SECTION OF PAPER - TERRORIST LINKS IN LATIN AMERICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
06693349
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
March 8, 2023
Document Release Date: 
December 3, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2016-02161
Publication Date: 
June 29, 1979
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PDF icon SECTION OF PAPER - TERROR[15564237].pdf149.89 KB
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CO6272789 Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE OF STATE EQUITIES/CIA Terrorist Links in Latin America: Post-Mortem On The JCR (U) The Junta de Coordinacion Revolucionaria (known as JCR or the Junta) represents one of the most ambi- tions attempts by terrorist groups over the last dec- ade to form an effective international terrorist net- work. Founded in Argentina in 1974 by terrorist lead- ers from Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argentina, the JCR opened its membership to guerrilla and terrorist formations that were "Harxist-Leninist" in orienta- � tion, agreed to form a "revolutionary army," and ac- cepted the "socialist" nature of the revolution. At first the JCR seemed a formidable threat to several governments in Latin America, particularly in view of Cuba's initial interest and conditional support. The potential threat increased as the JCR contacted revo- lutionary groups elsewhere in Latin America and even in Western Europe. However, the intensive counterter- rorist campaign in 'Argentina and other Southern Cone countries effectively curbed the armed activities of those terrorist groups that formed the base of the JCR. With little room for maneuver in Latin America, the JCR turned largely to propaganda efforts directed at Latin American exiles. The organization's recent lack of initiative, even in propaganda, indicates its strength is greatly diminished, its influence almost negligible, and its future quite dim. Its failure has some implications for efforts at collaboration by ter- rorist groups elsewhere. The JCR Today: A Paper Tiger The JCR is moribund, though on paper it still looks impressive. Had it retained all the staff it ever re- cruited, all the international contacts it ever made, and all the terrorists theoretically respbnding to its direction or receiving its aid, it would have become a "Terrorist International" for Latin America. US military 35 29 June 1979 � (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 CO6272789 Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 '3relitto J. estimates of September 1978 noted that -about 200 JCR ac- tivists had been "identified." Two hundred full-time terrorists can do much damage; for comparative purposes, the current active service units of the Provisional Irish Renuhliran Army probably total less than that number. The JCR still has an internal structure of a kind-- including a leader in Europe, Federico Chavez, married to the sister of the late Ernesto "Che" Guevara of Cuba, and at least eight other officials, most of whom, like Chavez, are living in Paris. At one time or another it had contacts with at least 20 revolutionary organizations in Latin America with memberships totaling in the thou- sands and nearly as many other groups in Western Europe, the Middle East, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In Paris the JCR occasionally publishes a journal called the Guevara, and maintains an anti-Argentine re- gime propaganda center, the Centre Argentina de Informa- cion y Solidaridad (ens). The Agencia de Prensa America Latina'(PRELA) in Caracas functions as another JCR propa- ganda outlet. Through such instruments, the JCR has tried to influence not only disaffected Latin Americans but international human rights investigators from Amnesty International, the UN Human Rights Commission and even members of US Congressional committees. For more than a year, however, no new evidence has come to light that it sponsors training, directs terrorist or revolutionary activities, spends money to support terrorists, or even sends observers to revolutionary events that may be under way. It has been conspicious by its absence during the latest Sandinista offensive in Nicaragua, that a handful of JCR activists in Costa Rica may have played a minor role in helping Cuba gain Latin American support for the earlier Sandinista offensive. At present, therefore, the JCR is hardly more than a nuisance. 29 June 1979 36 .010001Ligli (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) . (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 006272789 Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 When the Threat Seemed Real The JCR was formed in February 1974 at a clandestine meeting in Argentina by terrorist leaders from Argentina's People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Uruguay's Tupamaros, Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and Bolivia's National Liberation Army (ELN). Mario Santucho of the ERP was the driving spirit in establishing the body. For.the first two years his ERP provided most of the money and other logistical support for JCR activites. He also served as the main JCR contact with the Cuban Government. Cuba apparently encouraged formation of the Junta (although the idea probably originated with Santucho), and at least for the first two years supplemented the ERP contributions with some monetary support as well as a promise of training assistance. Havana probably con- sidered that the JCR could be of some use in influencing the ideological direction of Latin American revolution- aries; that it could serve as a surrogate instrument for subverting what Havana regarded as "reactionary" regimes without greatly jeopardizing Cubes state-to-state rela- tions elsewhere; and that it could run the risk of fail- ure without making it appear to be Cuba's failure. The JCR's early months showed several accomplishments. It seems to be Kell financed, with an income of more than $30 million duriri9 trperidd 1974 to 1976, and access to sources of additional funds from kidnapings, bank rob- beries and, reportedly, two narcotics networks. It at- tracted other terrorist, groups as affiliates, notably from Paraguay (National Liberation Front--Frepalina), Argentina (Montoneros), Peru (Movement of the Revolution- ary Left--MIR), Guatemala (Revolutionary Armed Forces of National Liberation--FALN), Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces--FARC), and