STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02343447
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-01640
• Publication Date: January 1, 1956

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING � JANUARY 1956
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not represent the official views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or of the Office of Training.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, ITSC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
Address all comments and inquiries to . . .
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Office of Training � ext.cb)(3)
Subsequent issues will be disseminated widely throughout
the Agency. To make sure of receiving copies, or to
secure extra copies, please call the extension listed above.
mew-
CON JTIAL2
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EDITORS INTRODUCTION
IN September, the Office of Training issued the introductory
number of Studies in Intelligence. Our purpose, we said,
was to stimulate thinking and writing about the funda-
mentals of intelligence work, and to sponsor the beginnings of
a professional intelligence literature. We especially empha-
sized two requirements basic to the production of such a litera-
ture: first, all that we publish will be entirely unofficial and
will represent only the opinions of the individual author;
second, the success of the project will depend on participation
by the whole intelligence community. Successive Studies, that
is to say, will appear only as worthwhile manuscripts reach our
desk; and we will be able to judge the impact of what we pub-
lish only as we receive reader comments.
In presenting this issue on "capabilities" we call your atten-
tion to a concept whose applications extend to nearly every
aspect of intelligence work. Just about everyone, at one time
or another, is in the capabilities business, from the case officer
who keeps current and reports on the "capabilities" of a nation-
al Communist Party to the Board of National Estimates which
turns out exhaustive studies on the "capabilities" of the Soviet
Bloc. One of the classic definitions of intelligence is, indeed,
"the analysis of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign
countries, relevant to US security interests." Both authors
tackle the subject at its most basic: what do we mean by the
word and, if our meaning is not always clear and consistent,
what should we mean? What experience do we draw on in
analyzing "capabilities" and how, in specific cases, does the
analysis proceed?
Both Abbot E. Smith and bring to bear on
the subject an abundance of experience in intelligence (spe-
cifically in capabilities analysis) and related fields. Mr. Smith,
a Rhodes Scholar and a distinguished historian, has taught at
seem�
CONFIDENTIAI
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The two two articles that follow by no means exhaust the subject
at hand � it is much too broad and involves too many side-
issues for that. At least two directly related problems, each
worth a Study in itself, have occurred to us as we have reflected
on Mr. Smith's and contributions. One is the
problem of the special characteristics of national, as distinct
from departmental, intelligence. To put it in the form of a
question: to what extent is the experience and the methodology
of, e.g., military intelligence directly applicable to the produc-
tion of national intelligence? The terminology has carried
over, to be sure; but in Mr. Smith's and articles
there are differences in usage of the capabilities concept that
may result in part from basic differences in the problems the
national and the military intelligence officer are asked to solve.
Then, too, there is the problem, raised in both articles, of the
lack of a national G-3 � which may, again, complicate the
process of applying the systematic and time-tested methodology
of the military intelligence officer to national intelligence. And
surely there are many other problems of "capabilities" that
could usefully be addressed in subsequent issues of this series;
these are but two of the more obvious.
We invite suggestions and prospectuses, therefore, for some
of these unwritten Studies and comments on the present one �
comments which we would like also to publish in subsequent
e'effer""
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ill
issues. To repeat something we think bears a lot of repeat-
ing: if indeed these Studies in Intelligence are to help in the
airing of intelligence principles and methods, in the recaptur-
ing of experience, and eventually in the building of authorita-
tive doctrine, then we are going to need the advice and the
participation of every member of the intelligence profession to
do the job well.
SfiregiLos
ranNiginChrri A
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NOTES ON "CAPABILITIES" IN
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
by Abbot E Smith
WHEN CIA was established with the mission of producing
"national" intelligence it perforce drew heavily for
doctrine upon the military intelligence agencies. Over
the years, the intelligence organizations of the armed forces
had developed a well-tested routine. Formulas were available
to meet various requirements. Agreement had gradually been
reached on what needed to be known about the enemy, what
data were necessary for the estimate, why they were necessary,
and how they could most usefully be presented. CIA had no
counterpart to this doctrine. It therefore frequently borrowed
from the military, and in no instance was this borrowing more
conspicuous than in the matter of "capabilities."
The doctrine of enemy capabilities is one of the most charac-
teristic and useful that military intelligence has to offer. A
capability is a course of action or a faculty for development
which lies within the capacity of the person or thing concerned.
More particularly, in military intelligence, enemy capabilities
are courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable
and which would, if adopted and carried through, affect our
own commander's mission.* In short, a list of enemy capabili-
* "capabilities, enemy � Those courses of action of which the enemy
is physically capable and which if adopted will affect the accom-
plishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes not
only the general courses of action open to the enemy such as attack,
defense, or withdrawal but also all the particular courses of action
possible under each general course of action. "Enemy capabilities"
are considered in the light of all known factors affecting military
operations including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength
and disposition of enemy forces . . ." Dictionary of United States
Military Terms for Joint Usage, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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ties is a list of the things that the enemy can do. It is there-
fore apt to be the most significant part of a military intelligence
officer's "Estimate of the Enemy Situation."
It is true, of course, that a military intelligence officer col-
lects and transmits to his commander a great deal of other
information. He reports on the weather, terrain, and com-
munications in the zone of operations. He may set forth the
politics and economics of the area. He collects and evaluates
data on the enemy's order of battle, logistical apparatus, equip-
ment, weapons, morale, training and the like. All this is made
known to the commander, but it is still not a statement of
enemy capabilities. Only when the intelligence officer has ac-
quired all this information, and constructively brooded over it,
can he set about describing the courses of action open to the
enemy. It is this list of capabilities that tells the commander
what, under the conditions existing in the area, the enemy can
do with his troops, his weapons, and his equipment to affect the
commander's own mission. The enumeration and description
of enemy capabilities is the ultimate, or at least the penulti-
mate, goal of military intelligence. It is one of the character-
istic modes to which the great mass of intelligence information
available is bent, in order to give the commander the knowledge
of the enemy he needs to plan his own operations.
Adaptation of this doctrine to the requirements of national
intelligence presents at first no real difficulty. Courses of ac-
tion may be attributed to persons, organizations, parties, na-
tions, or groups of nations as well as to military units, and to
friendly or neutral, as well as to enemy, powers. They may be
political, economic, psychological, diplomatic, and so on, as well
as military. It is true that a national intelligence estimate*
is not made for a military commander with a clearly defined
* Throughout this paper the term "national intelligence estimate"
is used generally to mean not just the solemnly coordinated "Na-
tional Intelligence Estimates" approved by the Intelligence Advisory
Committee, but any estimate, great or small, made by any office or
person producing national intelligence.
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mission, to which enemy capabilities may be referred to ascer-
tain if they do in fact "affect" the carrying-out of that mission.
An equivalent for the commander's mission is not far to seek,
however, since national intelligence is obviously concerned only
with foreign courses of action which may affect the policies or
Interests � above all the security interests � of the United
States. It is by no means as easy to be clear about all the poli-
cies and interests of the United States, and to perceive what
might affect them, as it is to understand the mission of a mili-
tary commander, which is supposed to be unequivocally stated
in a directive from higher authority. But this is one of the
reasons why a national intelligence estimate is apt to be more
difficult to prepare than a military estimate of an enemy situa-
tion.
In national intelligence, then, capabilities may be defined as
courses of action within the power of a foreign nation or organ-
ization which would, if carried out, affect the security interests
of the United States.
It is probably unnecessary to argue that statements of capa-
bilities are useful as a means of organizing and presenting na-
tional intelligence. The parallel with military intelligence doc-
trine seems perfectly sound. High policy-makers doubtless
want to be supplied with authoritative descriptions and anal-
yses of the politics, economics, and military establishments of
various foreign nations, together with explanations of the ob-
jectives, policies, and habitual modes of action of these nations.
