southeast Asia
South and Southeast Asia in Soviet Foreign Policy
Arms Aid Initiatives in Neutralist Asia
The Scope of Soviet Atirts Diplomacy
5. Latin America
Latin America in Soviet Foreign Policy
Cuba: The First Latin American Collaborator ..
The Impact of Soviet Military Aid to Cuba
6. Soviet Bloc Aid Diplomacy: Policy Alternatives
The Choice of Donors: Which Member of the Warsaw Pact/
The Choice of Instruments: Military or Economic Air
The Interrelationship et Military and Economic Aid
Economic Aid and the Soviet Military Posture .
Trade and Aid
re�
7. Wars of Liberation and Military Aid Policy
Concepts of Wars in Soviet Doctrine .....
Wars of Liberation Porseies
Policy Assessment
53
54
56
72
79
79
83
88
97
98
100
105
107
108
111
112
116
125
LIST OF TABLES
2-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to the Middle East:
1955 to June 1967 23
1959 through 1967 45
1956 through 1967 73
1955 through 1967 102
Receiving Economic Aid Only: 1954 through 1967 103
FY 1956 through FY 1967 130
Military Aid 131
135
3-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa:
4-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to South and Southeast Asia:
6-1 Estimated Soviet Bloc Assistance to Military Aid Recipients:
6-2 Estimated Soviet Bloc Economic Aid to Developing Countries
8-1 Estimated United States Military Aid to Third World Countries:
8-1 Comparison of Regional Priorities in Soviet and United States
8-3 Number of Countries within Regions Receiving American and
Soviet Aid: A Comparison of Two Sources of Aid, 1956
through 1967
8-4 Scores of Agreement between Aid Donors and Aid Recipients on
Political and Security Roll Calls in the United Nations:
1958 through 1964
8-5 Scores of Agreement between Aid Donors and Aid Recipients on
142
Colonial Roll Calls in the United Nations: 1958 through 1954 144
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PRPFACP.
Since peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the western
nations has gained prominence, the USSR has sought ways to compete
for influence in the Third World. Military assistance to the developing
nations haS emerged as a key element in Soviet-American rivalry.
Soviet foreign policy has been extensively studied, including efforts to
penetrate the Third World through economic aid. Scant attention, how-
ever, has been paid to military aid as a major component of Soviet
foreign policy. This study, therefore, attempts to round out further our
understanding of the instruments of peaceful coexistence and Soviet
policy in the Third World.
This book grew out of research we originally undertook between
1964 and 1968 for the Georgetown Research Project of the Atlantic
Research Corporation under contract with the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research. We are grateful to the Atlantic Research Corpora-
tion and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research for permission to
use some of this material as the basis for further research and analysis.
� We alone are responsible for the accuracy of facts and interpretations.
The views expressed in this book are our own and do not reflect the
opinions of the institutions with which we have been or are now affiliated,
nor of those who have so generously given us their assistance and
counsel.
Washington, D.a.
WYNFRED JOSHUA
Stanford Research Institute, Washington
STEPHEN P. GIBERT
Georgetown University
� � /
APPROACHES AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK
The Soviet military assistance program can only be understood as an ,
integral part of contemporary Soviet global foreign policy. While not
neglecting its paramount interest in maintaining preeminence in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin has accorded a much
higher priority to extending its influence into the less-developed regions
of the world. This objective is pursued by a variety of instruments, a
key one of which is the furnishing of military aid to selected cou7,tries
in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Dependent upon
individual circumstances, aid includes weapons, spare parts, military
training, and the construction of military and para-military operational
facilities. The program appears designed to promote the image of the
Soviet Union as the champion of anti-colonialism and to support those
objectives of aid-recipient nations consistent with Soviet foreign policies.
Further, Soviet leaders hope to forge or strengthen links between the
armed forces of the recipients and the Soviet Union, and to foster diplo-
matic and military dependency on the USSR. Soviet decision-makers
apparently anticipate that accomplishing these aims will strengthen the
international position of the Soviet Union at the expense of the United
States. It also will prevent Communist China from establishing itself
as the champion of and model for the developing countries.
Soviet military aid policy appears to operate within the parameters of
two constraints: the necessity not to take actions in furnishing military
aid that will bring on nuclear confrontation with the United States; and
the requirement that aid programs be consistent with the level of de-
velopment of the recipients, as well as with the conditions imposed by
the nations themselves. Throughout the book an attempt has been made
to assess the impact of these constraints on Soviet military aid decisions.
For this reason, although the study focuses on Soviet military aid
diplomacy, the conditions in the recipient countries and their objectives
in requesting military assistance have been discussed where relevant.
This approach permits an emphasis upon the international security im-
plications of Soviet arms diplomacy and avoids a mere accounting sheet
of weapons transfers. Stated differently, this study analyzes the impact
of Soviet military aid to the developing countries on the international
diplomatic scene in general, and on the great powers' struggle for in-
fluence in the Third World in particular.
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-
The study starts with an analysis of Soviet military aid to the major
regions of the developing world. The regional approach has been
selected because the impact of Soviet arms deliveries is seldom limited
to the particular recipient country. More often, it affects as well the
politico-military strategy of the major world powers and lesser states
adjacent to or near the recipient. Within each world region the key
nations receiving aid, such as Egypt in the Middle East, India and Indo-
nesia in Asia, Somalia in Africa, and Cuba in Latin America, have
received special attention.
Subsequently,-certain functional topics important to an understanding
of Soviet military aid diplomacy are considered. These include the alter-
natives open to the Sovid Union in pursuing military aid policies, arms
aid used to support wars of liberation, and the competitive aspects of
Soviet and American military aid programs.
This analysis is concerned only with Soviet military aid diplomacy in
the so-called non-aligned or Third World countries of the Middle East,
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. No consideration, accordingly, has
been given Soviet aid to East European countries or to other communist
countries such as China, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam. '
This restriction tvas necessary because the objective of the book is to
assess Soviet arms diplomacy as an instrument of competition for in-
fluence among non-European and non-committed nations rather than to
consider relationships among communist countries themselves. Also, it
is difficult if not impossible to secure reliable estimates of weapons flows
among the communist countries. This limitation, however, has been
modified to allow the inclusion of Cuba, since its position in interna-
tional affairs is quite distinct from that of other communist states and
because reliable data on Soviet military aid to Cuba is available.
Throughout the study value estimates of Soviet military aid have
been given in U.S. dollars. The choice of dollar estimates was arrived
at since dollar figures are usually cited in the press. Although the terms
of an agreement frequently specify that Soviet arms aid has to be repaid
in raw materials or commodities, the use of dollar values permits a ready
comparison of the magthitudes of the various arms aid programs.
While Soviet arms diplomacy is referred to throughout the study as
"military aid" or "military assistance," in fact the more technically
accurate term in most cases would be "military loans." While much
American aid has been in grants, almost all Soviet military aid has been
in the form of long-terru, low-interest loans. Since this is a marked
difference between the Soviet and American programs, the technical
distinction between loans and grants has been discussed separately, as
have the relationships among military aid, trade, and economic aid.
The terms "Soviet aid" and "Soviet bloc aid" are used interchange-
ably except where noted otherwise. Nearly all Soviet bloc aid has in
fact been aid from the USSR itself. Only Czechoslovakia among the
Soviet bloc countries has contributed a measurable amount of military
aid. "Soviet bloc" refers to the USSR and the members of the Warsaw
Pact. The use of the term "Soviet bloc" is merely a shorthand expres-
sion and does not imply monolithic unity among the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. Military aid by Communist China is not included in computing
Soviet bloc aid totals.
The history' of Soviet military aid is now sufficiently developed to
permit an assessment of the program's current usefulness to the Soviet
Union and its utility in the foreseeable future. Since present indications
are that military aid diplomacy will assume an even greater role in
Soviet foreign policy in years to come, an understanding of its impact
on the security of nations has become of vital importance.
PATTERNS AND MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET ARMS AID
Between the start of Soviet arms aid in 1955 and the present, suffi-
cient time has elapsed to permit drawing a distinction between the more
enduring and the more ephemeral factors and patterns in Soviet arms
aid diplomacy. In providing military assistance, Moscow plainly at-
taches importance to some factors and is willing to overlook others.
Most arms aid candidates have to meet certain qualifications, although
since 1964-65 the Soviet Union has apparently been prepared to dilute
some of the requirements for becoming an aid recipient.
As a rule, the USSR displays little concern for the domestic political ori-
entation of the recipient states. Egypt, like most other Arab recipients, con-
tinues to enjoy Soviet military assistance in spite of its measures outlaw-
ing or restricting internal communist activities. In only one instance in
the history of Soviet arms diplomacy in the Middle East did the Soviet
Union halt its aid program to register its protest against the recipient's
anti-communist policy at home. This case involved the Baath regime of
Iraq, which had ousted General Kassem in February 1963. The Baath
leaders, members of a militant Arab nationalist and strongly anti-com-
munist movement, embarked on a violent purge of indigenous com-
munists. Moscow's intense disapproval of Baghdad's domestic course
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was expressed in a- warning that Iraq's persecution of local communists
prejudiced the future of Soviet economic and other aid." Exacerbating
Soviet-Iraqi tensions was Iraq's armed offensive against the Kurds, who
had started a guerrilla war to win autonomy. The Soviet Union, which
sympathized with the Kurds' demands for autonomy, threatened to
terminate its aid to Iraq if Baghdad continued its military operations
against them." When the Baath leaders refused to stop their actions
against Iraqi communists and Kurdish insurgents, the Soviet Union in
the summer of 1963 halted its military supplies and training programs
for Iraq." A thaw in Soviet-Iraqi relations did not occur until the most
extreme Baathist ministers�Were dismissed in November 1963 and a new
government began to relax the repressive measures against domestic
communists. In May 1964 Iraq obtained new military aid credits."
Although the offensive against the Kurds was resumed with full force a
year later, Soviet arms supplies continued to reach Iraq without
interruption.
Except for Iraq, the Soviet Union did not use its arms aid instrument
to try to effect a change in the recipient's policies toward domestic com-
munism, nor did Russian arms aid imply approval or disapproval of
these policies. Military aid transactions reflect Soviet recognition of the
value of tolerating the personal attitudes and preferences of leaders who
have a national, if not also a regional, following. This explains Soviet
forbearance of Nasser's frequently arrogant and scornful attitude toward
Soviet ideology and at times even toward the leadership. Similarly, the
Russians lionized Ben Bella, notwithstanding his repression of the
Algerian Communist Party.
Moreover Nasser and later Ben Bella, because of their anti-western
bias and their relentless commitment to wars of liberation, promoted
Soviet interests by transferring some of their Russian-made weapons to
other militant regimes and to insurgent movements in white-dominated
and so-called neo-colonial African states. While Moscow may not have
originally intended to supply arms for re-export purposes, the Russian
arms carried by the Egyptian army into Yemen served to effectuate
Soviet hostility toward Saudi Arabia. The Soviet weapons Egypt and
Algeria shipped to the Congolese rebels who fought the Tshombe govern-
" Pravda, February 20, 1963.
" Ibid., June 20, 1963.
"U.S. Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party Organiza.
lions, 18th Annual Report (Washington, 1966), p. 101.
" Daily Telegraph (London), May 24, 1964.
ment in 1964-65, helped to enhance Soviet prestige in militant Afro-
Arab circles. This tactic of supporting wars of liberation by proxy
partly offset Chinese charges that the Soviet Union had betrayed the
wars-of-liberation commitment. The re-export device also helped to
protect the Russians against risks of escalating a local conflict into a
confrontation with the western powers.
Another key factor in the framing of Soviet military aid policy was
the importance of the military elites in the Middle East. Soviet military
aid strategy could succeed only with the support of the military, which
plays a crucial role in the political life of Middle Eastern countries. On
the military devolved a large institutional responsibility for sustaining
national efforts toward modernization. In several Middle Eastern coun-
tries, notably Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, and Turkey,
the military establishment provides either the national leaders or the
most vital organizational support of the government. In the long run,
this ascendancy of the military may appear in Soviet eyes as a negative
force in the building of socialism. But in establishing a foothold in the
Middle East, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to exploit the military
elites' ready perception of the advantage of r*TIS iki hots' fz.: the
and for their own political role.
