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• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02629375
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-01443
• Publication Date: September 1, 1970

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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
24 August 1970
CAMBODIA'S "MINIMIRACLE"- CAN IT LAST?
PNOMPENH
An untrained, ill-equipped Cambodian
Army, backed by U. S. air power and
South Vietnamese ground forces, has�for
the moment�created a "minimiracle" in
this Communist-threatened land.
When American troops pulled out of
Cambodia on June 30 after smashing
Red sanctuaries, predictions were wide-
spread that the Government of Premier
Lon Nol would fall in a matter of days
or weeks.
At the time, Cambodia had a virtual-
ly unarmed force of 35,000 men. Hard-
ened North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
troops were unopposed in Northeast
Cambodia and moving out across the
country.
The former dictator, ousted Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, was calling for
revolution.
Encouraging signs. In mid-August,
the situation is still critical. But most
observers here are vastly encouraged by
recent developments.
The Government in Pnompenh is
stronger than it was six weeks ago. The
Army shows signs of developing a back-
bone, having withstood two Communist
offensives since the Americans departed.
And, so far at least, Prince Sihanouk's
call for revolt in the countryside has
gone unheeded.
What accounts for all this?
The big factor is morale. Says one
American: "I haven't seen this kind of
unity since Pearl Harbor."
Students, bureaucrats, the middle
class, and even peasants, have enthusi-
astically joined the struggle against the
enemy.
The Government called for 200,000
volunteers�and got them. In small but
sometimes bloody battles with the Com-
munist forces, the Cambodians are throw-
ing themselves into the fight. Often, it
seems to observers Cambodian tactics
have more valor than finesse.
The Cambodians are getting help, of
course. South Vietnamese troops are har-
assing the Beds in Eastern Cambodia.
American air power�both B-52 bombing
of North Vietnamese concentrations and
supply lines, and tactical support of
Cambodian troops�plays a big role. One
military source says that, without this
air support, the Cambodians could not
have held on�and would not be able
to in the future.
�Red problems. The Communists have
other difficulties. Their old sea-supply
route through Cambodia�which in the
past few years supplied
most of their ammunition
and arms for the fight in
Southern South Vietnam
�has been cut off. So has
most of their rice supply,
which used to come of-
ficially through Siha-
nouk's Government.
And Cambodian villag-
ers are hostile to the Red
invaders, giving the Lon
Not forces more intelli-
gence than they can use.
There are still the
equivalent of at least
four divisions of Commu-
nists inside Cambodia.
That means as many as
50,000 fighting men.
Their command structure
Is intact and they are
consolidating in the
Northeast, east of the Me-
kong River and west of the Vietnamese
border.
What are Cambodia's chances of sur-
viving over the longer run?
Much depends on Communist strate-
gy. Most observers believe there will
be no all-out attempt to bring down the
Lon Not Government by massive mili-
tary action against this capital.
Rather, the Hanoi-Peking strategy
appears to be to consolidate in the North-
east�which the Cambodians have tem-
porarily abandoned. From there, the
war against South Vietnam can be
continued.
Puppet front. A long, hard war of
attrition�using the puppet government-
in-exile of Sihanouk as a front�has start-
ed against Lon Nors Cambodia. Targets
of opportunity will be exploited around
the countryside, with priorities given to
seizing rice and�more important�to re-
cruiting Cambodians for Sihanouk.
The Government is settling in for a
long haul, hoping to maintain the initial
enthusiasm and support of the people.
The Government hopes to turn 60,000
to 70,000 men into a first-rate fighting
force. The rest of the new manpower
will be used to guard villages, to police
military installations and to counter Red
terrorism. More American aid�not only
the 8.5 million dollars in arms and equip-
ment already promised and arriving�will
be needed.
So will continued U. S., South Viet-
namese and Thai air support. Especially
sought will be American economic aid to
rebuild Cambodia's economy, which was
bankrupted by Sihanouk's policies be-
fore he was ousted last March.
Peasants hold key. Biggest question
is whether or not the Communists can
make progress enrolling the peasants in
their ranks. The Communists "hold"
more than a third of the country�the
regions east of the Mekong River. But
these are largely uninhabited. The Gov-
ernment's challenge is to protect the
peasants in more densely populated
areas from Communist thrusts south-
ward and westward.
Confidence may be misplaced, but
right now the Cambodians�and many
Americans here�believe Lou Nol just
might survive. They say that only time
will tell if the "minimiracle" of the
past weeks can continue.
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THE OBSERVER, London
9 August 1970
smile
from GAVIN* YOUNG:' Skun,
SKUN, Cambodia. 8 August
A SCORE of .young Cambo-
dians killed in an, ambush a
day ago lie in the sun today
just down the road from here.
They are behind us�on what
8110(0: be our safe' .side.