They need to have the best possible statistics, diagrams, pic-
tures, and data in general. But when all the labor and re-
search has been finished, the results collated and criticized,
and the conclusions written down, it will still be worthwhile to
go on to a statement of what each foreign nation or organiza-
tion can do to affect the interests of the United States. This
is the statement of capabilities.
In recognizing, formulating, testing, and presenting foreign
capabilities, intelligence doctrine comes into its own. Apart
from the special function of intelligence operations in collecting
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data, most of the preliminary spade-work for intelligence esti-
mates is the province of other disciplines than that specifically
of intelligence. This spade-work of course takes nine-tenths of
the time, trouble, and space devoted to any estimate. Political
scientists analyze the structure of government and politics in a
foreign state; economists lay bare its economic situation; order-
of-battle men reveal the condition of the military establish-
ment; sociologists, historians, philosophers, natural scientists,
and all manner of experts make their contribution. When all
this has been done it is the peculiar function of intelligence
itself to see that the learning and wisdom of experts is directed
towards determining what the foreign nation can do to affect
US interests. Thereby the major disciplines of social and
natural science are turned to the special requirements of
intelligence estimates.
Let us be careful not to confuse this with the function of
prophecy. To predict what a foreign nation will do is a neces-
sary and useful pursuit, albeit dangerous; it rests on knowledge,
judgment, experience, divination, and luck. To set forth what
a nation can do is a different matter. One still needs judgment,
experience and luck as well as knowledge, but soothsaying is
reduced to a minimum. There is an element of the scientific.
The job can be taught, and its techniques refined. It can be
reduced to doctrine.
II
Generally speaking, in military usage an enemy capability is
stated without reference to the possible counteractions which
one's own commander may devise to offset or prevent such
action. The Navy's handbook entitled Sound Military Decision
puts it this way (italics added) : "Capabilities . . . indicate
actions which the force concerned, unless forestalled or pre-
vented from taking such actions, has the capacity to carry out."
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Here are three examples:
a. The Bloc has the capability to launch large-scale, short-
haul amphibious operations in the Baltic and Black Seas.
b. The USSR has the capability to launch general war.
c. The Chinese Communists have the capability to commit
and to support approximately 150,000 troops in Indochina.
These statements give no estimate of what the effects or
results of any of these courses of action might be. There is
no indication for example that the United States or some other
power might be able to make it difficult or impossible for the
Chinese Communists to support 150,000 troops in Indochina,
or that the West might possess such strength that a Soviet
decision to launch general war would be tantamount to suicide.
The statements simply lay down what the nations concerned
could do, without regard to any possible opposition or counter-
action. Such unopposed capabilities are frequently referred
to as "gross" or "raw" capabilities. They are the kind of
enemy capabilities which are reported to a military commander
by his G-2, in the "Estimate of the Enemy Situation."
The high policy-makers for whom national intelligence is
designed, however, are not in the comparatively simple position
of military commanders facing an enemy. They have broader
fields to cover, and more numerous problems to face. They
need to have a picture of the security situation in the world
as a whole and in various areas of the world. This picture
ought to show not only the multifarious forces which exist, but
also the probable resultants of these forces as they act upon
each other, or as they might act upon each other if they were
set in motion. The policy-makers need, in short, to know about
net capabilities, not merely about gross or raw capabilities.
This is well understood and accepted as long as the courses
of action of foreign nations alone are concerned. Nobody
would think of enumerating the capabilities of France, for
example, without giving due consideration to the frequently
opposing capabilities of Germany, and to the tangential capa-
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bilities of Great Britain and other powers. Even in the purely
military sphere, statements of net capabilities occur in national
estimates. For example:
a. In Israel, an army of 49,000 . . . is capable of defeating any
of its immediate neighbors.
b. The Chinese Communists have the capability for conquer-
ing Burma.
c. We believe that the Chinese Communists are capable of
taking the island of Quemoy if opposed by Chinese Nation-
alist forces only.
It is an intricate and difficult operation even to attempt to
work out the probable resultants of the enormous forces actu-
ally or potentially at work in the world � political, economic,
military, and the like. Without such an operation, however �
sometimes called "war-gaming" when limited strictly to the
military sphere � national intelligence estimates of capabilities
would lose much of their usefulness for the particular purpose
they are designed to serve.
Obviously no estimate of the security situation anywhere
in the world will be worth much unless the capabilities of the
United States are taken into account and their effect weighed.
At this point, however, grave practical difficulties arise. We
of the intelligence community are solemnly warned that we
must not "G-2 our own policy." Military authorities are
shocked at the suggestion that we should indulge in "war-
gaming." We are told that it is the function of the commander,
not of the intelligence officer, to decide what counteraction to
adopt against enemy capabilities, and to judge what the success
of such counteraction may be. It is pointed out that no ade-
quate estimate of net military capabilities can be made without
a full knowledge of US war plans, and a long and highly tech-
nical exercise in war-gaming by large numbers of qualified
experts. Since intelligence agencies as such quite properly
have no knowledge of US war plans, and possess no elaborate
machinery for war-gaming, they are estopped from making
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an estimate of net capabilities where US forces are significantly
Involved. As a result there is, for instance, no statement in
any national intelligence estimate of how the military security
situation on the continent of Europe really stands, i. e., of the
probable net capabilities of Soviet forces against the opposition
they would be likely to meet if they attempted an invasion of
the continent.
This state of affairs is unfortunate, and the value of national
intelligence estimates is thereby reduced below what it ought
to be. The difficulty is really not one of intelligence doctrine,
however. Practically nobody doubts that high policy-makers
ought to be supplied with estimates of net capabilities even in
situations where the US is actively engaged. It is agreed that
they ought to have the best possible opinion on the security
situation on the continent of Europe, and that they must be
informed not merely of the gross capabilities of the USSR
to launch air and other attacks on the US (the subject of an
annual National Intelligence Estimate) but of what the USSR
could probably accomplish by such an attack against the
defenses that the US and its allies would put up. In one way
or another policy-makers get such estimates of net capabilities,
even if they have sometimes to make them themselves, off
the cuff.
The question is, then, not whether estimates of net capa-
bilities are legitimate requirements, but simply who shall make
them. This problem is outside the scope of a paper on intelli-
gence doctrine. It may be suggested, however, that the diffi-
culty has probably been somewhat exaggerated. The jealous
prohibition of "war-gaming," on grounds that to conduct it
requires a knowledge of US war plans and an enormous appa-
ratus with numerous personnel, is overdone. In four out of five
situations where an estimate of net military capabilities is
needed the judgment of wise and experienced military men,
based on only a general knowledge of US war plans, is likely
to be about as useful as the most elaborate and protracted
piece of war-gaming. Such exercises have too often given the
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wrong answer they are really no more dependable as guides
to the outcome of future wars than research in economics is
dependable as an indicator of the future behavior of the stock
market. This does not mean, of course, that economics and
war-gaming are useless pursuits.
Gradually, indeed, the difficulties respecting estimates of net
capabilities are disappearing. In the most critical situations �
air attack on the United States, for example, and perhaps the
security situation in Europe � it may be necessary to establish
special machinery for the most careful playing-out of the
problems and ascertainment of net capabilities. In less critical
situations the trouble is solving itself. Military men are be-
coming a little less shy of making an educated guess as to net
capabilities, even when US forces are involved, and the com-
munity is not as distressed as it used to be at the accusation of
"G-2-ing US policy." A doctrine is gradually being evolved by
trial and error, which is as it should be. Some day it may be
desirable to commit the evolved doctrine to writing, but the
time has not yet arrived.