� � r
Table 2-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to the Middle East: 1955 to June 1967 (In Millions
et U.S. Dollars),
VAR 51,500
Syria at least 300
Yemen 100
Iraq at least 500
Morocco 20
Algeria 200
Cyprus 28
Iran 100
Estimated Total: $2,748
These figures do not fully convey the true costs of the arms aid. As far as the Russians are
concerned, much of the early materiel was obsolete and had lost much of its value for them.
As far as the recipients are concerned, occasionally they obtained Soviet arms at a discount
rate. The figures, moreover, do not reflect what it would have meant to the recipients had they
been required to make repayments in hard currency. Nor can these figures be compared with
figures for U.S. arms aid to the Middle East, since the United States made most of its aid
available as grants. The problems in assessing the dollar value of Soviet military aid are
discussed in Chapter 6. Data presented for the UAR, Cyprus, and Iran are derived from sources
documented in previous pages. For the figure for Algeria, see Joseph Palmer 11, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Address, U.S. Department of State Press Release
No. 109 (May 9,1967), p. 7. The figures for Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Morocco are based on
reports on the successive rv.ilitary assistance accords in daily newspapers and journals.
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� Ccatinaity in Sov'et Arens Aid Dip:otnacy. The persistence of the
basic trends in Soviet 'military aid policy in the Middle East was re-
flected in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war. Soviet efforts to shore
up Egypt's position after the war suggested that Egypt remained the
main target of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. - The Russians
recognized that Egypt retained the leadership of the militant Arab
world, that it offered easy Soviet' access into Africa, and, last but not
least, that it controlled the Suez Canal, the major route for Soviet ships
to the Indian Ocean. As long as Nasser and other Arab leaders ap-
peared to command popular acclaim and mass following, Soviet policy-
makers were prepared to support them. Ideological considerations as-
sumed at best a secondary role in Soviet arms aid diplomacy, as re-
peated Ilussian offers of military assistance to King Hussein of Jordan
indicated.
The rearmament campaign permitted Moscow to deepen its penetra-
tion of the military establishments of militant Arab states and of
Egypt's armed forces in particular. Soviet participation in retraining
and reorganizing the defeated Egyptian army and air force provided the
Russians with more effective access to Egyptian military elites and with
greater opportunities for influencing Egyptian military policies.
Moscow's arms diplomacy and aggressive penetration goals had
undergone no change. In fact, the aggressive pattern in Soviet policy
evolved more distinctly than ever. Soviet leaders did try to exclude the
risk of a direct armed encounter with the United States. At the same �
time, however, they proceeded to restore the distribution of military
power in favor of the militant Arabs, undermining thereby western in-
terests in the preservation of order and stability in the Middle East. The
USSR reinforced its military aid presence at the eastern flank of the
Middle East along the Red Sea coast in Yemen, in the. center of the
region in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and at the western gate of the Medi-
terranean in Algeria.
The growth of the Soviet Union's military presence in the Middle East
was further demonstrated by the buildup of its surface task force in the
Mediterranean, where only token Russian naval forces had previously
operated. By 1968 between forty and fifty Soviet warships were de-
ployed in the Mediterranean." The Soviet fleet received permission to
utilize Syrian, Egyptian, and Algerian ports. France's decision of Oc-
"New York Times, December 31, 1967; Washington Post, December 29, 1967.
tuber 1967 to return to Algeria the large naval base at Mers-el-Kebir in
early 1968�ten years ahead of schedule�raised the possibility that a
base across from Gibraltar would become available to the Soviet fleet in
the near future.
Soviet naval presence in the Middle East did not necessarily imply an
intention to acquire formal base rights, which would involve sensitive
political issues. It is important to distinguish between base acquisition
and base utilization. Rather, the Soviet Union appeared to be developing
a capability similar to that of the United States in being able to project
its naval power beyond immediate coastal waters without the benefit of
fixed overseas bases with fuel, supplies, and repair facilities. The Rus-
sians accomplished this by means of a supporting fleet train consisting
of oilers, store ships, tenders, and repair ships which could anchor in a
harbor or other shallow, sheltered waters. Compliant Arab countries
were the likely candidates to supply such harbors and anchorages, espe-
cially since the outcome of the June war had driven the militant Arabs
closer to the Soviet camp.
The Six-Day War reflected the impact of the nuclear balance of power
between the Soviet Union and the United States and emphasized thereby
the growing importance of the military aid instrument. Because the
nuclear balance has dictated a tacit understanding between the two
superpowers to try to avoid an armed confrontation between them on
behalf of a third party, the Soviet Union did not intervene during � the
fighting. In fact, both the Soviet Union and the United States delib-
erately limited their actions once the war had broken out; both were
eager to halt the shooting. In the end, they had no choice but to accept
the fait accompli of Israel's victory. Moscow's unwillingness to come to
the aid of the Arabs threatened to result in a serious political setback
for the Russians. The one option left to the Soviet Union after the
defeat of the Arab states was to resupply them with substantial military
aid. This was the only effective response the Russians could take to re-
trieve their losses in the Middle East, and although undoubtedly expen-
sive, it proved to be a highly successful course.
, On the whole, Moscow emerged'from the June 1967 crisis with its
position in the Middle East greatly enhanced. To the extent that Arab
dependence on Soviet military and other support deepened, Moscow's
leverage in the Arab world did increase substantially. This does not
mean that the Soviet Union achieved full control over Arab leaders, but
it is reasonable to conclude that the latter are now unlikely to pursue
a policy that would antagonize their principal backer, and certainly not
as long as they need Moscow's arms. For the near future, therefore, it is
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0 5e
THE BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIET AR.MS AID TO AFRICA
justifiable to assume that the Soviet Union succeeded in turning the
Arab catastrophe of the Six-Day War into a major Soviet victory_
In terms of the more distant future, however, it is possible that the
large-scale Soviet arms shipments after the June war may put the Soviet
Union in the role of the sorcerer's apprentice. While the chances of a'
fourth Arab-Israeli war may be presently remote, Nasser or another
Arab leader may feel forced to resume hostilities against Israel in order
to protect his position at home. Indications are that the Russians did
not want the-19,457 crisis to escalate into a full-fledged war. It must be
�
remembered, however, that in spite of extensive arms aid, the Soviet
Union was unable to prevent Nasser from taking the provocative actions
that led to the June fighting. Although after the June war Soviet con-
trol over the militant Arabs increased, Moscow may again be unable to
restrain its Arab protegis from launching another war against Israel at
some future date, thereby drawing the Russians deeper into the Middle
East quagmire.
e
COMMON FACTORS IN SOVIET ARMS AID DIPLOMACY
The Limitations. In terms of dollar value, Soviet military aid to sub-
Saharan African states reflected the region's secondary role in Soviet
policy toward the developing world. Cumulative arms aid to Africa still ,
totalled under $100 million by 1967, and with the exception of the ,
credits to Somalia, the various programs were relatively small, as Table
3-1 illustrates.
Table 3-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: 1959 through 1967
(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Congo-Brazzaville t.
Ghana
Guinea at least 6
Mali at least 3
Nigeria 10 to 15'
Somalia 35
Sudan N.A.
Tanzania 5 to 10
Uganda N.A.
SI '
Congo-Kinshasa 1.5,
10 to 15
Estimated Total: $86.5
Sources: Data presented are derived from sources documented in previous pages, except
for Ghana, Nigeria. and Tanzania, where cost of equipment reported in the open press
has been listed. Costs were calculated on the basis of approximate costs of comparable
U.S. equipment and assumed to include such additional items as support equipment for
aircraft, tools, spare parts, and %bee conoontitant equipment.
A crucial element in Soviet arms diplomacy in Africa continues to be
the objective of eliminating western and especially American influence.
At times Soviet action was a specific response to U.S. military aid poli-
cies. The $35 million Russian arms deal with the Somali Republic,
aimed at countering U.S. influence in neighboring Ethiopia, derived at
least in part from the $72.6 million U.S. military assistance program
there." Russian involvement in the 1964-65 Congo rebellion was to
some extent a reaction to U.S. military assistance to the Congolese
government. But the existence of a U.S. arms aid program was not a
necessary condition for the Soviet Union to act. Guinea and Nigeria
were specifically turned down by the United States for arms aid before
the Soviet Union moved in with military assistance, and American mili-
tary aid to other west African countries was insignificant. As a rule,
Soviet military aid policies were formulated with broader goals in mind
than offsetting a nearby U.S. arms aid presence. They were designed '
to erode in general the western position in Africa. Whenever the climate
suggested receptivity to Soviet overtures, Moscow proved ready to offer
arms assistance to African governments. In consequence, no ideological
restrictions inhibited Moscow in its arms aid ventures.
This flexibility and pragmatism was facilitated by the relatively modest t�
allocation in Soviet resources required to support arms aid to Africans.
No African state could be expected to use great quantities of weapons
or highly sophisticated arms. Even the operation of standard weapons
required training. Thus a relatively small investment could yield sub.
stantial political benefits for Moscow. The training programs, further-
more, provided the USSR with an opportunity to attempt to influence ;
African military elites. In light of the growing number of military coups!
detat, the good will, if not support, of the military could be essential to
the success of Soviet policies in Africa. For all these reasons arms aid ;
will remain a vital instrument in Moscow's African policies.
Soviet direct and indirect military assistance to African insurgent
groups has shifted in emphasis. Initially supporting dissident factions in
both independent black and in white-controlled states, the Russians later
rendered aid primarily to the national liberation movements, which
wanted to overthrow the white regimes. This aid remained more noted
for its political effects than its contribution to the military capability of
the freedom fighters. By their support of the freedom fighters, Soviet
leaders sought to appeal to militant Africans throughout the continent
"The $72.6 million represents cumulative U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia
through FY 1964. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts (Wash-
ington, May 1966), p. 14.
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aid to respond to Chinese charges of betraying the national liberation
movements.
Efforts to offset Chinese influence were reflected not only in Soviet
activities with dissident groups, but also in Russian aid to African gov-
ernments. To be sure, the prospects of Chinese inroads and the signif-
icance of Chinese competition should not be overrated. China's logistic
problems and limited support capabilities place Peking at a great dis-
advantage with respect to Moscow. Nevertheless, rivalry with China is
likely to remain an influential motive in Russian arms diplomacy and
could trigger Soviet pre-emptive action to provide arms aid. Chinese
operations in east Africa helped to focus Soviet attention more closely
on this area.
The evolving power vacuum in the Indian Ocean region, owing to the
accelerated British withdrawal from the area east of Suez, further por-
tends increased Soviet efforts to penetrate eastern Africa. Within sub-
Saharan Africa the Indian Ocean littoral appears to command priority
in future Soviet arms diplomacy.
In retrospect, the Soviet Union has not realized any dramatic results
from its military aid programs in Africa. In fact, in Ghana and the two
Congos Russian arms aid met with failure. These setbacks have not
deterred the Russians from embarking upon new military assistance ac-
tivities, as recent agreements with Nigeria and the Sudan might suggest.
Moscow's arms diplomacy in Africa is an integral part of its overall
policy of undermining western influence. By 1967 more than one-
fourth of the military establishments in sub-Saharan Africa had received
Soviet military assistance, whereas ten years earlier external military in-
fluence came solely from western sources. Although Soviet arms aid
diplomacy has created neither African satellites nor substantial de-
pendency on the USSR, the Russians are now active competitors for
influence over the destinies of African states.
