(EST PUB DATE) IMPACT OF THE "MONSTER PLOT" ON CIA'S POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND CI MISSIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01324278
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00369
• Publication Date: January 1, 1962

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CHAPTER X
IMPACT OF THE "MONSTER PLOT" ON CIA'S
POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND CI MISSIONS
The effect of "mirror reading" analysis, as practiced
by many officers of SB Division during the 1960's, was to
impede the dc' elopment of new sources of infoimation. This
technique also cast doubt on the bona fides of existing
agents and sources, and caused confirmable information to
be treated with skepticism if it had been received from a
supposedly "tainted" source.
It has not been possible, in the course of this study,
to examine in depth the negative effect which the Angleton-
Murphy-Bagley thesis (often referred to within the Agency as
the "Monster Plot") had on the development of new positive
intelligence operations, because the search of numerous
developmental case files, in which the impact of the thesis
is known to be reflected, would have been too time-consuming.
Had time permitted, however, there is no doubt that we could
have amply demonstrated the thesis' baneful effect.
Because time has not permitted us to document the problem
across-the-board, we have chosen instead to concentrate on
two cases by way of detailed illustration. The first is
The second concerns two Soviet diplo-
mats, Vladimir P. Suslov and Vasiliy V. Vakhrushev.
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2: Effect on Other Potential Operations
As previously mentioned, limitations of time have pre-
vented an in-depth study of the effect of the Nosenko case
on positive, human-source intelligence operations against
the Soviet Union. There are differing views among persons
we have talked to on this subject, each probably reflective
of some aspect of a complicated situation.
The cases of Suslov and Vakhrushev provide a good
example. Both men were long-time friends of Nosenko. Con-
cerning both, we had reliable, independent confirmation of
possible vulnerability to recruitment. At the time Nosenko
proposed that we mount operations against them with that aim
in mind, neither would have qualified as a top priority
target, yet they were sufficiently high-ranking in the
Soviet hierarchy to be of interest and both were very well-
connected with other, more important Soviet officials.
Suslov was Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the
United Nations Secretariat in New York at the time of Nosenko's
proposal. Vakhrushev, who inter alia had once served as an
escort-interpreter for Vice President Nixon during the latter's
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visit in 1959 to the USSR, was Counselor of the Soviet dele-
gation to UNESCO in Paris. Both men drank excessively, had
had marital problems, and manifestly enjoyed the amenities
of life outside the Soviet Union.
As of mid-1964, Bagley felt that SR Division should not
take advantage of the opportunities which their ready
accessibility in New York and Paris pres-nted. As usual,
it was precisely the fact that we possessed confirmatory
information regarding their vulnerability that weighed most
heavily against them. In a 7 July 1964 memorandum, SR
Division stated:
Nosenko is offering us two prime targets
for recruitment, both old personal friends
of his, neither of the KGB and both now
serving abroad. One is V.V. Vakrushev [sic]
in Paris, the other is Vladimir P. Suslov in
New York. Neither has been recalled as a
result of Nosenko's defection, and Nosenko
himself claims the KGB is not aware of his
special relationship with them. Suslov has
come to our attention through other sources
and through his own indiscretions, supporting
our suspicion that he is being offered to us;
Vakrushev [sic] has been recently mentioned
by [a medium-level Soviet official who was also
a CIA agent], possibly to feel out our inter-
est. Nosenko, in strongly urging us to
recruit aggressively among Soviets, and parti-
cularly these two, has commented, we think
significantly, "Some won't work, some will,
we mustn't be daunted by failure but must
push on." It thus appears that the KGB might
be offering us new "agents" among UN person-
nel whose later "discovery" by the KGB could
involve us in a major political flap. 42
Had the question of pursuing these operational leads
been left to Bagley alone, it is fairly certain that no attempt
would have been made to exploit them. His view was summed up
as follows:
We are fighting in the bull's terrain -- he's
strongest there. Of all available Soya,
Suslov would give us the closest-in reaction,
but he best briefed, has tricks we don't know.61-a
Murphy's attitude, on the other hand, was less one-sided.
He was an activist; as he said when debriefed on 16 July 1976,
" . . The most difficult thing that I had as a personal
problem during all that time was . . . to insist on the
development of the Division as a whole and try to push new
cases:" On the other hand, he was troubled by the
supposed inconsistencies in Nosenkc,'s story: "All this time,
I had this other thing and my attitudes toward it were in
part based on some of my own experiences. . . . I certainly
didn't believe that Nosenko was entirely bona fide__ . ." 131
Within the SB Division itself, the conflict was apparently
never satisfactorily resolved as long as both Murphy and
Bagley remained in positions of authority within it. We have
already seen Leonard McCoy's April 1966 letter, in which he
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spoke of the morbid effect which the Nosenko case has,
and will continue to have, on intelligence collection
against the USSR . . ." (See Page 81 of this study.)"
A report by the CIA Inspector General, published in October
1968, was highly critical of SB Division's performance
between 1964 and 1967, and attributed the Division's problems
to preoccupation with the Nosenko case. The report states
that the Division "gained a reputation f,r excessive
pessimism . . . for being one-sided in its approach to
counterintelligence, security, and operational matters.
. . . Facts and implications are repeatedly marshalled to
show the RIS at work continuously, on a massive scale, aiming
their work at us, and practically ric-:er missing a trick." nu
The fact that even Bagley was somewhat torn between the
demands of his CI role and the neccssity for collecting intel-
ligence is implied in an interview which he and another
senior SR Division officer had with Helms on 19 November 1964:
Mr. Helms wanted to know what we expected
to gain from our operation against Vakhrushev
in view of the fact that we believe him to
be offered to us by the KGB. We pointed out
that Vakhrushev's family connections and
official position in Paris should give him
access to positive and counterintelligence
information of value, and that we could take
what the KGB was willing to sacrifice and
sort the good from the bad. Mr. Helms
remarked that this had been taking us months
with Nosenko and doubted that we want to get
into a similar situation again. '0
Although time has not permitted us to examine the record
of the Vakhrushev and Suslov cases in detail, it is evident
that before and after the above conversation, periodic
efforts were made, as the occasion arose, to capitalize on
the Vakhrushev and Suslov leads. How efficient or resource-
ful these efforts were, given the suspicions which surrounded
the two targets, we have not been able to determine.
