(ESTIMATED PUB DATE) THE CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE 1990S: GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES - OCTOBER 1995

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• Publication Date: October 1, 1995

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The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
A Conference Report
R77' 95-10039
October 1995
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The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
A Conference Report
RT7' 95-10039
October 1995
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Scope Note
The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
This report contains the proceedings from a conference entitled, The Chal-
lenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s:
Geographic Perspectives, which took place from 30 September to 1 October
1993. The conference was sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency's
Geographic Resources Division.' It featured academic geographers and
anthropologists who are specialists in ethnic issues and US Government offi-
cials with practical experience in dealing with the consequences of ethnic
conflict.
This report contains the papers that the participants presented as well as the
key points of the discussions that followed. Where appropriate, the authors
have updated their papers to reflect events since the conference. The views
herein are those of the individual participants and not necessarily those of
their affiliated organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency, or any other
US Government agency.
' As of June 1995, Geographic Resources Division was renamed Conflict Issues Division.
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RTT 95-10039
October 1995
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Contents
Page
Scope Note jjj
Overview
Part I: Framing the Discussion
Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict 5
Dr. Alexander Murphy
Identity, Territory, and Self-Determination: Factors Underlying 15
Potential National and International Conflict
Dr. David B. Knight
Part II: Regional Manifestati6ns
Eastern Europe
Ethnic and Territorial Conflicts in Eastern Europe
Dr. Ronald Wixman
Discussant: Dr. Thomas Poulsen
25
Western Europe and Canada
Ethnic Conflict Within Western Europe
Dr. Colin H. Williams
Discussant: Dr. Alexander Murphy
42
Former Soviet Union
Ethnoterritorial Conflict in the Former Soviet Union
Dr. Robert Kaiser
Discussant: Dr. Ronald Wixman
59
Africa
Geographic Factors in Ethnic Conflict in Africa
Dr. Harm J. de Blij
Discussant: Dr. Rex Honey
74
Latin America
The Ethnic Challenge to National and International
Order in South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
During the 1990s: Geographical Perspectives
Dr. Gary S. Elbow
Discussant: Mr. Mac Chapin
86
Middle East
Ethnicity and Nationality in the Middle East
Dr. Marvin W. Mikesell
Discussant: Dr. Mildred Berman
99
Southeast and East Asia
Ethnicity Theory and Ethnic Conflict in China:
The New Politics of Difference
Dr. Dru Gladney
Geographic and Ethnographic Perspectives on Ethnic
Conflict in Southeast Asia
Dr. Eric Crystal
108
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South Asia
Evolving Ethnicity in South Asia With Particular
Reference to India
Dr. Joseph E. Schwartzberg
Discussant: Dr. Robert Stoddard
130
Part III: Regional Comparisons and Implications for the United States and
the International Community
The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict:
A Geographic Overview
Dr. Gary Fuller
151
Ethnic Conflict and Population Displacement 155
Dr. Martin Kenzer
Forced Migration and Ethnicity 157
Dr. Lee Schwartz
Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative Examination 166
Dr. Thomas M. Poulsen
Patterns, Trends, and Regional Comparisons 175
Discussants: Dr. Marvin W. Mikesell and Dr. Mildred Berman
US Policy Perspectives: A Conceptual Approach 178
Dr. Jon Gundersen
Ethnic Conflict and US Policy 184
Dr. Wade Hinkle
Concluding Comments: Implications for the United States and the 187
International Community: Problems and Prospects
Dr. Stanley D. Brunn
Discussants: Dr. Rex Honey and Dr. Harm J. de Blij
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The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
to National and International
Order in the 1990s: Geographic
Perspectives
Overview
Since the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts have
been of increasing importance�posing a threat to
international order and demanding the attention of
US policymakers. The aim of this conference report is
to highlight geographic concepts and factors that con-
tribute to our understanding of these conflicts and to
identify sources of potential ethnic strife. Following
the order of the conference, this report is divided into
three parts:
� The conference's conceptual framework. An exami-
nation of the geographic approach to the study of
ethnic conflict.
� Regional manifestations. Current and potential eth-
nic conflicts by region.
� Implications. Looking at ethnic conflicts from a
comparative basis and viewing consequences for the
United States and the international community.
Part I: Framing the Discussion
Dr Alexander Murphy, Associate Professor in the
Department of Geography at the University of Oregon,
establishes the groundwork in his keynote address. He
examines the geographer's unique approach to analyz-
ing ethnic tensions and discusses how the geographic
perspective can aid in understanding these tensions, in
identifying destabilizing ethnic conflicts, and in devel-
oping effective policy responses. His discussion
focuses on the core concepts of location, territory, and
environment.
Dr David Knight, Dean of Social Sciences at the Uni-
versity of Guelph, provides additional insights on the
geographic perspective, exploring the linked concepts
of identity, territory, territoriality, and self-determina-
tion as well as numerous territorial processes that
function within the nation-state system.
Part II: Regional Manifestations
Eastern Europe
Dr Ronald Wixman, Professor of Geography, Univer-
sity of Oregon, identifies some potentially serious
ethnoterritorial conflicts that may arise in Eastern
Europe as well as others that have implications
beyond the region. He also discusses the impact of
Western nonaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
presents a worst case scenario for the situation in the
Balkans.
Dr Thomas Poulsen, the respondent, is Professor of
Geography at Oregon State University. He under-
scores some of the key elements that affect the Bosnia
situation.
Western Europe and Canada
Dr Colin Williams, Research Professor at the Univer-
sity of Wales, College of Cardiff, examines ethnic
issues in Western Europe, highlighting the most press-
ing and drawing out the implications for multiethnic
accommodation to a changing world order. He empha-
sizes the significance of the spatial perspective at
urban, regional, and continental scales.
Dr Alexander Murphy's response provides further
observations on ethnic dynamics in the region and on
the impact of Western Europe's changing political
geography on ethnic conflict.
Former Soviet Union
Dr Robert Kaiser, Professor of Geography at the
University of Missouri�Columbia, explores the fac-
tors underlying the regional variations in the ethnoter-
ritorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Among
these factors are the degree of national consciousness,
the strength of attachment to place, the nature of
ethnodemographic trends, and the social mobility and
relative deprivation of the ethnic group. He also dis-
cusses how various groups have reacted to rising terri-
torial nationalism.
