REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00928342
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00941
• Publication Date: January 28, 1968

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28 January 1968
CIA/DIA/STATE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Reactions to Certain US Actions
1. In this memorandum we consider some recent developments
in North Korean, Soviet and Chinese policy in connection with the
Korean crisis and the possible reactions of these countries to
several US courses of action.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST POLICY
2. The attack on the Blue House in Seoul and the seizure
of the Pueblo are the most flagrant and conspicuous manifesta-
tions of an aggressive policy of armed subversion against the
ROK developed by Kim Il-Sung since the fall of 1966. This policy
aims at the eventual reunification of Korea by revolutionary
violence, and is designed to exploit the current US and ROK
involvement in Vietnam to this end.
3. In the current crisis they have apparently acted
independently and probably intend to keep the affair in their
awn hands insofar as they can. The influence of China in the
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present circumstances is marginal, and the influence of the
Soviets in Pyongyang, though greater than Peking'syis not decisive.
The Soviets have considerable potential leverage, but they would
be unlikely to apply severe pressures on North Korea unless they
thought hostilities on a continuing and extended scale were
becoming likely. They would be reluctant to risk the recovery
of their influence with the Asian Communist parties, a goal they
have been seeking for several years, unless they believed that a
major danger to their own security was developing.
4. In the last week, the North Koreans have maintained
a consistently hard and unyielding public position. However,
there isoin private statements through the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, some suggestion of a willingness to
bargain for the release of the Pueblo's crew. We judge that
the North Koreans wish to avoid military retaliation and a
possible resumption Of hostilities in Korea. Their primary
concern is to manipulate the crisis so as to discredit the US
and complicate US-ROK relations.
5. The USSR and China probably approve these immediate
North Korean aims, though they may have concern over Pyongyang's
tactical handling of the crisis. They may even be concerned
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that a prolonged crisis or possible hostilities in Korea would
adversely effect Communist prospects in Vietnam by encouraging a
general hardening of US policy in Asia. Both the Soviets and
Chinese have thus far refrained from involving themselves
directly. The Chinese, after remaining virtually silent for
several days, have offered only pro forma support, mainly
because of their severely strained relations with Kim Il-Sung,
and perhaps because of their own confused internal situation.
In public the Soviets have maintained a general support for
Pyongyang, but without adding to the tensions. They did pass
a US message to Pyongyang and through calculated leaks they
have endeavored to hint at the possibility that the Pueblo
incident could be settled peacefully if the US made some
concessions.
II. POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION
6. The possible US courses of action discussed below
are grouped into two broad categories: first, those that are
purely demonstrative in intent; second, those which are retalia-
tory or involve the use of force in some way. Under the first
category, we also discuss the question of possible warnings to
the North Koreans or through the USSR.
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DEMONSTRATIVE ACTIONS
7. The demonstrative actions, discussed below, taken
singly or even together, would not be likely to effect the
release of the Pueblo or its crew. Probably they -would not even
convince the North Koreans that the US in fact intends to use
military force if the crisis is not settled satisfactorily. The
North Koreans might still feel their possession of the crew was
strong insurance against US retaliation. They might also believe
that the US was constrained from moving very far in the direction
,of military action by the requirements of Vietnam. But taken
together with a further significant buildup of US military
capabilities in the area these demonstrative actions would
probably reenforce North Korean concern over US retaliation and
raise apprehension in Moscow and in Peking over US intentions.
While we cannot be sure, we believe there is a fair chance that
some combination of demonstrative actions, diplomacy, and a force
buildup woula lead to the release of all or most of the crew,
and possibly the ship.
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A. The US would deploy the USS Banner and a suitable
escort and air cover to the general location of the
Pueblo seizure, following the route of the Pueblo;
the following day the Banner would retrace this
route and the procedure would be repeated as long
as desirable.
8. No direct military reaction to this move is likely. All
of the Communists would recognize it as a demonstration, and as
long as North Korean territorial waters were not violated, there
would be no response. There would be further military alerts in
North Korea and a Soviet vessel would probably shadow the US
force. There would be the danger of incidents, particularly
between the Banner's air cover and patrolling North Korean
fighters. And such incidents would draw considerable inter-
national criticism of the US for deliberately seeking such
encounters. This course of action probably and any incidents
certainly would undercut US diplomatic efforts aimed at a peace-
ful solution of the Pueblo episode.*
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C. The US could move some ships to the site of the
Pueblo seizure and begin salvage operations.
-(A7s-g-17ing that the North Koreans were not already
on the scene for this purpose.)
11. The Communists would see in this operation a marginal
show of defiance and also an attempt to recover gear to support
the US claim regarding the precise location of the Pueblo. The
North Koreans would probably do nothing in response, except
perhaps complain publicly that the US was trying to provoke
another incident. If the US claimed to have recovered Pueblo
gear, the North Koreans would deny US veracity and continue to
insist that the incident had occurred in their territorial
waters.
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D. The US would convey indirectly a warning to the
North Koreans that military reprisals were intended
at an early date unless there was a satisfactory
termination of the Pueblo affair.
12. The question here is one of credibility. The North
Koreans would have some reason to believe that the US might be
bluffing. At least they could not be sure. Presumably they would
consult with the Soviets and ready their own defenses. If the US
were simultaneously making significant military moves indicating
an increased readiness for major hostilities in Korea, however,
then the North Koreans would probably make some gesture to fore-
stall US actions. They might make an acceptable offer to bargain;
they might even release part of the crew. Any Soviet advice in
these circumstances would probably run along this line.