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How CIA Worked to Defeat Itself
The lessons to be drawn from the
Vakhrushev cases are clear.
Suslov, and
The case in particular demonstrates that
Nosenko was not an isolated pf-nomenon. On the contrary,
he was the vice Im of a system of i:logic for which it is
difficult to find a parallel in Agency history. Secondly,
it brings into sharp relief a patter], of self-defeating
behavior within the Agency in its conduct of intelligence
operations against the United States single most threatening
adversary.
The collection of intelligence has been less systemat-
ically reduced to a coherent doctrine than most other
Governmental activities, because secrecy and compartmentation
have often combined to keep even its more senior practi-
tioners from comprehending the process as a whole. Yet
there has been one basic principle upon which neophytes and
old hands alike have long depended; this has been the
evaluation of information from one source according to the
degree of confirmation by other independent sources. The
usefulness of this relatively simple principle has been
accepted in the past as applicable in the field of both posi-
tive and counterintelligence.
The Monster Plot shattered the whole basis for confir-
mation. As long as any defector or potentially recruitable
agent was to be viewed as possibly in some way responsive
to a Soviet supra-authority fostering and directing a "grand
design" directed at deceiving the United States, there were
by definition no longer any valid independent sources. Quite
to the contrary, everything any source said could be part of
the same integral, though infinitely complex, pattern of
deception.
Difficulties produced by the above assumption were
aggravated by a pattern of dichotomous thinking. The Soviet
defectors and agents-in-place who came under analysis were
either good or bad, normal or psychotic, trustworthy to the
nth degree (e.g., Golitsvn, Deryabin) or threats to U.S.
national security. A middle ground was seldom given serious
consideration. this predilection for dichotomies was made
to order for Golitsyn, because paranoids do tend to divide
all humankind into two categories: their own persecuted
selves on one hand, and the persecutors on the other. Even
where persecutors and persecutees can be shown to exist,
rational men tend to see a preponderant middle component in
the population, whereas in paranoid thought the fallacy
which logicians call the "law of the excluded middle" is
prevalent.
It is troubling that so many otherwise able CIA officers
fell prey to this fallacy; but why they did so is beyond the
competence of this study. Whatever the reason, the result
was to reduce SB Division to a house chaotically divided.
It is the view of a number of senior CIA intelligence officers
who lived through the difficult period of the 60's and to
whom we have talked during this investigation, that the
Monster Plot thesis set CIA positive and counterintelligence
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programs back by a number of years. And though we may be
tem],cd to look back and say that this is now water over
the dam, there can be no assurance that such is the case.
For if one poses the question of how many additional Soviet
agents and defectors we might have gained had our handling
of those who did approach us been better calculated to en-
courage, rather than discourage, them, the only answer is:
Nobody knows.
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CHAPTER XI
NETHODOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP
Our Letter of Instruction requested that we address
ourselves to "the nature and validity of methodology of
previous Nosenko bona fides studies." We have interpreted
this instruction as referring to those s-udics made under
the auspices o: ::.iirphy and Terment Bagley, with input
from the Cl Staff, between 1962 and 1968. Our attention
has been principally devoted to the so-called "thousand-
page paper," of February 1967, and the briefer, revised
version published in February 1968. We also have reviewed
a very large number of formal and informal writings, many
of which have been quoted in previous chapters; all will
be found included, in their full versions, in the annexes.
1: Lack of CI Methodology
Webster's New International Dictionary (1954) gives,
as one of its definitions of Methodology, the following:
A branch of logic dealing with principles
of procedure, whether of theoretic or
practical science.
While the word "methodology" can perhaps be stretched to
include many things, it is doubtful that it could be so
defined as to encompass the techniques which Bagley described
as "mirror reading" without being distorted beyond recog-
nition. Certainly, no possible definition could cover mis-
translation, selective omission of data, and deliberate misuse
of technical data-gathering equipment (i.e., the polygraph).
The disturbing fact is that the analytical and investi-
gative procedures and techniques employed in the Nosenko case
were all in varying degrees viewed by the major protagonists
-- Messrs. Angleton, Murphy, and Bagley -- as legitimate
exercises of the counterintelligence process. We do not
believe that they were.
We accept without question the necessity for counter-
intelligence, as a category of the intelligence process
concerned with the activities of hostile powers' covert and
clandestine activities against the United States and our
allies. But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill its
purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic methodology.
Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no such thing.
We are forced to conclude that, in the 1960's, when
Golitsyn, Nosenko, and contacted CIA, the Plans
M O )
Directorate and its Clandestine Service were intellectually,
technically, and procedurally unprepared to handle them. (b)(3)
A useful study entitled KUBARK Counterintelligence Interro-
gation was published by CIA in July 1963, but the handling
of Nosenko gives no indication thal any of the Agency per-
sonnel directly involved had profited from it, if indeed
they had read it at all. Insofar as we can ascertain, in
respect to Soviet nationals, the Directorate lacked:
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A. Explicit written criteria to be applied
in evaluating bona fides of a defector or pro-
spective agent.
B. Explicit written procedures for the col-
lection, analysis, and evaluation of the counter-
intelligence product of a defector or prospective
agent.
C. Explicit written procedures for psycho-
logical evaluation of a defector or prospective
agent.
D. Any broadly-based systematic data base
(or systematic written procedures for employing
it, had it existed) regarding the relevant psycho-
logical characteristics of Soviet agents. There
did exist some psychological data regarding
defectors, but they had not been collated and
analyzed, nor were they objectively applied to
the cases of Nosenko and Golitsyn. The latter
was himself never even tested.
