CARTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 1951-1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05875316
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 123
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02620
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972

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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF
ITlid Directorate of Intelligence
Historical Series
CARTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1951-1970
-Secret�
OBGI-13
December 1972
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THE DDI HISTORICAL SERIES
OBGI-13
CARTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1951-1970
by
December 1972
John Kerry King
Director
Basic and Geographic Intelligence
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Contents
Page
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I. Introduction 1
II. Where Things Stood in 1951 6
A. The Earliest Current
Intelligence Publications
B. Cartographic and Graphics Units � �
III. Shakedown, 1952-1953 18
A. Map Production
B. The Special Support Branch (GC/X) 20
C. Lack of Administrative Unity 21
IV. The.Eisenhower Years, 1953-1960 � � 25
18
A. Graphics .for the New President . . . 25
B. Jurisdictional�Disputes and OCI
Graphics 27
C. Technical Advances 34
\
V. The Kennedy and Early Johnson
Administrations, 1961-1965
39
A. The New Frontier 39
B. Move to Headquarters Building . � . 40
C. The Crisis, USSR/Cuba 42
D. New Tasks for Cartographic Support 46
E. Consolidation 49
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Page
F. DCI Raborn's Influence on Graphics . 57
G. India-Pakistan War, 1965 62
VI. Growing Pains, 1966-1967 66
A. Searching for Simplicity 66
B. A Unique Cartographic Form 68
C. A Cartographic Analysis of a
Soviet Activity 71
D. The Search for Better Design 73
E. Miscellaneous Chores . .. 75
VII. Case Studies, 1968-1970 79
A. The Production Machinery 79
B. .The Three-layered CIB 84
c. The President's Quarterly Report 86
D. Automated Mapping Applications � � 88
E. Vietnam Coverage 89
F. Reorganization and Consolidation,
1970 91
VIII. Conclusion 94
Appendix
Source References 97
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Illustrations
Page
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
1. The First Use of a Map in the
Current Intelligence Bulletin
(5 August 1951)
2. Cartographic and Graphic Units
in OCI, ORE ORR, and OBGI,
1946-70
3. Example of a Map as Used
in the Current Intelligence
Bulletin
105
106
107
4. Central Intelligence Bulletin
Frontispiece Map 108
. A Typical Map in Current
Intelligence Weekly Review in
the Late 1950's
6. A Map From the Central Intel-
ligence Bulletin in Early 1965
7. Example of a Map Made for a DDSU
. Report in the Early 1960's . .
8. The "Boundary Map" of Vietnam
Printed in
1964-65
9. Monthly Production Rate in the
All-Source Branch, 1951-70 . .
10. A Typical Map Routinely
Prepared to Depict Military
Activity in Crisis Areas
Figure 11.
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. . 114
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Figure 12. The First Map Drawn by Computer
Figure 13. A Typical Central Intelligence
Bulletin Map in 1970
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CARTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT TO CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE, 1951-1970
I. Introduction
Current intelligence is a primary concern of
the CIA and has been of great interest to the
White House ever since the central intelligence
concept was adopted in 1946. A number of differ-
ent publications and a variety of other means have
been used to convey current information, with maps
and graphics playing an increasingly important
role over the years. The Cartography Division
(CD) has been associated with current intelligence
publications since 1951, and in a particularly
intimate way since 1965, designing and producing
thousands of maps and graphics to illustrate the
spatial aspects of current event's.
This monograph traces the Cartography
Division's participation in current intelligence
activities. It will show how the need for the use
of ever more all-source materials, for greater
speed in production, and for greater simplicity in
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format became a pervasive force which required
ever increasing sophistication on the part of map
producers and consumers alike. Running parallel
to this will be the story of how several quasi-
independent and often competing graphics groups
associated with current intelligence in one way or
another were slowly but surely brought together by
1970 in the interest of administrative efficiency.
By and large, CIA's top management has
always encouraged high-quality graphics products,
and in the Cartography Division it has had a team
of motivated professional cartographers accustomed
to be in the lead in their field.. In 1951, a very
small group of cartographers was separated from
the main unit, then called the Cartography Branch,
to service the special requirements of offices
within the Special Center. There, for over 19
years, it grew in importance and responsibility as
the Agency placed increasingly greater emphasis on
current intelligence production. To many people
within the Center, the small unit was the only
visible portion of the entire Cartography Division,
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though the job it was doing would have been
impossible without the technical and research
support of the larger unit. First as the
Cartographic Support Section, then as the Special
Support Branch (GC/X), and later as the All-Source
Branch (CD/X) -- all usually known simply as "X
Branch" or "Graphics" -- the unit turned out tens
of thousands of specialized maps and graphics for
a wide variety of requesters.
There was also a group of artist-
illustrators within the Center, housed in the
Office of Current Intelligence, which had existed
under a similar wide variety of organizational
names, sometimes in one unit, sometimes as separate
units. The identity of these units was often
confused with the All-Source Branch by casual
observers. The responsibilities and methods of
operating of the two groups were quite dissimilar,
however, and the story of their relationships with
each other prior to their merger into one unit in
1965 is an essential part of this monograph.
After the merger, a symbiotic effect occurred
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between the two professions -- artists and cartog-
raphers -- that enabled the All-Source Branch
(called CD/X after the merger) to achieve
considerable acclaim in the production of high-
quality specialty maps and graphics.
Throughout the period, the search for better
methods of communicating vital information with an
accent on brevity spurred an increased reliance
upon graphics to tell essential parts of the story.
Significant advances in cartographic technology,
international crises requiring particular kinds of
graphic products, and the strongly stated personal
preferences of highly placed individuals -- in-
cluding Presidents and Directors -- caused profound
changes in the way things were done. No senior
official was more influential in this respect than
Mr. Richard Helms, both as Deputy Director and as
Director of Central Intelligence. His pointed
comments and continuing interest in effective
graphics led to the development of several unique
publications for the use of the President containing
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information of the Most vital nature and relying
extensively on maps and graphics to portray it.
At the beginning of the period, in 1951, the
noun "graphic" -- meaning a picture, map, or
diagram used as an illustration -- did not even
appear in dictionaries. At the conclusion of the
period, in 1970, graphics were an integral part of
every major Agency publication, contributing in a
major way to fulfilling the DCI's responsibility
to inform the government on the significance of
events taking place around the world.
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II. Where Things Stood in 1951 ,
A. The Earliest Current Intelligence Publications
President Truman's penchant for conciseness
caused him to rebel at the mass of material
crossing his desk dealing with intelligence in one
way or another. In January 1946 he called upon
Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of Central
Intelligence in the newly created Central
Intelligence Group, to have prepared for him a
daily selection of items coming into Washington
from all sources which would serve as a summary of
the really important matters he should be aware
of. 1/* The advent of the first such selection on
15 February 1946 put Central Intelligence squarely
into the business of producing current intelligence
reports for high-level consumers'. Even so,
Secretary of State Byrnes immediately protested
that the daily Intelligence Summary was an invasion
of his prerogatives. The President held firm, and
*For serially numbered source references see Appendix.
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the National Intelligence Authority later made the
preparation of such a summary mandatory. 2/
A small Central Reports Staff in the Office
of Reports and Estimates (ORE) produced the
President's Intelligence Summary, with support
from all other parts of the Office. In December
1949 another group -- ORE's General Division, set
up for the specific purpose of handling COMINT
material -- also began to produce a current intel-
ligence publication. Following General Walter
Bedell Smith's reorganization of the Agency when
he became DCI in late 1950, two separate groups
continued to prepare two separate dailies -- one a
COMINT-only edition and one a collateral-only
edition. This arrangement satisfied no one, and
on 15 January 1951 the Office of Current
Intelligence (OCI) was set up to produce current
intelligence based upon facts and figures marshaled
from all sources. Headed by Mr. Kingman Douglass,
it consolidated the two predecessor groups.
In late 1951, Mr. Douglass described the
activities of his Office as follows:
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1. Prepares a daily, high-level bulletin
for the President and a half-dozen
other officials.
2. Responsible for daily briefing of the
President and the DCI.
3. Maintains a Situation Room in which maps
and charts of key areas and important
developments in many fields affecting
national security are kept up to date.
4. Publishes a Daily Digest for general
use; two weekly sumniaries dealing with
developments of current importance;
and periodic intelligence memoranda
collating the most recent information
on vital situations. 3/
The Current Intelligence Bulletin (the "CIB")
got off to an auspicious start in 1951. The first
edition was flown to President Truman who was
vacationing in Florida. He immediately wrote DCI
Smith, "You have hit the jackpot with this,
Bedell." 4/ By 1952 the publication was going to
the highest levels of government, but though maps
frequently would have been useful, the severe time
restraints posed an almost insuperable barrier to
getting them in.
The first maps appeared in both the daily
Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) and the weekly
Current Intelligence Review (CIR) in August 1951.
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The first CIB map did not appear until the,publi-
cation had been underway for almost
then a map of
was run in the 5 August 1951 edition
(see Figure 1). The first CIR map,
six months,
, was
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included in the third issue, 15 August 1951. These
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maps -- rather crude by cartographic standards -- (W(1)
were made possible by the switchover in printing
from ditto to multilith, an offset process, when
ORE's Intelligence Summary was supplanted by the
CIB. Responsibility for producing this type of
map fell to the artists attached to the Situation
Room Division of OCT.
B. Cartographic and Graphics Units
Rigid security precautions surrounded the
activities of OCI, and as a practical matter it was
not possible to make effective use of the sub-
stantial body of cartographic expertise in the
Geography Division of ORR. The same security
precautions led to the need for providing several
"in-house" graphics facilities and were largely
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responsible for the unorthodox division of labor
that characterized cartographic support to current
intelligence for many years (see Figure 2).
The Cartographic Branch of ORR's Geography
Division was unique in government in the manner in
which it employed professional geographers to
produce special-subject maps. Its know-how
emanated from experience gained over almost 10
years of working together as a team, first in the
Office of Strategic Services, then in the Department
of State, and after 29 December 1947 in CIA. It,
too, had been part of ORE but had become a part of
the Geography Division of ORR as a result of
recommendation to that effect in the Dulles Com-
mittee report. However, it had always been
physically separated from the mainstream of Agency
activity and was perhaps in that, era temperamen-
tally and spiritually unprepared to cope with the
special time constraints imposed by current
intelligence.
OCI, on the other hand, had a group of
artist-illustrators ("
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's Shop") in the
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Technical Branch of its Situation Room Division.
This group formerly had been one-half of a larger
unit which had operated under various names since
GIG days, always working closely with the Director
and his staff on briefing aids, and it was the
only graphics shop in the Agency cleared to handle
COMINT material. Its charter assigned it specific
responsibility to
present in graphic form the all-source
intelligence available in all fields in
support of substantive intelligence meetings
[and] provide all graphics work for permanent
Situation Room displays, as well as maps and
charts for all OCI publications. 5/
For these reasons, it was the unit which produced
the first CIB and CIR maps, even though its roster
contained no cartographers.
The other half of the divided graphics unit
was also composed of
artist-illustrators.
\
This group, known colloquially as "
Shop", had functioned as the Graphics Branch of
ORE for a short while after the split occurred.