Ahead, round- the: next bend
in the road, funnels, of smoke
rise from the little red-roofed
,town' of Skun. -.The .crash and
rattle of rockets and . machine-
guns. extend into the great green-
ness around us, even at our
backs on the way to Kompong
.Chain, the key base. .
Cambodian regulars .and
volunteers are now fighting
hand-to-hand and � house-to-
house with Vietcong and North
Vietnamese troops who occupied
Skutt a week- ago. . I saw
American and South Vietnamese
jets machine-gunning and rocket,.
-ting outside the town. Skun
:may be recovered today or to-
morrow. It sits on a vital cross-
roads on the main northern high,
:way only 35 miles from .Phnoni
�Penh, but the situation in this
important region of Cambodia
will still be serious. �
I Was plummeted down to the
gaies of Skutt by a helicopter
manned by South � Vietnamese
pilots, cool as ice in slinky black
flying suits with 'tiger-head
badges, . accompanied by a
Vietnamese colonel and the
.gentle-looking Cambodian coat-
attander, � General In Tam; � two
years ago, an unbelievable coin-
'bination of nationalities. .
- We landed on a cratered road.
�The helicopter soared prudently:
away. And something. amazing
.happened. Despite the Vietcong
milling around in the � undeN
,growth, about 50 sweating
'Cambodian soldiers, in motley
'battle-dress or . khaki' shorts,
charged out of their foxholes,
lams
er e
Cambodia, 8 August
cheering, clapping their hands
'above their heads,, jumping in
,the air with glee, rushing to
,shake the General's hand. In
,one of thebottest war zones' in
,Cambodia,. we were � suddenly' in,
la.sea of damp smiling faces.'
. ) r
,Army morale
�
'astounding'
The high morale 'of Cam-
bodia's under-trained :Army is
,astounding. It seethes through
'an increasingly battered country
like high-tension electricity:1
These men have been lighting(
atouud Skun day and night for
10 days. .Some are - peasants-,.
others are students, labourers.
teachers. � All are volunteers.:
They have been badly
knocked about. ',.;rhe North
Vietnamese had infiltrated
around and behind them. A
column from Kompong Cham
that was to have relieved them
was caught in the ambush that.
killed 27.
Yet � they had held�with
sporadic air support and no heli-
copters. Now they proudly,
pointed out their battered slit
trenches. Some had Vietcong
rocket craters only six feet away.
All were ripped with bullets. .
'They kept creeping up in the'
dark.' a Cambodian corporal
said. 'They shouted "Lay down
your arms ! "and we opened up
on them crouching there only 20
yards away. I saw the blackened'
grass and.bushes where Vietcong
or Cambodian grenades had
!ex-
ploded and the traces of 'Viet-
cong blood. I asked a boy, beam-
ing and clutching his Chinese,
sub-machine gun: Are you
scared?' He said:' 'I was. But.
now I know 'what the Vietcong,
are like, not any more.' :He cer-
2
tainly saw a battle here. The
General gave each man a. week's,
pay, on the spot.
General In Tam' is a remark-
able man. Over 50, he is an
administrator bV profession, now.
'a soldier by choice�. to save the
'country against this foreiga in-
vasion.' He is Governor of Kom-
pong Cham province where he
Was born and which he loves and
used to tour regularly. He is
balding, looks more like an
academic than a soldier, never
carries 'a weapon, and has a
wrinkled dark face like a friendly
walrut. Be could be safe in the
capital; his duties as President
of the National Assembly could
keep him there. He prefers to be
with his men. He has already lost
a brother and five nephews in a
war that is only four months old.
Today his staff tried to stop
him going to Skun in a vulner-
able helicopter--' The general is
far too rash.' But he said the
soldiers should see him. He said
it like a professor talking about
his favourite class.
He had already spent three
,days and nights under shot and
shell with his front-line troops at
Skun earlier this week. He had
personally extricated an encir-
cled battalion.
Like all Cambodians, without
exception, he complains mildly
but with justice of the lack of
modern equipment for his men.
Earlier, at his base in Kom-
pong Chant, which is itself under
rocket attack, I asked him if the
Cambodians could hold up under
the recurrent if limited losses in
the meek-old wave of � Vietcong
attacks across the country. Oh,
yes. With time we can train and
reorganise the ridiculous army
Sihanouk left us.' When he saw
Cambodians killed, did he feel
angry at the obvious delay in arms
deliveries 'from Cambodia's
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Well, a little of that.' Ile
'But it soon passes. We
understand th:at this war hap-
pened very quickly. We were all,
including our allies, taken rather
by surprise. It takes time to
bounce back.'
. Cambodians have been largely
pinned on the defensive in the
present hefty Vietcong and North
Vietnamese push from the north
towards Phnom Penh that has led
to heavy fighting around Koni-
pong Chain and even inside a
major town like Kompong
Thom from which the Vietcong
have been ejected. There have
been setbaces at Vkirirom,
battles around Takeo in the
south, and shelling of places
nearer to the capital. Bridges
have been mined. 'Cambodian
civilians were killed in a major
Vietcong ambush on the main
road to the port of Kompong
Soot. ,
�
Volunteers ,
turned away.