III
Of course any foreign nation of consequence is physically
capable of a vast number of courses of action which would
affect the security interests of the United States. One task
of intelligence (after the spade-work is complete) is to recog-
nize these capabilities; another is to test them against known
facts to make certain that they are real and not imaginary;
a third is to test them one against another to see how many
could be carried out simultaneously, and how many may be
mutually exclusive; a fourth is to work out in reasonable detail
the implications, for the nation concerned and for the United
States, of the actual implementation of each important capa-
bility. I propose to pass over all these tasks without further
discussion, and to concentrate on the problem of selecting from
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among the capabilities those which are to be included in the
formal estimate. For even after all the testing is finished
there will still remain far too many capabilities to put into
any document of reasonable size. Considerations of space,
time, and the patience of readers make it imperative that some
principles of exclusion be adopted, so that the list of capabili-
ties presented will be useful rather than merely exhaustive.
Capabilities are excluded from national estimates for one of
two reasons: either because they are judged unlikely to be
actually adopted and carried through, or because they are con-
sidered to be so insignificant that they could be implemented
without more than minor effect on the security interests of the
United States. For short we may say that they are excluded
on grounds either of improbability or of unimportance.
The second of these criteria does not require much discus-
sion. Clearly it would be a waste of time and paper to fill a
national estimate with lists of courses of action which, even if
carried out, would affect the security interests of the United
States only to an insignificant degree. One applies common
sense in this matter, and forthwith rejects a great number of
capabilities from further consideration. Along with common
sense, however, there ought always to be plenty of specialized
knowledge available. Everyone knows that an expert can
sometimes point out major significance in things which are
to the uninformed view negligible, and conversely that experts
will sometimes inflate the importance of things which common
sense and general knowledge can see in juster proportion. Out
of discussion and argument on these matters comes the best
verdict as to the importance or unimportance of a given
foreign capability, and the best guidance as to whether it
should be put into the formal estimate.
To reject any foreign capability because we judge it unlikely
to be implemented is a more serious and difficult matter. Here
indeed we part company with military doctrine, which frowns
upon the exclusion from an estimate of any enemy capabilities
whatever, and especially condemns any exclusion on grounds
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of improbability. There has been much debate, among the
military, on whether an intelligence officer should presume to
put into his formal estimate an opinion as to which of the
enemy capabilities listed is most likely to be implemented. It
has been said that such a judgment is for the commander
alone to make, and some have even held that the commander
himself must not make it, but must treat all enemy capabilities
as if they were sure to be carried through, and must prepare
to deal with them all. This latter doctrine is somewhat aca-
demic. It is doubtful that any intelligence officer, or any
commander worth his salt, has ever acted strictly in accordance
with it. Yet it remains that according to the more rigorous
teachings of military intelligence no enemy capability of any
consequence may be omitted from the list presented to the
commander. The disasters which can result from even a care-
fully considered exclusion have been frequently pointed out.
Nevertheless, in a national intelligence estimate we must for
the reasons already stated exclude many foreign capabilities
because we judge them unlikely to be carried out. The unlike-
lihood is in turn generally established on one or more of three
grounds, namely, that implementation of the capability (a)
would be unrelated to, or incompatible with, national objec-
tives of the country under consideration; (b) would run
counter to the political, moral, or psychological compulsions
under which the nation, or its rulers, operate; or (c) would
entail consequences so adverse as to be unprofitable.
The most obvious capabilities to exclude are those which, if
implemented, would serve no objective of the nation under
consideration, or would clearly run counter to some of that
nation's objectives. Thus we do not bother about the possi-
bility that the British might conquer Iceland, although they
certainly could do so and if they did US security interests
would be affected. The conquest of Iceland, however, would
serve no British objective that we know of, at least in time of
peace. Again, it is clearly within the power of the USSR to
give up its Satellites, renounce its connections with Commu-
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nist China, and retire modestly into isolation. Or the British
might, in order to improve their economic condition, abandon
all armaments and cease to be a world power. We do not give
such capabilities serious consideration, however, because we
believe them manifestly contrary to the fundamental aims of
the Soviets and British respectively. By applying this sort of
standard we can immediately reject a great number of courses
of action which lie within the power of the nation concerned
and which would affect US security interests.
One must be careful in using this test, however, for national
objectives change, sometimes with changes in government,
sometimes without. It is, for example, impossible to be sure
about the objectives which will determine West German policy
in years to come. Even the Soviets do not always appear to
the Western view to act in such a fashion as to serve what we
estimate to be their real aims. Moreover, all nations have
various objectives, many of which are to some degree incom-
patible with each other. Sometimes one is governing, some-
times another. Nations can even pursue simultaneously several
conflicting objectives, to the confusion of their own citizenry
as well as of foreign intelligence officers. We must be very
certain, before rejecting a foreign capability as incompatible
with a national objective, that the objective is genuine, deeply-
felt, and virtually certain to govern the nation's courses of
action.
The political, moral, or psychological compulsions which
operate on a nation, or on its rulers, make the implementation
of some of that nation's physical capabilities unlikely or even
impossible. Thus, for example, it would probably be judged
that the US is unlikely to undertake a strictly "preventive"
war against the USSR because such an action, under any
foreseeable US government, would be politically and morally
unthinkable. It may similarly be true that the Soviet rulers
are psychologically unable to establish a genuine state of
peaceful coexistence with capitalist states even though they
may proclaim their desire to do so and may judge such a
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course of action conducive to the ultimate aims of Communism.
There are some things that nations cannot do, despite the
fact that they are physically capable of doing them and might
serve their national objectives thereby.
To be sure, if a nation is politically, morally, or psychologi-
cally incapable of pursuing a given course of action that
course of action is not a capability at all, and we need not
worry about it. The trouble is, however, that while physical
incapabilities can generally be pretty satisfactorily established
the same is rarely true of political, moral, or psychological
incapabilities. One must depend more on judgment and less
upon demonstrable certainty for an estimate in the matter.
Not many would have estimated, before the fact, that Tito
would be psychologically capable of turning against Stalin,
or that the Germans would be morally capable of supporting
Hitler, or that the United States would be politically capable
of abandoning isolationism. Experience warns us against un-
due confidence in our estimates of national character, and it
will be safer to consider as capabilities all courses of action
which a nation is physically able to carry through, rejecting
many as improbable but none as impossible.
Finally, we reject from our estimate those capabilities which
would, if implemented, lead to such adverse consequences as
to be unprofitable. There are, curiously enough, very few
foreign capabilities which will pass the tests already mentioned,
and then have to be excluded on this ground. This is because
most courses of action having indubitably dire consequences
will by reason of that fact alone run counter to the objectives
or to the political, moral, or psychological compulsions of the
nation. Those few which are left are generally military in
nature and are apt to be so important that we include them
in the estimate anyway. Thus it is clear that general war
with the US would be hazardous and perhaps disastrous for
the USSR. It therefore seems highly improbable that the
Soviets will deliberately run grave risks of involving themselves
in such a war, yet no national estimate on the USSR would
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omit mention of the capabilities of that nation for conducting
war with the US. The same holds true for the capabilities of
the Nationalist Chinese to invade the mainland, or of the
South Koreans to attack North Korea. We may judge such
capabilities improbable of implementation, but we do not
exclude them from our estimate.
By applying the tests of importance and of probability, as
described above, the vast number of capabilities of any foreign
nation will speedily be reduced to manageable proportions.
The process of exclusion will at first be almost unconscious �
most capabilities will be rejected forthwith, without doubt or
debate. When this stage has been accomplished, however,
there will still remain a formidably long list which will require
more serious consideration. Exclusion becomes more difficult,
and begins to require longer discussion and maturer judgment.
The same criteria of choice continue valid, but are applied with
more deliberation. This is the point at which preparation of
the estimate gets interesting, for the choice of capabilities to
include or exclude may prove to be the most crucial decision
made during the estimating process.
Though we have departed from the military doctrine in
allowing a rejection of capabilities judged unlikely of imple-
mentation, we may still return to it for an important lesson.