The dissolution of ORE left this little unit with
out a home in the managerial area that was to
become the Directorate of Intelligence. It was at
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first slated to become a part of ORR's Publication
Staff, but ORR management decreed that a more
logical place for it would be the Cartographic
Branch. Steps were being taken in early 1951 to
move it there. 6/
The Special Center, therefore, lacked any
readily available cartographic expertise, even
though OCI, the Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI), and the Strategic Division (D/Z) of ORR
were all located there by 1951. Mr.
a GS-11 cartographer with OSS experience,
was tasked by the Chief of the Geography Division -
to set up a production unit in the Special Center
in "Q" Building and perform such liaison functions
and advisory services within the Center a he was
able. It perhaps was not a coincidence that the
request for a special intelligence clearance for
Mr.
was initiated on the exact date (2
August 1951) OCI published the first Current
Intelligence Review, presaging the stress on maps
that was going to come about a few years later.
By October Mr.
had been joined by
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other assignees from the Cartography Branch,
. The
unit was soon formalized as the Cartographic
Support Section of the Cartography Branch. Some
knowledge of the parent branch is necessary to
understand the nature of subsequent events.
The Cartography Branch was comprised of
about people, including "compilers" (professional
geographers trained in cartographic research) and
"draftsmen" (cartographic technicians who turned
the manuscript into a form suitable for printing).
The Branch was self-contained in many respects. It
had been housed since 1950 in a small temporary
building (Building 11) several hundred yards east
of Tempo "Q" near Constitution Avenue and 23rd
Street, N.W. The building had been renovated to
meet Cartographic Branch requirements, and in
recognition of the drastic manner in which heat
and humidity changed sizes and shapes of drawing
materials, it was at the time one of the few
government buildings to be completely air-
conditioned from a central system. The Branch had
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its own file room, its own printshop for making
type and symbols, and its own laboratory for
research into the technical aspects of making
better maps. It-also conducted its own training
course for new employees and in large measure
conducted its own recruitment program. Organi-
zationally, the Branch consisted of six sections:
three compilation sections, a drafting section,
and the recently acquired Graphics Section in
addition to the Cartographic Support Section.
Relationships among the sections varied. The three
compilation sections and the drafting section
worked closely together. The Cartographic Support
Section interacted regularly with both compilation
and drafting because of its liaison function and
because of the lingering associations between its
members and their former colleagues in those
sections. The interaction among these five units
was of extreme importance in the unfolding of
organizational movements which took place during
the next two decades because a high degree of
stability within the organization was retained,
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thus enhancing its ability to cope with changing
conditions in other parts of the Agency.
The Cartographic Support Section spent the
first few months of its existence establishing a
presence in the Special Center (the codeword area
of "Q" Building and other buildings as it expanded).
Acquiring the first items of furniture was a
matter of "scrounging." The unit operated as a
team from the very beginning, with each person
carrying on regular duties but pitching in in times
of crisis to do whatever he was equipped to, do.
Many formal procedures followed in the parent
branch proved to be unnecessary in the smaller
unit, and the easy informality which arose there
became a valued tradition.
At that time the 'Strategic Division (D/Z)
was the only ORR component within the Center. It
was for them that the first map produced by the
new section was done:
All the data added, including all
type, was hand done. The second map was also an
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overprint to a base. The third map produced was
in fact the first map requested. 8/ It was
prepared for an economic study
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t, too, was an
overprint to an existing base. The black plate
was out of register by 1/10" and the green plate
by 1/20". The type was prepared by an ingenious
("perditious," according to ) device (b)(3)
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called an imprinter which employed letters placed
into a roller and rolled across the face of the
map to imprint the words in the correct location.
These maps were remarkable achievements
considering the conditions under which they were
done, but their crudeness was unacceptable to the
cartographer. It was soon decided to overcome the
security problem by scrambling type orders and
having the type prepared in Building 11. Printing
quality was another matter, however, because
facilities within the Center were very limited.
The small printing plant in Tempo "Q" was inde-
pendent of the main printing facility in South
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Building. It was originally set up to service the
General Division of ORE and had made a paper
transfer to the Office of National Estimates (ONE)
for a short time before ending up in OCI. It
would not be made a part of the Printing and
Reproduction Division until late 1952. The
staff operating the multilith equipment
did the black text and red classifications simulta-
neously. 9/ They had also learned to overprint
small base maps procured in quantity from the
Geographic Division with story overlay plates
prepared on multilith masters by an artist or
cartographer using a pencil. Maps too large or
too complex for this technique were carried to the
main plant and printed overnight by specially
cleared personnel. 10/ These are only a few
examples of the many improvisations, made one
after the other, that make up the story of graphics
activities throughout the early years in the
Special Center. They were essential because
stringent security precautions put established
facilities and procedures out of reach.
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III. Shakedown, 1952-1953
A. Map Production
The Cartographic Support Section provided
their first CIB map 11/ on 18 January 1952, using
an overprinting technique. It was to make this
CIB item more meaningful:
Comment on new travel
restrictions in the USSR:
The Soviet Government has enlarged the
restricted travel area for foreign diplomats
to include key localities in the vicinity of
Moscow as well as twenty-two cities in
European Russia and Siberia. This action
has the effect of further limiting foreign
knowledge of defensive, installations sur-
rounding Moscow. Five of the cities are
located on the Trans-Siberian railroad west
of Lake Baikal. With these additions to
previous restrictions, all possibility of
observing this main artery for the supply of
� war materials and industrial goods to the
� Far East and the Korean front is eliminated.
(See map on following page'.)
The overprinting method proved satisfactory,
and a series of several dozen unclassified bases
was put into production in Building 11 to be
available
known as "
for use in the CIB. These were generally
maps", after their sponsor, Mr.
of the OCI Situation Room Division.
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The CIB of 21 February 1952 contained the first
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production model of this series, depicting (b)(3)
(see Figure 3). The (b)(1)
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overlay was prepared in the OCI Technical Branch
using a typewriter for names and a compass to
draw circles. The technique continued to be used
for the next two years until the printing plant
acquired the equipment to print maps from scratch.
The weekly CIR began to contain both maps and
graphics in every issue by early 1953, produced by
both OCI's Technical Branch and Cartography
Division's Special Support Branch.
An examination of Agency publications before
this period reveals surprisingly few instances of
maps being used to depict current intelligence
situations, even in the case of Korea. This is in
such stark contrast to the peribd some years later
when
maps a day on Vietnam alone
were commonplace that it gives cause to seek the
reasons. Technical restraints were undoubtedly an
important factor, but there existed means to over-
come that hurdle if a strong enough demand had
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arisen. It seems in retrospect that the disjointed
character and jumbled administrative control of the
Agency's graphic and cartographic production
resources would have hampered any efforts that
might have been put forth.
B. The Special Support Branch (GC/X)
, ORR was reorganized in July 1952, and the
name of the Cartography Branch was changed to
.Cartography Division. The Cartographic Support
GenSection became the Special Support
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Branch (GC/X). It was initially headed by Mr.
, who left "X" to return to Building
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11 as Chief of the Europe-Africa Branch in
November 1952. Miss took his
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GC/X worked very closely with OCI during
most of the summer helping to plot intelligence
information on large wall maps in the Situation
Room. In the monthly report for August 1952 Mr.
, the Cartography Division Chief, (b)(3)
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reported that "the Special Support Branch is well
organized and can accept requests with confidence."
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In October it did
(b)(3)
maps for a Presidential (b)(3)
handbook under a short deadline. In November
the entire Division did a series of maps, co-
ordinated by OCI, for the use of President-elect
Eisenhower. .
C. Lack of Administrative Unity
The lack of administrative unity in graphic
matters was readily apparent within the Special
Center.
to OCI;
and
GC/X of ORR provided cartographic support
it also provided maps and graphics to OSI
of ORR. The Technical Branch of
OCI prepared maps and graphics for publications,
maintained the Situation Room displays, and pro-
vided visual aids for the DCI and other high-level
Agency officials. 12/ There was a clear (or
rather, unclear) area of overlap between the two
units.
Outside the Special Center, the Cartography
Division was not only fulfilling its unique
responsibility to produce maps requiring carto-
graphic research but also had under its wing a
Graphic Branch which in many respects overlapped
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and even competed with OCI's Technical Branch.
This unit ("
's Shop," see section B of
Chapter II, above) had been grafted onto the old
Cartographic Branch as the Graphics Section in
February 1951. It is essential to understand the
shotgun-marriage nature of this union in order to
understand two subsequent mergers in 1954 and
1965. A substantially accurate account of it was
compiled for an earlier history.
For some time in the Agency there was a
group called the Graphics Branch which had
been shifted from one office to another
....Because they worked for the Agency as a
whole and they did not fit in logically with
any special group, no one wanted to join
with them just for administrative purposes.
Periodically, the Geographic Division had
been approached regarding possible placement
of the Graphics Section within its organi-
zation. However, they always expressed
unwillingness to such a transfer because a
'large part of the Graphics Section's work
was neither cartographic nor geographic in
character.' In a memo to, Millikan, AD/RR,
on January 18, 1951, the Advisor for
Management apparently suggested, possibly
as a final resort, that they should put the
group in the Publications Branch, ORR. (The
Advisor for Management wanted the group in
ORR, but the main discussion was where, in
ORR.) Before this change could be effected,
the D/G finally yielded because 'it has
become increasingly evident however, that
certain advantages to CIA would accrue from
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a transfer of this section to the Cartography
Branch, D/G...also understood that your Staff
is desirous of recommending such action.'
Furthermore, it was to be agreed that DIG
would have the same 'substantive control
over graphics and art work performed for all
requesters that it now has over cartographic
production".' Thereupon, the AD/RR suggested
to the Advisor for Management that the group
be transferred to the Cartography Branch
rather than to the Publications Branch as
stated in the previous memo. The reasons
given were that the work of the Section is
'basically dissimilar' to the Publications
Branch, and direction should rest on a
branch with similar functions. 13/
On 27 February 1951 the Geographic Division
officially "took in" the Graphics Branch admin-
istratively. This could not be called a proper
"merger," because although there was now one unit
where formerly there had been two, each continued
to do its own. work.
The lack of a coordinated effort between
ORR's Graphics Section (nee Graphics Branch) and
�
OCI's Technical Branch, both performing the same
kind of work, troubled the Chief of the Cartog-
raphy Branch, Mr.
, who mentioned
in the Branch's monthly report 14/ the need for a
solution to the "total graphics picture" and for
several months running stressed the need for a
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survey of the graphics facilities in the Agency.
Such a survey took place in late 1952. Covering
10 separate graphics facilities in the Agency, the
survey report Roted that "The Deputy Director
(Intelligence) has requested additional graphics
within OCI publications that exceed [OCI's] capa-
bilities." It went on to recommend consolidation
of the units which lent themselves to it under the
"ORR Cartography Division of the Agency," since
it was believed that the "Graphics Branch, of ORR
more closely approximates that of a central serv-
ice than any other facility." 15/ Management did
not accept this recommendation, apparently leaning
more toward the findings of a similar survey in
1950 which concluded that "centralization of
graphic facilities would in no way assist offices
affected," although "one building housing all CIA
activities would lend itself to [such] consolidation."
It would be another yeai before serious attempts
toward resolving the "graphics problem" would
begin anew.
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IV. The Eisenhower Years, 1953-1960
A. Graphics for the New President
President Eisenhower had been made acquainted
with the CIA during the 1952 election campaign.