All the time the Cambodian
army�turning away hundreds of
volunteers by now�is feverishly
training. It is ontroanouvred and
:outgunned. But it iseiot collaps-
ing It is even hitting back in
areas like Skun. And though it
�is a small country, Phnom Penh
does not seem threatened today.
Cambodian soldiers may look
raggle-taggle, but they have
seldom run away: Here I have
met l 5-year-old veterans of two
or three battles. And their
-morale is higher than any I have
seen in anybody's army in 10
years of visiting wars,
It is a strange and rare situa-
tion. Kompong Chain, the lush'
.green second city 'of Cambodia,
is cut off from Phnom Penh since
Skun was lost last week. This
week it was more like a city that
welcomes attack more than it
.fears it.
Two nights ago the crash of
Cambodian heavy mortars and
the drone of low-ciroline Ameri-
can planes dropping flares over
the Mekong river made sleep
difficult. Every greet corner has
its heavily . sandbagged strong
point. Men, women-, girls and
boys are in uniform, deter-
minedly clutching guns. I saw
a dienitied oict man of about 60
with white hair and Ho Chi Minh
beard being pedalled along in a
eyelo, nursing his carbine, In
the big lyeee, alreedy twice hit ,
by long-range Vietcong mortars,
while some students play basket-
ball or study, others in rotation
man well-protected gun emplace-
ments in which 'they sleep. A
professor, strapped about with
ammunition ibelt, grenades, and
carbine, pointed to himself and
said smiling: 'The; Duke of
Marlborough goes to.war, n'est-
ce paw ? '
In a small house in a back
street flanked by scarlet hibiscus,
two French priests, the only
foreigners left in the city since
it was cut oil, told me: ' There's
'no panic here. The people seem
relaxed. They've been expecting
an attack for weeks and they're
becoming used to it. Much
better discipline, too. Before, if
a shot went off, everyone in the
town would be blazing away.
They laughed at the recollection.
One does not get the feeling
that the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese are achieving a
major breakthrough in this essen-
tial heartland, though as the Viet-
namese liaison officer with 'the
troops at Kompong Chain says
of the situation: It's not
'pretty, eh ? '
The Cambcklian strength is in
their will to fight and the fact that
this is not a civil war. But there
are major North Vietnamese
units moving down by river and
truck, They are desperate for a
really big psycbological viceery.
Food prices are beginning to.
'creep up in Kompong Cham.
The Cambodians have other
disadvantages beside a shortage
of weapons, General In Tam,
that unusual man, will not allow
Napalm in his region. Again.
other towns have been destroyed
by air attack before beinvetaken
from the Vietcong. The general
here says: ' I must at all costs
protect our civilian lives and pre-
vent material damage. So the
fighting has been. very hard in
' Skun. ' The enemy gets into the,
buildings�even pagodas�and
uses them as fire points. We don't
3
want to destroy our own houses
and temples, so it takes longer to
retake a town and our losses may
be greater as a result. I would
not allow aircraft to ben* Skun.
Meanwhile Skun will be retaken
and the main road opened again.'
But only tentatively. It will be a
risky drive from Phnom Penh to
Kompong Chain for sonic time.
Today as I stood with the General
with his joyful troops cln the edge
of Skun, two big trucks encircled
by a strongly armed escort were
creeping down the road behind us
at walking pace. Because of the
lurking enemy, it Would take
them six hours to'-pick up the
poor ambushed bodies, the gay
scarves made up from the Cam-
bodian and Buddhist flags still
around their necks, and deliver
them to the incinerators in Korn-
pong Chain only 15 miles away.
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BALTIMORE SUN
16 August 1970
Lon Nol Slowly Introduces
A Greater Freedom To Cambodia
An Increased Pluralism
I Over Sihanouk's Era
" Is Bringing Support
30 MICHAEL PARKS
[Sun Stall Corresponded]
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Aug.
15--The new Cambodian govern-
inent, which many expected
Would quickly become another
American-supported military
dictatorship, so far seems to be
freer, more open and tolerant of,
dissent than the regime Of
-Prince Norodom Sihanouk was.
The government of Gen. Lon
Nol, ' the premier, also is pro-
ceeding gingerly to broaden its
political base, partially, through
patronage, partially through
community-development pro-,
grams but mostly by appealing
to the patriotism and soliciting
the support of the peasant and
laborer.
� The efforts are cautious and
often tentative, and they can be
undercut at any time, of course,
by serious military reverses:
By most estimates, the Phnom
.Penh government controls only
a third of the countryside, but
perhaps . two-thirds of the pro.
government population is con-
centrated in the provincial capi-
tals and towns. ,
Within this context, the gov-
ernment is firmly in charge
within the territory it holds, but
even its critics acknowledge it
to be more responsive to local
needs than was the Sihanouk re-
,
gime... . .