THE SCOPE OF SOVIET ARMS DIPLOMACY
The early years of Soviet arms diplomacy in South and Southeast Asia
reflected an emphasis on orthodox Soviet objectives. These included
encouraging a newly independent state to sever its ties with the former
European metropole, countering the defense initiatives of western alli-
ances, preventing "reactionary counterrevolution," and consolidating
Soviet influence in the recipient state by reducing the military establish-
ment to single dependency for arms buildup and replacement. While
not losing sight of these objectives, around 1960-61 Russian arms aid
policy was forced to respond to the growing threat of the establishment
of paramount Chinese influence in the area. Soviet arms aid activities
intensified, particularly in the wake of the November 1960 Conference
of Eighty-One Communist Parties in Moscow, where Russian leaders had
failed to compose the developing Sino-Soviet controversy. Soviet mili-
tary aid increased both in terms of dollar value and in number of com-
mitments. After 1964 the Vietnam war progressively became the focus
of Soviet attention in the region and affected Soviet policies. Arms aid
to non-aligned recipients decreased and became mainly confined to the
Asian subcontinent. Nevertheless, Soviet military aid had reached sub-
stantial amounts by the end of 1967, as Table 4-1 illustrates.
The distribution of Soviet military aid in South and Southeast Asia
shows that Indonesia, India, and Afghanistan were the countries to
which Russian leaders attached the greatest importance. Indonesia re-
ceived by far the largest share of the Soviet arms aid dollar in the
region. While aid to Afghanistan in absolute dollar amounts was rela-
tively limited, in relation to the size of the defense budget of a recipient,
Afghanistan had received more aid than any other recipient." The
Table 4-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to South and Southeast Asia: 1956 through 1967
On Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Afghanistan $260
Pakistan 5 to 10
India 600 to 700
Indonesia 1,200
Laos 3 to 3
Cambodia. 5 to 10
Estimated Total: $2.185
Sources: Estimates for Pakistan. India, and Indonesia are derived from sources documented
in previous pages. Estimates for Laos and Cambodia are based on costs of equipment reported
in the press. Costs were calculated on the basis of approximate costs of comparable U.S.
equipment and assumed to include support equipment for aircraft, tools, and spare parts.
The estimate for Afghanistan is similarly based on equipment costs and on a comparison of
bloc economic aid with total bloc aid to Afghanistan as reported in the New York Times,
May 28, 1967.
transfer of highly sophisticated weapons systems to these three recipients
further underlines their significance in Soviet policy. Each acquired the
MiG-21 jet; in fact, Indonesia was the first country outside the bloc to
receive the MiG-21. India, although receiving less total aid than Indo-
nesia, appeared to be the most privileged recipient among the three
"In 1965, for example. Afghanistan's defense budget was only $23 million.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World-Wide Military Expenditures
and Related Data, Research Report 67-6 (Washington, 1967). p. 10.
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states, in that India was the only one to obtain a licensing agreement to
produce and assemble 141G-21s at home. All three acquired batteries
of SA-2 Guideline missiles. Indonesia and India were the only two
countries, other than Egypt, which were able to negotiate agreements for
submarines.
# � �
The record of Soviet military assistance diplomacy in the South and
Southeast Asia region shows that between 1956 and 1968 the Soviet
Union managed to estabfish a military aid presence from Afghanistan in
the northwest to Indonesia and the Indochina peninsula in the southeast.
Receptivity to Moscow's initiatives on the part of recipients who had
failed to acquire weapons from western sources greatly facilitated Soviet
efforts. The balance sheet of Soviet arms aid policies included both
gains and setbacks; the record dictated caution in the Asian sub-
continent and the Indochina peninsula.
In Afghanistan, the first recipient in the region, the armed forces de-
pended almost entirely on Soviet weapons aid. It seems doubtful
whether they can function for any length of time without Soviet spare
parts and fuel." While the Russians have not tried to turn Afghanistan
into a satellite and have generally avoided open interference in the
country's internal affairs, it is highly unlikely that Kabul can pursue any
foreign policy to which Moscow strongly objected.
Farther east, Mosoirar has made considerable progress toward replac�
ing western military influence with its own. The Soviet Union has be-
come India's largest source of military supplies and has succeeded in
creating limited arms aid ties with Pakistan. Yet Soviet military aid
policies in these countries turned out to be extremely vulnerable to pres-
sures caused by actual and potential changes in the political-military
power constellation on the Asian subcontinent. The potential threat of
China in south Asia and the regional conflict between India and
Pakistan circumscribed the Soviet Union's freedom of maneuver in its
aid policies. The Russian dilemma resulting from the Sino-Indian border
war in October 1962 caused delays and obstacles in Soviet-Indian arms
aid discussions. When the negotiations were finally resolved in favor of
India, it served as a waning to China to restrain its ambitions in the
region.
" See Welles Hangen, 'Afghanistan," Yale Review, vol. 56, no. 1 (Cklober 1966).
p. 66.
The subsequent rise of Chinese influence in Pakistan led the USSR to
intensify its efforts to improve relations with Pakistan, a process already
under way as part of a broader endeavor to turn the erstwhile northern
tier of western defense into an area open to east-west rivalry. Little per-
haps was more galling to New Delhi than Moscow's arms aid agreement
with Rawalpindi in 1967. The new Soviet military aid relationship with
Pakistan, however, posed serious problems for Moscow in view of the
danger of antagonizing New Delhi and the attendant risk of India's turn-
ing to the west again. Since Indian good will remains an important asset
to the Russians, particularly if Chinese influence grows in the Asian
subcontinent, a decision to offer additional Soviet arms aid to Pakistan
will probably be accompanied by political concessions to India and by
compensatory weapons aid.
The history of Soviet aid activities in the states of the Indochina
peninsula demonstrates Soviet capability to react promptly to emergency
requests. While military aid generally arrived by ship and with a to-be-
expected time lag between the agreement and the delivery date, in Laos
the Soviet Union in December 1960 responded immediately with an
arms airlift to Souvanna Phouma's request. The Russian airdrop of
arms to the Viet Cong in early 1961 also attested to Moscow's rapid
reaction capability.
� Soviet emergency aid to the coalition of Laotian neutralists and com-
munists helped to bring Souvanna Phouma back into power. But the Rus-
sians were unable to consolidate whatever influence they had in Laos or
with the Viet Cong. Hanoi began to control the flow of arms, including
Soviet arms, to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong. In fact, formulating
policy for the former Indochina states proved most difficult and com-
plex for Soviet leaders, since it also involved Chinese and American rela-
tionships. Moreover, as Hanoi's demands increased, the flexibility of Rus-
sia's response diminished. To reject an appeal from a communist ally
fighting the major power of the capitalist world carried not only the risk
of driving North Vietnam into China's arms, but the threat that such a
rejection would erode �Soviet influence in other states as well. Under
these circumstances the Soviet Union stepped up its military aid to
North Vietnam. By the end of 1967, except for a modest military
assistance program in Cambodia, Hanoi clearly had priority in the
allocation of Soviet arms aid resources for Southeast Asia.
In Indonesia, intensive Soviet military aid diplomacy eventually failed
to achieve the Soviet objectives of insulating Indonesia from western
influences and turning its government into a supporter of Moscow's poli-
cies in the Afro-Asian world. Moscow's lavish arms shipments, per-
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sistent encouragement of the Irian policy, and somewhat cautious sup-
port of the Malaysia confrontation could neither win the allegiance of
Indonesia's army leaders nor alter Indonesia's increasingly pro-Peking
position in international relations between 1963 and 1965. Indonesia's
return to a more impartial foreign policy after the October 1965 coup
was prompted by changes in the domestic power structure and not by
Soviet persuasion. Its new military regime, in fact, sought to improve
relations with the west rather than with the Soviet Union. It may also
have been that the persecution of indigenous communists was too brutal
and created a climate too hostile for Indonesia to be able to re-establish
close relations with a communist power. The prospects are that Indo-
nesia will pursue a more truly neutralist policy, not only concerning the
Sine-Soviet quarrel but regarding east-west relations as well. The Soviet
Union's marked disinterest in renewing its extensive military assistance
program in Indonesia svggests a recognition by Soviet leaders that for
the near future few gains are to be made in Indonesia.
Future Alternatives for Soviet Military Aid Policy. There are several
theories that could be developed from the failure of the Soviet Union to
promote an aggressive military aid program in Latin America. It could
be argued that the Soviet Union, as part of its attempted d�nte with
the United States, does not wish to take any action in Latin America
which might jeopardize Soviet-American relations. Or, the Soviet Union
might be acting upon its own theories about the "peaceful alternatives"
to armed revolution in Latin America and,therefore concentrating on
united front tactics. Finally, one could conclude that the hazardous
association with Fidel Castro has discouraged the Soviet Union from
considering a possible =petition. Each of these theories contains ele-
ments of wishful thinking about Soviet intentions.
First, the Soviet Union is not likely to be restrained from taking any
action which it deems advantageous to its interests merely out of con-
sideration for a Soviet-American rapprochement. Russian activities in
the Middle East after the June 1967 war are a case in point. It is more
likely that the Russians fear that communist penetration of another
Latin American country, or even the threat of this, will be met by firm
and probably successful U.S. intervention.
Second, the notion that the Soviet Union has renounced the use of
force and denied that revolutionary methods could be successful in
Latin America is correct only from a short run port of view. The Rus-
sians do feel that the Cuban Revolution is not a ;,./cA example for the
rest of Latin America to follow and that the lack a cohesive leadership
and ideological unity among guerrilla movements has for the time being
doomed them to failure. Soviet strategists, howenr, remain convinced
of the revolutionary potential of the continent anti strongly imply that
when "conditions are ripe," a return to subversion and revolution will
be feasible.55
Finally, it is misleading to conjecture that Soviet disenchantment with
Fidel Castro has led them to harbor thoughts of disengagement from that
alliance. While Castro's purges of pro-Moscow communists and his
continued advocacy of aid to insurgent movements present the Soviet
Union with a constant dilemma, "the Soviet Union would presumably
rather have these worries . . . and the controversits . . than have no
Castro."56 While the Soviet Union does profit from its increased con-
tact with other Latin American governments, the advantages of having
an ally in Cuba (even at the $1 million-a-day price tag) appears to be
valued by the USSR highly enough to justify its investment
Cuba still remains of military significance to the Soviet Union. In
spite of past failures and the historical evidence discussed before, it
could be argued that Cuba remains a potential misse base. Cuba is also
a potential naval base and refueling stop, which 'would permit Soviet
vessels to remain on station longer in the Caribbean. It is even now an
invaluable intelligence center for monitoring U.S. missile range activities
in Florida and Texas and will shortly be used as a tracking station for
Soviet space shots. The use of Cuba as a military diversion is also occa-
sionally mentioned," although at present Cuban eiversionary potential
would amount to little more than harassment.
Even though the net benefit that the Soviet Union has received from
its association with Castro has been substantial, r.'aere are indications
that the Soviet Union would not at present be as athusiastic in its re-
sponse to a request for military aid if another 'bourgeois revolution
should succeed in Latin America.
"The Russians did sign the agreements arrived at dueing the January 1966
Tricontinental Conference of Havana, calling for inaurre4.:tion throughout Latin
America.
"Leon Lipson, "Castro and the Cold War," p. 199.
"Baldwin even believes that the United States has ItArd to divert a "sizeable
fraction" of its military establishment to what is essenti4Illy a static, defensive
task on its own doorstep. Baldwin, "A Military Perspettlixe; p. 220.
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Cuba is likely to retain for some time its exclusive status as the only
Latin American nation receiving Soviet bloc military aid. The sensi-
tivity of the U.S. government and the anti-communist tradition of the
Latin American military are major obstacles to new Soviet military aid
inroads in the western hemisphere. But if and when any additional
Russian arms aid agreements are made in the region, they will be
modest and will probably take the form of inter-governmental trans-
actions rather than covert assistance to anti-government groups. Agree-
ments are unlikely to include weapons of a primarily offensive nature
but may involve transport and communications equipment. In these
categories commercial purchasing practices, rather than political con-
siderations, are apt to guide Latin American governments, leading to
possible trade or aid in Soviet military equipment which has a competi-
tive edge in price or quality over similar offerings from western govern-
ments.