Like the military commander, the high policy-maker is entitled
to something more than intelligence's opinion of what foreign
nations will probably do. He is entitled to be informed of
various reasonable alternative possibilities, and to be given
some discussion of these alternatives � of their apparent ad-
vantages and disadvantages, and of the reasons why intelli-
gence deems them respectively to be less or more likely of
implementation. National estimates sometimes discuss only
the particular foreign capabilities which the intelligence com-
munity in its wisdom believes will actually be carried through.
This is going too far in exclusion. Intelligence must winnow
the mass of capabilities down to two or three or half a dozen
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in each situation examined, but it is the responsibility of policy-
makers, not of intelligence agencies, to decide which among
these few last alternatives shall in fact constitute the intelli-
gence basis for US policy.
IV
Looking back over old national estimates one is apt to feel
that the borrowing of military terminology was sometimes a
little over-enthusiastic. The word "capability," for example,
offers an almost irresistible temptation to all of us who compose
governmental gobbledegook. It is a long, abstract noun, of
Latin derivation, and it has a pleasing air of technicality and
precision. It will appear to lend portentousness to an other-
wise simple statement. Perhaps this is why the word appears
in estimates so frequently, unnecessarily, and sometimes even
incorrectly.
One trouble is that the word has a perfectly good, non-
technical meaning, signifying a quality, capacity, or faculty
capable of development. It is commoner in the plural, when
it usually denotes in a general way the potentialities of the
possessor, as when we say that a man "has good capabilities."
This usage is frequent in estimates:
a. The air defense capabilities of the Bloc have increased
substantially since 1945.
b. Chinese Communist and North Korean capabilities in
North Korea have increased substantially.
c. The capabilities of the new fighter aircraft are superior to
those of the old.
No valid objection can be taken to these examples. Indeed,
the usage is virtually the same as that of the technical term,
for the statements are about the things that the possessors of
the capabilities can do.
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One can find, however, a good many examples of slipshod
usage:
a. Satellite capabilities for attack on Greece and particu-
larly on Turkey are too limited for conquest of those
countries.
b. The Tudeh Party's capabilities for gaining control of Iran
by default are almost certain to increase if the oil dispute
is not settled.
There is no good reason for using the word "capabilities" in
either of these statements; in the first the word should prob-
ably be "resources," in the second, "chances" or "prospects."
If one really insists on talking about capabilities then the
statements ought to be rephrased: "The Satellites are not
capable of conquering Greece or Turkey," and "If the oil dis-
pute is not settled, conditions in Iran will be such that the
Tudeh Party may acquire the capability to gain control of the
country."
It will be perceived that the immediately foregoing examples
are statements of net capabilities, and it is in connection with
such statements that imprecise drafting most frequently
occurs. It must be remembered that in a relationship be-
tween two nations (or other organizations) the gross capa-
bilities of one side can be increased or decreased only by an
increase or decrease in the strength, resources, skills, etc., of
that side; what happens on the other side is irrelevant. The
net capabilities of one side, however, may be altered either by
a change in its own strengths and resources or by a change
in those of the other side. For example, suppose that the
strengths and resources of the United States and the USSR
both increase in the same proportion. Then the gross capa-
bilities of each side will have increased, but the net capabilities
will have remained unchanged. But, if the USSR should grow
weaker, while the United States made no change in its strength,
then the net capabilities of the United States would have in-
creased although its gross capabilities remained unchanged.
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This is simple enough, but it needs to be understood if
drafting is to be accurate and clear. Consider the following
example:
In South Korea and Taiwan where US commitments pro-
vide both physical security and political support of the
established regimes, present Communist capabilities for
political warfare are extremely small. If the US commit-
ment and physical protection were withdrawn for any
reason, substantial and early Communist political warfare
successes almost certainly would occur.
The first of the two sentences in this quotation can only be
understood as a statement concerning gross capabilities, al-
though to be sure the word is used in its non-technical sense.
But the second sentence reveals that Communist gross capa-
bilities, far from being "small," are in fact very considerable.
The two sentences together constitute a statement of net capa-
bilities, but the drafting is poor. Perhaps a rule to govern this
problem may be formulated in this way: when the word "capa-
bility" or "capabilities" is used in its non-technical sense,
signifying in a general way the qualities, faculties, or potential
of the possessor, it must be used only to refer to gross, and
never to net capabilities. If there is any question, doubt or
difficulty, the word ought to be avoided and a synonym chosen.
Finally, even when using the word in its technical meaning
of a specific course of action, the drafter ought always to make
clear whether he is referring to gross or net capability. For
example:
a. We estimate that the armed forces of the USSR have
the capability of overrunning continental Europe within
a relatively short period.
b. The Party almost certainly lacks the capability for
seizing control of the Japanese government during the
period of this estimate.
The first of these statements is unclear because the word
"overrunning" does not indicate beyond doubt (as "conquer"
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or "defeat" do in some examples previously quoted) whether
the statement is or is not one of net capability. Does the
sentence mean that the armies of the USSR can overrun Europe
against all the opposition that the West may put up? Or does
It mean only that the USSR has enough men and logistical
apparatus to spread into all of continental Europe within a
relatively short period if unopposed? The second example is
clearer, but still it does not indicate beyond doubt whether the
Party is unable to seize power because the Japanese govern-
ment is strong enough to prevent it, or whether the Party
simply lacks the men and talent to take dyer the job of govern-
ing Japan even if no one opposed its doing so.
Apart from such suggestions for clarity in drafting as those
given above, it would be premature to lay down rules for the
statement of capabilities in a national intelligence estimate.
Sometimes it may be desirable to list them seriatim, as the
military generally do in their estimates of the enemy situation.
This might be a wholesome exercise while drafting an estimate
even if it were not retained in the final version, for it would
tend to promote precision, to reveal inter-relationships and
produce groupings of related capabilities, and thus to prevent
the indiscriminate scattering through an estimate of state-
ments of capabilities in bits and pieces. On the other hand,
the number and complexity of courses of action which have
to be presented may often be so great that extensive listing
would be tedious, and attempts at grouping misleading. A
connected essay (in which, incidentally, the word capability
or capabilities need never appear) may convey the material far
more adequately.
These matters will be improved by experimentation, and by
the talent of those who draft estimates. Improvement is worth
trying for, in this as in other aspects of estimating capabilities.
It is a great and responsible task to survey the whole political,
economic, and military strengths of a nation, to ascertain its
objectives and the moral and political compulsions that govern
Its conduct, to weigh all these matters in the light of that
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nation's relation to other nations, to perceive what that nation
could do to affect the security interests of the United States,
and to select from among these manifold courses of action those
sufficiently important and feasible to be included in a national
estimate. The techniques of this task are still in a formative
stage. They will develop through experience, through trial
and error, through discussion and argument, and perhaps,
from time to time, through purely theoretical and doctrinal
investigation.
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NOTES ON SOME ASPECTS OF
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
by (b)(3)
(b)(6)
MEMBERS of the intelligence community will obviously
find useful reading in the articles by Abbot Smith and
Col. Kirtland.* These studies deserve the attention of
other groups as well. They are of particular value to military
commanders and planners and to their civilian counterparts
in both government and private life. The executive and the
planner are the prime consumers of the intelligence product.
Furthermore, since they and not the intelligence officer are
ultimately responsible for action taken, they are and should be
the sharpest critics of that product.
These consumers, therefore, need to understand the various
kinds of approaches which the intelligence officer can make
to his problem. In consultation with him, they should develop
an agreed approach � embodying doctrines either as discussed
In our military and other staff manuals or possibly as modified
by ideas developed in these papers.
Business executives and planners were mentioned above
along with military and government officials because study of
modern business organization and practice makes it quite clear
that the more effective enterprises engage in intelligence
activities in one form or another.