Intellectuals and' Students,
Who in most countries would
tend to be anti-government,
firmly support the coup and new
government. �
!Buddhist groups, basically
now-political here but closer to
the peasantry than any other
group, also support it.
The government's parliamen-
tary critics, who had won only a
few grudging changes from
Prince Sihanouk over a decade,
say they have no quarrel with
the current government's goals.,
only its methods.
- Generally they feel it is too
moderate, too cautious probably
reflecting the personality of Lon
Nol.
So far, the critics have 'Per-
suaded the government to end
end the practice of concentrat-
ing all power in the hands of two
or three men,' each running
three or four ministries. While
Lon Nol has kept the defense
portfolio, he and Naj. Gen. Siso-
wath Sink Matak, the deputy
premier, have given up their
other ministries to new Cabinet
members including assembly
deputies,,an Army general, and
-two popular university proles.:
sors.
They also have created 12 spe-
cial commissariats to deal with
refugees, veterans, planning and
other matters at the sub-Cabinet
level.
The essential, policy-making
powers remain in the hands of
Lon Nol and Sink Matak, but
neither local nor foreign politi-
cal observers here believe that
either man wants to be a dicta-
tor in the classic sense.
. The Cabinet membert andthe
officials appointed to rim the
new commissariats say they
have greater day-to-day operat-
ing authority than was ever al-
lowed under Prince Sihanouk.
Most of this means little so faF
4
to the Cambodian who is not a
member of the French-style
elite of civil servants, Army offi-
cers, university teachers, pro-
fessionals and businessmen, al-
though the government is mak-
ing plans to win the average
Cambodian's allegiance lest it
:revert to Prince Sihanouk.
Elite Approves, Too ,
Most of the members of the
political elite, whose viewpoints
range from the near-monarchist
to radical socialist, have said
'almost unanimously in ;private
Conversations recently that they
believe the Lon Nol government
has moved significantly toward
republican democracy with a
dreat deal of speed.
Similarly, most Western diplo-
Mats here say they are stir-
:prised at the stability of the goy-
i..ernment and the speed of its
:political reforms.
"Given that this is a country
War, a country occupied by
its 'enemy and a country that
had an abrupt change of govern-
ments five months ago," a polit-
ical analyst at a European em-
bassy said, "I find amazing sta-
bility. Moreover, I think the po-.
litical reforms are considerable
given the time period.,"
The current debate among the
politically aware centers on
when to. declare Cambodia a, re-
pulbkc and what form of govern;
ment to embody In the new CQII:
stitution Which is being drafted.
Lon Nol ;said fie expects the
-transforrnation from a constitu:
Ptionai mpharchy.-with ,Many
remnants of angkore,an god0
kings to,Areptiblle,-within twoThe
inonth8.--
&sate fi,ov'er whethir
the - new govetnment ,,be
Modeled _upon the. 0.e:hem*
form with a strong president, on
whether it will be modeled upon'
the old post-war French repuilic
with a figurehead president and
a basically parliamentary form
of government.
Predictably, the Lon Nol gov-
ernment favors the strong-presi-
dent concept and his parliamen-
tary opponents favor the other
form.
Questions of unicameral ver-
sus bicameral legislatures, de-
centralization . of governmental
functions, and the election of al-
most all local officials also are.
being vigorously debated by polJ
iticians.here M a style that they
say was never permitted before.
Whether this-constitution will be
drafted by the present national,
assembly or a new constituent
assembly has not been deter-
mined because of the impossibil-
ity of holding elections through-
out the country. For the same
reason, the government expects
to postpone for a year or per-
haps two the national assembly ,
elections scheduled for this fall,
a move accepted by alt here as.
reasonable.
, Another significant change
from the Mat Sihanouk years is,
the organization of several polit-
ical parties now under way. For
several years, there had been
only the Sangkum party, which
had its factions but no external
opposition.
It was growing dissatisfaction
within the Sangkum, however,
over the country's stagnating
economy and the government's
increasing deficits that forced
Prince Sihanouk to install Lou
Nol as premier last August in..
what the prince called "the gov-
ernment of SalvatiOn.", '
Those problems remain,
erbated by, the straths,of war. ,
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
18 August 1970
VOL. CLXX:VI NO. 35
Turn for the Good?
It Has Its Troubles,
But Cambodia Proves
It's Not Any Pushover
Hanoi Said to Be Too Weak
� To Fight Two Wars; Meets
'An Unexpected Resistance'
A Tale of Two Ferryboats,
By PETER R. KANN
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
PHNOM PENH�The Bulgarian embassy
here is a modest villa -furnished with couches
upholstered in plastic leopardskin. Its walls are
decorated with travel posters showing beefy
peasant girls harvesting grapes for the pro-
duction of wines like "Bulgarpiod."
