NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01367617
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: February 27, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: October 19, 1985

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Difocfoe of
Control
Intelligence
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Top Secret
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19 lobar 1985
Copy 535
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Contents
Italy: Domestic Roots of the Crisis
Syria-Lebanon: Security and Political Reform Program
Notes
EC-US: Dispute Over Wheat Trade
Greece: Government Response to Labor Unrest
Romania: Energy Emergency Declared
Nordic Countries-South Africa: Oil Shipments
South Yemen: Results of Party Congress
USSR: Reorganizing Machine-Building Industry
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In Brief 14
Special Analyses
South Africa: Status of Violence 15
Zaire-US: Mobutu's Visit 17
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ITALY: Dornootie Roots of tho Crisis
The Achille Laura hijacking precipitated a crisis that had long
been brewing over policy differences and personal rivalries
among the five coalition partners.
Commont: Over the past several months differences between
Socialist Prime Minister Craxi and the Republicans have become
acute. Academic studies suggest that the Christian Democrats and
the Communists, the two largest parties, will continue to lose voles
over the long term, leaving the Socialists and the Republicans in
direct competition for these floating voters. The two smaller parties
also are hoping to profit from problems within the Social Democratic
and Liberal Parties.
Craxi almost certainly believes he can talk the Social Democrats into
a merger before long. Republican Defense Minister Spadolini
probably believes his party will benefit from a collapse of the Liberal
Party
Tensions between the Socialists and Republicans are reflected in the
personal animosity between Craxi and Spadolini. Spadolini probably
holds Craxi responsible for the machinations that led to the fall of his
own government in 1983. He is now worried, moreover, that Craxi's
longevity in office has provided the basis for a Socialist surge. Craxi,
indeed, may be growing anxious to exploit his growing strength in
public opinion polls and to capitalize on the Communists' current
disarray in an early election
Deep divisions over economic policy also lie behind the current crisis.
Preliminary discussions of next year's budget have underscored
disagreements between the Christian Democrats and the
Republicans. The Republicans, who have the Finance portfolio, argue
that the government must cut spending and avoid higher taxes.
Although Spadolini and Craxi agree that sharp spending cuts are
needed, Craxi probably feels that the Republicans are being too
unyielding. The latter are upset that Craxi is being 7,--.1-.A.1 for the
positive effects of economic policies they initiated.
Economic policies will figure prominently in the negotiations to end
the crisis. Craxi may try to use concessions on the budoet as a lever
to bring the Republicans back into the fold.
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19 Weber 1985
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Top Swot.
SYRIA-LEBANON: Security and Political Reform Program
Syria is determined to begirt fts latest security and political
reform program in Lebanon before a possible Arab summit and
the muting between PriidanI Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev next month.
Lebanese factional leaders have agreed in principle to a Syrian-
sponsored security plan for Beirut that paves the way for President
Gemayel to invite S ria's Arab Deterrent Force I
shortly.
The factional leaders have reached tentative agreement on the
Syrian-sponsored proposals, which also call for a three-year
transition during which the Lebanese political system will be
overhauled. A key provision is a reduction in the powers of the
Christian presidency. The plan has drawn strong criticism from Sunni
and Shia fundamentalists, who have been excluded from the
deliberations.
Comment: Syrian leaders are worried that, unless they move to bring
Lebanon's quarrelsome factions into line befcre the summits, the
Arab states or even the superpowers might make moves Inimical to
Syrian interests in Lebanon.
Factional leaders are certain to encounter resistance from their
constituencies as they try to sell Syria's latest proposals, particularly
to, the handing over of heavy weapons. Hardline Christians
determined to resist a Syrian presence in East Beirut will view
acceptance of the agreement by Lebanese Forces leaders as a
sellout. Shies are likely to balk if the agreement fails to grant them a
political role commensurate with their growing strength.
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Security and Political Reform Program
Syria is determined to begin its latest security and political
reform program in Lebanon before a possible Arab summit and
the meeting between Pr Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev next month.