2: Influence of Angleton on Methodology
The predominant influence in the CI field within the
Agency until 1975 was James Angleton, a man of...1nncp aud_
(1/411�,joinie.d-4414..4:-..i.. whose /11.e.caies, when applied to matters
of public record, were patently unworthy of serious con-
sideration. His contention t at t e let sc ism was
--a�crtiormation project carried out under the direction of
the KGB was subject to ridicule even by some of his friends
and supporters.
Angleton's reputation for expertise rested, therefore,
on his purportedly unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide
covert political role. In truth, no one could compete with
Angleton as an expert on this subject. HT-S�iiialyses, based.
on fragmentary and often inapplicable data, were more
imaginative than systematic, and therefore neither easily
comprehended nor replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike
the Emperor and his imaginary clothes, Angleton's fantasies
were never vulnerable to objective examination, simply
because he surrounded such data as existed with a wall of
secrecy. His "facts" were available in full only to a
minimum number of trusted apostles; to the rest of the
intelligence community, both American and foreign, he doled
them out selectively -- seldom in written form -- to prove
whatever point he was trying to make at the time.
Angleton's preference for oral over written communication
is worth emphasizing. During is in,umneircy as its Chief-,
the Cl Staff, though it supposedly had in its possession
information concerning a horrendous hazard to both the
United States an,d- its allies, never committed to paper any
complete, written, documented report on the subject. There-
fore, the threat could never be systematically analyzed and
evaluated. Only when Angleton finally departed did dispas-
sionate analysis of Cl Staff's data holdings finally become
possible, and it has consistently failed to support his
central claims regarding the KGB's massive influence in world
affairs.
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Nevertheless, Angleton retained great influence within
the Agency until his departure. He certainly could have
remedied the rather obvious lacunae, outlined in Section 1
above, had he chosen to do so. That he never took the
necessary action is certain; why he did not is a question
beyond the scope of this study.
What Angleton did successfully do, on the other hand,
was to exercise a.. great dc.ai of influence on Bagley and
Murphy, Whether this influence preceded the -tiosenko case,
we have not been able to ascertain, but in any case by mid-
1962 it had taken root and flowered.
Bagley in particular was an apt pupil and emulator of
Angleton, but with the added defect of applying his faulty
thou ht recesses with enormous energy and considcra-b".nr---
super icial organization. As his profuse writings show,
Bagley was master of the grandiose non sequitur. He was
also disinclined to define his term."----ITe�irratte�tuch in his
writings of a technique which he called "mirror reading";
yet we have been unable to uncover any definition of the
term in the thousands of pages which he and his staff left
behind in the course of employing this purported analytical
method.
Mirror reading may originally have meant interpreting
a defector's statements so as to extract the reverse meaning;
maybe it stemmed from the idea of a mirror-image. The term
may even have been coined simply as a figure of speech,
meant half in jest. But it ended up, still undefined, as
an accepted doctrine of how to approach a counterintelligence
problem. It must be taken seriously, if only because of
its unfortunate impact on the Nosenko and related cases.
3: Impact of Faulty Cl on Positive Intelligence Collection
There is an important interrelationship between counter-
intelligence, as it was conrl"rted in the 1960's, and the col-
lection of positive intelligence from human sources. Only
if this relationship is spelled out can the full impact of
the events we have been describing be comprehended.
At the time CIA was established, the primary mission
of what was later to become the Plans Directorate's Clandestine
Service was conceived to be the collection of strategically-
significant intelligence from clandestine human sources.
How successful was the Clandestine Service in fulfilling this
mission?
For purposes of this discussion, let us define strategic
intelligence as relating to the military plans, intentions,
and capabilities of the two major hostile powers which have
emerged since 1945, the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Addressing�ourselves to the Agency's success in obtaining
strategic intelligence on these two powers, three significant
findings emerge:
A. Between 1949 and 19-0 the Aoency
able to develop a single in-place human cOUSE_ewirNn
the government ot Communist China capable of yam.
dung in-reiligente o strategic ifEsIllase.
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B. During the sae period, the Agency was by
contrast successful in developing a number of in-
place human Sources who reported strategic intelligence
on the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries.
C. Almost without exception, the human sources
mentioned in sub-paragraph B volunteered their
servic, in th,, ri-,, the Agency did not
develop them from scratch. After they had of their
own initiative indicated some degree of willingness
to cooperate with U.S. intelligence, the Clandestine
Service attempted to assert sufficient control over
them to enable us to guide their collection acti-
vities. In some cases, there was also a question
of whether a volunteer would defect outright,
meaning that he would leave his native territory
to sebk asylum in the non-Communist world, or
alternatively remain in place in order to provide
a continuing flow of intelligence; the Agency
normally attempted to persuade the volunteer to
take the latter course. It was in such ways, then,
that the Agency can be said to have "developed" its
best agents.
The above definition of "agent development" may seem,
to some well-informed readers, so self-evident as to be
superfluous. It is not, however; for Agency claims of
success in the human-source collection field have often been
so phrased, whether intentionally or not, as to give the
impression that our achievements stemmed largely from the
process which, in Clandestine Service parlance, is called
"development and recruitment." The impression that we
"recruited" our best Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources, in the
1949--1970 period, following a period of orderly development
must be dispelled before there can be meaningful discussion
of previously described lacunae. In most major Soviet cases
prior to 1970, it might be more nearly correct to say that
the fo-':ls _volveclevagoesi" the Americans.
In the case of PenkovSTa57717-Eite an extreme example, U.S.
officials made even the latter process so outrageously diffi-
cult for him that he had to write a letter to both the Queen
of England and President Eisenhower in order finally to
achieve a clandestine working relationship with the British
and American intelligence services.
Points A, B, and C above are also valid as applied to
the field of counterintelligence information, with one im-
portant exception. In the CI field, much information has
been obtained from spies of hostile powers arrested in areas
under the control of the United States or nations friendly
to us. Thus, in this latter field, we are not as dependent
on agents or defectors as we are in the case of the positive
intelligence collection effort.
Within the�framework of what has just been said, we can
now judge the seriousness of the lacunae listed on page 184.