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Dr. Ronald Wixman, in his response, discusses the
region from a slightly different perspective, viewing
the Soviet Union as an empire that is going through
stages of decolonization.
Africa
Dr. Harm J. de Blij, Landegger Distinguished Profes-
sor of Geography at Georgetown University, examines
the three kinds of ethnic conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa: religious, tribal, and strategic. He then looks in
detail at current ethnic strife in Liberia, Sudan, Dji-
bouti, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola and
assesses the potential for ethnic conflict in Nigeria and
South Africa.
Dr. Rex Honey, Associate Professor of Geography at
the University of Iowa, responds by placing African
ethnic conflict in a historical perspective. He associ-
ates current problems with the European colonialists'
imposition of boundaries and of the modern nation-
state system.
Latin America
Dr Gary S. Elbow, Professor of Geography, Texas
Tech University, discusses the potential for ethnic
conflict in South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
in the 1990s. He focuses on the potential for confron-
tation between indigenous peoples and national gov-
ernments.
Mr Mac Chapin of Rights and Resources responds
by discussing ethnic tensions among groups in Central
America. He concentrates on the marginalization of
the indigenous p_opulation.
Middle East
Dr Marvin Mikesell, Professor of Geography at the
University of Chicago, examines the ethnic realities
that make the Middle East a region of inherent instabil-
ity and the persistent conflict between ethnic groups,
many of whom share a common language and religion.
Dr Mildred Berman, Professor of Geography at
Salem State College, calls attention to refugees as
another of the destabilizing aspects of the region's
human geography.
Southeast and East Asia
Dr Dru Gladney, Research Fellow, Program for
Cultural Studies at the East West Center, Hawaii,
illustrates some of the potential ethnic and subethnic
faultlines in Chinese society. He explores ethnicity in
the context of the shifting nature of identity and pro-
poses some policy considerations.
Dr Eric Crystal, Coordinator for Southeast Asia Stud-
ies at the University of California, Berkeley, presents
four key focuses for understanding ethnic tensions in
Southeast Asia: highland-lowland divides, religious
identification, cultural and linguistic differences in bor-
der regions, and ideological conflicts articulated in
terms of ethnic interest. Dr. Crystal highlights the
impact of outside intervention on inflaming ethnic ten-
sions in the region since World War II and concludes
with some observations for policymaking.
South Asia
Dr Joseph Schwartzberg, Professor of Geography at
the University of Minnesota, examines evolving eth-
nicity in South Asia, focusing on postindependence
India. Among the issues he discusses are the processes
of-ethnic identity formation, linguistic affiliation as an
organizing principle, and Hindu nationalism.
Dr Robert Stoddard, the respondent, is Professor
of Geography at the University of Nebraska. He dis-
cusses the regionalization of the Tamil population in
Sri Lanka and comments on two major perspectives of
Indian nationalism, the secular and the Hindu.
Part III: Regional Comparisons and
Implications for the United States and the
International Community
Perspectives on Demographic and
Humanitarian Issues
Dr. Gary Fuller, Professor of Geography and Popula-
tion Studies at the University of Hawaii, examines the
demographic underpinnings of ethnic conflict. He
argues that certain demographic data, such as infant
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mortality, are good indicators of a particular ethnic
group's well-being. He also looks at how youth
bulges�when the 15 to 24 age cohort exceeds 20 per-
cent of a given population�affect stability within
ethnic groups.
Dr Martin Kenzer, Associate Professor of Geography
at Florida Atlantic University, provides a review of
post-World War II ethnically driven refugee move-
ments and assesses the current refugee picture.
Dr Lee Schwartz, Office of the Geographer, Depart-
ment of State, examines the linkage between forced
migration and ethnicity. He presents a typology of
forced movements of people and a geography of the
ethnic composition of such migration.
States, Nations, and Ethnic Conflict
Dr Thomas Poulsen looks at how overlapping pat-
terns of states (sovereign countries) and nations
(groupings of peoples with common identities) affect
current affairs. He then examines factors that aggra-
vate or ameliorate ethnic conflicts, especially where
nations and states do not correspond, and presents
some political-geographic truisms that the United
States should consider in dealing with ethnic conflict
abroad.
Patterns, Trends, and Regional Comparisons
Dr Marvin Mikesell suggests that some countries�
such as Finland�have done a good job accommodat-
ing minority populations and that neighboring coun-
tries could learn from this.
In her discussion, Dr Mildred Berman relays the
importance of examining population trends.
Ethnic Conflict and US Policy
Dr Jon Gundersen, Department of State, presents his
view that US foreign policy must take into account
ethnic conflict, which will be on the international
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3
agenda over the long term. Concentrating on Europe
and the former Soviet Union, he questions what type
of state structure can best protect ethnic groups in the
region. He concludes by suggesting that the problem
of ethnic conflict in Europe could be addressed
through a united, decentralized Continent governed by
mutually accepted rules of behavior.
Mr. Wade Hinkle, Department of Defense, reiterates
then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's view that eth-
nic/national conflict is one of the main dangers to
US national security in the post�Cold War era. He
then summarizes the key points of US national secu-
rity strategy: remaining engaged in international
affairs, preventing the effects of ethnic conflict, and
forming partnerships with like-minded democratic
countries.
Conclusions: Implications for the United States
and the International Community�Problems
and Prospects
Dr. Stanley Brunn, Professor of Geography at the Uni-
versity of Kentucky, examines the state of the world
political map and itemizes six factors that will affect
global politics over the next 20 years: environment,
religion, secularization, sports, territoriality, and com-
munications.
In the discussion, Dr Rex Honey calls for understand-
ing that oppressed ethnic groups have legitimate
grievances and for support of human rights globally.
Dr Harm J. de Blij, the concluding discussant, points
out that ethnic strife may be related to deteriorating
environmental conditions in parts of the world.
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Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict
Alexander Murphy
Associate Professor of Geography
University of Oregon
Introduction
The topic of ethnic conflict has long interested geogra-
phers, and in recent years the geographical literature
on the subject has attracted considerable attention.
