RED CELL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01327044
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02409
• Publication Date: October 28, 2002

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DCI Red Cell
A Red Cell Report
Number 89 26 October 2002
In response to rho events of
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Could Saddam Step Down as a Ploy to Delay US Action? (SHREW�
In � last ditch effort to dimwit II $ pia,* Saddam 'night resign as hales
President and pass the inintie to 4 pupae 4 perhaps his manger son (Assay but
possibly a stooge he thinks the international community may find less
malodorous. Saddam might cakulate a sudden, witil-timed resignation�
although deceiving no one about isfb� calk, the shots in Iraq.-could throw the
ti.S off stride stride and postpone an invasion as tiN members demand an assessment
of the "new"situation and support for military action erodesi bra resignation
ploy had //We effec4 Saddam coidd easily orchestrate his recall to poWer "by
the Iraqi yew*" and use his gesture to stoke Arab resistance to the US.
Saddam realizes that W the US invades Iraq, he will lose power and probably his life. Based
on his past behavior, Saddam surely has some surprises up his sleeve. The Red CeN
consulted CIA analysts on an eleventh hour gambit Saddam might use to
thwart an hwasiont
Standing Down to iJostaga Washington
Saddam reliShes power and will do virtuaNy anything to retain It. His foes are therefore
prudent to prepare for the unthinkable�steps even Saddam might see as anathema until
he sees the end approaching. For example, a sham resignation in which Seddon ruled
from behind the scenes would be far preferable to him than exile abroad, but he might
rear loosing control, especially of the security forces. He would be mindful of Milosevies
fate, perhaps calculating a succear.or would eventually turn him over to the war crimes
Tribunal.
� Moreover, Saddarres personality is IN suited to stepping aside. He reacted negatively
when a diplomat raised with him the possibility & exile, reflecting his determination
to hang on to power even if offered persons security
Nevertheless, in the face of overWheineng US and coalition force, Saddam may come to
see a resignation gambit as offering the best' hope for personal survival and the only way
to preserve his influence: Compared to death at US hands or foreign exile, voluntary
resignation might strike him as a way retain oontrol.through a hand-picked successor while
posturing as eider statesman, sacrificing position for the good of Iraqi and Arab peoples.
� Saddam has already played the puppet master. Before he became president In 1979,
he exercised near absolute power from behind the throne as Iraq's number two
leader.
What He Hight Hope To Gain
If an attack against Iraq seemed inevitable, Saddam might calculate that a last minute
resignation would at least buy him additional time whNe the world puzzled over the
significance of such a move. If key actors played their parts adroitly, Saddam might hope
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to break up any existing coalition while denying the US the objective of regime change. In a
best case for him, Saddam might even be able to resume formal power at the "behest of
the Iraqi people" when the heat eventually subsided. '
� Even if the US refused to bite and moved ahead with invasion plans, Saddam wduld
probably calculate�correctly, in our view�that other states would pressure
Washington to pause and let the UN try to deal with the "new" regime.
. Neighboring Arab leaders might even praise Saddam's statesman-Bke�move to avert a
potential crisis for them in dealing with the Arab "street"�especialk if Saddam
claimed his departure would Mow the world to focus on the "real" issue of Israeli
aggression against the Palestinians.
� A Saddam resignation would also throw the already fractious Iraq opposition off
balance and cause a scramble for influence inside and outside Iraq. Despite suspicions
of what Saddam was really up to, Kurds and Shia opposition elements might approach
a new Iraqi leader to cut a deal.
A resignation might enhance Saddam's policy of trying to appiear forthcoming on UN
Inspections. Saddam could calculate a figurehead would be even more effective in selling
the notion that Iraq had nothing to hide. With several years to conceal its programs and
remove evidence from suspect facilities, the regime stands an orcellent chance of fooling
UNMOVIC and creating pressure In the UNSC to dismantle the sanctions regime.