If our most significant positive intelligence and much
of our most significant counterintelligence from human
sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact nationals .
who volunteered their services, why did we fail more fully
to systematize their handling? Even more to the point within
the framework of the present study, why would�we not give such
persons the benefit of every reasonable doubt rather than
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tre
and
with suspicion and, in the cases of Nosenko
outright inhumanity?
4: What Went Wrong?
There are no easy or certain answers. Nonetheless,
a retrospective glance at the intellectual preparation of
thos, who led the Clandestine Service may shed light on
the problem and permit the formulation of constructive
recommendations for future action.
The leaders of the Clandestine Service in its first
quarter century were, for the most part, people who had
emerged from World War II, oriented toward action rather than
contemplation. Angleton was almost unique in his interest,
however ineptly applied, in long-range analysis. Within
the Clandestine Service, his generation was in general
suspicious of theory, and ill-prepared in most cases to
cope with it.
On the other hand, the best of the Service's leaders
-- and there were many good ones -- were successful because
they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called.c.amaZO.
re Its value should not be underestimated. For example,
when Penkovskiy was producing strategic intelligence which
remains of value to this day, it was the common sense of such
leaders as Richard Helms and John Maury which led them to
resist Angleton's allegation that Penkovskiy was a "disinfor-
mation agent."
Unfortunately, over time, common sense alone has proved
less and less adequate to guide a rapidly growing organization
through the turmoil of a form of endeavor whose complexities
most of the leadership seem originally to have under-
estimated. This point is difficult to clinch without overly-
lengthy explanation, so we content ourselves with an example,
drawn from a 5 December 1966 memorandum by Leonard McCoy in
which he attempted to explain Murphy's abandonment of common
sense in favor of the Monster Plot thesis. McCoy ascribed
Murphy's conversion to a series of, to the latter, otherwise
inexplicable frustrations:
a. As head of [an operational] base in Germany,
he had major responsibility for the failure of
every . . . operation which [it] ran.
b. He was publicly disgraced by the "beer-in-
the-face" recruitment failure in Vienna.
c. After he moved to Berlin Base, Lt. Col.
Popov was transferred from Vienna to Berlin
and was soon compromised.
d. While he was in Berlin Base, close cooper-
ation -with the 'Nest German services resulted
in the loss of a large number of our agents
who were compromised through Felfe, a Soviet
agent in the BND CI Section.
e. [An] MI-6 staff officer was discovered to
have been working for the Soviets while in
Berlin [George Blake].
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g. The Berlin tunnel was discovered and
closed.
g. Several Berlin Base support agents were
found to be under hostile control, and all
SR cases running in Berlin were rolled up.
h. Shortly after he met [a Soviet defector-
in-place] in Pan i the latter was called
home and shot.
i. He was again publicly 'disgraced by the
kidnapping failure in Tokyo.
Reactions to such frustrations and failures differed
from individual to individual. Many Clandestine Service
managers went calmly about their business, simply adapting
their operational procedures to the apparent limitations
and opportunities of the current situation. A very small
but influential minority reacted by ascribing every adver-
sity to the Monster Plot.
But while the planning and execution of individual
operations improved and often achieved a very high level of
efficiency, there were few initiatives of a broadly con-
structive nature to remedy the Clandestine Service's basic
deficiencies. Initiatives which might usefully have been
taken were inhibited by three factors:
A. Major organizational changes tended to
disturb an increasingly rigid organizational frame-
work, in whose continuance a number of senior
executives had a vested interest.
B. The leadership of the Service was over-
confident, taking excessive credit for any and all
successes, while blaming failures on events beyond
their control (e.g., President Kennedy's refusal
to approve some of the air strikes planned in sup-
port of the Bay of Pigs invasion).
C. Finally, many senior as well as middle-
level managers of the Directorate had not kept
pace With the times. They were almost without
exception honorable and highly-motivated men but,
as many of history's lost battles prove, honor and
high motivation do not necessarily lead to correct
decision-making.
mejaber of the generation now under examination, the
(nior aulloi.'"Isan say from personal experience that this
-generation's intellectual blind-spots played an important
role in limiting the Service's performance.
Senior Clandestine Service supervisors of the period
1948-1970 had seldom themselves been trained in rigorow
analvt ues, and thus segoom were in a position to
emand high standards of analysis of their subordinates.
Furthermore, until the massive outflow of retirees in recent
years changed the demography of the Service, most senior
operational supervisors had received their higher educations
'PT I'iicmic
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before systematized analysis became routine even in such
"soft" subjects as political science (for which a knowledge
of inferential statistics is now required at most univer-
sities). Many, probably most, of these same gentlemen were
also educated during a sort of interregnum in academe, when
the study of classical logic had passed from vogue and had
not vet been replaced by emphasis on scientific method.
In the realm of technology, almost all senior executives in
the Clandestine Service before 1970 (the senior author of
this study included) had finished college before the first
digital computer, an invaluable analytical tool, became
commercially available about 1951.
There also have been, of course, a number of bright
spots. Some of the Plans Directorate's Divisions and Staffs
had subordinate components which specialized in substantive
intelligence, and built up great expertise on specific
subjects over the years. From time to time, there were
also bursts of enthusiasm for the use of psychological
evaluation techniques in the assessment of prospective
agents. But these cases were exceptions; primary reliance
within the Clandestine Service was on judgments which,
though sometimes bolstered by impressive figures and arcane
terminology, were nevertheless essentially intuitive and
non-systematic.
Such systems and criteria as did exist were largely in
the heads of various individuals, and there is no evidence
of any appreciable long-term consensus among the latter.
Every defector case tended to be subject to the vagaries of
the momentary line-up of CIA leadership. The existence of
an Interagency Defector Committee, subordinate to the DDP,
introduced some uniformity of approach, but its concerns
were limited for the most part to superficial administrative
and procedural formalities.
This lack of system in the substantive handling of
defectors and prospective agents meant that the judgments of
top managers in the Agency were often reactions to ad
hominem arguments. There is no doubt that Helms, for
example, often accepted judgments and theoretical formula-
tions tailor-made by Angleton, at which he certainly would
have boggled had they come from the mouth of almost anyone
else.