Although some of the issues raised in this literature
are similar to those examined by political scientists
and sociologists, the emphasis in geography on spa-
tial, territorial, and environmental issues has trans-
lated into a distinctly different analytical approach to
ethnic conflict. The purpose of this paper is to summa-
rize the most important aspects of this approach and to
discuss how a geographical perspective can help us
understand ethnic tensions, identify potentially desta-
bilizing ethnic conflicts, and develop effective policy
responses to those conflicts. ,
The ensuing discussion centers around three core geo-
graphical concepts: location, territory, and environ-
ment. In the United States, the discipline of geography
is sometimes equated with efforts simply to locate and
describe the physical and human attributes of the
earth's surface. Geography is, however, much more
than this; it is concerned with analyzing and explain-
ing the nature and significance of the spatial and envi-
ronmental contexts within which events and processes
unfold. Geographers seek to understand and explain
the patterns that make up the earth's surface, the rela-
tionship among phenomena in particular places, the
situation of places and peoples in relation to one
another, and peoples' understandings of the places
where they live.
Core Concepts
The three core concepts around which this paper is
structured are at the heart of these geographical con-
cerns. The concept of location deals not only with the
spatial distribution of ethnic groups but also with the
relationship between ethnic patterns and other human
and physical patterns. Territory is a rich concept that
encompasses the nature and function of formal ethnic
territories and group sense of place. The environmen-
tal concept is concerned with the relationship between
ethnic groups and their tangible physical setting,
including the ways in which environmental percep-
tions affect group definition and intergroup relations.
There are obvious overlaps among these concepts, and
they do not encompass all relevant aspects of geo-
graphical inquiry. Nonetheless, they provide a useful
organizing framework around which a discussion of
the most important geographical insights on ethnic
conflict can be built.
Location: A Key To Understanding Relationships
Between Ethnic Groups
In any attempt to understand ethnic conflict, the loca-
tion of the groups in question must be taken into con-
sideration. On its surface this seems obvious, but many
general analyses of ethnic conflict pay remarkably lit-
tle attention to locational issues. Instead, it is simply
assumed that groups live in the political units or histor-
ical homelands with which they are most readily iden-
tified. Too often studies note that the Bretons live in
Brittany, the French speakers of Canada in Quebec,
and the Tamils in Tamil Eelam without any consider-
ation of the distributional complexities that lie behind
these generalizations.
Approaching ethnic conflict from a geographical per-
spective implies a much greater concern with the
details of location and distribution. This means focus-
ing on the precise character of ethnic patterns and
their relationship to other political, social, and envi-
ronmental patterns. A critical entry-level problem in
such an endeavor is to decide who does and does not
belong to a given ethnic group (see Smith 1986). How
an ethnic group is delimited depends on circumstances
and purpose, of course, but the process is not always
straightforward or obvious. There are more people
that Welsh autonomists would like to include in their
ethnic group than there are people who identify them-
selves primarily as Welsh. The Tamils of Sri Lanka
encompass two different groups from a historical and
religious standpoint. On a larger scale, the Russians in
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the Baltic countries or the Germans in Eastern Europe
cannot necessarily be viewed as one group. Russian
and German migrations into these regions took place
over long periods of time, and those who came earlier
have distinctly different perspectives from those who
migrated during the past few decades.
Once the issue of defining ethnic groups has been
addressed, there is much to learn from a careful analy-
sis of group location and distribution. This can be seen
through an examination of the effects of different dis-
tributions at a large scale. As Marvin Mikesell and I
demonstrated in a recent article (Mikesell and Murphy
1991), the basic distribution of a minority group within
a state influences the types of demands the group is
likely to raise. We posited three scenarios (figure 1),
each involving a dominant group (A) that constitutes
90 percent of the population and a minority group (B)
that constitutes 10 percent of the population. In the first
scenario, group B is concentrated in one area within
the state. In the second scenario, group B is intermixed
with group A throughout the state territory. In the third
scenario, a significant portion of group B is concen-
trated in one territory, but many members of group B
live in other parts of the state. We went on to show that
if a minority grotip feels marginalized or repressed, in
the first scenario it is likely to make demands for sepa-
ration (S), autonomy (A), or even independence (I).
This was the case for the Basques in Franco's Spain
and is still the case for the Tibetans in China. In the
second scenario, by contrast, the demands are likely to
be for recognition (r), access (a), and participation (p),
as exemplified by African-Americans in the United
States. The third scenario, which corresponds to the
situation of the French speakers of Canada, is likely to
yield a mixture of demands and a greater heterogeneity
of ethnic group aspirations.
An understanding of ethnic patterns at a variety of
scales can tell us much about the nature of conflict and
about the viability of proposals to ameliorate conflict.
Take the case of Bosnia, for example. Generalized eth-
nic distributions shown on large-scale maps became
the basis for the Vance-Owen plan to divide up the
country into discrete ethnic territories. A closer exami-
nation of ethnic patterns, however, reveals distribu-
tions that are much more nuanced than those reflected
in the Vance-Owen plan. Awareness of these, together
with some of the territorial issues that will be raised
6
later, helps explain the negative reactions that the plan
engendered. Similarly, a detailed understanding of the
distribution of Tamils in Sri Lanka sheds light on the
problems facing the Sinhalese-dominated government
in its efforts to quell separatist threats through the dev-
olution of power to regional governments. As regional
governments grow in power, ethnically heterogeneous
administrative districts such as Puttalam and Ampara
increasingly become the focuses of conflict.
The forgoing examples suggest that a geographical
perspective on location involves more than simply
identifying where the members of ethnic groups live.
It is concerned with a group's location in relation to
other physical and human phenomena of importance.
Analyzing a group's "relative location" can provide
insight into the likelihood that one group will seek to
exert control over another, the opportunities and cata-
lysts for ethnic group mobilization, the strategies
employed by groups during times of overt conflict,
and the possibilities for a conflict to spill beyond state
boundaries. A brief examination of each of these
points is instructive.
Attempts by one ethnic group to exert control over
another often occur when one group lives in an area
that is highly prized by another (see, for instance,
a number of the essays in Johnston, Knight, and
Kofman 1988). This is evident in the history of rela-
tions between dominant and minority groups in states
as diverse as Australia, Turkey, and France. In each
case, minorities concentrated in areas thought to have
little value or Importance were generally left alone or
ignored. Those living in areas of economic, military,
political, or cultural significance, however, often
encountered interference and domination by the
group in power, which in turn frequently led to
conflict. In making this point, it is important to stress
that the perceptual importance of an area is not simply
a function of its economic and strategic attributes;
places with great historical-cultural meaning or
political significance can become focuses of conflict
as well. Thus, the presence of Albanians in Kosovo
and of French speakers in the communes around
Brussels have generated serious discord because of
the historical-cultural significance of Kosovo to Ser-
bians and the political-cultural significance of the
communes around Brussels to Flemings.