Nicaragua (the Sandinista). Its rep- resentatives fanned out to Paris, Lisbon, Frankfurt, Rome, Stockholm and elsewhere to establish contact with additional terrorist groups, with local Communist parties, and with any other organization willing to provide ma- terial or moral support. It established a system for providing safehouses and false documentation. It set up a guerrilla training base in Argentina, complete with � 37 29 June 1979 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 CO6272789 Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 airstrip, and arranged for other guerrillas to rPreiVP training The governments of the so-called Southern Cone countries reacted decisively to this perceived "interna- tional" threat, including a cooperative effort dubbed "Operation Condor." Between October 1975 and May 1977 security forces overran the Argentinian training base, killing Santucho, decimated the four founding terrorist groups, and thwarted every terrorist operation in Latin America bearing the signature of JCR. Some of these operations were near misses, such as the plot to assas- sinate Paraguayan President Stroessner in December 1975. Indeed, a JCR-sponsored plot in Paris to kill the Bolivian Ambassador to France in May 1976 was successful Other operations, however, were caught at such an early stage that they seem in retrospect to have been badly con- ceived--notably "Operation Red Boomerang," which involved the invasion of Chile by 140 guerrillas on horseback. Indeed, the security forces seem to have had little trouble in penetrating the JCR and thereby countering onerations almost as soon as they had been conceived. The last known terrorist operations that may have included significant involvement by the JCR occurred in April 1977 in Western Europe. One was an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap a former Swedish Government minister in order to gain the release of Baader-Meinhof Gang mem- bers imprisoned in West Germany. The other occurred when the director-general of Fiat-France was kidnaped and ransomed for $2 million; the Swiss police recovered more than three-fourths of the ransom. Present or former members of the Tupamaros, Montoneros, and the ERP par- ticipated in this bizarre episode. During 1978 terrorist groups loosely affiliated with the JCR attacked Nicaraguan consulates and airline offices in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia. While this represented a significant gesture of sympathy for the Sandinista by other Latin American terrorists, it was not, as far as can be determined, a JCR-sponsored operation. 29 June 1979 38 (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 CO6272789 Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 CO6693349 Why the Failure? By 1978, what was left of the JCR itself was reduced to a European-based publishing enterprise ing a continually decreasing readership. thus serv- The failure of the JCR to remain an effective ter- rorist threat can be accounted for by both particular and general factors. Santucho's death in 1976 clearly was one blow from which the JCR never recovered; his particular leadership skills proved tote irreplaceable. This situation has parallels in other terrorist organiza- tions. Since terrorism requires the use of small units to commit spectacular incidents, an individual's personal qualities often play a decisive role in the ultimate success or failure of the entire organization. When the opposing security forces succeed in putting a few key terrorists out of action, the results can thus be signif- icant. For example, the deaths of two important Belfast IRA leaders at the hands of the British Army in 1972 and 1973 (Joe McCann, believed to have assassinated 15 Brit- ish soldiers, and Jimmy Bryson, a particularly resource- ful IRA battalion commander) weakened the capabilities and apparently the resolve of the IRA to engage British forces directly in Belfast, though not elsewhere in Northern Ireland. The recent passivity of the interna- tional terrorist "Carlos"--Ilich Ramirez Sanchez*--has coincided with a worldwide decline in the complex multi- country terrorist "spectaculars" for which he has shown a special flair. Santucho, like McCann, Bryson, and Carlos, was a special type, and his also was a special loss. Other factors, however, clearly affected the JCR as well. Even before his demise, Santucho admitted to his associates that the JCR had failed. In addition to ex- ternal pressures from governmental security forces, the JCR had been weakened internally by factionalism. The four founding groups never bore equal burdens, and Santucho's group (ERP) grew tired of supporting the other three, which were weaker. Moreover, when the Montoneros applied for membership they were not given a position on *Carlos is a Venezuelan-born operative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine who was involved in several sensational terrdrist attacks in the past. 39 29 June 1979 (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 CO6272789 Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349 the ruling secretariat. Their second-class status was a reflection of their previous rivalry with the ERP in Argentina. Once the Montoneros had been relegated to a secondary position, no other group joining the JCR could be raised to the same level as the original four. The stage was set for bickering and mutual rather than effec- tive collaboration. The Cuban relationship to the JCR proved another source of the'organization's decline. Some affiliates feared Cuban domination, and JCR efforts to show dis- tance from Havana reduced Castro's interest in providing support. The factional, ideological, and ultimately nation- alistic differences which contributed to the JCR's demise tend to inhibit the creation of any effective interna- tional network of terrorist groups. Coordination of terrorist groups tends to work-best on an ad hoc, essen- tially bilateral basis. In any event, such coordination tends to be less important than the relationship of the terrorist group to a patron state or some internal popular base of support. When the number of terrorist groups involved in coordination, or the number of target coun- tries is greater than two the situation becomes unwieldr and unworkable. 29 June 1979 40 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2019/01/25 C06693349