President Truman had ordered that both candidates
be given periodic briefings, and the Cartography
Division had prepared some of the base maps that
were used by OCI Technical Branch in making the
presentation material.
With the change in administration, a
grandiose scheme was undertaken at OCI s request
to prepare. for the White House a series of maps
of the regions Of the world on hand-painted
panels, using enamel paint, which would be
instantly available for briefi;lg purposes. 16/
The project required a maximum coordinated effort
from both OCI Technical Branch and ORR Cartography
Divj.sion which sadly turned out to be largely
wasted because the White House decided the maps
were too cumbersome to be usable. Abortive
efforts of this kind subsequently proved to be
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common with every changeover in administrations,
but they illustrate the intense desire on the part
of Agency people to provide a new president with
useful information. Uncertainty reigns at the
early stages of an administration about both the
substance of the needed intelligence and the form
it should take.
Eisenhower was known to prefer oral
briefings over having to read reports. Both DCI
Smith and DCI Dulles made frequent trips to the
White House for these oral briefings, carrying
large briefing panels made by either the OCI
Technical Branch or the Graphics Branch in the
Cartography Division. The President had
additional contact with the Agency through both
the CIB and the National Security Council. 17/
Presidential assistant Sherman Adams related
Ready for him (the President) when he
arrived [in his office each morning] were
the latest State Department, CIA and
military intelligence reports and the
staff secretary, at first General Carroll
and later General Goodpaster, would be on
hand to give him the essentials in all the
various intelligence information [see
Figure 4]. Once a week the White House
staff was briefed by the CIA and at the
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and the
headed by Mr. were engaged in un-
healthy competition. Moreover, the Graphic Branch
never did fit in very well with the rest of the
Cartography Division, which it had joined by
default. The artists and the cartographers got
(b)(3)
weekly National Security Council meetings
the President listened to another summary
of top-secret world developments by Allen
Dulles, the CIA head. 18/
A quickening interest in maps and graphics
was quite evident during Eisenhower's administration.
The considerable concern over the Nationalist China-
Communist China problem caused large numbers of
maps to be prepared on the Taiwan Straits and the
offshore islands. Berlin and the Middle East area
underwent recurring crises. It appeared to members
of "X" Branch that a conspiracy was afoot to keep
at least one hotspot going all the time, to which
they had to respond with overtime.
B. Jurisdictional Disputes and OCI Graphics
It became increasingly evident in
the OCI Technical Branch headed by Mr.
Cartography Division Graphic
1954 that (b)(3)
(b)(6)
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along very well socially and as individuals, but
t was clearly evident to everyone that they
marched to different drumbeats professionally.
Finally, in August 1954, the Chief of the Carto-
graphy Division met on several occasions with
members of the DDI's Office and the Situation Room
Division of OCI, 19/ and by November an agreement
had been reached for the transfer of the Graphic
Branch to OCI. Mr. expressed high praise
for the departing unit and its chief and commended
their contributions to the support of the Division.
He noted that the Branch had shown marked improve-
ment over the past several years, and he believed
that it would contribute greatly toward the
creation of an effective DDI graphics unit.
The official notice of the change was issued
on 4 January 1955.
It read as follows:
1. The Technical Branch, OCI and Graphics
Branch, ORR, have been consolidated into the
Graphics Branch, Presentations Division,
with offices in Room
2. The mission of the new branch includes
analysis and production of graphics for all
the DDI offices, but excludes cartography,
which will continue in ORR.
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3. Mr. has been designated
Chief of the new Graphics Branch. 20/
The new Graphics Branch came immediately to
be known as "OCI Graphics." Soon after its
official establishment, which was more than two
months after the fact, a new version of the
Current Intelligence Weekly Review went into
production. In a foreword to his new publication,
Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon, Assistant Director for
Current Intelligence, described it as being
the first number of a new weekly Code Word
publication of the Office of Current Intel-
ligence which replaces the Current Intelli-
gence Review, the Situation Summary and
Critical Situations. '21/
It was to consist of four parts: a summary; "Of
Immediate Interest"; "Notes and Comments," dealing
with less urgent situations; and an analysis of
long-term trends.
Graphics- and maps were going to be
increasingly important for the new Weekly, but new
jurisdictional disputes between Cartography
Division and OCI Graphics were in the. making. In
the third issue of the new Weekly,
maps and a
chart appeared, all prepared by OCI Graphics.
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Professional sensibilities in the Cartography
Division were pricked by what they regarded as
poor map work. The matter was discussed at the
Branch level and thought to be resolved several
months later when Miss
reported that
(b)(3)
when we take over map work for the Weekly
we will handle all liaison with editors and
staff of the Weekly instead of going through
0/CI Graphics. 22/
A shock was in store, because the "take over" of
Weekly map production was not to be an accomplished
fact for some time to come. In two _separate
notices, OCI addressed the issue without clarifying
the hazy areas of responsibility. For example, on
13 June 1955 OCI announced:
Effective this date, the Chief,
Presentations Division, in carrying out his
responsibilities for the production of
illustrations (graphic and cartographic) for
0/CI publications, may call on either Graphics
Branch, Presentations Division, 0/CI, or the
Special Support Branch, Cartography Division,
0/RR, as appropriate. 25/
The jurisdictional confusion still existed
in August:
cut directives is the primary cause of the
problem." 24/ A second OCI notice in September
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(b)(6)
wrote that "the lack of clear- (b)(3)
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concerned the overall problem but failed to address
the issue that was of interest to the principals.
1. Purpose These standing procedures
are issued to prevent publication of in-
adequately conceived and executed graphics
in illustration of articles published by 0/CI
in its Current Intelligence Weekly Review
(CIWR) and Current Intelligence Weekly
Summary (CIWS).
2. Scope This regulation applies to
A 0/CI. copy has been transmitted to AD's
of other offices contributing illustrated
articles to the CIWR and CIWS, with request
for their issue of similar instructions
within their offices.
3. Responsibility� [Describes respon-
sibility of author-analyst for correctness
of data and for making sure the graphic is
in accord with the concept originally
approved by the 0/CI Publications Board.]
4. Procedure fDescribes the channels
for requesting a graphic and includes a
sample request form.] 25/
The first step in the procedure described in
paragraph 4 of the regulation required the analyst
to obtain the approval of the Chief of the
Presentations Division of OCI for his graphic.
The Presentations Division therefore retained
de facto authority to segment responsibilities as
the Chief saw fit. By December Mr. was (b)(3)
(b)(6)
able to write in the monthly report that
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A meeting with the Chief of the Presentations
Division resulted in a clearer understanding
of relationship between Graphics Branch and
GC/X. 26 /
In a lengthy memo entitled "0/RR Cartographic
Division Views on Responsibility for Artwork in
CIWR," describing the same meeting, the Chief of
the Presentations Division presented the OCI view
as well. Essentially, he said that Mr. (b)(3) -
(b)(6)
was bringing up his concern over a breach in the
understanding that OCI Graphics' field of endeavor
did not include doing maps or "statistical charts,"
which lay within the purview of Cartographic
Division. .
Mr. has received the impression (b)(3)
that the consolidated D/Pres Graphics Branch (b)(6)
would, in essence,�confine its future work
to the production of large-size illustrations
required by various DDI components. All
other artwork was envisioned as the proper
responsibility of 0/RR's Cartographic
Division (and Miss 's Special �Branch (b)(3)
in particular). 27 (b)(6)
He went on to say that the pressures of deadlines
made it mandatory for short-deadline work to be
done in OCI Graphics, whether maps or non-maps,
and that efforts being made to achieve greater
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leadtimes were not particularly fruitful. He
criticized a recent illustration planned and
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
executed by the ' group". (b)(6)
The conception was excellent, but an
otherwise impressive treatment was reduced
in its impact by a 'style' that remained
fussily
simple....
He concluded,
cartographic,
28/
rather than bold and
there is no question
but that Mr.
(b)(3)
feels most strongly
that the Agency's
(b)(6)
interests will best be served if most
conventional CIWR maps are for the most part
produced by his
Division.... 29/
He stated
that, as
a matter of policy, OCI would
give Miss
"first refusal" on all con-
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
ventional maps for the CIWR, OCI appeared
determined to avoid relinquishing any of its
prerogatives.
In April Mr. reported optimistically
that during the past six weeks GC/X had contrib-
uted essentially all maps required for the OCI
Weekly. He viewed this as an encouraging
development which reflected cooperative efforts of
the Branch and OCI. 30/ However, an examination
of the Weeklies during that period reveals that
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the matter was not in fact resolved for several
more months. During
were made by OCI and
were made by OCI and
May,
naps in the Weekly
y GC/X. In June,
by GC/X. By July all
(b)(3)
cartographic work was being done in GC/X, and a
jurisdictional problem that had been in ascendancy
for almost two years was finally resolved.
C. Technical Advances
In the early Eisenhower years, the number of
maps and graphics used in the CIB and the Weekly
grew, but printing plant limitations made these
efforts appear crude. Color work was possible,
though considerable jury rigging was necessary to
get it.
A significant forward step took place in
February 1954 when the printing plant acquired a
Robertson studio camera which made Thoto-offset
printing possible in the Special Center for the,
first time. The first use made of it for a CIB
map was to illustrate the order of battle in
and the adjacent. area of
Terrain hachures showed in green, place names and
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L. boundaries (from the plates to a Cartography
Division map) in black, 17 order-of-battle symbols
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
for enemy
forces in
garrisons at
red, and three symbols for
, and
31/ It was the forerunner
in blue.
to many
over the
similar maps produced on
next 17 years in a constant
attempt to portray the "situation." The map was
a new departure not only in printing technique but
also in that it was cut into the text adjacent to
the.section of the story it illustrated and was a
valuable adjunct.
As soon as the functional separation between
OCI and GC/X became effective, there was a
spectacular upturn in the quality of the graphics
and maps in the Weekly. Under the new arrange-
ment, artists and cartographers -- members of two
different professions -- exclusively did work they
were trained to do, and they collectively became
a part of the team that provided the Weekly
readership with a high-quality publication indeed.
The Weekly was quite voluminous, averaging
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pages of text in the beginning and more than
later on. Map and graphic work was becoming quite
sophisticated (see Figure 5). By the third year
of publication, OCT Graphics was averaging
charts and GC/X maps in each issue. The high
quality of this publication reflected the work
of the OCT Publications Board and its Secretariat
who oversaw the Weekly (and the CIB) down to the
smallest detail. Mr.
, a
staff member
who coordinated the work of the analysts with the
expertise of the artists and cartographers, was a
strong force behind this achievement. 32/
For reasons that are not clear, the juris-
dictional problem that arose with respect to the
Weekly did not spill over to the CIB. OCT Graphics
had exclusive responsibility there and ran a "late
shift", originally with approximately one-half of
A. the work force but later as a
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
operation, (b)(3)
which had as one of its purposes the preparation
of graphics for the CIB. Few charts were required,
but a map or two appeared in almost every issue.