To bring out the parallel with national and military intelli-
gence, we may note that business intelligence comprises eval-
uated information concerning such matters as: the actual
and potential users of the goods and services the business
produces; the actions and plans of competitors; related goods
and services; and other factors which bear on the production,
marketing, and use of the product. Among the "intelligence
* See below, p. 39, for review of Col. Kirtland's article.
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activities" in which most business organizations engage we
can include market analysis, research and development, and
the collection of general business information.
Market analysis is essentially an intelligence activity, for
It covers not only what the product may or might do but also
what other firms and products may do or are doing. Credit
Information on firms and individuals is perhaps the most direct
form of intelligence used by business.
Research and development is an intelligence activity in the
sense that it yields information on which to gauge the value
of one's own product as well as that of actual and potential
competitors. Research and development have become so im-
portant that investment analysts now consider the size and
quality of this effort an important factor in determining the
value of a security.
Finally, no business of any stature can plan without giving
at least a quick glance at political, economic, and sociological
data. It is inconceivable that either Ford or the UAW in 1954
planned for 1955 without considering international affairs, the
domestic political situation, and the sociological "climate"
which might make it propitious to raise the -issue of the guar-
anteed annual wage. The tremendous growth in the number
of trade and commercial publications is an indication of the
interest in business intelligence information.
This is not the proper place to pursue this matter further
and discuss whether or not business would improve its lot by
openly recognizing its intelligence requirement and organizing
more specifically for it. It is useful to note, however, that
World War I taught business leaders the value of the line
and staff principle of organization and that World War II
has already given them clear object lessons in operations
analysis and on research and development. "Business intelli-
gence," full-fledged, may well be the next important step.
It has seemed worthwhile to mention this point because we
want to go along with Mr. Smith who believes that military
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intelligence doctrine has application in national policy proc-
esses. In fact, we want to go further and assert that the basic
concepts � not necessarily all the detailed precepts and pro-
cedures � have application to any form of human activity:
political, economic, scientific, or sociological.
There is some reason to suspect that both Mr. Smith and
Colonel Kirtland have misinterpreted or misunderstood some
of these basic concepts. We propose to deal with these mis-
understandings as they come up in our discussion of the two
papers. At this point, it is useful to cover one matter which
both seem to have failed to keep clearly in mind. It is the
fact that both the intelligence officer and the commander (or
policy-maker) are in the estimating business.
The Intelligence Function and the Command Function
The intelligence officer is the "expert" on the enemy. Ac-
cordingly, he is charged with giving the commander, the staff,
and subordinate commands the best information and esti-
mates on the enemy situation. The end product of his estimate
is enemy capabilities and � let us not forget � where available
information provides a basis for such judgment, the relative
probability of adoption of them.*
This is a full-time job, particularly when one considers that
the intelligence officer must also continuously provide his
command � and, in addition, assist in providing subordinate,
adjacent, and senior commands � with the information and
intelligence they require for their day-to-day operations as
distinguished from that needed for estimates. It is for this
reason, rather than any slavish devotion to doctrine that, as
Mr. Smith points out,** some persons hold that the intelli-
� FM30-5 and Principles of Strategic Intelligence, AC of 8, Ci�-�2 (Feb.
50) .
**As Smith puts it: "We are told that it is the function of the com-
mander, not of the intelligence officer, to decide what counteraction
to adopt against enemy capabilities and to judge what the success
of such counteraction may be."
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gence officer should not deal in the capabilities and lines of
action of his own side. Mr. Smith is correct in saying that
some persons oppose this from wrong motives, but that is not a
fault peculiar to the military. It should also be pointed out
that many planners have a supercilious view of intelligence and
intelligence officers. They fancy themselves equally competent
in intelligence matters. Indeed, most of them are, but the
reverse is also true. Most intelligence officers are fully com-
petent planners. Since each has a full-time job, however,
each needs to tend to his own knitting to get the job done well.
There needs to be, and in good commands there is, continuous
close liaison at all levels in the intelligence and plans sections.
Historically it is true that many commanders have leaned as
much or more on their intelligence officers in planning matters
as they have on their planners. In even more cases, after the
whole staff was thoroughly informed about the enemy, the role
of the intelligence officer appeared to be less prominent. It is
noteworthy that this usually occurs on the side that is winning
or has a preponderance of force. When things are tight, the
intelligence officer is in great demand and, we might note, his
neck is way out.
We noted above that the commander also makes an estimate.
His estimate takes the enemy capabilities � presumably as
developed by the intelligence officer � and, in the light of
each capability, studies each line of action open to the com-
mand to determine the one that best accomplishes the mission.
He determines the lines of action open to him by having full
information about his own forces their position, condition,
morale, supplies, supporting forces available and so on. Just
as the intelligence officer contributes the information about
the enemy, so many other staff officers contribute this other
information which the commander must have to make a sound
decision.
Let us then keep clearly in mind that, in military usage, the
intelligence estimate sets forth the enemy capabilities. The
commander, for his part, uses that estimate in conjunction
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with other information (there may be a logistics estimate, an
air estimate, etc.) and makes a final "policy" estimate to deter-
mine the line of action which will best accomplish his mission.
The Military Theory of Capabilities
Many of the difficulties which Mr. Smith points out in the
application of military usage in the field of national policy
stem from the fact that in the national field we do not have
the same common understanding of staff and command func-
tions that obtains in the military. This is true both because
the "staff" in national policy affairs, though to a degree com-
parable, is not a close parallel to a military staff, and because
many of our policy-makers are not experienced in or familiar
with staff functioning.
Against this general background, we can now_examine Mr.
Smith's advocacy of the concept of "gross" and "net" capa-
bilities and his contention that war-gaming should be used to
improve the usefulness of our intelligence.
In reference to the first matter Mr. Smith points out the
need to recognize that enemy capabilities are one thing when
we study them in the light of one of our own actions and quite
different when we consider them in the light of another.
To indicate these differences he uses the expressions "gross
capabilities" and "net capabilities." Use of these terms brings
to mind the idea of a fixed measurable quantity like the gross
income of General Motors and, similarly, that a "net capa-
bility" is like GM's net income. It is quite clear that such a
concept is not accurate.
Pursued to the logical end, gross capabilities would be capa-
bilities, as it were, in a vacuum. Such capabilities have no
practical meaning, both because they are limitless (without
opposition the Soviets can do almost anything) and because
there are no true vacuums in world affairs.
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In a sense capabilities are always "net." But they are fixed
only in reference to one given set of conditions. As these con-
ditions change, the capabilities change. They are a moving
picture, not a still photograph. The Soviet "net capability"
to induce a peripheral war in Thailand is one thing if Thailand
has the political and other support of Burma and the SEATO
states and quite a different thing if it does not have such sup-
port. Indeed, the timing and extent of such support changes
the "net capability." In military usage capabilities are always
what Mr. Smith calls "net." The intelligence officer deter-
mines the enemy's capabilities as of a given time and in the
light of given circumstances.* This idea is readily applicable
in national strategic intelligence.
What Mr. Smith calls gross capabilities could perhaps better
be thought of as "basic" capabilities. For example, intelli-
gence officers can readily estimate that by 1959 the Soviets
could have a stockpile of X hydrogen bombs, Y rounds of atomic
artillery ammunition, Z intercontinental bombers, W army
divisions, and V major naval craft, and could still meet the
industrial requirements of their civilian economy, provided
they give no more than the current level of military aid to
Red China and the Satellites. On the other hand, if they
curtailed production of equipment for the Red Army and
Navy they could contribute more to the armament of China
and the Satellites. These are capabilities. They are basic
capabilities to produce or take general action not normally
subject to interference. Further analysis and research can
develop what, under various assumptions, the Soviets can do
with these resources and thus can determine their capabilities
to act. Perhaps it is this distinction that Mr. Smith has in
mind when he speaks of "gross" and "net." Even if this is
the case we would still be loath to accept the concept because,
in the general sense of the term, even such "gross" capabilities
* See quotations from Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint
Usage, cited by Mr. Smith; also the description used at the Strategic
Intelligence School.