It may be argued, to cite the subject of our present
study as an example, that the mountainous quantities of data
which were Bagley's stock-in-trade, and which culminated in
the "thousand-page paper," were too numerous and complex to
have been mastered by any manager at Helms' level. We dis-
count this argument on the grounds that, had the process of
handling and evaluating the data been systematized on the
basis of a well-articulated doctrine, they could have been
presented in a standardized form, both in the case of Nosenko
and others, in -5-uth a manner as to allow even a very busy
executive to make an intelligent decision. It was thus not
the quantity of data, but rather the lack of any orderly
methodology for their evaluation and presentation which led
inevitably to errors in judgment at all levels of command.
Poor judgment then culminated all too often in less-than-
adequate leadership in the CI and Soviet operations fields.
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5: Summary
If we seem to have wandered far afield from the "nature
and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides
studies," we have done so because the unfortunate handling
of NosenRo Rather, it was
symptomatic of some fundamental inadequacies of the Plans
Directorate.
What this means to us is that the long-needed improyi:
ment in our con4,,t nf rn�ntnrintPlilgpnce activity now
well underway, must be carried on within the framework of
a searching reexamination of the analytical techniques
employed by the Directorate and its Clandestine Service.
We do not of course pretend to know to what extent such a
process is in course, or is already envisaged for the future.
Whatever may be the case, however, we believe that the
last quarter of this century is going to be even more exigent,
though in a different way, than the past twenty-five years.
We therefore sum up the implications of this chapter by
posing a single question: How can we ensure that the upcoming
generation of Clandestine Service leaders is better prepared
intellectually to meet the challenges which face them than
were those who ran the Service in the sixties?
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CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1: The Letter of Instruction
General guidance for the preparation of this report was
contained in a Letter of Instruction, signed by the Deputy
Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It assigned the
following tasks:
You are tasked to write an analysis of the
Nosenko case which will address the following
matters:
a. The bona fides of Nosenko.
b. The value of Nosenko to the United
States and allied governments.
c. The relationship and significance of
Nosenko to other agents and operations.
d. The identification of unexploited
Nosenko penetration leads and information.
e. The nature and validity of methodology
of previous Nosenko bona fides studies.
We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather
liberally, because the ramifications and implications of the
Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we, and
probably the framers of the above Letter, anticipated. None-
theless, we shall commence this concluding chapter with
responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs a through
e above.
1-a: Bona Fides
Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of our own
making. Had the job of initially assessing him as a person,
as well as of gathering and evaluating the intelligence he
had to offer, been handled properly he could have been
declared a bona fide defector as readily as have many other
Soviet intelligence officers.
This is not to say that we can be certain of the genuine-
ness of any defector. It will always remain hypothetically
possible that the Soviet Government, acting through the KGB
or some other instrumentality, will attempt to plant an
intended "disinformation agent" or prospective penetration
of our Government on our doorstep. But the usefulness of the
Soviets' doing s.15., in the manner ascribed to them in the
Nosenko case, is probably as slight as is the feasibility.
Soviet success in using native-born citizens of other
countries to spy on their own homelands has been considerable.
By contrast, there is no record of the USSR successfully
infiltrating the government of a major non-Communist power
by use of an acknowledged Soviet citizen, least of all one
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whose career has been spent in a Soviet intelligence or
security service. Thus, the probability of the KGB em-
barking upon, or succeeding in, the type of enterprise
envisaged by Angleton, 'Murphy, and Bagley, was from the
outset negligible.
As we conclude this study, it has consumed almost the
full time of five intIligence specialists over a period of
some six months. No information uncovered during that time
has lent substantial credence to any of the doubts or sus-
picions harbored in the early days of this case by Messrs.
Angleton, Murphy, and Bagley.
We therefore conclude that Nosenko was from the
beginning a bona fide defector.
1-b: Value of Nosenko
Nosenko's contribution has been summarized in Chapter IV.
He has been of great value, but probably could have been
even more valuable had he been properly handled.
1-c: Relationship to Other Agents and Operations
As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the Nosenko case,
through no fault of the defector himself, had a most
unfortunate effect on all clandestine operations in the
Soviet field.
1-d: Identification of Unexploited Leads
We have not felt that this subject was one which we
could feasibly or properly investigate. To do so would
have meant delving into the past and current operations of
both the SE Division and the CI Staff to ascertain the extent
to which there might have been "exploitation" of any of the
hundreds of persons whom Nosenko identified by name. Time
would not have permitted us to accomplish this task, nor
would our doing so have been consistent with the principle
of compartmentation.
1-e: Methodology
It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the variety
of techniques used in handling Nosenko did not conform to
any generally accepted sense of the term "Methodology."
:'4urtihy, and Bauley must be iudged incomnetent in
their hanaling of thirs�r: In addition, by the arbitrary
and secretive manner in which they conducted their business.,
they imposed a similar incompetence upon their subordinates.
2: The Question of Responsibility
An obvious question arises at the end of this long
recital: Where�aid responsibility lie for the multiple errors
of the Nosenko case?
Fixing responsibility was not a part of our mission as
defined by the Letter of Instruction. Nor would we wish to
assume the full task of making a judgment regarding it.
There is, however, one point to which we may properly address
pp!ileT2iZ114
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ourselves: Who was not responsible?
nur opinion cannot be considered definitive, but it
may help others avoid some rather natural misapprehensions.
The prevailing principle within most large organizations
is that the supervisor must accept responsibility for the
actions of his subordinates. - Applied to CIA as it functioned
during the Nosenko case, that principle would lead one to
apportion a goodly share of blame among three DCI's
McCo e, Raborn, and,LiLLTs) and three DDFT�Irre'rris,
FitzGe-rald, and Karamessines).
In fact, we believe that to fix blame on the basis of
hierarchical responsibility would be unfair. Detailed exami-
nation of the documentation in this case leads to the
following conclusions:
A. The supervisory echelons above SB Division
and CI Staff were never accurately informed con-
cerning the conduct of the case, despite voluminous
reporting directed to them. They were thus making
decisions on the basis of data and evaluations
which were inaccurate and misleading. Under the
circumstances, the possibility of correct decisions
was virtually nil.