The Soviet course in the later 1960s, although ambiguous enough to
draw substantial criticism from Maoists and Castroites, enables the
Soviet Union to pursue a gradualist policy of helping to overturn the
US. monopoly of influence in the Latin American region. The con-
tinuing, if reduced, military assistance program in Cuba, while not im-
periling the success of this major policy, may still afford the Soviet
Union long-term opportunities for the support of militant revolution in
Latin America.
CONCEPTS OF WARS IN SOVIET DOCTRINE
Soviet doctrine distinguishes three basic types of wars: (1) general
and strategic war; (2) local-limited war; and (3) wars of liberation.
Soviet spokesmen strongly condemn the first two types of wars but
emphasize the duty of communists to support wars of liberation. Soviet
sources, however, are somewhat ambiguous in distinguishing between the
various types and are occasionally even contradictory. While Soviet doc-
trine is fully developed as regards general and strategic war, other
types of war concepts are not fully articulated. Accordingly, Soviet
policy toward non-strategic wars, whether local wars or wars of liberation
in doctrinal terms, must be interpreted not only from Soviet statements
but also through empirical analysis of Soviet behavior toward these
conflicts.
4. �et p
In no area of discussion about the use of force to achieve interna-
tional objectives are Soviet statements more vague and more contra-
dictory than in the case of wars of liberation. It is frequently assumed
that these types of wars refer solely to conflict initiated by communists
or other revolutionary elements within a society, usually the so-called
national bourgeoisie, against a capitalist-coloniafist incumbent govern-
ment. This interpretation, in fact, has been given credence by Khrush�
chev's extensive review of world politics in a speech before a group
of world communist leaders meeting in Moscow in January 1961.1
Other Soviet statements seem to suggest, however, a much broader
definition of wars of liberation.
A 1964 article written by two Soviet army colonels identifies Soviet
military aid to incumbent governments in Indonesia, Egypt, and Algeria
as aid to "national liberation movements."2 Another article justified
Soviet military aid to newly independent nations as necessary to assist
these nations in their "fight against colonizers."3 This theme, that in-
cumbent governments are also forces of national liberation, was re-
peated in a 1965 commentary which stated that the Soviet Union grants
new nations "long-term credits at favorable terms . . . to strengthen
their national-liberation armies and provide them with modern military
technology."4 The military of the new nation-states are regarded as
forces of national liberation in conflict with capitalism and colonialism,
whether at home or abroad. Military aid to these incumbent revolu-
tionary-type governments is justified, since the "armed forces of these
countries have acquired an anti-imperialist character" and are struggling
to free themselves from foreign contro1.5
These statements, coupled with Soviet aid behavior, suggest a broad in-
terpretation of wars of liberation, which includes at least three distinct
elements: first, struggles by revolutionary elements, communist or not,
'See Charles Burton Marshall (ed.), Two Communist Manifestoes (Washington:
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961), passim.
'Lt. Col. G. Eckov and Colonel Prilepskii, "World Socialist System: A Decisive
Contemporary Factor, Komtnunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed
Forces), no. 22 (November 1964), pp. 34-41.
'Colonel S. Kukonin, "The Character of our Epoch and the General Line of
the World Communist Movement," ibid., no. 21 (November 1964), pp. 15-22.
"Contemporary Stage of the National Liberation Movement," ibid., no. 6
(March 1965), pp. 67-71.
'Colonel E Dolgopotov, "Armies of Liberated Africa." Krasnaia Zvezda (Red
Star), September 25, 1965, p. 3.
_
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within a state against an incumbent capitalist government; second,
conflicts of communist states in the less-developed world against capi-
talist governments; and third, wars by non-communist but left-oriented
new states against capitalist nations. All three types of wars of libera-
tion are to be supported and encouraged by the Soviet Union through
the provision of military assistance. These wars are "holy wars," "just
wars"�legitimate instruments for hastening the day of world com-
munism.
The Soviet government would prefer, of course, to back recipients
who have some reasonable chance of winning their wars of liberation.
At the same time, Soviet decisions must also take into account the
opponents of the wars-of-liberation forces. Thus the Russians might
support even a losing side if the other combatant were a western coun-
try or strongly oriented toward the west. On the other hand, they would
not support a preferred but losing side in a case where neither pro-
tagonist was closely linked to the western powers. With these standards
in mind, it should be noted that the Soviet Union has not supported
indigenous communist movements in wars of liberation against anti-
colonialist, nationalist-bourgeois regimes when it appeared that the
communist forces could not possibly succeed. Examples of this policy of
restraint include Soviet disinclination to aid communists in Egypt and
Indonesia against friendly regimes or even Indian communists against
the neutralist government of India.
In instances where insurgents faced neutralist regimes not friendly to
the USSR, but where the insurgents had little chance of success, the
Russians have displayed some ambivalence but generally have opted for
the winning skit-, notably in Iraq. Despite frequent strains in Soviet-
Iraqi relations, particularly in the 1960-63 period, the Soviet Union did
not materially assist the Kurdish insurgency except by attempting to
persuade Iraq to seek a negotiated settlement with the Kurds. In 1964,
when Iraqi policy became more favorable to Moscow, Kurdish aspira-
tions were disregarded; both Iraq and Syria received Soviet military aid
for almost certain employment against Kurdish wars-of-liberation forces.
In those cases where insurgents, whether communist, leftiit, or
moderate nationalist-bourgeois, faced regimes clearly hostile to the
USSR, they benefitted from Soviet support, at least on a limited basis,
even if they had little probability of success. Hence Soviet arms arrived
for Lumumba and his followers in the Congo in their efforts to liberate
territory controlled by the Belgians. The chance of success in this con-
flict was minimal.' Illustrative of the same policy would be the limited
amounts of weapons supplied to clandestine, sublimited warfare oper-
ations in Portuguese Africa.
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NEW YORK TIMES
25 March 1970
Thieu, at Rite Tomorrow, Will Start Land Ref orin
Program Intended to Aid a Million Tenant Farm&rs
, SAIGON, South Vietnam,
March 24�Presidential Nguyen
Van Thieu is scheduled to prom-
ulgate on Thursday a sweep-
ing land reform program de-
signed to make the Government
a bigger benefactor of the land-
less peasant than the Vietcong
have been.
The revolutionary program
prohibits virtually anyone from
owning land he or his family
members are net themselves
cultivating. It provides for the
Government to buy up such
land�more than two million
acres�and distribute it free to
the one million families who
have been working it as tenant
farmers for absentee landlords.
The land reform, called
['Land to the Tiller," is, on
paper, one of the most ambiti-
ous and progressive land re-
distribution programs ever
promulgated in non-Communist
Asia.
However, said one official,
who is enthusiastic about the
program and who has worked
closely with the South Viet-
namese to put it into effect,
"the administrative opacity and
political will of the Govern-
ment is a moot question."
- One high-ranking American
pacification official who has in-
vestigated some of the Viet-
names officials who will ad-
minister the program at the
THE ECONOMIST APRIL II, 1970
'local levels reported having
found them either corrupt or
Inefficient.
U. 5. Action Urged
His recommendation that the
United States Embassy take an
immediate and firm stand
against such appointments,
which could doom the program
(before it has a chance to take
Ihlod, has reportedly set off a de-
bate within the embassy.
The strong commitment of
President Thieu to the program,
which he introduced in a Na-
tional Assembly bill last July 2,
has not been questioned. The
President has called it his first
major piece of social legisla-
tion.
The lower house approved the
bill Sept. 9 over the objections
of landowners, who denounced
it as "an inhuman, immoral, un-
scientific, Communist policy of
proletarianizing the people.'
The Senate gave its approval
March 9. Thursday, the day
President Thieu has set for
promulgating the program at a
ceremony in Cantho in the
Mekong Delta, has been de-
clared a national holiday.
Landlords to Be Paid
The program is designed to
give land ownership for the
first time to the tenant farmers
who now work 60 per cent of
the country's ricelands and pay
rents of about 30 per cent of
Land to the tiller
Now that President Thieu has signed
the "land to the tillers" bill, the govern-
ment of South Vietnam can get under
way with its ambitious new programme
of land reform. As many as 800,000 tenant'
farmers may be given free title to their
fields.
The new law provides for the transfer
of up to 21 million acres now held by
big landowners. If it works it will create
d. whole new class of small peasant pro-'
prietors with a stake in the country and
�the government hopes�a personal
mitment to the anti-communist cause:
From this angle, it may be the most
intelligent political move that has so far
been made in South Vietnam.
Land reform has been tried before,
with little, success. President Diem broke
up some of the big estates and bought
the crop to the landowners.
The Government is to pay
absentee landlords a purchase
price for their land set at two
and a half times the tvalue of
the average annual paddy yield.
The land will then be given
free to the tenants who have
been cultivating it. Tenants in
the rice-growing Delta are to
be given 7.4 acres while those
in the more rugged central
highlands will get 2.4 acres.
Under terms of the legisla-
tion, landlords who farm their
own land will not be allowed
to keep more than 37 acres.
Exempt from the redistribution
program are small plots set
aside for ancestor worship, land
owned by religious organ-
izations, Industrial crop-and-
orchard land, Industrial building
up the French plantations. But his reforms
were limited in scope and foundered on
official corruption and the landowners'
stratagems. Since 1968, the 'present
government has been handing out land
more quickly and has offered credit facili-
ties for peasants wanting to buy their
plots. These measures naturally had little
appeal for those who had been given,
or promised, land by the Vietcong.
The new law goes beyond these rather
grudging concessions. Any farmer tilling
rented or vacated land can lay claim to
2-1- acres in the central regions, and up
to 71 acres in the Mekong delta�enough
for a comfortable living. Landowners are
allowed to keep about 37 acres, providing
that they work on their own estates. The
government will pay compensation for
confiscated land.
The most enlightened feature of the
new. law , is the prescribed method of
dealing with Vietcong land grants. The
government's position used to be simple:
:sites, salt fields, lands. desig-
nated for urban planning and
some other minor categories.
Expropriated land, kb tases
where there are no tenants, will
be given to families of War vic-
tims, soldiers ad displaced re f-
lugees�in that order�who file
'applications.
To prevent a new vete of
absentee ownership and
tenancy, sale of redistrihuted
land is prohibited for 15 Years
� a provision that some' ex-
perts censider too sweeping in
view of the need to create
farms of more economical size.
But that prohibition can be re-
vised in forthcoming legishktion.
The landowners forced to: sell
Iwill be paid 20 per cent in cash
and the remainder in eight-year
guaranteed government bonds
pearing 10 per cent interest.
after pacification, the landowners driven
out by the communists would be restored.
And as long as the communists could tell
the peasants in areas they controlled that
the landlords would follow the South
Vietnamese army, they had a powerful
propaganda weapon. But now pacification
need hold no terrors for the peasant made
a proprietor by the Vietcong. He will
be allowed to go on farming his land.
It will take him a year to establish legal
tenancy, after which he can claim owner-
ship. There is no automatic confirmation
of ownership, and the delay may give
rise to counter-claims or intimidation. But
there is security of tenure, and a clear
statement of principle.
The reforms will not be easy to apply.
,Money to compensate landlords will come
from the Americans, through their general
programme of budgetary support. The
total runs to more than 46 billion piastres
(between $loo million and Um million,
at' the official or the prevailing black'
market rate). The issue of government
bonds will help to spread payment over
several years.
But insecurity and lack of confidence
, are 'the biggest problems. So long as
villagers cannot sleep soundly at night
it is unlikely that they will place
much value on a piece of paper giving
them legal title to their, land. More than
a thousand civilians and village officials
have been murdered by communist
terrorists so far this year.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1970
DATES WORTH NOTInG
May8
May9
May 7-10
June
Europe 25th anniversary of end of World War
II in Europe (VE Day).
Czechoslovakia 25th anniversary of "liberation" by
the Red Army.
Beirut World Conference of Christians on
Palestine, supported by the (Communist)
World Council of Peace. A publicity-
seeking effort.. .but it is expected to
have only limited impact. (Avoid pub-
licizing.)
Ulan Bator,
Mongolia
Soviet-sponsored World Buddhist
Conference.