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Figure 1
Minority Aspirations: Significance of Distribution and Size
B
A
B
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
A
B
B
B
SAI
rap
rap
SAI
Source: Mikesell, M., and Murphy, A., "A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority Group Aspirations," Annals of the American Geographers, 349175 6-95
Volume Si, Number 4, page 585, 1991.�
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Turning to the importance of relative location for eth-
nic mobilization, groups living within areas that are
disadvantaged from a socioeconomic standpoint can
use that disadvantage to foster a sense of discrimina-
tion. This does not mean that ethnicity is simply a
product of socioeconomic differences, but comparative
standards of living often become points of contention
in ethnic conflicts (see, for instance, many of the
essays in Chisholm and Smith 1990). In former Yugo-
slavia, for example, Serbian resentment of Croats and
Slovenes was heightened by the disproportionate share
of tourism-related revenue that flowed into Croatia and
Slovenia. The Croats and Slovenes, in turn, resented
the central government's efforts to redistribute some of
that revenue to other parts of Yugoslavia.
The capacity of a group to mobilize is also tied to its
location in relation to demographic and settlement
patterns. There is considerable evidence to suggest
that culturally distinct groups without a significant
urban base are unlikely to develop and sustain a seri-
ous ethnic movement (Murphy 1992). Most ethnic
movements begin among an intelligentsia with some
access to established lines of power and communica-
tion (Smith 1982). Such movements develop and grow
through the successful mobilization of people and
resources, which in turn requires the establishment of
an institutional base that is convenient to a significant
number of group members and that offers access to
channels of communication. Since these elements are
found primarily in cities, an urban base is almost a
prerequisite for ethnic mobilization. Thus, in Western
Europe most successful ethnic challenges have come
from groups such as the Catalans and the Flemings
that have major cities within their territories. By con-
trast, efforts to challenge existing arrangements
among Saami activists in Norway or their Basque
counterparts in France have been frustrated by the
lack of a central place that could become the focus of
identity and nationalist activism.
Turning to the significance of relative location for the
strategies employed by ethnic groups in situations of
overt conflict, it has long been understood that a
group's position in relation to physical features, trans-
portation routes, and settlement patterns affects the
tactics of conflict. As is discussed in more detail
below, ethnic conflicts often revolve around territorial
issues, and control over territory is a primary goal in
times of armed conflict. Assessing the strategies that
are likely to be employed in such conflicts requires an
understanding of a group's location in relation to
places of strategic or perceptual importance, the diffi-
culties of exerting control over those places, and the
advantages that can follow if control is successfully
asserted. In the case of recent Serbian initiatives, for
example, Ronald Wixman has argued that it is impos-
sible to understand the military objectives of the Serbs
without considering the geopolitical and strategic
advantages that will follow from a successful Serbian
attempt both to control the Krajina region of Croatia
and to connect it to Serbia (editorial, The Register
Guard, Eugene, Oregon, 6 June 1993, section B, pp. 1
and 4).
A final important dimension of "relative location" is
the situation of a group in relation to similar or sympa-
thetic groups in other states. Social scientists and poli-
cymakers are so much in the habit of looking at issues
on a state-by-state basis that they often ignore cul-
tural/ethnic continuities across international bound-
aries. Yet Azerbaijanis live in Iran as well as
Azerbaijan, and Armenians are found in Turkey as
well as in Armenia. Focusing on the relationships
among the peoples living on either side of these
boundaries is of critical importance if we are to under-
stand the forces that will affect political stability in
Western and Central Asia in the years ahead. Indeed,
given the increasing permeability of international
boundaries, an awareness of cross-border cultural con-
tinuities and interaction patterns in many parts of the
world is going to be necessary if we are to compre-
hend the ways in which conflicts develop and their
likely ramifications.
Territory: At The Heart of Ethnicity and
Ethnic Conflict
A territory is generally understood to be a bounded
area that has some political character or meaning. As
the embodiment of a particular way of understanding
and using the earth's surface, territory is at the heart of
geographical thinking about ethnicity and nationalism.
Geographers are concerned with the functional and
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perceptual attributes of territory, the ways in which
territory acquires significance in human affairs, and
the nature and impact of competing strategies to con-
trol territory (Knight 1982). Much of the social sci-
ence and public policy literature on ethnicity fails to
consider these issues; instead, territories are treated
simply as fixed units within which political and social
developments are situated. This does not mean that
territories are entirely ignored. Questions are asked
about the role of Quebec in Canadian national politics,
the political tactics of the Armenian minority living
within Azerbaijan, the social consequences of ethnic
heterogeneity within the states of India, and the prob-
lems that interstate resource inequalities pose for
political stability in Nigeria. These questions tend to
be addressed, however, without any consideration of
the historical development, perceptual attributes, or
spatial configuration of the territorial units involved.
The importance of such questions becomes immedi-
ately apparent if we pose a series of counterfactual
questions. Would ethnolinguistic identity and inter-
group conflict in Canada be different if Quebec had
developed as three separate provinces instead of one?
Would Armenian-Azerbaijani relations be any differ-
ent if Stalin had not created an Armenian enclave
within Azerbaijan? Would ethnic relations in Nigeria
be different if the state had been divided into 30
instead of 19 constituent units? The obvious "yes" that
each of these questions commands indicates the
importance of going beyond approaches that take the
territorial status quo for granted.
Two related territorial issues are at the heart of geo-
graphical work on ethnic conflict: (1) the nature and
scope of ethnic senses of territory and (2) the develop-
ment and institutionalization of particular political-
territorial arrangements. Turning to the first issue, the
habit of taking territorial arrangements for granted
means that we often do not consider the disjunction
between territorial structures and group sense of terri-
tory. Yet a map showing group sense of territory can
tell us much more about the likelihood of conflict than
can a static political map. It is, of course, difficult to
delimit a group's sense of territory with any precision,
but insights can be gained through an examination of
historical political patterns, group rhetoric and ico-
nography, population concentrations, and the distribu-
tion of sites with particular ethnocultural significance
(see Gottmann 1973). When the same area clearly
falls within more than one group's sense of territory,
the potential for conflict is heightened (see, for
instance, White 1992).