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are "net." Rather than adopting misleading terms like "gross"
and "net" we seem to be better off if we stick just to "capa-
bilities" and understand it to apply, as in basic military
doctrine, to a stated set of circumstances.
The second point in Mr. Smith's thesis that we wish to
examine is the matter of war-gaming. He laments the fact
that accepted practice frowns on having intelligence officers
war-game the plans of their own side. We do not concede
that this "frowning" is as prohibitively effective as Mr. Smith
contends. To the extent that it does exist, it is directed
against the idea of having the intelligence officer play both
sides. This is logical. The intelligence officer cannot be
"expert" on his own resources and plans as well as on those
of the enemy. As pointed out earlier, the latter is a full-time
job. To the extent that he thumps for joint war-gaming by
intelligence and plans personnel as a device to assist in im-
proving the usefulness of intelligence estimates, however, Mr.
Smith is emphatically right.
War-gaming for this particular purpose is not used as widely
in the military as it might be. But the concept of war-gaming
for other purposes with all staff elements participating is well
established. It could easily be used in the more complex field
of national estimates.
War-gaming has been modified radically in recent years with
the employment of advanced mathematics and electronic com-
puters. These techniques leave much to be desired in the
military field and many of them could, at the current stage of
development, be used to only a very limited extent in reference
to the "imponderables" of national policy affairs. The more
conventional type of war-gaming, on the other hand, could
certainly be used across the board and with every possibility of
making our intelligence estimates more useful.
Mr. Smith's observation that national policy-makers have a
more complex problem than military leaders is valid, and it
has an important bearing on the activities of the intelligence
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services which support them. The national policy-maker must
consider a great variety of "capabilities" which interact on each
other. For example, a sociological change in Germany may
have an important repercussion in the political capabilities of
France. Furthermore, it is always difficult to determine the
"facts" in many areas of interest. The military leader usually
knows how many and what kinds of guided missile squadrons,
atomic bombs, fleets, and army troops he and his opponent
have. The political leader is always far less certain about his
"forces" and those of his allies. There is even more uncer-
tainty about the resources the enemy can bring to bear. To
illustrate, we can be sure that Khrushchev's advisers have
many a headache estimating how effective the Satellites and
Communist China really are and what assets the West will
actually apply in various situations. In such a field, therefore,
there can be no one "net" capability. There are as many "net"
capabilities as there are variant situations. Mr. Smith appears
to think that intelligence officers should compute these "net"
capabilities by their own efforts. It would seem more logical
that they should be worked out in conjunction � and we do
not mean concurrence � with the planners. Intelligence offi-
cers and planners must sit down together and thrash out all
the angles. This is precisely what happens in an efficient
military staff in time of war. The formal estimates of capa-
bilities appear only when a radical change in one's own or
the enemy situation takes place. For example, after "The
Bulge," 21st Army Group conducted an extended and more
or less "conventional" campaign to gain the Rhine. It was
obvious that crossing that formidable obstacle would call for
different types of action and support. An estimate of the
situation was essential.* This, in turn, meant that intelli-
gence forecasts and estimates had to be produced. At such
times a new "stock-taking" is in order. At other times, day-
to-day close coordination by the working intelligence officers
" Both US and British strategic planners had long before been work-
ing on such plans. We are here considering the more nearly tactical
planning.
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and planners, with a check on interpretations of major impor-
tance by the senior intelligence and plans officers, is the best
modus operandi. It keeps all concerned aware of enemy capa-
bilities applicable to the prevailing conditions.
In the national field, a similar condition could obtain. Un-
happily the lines of demarcation in staff organization are not
as simple and clear as in the military. Instead of overall
planners like those in the Joint Staff or in an international
staff such as the Combined Staff Planners of World War II,
we have political planners in State, military in Defense, eco-
nomic in agencies like OES, propaganda in USIA, etc. Each of
these has some form of intelligence support of its own. These
intelligence agencies are tied together by CIA for national
purposes and planning is brought together in the NSC. How-
ever, there is still a vast amount of "sprawling." Parentheti-
cally, it should be noted that this statement is a description
of a condition; it is not to be construed as an unfavorable
criticism. This is not the occasion for such criticism; and
it is by no means certain that highly centralized planning and
intelligence would be best, or even better, for the country.
Here, we want simply to note that close integration of intelli-
gence into planning is difficult because of the decentralized
planning and operating mechanism in the US government.
A great deal of informal coordination on the working level
does take place. This is all to the good and should be
encouraged. This complexity of organization and operations
in the national field results in a greater need for formalized
estimates and is, in itself, a justification for the use of the
war-gaming principle. However, with all due respect for the
skill, wisdom, and judgment of our intelligence community,
we should not leave war-gaming as a basis for decisions to
them alone. The danger here is at least as great as it is to
have the planners do it alone. We have suffered on both the
military and the national plane from an unwillingness (or
inability) to accept and understand available intelligence. We
need not repeat such gross errors.
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With little or no information of our own plans and resources,
the intelligence officer can still tell the planner what resources
the enemy can have at a future date and the general kinds of
action he can initiate with them. If the commander and
planner want to know what results the enemy can achieve
with these resources and actions, the intelligence officer must
have knowledge of his own resources and plans.
Applying this notion to the current situation, we can expect
national intelligence officers to tell us what resources the
Soviets will have for peripheral wars by 1959 without much
guidance as to our own resources and national plans and
policies. But they can tell us where and with what likelihood
of success the Soviets can use those assets only if they know
the opposition which the Soviet action is likely to meet. Joint
war-gaming would provide such interchange of information.
It should make for a healthy interplay between intelligence
and planning and probably result in improving both.
Estimating Enemy Intentions
In Colonel Kirtland's paper we have a more restricted and
therefore more specific subject for consideration. He objects
to what he describes as "unrealistic resistance" to the use of
intentions-analysis as opposed to capabilities-analysis in intel-
ligence estimates. He holds that we need to consider both.
By inference, he is most directly concerned with combat intel-
ligence. He makes clear, however, that his conclusions apply
to strategic intelligence as well.
After analyzing what Colonel Kirtland has to say, we can
agree with his main thesis that both intentions and capabilities
need to be considered. However, he has not hedged his pro-
posal with essential safeguards and his arguments against
the "capabilities doctrine" contain very serious weaknesses.
We will review these arguments and then develop our own
conclusions.
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In order to evaluate Colonel Kirtland's contentions, it is
important that we have a common understanding of the
meaning of "the capabilities doctrine." The burden of this
concept is that in a combat intelligence estimate, the intelli-
gence officer should present to the commander his best estimate
of the enemy's capabilities rather than the enemy's intentions.
The doctrine goes further: it holds that the commander in his
estimate should consider each of the lines of action open to
him in the light of each of the enemy capabilities in arriving
at his final decision on a course of action. It is important to
keep in mind that the doctrine has these two aspects: first,
the intelligence officer is to determine capabilities; and second,
the commander should make his decision only after considering
all the capabilities.
An elaboration of this doctrine which is too often forgotten
is that the G-2 is expected to give the commander his con-
clusion as to the relative probability of the exercise of any of
the enemy capabilities, where there is evidence to support such
a conclusion.*
Earlier doctrine had held that the task of the intelligence
officer was to estimate the mission of the enemy and, from that,
deduce the lines of action the enemy might take and then to
determine their effect on the courses open to his own side. This
doctrine invited a refined form of guessing as to the enemy
mission and encouraged consideration of intentions in the
deduction of enemy lines of action.