On one wall of the office of the Bulgarian ,
charge d'affaires is a large road map of Cam-
bodia, festooned with several score little red
flags. The flags mark scenes of battle, but the
map is sadly out of date. There, are no red
flags on the towns of Kampot, Kompong Thom,
Kirirom or a dozen other sites of recent com-
bat.
"It is unfortunate," says the . charge
d'affaires, "but we have run out of flags."
The Bulgarians aren't the only ones who
have been unable to keep pace with recent
events in Cambodia. Four months ago Cam-
bodia was the most peaceful and cohesive little
country in Southeast Asia. Today it is barely a
country at all.
� Within two months of the mid-March coup
that toppled Prince Sihanouk, North Vietnam-
ese and Vietcong troops had spread across
most of Cambodia, even occupying the towers
of the ancient Khmer kingdom at Angkor Wat.
Today they are in full control of all of north-
east and most of northern Cambodia�more
than half the country's land area.
Sonic Hope
What's more, the South Vietnamese effec-
tively took control of large parcels of southeast
Cambodia. Thailand currently is debating
when to move troops into western Cambodia,
American and South Vietnamese planes
fly
bombing raids throughout most of the count
as the Cambodian army lumbers from one der',
teat to another in Pepsi-Cola trUcks and gaylY
painted buses.
5
Most of Cambodia's rural population lives
under the control of neither the Communists
nor the new Cambodian government of Pre-
mier Lon Nol. They live in political vaccuume
that are gradually coming to be called "con-
tested areas."
"We are witnessing the Congolization of
Cambodia, a country disintegrating before our
eyes," says a European diplomat. He notes
that the tough and resilient South Vietnamese
have been fighting continually for 30 years, but
still , South Vietnam is in better shape than
Cambodia, which has been at war for only four
Months.
But if Cambodia is far worse off than it was
tour months ago, most observers here now feel
that its prospects of resisting a Communist
takeover look a bit brighter than they did two
months ago. At that time there was talk here of
the siege, and even seizure, of Phnom Penh,
and of the hopeless incompetence of the Cam-
bodian army.
Communist Aim Unclear
Now observers speak of the isolation, rather
than siege, of the capital ("Lon Nol looks
pretty secure as mayor of Phnom Pehn;" says
a Western envoy). They still talk of Cambodian
military incompetence, but the word "hope-
less'i often is dropped ("The Cambodian army
used to run on rumors of a Vietcong attack,
now it only runs when the VC start shooting,"
says a foreign military attache). And they now
tend to stress the problems and weaknesses of
,the Communists, as well as their strengths.
These shifts in attitude may seem overly
subtle. But this is a country where the word
"uncertainty" takes on a definitive ring, where
Westerners resort to humor and cynicism to
try to blot out the tragedy, where an "optimis-
tic military assessment" translates into more
death and destruction for a country that tum-
bled almost by accident into the eye of the In-
dochina war.
It's not entirely clear whether the Commu-
nists' aim has been to topple the Lon Nol gov-
ernment, to pressure it into a sort of accommo-
dation, or simply to gain time while they set
about consolidating vast new sanctuary areas
in the northeast.
"I think Charlie has been hoping to pick up
Cambodia on the quick and cheap, and it hasn't
quite worlEed," says a Western military at-
tache.
A Tough Decision
This official and others now believe the
North Vietnamese face a tough decision.
Should they make Cambodia their top military
priority and concentrate their 35,000 or so com-
bat troops .on conquering the country? Or
should they just continue harassnients to keep
the Cambodians off balance while concentrat-
ing their energy and forces on the war in South
�Vietnam'? Few observers here believe that the
Communists can, at the same time, take all of
Canilbodia and seriously threaten the crucial
southern areas of South Vietnam.
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Several analysts here think the Communists
will concentrate first on Cambodia. They argue
that the enemy for months has been scaling
down to a low-level "protracted war" in most
of South Vietnam and that it's in their interest
to lie low there for another year or two until
U.S. combat troops are gone. They stress the
relative ease with which Communist troops can
win victories in Cambodia, to the extent, they
contend, of toppling the Lou Nol government if
they really try.
The majority of diplomats, however, seem
to be betting the other way. They argue that
Hanoi is committed�both by its ideology and
Its nationalism�to concentrating on winning
the war in South Vietnam. They suggest that
victories over the Cambodian army may be
easily won, but lack the impact of defeats of
South Vietnamese forces or infliction of heavy
casualties on U.S. 'troops. They say the war in
South Vietnam's southern corps areas is cur-
rently going so badly for the Communists that
they must commit more forces there. And they
add that Cambodia will inexorably fall to the'
Communists if the Thieu government can be
defeated in Vietnam.
Moreover, there's a growing realization
here that Cambodia would be no pushover for
the Communists. The dispersal of Communist
forces across so much Cambodian territory al-
ready is said to be causing supply shortages.