GC/X base plates drawn for a previous Weekly map
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were invariably used by the OCI Graphics late-
shift person who prepared the overlay depicting
the particular event that was being reported (see
Figure 6). The artists who worked the late shift
made no claim to being cartographers and in fact
would have considered being called one a
disparagement. Their training placed a premium on
the quality of visual impact. This led to an
occasional cartographic howler, such as the time
a Mercator projection was used to plot the impact.
points of four Soviet missiles shot into the
Pacific, landing within a few tens of miles of
.each other but on both Sides of the meridian that
bounded the base map. The CIB appeared with an
illustration showing two spots on the left-hand
side of a world map and two on the right-hand side,
separated by almost 25,000 miles.
The Current Intelligence Bulletin was re-
placed by the Central Intelligence Bulletin on 14
January 1958. It differed from the former CIB
principally in that it was fully coordinated
within the community. 33/ Taking into account
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� President Eisenhower's liking for both maps and
brevity, the inside front page of the new CIB
contained a map of the two hemispheres with areas
highlighted where significant events were taking
place, along with one or two short sentences
providing a brief. The front-page map (see Figure
4) proved to be a successful device and was
continued unchanged until President Kennedy set
forth his own distinctly personal requirements.
The story of "X" Branch would be incomplete
without a passing reference to the role it played
in utilizing U-2 photography from the earliest
days. Quite apart from its work on OCI publications,
the Branch undertook the task of using the photo-
graphs to construct maps of Soviet cities about
which there was an almost total lack of first-
hand knowledge since prewar days. It was the
first known attempt to use this new source to
construct large-scale maps. Efforts continued
until the Army Map Service in 1959-60 applied its
vast resources to meeting the requirement for up-
to-date paps of the Soviet Union based on aerial
photography.
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V. The Kennedy and Early Johnson
Administrations, 1961-1965
A. The New Frontier
President Kennedy's voracious appetite for
information was not satisfied by the one-page
briefs that had been done for President Eisenhower.
OCI immediately added to its string a new daily
publication specifically tailored to President
Kennedy's needs. It was called the "Checklist"
and was literally all-source, containing items
such as agent's reports and information derived
from clandestine photography. 34/ The "Checklist"
(later called the President's Daily Brief) contained
an occasional map or chart lifted from the CIB,
but only rarely was an original map done for it.
The "New Frontier" also brought into the
White House offices a number of young intellectuals
who concerned themselves with foreign affairs. In
the early part of the Kennedy administration,
weekly National Security Council briefings by Mr.
Allen W. Dulles, DCI, were still carried on.
According to the usual routine, OCI Graphics
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prepared visual aids for these, and one of the
younger artists was detailed to escort the boards
down to the White House in a station wagon, set
them up in the cabinet room, and stand by outside
until the meeting was over so that he could take
them back to Headquarters. During the transition
period in early 1961, Mr. Dulles walked into an
NSC meeting a few minutes early and saw Mr.
of OCI Graphics standing beside the
briefing boards. He presumed he was another one
of the youthful representatives of the New
Frontier come to learn the state of the world. He
put out his hand and boomed, "Dulles, CIA." Mr.
replied, "Yes, sir, I know. I work for you."(b)(3)
(b)(6)
B. Move to Headquarters Building
Almost coincidental with the beginning of
the Kennedy administration was the Agency's move
to its new building. GC/X moved concurrently
with OCI in the fall of 1961, occupying Room
in the Special Center. These were ordinary
quarters, but they were equipped with a number of
accouterments which improved efficiency. There
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were special light fixtures for added illumination,
a photolab for in-house duplication of master
plates, and a spacious vault for storage.
Several new materials and pieces of
equipment had been uncovered by the Division's
Technical and Construction Branch which enabled
GC/X to become largely self-sufficient in the
preparation of type and certain intermediate
materials required in a cartographic production
shop. 35/ It was becoming more and more a
miniature version of the entire Cartography
Division, operating autonomously in many respects.
OCI Graphics was very kindly treated with
rooms on the
floor having an array of
floor-to-ceiling windows looking across the
Virginia woods into Maryland. It was also con-
veniently located between the OCT editorial
offices and the printing plant which was provided
with excellent facilities. It could handle every
need of both the artists and the cartographers.
Just prior to the move, Mr.
once again
took over the direction of GC/X. Miss
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(b)(3)
had resigned from the Agency in 1960, and Mr.
had acted as Branch Chief during
the period, June 1960-August 1961.
C. The Crisis, USSR/Cuba
GC/X was closely involved in providing
intelligence support during the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962. U-2 photography flown on Sunday,
14 October, showed surface-to-surface missile
sites under construction southwest of Havana.
During the day on Monday, an urgent request came
into "X" Branch from OCI to make a map showing
distances from the sites to the United States. A
manuscript map was hastily prepared and handed
over. At the same time, in another part of the
Division, a query had come in from ORR asking for
the exact distance between pairs of coordinates
in Cuba and Washington, D.C. The range of the
missiles and the distances of the sites from
Washington and other major cities were of most
intense interest during the first few hours after
detection. Some analysts learned for the first
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time that determining distances along earth arcs
is a great deal more complicated than measuring
short distances on a school map. Fortunately,
several individuals in the Division were trained
to cope with this kind of problem, and accurate
determinations were quickly made. Washington lay
at the outer edge of estimated range capabilities
of the type of missile first detected.
On Tuesday, 16 October, Mr.
made a map from scratch which showed distance
relationships between the missile sites and the
United States. 36/ It accompanied a three-page
typescript OCI memo, 37/ believed to be the first
authoritative information disseminated on the
probable Soviet MRBM sites in Cuba though pre-
liminary judgments had gone to the Secretary of
State late Monday night 38/ and to the President
at 9:00 a.m. on the 16th. 39/
During the following ten days, GC/X was
fully occupied with Cuba. Almost half the projects
officially logged in between 16 and 26 October
dealt with it in one way or another, and considerable
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unlogged support was provided to the Situation
Room and to "walk-ins" who needed immediate
cartographic support. The 16 October map had to
be extended three days later when longer range
missiles were detected. After President Kennedy
invoked a quarantine on foreign shipping on 22
October, emphasis shifted from the sites themselves
to the Soviet ships steaming toward the island.
The formal daily situation report called
"The Crisis, USSR/Cuba," prepared for the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council begin-
ning on 24 October, contained surprisingly few
maps. 40/ Only two basic maps were used: one was
a CIB-type map of the island and the missile
complexes done by OCI Graphics; the other was a
reiterative map of the North Atlantic showing the
progress of Soviet ships as -Ohey moved toward the
Caribbean. 41/ One of the ironies of the time was
the printing on 18 October for the SECRET-level
Current Intelligence Weekly Summary of a Cuba map
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Branch activity returned to the normal
routine after the lifting of the quarantine on 27
October. The final brush with the Cuban crisis
occurred a month later7 A fairly sophisticated
map, twice as large as page-size, was done
to accompany a memo for President Kennedy laying
out in detail the time sequence of construction
activity. 42/ in an attached note addressed to
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, Mr. Cline,
the DD/I, noted that it was to be used for "Mr.
Mikoyan's visit to the President tomorrow" (28
November). 43/
The Cuban missile crisis illustrated, among
other things, the frequently demonstrated fact
that being "in the know" about important current
events gives people in the current intelligence
end of things a tremendous psychological boost,
even though the demands upon their personal lives
are arduous at times. The Cuban crisis was kept
under the tightest security wraps for the first
seven days. The President's 22 October speech,
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bringing the matter into the open, provided a
great measure of relief to persons privy to the
Soviet activities. The Secretary of State said
afterward in a television interview that
Senior Officers did their own typing; some
of my own basic papers were done in my own
handwriting in order to limit the possi-
bility of further spread of the utterly
vital matters we were dealing with. 44/
D. New Tasks for Cartographic Support
During the early 1950's, a high proportion
of GC/X efforts had been devoted to doing maps and
graphics for basic ORR and OSI studies of special
classifications. The association with OSI was so
close in the mid-1950's that some consideration
was given to setting up a support unit in Barton
Hall when OSI moved there from Tempo "M". 45/ ORR
requirements had increased considerably after
Division was dissolved in 19'53 and the entire
Office was housed in the Special Center. The
support required for OSI zoomed in 1962 following
Mr. Albert D. Wheelon's assumption of the post of
Assistant Director, and it rose for the entire
DDSU Directorate when he became the Deputy
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Director for Science and Technology in August 1963
Mr. Wheelon relied extensively on graphics for his
own presentations and liked to see them in DDSU
publications (see Figure 7). He created a small
graphics shop as part of his own staff (and
incidentally recruited
of Cartography Division's (b)(3)
most promising young cartographers to man it).
The total graphics load was so great, however,
that the workload in GC/X became heavily balanced
on the side of non-current intelligence. It was
necessary for Branch strength to be increased
gradually from
persons in 1961 to
persons in 1965 to cope with the overall workload.
By early 1964, Vietnam had become such a �
preoccupation of the White House that several
specialized publications were created to deal with
the subject. GC/X provided an occasional map for
the "Weekly Report of the Intelligence and
Reporting Subcommittee of the Interagency Vietnam
Coordinating Committee," issued by the Agency
beginning 28 February 1964. Distribution was
tightly controlled in the beginning, copies going
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only to Mr. McGeorge Bundy and other members of
the Committee. The maps in it were not particu-
larly revealing, being used principally to
locate "critical provinces" for the reader and to
pinpoint military activity. A year later, on 9
February 1965, a daily Vietnam Situation Report
came into being, with wider though still
restricted -- distribution. The new daily was
begun in connection with renewed US air strikes
against North Vietnam. It contained only an
occasional map during its first several months,
and those were prepared by OCT Graphics over GC/X
base plates. Later on, a locator map became
routine, and every issue contained two maps: the
so-Called "Boundary Map" (named for its original
title, "Administrative Boundaries") and the
."Strike Map" showing air activity. Both maps were
completely lacking in merit (see Figure 8) as
examples of either graphics or cartography but
were continued unchanged for several months, even
after the responsibility for preparing them was
taken on by the cartographers after the 1965
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merger (see below). Their production was regarded
as a necessary evil by all concerned, and they
were given as short shrift as human nature could
devise.
E. Consolidation
The Geographic Research Area of ORR was
consolidated with the old Office of Basic Intel-
ligence on 1 July 1965 to form a new Office of
Basic Intelligence (OBI). The chain of command
in the new Office was:
Director: 'James
Deputy Director:
Executive Director:
Chief. Cartography Division.
A.
Brammell
Deputy Chief. Cartozraphy Division
Chief, All-Source Branch:
Deputy Chief, All-Source Branch:
A series of personnel shifts were made, in-
cluding the assumption of the dlities of Chief of
the All-Source Branch by Mr.
Current intelligence was a new milieu for Mr.
whose previous assignment was Chief of the
Branch in the Cartography Division.
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Even as the new Office was being formed,
4
steps were underway to merge OCI Graphics and the
All-Source Branch (now called "CD/X") of Cartog-
�
1
raphy DivisiOn. Mr. Paul A. Borel, the Assistant
Deputy Director for Intelligence, had undertaken
intensive studies of the organization and oper-
ation of a number of DDI components on behalf of
Mr. Ray S. Cline, the DD/I, and several major
managerial changes resulted from these studies.