June 27-29 Rome Conference on Portuguese Colonies
sponsored by the (Communist) World
Council of Peace and the Afro-Asian
Peoples Solidarity Organization.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1970
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(21 March - 17 April 1970)
1. Oddities about Soviet Liberation Anniversaries
This year marks the 25th anniversary of the end of World War II, which
the Soviets are utilizing to remind their European Satellites of the Soviet
"liberating" role and their claim to continuing hegemony over their Satel-
lites. The instances of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are especially interest-
ing, because of odd aspects of Soviet behavior in respect to the anniversa-
ries, and because both countries had to be "re-liberated" by invading Soviet
troops: Hungary in October 1956 and Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The
celebration in Hungary of the liberation anniversary took place on 3 April;
the anniversary in Czechoslovakia is to take place 9 May.
a. Hungary
The most important personage among the mixed bag of Satellite
big-wigs attending the Hungarian ceremony was CPSU Secretary General Leonid
Brezhnev. On arrival he took the unusual step of granting an interview to
a Budapest newspaper in which he expounded at great length on how well the
Soviet Union was doing domestically. As the attached New York Times article
points out, this seemed odd considering the international nature of the oc-
casion. The explanation undoubtedly lies in the increasing international
awareness that the Soviet Union is actually in trouble in many domestic sec-
tors, most notably its economy, which is marked by stagnation resulting from
the conservatism of the Soviet leaders. It seems quite clear that Brezhnev,
first among the conservatives, has become alarmed at the low opinion in which
the USSR is currently held. Thus, Brezhnev took this occasion, as he will
undoubtedly take many other occasions, to try to polish up the drab image.
The Hungarian occasion was being watched keenly to see what sort of
attitude Brezhnev would register concerning the slightly off-center, un-
orthodox approach to economic management and intellectual freedom exercised
in Hungary. The Hungarians have carefully experimented with decentralizing
the economy and giving their intellectuals freer rein. This behavior clashes
with the tight centralization of the economy and the stringent control of
intellectuals in the USSR. To the Hungarians' surprise and relief, Brezhnev
publicly professed himself pleased with the way things are run in Hungary.
Nevertheless, Brezhnev also reiterated his doctrine of limited sovereignty
according to which the international interests of Socialism [read: Soviet
national interests] take precedence over mere national interests. Thus, it
is safe to assume that while Brezhnev may be concerned with signs of un-
orthodoxy in Hungary, his main concern is that boss Kadar not boast about
his experiments, that he keep reform within bounds, and that above all there
be no anti-Soviet noises that might cause Brezhnev to invoke his doctrine
after the manner of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
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b. Czechoslovakia
To the Czechoslovak people, the Brezhnev Doctrine is no theoreti-
cal idea. It was invented and invoked as a justification for the Soviet in-
vasion of 1968, a second "liberation" from "counterrevolutionaries" and
perialist enemies." The date of the first liberation, from Nazi Germany, is
fixed as 9 May 1945, and festivities of some sort are planned for 9 May this
year. The curious thing is that while a new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty is
to be formally signed (it has already been initialed by the contracting par-
ties) as the highlight of the occasion, the text of the treaty is being kept
secret! And it is not even certain it will be made public after the signing!
There is a ready, logical explanation of this odd reticence, though
there is no guarantee of its accuracy. Like the 20 British Members of Par-
liament who wrote an advance protest to the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain,
one might surmise that the treaty contains provision for the permanent or in-
definite stationing of troops in Czechoslovakia. If this be the case, it is
only natural that the Soviets would not want to advertise it, particularly
since the Czechs so fervently hope that �the treaty will contain some indica-
tion of withdrawal. What seems more likely is that the treaty will contain
a reiteration, in veiled form, of the Brezhnev Doctrine and a reaffirmation
of the platitudes on international solidarity codified in the June 1969
World Communist Conference, with no reference to troops.
Presumably the treaty will eventually be made public, possibly with
protocols concerning Soviet troops being kept secret! The original Soviet-
Czechoslovak treaty was signed in 1943, and was renewed for another 20 years
in 1963. There clarity ends -- why was it not continued to the end of its
span?
2. French CF vs Yugoslavia over L'Affaire Garaudy
Roger Garaudy, dissident French Communist leader and theoretician who
was purged from his positions of leadership in the Party last February, is
famous among the growing corps of his fellow Communist dissenters for putting
his finger most accurately and eloquently on the reasons for breaking with
the Soviet Union. In the Czech invasion, Garaudy saw the imperialist quality
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, but cast his criticism of the Soviet Union less on
the Doctrine than on an important ramification of it, i.e. the fact that the
Soviet Union cannot tolerate in any Communist party, least of all in Eastern
Europe, any essential departure from its own practice of Marxism-Leninism.
Garaudy is a prominent exponent of the belief that Communism can succeed only
if every Communist party and Communist country can follow its own road and
not be forced to imitate the Soviet model on Soviet terms. This same belief
is precisely what caused Tito to break Yugoslavia away from Stalin's bear-
hug in 1948, and it has remained Yugoslavia's fundamental belief ever since.
It is quite natural therefore, that the Yugoslays would support Garaudy in
his quarrel with the French Communist Party (PCF). It is for this reason
that last September, they published in their most prestigious journal, Komu-
nist, an interview with Garaudy in which he freely expounded his "heretical"
views. Now, expressions of support for Garaudy in less well-known Yugoslav
periodicals have caught the eyes of PCF watchdogs and have prompted them to
2
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accuse Yugoslavia of "crudely interfering in the PCF's internal affairs in
the name of 'anti-Stalinism' and 'anti-dogmatism." (See attached L'EUmanite
attack and Le Monde account of the Yugoslav articles.)
3. What Do Dissenting Comrades Complain About?
Attached is a collection of complaints by members of what might be called
the Dissenting Communist Community. They have been arranged in three group-
ings: a) the Brezhnev Doctrine and National Roads to Socialism, b) the In-
vasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, and c) Democracy and Democratic
Centralism. While they have been grouped under three headings, it is recog-
nized that they are all very closely inter-related. Even this partial selec-
tion gives some notion of the common interests, despite geographic remoteness,
of the Dissenting Communist Community.
3
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WASHINGTON POST
4 April 1970
Teez iiey.,
:cionficielecAboot-E.
By Dan Morgan .
Washington Post Pore= service
� BUDAPEST, April 3�Soviet
Party leader Brezhnev Ind'-
. iectly refuted reports of grave.
economic and political trouble
.in Moscow in a rare newspa
per interview printed here
today.
. "The situation of the &Strict
Union is firm," he said. "The
Soviet people look With self-as-
surance into the future and
are firmly' resolved to realize
the plan set: The creation of
the 'material and technical
:basis of Communism." '
The publishing of the inter-
View in- the Hungarian daily
'Nepszabadsag on the morning
after his arrival in Budapest
,to commemorate the 25th an-
niversary of the liberation of
� Hungary by the Red Army,
� was Unusual.
e Given the "international"
nature of the state and party
occasion, his decision to an-
swer at ,some length a ques-
tion on the internal situation
in the Soviet Union wasseen
�,by Hungarian sources .as even
more significant. .
Plans Fulfilled
.� He said that thePlans set bY
;the 23d Soviet Communist
'Party Congress were being
� fulfilled "with 'success," in "all
:branches of economic and cul-
tural construction."
� The party leader dealt only
generally with the Soviet
economy, . criticism of which
'he, himself initiated in Deceml
.1a-er with a speech to 'a party
plenum and which is now con-
tinuing at the factory level all
over the Soviet Union. . �
said only that' it was 'a
principal task "to make our
ee.onomY more -intensive" � by
rn troduc in g. scientific- and
:technical advances - and;: by
the . efficiency .ot:the
direction.'oVtlie peoPleVeeOn-
!pmv."
Most observers did not- 'sea
performance. item
0
,
ture
as that of a.rnan in a particu- strength of initiative sof-the
larly weak .position within his�
own party.
He rephrased the Brezhnev
sloctrine � of limited sover-
eignty for socialist .nations in a
speech before the Hungarian
'parliament in the .afternoon
where he declared ,that no ea-
tional interests of a socialist
country sheillti be enforced at.
the extiense. of the interna-
tional interests of socialism.
This ,statement, in ,a 'city
'wheye Soviet, Jenks crushed
the 1956 uprising, was taken
as' �eaffiimation orthe So-
viet leadcr'S line'of consolidat-
ing the East European. bloc.
At the shene time he made a
strong rie.Wt pitch for A Euro-
pean security conference
which he said should be ap-
proached in' a "sober and real-
istic" way rather than by
"spectacular 'actions in the po-
litical sphere."
But he warned that the situ-
ation "Is made more compli:
cated by the f4ct. that' Ameri-
can � infperisiligm ' has entered'
more hied rnore'VigoronslYihto
the key industries of Western
Europe's economic. 'life, at-
tempting to stem the progress
progressive -forces' in , Eu-
rope."
Some interpreters of trends
in the Kremlin have suggested
that the economic self-criti-
cism unleashed by Brezhnev
in December could mean a pe-
riod of more eronomio ortho-
eloxy and centralized discip-
line,' ,which could put the
brake on reforms being Initi-
ated �in Himgary 'Tend else-
where in Eastern Europe.' ,
However, .Brezhnev said in
his' intervietv that he favored
the "further improvement of
socialist .delnocracy," , and at.
the 'politiCal level ,"eXnansion
of the contact of the party
with the masks, the develop-
ment of theecreetive spirit and
Soviet workers .'.."
Hungariat Regime
These are trends �aleeedy
being fostered by the Hungar-
ian regime of janos Kadar:
Hungarian � sources this
week viewed the attendance of
Brezhnev here as an achieve-
ment for the Budapest regime,
and a confirmation of Soviet
approval for :its cautious re-1
form course.
For !several years, Hungary
has been slowly implementing
a "new, economic mechanism.",
Prices' have, been freed In
some sectors of the economy,
the private sphere has been
enlarged and, foreign invest-
ment is being encouraged.
This week, the �AP revealed!
from Hungarian sources thatl
the country's foreign trade!
balance broke' �tit of the red';
in 1969 for the first time, with
a surplus of $69 million.
In a speech' to the Hunger-,
Ian National Assembly this
'afternoon, Brezhnev was glow-
ing in praise' of !Katlar, whom;
he described : SS a "distin,e
guished son of his' country Midi
a true friend of the Sovieti
Union."
Hungarian ReVolt ' �
Though Saturdey'r, military
parade and festivities will be1
to commemorate the Soviet i
liberation�an event recalled'
in photographs in dozens of
dowhtown shop windows this
week�many here still remem-
ber 1956 when, Russian .tanks,
crushed the Hungarian revolt.
Kadare in his speech in Par-I
liement, referred to the "se-!
tarian � mistakes. which had!
caused the crisis and led to\!
the 1956 ,counter-revolutionary:
uprising which was overcome'
with-the support of true Com-
munists in the country, and
with the support of the Soviet
Union.'' �
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LE MONDE, Paris
5-6 April 1970
Hongrie
Difference de ton entre MM. Kadar et Brejnev
sur l'interet national des pays socialistes
Budapest A.P.), � Les
Hongrois celebrent avec faste le
25 anaxersaire de la liberation
de leur pays. En effet, le 4 avril
1945, les dernieres unites alle-
mandes quittaient le territoire
hongrois (voir le Monde des
24-25. 26 et 27 limit 1969, F.
Fetjo : a B y a Vingt-cinq ans
l'Est.
Au cours d'une s�ce solen-
nelle au Parlement, M. Brejnev
prononce un long discours dans
lequel il a notamment dit qu'en
&pit des aspirations ou des vel-
leites de certains pays l'U.R.S.S.
entendait demeurer le chef in-
conteste du camp socialiste.
M. Brejnev a declare que
taus les pays freres luttent pour
l'etablissernent de la division so-
cialiste du travail et pour le de-
velopperaent de l'integration so-
cialiste. Les interets nationaux et
internutionaux des pays soda-
listes, de meme que leurs inte-
rets po7itiques at economiques,
sont imbriques au sein d'un en-
semble etroitement uni. Les pays
socialistes ne doivent pas cher-
cher a d�ndre leur interet na-
tional au detriment des interets
internationaux du socialisme a.