� With inspectors back in Iraq and Saddam on the sidelines, international support for a
hard line would erode. Over time, a "'new" Iraqi regime could resume its efforts to
develop WMO.
Qualified Candidates for Front Man (S//REL)
To undertilke a faux resignation, Seiddam would need a "stccessor" strongly committed to
Saddam's personal safety and the interest of the family and brooder Tikrit clan. The new
president would need to be willing to serve as a facade behind which Saddam would rule
and to resist efforts to transform the system or marginalize the Bath party. A Saddam
surrogate would also need credibility with the security services and the Revolitionary Guard
and have a measure of international standing, especially among Arabs states.
With these considerations in mind, Saddarn might go one of three ways:
� Dynattic. Saddam's preferred successor Is his younger son, Qusay, whom he has
been grooming for power. Qusay has dose ties to the security organizations and the
Bath party. He would protect family and clan interests. He is steeped in the Arab
tradition of deference to parental authority and has less Incentive than other potential
successors to betray Saddam's trust, as long as he remained comfortable in an ersatz
role. Qusay would be seen as identical to Saddam, however, with almost no fig leaf to
cover Saddam's continuing power.
� Constitutional. According to the interim 1970 Constitution as revised, the Vice
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat al-Dun, shOuld be Saddam's
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successor. Al-Dun is a loyal Saddam henchman, having suryived in the position since
1979. His poor health and lack of charisrre suggest he would not be a threat to
Saddam., He is, however, a sleazy figure tainted, by involvement in WMO and would be
a poor "face" to the outside world.
� Pragmatic Saddam might turn to Deputy Premier 'Twig Aziz if he thought someone
with greater standing in the outside world would complete the ruse. Aziz is well known
abroad, having dealt with Western and Arab leaders for years, and is seen as a
relative moderate. As a Christian of some urbanity, /viz might be the sort of benign
face that can help make Saddan's strategy of tactical retreat work. His lack of ,11
power base and age (72) would make him easy to manipulate.
How It Could Happen
If he deckled to resign at the eleventh hour, Saddam would in aft likelihood make a major
speech, perhaps to a Iliathist conclave, scplalning that he was stepping down to save his
countrymen and to promote Arab Interests. He might blame the US, with its imperialist
ambitions and Zionist string-pullers, noting that efforts to oust him violated the collective
will of the Iraq people expressed in his "unanimous' reelection in October. He would make
a plea to the Arab world to no longer let a 'Yal.se" corirontation with him defier/ from '
resistance to US and Israeli aggression.
Saddam would avoid touching�Troth less playing�the resignation card until he vas
convinced he had no other alternative. In 1991, he offered to withdraw from l(uwait only
when major coalition military movements were underway, but by then the coalition saw
Saddam's offer as a transparent stalling tactic. This time, support for moving against
Saddam is much softer and a late surprise might find greater receptivity. (S//REL)
If Saddam plays this low probability, high impact" gambit, we might see some indicators.
� On the ewe of a resignation Saddam might purge of offlelals of questionable loyalty
lest anyone-suspect he is goingsoft.
� Saddam and the Iraqi man might increasingly pottray the struggle with the US
exclusively as a personal vendetta against Saddam, helpirg pave the way for an
accommodation with the new leader.
� Saddam might consult with his sons, al-Dun, and some Bath Party leaders. We might
detect such efforts to script a resignation.
If a staged resignation appeared unlikely to delay US rniNtary 'action, Saddern could quickly
reassume the reins. He would swing the Iraq propaganda apparatus into action behind a
"grass roots* recall to power. The media would stress that Saddern, In a last attempt to
avert conflict and protect the Iraqi people, had been willing to step askle, but that even this
"magnanimous" gesture would not satisfy the "rapacioue US administration and its allies,
the Israelis and anti-Islamic Arab lackeys."
� Such themes would resonate in the Mkklie East and could activate the Arab "steer to
violent protest against any support provided to US forces.
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