Mr. Borel's perusal of Agency publications
convinced him that text and graphics needed to be
integrated more closely and that the work being
done by the two graphics organizations was so
similar in character as to make a merger manda-
tory. 46/ After personally conducting a survey
in e,arly July 1965, he summarized his findings
on the first point as follows:
2. As I see it, the DDI has, through its
publications and informal memoranda, repeat-
edly demonstrated high competence to com-
municate through the written word. We have
also shown considerable ability to communicate
through the graphic arts (photography,
cartography, artistic illustrations and
renderings). We have done less well in
imaginatively relating text and graphics in
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combinations wherein each supports the other
with optimal results. The problem therefore
is to explore what steps may be taken to
upgrade our present effort.
3. Improvement in the use of graphics
can, it seems to me, come about in a number
of ways.
.a. The amount of graphics can be varied
to advantage, some being used, for
example, where none has been. This
is most likely to be the case where
graphics are used to supplement text.
b. The quality of graphics now used can
be improved to make for a more,mean-
ingful presentation; that is, to tell
its story more quickly or more
accurately..
c. More importantly, there no doubt are
ways of using graphics or graphic
techniques as a superior way of
communicating ideas now conveyed
verbally. This would involve graphics
as a substitute for text. 47/
Mr. Borel further indicated that there were
administrative and organizational problems ranging
from
aspects of personnel management, competition
for limited resources, allocation of
priorities in view of appetites for service
beyond means to satisfy, technical problems
in the use of color vs. completion of
projects with short deadlines, and the host
of other matters involving the selection
among options each having different impact
upon PSD/DDS. 48/
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As a next step, Mr. Borel proposed to visit
each graphics shop to familiarize himself with its
program and problems and to discuss with its
leaders their ideas on how best to proceed.
It was in fact true that, so far as DDI
publications were concerned, no discernible
difference existed in the kinds of requirements
being placed upon the two graphics units. Never-
theless, OCI's two mainline publications presented
a particularly muddled situation. Since 1956 it
had been established practice that for the Weekly,
maps were done in GC/X and non-map graphics in OCI
Graphics. For the CIB, both maps and non-maps
were done in OCI. The increasingly frequent maps
in the CIB were often comprised of a mixture of a
Cartography Division base map and an overlay made
in OCI Graphics. CIBIs for July 1965 contained
two basic maps of. North and South Vietnam,
used
and a scattering of
other base maps
times each. To an observer such
as Mr. Borel, the evidence as to who was doing
what graphics in the various DDI and DDSU
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publications was difficult to discover, and the
division of responsibility appeared quite illogical.
For example, GC/X did maps for the OCT Weekly and
OCT Memos, but not for the CIB. OCT Graphics did
illustrations for the Weekly and for OCI Memos,
but not for the rest of the DDI or the DDSU.
Cartography Division, GC/X in particular, did all
DDSU work, both maps and non-maps. A not un-
common spectacle at the time was a cartographer,
holding a Master's Degree in geography without any
formal training in design, laboring over a set of
simple drawings for a DDSU publication while an
illustrator, holding a degree in art and skilled
in design and layout, was doing a patchwork job on
a map for the CIB.
On 19 July Mr. James A. Brammell, the
Director of Basic Intelligence, submitted a formal
proposal that the Graphic Division, OCI, be trans-
ferred to the Cartographic Division, OBI, and
assigned to GC/X Branch. His supporting argument
ran as follows:
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2. The problem of providing the DDI with
a coordinated graphic-support facility can
best be served by centralizing the function
under a single management. Essentially, all
graphic support (maps, charts, graphs,
briefing aids, etc.) involves the visual
medium. Experts in cartography, in graphic
.arts, and in visual aids all employ the same
basic skills and techniques. Coupled with
professional training in geography, a com-
bined unit can provide an 'across-the-board'
total graphic support facility.
3. The effectiveness of the All-Source
Branch, CD/BI, results from the strong
administrative support within the Division
and the close support given that branch by
the other branches in the Division. This
includes the latest technical methods and
the total research-compilation efforts of
the regional branches. By consolidating the
graphics unit in the All-Source Branch, these
support facilities would be automatically
available to the total effort.
4. Single management also would provide
a single contact point for requesting graphic
support. Greater efficiency would be pos-
sible in assigning specific tasks and
priorities, arranging for reproduction,
maintaining files, and reacting to 'crash'
projects.
5. The effectiveness of graphics in
supporting intelligence depends on the
quality of trained personnel, the main-
tenance of skills, the effectiveness of
solid management, the stimulation of
imaginative products, and a 'team'concept
with high morale. A merger would provide
these in a minimum of time. 49/
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Mr. Brammell's suggestion was accepted, as
was his target date of 1 September 1965. On that
date, a terse DDI notice stated:
1. Effective 1 September 1965, the
Graphics Division, OCI, is transferred to
the Cartography Division, OBI, and
integrated with the All-Source Branch.
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2. After that date, all requests
formerly made to the Graphics Division, OCI,
will be directed to the Chief, All-Source
Branch, Cartography Division (Mr.
Room
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) ,(b)(6)
3. Requests for cartographic support not (b)(3)
requiring special classification will con- 0:0)
tinue to be directed to the Chief, Cartog-
raphy Division (Mr. ), Room
The new unit, continuing under the formal
name of All-Source Branch (CD/X), but
still referred to as "X Branch", was
cartographic backgrounds, and
more often
comprised of
persons had
came from OCI
Graphics. The managerial problem was to get the
two groups to pull together toward a common goal.
To outsiders -- for example, the DDI management --
the products of "X" Branch and OCI Graphics showed
sufficient similarity for them to be thought of as
coming out of one professional group, but in fact
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the disparate backgrounds of the people in the two
former units did not lend themselves to a perfect
blending. Mr. Brammell admonished the new Branch
Chief, Mr.
, to avoid restructuring the Branch
into sections and to guard against the two former
units continuing as cliques, each going its own.
way. However, conditions made it mandatory that
at least an informal breakdown be recognized to
keep production going and standards high.
teams made up of cartographers/illustrators
were tried with limited success. There was con-
stant disagreement between the senior people in
the Branch, on the one hand, who knew team spirit
was slowly developing, and Division and Office
management, on the other, who harbored the old
fears, over the need to organize the Branch along
lines reflecting the type and volume of work
coming in. This fundamental issue remained a
matter of internal controversy for the next five
years.
Rooms
For six months CD/X operated out of both
. Support to the current
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intelligence publications and work on briefing
materials was carried on in Room
and maps
(b)(3)
and graphics for special
projects,
memoranda, and
reports were 'done in Room
. Then the latter
(b)(3)
quarters were expanded, and
by
early March 1966
consolidation
was a fact. CD/X
was housed in
Rooms
and until
it moved to the
(b)(3)
floor in 1970.
F. DCI Raborn's Influence on Graphics
Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., served
as Director of Central Intelligence from 28 April
1965 to 30 June 1966. With his liking for
flamboyant graphics, he had a considerable
personal impact on the Cartography Division.
Admiral Raborn's initiation into the office
coincided with the DominicaA Crisis in April 1965,,
when several thousand US Marines were sent into
Santo Domingo to- give protection to American
nationals there during a period of violence and
disorder. CD/X produced a large quantity of maps
of the city and the sanitized corridor along which
Americans could move safely. These were provided
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to the Agency task force established to watch the
situation and were used for situation reports,
memos, and the CIB, most of which were delivered
promptly to the new Director.
To acquaint himself with the worldwide
situation, Admiral Raborn instituted a series of
morning briefings covering a specific area or
topic. These were held at 9:00 a.m. daily, as
the first item of the Director's staff meeting,
and were conducted by Agency area and topical
specialists, usually analysts from OCI oi ORR.
The briefing schedule was set up well in advance
to allow the analyst ample time to prepare himself
thoroughly and to order supporting graphics. From
to briefing boards became the order of
the day, and the artists in CD/X were swamped with
requests entailing considerable work of the kind
they most liked to do. Numerous accolades from
analysts and periodic compliments from the
Director were passed back to CD/X personnel and
were excellent morale builders for them.
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Mr.
the
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Admiral Raborn soon engaged the services of
, an old associate of his in
Polaris program, to give Agency supervisors a
lesson in the proper use of graphics in putting a
message across. On 13 August 1965 the auditorium
was filled to capacity with every Agency officer
of Branch Chief rank on upwards to hear Admiral
Raborn give a short talk on his experience with
effective graphics in the Polaris program and then
to introduce Mr. who talked for more than
two hours, using a large quantity of illustrations
to make his points.
The lesson :took. Analysts who had previously
avoided the use of maps and charts began to under-
stand their importance in reaching pressed-for-
time policymakers. A measure of the change is
indicated by -a comparison of the number of maps in
the CIB in July and in October 1965. In July,(b)(3)
before the lecture,
were used. In October,
several other graphics.
maps on
different area's
maps were used, plus
This doubling of effort
was not limited to the CIB but carried across the
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board. The burgeoning production figures of the
next 12 months (see Figure 9) stemmed from several
causes, but Admiral Raborn's interest in maps and
graphics was one of the principal ones. For
example, Admiral Raborn wanted an atlas on
in preparation for
and paid
a personal visit to the Division on a Saturday
morning to discuss the project with Cartography
Division personnel responsible for the production
of reference-type maps.
In CD/X, requests went up 28 percent, from
, in the first six months of the
existence of the combined unit compared to the
_previous six months. To keep up with these
requirements overtime became a way of life,
hours being recorded between September 1965 and
February 1966.
Admiral Raborn again retained the services
of Mr. in June 1966 to further the cause of
effective communication through more use of graphics
Dr. Edward W.
Proctor, the Acting DD/I,
, Chief of Special Staff,
and Mr.
OCI, were
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responsible for the arrangements. Following a
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morning session with Dr. Proctor and Mr.
Mr.
met in the afternoon with
supervisors of various map and graphics shops in
the DDI, DDS, and DDSU.
withstanding, it was not
Mr.
Good intentions not-
a profitable undertaking.
described the problem as being "100
percent human," incensing the cartographers and
artists. 51/ However, in his 11-page report to
the Assistant DD/I entitled "Expanding the Use-
fullness of CIA Graphics as Instruments of
Communication," he dealt himself out of cartog-
raphy calling it "a highly specialized function
in which I have no experience" and restricted his
remarks to "the charts and graphics and panels
used by both government and business in oral
presentation."
Dr. Proctor forwarded the report to the
Executive Director describing Mr. as "the
Director's Consultant" and noting that
although it is supposed to present his
recommendations based on his review of the
Agency's activities, the memo outlines
exactly what he told me before he had his
discussion with the heads of CIA graphics
shops and before he had a chance to review
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our publications. Clearly these are his
preconceptions; yet, there are some worth-
while recommendations in the memo. This
could be of use to whomever may be given
the task of reviewing the organization and
production of CIA graphics. 52/
There is no corroborating evidence to sub-
stantiate the hint that an overall review of
Agency graphics facilities was in the offing.
Admiral Raborn resigned as DCI on 30 June 1966,
and the matter was dropped.
G, India-Pakistan War, 1965
Open conflict between India and Pakistan
broke out in early September 1965 in the Jammu-
Kashmir area, following a number of violations of
the 1949 cease-fire line by both sides. A task
force was set up to monitor the situation, with
situation reports published several times a day
in addition to the CIB item. Adtiral Raborn's
desire for good graphics was by now common know-
ledge, and the task force wanted to make full use
of situation maps in its reports. The new Branch
Chief of the new consolidated Branch immediately
felt a kinship with Admiral Raborn's position
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during the Dominican Republic crisis five months
earlier when he faced both a brand new job and an
on-going international crisis of the first order.