More important, the Communists are outsid-
ers�and unpopular ones�in Cambodia. Cam-
bodians traditionally hate Vietnamese of any
sort and have been trying to resist various
Vietnamese invasions for centuries. Here the
Communists cannot follow Chairman Mao's
dictum to move among the people as fish in the
ocean; so far they look more like piranhaa in a
goldfish bowl. Even diplomatic sources
vaguely sympathetic to the Communists set the
number of Cambodians fighting on the same
side with the North Vietnamese and Vietcong
at less than 10,000. Other Western diplomats
say even that figure is twice too high.
Whatever their problems the Communists
are master organizers and have a potent prop-
aganda line in reminding the peasantry that
in the good old Sihanouk days peace reigned in
the rice paddies. And though the Communists
are having only marginal success in turning
the Cambodian conflict into a real civil war,
the Lon Nol government�despite some signs of
growing competence�is hardly moving to win
mass allegiance in the countryside.
The New Helmet
The new government has strong support
among organized urban groups: Army, civil
service, Students, intellectuals, businessmen
and, some say,, the Buddhist clergy. Civil ser-
vants in, paramilitary dress walk proudly
around the city. Nearly everyone in the capital
wears some ,scrap of military uniform, includ-
ing the teenyboppers who outfit themselves in
khaki bell-bottom slacks. It's not unusual to
find a portly Cambodian soldier beaming with
pride as he sits down to dinner at a French
restaurant with a new steel helmet perched on ,
his head. Other soldiers then wander by his 1
table to admiringly tap the new helmet. .
6
All this esprit fades rapidly as one leaves
the capital. Only 20 miles away is the town of
Sating, four times battled over and now largely
In ruins. All but a few score of its 2,000 inhabi-
tants have fled. A Cambodian battalion, com-
manded by a major who was teaching primary
school three months ago, is based in Saang.
Three kilometers down the road the Vietcong
are taxing, propagandizing and conscripting
villagers. The VC have been there for three
months.
It is midafternoon and the Cambodian bat-
talion has scattered to sleep among the
'charred remains of shops and homes. The pro-
prietor of a soft drink cart seems to be doing
a booming business selling limeade to the
troops, but he says he is scared and plans
to leave.
Between attacks the Vietcong send small pa-
trols to snipe at the Cambodian troops, most of
whom are barefoot. The Cambodians also send
out occasional patrols, but they never venture
farther than two kilometers from Saang. The
schoolteacher major seems perplexed when
asked why his troops don't venture one kilome-
ter farther to harass the enemy. "We are wait-
ing for heavy rains so the countryside will
flood. Then perhaps the Vietcong will move to
high ground, and maybe we can find some
boats and attack them," he finally replies.
While he talks, a chicken runs across his feet.
It is by fax the most animated creature in
Saang.
Saang notwithstanding, the Cambodian
army is starting to dght.better. Observers here
are impressed with the personal courage of
Cambodian soldiers, willing to go into battle
with ancient weapons, inadequate ammunition
and negligible training against experienced
Communist troops with superior firepower.
!Many Cambodian retreats have been incon-
testable cases of discretion being the better
apart of valor.
The Cambodian army is greatly expanded
�from 35,000 troops four months ago to about
150,000 now, though fewer than 100,000 have
any arms at all and fewer yet have anything
approaching military training: But, even at its
,best, the army is fighting a defensive, urban-
toriented War, trying to prevent the enemy from
'occupying or harassing towns.
Admirable Calmness?
Politically, the Lon Nol goverr-aent has dis-
played what diplomats consider a. suprising de-
gree of internal unity. The national crisis
seems to be keeping personal politicking at a
every low level, and the Phnom Penh rumor
mill is devoid of coup scares. "The coup stage
will come later, after the colonels have won a
few battles," says one European envoy.
Some diplomats also credit the government
with admirable calinness in a situation where
many men might panic. Other analysts attrilk"
ute the seeming composure to simple Cambo-
dian inertia. War or no war, government of-,
flees still close for the day hy 2 p.m. and cabi-
net ministers are easily located in Phnom
Penh's few good French restaurants after.
dark.
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In its relations with outside world, Cain-
bodia has displayed both sagacity and naivete.
It has wisely managed to maintain at least the
pretense of neutrality by avoiding any formal
military alliances with its South Vietnamese
and Thai neighbors.
The Cambodians, however, have been wildly
over-optimistic in their expectations of Ameri-
can military assistance. To date the U.S. has
provided only captured Communist weapons
and $8.9 million worth of radios, trucks, car-
bines and other modest equipment. The U.S.
presence in Phnom Penh is still so "low pro-
file" that there is no American ambassador,
and a senior member of the American mission
travels by pedicab from the tiny hotel room
where he lives to the cramped little office
where he works.