Cette declaration a ete faite
par M. Brejnev apr6s ravoir en-
tendu M. Radar affirmer que
a la question decisive en ce qui
concerne to construction du so-
cialisme reside dens la coordina-
tion entre les lois fondamentales
applicables a l'echelan interna-
tional et les donnees nationales
specifiques D.
Sans tenir compte de l'opinion
du dirigeant hongrols, qu'il a
qualifie de a grand communiste,
bon Ills du peuple hongrois at
and fidele de l'U.R.S.S.), M.
Brejnev n'a pas hesite dire :
a Nous partageons entierement le
point de vue qu'a exprime souvent
le camarade Kadar et selon le-
quel Ii convient que les pays so-
cialistes ne cherchent pas d de-
fendre leur inter& national au
detriment des interets interna-
tionaux du socialisme.
Evoquant les probleines inter-
nationaux, M. Brejnev a cons-
tate qu'on ne a pouvait pas nier
que des signes d'amelioration se
sont fait four ces derniers temps
dans reVolution du clintat politi-
que en Europe. II a afilrme
neanmoins que la situation de-
ineurait �Lewin et incertaintor,
LE MONDE, Paris
5-6 April 1970
en raison d'une � infiltration tou-
fours croissante de l'imperialisme
americain dens les principaux
secteurs economiques de rEu-
rope a.
Le probleme de la paix
en Europe
En ce qui concerne le pro-
bleme de is paix en Europe, 11 a
rappele la proposition des pays
du pacte de Varsovie d'une con-
ference sur la securite euro-
peenne.
((Nous comprenons bien, a-t-I1
dit, que la solution des proble-
mes de la securite europeenne
est dif Pelle at exige du temps.
On ne pourra pas reussir en tine
seule conference. Mais il est im-
portant de commencer, de trou-
ver tine approche acceptable par
tous at de degager les aspects stir
lesquels les points de vue se rap-
prochent le plus. Cette fagon
faire serait realiste.
Une condition indispensable
d tout reglement durable sur le
continent europeen est la recon-
Staissance des frontieres existan-
(Excerpts Only Translated)
tes, resultant de la seconde
guerre mondiale at des evene-
ments ulterieurs. Ces realites at
d'autres doivent etre reconnues,
y compris le respect de la sou-
verainete nationale de la Repu-
blique democratique allemande �,
a-t-il ajoute.
De son cote, M. Walter Ulbricht
a dit notamment : � Ces ques-
tions ne peuvent etre negligees.
La rencontre d'Erfurt, tine initia-
tive de la Republique democrati-
que allemande, a donne l'occasion
au gouvernement Brandt de s'en-
gager sur la route conduisant
La pair. Mais M. Brandt et elude
des questions fondamentales
Erfurt. IL s'est retranche derriere
ZeS accords de Paris de 1954 qui
� c'est un fait bien connu
ont scene la division de la nation
allemande. �
Le chef du parti communiste
est-allemand considere que la,
pierre de touche pour connaltre
les intentions reelles du nouveau
gouvernement d'Allemagne occi-
dentale est tie sa,voir recon-
naltra inconditionnellement les
frontieres europeennes existantes
et renoncera a sea � revendica-
tkme, aUgales tut ,Beriin-Oueet a �
"A Difference of Tone as Mr. Kadar and Mr. Brezhnev
Discuss the National Interests of Socialist Countries"
It was with pageantry that the Hungarians celebrated the 25th anniver-
sary of the liberation of their country. It was on 4 April 1945 that the
last German units departed the,territory of Hungary....
During a solemn session of Parliament Mr. Brezhnev made a lengthy address,
during the course of which he particularly noted that in spite of the aspira-
tions or the whims of certain countries, the U.S.S.R. intends to continue
as the uncontested head of the Socialist camp.
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Mr. Brezhnev declared that "all fraternal countries struggle to estab-
lish the division of socialist labor and for the development of socialist
integration. The national and international interests of socialist states,
the same as their political and economic interests, are intertwined in
close unity. The socialist states should not seek to defend their national
interests to the detriment of international socialism."
This declaration was made by Mr. Brezhnev after he had listened to
Mr. Kadar affirm that "the decisive question concerning the development of
socialism rests in the coordination of the fundamental laws applicable at
the international level with specific national characteristics."
Without taking into account the opinions of the Hungarian head of state
(whom he described as a "great communist, son of the Hungarian people, and
true friend of the USSR"), Mr. Brezhnev did not hesitate to say: "We com-
pletely share the view often expressed by Comrade Kadar according to which
socialists states do not endeavor to defend their national interests to
the detriment of international socialism...."
DAOENS NYHETER, Stockholm
Thursday, 26 March 1970
l'yssarna
blir kvar
I Prag
PRAG, onsdag
De sovjetiska soldaterna har
kommit till Tjeckoslovakien for
att stanna. Den tillfalliga stalio-
neringen av ryske trupper liar nu
blivit permanent.
Det fraingar av det tjeckoslo-
vakisk-sovjetiska vanskaps- och
samarbetsavtal Sem underteckna-
des forra Veckan i Prag, omtalar
AFP. En artikel i den tjeckoslo-
. vakiska partitidskriften Tvorba pa
.onsdagen tolkar avtalet sA.
. 'Nar soVjetiska trupper ingrep I
Tjeckoslovakien i augusti 1968
skericie det riled motiveringen att
-det var .socialistlandernas plikt att
skydda -socialismens landvinning-
ar. Den tillfalliga stationeringen
'av trupper i Tjeckoslovakien skul-
.1e upphora 'tar en "inre konsoli-
, dering" intratt.",
Det nya fordraget innebar att
stationeringen blivit permanent,
med syfte att fiirsvara socialist-
varldens viistgrans, menar Tvorba;
som ocks& tillagger att det nya
� :fordraget sakert kommer att for-
talas av antisocjalistiska krafter I
Tjeckoslovakien och av deras
drivare utomlands.
THE RUSSIANS STAY. ON IN pRAGUE
Prague, Wednesday
The Soviet soldiers have come to Czecho-
slovakia to stay. The temporary stationing
of Russian troops has now become permanent.
This is made clear by the Czech-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which
was signed [sic] last week in Prague, reports
APP. An article in the Czech party newspaper
Tvorba Wednesday interprets the treaty that
way.
When the Soviet troops came into Czecho-
slovakia in August 1968, they came under the
justification that it was the duty of the
socialist countries to protect their terri-
torial gains. The temporary stationing of
troops in Czechoslovakia would end when an
"internal consolidation" took place.
This new treaty means that the station-
ing has become permanent in order to defend
the western border of the socialist world,
comments Tvorba, which also adds that the
new treaty surely will be criticized by anti-
socialist powers in Czechoslovakia and by
their instigators abroad.
3
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LE MONDE, Paris
2 April 1970
Des philosophes yougosluves temoignent
lour solidurite a M. Roger Goody
(Corrosporicion, pa rticullare.)
Zagreb. -- Le a cps D de M. Ro-
ger Garaudy a ete suivi avec
beaucoup d'attention en Yougo-
stavie. La presse a soigneusement
enregistre cheque critique et che-
que justification des points de
vue du philosophe frangais. Ainsl,
avant meme que le Grand tour-
nant du socialisme ne paraisse
en librairie, ii avait ete publie
presque integralement en feuille-
tons par differents quotidiens, tots
que le Politika de Belgrade ou le
Vjesnik de Zagreb.
Mats en depth de l'attitude de
la presse et de in sympathie evi-
dente gut pergait a travers les
informations fournies, les milieux
officiels ont reussi tt. eviter toute
prise de position ou commentaire.
Cette discretion s'explique sans
doute par la volonte des autorttes
yougoslaves de no pas enveni-
mer davantage leurs rapports
� gravement endommages apres
aoat 1968 � avec les partis corn-
munistes des pays de l'Est.
Cette prudnece officielle vient
d'�e largement compensee par
une manifestation de solidarite
des philosophes yougoslaves avec
M. Roger Garaudy. Ainsi, M. Pre-
drag Vranitzki, auteur d'une mo-
numentale Histoire du marxisme
et membre du comite de redac-
tion de Praxis, revue philoso-
phique connue pour son non con-
formisme, a recemment exprime
son opiniOn fall' la condemnation
des theses de M. Garaudy par le
XIX� congres du P.C.F.
Dans une interview Nin, heb-
domadaire belgradois, 11 ecri-
vait : � Pendant de longues
annees Garaudy a -pratique lui-
meme une variante stanilisee
du marxisme, tout comme ceux
qui to critiquent a present dans
La Pravda, Honstantinov et les
autres. A cette difference Ives
que, chez lui, l'esprit createur et
autocritique l'a emporte d'une
maniere decisive sur un dogma-
tisme gull a su reconnaitre et
dont it a pu pt-entire conscience.
Mais ceci no serait pas suffisant
pour permettre de jeter l'ana-
theme sur lui.
� Roger Garaudy a ete boule-
verse par les evenements de ces
dernieres annees et surtout par
to fait que, si tant de choses ont
change dans le monde, la poll-
tique des partis communistes eat
restee, elle, la meme. Ainsi, la
place de la classe ouvriere et des
intellectuels dans les pays deve-
loppes eat de nos jourS bien dif-
ferente de celle qu'ils occupaient
dans le passe. Des tendances nou-
velles se font jour an sein de la
gauche en general. Nous avons
ete les temoins d'un mouVemen
profOnd chez les etudiantS. Sous
nos yeux, des peuples parviennent
leur liberation. Les attaques
contre la Yougoslavie se sont
montrees sans jonctement. La
Tchecoslovaquie a clzoisi elle
aussi sa propre vole.
La chance hisforique
nth en France
)) Et, malgre tout cola, le
mouvement communiste a rate
:me chance historique en Franca(
pendant la grave generate, les at-
taques contre la Yougoslavie ont
repris en raison de son desir d'in-
dependance et de sa tentative
d'approfondir kz democratic so-
cialiste par l'autogestion, lea for-
ces armees de pays socialistes ont
empeche les conzmunistes tcheco-
slovaques de choisir leur manic
de socialisme (...). En outre, les
partis communistes Minis 4 Mos-
con n'ont pas eu le courage d'en-
gager une discussion ouverte et
critique sur l'acte qui avail dis-
credite rid& tin communisnte
plus que no seraient parvenues d
le faire des dizaines ou des eon-
tames de theoriciens.
� C'est id; tris sommairement.'
faut rechercher les raisons'
veritables du con/Lit autour de La
personne de Roger Garaudy. .le:
liens 4 ajouter aussi que cc re-,
glement se fait selon tin poncif
bien connu : le pretendu travail
de sape contre la conception le-
niniste tin parti revolutionnaire,
La pretendue mise en cause des
posit ions fondamentales du
marxisme, l'antisovietisme, etc. '
IL faudra pourtant que les theo-
riciens du marxisme sovietique'
comprennent une lois pour toutete
que critiquer des structures sta-
liniennes n'est pas faire preuve
d'antisovietisme is
D'autre part, rhebdornadaire
culture! Telegram vient de cOnsa-
crer en entier son supplement
Spektar a rceuvre de M. Roger
Garaudy et a rexamen de revo-
lution de sa pensee. e IL taut
esperer, ecrit reditorialiste de Is
publication zagreboise en evo-
quant le cas de M. Garaudy,
s'agit d'une crise qui aura pour
dern4ere consequence .une issue
positive, car on n'a que trop Vic
d'usurpations dogmatiques, do
confusions, de Mystification von-
lues on inconscientes a.
PREDRAG MATVEJEvrilill,
1
YUGOSLAV PHILOSOPHERS DECLARE
THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH MR. ROGER
GARAUDY
By Predrag Matvejavitch
Zagreb. The Roger Garaudy "case"
has been followed with much atten-
tion in Yugoslavia. The press has
carefully recorded each criticism
and each justification of the points
of view of this French philosopher.