An approach towArd preparing current situation maps
that began to take shape during the few weeks of
the India-Pakistan war developed into a fine art
in later crises. It is necessary to go back a bit
to understand why.
An unrecorded but openly admitted reason
behind the merger of the two units was to achieve
better maps in the CIB. To the cartographers this
meant more accuracy and detail. To senior Agency
officials it meant greater clarity and less detail.
Criticisms at upper levels which may have been
voiced in constructive terms invariably filtered
down to the mapmakers as admonitions to remove the
"clutter," a term too subjective to justify
specific reactions. The cartographers felt that
everything they were in the habit of including on
the maps (locations of forces, roads, towns,
streams) was essential to understanding the story.
Still, criticisms about "too much clutter"
continued to be heard.
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The cartographers doing the India-Pakistan
maps (Miss and Mr.
and the Branch Chief finally decided they
would prepare a map that would show the opposing
forces and little else. This effort appeared in
the President's Daily Brief of 17 September, and
it had far-reaching consequences. Quite by
accident, not only was the map devoid of the usual
supporting "basic information", omissions which
were planned, but the Printing Plant had neglected
to print even the terrain plate, which was supposed
to bind the data together visually. Mr. Helms,
then the Deputy Director, ordered the map completely
redone by the next morning. Mr.
was told by
the Senior Intelligence Duty Officer that Mr. Helms
had said in no uncertain terms that the next time
he saw a map like
by the ****�
night to do a new
was used almost daily
crisis. This episode
that he was going to get someone
people literally worked all
map which was so successful it
for the remainder of the
marked a turning point in
CIA current intelligence mapping. It laid the old
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shibboleth of "clutter" to rest, because the new
map had more information on it, not less, but the
background data were woven into the story better
than before. It,also proved that senior management
was indeed anxious to have high-quality maps in
current intelligence publications, that off-the-
shelf items were not good enough, and that the
days of "short shrift" were past.
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VI. Growing Pains, 1966-1967
A. Searching for Simplicity
On 8 August 1966 the Chief of CD/X was
called into a meeting by Mr. E. Drexel Godfrey,
the Director of Current Intelligence, and found
himself surrounded by several senior OCI people
responsible for the CIB and the Vietnam situation
reports. His memo describing the event gives an
insight into the desire on the part of'management
to get "good" graphics and into some of the
obstacles that were rapidly being put behind us.
[1] Played twenty questions for an hour
and 10 minutes with Drex Godfrey, Dick Lehman
(Deputy Director, OCI) Waldo Dubberstein
, OCI),
(panel secretary for the CIB)
They are desperately anxious to improve CIB
and SITREP (the daily Vietnam Situation
Report) graphics. They are sympathetic to
our real problems, but want to smooth out
rough spots. Godfrey is going to direct CIB
panel to ensure that adequate guidance will
be given on graphic requirements, in place
of the 'map' or 'chart' now thought sufficient.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
Godfrey wants to function
as a staff, clearing path for correct
procedures. I told Godfrey (he agreed) that
we did not want to be a bearer of messages.
We must not cut off contact between cartographer
and analyst.
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Dubberstein has strong personal opinions
about appearances of graphics. I.pointed
out to the group that personal tastes varied
considerably, and we had to play percentages. 53/
In effect, Godfrey was solving the problem
posed by the "graphics coordinator," a paper
position which had been created by Mr. R. Jack
Smith, his predecessor as D/OCI, after the transfer
of the OCI graphics shop to OBI. The "graphics
coordinator" position proved to be untenable for
the incumbent, Mr.
, in that he had
responsibility to oversee the use of graphics in
OCI publications but
things done. He was
that went wrong, and
with no authority to get
generally blamed for anything
it was clearly in the
interests of everyone to make the analyst and the
cartographer or artist more completely responsible
for the accuracy and timeliness of the map or
graphic. Moreover, the notion was rather widely
held that the job had been created to assuage
several members of OCI on the loss of their own
graphics shop. Godfrey did not rescind the
office notice defining the duties of the graphics
coordinator, but by putting
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picture in the place of a formal "coordinator,"
he was providing a means for �the OCT front office
and CD/X to communicate instantly on problems.
This decision lowered some tensions that had
previously existed and hastened the day for
achieving more effective graphic products.
B. A Unique Cartographic Form
The cartographers in CD/X began working out
various systems of portraying military activity
against a cartographic background that would
enhance the reader's ability to see spatial re-
lationships. High-level interest in Vietnam was
evident from the criticisms -- and praises -- of
maps in the CIB or the Vietnam Situation 'Report
handed out by the DDI at the DCI's morning meeting.
The problem of achieving high-quality cartographic
backgrounds was solved in 1966 by beginning a series
of maps at varying scales designed for the express
purpose of being overprinted with current intelli-
gence information. The "all-purpose" base map
approach was cast aside.
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The most significant advance in handling the
portrayal of military operations was achieved by
an ingenious method of producing relatively large-
scale (larger than 1:1,000,000) area maps begun in
1966. Three dimensional plastic relief map blanks,
that is, without color overprint, were procured
from the Army Map Service. These were side-lit to
permit the shadows to enhance the terrain detail
and then photographed. The photographs were pieced
together, and the splices disguised with an air-
brush wielded by the Division terrain specialist,
Mr. . The transportation was (b)(3)
(b)(6)
drawn at a very large scale and photographically
reduced by a factor of two to four times to obtain
the correct degree of fineness. "Clutter" was
handled by judicious selection of colors and
screens and judicious omission of the nonrelevant,
such as geographic coordinates and small streams.
These base maps were preprinted, omitting the
plates subject to change, such as the name plate,
and stocked in the
floor printing plant (b)(4
for instant use. They were highly successful and
became the envy of DIA mappers. They had just the
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right combination of simplicity, authoritativeness,
and timeliness (see Figure 10). Miss nd
Mr.
, the developers of the map form, worked
in close partnership with OCI area specialists and
the printing plant to get new maps prepared on .
areas that appeared to be on the verge of becoming
hot, so that a quite sophisticated map might
appear in the CIB when the action took place.
This technique was employed to maximum
advantage during the North Vietnamese buildup in
the vicinity of Khe Sanh in early 1968. There were
indications that enemy forces were beginning to
concentrate near the Allied base at Khe Sanh in
early January. From then through the height of
the assault in mid-March there was great concern
for the'safety of the troops there. To present
information in the most meaningful fashion possible
CD/X prepared base maps at graduated scales,
each .focusing upon progressively smaller areas.
When enemy pressure reached its height, author-
itative maps were available on which small details,
such as trenching, could be shown.
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C. A Cartographic Analysis of a Soviet Activity
By virtue of its being the only all-source
area in the Division, CD/X was called upon to
perform many kinds of cartographic tasks not
associated with current intelligence. Among these
was a 1966-67 project sponsored by the Foreign
Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC), �requiring
cartographic portrayal of the activities of several
(the
series). Masses of information derived from
were available
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
ELINT
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
However, so much data could not be assimilated by
even the most sophisticated reader. It was decided
to analyze all data available
as a representative first look. It(b)(1)
(bX3)
was next decided to plot onto existing base maps
the territories
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The
projected manpower input to do this was so enormous
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that some means had to be found to reduce it. CD/X
turned to the growing but then relatively
inexperienced computer staff to seek a way to
manipulate the ,-data and turn it into something
directly usable by the cartographer. The officers
involved, Mr. , CD/X, Miss
, FMSAC, Mr. an IBM contract
employee, and Mr.
problem with the gusto of new physicians in an
epidemic.
A symbiosis among the professions took place
in this project that in many ways helped the
entire Division -- perhaps the Agency -- get into
the forefront of computer applications to carto-
, DDSU, tackled the
graphic problems. A list containing over
facilities of military significance around the
world, stored on magnetic tape was uncovered at
the Pentagon. A selection of about
was made from it and
matched against the areas
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by a machine owned by the Office of Special
Activities. The names of the targets were sorted
by a meticulously planned arrangement and processed
through a third computer program -- developed by
Printing Services Division in connection with the
National Intelligence Survey -- which automati-
cally provided type placement on the final map.
Everything worked as planned, and the results (see
Figure 11) stimulated much favorable comment. The
Director wrote Mr. Brandwein, Director of FMSAC,
a note expressing his interest in the project, 54/
and a group of DDI planners opined later that here
was one instance where computers paid off.
D. The Search for Better Design
The pressure from all sides to improve the
clarity of Division products gave several Branch'
Chiefs pause to reconsider training requirements.
Division personnel had always been their own
severest critics on technical matters and geographic
interpretations, but training in the area of design
was lacking. The opportunity for day-to-day
association with several excellent resident artists
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instruction plus considerable homework. The
results were impressive. Mr.
touched a
responsive chord in people who had hungered for
more knowledge about this neglected part of their
cartographic education. Their "homework,"
comprising exercises in the use of colors and
shapes, was put on display in the Headquarters
Building in an exhibition sponsored by the Fine
Arts Commission.
E. Miscellaneous Chores
"X" Branch carried on many service-type
activities that went unrecorded in the logbook.
It was a convenient place to go, it had a wide
variety of talents available, and it imposed little
bureaucratic redtape. Some of the jobs that fell
to it were:
Designing nonroutine Ageny covers for
reports
Doing DDP graphics work, if specially
classified
Providing reproducible materials to graphics
shops in the Defense Intelligence Agency
and other organizations
Providing placecards for the DCI's dining
room
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Preparing type for titles to most DDI
publications
Serving as a source of supply for analysts
who need materials to make their own
briefing aids
Preparing zpecial briefing books for high-
level officials on the eve of foreign
visitors' trips. (Several done for
Vice-President Agnew were very favorably
received.)
Other commissions were somewhat less routine.
The Arab-Israeli War in June 1967 led to the
practice of making the Chief, CD/X, responsible
for providing the Director's Conference Room with
suitable maps during times of international crises.
Care was exercised in choosing what was to go
there, to make sure that it would be useful. The
Branch was familiar with the room, having
previously been asked by the Deputy Director,
Admiral Taylor, to "do something about the map
panels on the walls," for whichit had then done
two handsome raised-relief maps of Africa and
Latin America. An easel was set up, and between
1967 and 1970 it usually contained a map of the
current crisis area -- such as Nigeria, Laos,
Saigon, or Czechoslovakia -- suitably annotated.
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In December 1967, a telephone call came into
the Branch from President Johnson's social
secretary, Mrs. Juanita Roberts. She asked that a
map be prepared for use in a memento booklet of the
President's recent globe-circling trip. With some
imaginative planning, a handsome spread of two
hemispheres was produced by means of the Division's
automatic plotter and data bank. The map 55/ was
appropriately entitled "All the Way- with LBJ" and
must have made a hit with the President, because
the two project officers, Mr.
and Mr.
, each received a copy of the map
from him inscribed to them personally, perhaps the
only instance of a president citing a CIA
cartographer.