13. If the US involved the Soviet Union as a channel to
convey a warning to North Korea, the Soviets would almost
certainly refuse to be a party to conveying officially an
American ultimatum. Nevertheless, the Soviets would probably
pass the warning to Pyongyang. It should be emphasized, however,
that there is no guarantee that the Soviets could persuade the
North Koreans to make concessions, even if they decided to try
to do so. There is a good chance, however, that the Soviets
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might open up clandestine channels to the US, hoping to gain time
while they explored further both US and North Korean positions
and the possibility of a settlement.
RETALIATORY ACTIONS
14. As indicated above, there is a fair chance that a
combination of demonstrative actions, diplomatic moves, and
military reinforcement in Korea would persuade the Kim Il-Sung
regime to end the current crisis by. releasing the crew and perhaps
the ship. Once the US took retaliatory actions involving the use
of military force against North Korea, however, the chances of
obtaining early release of the crew and ship would be virtually
eliminated. Moreover, retaliation would probably bring the
Chinese and Soviets more directly into the situation. They would
probably still try to contain the crisis, but would feel compelled
to take some steps to show they were prepared to aid North Korea's
defense. Thus, the risks of an enlargement of the crisis and
actual hostilities would be increased.
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A. The US would mine Wonsan harbor, preferably at
night, by an air drop.
15. North Korea would, of course, defend against this
action; it might also attempt some retaliation of its own, for
example against US ships or forces. The USSR would assist in any
efforts to remove the mines, if requested, and they would also
begin to build up North Korean air defense capabilities around
Wonsan and other major ports. Mining of Wonsan would be of
special concern to the USSR, not only because Soviet ships use
the harbor, but also because the action might be seen as a
precedent to similar action against Haiphong.
B. The US would quarantine or blockade one or more ports,
but limit the action to North Korean naval vessels.
This would be a close in blockade with some US ships
entering North Korean waters.
16. There would be a high risk that the North Koreans would
challenge the blockade with their forces. The Soviets might
ostentatiously move ships through the blockade line, possibly
including some military vessels. Some move would probably be
made by the Soviets at the UN; they would have good prospects
for getting wide support. At this point the North Koreans and
Soviets would conclude that further US military action might
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follow; they would move ahead rapidly with defensive preparations.
The Chinese too would probably begin some show of military
activity in North China and Manchuria.
C. The US would attempt to seize a North Korean vessel
and hold it in return for the Pueblo and its crew.
17. If time and circumstances permitted, the North Koreans
would defend against such a seizure, regardless of whether in
international or territorial waters. Presumably, they are
perspicacious enough not to expose a major ship to such action
beyond the reaches of their air cover. In any case, the North
Koreans would not be likely to bargain for an exchange. And the
resulting propaganda would becloud the original US case against
Pyongyang. No military retaliation would be likely, however.
D. The US or the ROK would undertake a raid in reenforced
battalion size across the DMZ.
18. The North Koreans are probably alert to this possibility;
in any case the action could build up into a major battle involv-
ing reenforcements on both sides. It would certainly not bring
about the return of the Pueblo's crew. Indeed it is possible
that action on this scale warilA be tantamount to reopening the
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war. The Soviets would probably accelerate arms aid to North
Korea, and the Chinese might make some gestures to indicate more
support for Pyongyang.
E. The US and/or the ROK would conduct an air strike
against one or more selected targets: a US air
strike against Wonsan airfield and Mumpyong Ni
naval base; the ROK AF would strike against guerrilla
training centers in North Korea.
19. The North Koreans would of course defend themselves
against the attack. They would weigh carefully the desirability
of a retaliatory air strike of their own against South Korea.
They would recognize that such action would invite a continuing
exchange and a virtual air war. On balance, we believe they
would probably not retaliate in this way unless they judged that
the US intended to continue its attacks.* At the same time, they
would probably not be willing to accept the US and ROK actions.
Probably they would immediately sentence the crew; perhaps they
would hint at an execution.
20. The attitude of the Soviets and Chinese in this
situation would be of increasing importance to the North Koreans.
The DIA representative believes that the North Koreans
would make such a retaliatory air strike.
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Chinese-Korean relations are currently so strained and the situa-
tion in China so confused that the North Koreans would probably
not count on Chinese support. While the Chinese would take a hard
propaganda line, they would almost certainly refrain from any
action against the US.
21. The North Koreans cannot afford to proceed. very far in
a confrontation with the US-without some assurance of Soviet
military support. We doubt that any firm Soviet assurance would
be given at this stage, despite Soviet obligations under the
1961 Mutual Assistance Treaty. We think that the Soviets would
initially respond to a US air strike by tough public support
of Pyongyang, but probably they would also make private efforts
to persuade North Korea and the US to end the crisis and for
Pyongyang to restrain its own reactions.
22. Nevertheless, the Communists would be greatly concerned
that the US might embark on a course of sustained air attacks.
They would step up preparations to meet this contingency,
including new measures to strengthen North Korean air defense,
since both the USSR and China regard North Korea as an area of
special security interests to them.
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23. International Reactions: - If the US did resort to
sanctions or punitive measures against North Korea, it would gain
considerably among certain of its allies in Asia, but it would
certainly draw criticism in those quarters already opposed to US
policy in the Far East. Indeed, most Free World countries think
that an early resort to military action would be unjustified. If,
after a retaliatory actionIthere were no serious consequences,
international concern and alarm would die down. The US position
in the UN would deteriorate; charges would be made that the US
was misusing forces operating under UN auspices.
24. Should the US try to marshal support for a break in
trade between North Korea and the Free World, it would probably
meet considerable resistance. Japan, the largest of North Korea's
trading partners in the Free World, would be reluctant, because
of domestic considerations, to join the US. Indeed, the Japanese
left would exploit the Korean crisis to bring heavy pressure on
the government, and among other things to harass and inhibit the
use of US bases in the country. The Sato Government would be
placed in a very uncomfortable position.
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