The new capabilities doctrine was developed after World
War I because it was felt that earlier doctrine introduced too
much clairvoyance into military problem-solving (which is
what decision-making really is) , and that it came too near
urging officers to guess the worst the enemy could do and to
stake everything on that. It was believed that the "capa-
bilities" system was more "scientific" and more nearly in
accord with the facts of life. This conviction was illustrated
* FM 30-5.
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at the Command and General Staff School, just before World
War II, when one of the instructors "clinched" the argument
in favor of basing estimates on capabilities by showing that
in World War I von Kluck had changed his mind four times
in one day and actually issued three different orders.
A concomitant of the acceptance of the capabilities doctrine
has been the growth of an attitude that anyone who advocates
basing estimates on enemy intentions just hasn't been brought
up properly. To advocate the use of intentions-analysis has
come to be considered the equal of advocating mind-reading
or the use of a ouija board. Advocates of intentions-analysis
like Colonel Kirtland object more to this anti-intentions preju-
dice than to the capabilities doctrine per se.
In marshaling support for the thesis that our doctrine needs
review and, in particular, needs to give more consideration to
Intentions, the critics tend to make some amazing misinterpre-
tations and to neglect some crucial facts. We agree that our
doctrine needs recasting but we must, in fairness, keep the
record accurate and logical.
Colonel Kirtland's objection to current doctrine is based
on three main points: first, "a nation or a commander must
have a preponderance of force if he bases his decisions on
capabilities alone"; second, "the resulting decision is always
conservative"; and third, the enemy's potential capabilities are
not adequately considered.* We will examine each of these
points in some detail.
The statement that the capabilities doctrine is useable only
when you have a preponderance of force is clearly erroneous.
It is a very practicable doctrine when you are on the defensive
and even when you are the hunted in a pursuit. To hold
otherwise is like saying you cannot use the principles of arith-
* The third point is paraphrased because the actual statement is not
very precise. However, subsequent explanation makes clear that it
means what has been said here.
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metic when you are in debt. The capabilities doctrine � and,
for that matter, any other doctrine � gives you a discouraging
picture in such cases, but that is the picture you must face.
In an adverse situation, the doctrine is designed to indicate
which line of action would have the least adverse result. In
other words, it indicates the course of action which would get
your nose least bloody.
The second criticism, that application of the doctrine gen-
erally results in conservative action, is to a large extent true;
but it is true because, in matters of life and death, leaders
generally tend to be conservative. Usually they should be.
The criticism is justified only to the extent that the going
doctrine makes it easier for leaders to be conservative. This
is particularly true when officers take the view which an
allegedly bright and "successful" officer (he later got a star)
expressed when he said: "I teach my officers to select the
line of action which gives them the best chance against what
they figure is the enemy's most dangerous capability."
It is this use of the capabilities doctrine that brings on the
criticism of conservatism. Actually it is a reversion to the
older doctrine. It is, in fact, a form of intentions-analysis
because the user assumes that the enemy will exercise a given
capability. Such use does not condemn the doctrine itself,
any more than the fact that some men get drunk justifies the
condemnation of all whiskey. Current doctrine holds that the
commander shall select the course of action which, in the
face of all the estimated enemy capabilities, insures the most
effective accomplishment of the mission. This is not the same
thing as saying that he should select the one that gives the
greatest certainty of accomplishing the mission. Clearly, the
most certain course might be the most bloody while a slightly
more risky line of action would be less costly and might accom-
plish the mission in a shorter time or have some other advan-
tage. The selection of a line of action requires a balancing
of costs and gains under the various possibilities. It also calls
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for what is known as "military character." No matter whether
we use capabilities or intentions, the decisions will reflect that
character.
The third argument is that use of the doctrine prevents con-
sideration of potential capabilities, meaning those that develop
between the time the estimate is made and the action takes
place. This, of course, is woven of the very flimsiest cloth.
The doctrine is based on the use of capabilities which the
enemy will have at the time of the action for which one is
planning � not the capabilities at the time the decision is
made. It is the capabilities forecast for the action-time. If
one accepts the argument, he must also accept the conclusion
that if intentions were used in the analysis, one could not
use forecasts of intentions. On this score, then, one would
be as badly off under one system as under the other.
One other serious error in Colonel Kirtland's paper that we
must bring out is the failure to show that Army doctrine has
for years made clear that in strategic intelligence � as dis-
tinguished from combat intelligence � bath intentions and
capabilities are considered. Official doctrine and teaching at
the Strategic Intelligence School and at Army schools have
emphasized this point at least since World War II.
The Role of Intentions in Intelligence Estimates
So far we have been concerned with showing that the argu-
ments presented against the capabilities doctrine are not very
good or conclusive. This is not the same as saying that we
are trying to build a case against intentions-analysis. Actu-
ally, we do not intend to do so. We will weasel but, we believe,
with good reason. We agree that use should be made of both
capabilities and intentions in developing estimates, but we hold
that one must be equally objective and "scientific" in deter-
mining either of them.
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Having noted that the common arguments against the capa-
bilities concept are not too decisive let us note a few of the
weaknesses of that system and indicate some of the strengths
of the intentions approach.
The faults of the capability system are two-fold. First it
tends, as Colonel Kirtland points out, to cause intelligence
officers to include remote possibilities as capabilities. They
forget that the doctrine calls for the consideration of only
those capabilities which bear on the accomplishment of one's
own mission. Second, and despite strong language to the
contrary in Army training, the doctrine seems to justify lazy
intelligence officers to feel that they have done their bit when
they have made one forecast of capabilities. This is most
unfortunate. Intelligence officers must keep capabilities under
continuing study to narrow them down. For example, in
September of 1943 the predicted capabilities of the Germans
vis-a-vis the Normandy landings were of a given order. As
time went on, the Allies developed certain techniques and
equipment and new forces became available. On the Axis
side, Italy was knocked out of the war, and the Germans
committed some of their forces in new areas. Consequently,
the enemy capabilities changed continuously so that by June
1944 they were far more limited than could possibly have been
predicted in September 1943. SHAEF intelligence kept a con-
tinuous spotlight on these capabilities during this period. So
it should be in all operations. The good intelligence officer
keeps on the ball as long as there is time to influence his own
side's line of action. In many cases the situation develops so
that at a point the enemy has only one capability. This hap-
pened at Falaise and in the Ruhr. Eventually, the Germans
could no longer disengage their forces. They had to stay and
fight. This idea was also illustrated in General Eisenhower's
statement to the effect that after a given time he could no
longer influence the course of the Juggernaut that became
the Normandy assault. For a considerable period he had only
one capability. Just how long the German G-2 was useful
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by keeping tabs on that has not been made clear. Our teach-
ing does not emphasize this concept as clearly and firmly as it
should.
As we have already noted, World War I provided a startlingly
effective case to bolster the capabilities doctrine. Similarly,
the Civil War and World War II give us particularly fine cases
for defense of intentions-analysis. In the Civil War, opposing
commanders often knew each other personally. They used this
knowledge in their planning. They knew the training, abili-
ties, and personalities of their opponents and, hence, could
determine the line of action the enemy was most likely to take.
In a sense, of course, this too is an assessment of capabilities
but there is no point in splitting any unnecessary hairs. In
ordinary language, such an evaluation results in a prediction
of intentions. There is a grey zone where capabilities slide
into intentions, but for our purposes, we will lean to the con-
servative side and call the borderline cases intentions.
The World War II support for intentions-analysis is in some
ways even stronger. It stems from the fact that the Japanese
tendency to fight to the death was so effectively ingrained that,
to a very marked degree, capabilities to take other lines of
action were not meaningful. To a lesser extent this same
situation applied in the European war where Hitlerism molded
capabilities.
One can make a very good case for the contention that
enemy intentions should properly be considered under the
capabilities doctrine because they are a factor in the combat
efficieney of the enemy. To accept such an interpretation
without clearly labeling it, however, would simply be a way
of getting around the intent of the doctrine and have the
disadvantage of not calling intentions by their true name.