The Branch was usually called upon to support
Agency task forces providing around-the-clock
watch on an international crisis, such as the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, or on a
presidential trip abroad, such as President
Johnson's attendance at the Punta del Este
Conference. In the case of international crises,
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appropriate maps were obtained from the Map Library
and posted on the walls of the task force quarters
in the Operations Center. Task force members or a
CD/X representative annotated these with the latest
information. Task forces issued situation reports
throughout the day, and CD/X normally provided a
map for at least one of the reports, in addition
to the map going into the CIB. In the case of
presidential trips, most of the work involved
plotting the President's itinerary on the largest
.possible scale map and identifying pertinent
facilities, such as hotels where the correspondents
were staying or the local police headquarters. On
some occasions, a second display was prepared for
DDP who maintained their own watch.
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VII. Case Studies, 1968-1970
A. The Production Machinery
Procedures for producing and communicating
were basically stable for the entire life of "X"
Branch. The trend was steadily in the direction
of placing greater responsibility on Branch
personnel and fostering increasingly closer
contacts between the Branch and requesters.
Over the years the Branch had developed
filing system for originals and negatives and a
cross index of published maps that permitted very
quick turnaround time for spot requests. A map on
almost any country or region in the world could be
on the press within an hour. A new kind of type-
writer produced by the International Business
Machines Corporation called the'"Selectric
Composer" purchased in July 1968 proved to be
invaluable for quick prepatation of small type.
Two Varitype Corporation "Headliners" were
purchased for large type.
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place (b)(3)
names were preprinted and kept on hand for instant
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application. Base map production
the Division was closely monitored
sets of plates obtained.- These and
provided the Branch with unmatched
produce high-quality maps on short
by the rest of
and duplicate
similar efforts
resources to
notice. The
Branch clerk-:typists, notably Miss
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
were the overseers of these support
activities.
The
printing plant
on the
floor,
(b)(3)
under Mr.
, was very
responsive to
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
all Branch
requirements.
Its
photographer, Mr.
, and
day-shift
foremen, Mr.
(b)(3)
, performed miracles (b)(3)
(b)(6)
with their limited printing eqUipment designed
1961-type requirements but not for the quality
taken for granted a few years later. All
for service were channeled through Mr.
for
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
requests
in OCT.
Requests that wpuld have an unusual
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
impact
on the printing
plant were cleared through
Mr.
Chief, Intelligence Information
(b)(3)
,
(b)(6)
Staff,
OCT.
In early 1969, the "X" Branch was
organized into three sections -- Map, Publications,
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and Presentations Presentations -- each responsive to a
particular kind of requirement. This formalized
an internal structure dating back a year
The Map SeCtion, headed by Miss
later by Mr
or more.
and
, was staffed with
professional cartographers who
concentrated on map production and development.
The Map Section Chief coordinated Branch efforts
toward the Current Intelligence Weekly Review,
including attending the planning meeting held every
Monday at 10:15 a.m. in the OCI Front Office. The
deadline for CIWR graphics into PSD was Thursday
noon, making Thursday morning a particularly busy
time in the Map Section. A member of the Section
remained on duty Thursday evenings to examine
copies of the graphics as they came off the press
to make sure everything was in brder. In the
event of error, corrective action was taken on the
spot.
The Map Section also staffed the Branch
duty-officer roster, in recognition of the fact
that the frequent emergency calls invariably
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involved map work. The duty officer came in at
10:30 a.m. and worked until 7:00 p.m. or until his
work was done, Sunday through Thursday. He took
the following Friday off to compensate for the
Sunday. The Map Section was responsible for
evolving map products that addressed the needs of
the Weekly, the CIB, the several DDI offices, and
the peculiar requirements of the USIB Committee on
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).
Considerable pioneering effort went into employing
the Division's growing electronic data processing
expertise for these
Each officer had an
responsibility, did
and maintained
specialists in
his geographic
purposes (see Figure 12).
assigned geographic area of
most of the maps on his area,
contact with counterpart area
the Cartography Division to keep
base information, current.
The Publications Section was responsible for
producing non-map graphics. It was staffed by
Visual-Information Specialists
(formerly Illustrators General). The Deputy Branch
Chief, Mr.
, served as Section Supervisor.
He coordinated all DDSU, OSR, and ONE graphics
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requirements. Each officer was assigned the
graphics requirements of a particular office. As
an aid to planning, Mr. periodically
attended the meetings of the OSI Intelligence
Board, chaired b3-7 the Director, Dr. Donald
Chamberlain. The Office of Strategic Research (OSR)
graphics requirements reflected an appreciation of
the art of graphic communication held by its
Director, Mr. Bruce Clarke, and the know-how of
the Chief of its Publications Staff, Mr.
a veteran of the CIWR. The Branch Chief
attended the weekly OSR production meeting, chaired
by the Director, Mr. Clarke.
The Presentations Section was responsible
for single-copy briefing aids. It was staffed by
Visual-Information Specialists.
Their work, and the work of their predecessors,
the subject of a separate OBGI historical
monograph by the Section Chief, Mr.
The total size of CD/X after 1965 varied
between
persons, including the Branch
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(b)(3)
(b)(6)
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(b)(6)
(b)(3)
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Chief,
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supervisors,
clerks,
artists, and
cartographers.
(b)(3)
Also,
one artist
was permanently
detailed
to the
(b)(3)
National Indications Center at the Pentagon.
Division management augmented the strength
of the Branch whenever the work overload reached
an intolerable level. Officers were detailed there
for periods of days or months to work on specific
tasks or just to help out. In general, an attempt
was made to rotate officers who had tired of the
pace and replace them with officers who had not
previously experienced the unique activities of
the Branch. Unfortunately, this policy applied
only to cartographers. There was no reservoir of
artists or illustrators outside the Branch.
B. The Three-layered CIB
When OCI overhauled the CIB in early 1968,
the graphics received close attention. The book
formats were revised to comprise three versions,
with one all-source version prepared specifically
for high-level officials who needed to get the
message clearly and quickly. This new CIB
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provided its readers with succinct, authoritative,
and comprehensive summaries of all significant
current developments.
Just prior to the launching of the new CIB,
CD/X leadership had at last been provided with an
instrument to wield on stubborn analysts
unrelenting of their traditional prerogatives to
control
the map. It was
in the form of a memo
from Mr.
, Chief of the OCI
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
Presentation Staff, directed to all components
involved
in producing the CIB. In his usual
forceful
style, Mr. wrote that
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
A 'careful study of fresh lacerations and
older scar tissue indicates that the
Director reacts negatively, to put it
mildly, to CIB Graphics that are not self-
contained and self-explanatory....Do not run
a map which is a puzzle until you read the
text. Unless the title of the map, or a
specific legend, makes it clear why certain
areas are colored, don't color them.... In
other words, the maps should contain what is
necessary to help the reader understand the
text, but inasmuch as he is going to see the
map first don't create a map which interests
and puzzles him so much that he bogs down
before going on to the text matter. 56/ (b)(3)
(b)(6)
As a snapper, the Chief of CD/X or his
representative (Mr.
or Mr.
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was now included in the daily CIB planning meeting
where initial decisions were taken with respect
to the thrust of articles and judgments made on
whether meanings would be clarified with the aid
of a map or other graphics. After a month of
experience with the new CIB, launched on 23 April
1968, Mr.
was able to write in an internal
memo to CD/X personnel that
Recent comments to me by D/OCI, D/OBGI...
and numerous requesters clearly indicate
we are consistently producing interesting,
useful and attractive products for the
CIB. 57/ [See Figure 13]
C. The President's Quarterly Report
In late 1969 work commenced on a CIA project
which would pull together into one thin report
"evaluated facts with interpretive comments" on
the subject of Soviet strategic forces. 58/ It
was to be aimed at one consumer, the President of
the United States; to be produced quarterly; to
be all-source without limitation; and to impart
maximum information with minimum verbiage. OSR,
under the leadership of its Director, Mr. Bruce
Clarke, was the principal production agent, and
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representatives from OSR and CD/X worked together
to devise a concept and a layout
the desired aims. It was agreed
discipline would be exercised on
(b)(3)
which would achieve
that tight self-
space utilization,
and the graphics would be used freely to convey
ideas of magnitude and change. Opinion was
divided on format, so Mr.
was tasked to establish a model. He proposed a
folio-size book, one page for each topic, using
of CD/X
maps, photos, sketches, and graphs in harmony with
paragraphs of text. He also presented an
-alternative book more conventionally done up. To
everyone's delight, the DD/I, Mr. R. Jack Smith,
favored the folio approach and was seconded by
Mr. Helms and Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger.
After very considerable effort to remain within
the limitation established by the format, �success
was achieved. Mr. Helms wrote Mr. Clarke a note
describing the report as "one of the best things
we have ever done." 59/ Its doing required an
enormous expenditure of planning time on the part
of the analysts, the artists, and the printers.
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It also represented another example of the fact
that sound planning was the sine qua non of
effective graphics communication.
D. Automated Mapping Applications
The variety of requirements placed upon CD/X
allowed it many opportunities to experiment with
automatic data processing applications to carto-
graphic problems. These experiments met with
varying degrees of success. Some solutions were
conversation pieces that afforded such design
niceties as bird's-eye views of the earth from
space. Some offered a better basic map projection
than was otherwise obtainable; the first successful
use of the Division data bank was of this nature. 60/
Some were spectacularly successful in terms of
man-hours saved or in superior quality achieved.
The latter points became increasingly significant
as COMIREX requirements grew more sophisticated.
Plotting of thousands of targets, earth traces,
range-rings, azimuths, etc:, became routine
production problems, limited only by the accuracy
of base maps. Work done in the Branch, primarily
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by Miss
1969 and
base 61/
and Mr.
early 1970, demonstrated that
coupled with various computer
in late
an accurate
programs
offered vastly improved capabilities to monitor
certain collection programs involving photography.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
E. Vietnam Coverage
The war in Vietnam at first exhilarated, then
exhausted, eventually bored, and always disap-
pointed people closely associated with reporting
about it in CIA publications. CD/X, and OCI
Graphics before it, passed through each stage.
"New boys" were invariably given the job of doing
the routine daily maps. The periods of exhilaration
and creative endeavor were associated with breaks
in the routine. There were a number of these between
1965 and 1970, several of which have received prior
mention in this monograph. The intensity of
interest in Vietnam by the White House was
continually evident. CD/X prepared many
of maps and graphics on every phase of the war,
many for ultrasensitive reports. Secretaries of
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Defense McNamara and Clifford received profusely
illustrated studies from the Agency on the
effectiveness of the bombing campaign. The
National Security Council staff wanted "Eyes Only"
maps done of the trends in the pacification
program. Studies on all phases of the war went
to Presidential advisors Walt Rostow and Henry
Kissinger. One of these projects is worth
describing in some detail because it illustrates
both the problem-oriented character of much of
CD/X activity and Mr. Helms' views on the potential
of a well-thought-out graphic.
In mid-November 1969 the DCI directed the
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA)
and the Chief, CD/X, to devise a single-page
graphic that would illuminate trends in the war.
It was to be for the President only and designed
to be delivered to the White House within hours
after the receipt of statistics. Several mockups
were shown to the DCI who made pointed criticisms
about each one, continually stressing the importance
of simplicity and the necessity that trends be
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quickly evident. The fi.al plan contained a
series of small graphs of quantifiable factors
comparing one year with another, combined with
short narrative comments. It was favorably
received at the White House. It has been updated
weekly since the first issue and is routinely
delivered to the White House the same day the
data are received by SAVA.