Lebanese factional leaders have agreed in principle to a Syrian.
sponsored security plan for Beirut that paves the way for President
Gemayel to invite Syria's Arab Dettwrent Force to return to the capital
shortly.
The factional leaders have reached tentative agreement on the
Syrian-sponsored proposals, which also call for a three-year
transition during which the Lebanese political system will be
overhauled. A key provision is a reduction in the powers of the
Christian presidency. The plan has drawn strong criticism from Sunni
and Shia fundamentalists, who have been excluded from the
deliberations.
Comment: Syrian leaders are worried that, unless they move to bring
Lebanon's quarrelsome factions into line before the summits, the
Arab states or even the super owers might make moves inimical to
Syrian interests in Lebanon.
Factional leaders are certain to encounter resistance from their
constituencies as they try to sell Syria's latest proposals, particularly
for the handing over of heavy weapons. Hardline Christians
determined to resist a Syrian presence in East Beirut will view
acceptance of the agreement by Lebanese Forces leaders as a
sellout. Shies are likely to balk if the agreement fails to rant them a
!
political role commensurate with their growing strength.
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Top O.i.t
EC-US: Dispute OM Wheat Trade
The EC intends to file a complaint with the GATT against the US
export support program for wheat in response to the US decision to
begin an action against EC wheat export subsidies. The EC contends
that US subsidies have undercut world prices, whereas EC subsidies
only close the gap between international and domestic prices.
Comment: Bilateral consultations on the wheat subsidies question
are unlikely to produce a solution, and the dispute probably will be
referred to a GATT panel by the end of the year. The dispute almost
certainly will complicate EC-US negotiations on other agricultural
trade problems, including the EC's preferential treatment for Imports
of Mediterranean citrus and its production subsidies for Community
fruit canners. The US complaint will increase EC fears about the way
agricultural subsidies will be treated in the new round of GATT talks.
It also is likely to intensify the continuing debate within the EC on
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and on how to cut cereal
production
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Government Response to Labor Unrest
Prime Minister Papandreou has expelled eight labor leaders from his
PASOK party, according to press reports. The eight had Joined the
Communists in calling for a nationwide strike in opposition to the
economic austerity program announced last week. In Athens, only
about 20,000 workers responded to the call.
Comment: The expulsions reflect growing dissension within
Papandreou's party over the government's latest austerity measures,
which will reduce the real income of workers. They also reflect
Papandreou's determination to maintain tight control over the party
and to stifle leftwing criticism of his economic policies. At a party
Central Committee meeting last month, Papandreou laid the
groundwork for the expulsions by accusing dissident unionists of
pursuing narrow economic ends a the expense of the national
interest.
ROMANIA: Energy Emergency Declared
President Ceausescu this week imposed a state of emergency in the
energy sector, fired the minister and deputy premier responsible for
electrical power production, and put the military in charge of running
the entire power system. Military command teams are to take control
of thermal power plants and punish civilian emploteesiorny failure
to obey orders to maintain production schedules.
Comment: The move reflects Ceausescu's desperation over the
effect of energy shortages on the economy this year, but it will
probably do little to augment the supply of electricity. Coal production
is far below planned targets and snarls in traffic have interrupted coal
deliveries. Much of the coal is low-grade lignite that causes
equipment to break down, and
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NORDIC COUNTRIES-SOUTH AFRICA: Oil Shipments
Norway has begun talks with other world shipping powers, including
Greece, Panama, and Liberia, to halt oil shipments to South Africa
there was considerable foreign and domestic
opposition to the plan; some African states flatly refuse to take part.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and
Iceland voted to support the Norwegian initiative as well as to extend
the Nordic countries' program of trade restrictions against South
Africa at their semiannual meeting 17 anci 18 October.
Comment: Norway probably realizes that the chance of winning the
cooperation of other major shipping countries is slight, but Prime
Minister Willoch, whose coalition was narrowly reelected last month,
hopes that the effort will satisfy demands from the opposition for
stronger measures. The talks may also have been a political gesture
designed to reinforce the actions taken at the Foreign Ministers'
meeting. Even if Norway won agreement on banning oil shipments,
the impact would be minimal because South Africa has large reserves
and could obtain oil throuth other means, including clandestine
transactions.