It is important to note that not all senses of territory
are monoethnic in character. One of the fundamental
flaws of many analyses of pre-civil-war Bosnia is the
failure to recognize the strength of a multiethnic Bos-
nian sense of territory. The number of people in Bos-
nia who were declaring themselves as "Bosnian" on
census and survey forms grew steadily in the post�
World War II era, and many inhabitants came to think
of the country as a territorial synthesis of cultures. The
recent partition plans developed for Bosnia fail to
grasp this reality. Instead they propose dividing the
country into ethnically discrete units. Since such pro-
posals neither can build upon preexisting senses of
territory nor can possibly lead to the establishment of
truly monoethnic territories�the groups are too inter-
mingled for that to happen�their implementation
would at best create a highly unstable situation; each
of the new subdivisions would have an explicitly
monoethnic rationale, yet each would be ethnically
heterogeneous and would fall within more than one
group's sense of territory (Jordan 1993).
The Bosnian example suggests that, when policies are
implemented that ignore underlying territorial ideolo-
gies, instability is likely to result. The issue of sense of
territory is thus closely linked to the second core terri-
torial issue: the development and institutionalization
of particular political-territorial arrangements. Focus-
ing on the process by which formal territories come
into being is important because it can provide insights
into how territorial arrangements shape ethnic identity
and interaction, how conflicts develop and are sus-
tained, and how territory is used to advance particular
political ends (see generally Sack 1986).
Many groups sharing basic cultural traits did not
become self-conscious ethnic groups until fairly
recently. Some 200 years ago there was no widespread
sense of Palestinian, Kurdish, or Flemish identity.
Those identities were forged in the context of politi-
cal-territorial developments that served to differentiate
peoples based on cultural characteristics. In the case
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of the Kurds, a larger sense of group identity devel-
oped out of a territorial struggle that marginalized and
ignored the Kurdish peoples. In the Flemish case, the
implementation of a territorial strategy by a move-
ment initially focused on individual language rights
provided a crucible in which a larger sense of ethnic
identity could develop. In both cases, ethnic demands
and intergroup relations are fundamentally tied to the
development and institutionalization of particular ter-
ritorial arrangements.
The political-territorial history of a region is also
implicated in the development and conduct of inter-
group conflict. This is because particular issues take
on significance as territorial structures come into
being and because those structures, in turn, provide
the frameworks within which the issues in question
are confronted. This complex point can best be illus-
trated through an example. In early 20th century Bel-
gium, the Flemish movement sought to secure the
rights of Dutch or Flemish speakers to use their lan-
guage in public life. Frustrated by their lack of success
and concerned about the growing use of French in
northern Belgium, they changed strategies and began
to call for the partitioning of the country along lan-
guage lines. This eventually occurred, and the country
is now a federation made up of language regions with
broad competencies over economic, social, and cul-
tural matters. The adoption and implementation of a
territorial approach to the language problem shifted
attention away from individual language rights and
directed it toward territorial issues; disputes over the
use of language in governmental and commercial
affairs were replaced by conflicts over the regional
affiliations of certain communes along the language
boundary and around Brussels. Moreover, since pow-
ers over a broad array of issues were devolved to the
language regions, many economic, social, and politi-
cal matters took on ethnoregional significance. As a
result, the internal territorial structure of Belgium has
promoted ethnoregionalism. Without a consideration
of the development and institutionalization of territo-
rial arrangements in Belgium, this point could easily
be missed.
A final reason for focusing on the processes by which
territorial arrangements come into being is that such
an approach provides insight into the purposes behind
the creation of ethnic territories. This, in turn, can tell
us much about the circumstances that lead to ethnic
conflict (see Wixman 1986). General analyses of legal
arrangements in multiethnic states draw a distinction
between "personal" and territorial policy approaches.
The latter encompasses laws that set aside some terri-
tory for a given ethnic group. The assumption is often
made that these laws are pluralist in intent and effect;
it is assumed that they are acknowledgments of the
existence of ethnic diversity and that they operate to
sustain that diversity. A closer examination of territo-
rial policies in multiethnic states reveals a much more
complicated picture (Murphy 1989). In some cases,
territorial policies reflect a desire to recognize and
sustain diversity (for instance, Switzerland, India, and
Canada). In other instances such policies have dis-
tinctly different intents and effects. Territorial policies
are adopted to diffuse international pressure (for
instance, the recognition of-ethnic territories in
Burma), to promote rivalry between groups_ (for
instance, Soviet manipulation of borders in the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia), and even deliberately to con-
strain ethnic rights (for instance, the creation of
"homelands" for the indigenous peoples of South
Africa). Understanding the intent and effect of such
policies is clearly important if we are to judge what a
territory means for a given group and the role that the
territorial context plays in intergroup relations.
Environment: Its Context in Ethnic Conflict
Geographers are fundamentally concerned with the
relationship between people and the environment.
This relationship is important in the context of ethnic
group relations because ethnic identity is often tied to
a particular environmental context, because ecological
issues can become focuses of intergroup conflict, and
because the manipulation of the environment is a fre-
quently used tactic to advance particular ethnoterrito-
rial ends. A brief examination of these three factors
provides insight into the importance of the geographi-
cal concern with the environmental foundations of
ethnic relations.
In many parts of the world, ethnic identity is closely
linked to a people's understanding and use of the envi-
ronment. The strong tie between ethnic identity and
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environmental context can often be seen in the rhetoric
and iconography of ethnic movements; great attention
is paid to the unique physical characteristics of a
group's homeland in the songs, poems, art, and litera-
ture of the group. In many cases, these environmental
characteristics are so much a part of group identity that
any threat to them can precipitate a crisis. The link
between ethnicity and environmental context is even
deeper in parts of the world where differences in sub-
sistence practices define ethnic boundaries. In the
highlands of Nepal, agriculture and ethnicity are
closely linked. An understanding of the intricacies of
that link is of considerable importance if we are to gain
insight into the types of events that can precipitate
conflict. Knowing that the Hindus equate brown grains
with impurity, for example, allows us to understand
the potential implications of a decision emanating
from Katmandu to introduce brown rice into the area.