F. Reorganization and Consolidation, 1970
The increasing complexity of map requirements
at special classification levels developed to a
point that began to give OBGI management rather
grave concern about the effectiveness of the
organizational structure of the Cartography
Division. In 1969 the Division Chief proposed
that the Division be housed either entirely within
or at least contiguous to the Special Center and
that the branches be restructured to overcome
deficiencies that had become more pronounced over
the years. According to his plan, the entire
research activity, for example, should be central-
ized in one large branch; CD/X activities would be
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curtailed, and some of its functions spun off to
the other branches. In a memorandum on the subject
of a proposed reorganization of the Cartography
Division, he described the problem thus:
The All-Source Branch [CD/X] is isolated
from the Division physically and extremely
difficult to manage in all aspects. With an
increase to people it becomes a major
chore to handle time and attendance reporting,
supervise production, provide policy guidance
and control, and provide for house-keeping
chores, supplies and materials. It is quite
obvious that the Branch responsibilities have
expanded to the point it has become an entity
relatively isolated from the other Branches
of the Division. This has lead to management
of the Branch making policy decisions which
rightly belong in the province of the Division
Chief. There is a duplication of production
effort between the All-Source Branch and both
the compilation branches and Technical Support
Branch. Because of the policy of production
based on classification there are frequently.
reports issued with graphics produced by both
CD/X and the downstairs units which leads to
confusion in the Division and in PSD. 62/
Sufficient space to house the entire Division
within the Center could not be Obtained, and it was
decided that appropriate support to current intel-
ligence could be rendered from facilities located
outside the Center. Accordingly, in November 1970,
the old CD/X -- which had been renamed the Current
Intelligence Branch (CD/I) in April 1970 -- moved
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into quarters on the floor contiguous with
the rest of the Division. A large portion of its
responsibilities, together with a third of its
personnel, went to other branches in the Division.
The entire Division was by then provided with
security safeguards that enabled work to be done
on projects bearing special classifications. The
move brought to a close an activity that was
established to fill a gap, had done its job, and
was wound down as an independent outpost after
producing
individual pieces of work.
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VIII. Conclusion
The all-source current intelligence support
�unit of the Cartography Division was created to
make cartographic support available to components.
within the Agency's Special Center. It continued
to fill a need over the ensuing years, not only
in meeting cartographic requirements but also in
the rapidly developing field of graphic communication.
It worked in harmony with a wide variety of
requesters and associates, and it served well during
crises and during a period of expanding Agency,
influence in the Intelligence Community.
A curious aspect of an assignment to. one of
the units doing current intelligence support work
was that one either loved or despised it. A
neutral, take-it-or-leave-it attitude was rarely
encountered. There is no rational explanation in
academic managerial courses as to why it should be
so, but all those who have held the post of Branch
Chief in either the "X" Branch or the OCI Technical
Branch look back upon their tenure with warm
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satisfaction -- despite the fact that the job
offered relatively poor physical working conditions
mental strain, external pressures, long hours,
frequent weekend work, and-no increase in pay.
Several impelling lessons have come to this
writer out of his assignment as Chief of CD/X:
a. Recognition of an individual's
contribution to his profession is one of the more
important rewards he can receive.
b. Busy officials who have little time to
read voluminous reports are very appreciative of
a map or graphic that lets them see at a glance
how the present compares with the past, whether
the trend is toward more or toward less, or
whether the outlook is favorable or unfavorable.
c. Maps and graphics done solely to
"beautify" a report are usually, a waste of time.
The Agency has provided the cartographers as
a group with professional standing, career
development opportuniti.es, and physical facilities
always adequate to the task. This investment in
managerial support has been amply repaid in that
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the Agency has always been in the forefront in
matters involving thematic maps and mapping. A
past chief of the Cartography Division regards
the long and successful struggle to raise the
professional standards of the cartographers as
"our finest hour." This achievement stands in
vivid contrast to the professional standings of
the artists, cum illustrators, cum visual infor-
mation specialists in the Agency, who play a vital
part in getting the Agency's message across. A
question that senior management would do well to
consider is whether similar attention is being
paid to the human side of developing the art of
graphic communication.
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Appendix
Source References
The writer was closely involved with devel-
opments relating to the July 1965-June 1970 period,
during his tenure as Chief of CD/X. Personal
files, containing scribbled notes and memos of
record, were valuable supplements to official
documents in reconstructing the events of the
period. The Records Center holds archival copies
of all Cartography. Division maps and graphic
production (when multiple copies were made), filed
numerically. OCI memoranda, both formal and type-
script, are filed in the Records Center by date of
, issuance and frequently contain marginal notes
concerning high-level reaction of interest to the
=
historian. OCI's serial publications (the various
weeklies and dailies) are filed by title and date.
Files held by the CIA Historical Staff were
invaluable in-determining the sequence of events
that shaped the present DDI during the transitional
period of the early 1950's.
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One of the problems in writing a microcosmic
history is that many achievements, not to mention
goofs and internal managerial crises, never become
a matter of record. The writer has had the good
fortune to be friends with most of the staff
members in both graphics and cartography during
the period which is the subject of this monograph
and had heard over lunch much enlightening
information that put the official record into
perspective.
Monthly reports were a requirement in the
Cartography Division from its establishment, and
record copies have been retained. They are useful
as leads to activities and problems but rarely
provide sufficient background material to permit
weighing the relative importance of achievements.
Anonymity was a passion with management of
the era, making it extremely difficult to
establish which personalities were involved in
history-making projects. This is quite evident
in monthly reports, where surnames were �a rarity.
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A five- or six-digit number in the lower
left-hand corner is the only identifying feature
of graphics and maps produced by the units
described in the monograph. "X" Branch numbers
were:
OCI
Graphics used a code that indicated the year,
month, day, and item. For example,
shows
the item was the second job logged in on 3 April
1965. This numbering system was discontinued on
31 August 1965.
Individual source references are cited below.
Source References
(b
(b
(b
- 99 -
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
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,
nin
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Figure 1. The first use of a map in the Current Intelligence Bulletin (5 August 1951).
Drawn by one of the artists in OCI, it appears to have been an experiment, since
no other maps appeared in the CIB for several months.
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(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
Figure 2. Cartographic and graphic units in OCI and ORR, ORE and OBGI, 1946-
1970. Cartographic support to current intelligence evolved along the lines indicated
on the diagram. The Cartography Division provided a stable base which supported
and ultimately absorbed other units engaged in current intelligence support.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Figure 3. Example of a map as used in the Current Intelligence Bulletin. (b)(3)
base map prepared by the Cartography Division was overprinted on a multili(b)(6)
press, using a multilith plate made with a typewriter and pencil. It represented a
I major step forward in cartographic style over the crude maps used in earlier
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SECRET
28 FEBRUARY 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Figure 4. Maps such as this appeared as frontispieces in the Central Intelligence
Bulletins in the last years of the Eisenhower administration. They provided the Presi-
dent with a synorApproved for Release: 2019/04/19 C05875316
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AFRICA
ma, Tropical African areas
lig of recent interest to
Peiping regime
El Formal relations with
gla Communist China
�C-ONFIDENIFFAL-
1 a AUGUST 1959
30803
Reeiblit
(Madagiiii
Figure 5. Maps in the Central Intelligence Review in the late 1950's reflected a high
degree of correlation between text and map. Newly available printing inks provided
.cartographers with opportunities to experiment with design that ultimately evolved
into a kind of cartographic journalism that became one of the hallmarks of CIA
cartography.
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Figure 6. A map from the Central Intelligence Bulletin in early 1965. Such maps
were pairings of base plates from the All-Source Branch and overlays made by the
"late shift" officer in OCI Graphics. Quality was irregular, depending upon the avail-
ability of an appropriate base and the skill of the late shift officer.
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pong�tor,1
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Figure 7. Example of a map made for a DDS&T report in the early 1960's. A high
proportion of the All-Source Branch workload in that period stemmed from the
heavy emphasis being placed on graphics in the Directorate of Science and Tech-
nology. Some reports contained or more photos, diagrams, charts and
maps, greatly enlarging the scope of CD/X activity.
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Rriarrr''.0
\
y
Duong Deng , (MO PHU
%IOC
MM.;
G 1.1 F OF
s':1 4 .11 '
48823 9-85
CAPI A
I"���
Tien
KIEN
REM CAT �
VI
Vinh L
ha
BA X)/YEN
DEMARCATION UNE{
gin
Mug
)411A TII
/ �
SECRET
,I CORPS
NANG
Nang (Iowan.)
Chu lai
QUANG NGAI
Ngai
4th
Z
LAM 0. G
Bao Lan
BINH
TOY
piluoc
5'n�iz_iz.;
,,LL.rn-11-91at
c � SOecial Zone
,4u112-) � (VNN)
'ItH(Division
nit
1�44,V11.0.1^
0
Li B-52 STRIKE
----IV CORPS
004INDARV litIMUCNTATIOIV
NOT MSCJISSIARII.V AUTHORITATIV,
zgCrion Son (Poulo Condon)
CON SON
,
CORPS
PAir Thuot
Di isio
!:4�� -
Phan�Thiet
1/4-1 (;"L'ao"
AN KHE
ROUTE-I9---'-- -
CORPS
iQUI NHON
H "
YE
!Tu. Nos
'.14ha Trani
C�o
Rang
leanh
Roy
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY BOUNDARIES
MOWID4==== Corps boundary
Special zone boundary
����1= Division boundary
O 2,5 50 75
O 25 50 75 IU0 Kilometers
Figure 8. The "Boundary Map" of Vietnam was printed in 1964-65.
The version above was the first modification made to it following the merger of OCI
Graphics with the All-Source Branch. Prior to September 1965, it suffered from han-
dling problems described under Figure 6. Following the merger, clutter was removed
bit by bit and an almost stylized version was in use in 1970.
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(b)(1)
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Figure 9. Monthly production rate in the All-Source Branch, 1951-1970. Statistics
present a generally reliable guide to the burgeoning workload in the Branch but
are only part of the story. In the early 1950's almost every item was done from
scratch and tailored to the needs of the Weekly. The sharp rise in the early 1960's
reflects the growth in the use of graphics in DDS&T reports. Merger with OCI
Graphics took place concomitantly with a sharp rise in requests associated with
Admiral Raborn's directorship. More emphasis has been placed on quality rather
than quantity in recent years.
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�
69434 1-68 CIA
.a S Ga. �A Pre r7.5
G.:. � � .0
44
Figure 10. Maps such as this were routinely prepared to depict military activity in
crisis areas, both in Vietnam and elsewhere. They reflect a high degree of carto-
graphic skill, employing methods beyond the ability of other government agencies
reporting on the Vietnam w9r.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
;-67
�Figure 11.
The team effort to pull vast quantities of data together and process it through
computers was noteworthy and helped get ADP into use on a routine basis in the
Cartography Division. 7seeiteit
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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-- Proposed SAS route
--- Other proposed route
Existing route
-
ngrod U- S S R.
Moscow
Tashkent (
. (
NEW DELHI
63.408 1-67 CIA
Figure 12. In January 1967, the first of many maps was constructed almost wholly
by automatic data processing equipment, presaging a cartographic revolution still
'in the making. At this writing (March 1972) no cartographic establishment in the
world has ,demonstrated a similar ability.
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Tapline Blown Up in Israeli-Occupied Syria
Tyre