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SOUTH YEMEN: Results of Party Congress
President Hasani withstood challenges to his rule during the recent
Yemeni Socialist Party congress but emerged politically weakened.
One of Hasani's opponents,
tormer eresioem ADO al-rattan Ismail, has been appointed to the
Politburo and that the Governor of Shabwa Province, one of Hasani's
key supporters, did not attend. There are no signs, however, that
Hasani is planning to abandon his relatively moderate, pragmatic
policies
Comment: Hasani's political control appears to have slipped slightly,
even though holding the congress as scheduled represents a major
political achievement. Ismail's appointment means that Hasani did not
have the clout to stack the Politburo with his backers and was forced
to compromise with the man he deposed as president in 1980. The
governor's absence suggests that members of the party's right wing,
traditionally Hasani loyalists, are unhappy with the concessions to
Ismail and other hardliners. If Hasani cannot show a greater payoff
from his policies of expanded contacts with the West and improved
relations with Oman and Saudi Arabia, he will be open to increasing
political challenges from Ismail and the leftists.
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USSR: Reorganising Machino-Building Industry
Soviet media report that on Thursday the Politburo approved the
creation of e bureau within the Council of Ministers to coordinate the
work of the various machine-building industries. The new bureau
reportedly is to have the power to issue binding decisions and
reallocate resources among the ministries. There are currently
11 machine-building ministries in the civilian sector and another nine
engaged primarily in military production.
COMM* It is unclear which ministries will be affected or whether
the powers given to the new bureau will enable it to function more
successfully than did a similar unit set up for the agro-industrial
sector in 1982. While stressing the need to improve coordination
among ministries, General Secretary Gorbachev had earlier called for
a major shakeup of the ministerial bureaucracy to reduce its size,
eliminate overlap, and remove superfluous layers. The creation of the
new bureau may be a move designed to prepare the way for bolder
steps later. but if Gorbachev stops here it will only worsen problems.
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Tap Secret
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In Briof
American
Middle East
Europe
tr.
� Mexico to expropriate 7,080 quake-damaged properties in capital
to reduce frustrations of homeless... right wing, private sector
opposed ... fear compensation will be inadequate and may
encourage other actions against property.
� Prime Ministers of Syria and Jordan to resume reconciliation talks
in Riyadh tomorrow... seeking minimal consensus for possible
Saudi-sponsored Arab summit next month ... will probably steer
clear of Hussein-Arafat peace initiative.
� Radio Monte Carlo, citing Palestinian source in Tunisia, claims
Palestinian Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas will attend
forthcoming PLO Executive Committee meeting in Baghdad ... no
date set, but should meet within next few days.
� Greek Cypriot legislature to be dissolved on 31 October...
election set for 8 December ... election likely to strengthen
Conservative and Communist Party opposition to Presi�nt
Kyprianou, handling of UN peace negotiations.
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Continued Unrest in South Africa
Namibia
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
Spacial Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA: Status of Violence
Recent efforts by activists to mount national protests have been
largely ineffective, but militant youths show no signs of
abandoning soon their low-level war against security forces and
black "collaborators." Excesses by security personnel in clashes
with nonwhites are keeping antigovernment sentiment high.
Several white passers-by and security personnel were injured
yesterday when police dispersed some 3,000 nonwhites outside the
memotial service for Benjamin Moloise. the black African National
Congress member executed for killing a policeman in 1982. The
service was held at a building in downtown Johannesburg that houses
offices of various activist groups, including the United Democratic
Front. Winne Mandela, wife of imprisoned ANC President Nelson
Mandela, defied government restrictions by speaking at the service�
her first public speech in eight years.