The state of the environment in an ethnic region can
also become a source of conflict. The ethnopolitical
consequences of ecological degradation were apparent
in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s; concerns over the
rapidly deteriorating state of the environment in Bul-
garia, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland provided a rallying point for those seeking to
bring down Soviet hegemony in the region. Within
states, policies that promote environmental degrada-
tion in ethnic homelands or territories, whether inten-
tional or not, can spark dissention and conflict. This
can be seen in former Czechoslovakia where the cen-
tral government decided to support the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros hydroelectric dam project on the Danube
River. The project, which will result in the flooding of
land within the part of Slovakia where Hungarians are
concentrated, sparked protests amongst Slovalcia's
Hungarian minority.
Manipulation of the environment is also frequently
used as a tactic in ethnic conflicts. In some cases,
efforts are made to demarcate the boundaries of ethnic
territories through the building of particular structures
(for instance, walls and fences), the erection of signs,
or the emplacement of more subtle indicators of ethnic
group territoriality (for instance, symbolic icons or
structures) (see Rumley and Minghi 1991). In other
cases, land use decisions are made with the goal
of asserting control over a given area. This is most
clearly seen when settlements are established in
disputed territories (for instance, the establishment of
settlements by Israeli Jews in the West Bank). More
subtle land use decisions are also linked to ethnic con-
flict. In a provocative recent study, Shaul Cohen
(1993) has shown how the Israeli Government and the
Palestinians use tree planting to assert their claims to
land, the former through afforestation schemes and the
latter through the planting of olive groves. Studies of
this sort highlight the importance of landscape and
land use issues for understanding ethnic conflict.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
The forgoing account has only scratched the surface
of the ways in which geographical perspectives can
enhance our understanding of ethnic conflict. Each of
the highlighted themes could be greatly expanded, as
will undoubtedly become clear in the regional papers
that follow. Looking at ethnicity through a geographi-
cal lens has a variety of implications for the formula-
tion of policy responses to ethnic conflict, but three
stand out: (1) the importance of looking beyond politi-
cal leaders, (2) the importance of looking beyond indi-
vidual states, and (3) the importance of looking at
maps�not just political maps, but ethnic, economic,
environmental, and perceptual maps as well.
11
Turning to the first two points, most of the questions we
ask about the world are framed in terms of states and
state leaders. The assumption is made that states are the
units that really matter in the world today, and the key
questions are thought to be those that focus on the via-
bility and policy stances of political regimes. While this
assumption made some sense during the Cold War era,
it is increasingly problematic. The very ubiquity of eth-
nic conflict points to its limitations. If we are to grasp
the dynamics and power of ethnic conflict in the mod-
ern world, we must be prepared to look at ethnicity
from a bottom-up perspective, one that begins with the
aspirations and needs of groups, not one that always
begins with the existing pattern of states.
This is where geography comes in, for a geographical
perspective provides important insights into ethnicity
and ethnic relations that go beyond conventional
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political analyses Its power is ultimately to root
our understanding of ethnicity in a context that is not
simply one of political leadership and political initia-
tives. By focusing on the loc-ational, territorial, and
environmental dimensions of ethnic conflict, a geo-
graphical perspective directs attention to basic opportu-
nities and constraints, to issues that may precipitate
tensions, and to vital connections across international
boundaries that may be missed if we approach ethnic
conflict on a state-by-state basis. Maps can be extraor-
dinarily important tools in this endeavor, for they
encourage us to think about the relationships between
ethnic processes on the one hand and their territorial
and environmental contexts on the other. Maps should
not be seen as ends unto themselves, however. Rather,
their usefulness is in helping us to see relationships and
issues that otherwise might be missed.
The perspectives on ethnic conflict outlined in this
paper are suggestive of a larger challenge for US for-
eign policy: the need to redefine our national interest
in a way that transcends conventional assumptions
about the power and static character of the existing
political-territorial order. Ethnic conflicts are likely to
intensify, not abate, in the years ahead, and in places
they may well lead to changes in the political organi-
zation of territory. Since there is little the United
States can do to alter this situation, US foreign policy
should not be driven by the assumption that regional
stability is most likely to occur in places where there
are no changes in the world political map. Instead,
long-term stability is likely to be achieved only in sit-
uations where political and territorial arrangements
are organized to protect the basic cultural and political
rights of ethnic groups. This implies the need for a
US foreign policy that is open to political-territorial
structures that promote representative pluralism,
whether or not those structures reflect the existing
pattern of states.
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References
Agnew, John A. Place and Politics: The Geographi-
cal Mediation of State and Society. Boston: Allen &
Unwin, 1987. An excellent overview of the impor-
tance of location, local context, and sense of place in
political and social processes. Includes an extended
discussion of the ways in which place affects ethnic
identity with examples from the Scottish and Ameri-
can contexts.
Chisholm, Michael and Smith, David M., eds. Shared
Space: Divided Space. Essays on Conflict and Territo-
rial Organization. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990. A
good collection of essays showing how territorial
issues come into play in many ethnic conflicts. The
essays include case studies in Western Europe, the
Middle East, the former Soviet Union, South Asia,
South Africa, Australia, and North America.
Clarke, Colin; Ley, David; and Peach, Ceri., eds.
Geography and Ethnic Pluralism. London: Allen &
Unwin, 1984. The essays in this book employ geo-
graphical concepts to analyze ethnic and racial ten-
sions in Third World and metropolitan contexts.
Several of the case studies highlight the importance of
distributional issues for ethnic relations.
Cohen, Shaul E. The Politics of Planting: Israeli-Pal-
estinian Competition for Control of Land in the Jerus-
alem Periphery. Geography Research Paper No. 236.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. A fasci-
nating case study of the use of planting as a means of
asserting control over land. The study demonstrates
the importance of the environment in ethnic relations.
Gottmann, Jean. The Significance of Territory. Char-
lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973. A semi-
nal study of the ways in which territory reflects and
shapes our ideas about politics and society. The study
adopts a historical approach to show how the nature
and meaning of territory has changed over time.
Johnston, R. J.; Knight, David B.; and Kofman, Ele-
onore., eds. Nationalism, Self-Determination and
Political Geography. London: Croom Helm, 1988. A
collection of essays by geographers that focuses on
the links between ethnicity and political geography in
a variety of contexts. The essays provide a good sense
of the range of issues that geographers consider when
studying ethnic conflict.
Jordan, Peter. "The Problems of Creating a Stable
Political-Territorial Structure in Hitherto Yugoslavia."
In Croatia: An New European State. Edited by I.
Crkvenci, M. Klemencic, and D. Feletar. Zagreb: Ure-
dnici, 1993; pp. 133-142. A useful assessment of the
difficulties of creating mono-ethnic territories in Bos-
nia. The study also highlights the disjunction between
proposed territorial partitions for Bosnia and preexist-
ing functional regions.