B. Lxcept for Helms, no subsequent DDP during
the period covered by this report exercised any
real authority over the conduct of the Nosenko case.
Although they were in theory the direct supervisors
of Angleton and Murphy, FitzGerald and Karamessines
were onlookers more than they were participants.
C. Helms himself was the victim of incomplete
reports and erroneous analyses from the two persons
on whom, until 1967, he principally depended for
advice regarding Nosenko. He himself eventually
realized that he was being badly served, and for
this reason assigned Admiral Taylor to investigate
the handling of the case and recommend procedures
for its resolution. Upon receiving Taylor's
recommendations, Helms promptly accepted and imple-
mented them. Thus, while there is room for argument,
a to whether he acted as soon as�he snould have,
the record shows that once Helms received an accurate
evaluation of the problems involved in this case,
he took immediate corrective measures.
There are of course other questions which could be raised,
such as wh---.e_i_b_tr.-441L_Tiswaswise in his choice of subordinates. ,
These are, however, beyond the scope oi fhis study.
Within the restricted frameork of judgment which we
have imposed upon ourselves, our overall conclusion is that
the echelons of supervision above SB Division and Cl Staff
were not responsible for the errors of the Nosenko case.
3: Recommended Action
Most of our recommendations for action have been pre-
viously stated Or implied. In the following paragraphs, we
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recapitulate them, with such supplementary remarks as seem
necessary.
1
3-a: Examination of the Role of Professionals
We recommend that the role which can properly be
played within the Agency by members of the organized pro-
fessions -- medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law, and
others -- be given careful study, within the context of
(1) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills to the best
possible use, while (2) refraining from involving them in
matters not properly within their professional purview.
3-b: Improvement of Intellectual Standards
We recommend that the Operations Directorate, and its
Clandestine Service, take whatever steps are possible to
ensure that the intellectual caliber of their personnel is
equal to the exigencies o
We realize that the present personnel selection system
sets high standards for those entering on duty at the pro-
fessional level, particularly as regards IQ and education.
But the standards presently in force do not by themselves
guarantee that future selectees will possess independence of
mind, analytical ability, and objectivity.
In the case of personnel already on board, it should be
kept in mind that we live in a rapidly-evolving, technologi-
cally-oriented civilization. Knowledge and intellectual
skills adequate at this time may be inadequate a few years
from now. For an intelligence organization, we define
"inadequate" as anything which is less than the best.
We suggest that a board of expert crnsnit.ants be estab-
\l
ished, drawn primarily from research institutions, high-
technology enterprises, and the academic world to recommend
program of scl......;_esating�ne.w_ens.t.a..n.Y..s, and improving the
ral- those alread on duty, with the aim of
chieving and maintaining a high leve o a ctual
excellence throughout the Operations Directorate.
3-c: Detection of Deception
We recommend that high priority be accorded a program
to develop new methods of detecting deception.
Some seeps are already underway in this regard, but
they should be extended and given greater emphasis. Present
methods, based mainly on the use of the polygraph, are clearly
obsolete.
, >
Specific criteria of bona fides will follow naturally
from improved methods of detecting deception.
3-d: Collection, Analysis and Evaluation of Cl Product
We are not making a recommendation in this regard
because, although well aware of the inadequacies of the
Nosenko period, we do not know how the matter is now being
handled.
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3-e: Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent
Handling and Personnel Selection
We recommend a multi-track program of psychological
research, geared specifically to the Operations Directorate's
needs, to develop a new generation of personality assessment
techniques necessary for both defector/agent handling and
selection of DDO per.,onnel. This program should be under
direct DDO control.
A surprising amount of relevant expertise now exists
within the Agency, and some valuable research is underway,
but it is not being geared to DDO's needs to the extent it
could be. Instead, it is being handled by DDSU/ORD/Life
Sciences Division, which currently accords it a low
priority and may eliminate it altogether.
It is theoretically possible to establish, within the
reasonably near future, certain measurable physiological
correlates of a number of personality types.
It is also theoretically quite possible, though not yet
demonstrated, that by establishing such physiological
correlates we could take much of the guesswork out of
personality evaluation. We would thus substantially reduce
the threat which the employment of unstable or anti-social
personalities (e.g., Philip Agee) poses for the Agency, and
particularly for the Operations Directorate.
3-f: Further Research on Past CI and SE Division Cases
We recommend that the psychological research program
(sub-paragraph 3-e) be supplemented by continuing research
on past CI and SE Division cases involving Soviet or Soviet
Bloc nationals. The purpose would be to extract possibly
objectifiable indicators of the personality of the defectors,
agents, or suspects involved, in order that a personality
typology be built up to cover persons in those three cate-
gories. Such a typology should enhance our ability in the
future to predict the behavior of such persons, as well as
to improve our handling of them.
3-g: Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors
We recommend early, systematic psychological evaluation,
by clinical psychologists using standardized measurement
techniques, of all denied area agents, as well as defectors
from the denied areas. We recommend a ainst dependence on
psychiatric examinations, unless the psychiatrists are
willing to use the same standardized instruments as the
psychologists would.
Although few, if any, of the Soviet or Soviet Bloc
agents to whom we have had direct and continuing access have
ever been tested 'as long as they remained in agent status,
we do not accept as valid the reasons usually given for not
testing them.
Implementation of this recommendation would, if the
other programs above-recommended are also carried out, con-
tribute substantially toward authentication of agent sources
and information.
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5-e: Psycholoaical Aspects of Defector/Agent
Handling and Personnel Selection
We recommend a multi-track program of psychological
research, geared specifically to the Operations Directorate's
needs, to develop a new generation of personality assessment
techniques necessary for both defector/agent handling and
selection of ODD personnel. This program should be under
direct DDO control.