In this manner, even before Le Grand
Tournant du Socialisme (Socialism's
Great Turning Point) appears for sale,
it has been published almost entirely
in serialized installments by various
daily papers, such as the Belgrade
Politika or the Zagreb Vjesnik.
But despite the attitude of the
press and the obvious sympathy which
can be glimpsed in the information
given, official circles have suc-
ceeded in avoiding having any posi-
tion taken or commentary made. This
discretion is undoubtedly explained
by the desire of the Yugoslav autho-
rities not to embitter any further
their relations -- which were
seriously damaged after August 1968 --
with Communist parties of the countries
of the East.
This official prudence has just
been greatly counterbalanced by a
demonstration of solidarity of Yugo-
slav philosophers with Roger Garaudy.
Mr. Predrag Vranitzki, author of a
monumental Histoire du Marxisme
(History of Marxism), and member of
the editorial board of Praxis, a
philosophical journal known for its
non-conformism, recently expressed
his position on the condemnation of
Mr. Garaudy's opinions by the 19th
Congress of the PCF [Parti Communiste
Francais; French Communist Party].
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In an interview with Nin, a Belgrade
weekly, he wrote: "For many years
Garaudy himself practiced a Stalinized
variant of Marxism, just like those
who are now criticizing him in Pravda,
Konstantinov and the others. With
just this difference, that for Garaudy,
the creative spirit and the spirit of
self-criticism decisively overcame a
dogmatism which he learned to recognize
and of which he became aware. But this
would not be enough to have him denounced.
"Roger Garaudy was distressed by events
of recent years and especially by the
fact that, while so many things have
changed in the world, the policy of Com-
munist parties has remained the same.
For the place of the working class and of
intellectuals in developed countries in
our times is quite different from the
place they held in the past. New trends
are appearing within the left in general.
We have been witnesses of a profound move-
ment among students. Under our eyes,
peoples are achieving their liberation.
The attacks against Yugoslavia have been
shown to be without basis.... Czecho-
slovakia has also chosen for itself
its own course."
Historic Opportunity Missed in France
"And, despite all that, the Communist
movement missed an historic opportunity
in France during the general strike, the
attacks on Yugoslavia have resumed be-
cause of its desire for independence and
its attempt to deepen socialist democracy
by self-management, the armed forces of
the socialist countries prevented the
Czechoslovakian Communists from choosing
their model of socialism.... In addi-
tion, the Communist parties that met in
Moscow did not have the courage to begin
an open and critical discussion of the
act which had discredited the idea of
Communism more than tens or hundreds of
theoreticians could have done.
2
"It is there, very briefly, that
must be sought the true reasons for
the conflict surrounding the person of
Roger Garaudy. I want to add also that
this settlement is being made accord-
ing to a well known cliche: the
alleged undermining of the Leninist
conception of the revolutionary party,
the so-called questioning of basic posii-,
tions of Marxism, anti-Sovietism, etc.
However, the theoreticians of Soviet
Marxism will have to understand once
and for all that criticizing Stalinist
structures is not a proof of anti-
Sovietism!"
In additon, the cultural weekly
Telegram has just dedicated its entire
supplement Spektar to the work of
Roger Garaudy and to an examination
of the evolution of his thought. "We
must hope," writes the editorialist of
the Zagreb publication in discussing
the case of Mr. Garaudy, - "that this
is a crisis which will have as its
final consequence a positive result,
for we have seen only too many dogmatic
usurpations, confusions, and either
voluntary or unconscious mystifica-
tions."
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L'Humanitg, Paris
3 April 1970
A propos de deux articles de la presse yougoslave
sur Factivite de Garaudy
DEUX hebdomadaires yougoslaves ,ont
cru devoir exprimer leur solidarite
avec Roger Garaudy..
Les citations donnees dons la press@ .
francaise ce propos montreni sans equi- '�
vogue qu'il s'agit en fait d'une attaque en ,
regle contra le Parti Communiste Francais.
C'est ainsi que P. Vranitzki, dons le
journal � Nin de Belgrade, pretend que
c des tendances nouvelle se font jour au
scin de la gauche en general mais qu'en
mai-juin 1968 c, le mouvement Communiste
a rate one chance historique en France a.
Autrement di?, s'il n'a pas ate possible
den finir a ce moment avec le pouvoir
des monopoles et de leur substituer on re-
gime dernocratique availed, la faute n'en
est pas � selon P. Vranitzki � 8 ceux
des partis de gauche qui ont refuse l'en,
tente que leur proposait notre Parti en
cc sons, mais... 8 noire Parti luemerne I
C'est, certes, le droit de quiconque,
compris d'un pumal d'un pays socialiste,
de porter One appreciation critique sur tel
ou tel aspect de notre action. Mais c'est
aussi notre droll de relever les calomnies.
II fair? vraiment etre aveugte ou irrespon-
sable pour no pas comprendre qu'en l'absen-
ce d'une union solids des forces ouvrieres
et 6rnocratiques � union refusee par to
gauche non communiste � la grande bour-
geolsie reactionnaire, aUrait; vu jeer la
fraction la plus avancee de la classe ou-
vriere dons on baits 'de sang, briser pour
longtemps le mouvernent ouvrier revolu-
tionnaire it instaurer one dictature mili-
taire. .
La reaction le souhaitail. Notre Parti a de-
leue le calCul de l'adversaire de classe.
Parce qu'il est conscient de ses response-
,billIes devant la classe ouvriere. On ne,
5 petit pas en dire autant de P. Vranitzki,
1
�
Celui-cl suggere par ailleurs que le Peal
Communiste Francais utiliserait avec Ga-
raudy des methodes � staliniennes D . P.
Vranitzkl cache soigneusement 8 ses lec-
teurs que les theses et l'activite de Garau-
ny ont fait l'obiet d'un large dehat dons
lout It Parti, que to &bat s'est deroule
publiouement, ne s'est trouvo que
hull cellules sur 19.250 pour soutenir Idle
no tette des positions de Garaudy et qu'au'
'terme de cello longue at libre discussion,
le ?CV* Congres a ePe unamme a rejeter
ces positions, Notre Peril a ainsi fait preu-
ve d'un democratisrne profond, authenti-
quement leniniste. Les nombreuses Mega-
lions de partis freres presentes 8 notre
congres, y compris la delegation de la Li-
gue des Communistes Yougoslaves, on! pu
s'en rendre compte. Mais P. Vranitzki
ce qu'est la democratic proletarienne, leni-
niste ? A le suivre, II aurait faflu que tout
� le Parti se soumette aux idees d'un scut
homme... Curieuse demarche de pensee pour
quelqu'un qui se veut aussi farouchement
� antistalinien I
Quant 8 l'autre hebdomadaire, le c Sock-
' tar de Zagreb, evoquent le cas de Go.
raudy, il place ses espoirs dons cc
, � appelle one � issue positive mettant fin
aux c usurpations dogmatiques a. Qu'est-
. ce A dire, sinon qu'on en appelle einsi 8 a
lutte oppositionnelle an scin de notre
� Parti ? Le 4 Spektar ne devrait pas fonder
.,� d'espoir la-dessus. Au lendernain du XIX'
Congres, notre Parti est plus uni quo ja-
. . mais. Plus uni clans le refus des theses
opportunistes et dogmatique:, de tous bords,
� � plus uni dons l'elaboration et la mise en
� ceucver.e d'une politique creatriee et nova-
� tri
Cola di?, il est curieux qu'au nom de
I' � antistalinisme e et de l' � antidogma-
tisme le journal de Zagreb se permette
-one ingerence aussi grossiere darts les
affaires de notre Parti. to Parti Commu-
niste Francais se fait, quant a lui, one re-
gle de no pas s'immiscer dons les affaires
de la Ligue des Communistes Yougoslaves.
II no manquera pas de reclamer le respect
de cello regle par autrui cheque fois gulf
sera neeessaire,
WITH REFERENCE TO TWO ARTICLES IN THE YUGOSLAV PRESS ON GARAUDV S ACTIVITIES
Two Yugoslav weekly periodicals considered it their duty to express their
solidarity with Roger Garaudy.
,The excerpts published by the French press in connection with this indubitably
;show that a regular attack against the Prench Communist Party (PCF) has been launched.
P. Vranitzki, for example, asserts in the Belgrade paper NIN that "new trends
iare appearing within the left in general," but that in May-June 1968 "The communist
movement missed a historic chance in France."
In other words, if it was not 'possible at that moment to liquidate monopoly power
,and replace it with an advanced democratic regime, it was not the fault, P.
.Vranitzki says, of the leftwing parties which declined the alliance that our
party proposed to them with a view of achieving this aim. It was the fault of
our party! Obviously everyone, including a paper published in a socialist country,
Is entitled to judge critically certain aspects of our activities. But we have
the right to refute slanders. Indeed one has to be either blind or irresponsible
not to understand that without a powerful alliance of workers and democratic
3
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forces, an alliance which had been rejected by the noncommunist left, the reactionary
high bourgeoisie would have been able to subject the most advanced faction of the
working class to a bloodbath, crush rqr a long time the rev011ifiRnZry workers
movement, and establish a atilitary dictatorship'.
The reactionary forces wanted thil to happen. Our party frustrated the class
enemy's design because it was oonicious of its responsibilities toward the Working
class. This cannot be said of P. Vranitzki.
P. Vranitzki also suggests that the PCP has used "Stalinist" methods with respect
to Garaudy. The author has been careful to conceal. from his readers the fact
that Garaudy's theses and activities were the subject of a wide-ranging discussion
within the entire party, that this discussion was public) that only eight -
cells out of 19,250 supported some of Garaudy's views, and that at the conclusion
of this long and free discussion the 1961 congress unanimously,rejected these
views. Thus our party showed that it is profoundly democratic and .truly Leninist.
The numerous fraternal party delegations, including the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia delegation, which were present at our Congress were able to ascertain
this. But does P. Vranitzki know what proletarian and Leninist democracy means?
If one were to pursue his way of reasoning the entire party would have to submit
tothe ideas of one man...a strange way of thinking for someone who pretends t.o be
so fiercely "anti-Stalinist"
As for the other weekly periodical, the Zagreb SPEKTAR, when mentioning the Garaudy
case it pins its hopes on what it calls a "Positive conclusion" which would bring
"dogmatic usurpations" to an end laut is this but an incitement to an opposition,
struggle within our party? SPEKTAR should not base its hopes on this. Following
the 19th congress our party is more united than ever before. /t is more united
In its rejection of any opportunist and dogmatic theses and in the formulation and
implementati9n of.a creative and-innovatofy policy.. -7 . , .
This having been said, it is strange that the Zagreb paper should venture to interfere
In such a crude manner in our party's affairs in the name of "anti-Stalinism" and
"antidogmatism. For its part the PCP follows the rule of non-interference in the
affairs of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It will not hesitate to demand
that this rule should be respected by others every tilts- this proves necessary.
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What Do the Dissenting Comrades Complain AbOut?'
Brezhnev doctrine and national roads to socialism
"The doctrine of limited sovereigpty or socialist community was not
invented either by Western propaganda or the so-called revisionists, but
by theoreticians and responsible statesmen of the countries whose troops
intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The article we mentioned in
Soviet Russia clearly confirms this. It says, among other things, that
the sovereignty of a state not only says, among other things, that the sov-
ereignty of a state not only is a concept of international law but it also
has class character. This reference to class character actually represents
the arrogation by one or more countries of the right to intervene in every
socialist country which, but its criteria, is building socialism in accord-
ance with its own specific conditions and not on the basis of foreign
models.
"According to the paper [Soviet army Red Star], varying models of
socialism are not acceptable and deserve only to be condemned because the
Soviet experience has allegedly shown that there is only one road to
socialism.
"These theories, naturally, are unacceptable and very dangerous and
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia rejects them as dangerous for the
unity of socialist countries and the Communist and workers movement. It
is all the same to Yugoslavia whether the right to intervene in a country
is part of the doctrine of limited sovereignty or whatever other name this
doctrine might have. What is at stake here is not the name but the essence
of the policy."