Knight, David B. "Identity and Territory: Geographi-
cal Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism."
Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
72 (4), 1982; pp. 514-531. An important statement on
the nature and meaning of territory for ethnonational-
ist groups. The study demonstrates the significance of
the emotional bonds that people develop to territory.
and Davies, Maureen. Self-Determination: An
Interdisciplinary Annotated Bibliography. New York:
Garland, 1987. A useful bibliography of works on eth-
nicity and nationalism, including many written by
geographers.
Mikesell, Marvin W. "The Myth of the Nation State."
Journal of Geography, 82 (6), 1983; pp. 257-260. A
highly accessible overview of the disjunction between
political and ethnic patterns in the modern world and
the significance of that disjunction for political stabil-
ity.
and Murphy, Alexander B. "A Framework for
Comparative Study of Minority Group Aspirations."
Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
81(4), 1991; pp. 581-604. A study of ethnic group
relations in comparative prespective, including a pro-
posed framework for understanding the relationship
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References (continued)
between ethnic group aspirations and government pol-
icies. The study also examines the significance of geo-
graphical context for minority group goals.
Murphy, Alexander B. "Territorial Policies in Multi-
ethnic States." Geographical Review, 79 (4), 1989;
pp. 410-421. An overview of the nature and impact of
different kinds of ethnoterritorial policies in culturally
heterogenous states. The study shows that territorial
policies are not necessarily pluralist in intent and
effect.
of the role that elites play in the development of ethnic
movements. The study provides interesting insights
into the circumstances that are likely to lead to ethnic
mobi1i7ation.
. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986. A seminal work on the nature of eth-
nicity and nationalism. The study adopts a historical
approach to show the continuities and discontinuities
between modern ethnic nationalism and its premodern
antecedents.
"Urbanism and the Diffusion of Substate White, George W. "The Territorial Dimension of Hun-
Nationalist Ideas in Western Europe." History of garian Ethnic Identity." Yearbook of the Association of
European Ideas, 15 (4-6), 1992; pp. 639-645. An Pacific Coast Geographers, 44, 1992; pp.23-48. A
examination of the importance of settlement structure thoughtful overview of Hungarian territorial issues in
for the development and dissemination of ethnona- the aftermath of World War I. The study highlights the
tionalist ideas. The study points to the importance of�importance of group sense of -territory in the delimita-
an urban base for a minority group's ability to extract tion of national boundaries.
concessions from state authorities.
Rumley, Dennis and Minghi, Julian V., eds. The Geog-
raphy of Border Landscapes. London: Routledge,
1991. An interesting collection of essays looking at
the various ways in which groups use landscapes to
establish and maintain borders for political and cul-
tural purposes. The book includes case studies from a
variety of different settings.
Sack, Robert D. Human Territoriality: Its Theory and
History. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press, 1986. A major statement on human efforts to
exert control over geographical space. The study dis-
cusses the historical development of territoriality,
examines some of the reasons for adopting a territorial
approach, and indicates some of the implications of
such an approach.
Smith, Anthony D. "Nationalism, Ethnic Separatism,
and the Intelligentsia." In National Separatism. Edited
by Colin H. Williams. Vancouver: University of Brit-
ish Columbia Press, 1982; pp. 17-41. A good analysis
Williams, Colin H. and Smith, Anthony D. "The
National Construction of Social Space." Progress in
Human Geography, 7 (4), 1983; pp. 502-518. A good
overview of the ways in which geography is impli-
cated in ethnicity and ethnic relations. The article
focuses on a variety of spatial and territorial issues
that are relevant to ethnic conflict.
Wixman, Ronald. "Applied Soviet Nationality Policy:
A Suggested Rationale." In Pass�urco-Tatar--
Present Sovietique: Etudes Offertes a Alexandre Ben-
nigsen. Edited by Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Vein-
stein, and S. E. Wimbush. Louvain: Editions Peeters,
1986; pp. 449-468. An interesting case study that
shows how ethnic territories have been manipulated to
achieve particular political ends. The study focuses
attention on the importance of the historical develop-
ment of territorial structures for ethnic group relations.
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Identity, Territory, and Self-Determination:
Factors Underlying Potential National and
International Conflict
David B. Knight
Dean of Social Sciences
University of Guelph
The State
States' remain the principal territorial framework for
international society. Whereas all States are legally
equal within the international system, in geographical
terms there are great differences within and between
States, including differences that find reflection in the
way individual States may be perceived as partici-
pants in the system (Cohen 1991; Knight, 1993).
The State, a physical and legal entity, is a bounded
container for the contents of a particular portion of the
earth's surface, which includes the people, their gov-
ernment, resources, and means for communication
and movement. The State, theoretically, is "the chief
custodian of overall social order; it is monitor, comp-
troller, arbitrator" of all people, things, and processes
operating within the delimited bounds (Greer and
Orleans, cited in Knight, 1982). Further, as Johnston
(1982) has observed, the State acts as the promoter of
accumulation, as the legitimator of capitalism, and as
the creator of social consensus and order. In order to
perform these three roles, each State develops its own
instruments and mechanisms by which the structural
links between social formation and the State can func-
tion hierarchically and so enable the reproduction of
the system.
The State is thus itself a geographical factor because
things happen that have spatial consequences as a
result of decisions and actions by State agents and
institutions. States' actions pertain to their own and
others' territories. An essential quality of statehood is
territory; all States have territory that is bounded, for-
mally or informally, by human decisions and actions.
I State, with a capital "s" herein, refers to an internationally recog-
nized independent, self-governing territory, sometimes called a
country. State with a lowercase "s" refers to a politico-territorial
unit within a State, such as Minnesota within the United States.
Territory
Territory by itself is a passive concept. People, by
their beliefs, decisions, and actions, give meaning to
territory. Territory thus is not; rather, it becomes! It is
true that many people obtain meaning from "their"
territory and the landscape within it by believing that
the territory and its landscape are living entities that
are already filled with meaning. And it is true that
such meanings may be reflected in a people's cultural
ecology, the spatial patterning of their settlement and
land use systems, their naming of places, their patterns
of movement, and perhaps in reverential beliefs they
hold about specific parts of the landscape around
them. To suggest that these meanings are simply fig-
ments of the collective imagination�parts of the
"geographies of the mind"�is to be radical, at least
for those people who accept the apparent truth of such
meanings. Meanings gained from territory�which are
really attributions to the territory�reflect a cultural
relationship with the territory. Consider, for instance,
the powerful links most US citizens have to Washing-
ton, DC, where the human-created capital landscape
serves as an important symbolic place for members of
the American nation.