A surprising amount of relevant expertise now exists
within the Agency, and some valuable research is underway,
but it is not being geared to DDO's needs to the extent it
could be. Instead, it is being handled by DDS4T/ORD/Life
Sciences Division, which currently accords it a low
priority and may eliminate it altogether.
It is theoretically possible to establish, within the
reasonably near future, certain measurable physiological
correlates of a number of personality types.
It is also theoretically quite possible, though not yet
demonstrated, that by establishing such physiological
correlates we could take much of the guesswork out of
personality evaluation. We would thus substantially reduce
the threat which the employment of unstable or anti-social
personalities (e.g., Philip Agee) poses for the Agency, and
particularly for the Operations Directorate.
3-f: Further Research on Past Cl and SE Division Cases
We recommend that the psychological research program
(sub-paragraph 3-e) be supplemented by continuing research
on past CI and SE Division cases involving Soviet or Soviet
Bloc nationals. The purpose would be to extract possibly
objectifiable indicators of the personality of the defectors,
agents, or suspects involved, in order that a personality
typology be built up to cover persons in those three cate-
gories. Such a typology should enhance our ability in the
future to predict the behavior of such persons, as well as
to improve our handling of them.
3-g: Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors
We recommend early, systematic psychological evaluation,
by clinical psychologists using standardized measurement
techniques, of all denied area agents, as well as defectors
from the denied areas. We recommend against dependence on
psychiatric examinations, unless the psychiatrists are
willing to use the same standardized instruments as the
psychologists would.
Although few, if any, of the Soviet Or Soviet Bloc
agents to whom we have had direct and continuing access have
ever been teste-d�as long as they remained in agent status,
we do not accept as valid the reasons usually 'given for not
testing them.
Implementation of this recommendation would, if the
other programs above-recommended are also carried out, con-
tribute substantially toward authentication of agent sources
and information.
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4: Review by Higher Echelons
In addition to review at the appropriate echelons of
command, we recommend that this report be thoroughly reviewed
by the Inspector General and General Counsel.
Although the St3t,La�E---&-C--4-ita4�4+4OTIS presumably renders
impossible ckfiminal actia24.,-..,as a result of this case, there
will remain virtually indefinitely the threat of an action
f.Qr damages on the part of Nnc,nko In the view of ti
senior author, this danger is minimized by keeping Nosenko
actively and productively engaged ir work on behalf of the
CIA and FBI. Nonetheless, the possibility of Nosenko's
eventually deciding to press publicly for further compen-
sation cannot be totally discounted. The Agency should
therefore be fully prepared in advance for such a contingency.
5: Moral Responsibility
We recommend consideration be given to establishing a
written code of moral responsibility for Agency employees.
Even the conduct of a declared war is to some extent
restricted by certain morally-based limitations, such as the
Geneva Convention. While the nature of clandestine and covert
activities demands exemption from many legally-imposed limi-
tations, this fact should not be taken to imply a total dis-
pensation from all moral imperatives. We believe, for
and the
(b)(3)
indetensioie
We suggest that there should be enough consensus within
the Agency regarding c OT. f inoerm. sibl
an e.
at tn" .U) Rsablished and enforced.
Enforcement is as important as establ'shment of such a
code. In the aftermath of the Nosenko and cases,
manifestations of oE/Lazeauslx_agal_ip.dgment on t e part of
key Agency officers- seem regularly to been followed by
ass
is sequence may
ious; ut whet er it was or not, it pro-
jected an image of ....11a2Ialita on the part of the Agency's
leadership which does not bode well for CIA's future in a
democratic society. One of the Clandestine Service's most
positive features has always been the dedication of its
personnel; yet amorality and dedication are self-evidently
inconsistent in our society. It is essential that the Agency's
leadership keep this fact in mind.
SECRviis "t
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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APPENDIX:
CHRONOLOGY OF THE YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO CASE
1962
mid-March
5 June
9 June
11 June
12 June
13 June
14 June
15 June
16 June
ca 20--26 June
26 June
27 June
14 August
1963
13 September
4 November
1964
19 January
23 January
Nosenko offers, t
information to American intelLo sell
g
identifies self as KEN nffirpr
Bagley and Kisevalter meet Nosenko.
They advise Headquarters Nosenko has
conclusively proven bona fides.
Bagley and Kisevalter meet Nosenko and
report him cooperative.
Meeting No. 4.
Meeting No. 5.
Nosenko returns to Moscow after agreeing
to re-establish contact with CIA when
next in West.
UN Disarmament Conference opens in Geneva.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b))
Nosenko case discussed at CIA Headquarters
by Angleton, Maury, Bagley and Kisevalter.
Bagley studies Golitsyn's reporting on
alleged KGB disinformation mission.
Bagley discusses Nosenko material (in
disguised form) with Golitsyn. Golitsyn
agrees Nosenko's information may reflect
disinformation.
Bagley suggests Nosenko under KGB control
and commences to build case against Nosenko.
Kisevalter completes "summary transcripts"
of CIA's five meetings with Nosenko in
Geneva.
Yuriy Krotkov, KGB SCD agent, defects to
British.
The Cherepanov incident in Moscow.
Nosenko informs CIA of his return to Geneva.
Meeting No. 1. Nosenko says he wants to
defect.
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24 January
25 January
26 January
27 January
28 January
29 January
30 January
31 January
1 February
2 February
3 February
4 February
5 February
6 February
7 February
8 February
9 February
10 February
11 February
12 February
14 February
Meeting No. 2. Bagley cables Headquarters
that suspicions regarding Nosenko's bona
fides are justified. Requests TOY to
Headquarters.
Meeting No. 3. Karpovich meets Nosenko
vice Bagley.
Meeting No. 4.
Murphy tells Helms SR goal is to "break"
Nosenko.
Meeting No. 5.
Meeting No. 6
Meeting No. 7. Bagley, now back in
Geneva, requests Nosenko remain in place.
Meeting No. 8.
Meeting No. 9.
Meetings No. 10 and 11.
Meeting No. 12.