Milika Sundic (Yugoslavia) Zagreb Radio
31 January 1970
"As it happens, the current Soviet leaders are opposed not only to
changes which have become necessary in the Soviet Union but to all attempts
'by Communist parties (especially in the socialist nations) to develop
models of socialism corresponding to their social structures and national
histories."
Roger Garaudy (France) in The Great Turning Point of Socialism, 1969
"This campaign has assumed such proportions that in order to insure
their hegemony based on dogma of the single model the Soviet leaders, like
the Chinese leaders, became involved in a decisive policy at the international
level, not hesitating to require in each country a purge of those who opposed
this principle and to bring about deliberately a split in the communist
parties where this opposition was too strong....
1
- 477
!
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"...'Stalinism', that is to say that specific form of dogmatism
which consists in presenting as a universal and single model the form
of socialism which history imposed in Russia, in a country:where, there
was conflict between the problems of building socialism and those of
fighting underdevelopment with all that implies by way ofOconomic cen-
tralization to the n-th'degree and of limitations on democracy."
-
Roger Garaudy (France) in. The Whole Truth, 1970
"The new economic development and the problem of the transition to so-
cialist democracy from the undemocratic Stalinist system represent a complex
of two problems and one of them cannot be solved without the other. It is a
fateful international consequence of the Stalinist development that the cause
of the development or socialism in Russia lost the power of a common cause
among European movements in relation to socialism. It is not true that the
Frenchmen or the Italians are socialists because they would like to live as
workers in the Soviet Union live. They would not want to live like that.
If they are true socialists , they want a socialist life and they do not
consider the life of a worker or a collective farm member in the Soviet Union
a socialist life."
'Gyorgy LUkacs (Hungary) interview for Borba, Belgrade
1, 2 January 1970
"The Moscow leadership considers the order prevailing in the Soviet
Union as being the generally valid, obligatory model of socialism, and it
reserves itself the sole right of deciding what is socialist, communist,
and Marxist-Leninist, and what is not. The Moscow leadership sent its troops
into Czechoslovakia, there to 'save' socialism -- because the Czechoslovak
communists had dared to propose another model of socialism, and even to begin
implementing it. The Moscow leadership undertook its 'rescue mission' atto-
cratically and unasked, without consideration of the principles of national
self-determination and sovereignty; the fact alone that it was able to do
so already gives reason to seriously doubt Its socialist character."
Tagebuch Zeitschrift fuer Kultur und Politik (Austrian Communist)
May 1969
"Soviet Neoimperialism. In the light of Marxism, everything would
indicate that if contradictions are more antagonistic in the east than in
the west, war, rebellion and national liberation movements will be greater
where there are more contradictions. War between the USSR and China can
be nearer, be more probable than between China and America or between America
and the Soviets. But there are some whose ideologies will not let them see
the realities of our times, when it is a matter of applying:Marxist dialectics
to the resolution of contradictions in the east, where there is state capi-
talism and not socialism."�
Accion Montevideo, Arapey-(Uruguay)
1 September 1969 .
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"Identifying the USSR with socialism is a dangerous e)9edient.... But
it is even more inadequate to establish an identity between socialism and
the leadership of the CPSU. Historical experience should teach us be to
very cautious on that topic since the political changes which have occurred
in the USSR are, among other things, characterized by the 'fact that each new
leadership team denies and almost absolutely denounces the preceding team.
Once upon a time, socialism supposedly was Stalin, then Malenkov, then
Khrushchev, and now Bradinev. But, if the incarnation of socialism =Mem
down to being what each one of these leaders says about his predecessor,
then socialism would be a very poor thing indeed."
Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem, 1969.
Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia
"We assert that the [1968] Czechoslovak CP firmly but with a clear
spirit of tolerance and with a broadminded approach confronted the conspir-
atorial manipulations of its conservative wing. It prevented vengeance
and retaliation and, with undeniable feeling for democracy and socialism,
it effected the necessary changes in terms of personnel in the government
and party apparatus, without resorting to the police methods of the past.
"We assert that the lack of understanding on the part of the current
leadership group in the USSR was the principal factor for instability in
Czechoslovakia. The conduct of the Soviet government aggravated the contra-
dictions, stimulated negative or chauvinist positions, and enabled the
counterrevolution to conceal itself behind the banners of the defense of
the fatherland.
"Why did the USSR deliberately risk its prestige in so disastrous an
adventure? In the final analysis, this represents the ultimate argument
of those who believe that the intervention was right or necessary. If the
Soviets did this, then there must have been some extremely powerful 'reasons
to do so since people as responsible as they cannot deliberately perpetrate
such stupidity. This is reason based on faith.,; the reason that springs
from blind confidence in the USSR; this represents the remnant of a simple
and naive past in which the word of the USSR was the sacred word of the
fatherland of socialism,of the heirs of Lenin, of the heroic builders of
socialism.
"Fortunately -- or unfortunately, depending upon the individual's view-
point, that past has been smashed to bits. One cannot go on being a communist
and a Catholic at the same time. Right now, is it more difficult to be a
communist."
Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia - Socialism as a Problem, 1969
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A Japanese Party leader denounced the invasion and occupation as
"an unwarranted armed intervention, trampling underfoot Czechoslovak sover-
eignty and independence."
Tetsuzo Fuwa (Japan) Akahata, 21 September 1969
likocow was accused with the intervention in Czechoslovakia "to have
betrayed the confidence of the peoples of the world," and the party organ
condemned the intervention as "disgraceful and unequalled episode in the
history of the international communist movement." On the occasion of the
anniversary of the invasion, the party organ referred to the self-immolation
of Jan Palach and to the demonstrations of the Czechoslovak people, and de-
clared, "Open criticism of the intolerable violation of the sovereighty of
the country has been banned under the pretense of 'normalization' of the
situation." Once again it was demanded that foreign troops be immediately
withdrawn from Czechoslovakia.
Arnold Kuenzli, Frankfurter Rundschau
writing about the Japanese Communist Party
27, 30 December, 2 January 1970
The awesome, iron consistency of the Soviet moves in the CSSR since
August no longer leaves any room for illusions. The Czechoslovak experi-
ment has been terminated; this does not mean that it was unsuccessful. An
experiment must be called unsuccessful if it does not provide any new in-
sight. The Czechoslovak experiment brought more than one new insight.
First -- in the seven months of the "Prague spring" -- the realization that
socialist democracy is not an utopian idea but a realistic possibility;
and in connection therewith a whole series of concrete insights into the
nature of the means and ways, and into the methods and forms which permit
in the age of the scientific-technical revolution to realize the initial
ideas of the founders of scientific socialism; and finally, insights into
the true nature of the results of 50 years of development after the first
successful proletarian revolution in the concrete reality of historY. We
know incomparably more today about what socialism can be than we knew
prior to the Czechoslovak experiment; and we also know why Czechoslovakia
was not allowed to complete the experiment at a time when it just began to
show the most promising success.
Tagebuch Zeitschrift fuer Kultur und Politik
(Austrian Communist) May-June 1969
"The undersigned believe that the condemnation of the occupation of
Czechoslovakia expressed in August 1968 by a significant segment of the
communist movement constituted an act of positive value at that time.
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"Still, if the workers' hope for the advent of a genuinely socialist
society is to be kept alive in the lonik run, that condemnation -- lest it
seem a mere inconsequential and p3a0ton1c gesture designed to impress the
other leftist parties and public opinion -- should be followed by the con-
demnation in our country of a so-called 'normalization' imposed by a for-
eign army on a nation 87 percent of whose people had approved of its poli-
tical orientation towards a 'humanist' socialism.
"Approving the essential decisions of January 1968 which tended broadly
to enlighten the working masses, to recognize their real aspirations, and
to train them for the task of managing a socialist state, the undersigned
condemn the present attempts to mask, minimize or cause France to forget
the effects of the Soviet military intervention against socialist Czecho-
slovakia. Thus they reaffirm their solidarity with those who tried to
create a socialist society in which political power would be transferred
from the hands of the bureaucrats to those of the workers."
Declaration by French Communist militants, Le Monde, 16 January 1970
"We must really sit up and take notice as we see that, in the new situ-
ation estimates, which we learned about in connection with this problem
from the publications of the Czechoslovak party assemblies, there is-not
a single element pointing to a concrete preparation of a counterrevolution
which allegedly might have endangered socialism in Czechoslovakia in August
1968. More than that: arguments which were brought up in the past (about
suspected weapons caches and the like) are not even being mentioned anymore
now. Today, the discussion is concentrated on whether the policy and the
methods, applied by the Czechoslovak party on a number of issues, were cor-
rect. The issue now revolves around internal party questions, around prob-
lems of relationsships with other forces in the National Front, around forms
of managing the press organs, etc. The fact that things shifted to this
area can only strengthen us in our conviction that there can only be a politi-
cal solution for this kind pf problem."
Article by Spanish CP, Wiener Tagebuch, January-February 1970
"In 194811 Yugoslavia havinE been the first socialist nation to confront
authoritarian dogmatism and seek its own approach to the construction of
socialism, its leaders were denounced as counterrevolutionary agents, spies,
murderers, and fascists. These accusations were again levelled 20 years
later, in the name of the same postulates and even more brutally, when on
21 August 1968 Soviet tanks crushed the attempts by Czech communists to
develop a "model" of socialism corresponding to the requirements of a
highly developed society. Brezhnev thus went beyond the limits of Stalinism;
at least Stalin did not invade Yugoslavia!"
Roger Garaudy (French) The Great Turning Point of Socialism, 1969
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Democracy and Democratic Centralism
An underground letter, now circulating in Moscow, purportedly by well
known Soviet citizens, urges major changes in Soviet society including "anti-
democratic traditions and norms ... which appeared during the Stalin era
and have not been completely liquidated."
From Washington Post, 3 April 1970
"The occupation of Czechoslovakia has crushed a unique chance socialism
had in Europe. Nevertheless, the nonviolent democratic revolution in Czecho-
slovakia has made it clear unforgettably how great the possibilities of
socialism are in a no longer capitalist society. It is to be hoped that
the realization will prevail in the Soviet Union -- someday -- that the
competition with the capitalist world cannot be won without demoCracy,
that a gigantic power, which more than 50 years after the victorious revo4
lution trembles every time somebody drops a leaflet, that such a gigantic
power throttles the development of its own creative forces."
Ernst Fischer (Austria) Wiener Tagebuch, January-February 1970
"I think that around this revolves the problem of "socialist democracy"
(in fact, I believe there can be no socialist democracy without democracy
within the Tarty and without a leadership function of the party understood
in Lenin's terms.) Also around this problem revolves that of the "national
road." It seems to me beyond question that the clash between the Soviet
and Czechoslovak comrades was about this, and not about the "national road."
The Soviet comrades continue to hold a concept of the leadership function
of the party in which the party as the center of everything, becomes identi-
fied with all of society and does not recognize any independent power center
except as a "transmission belt."
Francesco Malfatti, (Italian) Rinascita, 26 December 1969
"Because of its very own status, because of its level of awareness,
because of its Marxist upbringing, because of its cultural education and
because of the availability of information, this intelligentsia, as a prior
condition for its development, demands socialist democratization on an
urgent basis.
The [Soviet] bureaucracy, which feels that this socialist democratiza-
tion means the progressive diminution of its power and its privileges,
forcefully opposes this and punishes its most apparent manifestation, the
intellectual rebellion, with a strictness that claims to be a warning and
that, as far as we can see now, only stimulates the call for democratization."
Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem, 1969
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"The speech of the secretary-general of the Spanish CP, Mr. Santiago
Carrillo, at this same Moscow conference backed the statements of the
Italian delegate. Roger Garaudy quotes it under the heading "Socialism
Has No Mecca."
"We would like to stress," Mr. Carrillo said, "that 'contrary to what
ocouro in our parties, the international communist movement is not guided
according to the principle of democratic centralism. Problems of principle
cannot be solved here either by ballot or by majority rule."
Review of The Whole Truth by Roger Garaudy in Le Figaro, 24 February 1970
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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