The U.S. has been so tightfisted that when
two Cambodian ferryboats were sunk by the
Vietcong and later raised through American ef-
forts, they were towed off to South Vietnam.
The ferries sat in South Vietnam for nearly two
months because some U.S. Navy officials there
hoped to trade them back to the Cambodians
for an American river patrol boat that the
Cambodians had captured inside Cambodia
during the Sihanouk days. The total value of
the river patrol boat, Which the Cambodians
presumably need more than the Americans
anyway, is less than go,000. Yet for Om
months Cambodian military and civilian traffic
was hampered by lack of ferries on the Mekong
River. The ferries finally were returned late
last month and the Cambodians, it seems, will
get to keep the patrol boat�the only one in
their navy.
American pennypinching is difficult for the
Cambodians to comprehend, particularly when
they look at U.S. extravagance in Vietnam,
where $8.9 million can be expended on artillery
shells and bombs in a single day. Cambodian
officials who had expected American bases and
;combat troops and a Cornucopian outpouring of
airplanes, helicopters and other wondrous
Weaponry, now find themselves being turned'
down on a request for 100,000 ponchos to keep
their troops covered in the monsoon rains. ,
1,
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1970
MIDEAST CEASEFIRE
A ceasefire between the UAR and Israel became effective at 2200
GMT, 7 August 1970. An integral part of the ceasefire on the UAR-
Israeli front is a military standstill to be effective 50 kilometers
wide on each side of the ceasefire line. This arrangement was made
only for the Israel/UAR front because the UAR was the only country to
repudiate the ceasefire resolutions of 1967; therefore the Suez
Canal represents the main military front. On the Jordanian and Syrian
fronts the 1967 ceasefire agreements still apply; these agreements have
not been renounced by Syria and Jordan.
Subsequent to the announcement of the ceasefire U Thant reacti-
vated the mission of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring to work
for a peace settlement under UN Security Council Resolution 242, dated
22 November 1967. Jarring, at this writing, is consulting with the
UAR, Jordan and Israel to initiate political talks. The principles
of the UN Security Council resolution are: Israeli withdrawal from
occupied Arab territories; the right of Israel and other countries of
the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
a just settlement of the refugee problem; and a guarantee of terri-
torial inviolability.
An irritant to the ceasefire and to political talks will be the
activities of the 'fedayeen'. The Ifedayeen' do not want peace, they
do not seek peace and to them the idea of a ceasefire is anathema;
their aim is to destroy Israel. Nonetheless, in spite of their
capabilities for raids and harassment they have no political base
and there is some reason to believe Arab governments may ignore
military actions between them and Israelis as long as Arab interest
in maintaining the ceasefire continues. Nasir has deprived Palestinian
organizations in Cairo of radio frequencies and broadcast facilities.
Nasir's foreign policy publicist Mohammad Heykal, editor of Al-Al-hram,
in his influential Friday column on 7 April, wrote that the Palestinian
organizations could not possibly liberate Palestine "from the river
to the sea." Heykal discredited the comparison often made between the
Palestinian and Algerian situations and said that liberation was
possible in Algeria, but was not possible in Palestine.
Iraq opposes the ceasefire. Iraq opposes the UAR policy of
acceptance of the ceasefire. The USSR has failed to change the
Iraqi attitude. Historically, Iraq has always opposed Israel and,
technically, has been at war with Israel since the first Arab-
Israeli war. Iraq has no common border with Israel and Baghdad is
600 miles from Tel Aviv. Syria has given lip service to opposing
the ceasefire but has privately let it be known that it will support
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the UAR position.
Gunnar Jarring is trying to bring Israel and Egypt to a meeting
place; Israel wants the talks to be conducted by Foreign Ministers and
has suggested Cyprus as the conference site. Jordan and Egypt want
negotiations to start at a lower level, an Ambassadorial level with
New York as the site and with the option of upping the level of partic-
ipation to include Foreign Ministers who will likely be in New York
for the UN General Assembly beginning 15 September.
21 September is the half-way point of the ceasefire period.
2
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September 1970
Distinguishing the Palestinian Commando Organizations
All Palestinian commando organizations have the same basic aims:
(a) the regaining of all of Palestine, including present-day Israel, and
the establishment of a Palestine state which would include Muslims, Christ-
ians, and Jews; and (b) the rejection of a peaceful solution of the Arab-
Israeli impasse, and the use of armed force as the chief weapon against
Israel.
The Major Palestinian Organizations:
1. The Palestine Liberation Movement (Fatah), the largest commando
organization, has no special allegiance to any particular state or political
party. In contrast, other major commando groups are sponsored by either an
Arab government or a political party (sometimes both).
2. The nucleus of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) comes from the George Habbash wing of the leftist Arab Nationalist
Movement (ANM). The ANM's more extreme Marxist-Leninist faction, led by
Nayif Hawatmah, controls the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PDFLP).
3. The Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War and its military arm, al-
Saiqa, are sponsored and controlled by the Syrian Government and the Syrian
Ba'th Party.