While the violence generally appears to be reduced in districts under
the state of emergency, it Is up in other areas, including western Cape
Province, now the center of the worst unrest. The eight funerals being
held today for riot victims in the western Cape Province are likely to
occasion more clashes with security forces. Meanwhile,
antigovernment disturbances in the Durban area have been
overshadowed by a violent struggle for influence in nearby nonwhite
townships between the multiracial United Democratic Front and Chief
Buthelezi's powerful Zulu group, lnkatha.
The Government's Tactics
Since a state of emergency was declared in July, the rate of deaths�
averaging 3.5 a day�is more than twice as high as during the first
half of the year. This probably is partly the result of the increased
security presence in the townships, which has led to more attacks on
police and soldiers as well as retaliatory actions. Detentions without
trial and arrests continue at a high rate, affecting more than
7-n7vhites since mid-1984, according to government figures.
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(b)(3)
NatSecAct
The use of particularly harsh tactics frequently has backfired. This
week security personnel hiding in a truck shot at Colored youths who
had begun stoning the vehicle, killing thre7r7oking some of the
worst rioting in the area in the past year.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Pretoria undoubtedly realizes its announcements on black citizenship
and political rights and the eradication of some racial restrictions will
not end the unrest, but these actions signal an understanding that this
violence, as well as earlier cycles, stems from deep-seated black
frustrations. The timing of the announcements, many of which had
been planned for some time, is designed both to provide hope to
deflect international criticism of Pretoria's policies
black moderates that more substantial changes wi!ltolloi nd to _aiv
(b)(3)
Pretoria recently began a new jobs program to try to reduce the high NatSecAct
black unemployment rate�at present about 30 percent�which is
contributing to the unrest. Revisions also are due in the pass laws,
originally dfisigned to keep excess black labor out of nominally white
areas; more than 18 million blacks have been arrested for pass-law
violations in the last 75 years, (b)(3)
NatSecAct
Outlook
A continued stalemate is likely over the coming months, with ebbs
and flows in the violence. Pretoria is not interested at this p
talks with black opposition leaders about political solutions. (b)(3)
NatSecAct
If the situation deteriorates rapidly and the ANC and other militant
groups become more actively involved, Pretoria is likely to rely more
heavily on coercion. The government has had success in the past in
repressing violence, and President Botha. along with many other
whites, would back stronger and more deadly security measures if
necessary.
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Special Analysis
ZAIRE-US: Mobutu's Visit
President Mobutu comes to Washington next week to reaffirm
close bilateral Iles and seek assurances of US support to cope
with formidable econenroblems and increased Libyan-
backed subversion.
Mobutu will seek help in reducing Zaire's growing debt-service
burden�more than 50 percent of government revenues in 1985
he may propose a three-year moratorium on
principal payments on its $4.4 billion debt and a multiyear
rescheduling of the interest payments. (S NF NC OC)
Mobutu is likely to point out that Zaire's poor economic prospects are
due to low world prices for its leading exports�copper, petroleum,
diamonds, and coffee�and stress his opposition to US plans to sell
cobalt from Its strategic stockpile. Although he probably will agree to
another IMF arrangement, Mobutu is
frustrated with the increasing involvement of IMF officials in economic
isions, which he believes undermines Zaire's sovereignty.
rtinnevA7
Despite his strong political position. Mobutu believes he must move
toward more expansionary policies as the ruling elite, urban workers.
and private businessmen become increasingly discontented with
austerity. Rising expectations among the urban working class for
Improved wages and health care have increased the likelihood that
another austere budget would lead to disturbances. In addition,
Mobutu rearrested several opposition leaders this week because of
their demands for a more open political system, possibly
foreshadowing a return to more repressive government tactics.
Mobutu is likely to seek additional US military aid and help in
refurbishing military facilities to counter Libyan-backed rebel activity
In eastern Zaira. The rebels are not an immediate threat to the
regime, but continued small-scale attacks are forcing Mobutu to
expend scarce resources on counterinsurgency operations.\
Mobutu may also raise his concern about the growing Soviet role in
Angola and the success of the recent Angolan offensive against
UNITA insurgents. He may offer to increase logistic support to UNITA.
(FkEN BLA.NK)
ego
'Top Sucrut
17 19 October 1985
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