Meeting No. 13. Nosenko insists on
immediate defection and is exfiltrated
to
Nosenko arrives
1Nosenko cooperates with debriefing in
FBI judges Nosenko's infor- ku)o)
mation "valid and valuable."
(b)(3)
Murphy visits to assess Nosenko.(6)(1)
Murphy confirms Bagley and Karpovich judg-(b)(3)
meat that Nosenko not bona fide.
Murphy assures Nosenko we consider him
bona fide, and makes detailed financial
commitments to him.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Murphy, back at Headquarters, tells
Karamessines Nosenko is KGB agent on mission.
McCone directs Nosenko be brought to
Washington soonest because Soviets are
publicizing the case. McCone also notifies
President of CIA's suspicion that Nosenko
is on KGB mission.
Nosenko arrives in United States.
Nosenko is confronted by Soviets and
confirms desire to remain in United States.
� . �
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17 February
18--21 February
20 February
24 February
25 Feb--6 March
9 March
12--28 March
12 March
20 March
23 March
1 April
2 April
4 April
6 April
Helms approves Murphy's plan for
handling case on basis Nosenko not
bona fide. Concurrently, Bagley assures
Nosenko of future collaborative relation-
ship with CIA and sets schedule of
emoluments.
Nosenko is debriefed.
Helms agrees to bring Golitsyn into the
case. Golitsyn will receive virtually
full access to Nosenko material.
FBI begins debriefing of Nosenko.
Nosenko complains of his treatment by
FBI
(b)(1)
FBI debriefing continues despite Nosel(b)(3)
reluctance.
Murphy tells Helms little of Nosenko's
information is new. Nevertheless, FBI
believes Nosenko to be genuine KGB defector.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Deryabin reports extensive errors in
"transcripts" of 1962 meetings with
Nosenko.
Helms, Angleton and Murphy meet with McCone
to discuss plans for confinement and .
hostile interrogation of Nosenko. Goal
is to "break" him.
CIA disseminates to State Department
Nosenko's information on microphones in
U.S. Embassy, Moscow.
CIA clears its proposed handling of
Nosenko with FBI, which interposes no
objection. Helms advises State Department
that Nosenko is not genuine defector and
raises possibility of turning Nosenko
back to Soviets.
Helms, Murphy, and Houston meet with
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach to
discuss CIA's freedom of action under
provisions for "parole" to Agency.
Murphy briefs McCone on reasons why
Nosenko is considered KGB plant.
Following "polygraph," Nosenko is confined
in safehouse at Clinton, Maryland. Bagley
confronts Nosenko, saying hit. KGB mission
has been known to CIA for two years.
Hostile interrogations begin,
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25 April
end-April
14 May
23 June
29 June
20--21 July
10 November
19 November
1965
5--8 January
Interrogations cease, since Nosenko
has not confessed.
Microphones found in U.S. Embassy, Moscow.
Interrogations resume and continue until
late July.
Gittinger administers psychological test
to Nosenko.
Golitsyn presents his conclusions on
Nosenko.
CIA tells MI-5 and MI-6 that Nosenko is
KGB plant and links Krotkov with wide-
spread "diversionary plot."
Interrogation of Nosenko stops.
Helms orders rapid windup of Nosenko case.
CIA and FBI attempt to reach common
position on Nosenko.
18 January FBI tells McCone they are in no position
to reach firm conclusion regarding Nosenko.
25 January Murphy initiates planning for Nosenko's
confinement at LOBLOLLY.
26 Jan--5 March Hostile interrogations resume.
3--21 May Gittinger interviews Nosenko.
26 July--13 Aug Deryabin interrogates Nosenko in Russian.
27 July Angleton, Murphy, and Osborn inspect
LOBLOLLY.
13 August
Bagley tells Nosenko his position is
hopeless and breaks off direct SR Division
contact with him.
10 December McCoy forwards his dissenting paper to
Murphy.
1966
12 January
Murphy tells Helms no one from SR Division
has seen Nosenko since August 1965, and
they discuss use of "special techniques"
on Nosenko.
19 April Murphy again discusses use of "special
techniques" with Helms.
21 June Murphy discusses sodium amytal interview
and other "special techniques" with Helms.
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f. 17111r,
u
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6 July Bagley makes first case officer visit
to Nosenko in a year.
23 August
30 August
1 September
2 September
18--28 October
1967
February
10 March
16 March
29 March
10 May
Helms instructs FitzGerald and Murphy
to terminate Nosenko case within 60 days.
Murphy organizes SR Division task force
to meet Helms deadline.
Murphy tells Helms chance of Nosenko
confessing is not great.
Helms forbids use of sodium amytal and
other "special techniques" on Nosenko.
Helms considers turning Nosenko over
to Soviets.
Murphy obtains from Helms extension of
60-day deadline until end of year.
Nosenko is interrogated extensively with
assistance of polygraph.
SB Division produces long-awaited report
on Nosenko case.
Murphy forwards portions of SB Division's
report on Nosenko to Angleton.
Admiral Taylor questions Murphy on
Nosenko case.
Angleton objects to manner in which SB
Division report treats Golitsyn material
about Nosenko.
Admiral Taylor finds SB report on Nosenko
unconvincing and overly-lengthy.
26 May Taylor requests Office of Security comments
on SB report. Director of Security recom-
mends Bruce Solie to take over interro-
gation of Nosenko.
19 June Solie comments on SB Division study and
recommends alternative lines of inquiry.
11 August Solie is assigned to interrogate Nosenko.
27 October Office of Security moves Nosenko from
LOBLOLLY unbeknownst to SB Division or
CI Staff.
30 October
1968
February
Solie's first interview with Nosenko.
SB Division produces revised report on
Nosenko representing compromise with
CI Staff. . .
SECREUENSITIVE
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Approved for Release: 2019/06/18 C01324278
SEGREEJSENSITIVE
-- 202 --
2--G August Office of Security administers first-
ever, valid polygraph to Nosenko.
There are no signs of deception.
September--October FBI and CIA Office of Security reports
conclude Nosenko bona fide defector
and not dispatched by KGB.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Approved for Release: 2019/06/18 CO1324278