Experience in all walks of life shows clearly that a failure
to make a thorough study of one's opponent to determine
his motivations and his mental and psychological reactions
as a basis for estimating his future action is worse than
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unwise. The press is full of stories that the USSR is very
active in this field and has attained great successes, perhaps
as a concomitant of progress in brain-washing and psycho-
logical matters generally. In our zeal to make sure that
training will make commanders and intelligence officers "ob-
jective" and "scientific," we may have gone so far that we
have tended to overlook the obvious. Certainly, the mental
makeup and attitude of the enemy is as much a "fact" as is
his training, his morale, his organization, or his weapons.
Surely then it is logical to consider intentions. Equally surely,
it is important to do so objectively and to know what you are
doing. If you are an intelligence officer, it is most important
that you alert your chief to the fact that you are considering
intentions.
In the discussion so far we have used examples and applica-
tions in the purely military field. The conclusions are valid
in national intelligence as well. In fact, intentions of a nation
or a government can be determined with more accuracy than
those of an individual commander. These intentions are
shaped by many clearly observable facts such as past actions,
sociological conditions, cultural characteristics, internal politi-
cal pressures, economic circumstances, and a host of others.
The British exploited their understanding of German inten-
tions in both World Wars and it was not uncommon to hear
their intelligence officers use such expressions as: "the Hun
is sure to � � � �," and "the German probably appreciates."
They personified the enemy government and high command.
On the other hand, the Germans seem consistently to have
missed the boat. They clearly either did not or could not
evaluate US and Russian national intentions properly in either
of the World Wars. The evaluation of national intentions in-
volves a more comprehensive field of thought than does the
evaluation of the intentions of an enemy commander. How-
ever, the task is no more difficult. Even if it is, it must be done
because the rewards for success and the costs of failure are too
great to permit neglecting the job.
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Where does all this get us? It seems to indicate that, as
Colonel Kirtland says, a proper doctrine would be to include
both capabilities and intentions in all estimates as we now do
In the strategic estimate. However, we should expand the
principle to include insurance that staff and command training
will impress on all concerned that they need to apply the most
rigid tests to all evidence bearing on intentions and that con-
clusions based upon them clearly show that this is the case.
Since all concepts and doctrines wind up in a "form" of some
sort, we might as well present a proposal on that score, too.
In the military field the solution is easy. All we need to do in
the commander's estimate * is to insert a paragraph on "enemy
intentions." The intentions paragraph need be only a brief
statement, either to the effect that there are no reliable
indications of enemy intentions or that certain stated evi-
dence indicates an intention to exercise one or more of these
capabilities.
In the intelligence estimate, we need merely insert that
"combat efficiency" includes knowledge of enemy personal
characteristics which shape or have a major influence on his
actions. In addition, we should add a paragraph on enemy
intentions similar to the one suggested for the commander's
estimate. This one should also present the critical evidence
upon which the estimate of intentions is founded.
Such a detailed analysis of combat intelligence doctrine is
warranted at this juncture because, as Mr. Smith points out,
so much of the concept and procedure of combat intelligence
has found its way into the national strategic intelligence
process. The additions to military command and intelligence
estimates which we have proposed here could be paralleled in
our training for national strategic intelligence.
Our current doctrine probably goes too far in playing down
intentions-analysis. Going all out the other way would cer-
* FM 101-5
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tainly be worse. It would encourage clairvoyance and, in
addition, might discourage the continuous effort to seek for
new indications of capabilities. The stress on measurable
physical facts is Justified. While we are making important
strides in understanding and measuring motivation and mental
processes, we are not yet far enough along in that field to
measure intentions as precisely as we can capabilities and, as
Colonel Kirtland notes, the danger of deception is a very real
one. Even so, since decision-making is so inevitably bound
up with consideration of the personal element, it is the better
part of discretion, and of valor as well, to consider intentions.
They are so often the sparkplugs of human action.
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC SECTION
EDITORS NOTE: Whenever books or articles ap-
pear that have a close relation to the subject of a
monograph, we plan to include a Bibliographic
Section. This will have the primary purpose of
directing the reader's attention to items in the
existing literature, overt and classified, which in
our judgment make a contribution to the devel-
opment of sound intelligence doctrine. We think
the following is one such item.
Col. Sanford H. Kirtland, Jr., "The Hazards and Advantages of
Estimates of Enemy Intentions." Thesis, Air
War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, April
1954. Mss. CONF. 5Opp.
also summary in Air Intelligence Digest, January
1955.
In this paper, Col. Kirtland comes frankly and vigorously to
grips with the caveat in traditional military intelligence doc-
trine against estimating enemy intentions � or, to put it
another way, against breaking down the distinction between
enemy capabilities and enemy intentions. Col. Kirtland is
far from contemptuous of this doctrine; indeed, he makes an
excellent case for it, emphasizing the dangers of second-
guessing and of assuming that the enemy will choose to do
pretty much what a US commander would do, in a similar
situation. He emphasizes, too, the danger of writing up an
Estimate of the Situation from even the shrewdest guess of
enemy intentions, thus inviting disaster if the guess turns out
to be shrewd but wrong. In brief, this thesis is no hatchet job.
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What it is, on the other hand, is a most sensible investiga-
tion of the traditional doctrine and an invitation not to fall
into a variety of naive traps where the estimative process is
concerned. First of all, the author points out that the distinc-
tion between capabilities and intentions is sometimes synthetic.
The line can be more easily drawn in the abstract than it
can in real situations � especially, we might point out, in situ-
ations that count the most, when a US commander has to
spread out thin resources to meet a variety of possible enemy
moves. Any intelligence officer (as Mr. Smith argues above)
obviously works from estimates of intentions in that he ex-
cludes from his situation-estimate a whole series of outlandish
and, from the enemy point of view, self-defeating gross capa-
bilities. If the clear enemy objective is to seize a piece of land,
it is not very instructive to point out that he is capable of an
immediate, orderly retreat.
Second, according to Col. Kirtland, the intelligence officer
is forced into estimating intentions (or probable courses of
action) precisely because the US is no longer in a position of
undoubted preponderant power from which it can prepare
for and can thwart any and all enemy capabilities. Which is
to suggest that the traditional doctrine is outdated. As Mr.
Smith says:
There has been much debate, among the military, on
whether an intelligence officer should presume to
put into his formal estimate an opinion as to which
of the enemy capabilities listed is most likely to be
implemented . . . Some have even held that the com-
mander himself must not make it, but must treat all
enemy capabilities as if they were sure to be carried
through, and must prepare to deal with them all.
This latter doctrine is somewhat academic. (Emphasis
added.)
Col. Kirtland and Mr. Smith both seem to be saying that
these days the intelligence officer may pay lip service to the
traditional military doctrine � may insist that he is follow-
afirmiliem.
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ing the book on the distinction between capabilities and
intentions but cannot possibly keep the distinction clear
in practice.
Finally, the author concludes that there is no inherent
drawback in estimating intentions: to do so with reliability
simply puts the burden on finer judgment, on better back-
ground and training, and on better personnel selection of
estimators. He might also have added that since estimating
Intentions is what the intelligence officer in fact does, some
of the time at least, it would be well that he do it consciously.
The real danger is that the estimator might think he is dealing
with relatively sure and scientific capabilities data (claiming
relative certainty for his conclusions, therefore) rather than
with speculative premises about enemy intentions.
Col. Kirtland is writing, of course, strictly about military
intelligence. But most of what he says can be translated into
the frame of reference of the civilian intelligence agency � as
Mr. Smith's paper demonstrates � with some valuable instruc-
tion for all of us. This is, at the least, a thoughtful contribu-
tion to the subject.
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