The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was created by the Iraqi Government
and the Iraqi Ba'th Party.
5, The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by
the Arab Summit conference as a quasi-governmental organization. It has a
regular army of its own, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and a commando
unit, the Popular Liberation Forces, which was formed after the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war.
In February 1969, after al Fatah succeeded in taking over its control,
the PLO began to fundtion as an umbrella for the various commando organiza-
tions and other Palestinian groups. Its Palestine Armed Struggle Command
(PASC) coordinates the release of information concerning fedayeen commando
operations, and is also to coordinate their military activities. PASC now
includes eight commando organizations. The PFLP is the only.major fedayeen
group which has not yet joined and which still continues to operate inde-
pendently of PASC. Efforts are being made to bring PFLP into both the PLO
and PASC, but so far no agreement has been reached..
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Differences between the Commandos:
1. Party affiliations and sponsorship.
Arab governments sponsoring commando groups have tended to give their
time and effort to their own rather than to Fatah and other groups. They
have also been auspicious of commandos sponsored by a rival government or
political party and have at. times deported them or curtailed their activities.
2. Nature of cooperation.
Disagreements have arisen over reorganizing the PLO and over representa-
tion.in that body. Fatah favors proportional representation, depending on
the size of the commando organization, and is against equal votes for each
commando group because tbe,small groups could then paralyze action with their
veto'.
3. Smaller vs. larger groups.
Fatah is against the formation of smaller groups because it feels that
these are being used to sap the energy of the bigger organizations. In con-
trast, the small commando groups feel that they serve a useful purpose and
reflect differences of opinion.
4. Class struggle.
Most commando groups consider themselves representative of progressive
national liberation movements. The PDFLP believes that the commandos should
only include the workers and peasants-because of the collusion between im-
perialism and the big bourgeoisie. Fatah believes that this class limitation
would weaken the movement and that Marx's class breakdown is not applicable
to the Palestinian situation anyway.
5. Palestinian vs. Pan-Arab movement.
Some groups such as the ALF emphasize the Pan-Arab nature of the struggle.
Others such as Fatah consider the conflict as primarily a Palestinian one
linked with the Arab revolution.
6. PFLP strategy.
Although the commandos sympathize with any attacks against Zionist, im-
perialist, and Israeli interests, only the PFLP has engaged in terrorism
against these targets abroad. Fatah has registered its opposition to those
activities, and at this time the PFLP is alone among the commando groups in
undertaking them.
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(
(
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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R.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY September 1970
DATES WORTH NOTING
September 6 - 10 Lusaka, Zambia
Non-aligned Nations Conference; organized
at last session of UN General Assembly
to determine, prior to UNGA session in
September, common positions among non-
aligned states on world issues. Last
such meeting was in 1964.
September 7 - 17 Fontana, Wisconsin Annual Pugwash International Conference,
Brings together Scientists from East
and West.
September 11 Peking One year ago Premiers Kosygin and Chou
En=lai met at Peking airport in attempt
to cool tensions between two communist
countries. Agreement was reached to
begin talks on settling border problems
but after a year of intermittent and
desultory meetings no solutions have
been found.
September 15 New York City
September 21 - 29 Prague
UN General Assembly convenes. This
will be 25th session. Celebrations on
25th anniversary will be held 14 - 24
October. About 50 heads of State or
Prime Ministers will attend, including
Nixon, Kosygin, and Heath.
Arab-European Seminar on Middle East,
sponsored by communist World Federation of
Trade Unions.
September 25 - 27 Belgrade Executive Council meeting of communist
World Federation of Scientific Workers,
September 28 -
October 1 Varna, Bulgaria
October 1
October 3
2nd International Conference on Problems
of Young Workers, sponsored by communist
World Federation of Trade Unions.
Peking Peoples Republic of China National Day.
Paris 25th anniversary of the Founding of World
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Founded
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in 19-45 as an organization for international
labor cooperation, it was subverted by the
Communist members who took complete control
in 1949 and turned the WFTU into an instru-
ment of Soviet foreign policy. The non-
communist members withdrew and formed the
International Conference of Free Trade
Unions.
October 10
October 16 - 18
Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China National Day.
New Delhi Presidential Committee meeting of the
communist World Council of Peace.
October 19 Japan Anniversary of the signing of a protocol
in 1956 by the USSR and Japan ending
the state of war. The protocol, signed
in lieu of a peace treaty, left hanging
the question of the Kuril Islands which
the USSR seized in the closing days of
World War II and now refuses to return.
2
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Page 4
THE N.47701V4L OBSERVER
Monday, July 27, 1970
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ISRAEL
POPULATION: 2,900,000
Tel Aviv*
SUEZ CANAL Jerusalem
Alexandria �
Great Bitter Lake
14 FREIGHTERS
REMAIN TRAPPED
Cairo
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