A State's territory is thus not value-free; it holds dif-
ferent kinds of meanings for its people versus�but
from quite different perspectives and degrees of
knowledge, insight, and appreciation�those who do
not belong. People of the State will revere and gain
strength from their territory. People will see certain
structures or specific locations, such as statues, capital
cities, battlefields, and even the territory as a whole, as
sacred or at least very special. In sum, territory is a
social construction (Williams and Smith, 1983).
If it is accepted that territory "becomes," then States
are not geographical givens. No State exists because
of firm geographical factors. States and their spatial
parameters�dimensions, shapes, and boundaries�
exist because human actions and various local and
world economic-political-social processes have led to
their creation and continuation. These actions and pro-
cesses occur in specific time-space settings and so
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involve geographical considerations, with resulting
actions and processes having sometimes profound,
sometimes subtle geographical impact.
For those who belong to and control a territory, there
will undoubtedly be powerful symbolic links to
"their" territory, no matter how little the territory is
actually known or how wealdy it is perceived; it is
enough that it is theirs! But what if the territory in
question does not coincide with the bounds of a partic-
ular State, either in terms of its internal or inter-State
structures? Where there is a distributional disparity,
there is the potential for conflict.
The Inherent Contradictions of Territory
The attachments people have to their territory can
have spiritual and psychological bases that go deeper
than anything generated simply by economic factors.
These attachments and linkages help to bond people
both to their territory and to others who also "belong"
to it and accept it as theirs.
Territory, according to the French geographer Jean
Gottmann (1973), when delimited with a system of
government that has effective control over it, provides
both security and opportunity for those who live
within its bounds. On the one hand, there is security to
be gained from being an isolated community, whereas,
on the other hand, there is opportunity to be derived
from being a part of a larger whole. Inwardness and
security, outwardness and opportunity�stress is
caused by these contradictory dimensions of territory,
for elements of both undoubtedly are always present
in any situation. In terms of foreign policy and inter-
national trade and other linkages, States may be fur-
ther along the continuum toward one extreme or the
other at different times, thus more toward stressing an
outward-looking opportunity perspective than an
inward-looking security perspective at one time, and
vice versa at another. That there is an interplay
between the two contrasting, fundamental dimensions
of territory is vital to any understanding of the politi-
cal geography of specific States, the international sys-
tem of States, and the various group politico-territorial
identities around the globe that are challenging the
status quo.
Territorial Processes
For any State to exist there must be numerous "cen-
tripetal forces" operating that link people, places, and
socioeconomic and political processes (Whebell 1983;
table 1). A key process is centralization, whereby the
people and their territory are "welded" together via
socioeconomic and political integration. Centraliza-
tion processes vary, and the degrees of success in
achieving unification, if-such is the goal, also vary. It
has been almost an article of faith that by the modern-
ization of all within the State's bounds a unified devel-
oped State can be achieved, with the center�be it
political or economic�providing supposed solutions
to the development needs of periphery. The efforts of
the 1950s and 1960s, in many States, did not achieve
such a goal. Still, even when unity eluded States,
modernization processes generally linked people and
regions together. Core-periphery relations have inter-
nal and international dimensions for all States (Gott-
mann, ed., 1980). They operate in colonial situations
too, as when the center establishes and then strength-
ens its links to the colonial periphery center.
States also constantly have to deal with various decen-
tralizing processes. Whereas various centripetal forces
strengthen and unify the State, countervailing, centrif-
ugal forces reduce its cohesion. A weak central gov-
ernment; poor communications; or significant ethnic,
cultural, religious, or other divisions among people
within the State serve as examples of centrifugal
forces. If the divide is too great between a regionally
based group and the central government, self-determi-
nation and secession may be demanded. To deal with
demands from a peripheral portion of the State, the
government may grant devolution whereby legislative
power is devolved from the center to a region�such
as what Scots nationalists want from the English-dom-
inated parliamentary center in London or when a new
sub-State territory is created as in Jura in Switzerland
(Jenkins, 1986). If centrifugal forces prove to be too
destructive within a State, a people may demand inter-
nal self-determination by throwing out a government
and reforming the State, as happended early in the
1990s in Poland and Hungary when Communist gov-
ernments and their apparatuses were overthrown and
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Territorial Processes"
Centralization subsumed:
� "Centripetal forces."
� Socioeconomic and political integration.
� Modernization.
� Metropolitanism.
� Core-periphery relationships.
Decentralization subsumed:
� "Centrifugal forces."
� SW-determination�processes involved in a demand
for the restructuring of the State, with new power to
the people.
� Devolution�legislative power from center to
region(s).
� Colonial rule.
� Decolonization�instigated by the imperial power
Capital city location:
� Site selection process and consequences of site
selection.
Boundary establishment's three stages:
� Definition.
� Delimitation.
� Demarcation.
Expansionist subsumed:
� Imperialism.
Irredentism subsumed:
� Annexationism�change in political control from
one unit to another.
Separatism subsumed:
Autonomism�implies territorial distinctiveness.
� Self-determination�processes involved in a demand
to be separated from the existing State.
� Decolonization�initiated by colony.
� Secessionism�detachment to create a new territory.
'Based on Whebell (1983), with modifications and additions by
Knight.
replaced by multiparty democratic systems responsive
to ballot box results. Colonial rule, under the guidance
of a governor, is a form of decentralization, as is
decolonization that occurs by imperial action.
All States, through their governments, deal with com-
peting centripetal and centrifugal forces. Competition
between and among the regions of the State and with
the center provides evidence of this. The selection of a
capital city generally brings both forces to the surface
as competing territorially based biases and opinions
are expressed. Hence the selection of a new capital
can itself be a territorial process, as evidenced by the
bitter case in Canada in the 19th century (Knight,
1992) and in united Germany over whether Berlin
should once again become the capital.
17
Other territorial processes include:
� Boundary establishment�the creation of limits to a
territory. This can involve dynamic processes, as
governments determine the areal extent of their con-
trol. Boundary conflicts remain the primary cause
for conflict between States (Boundary Bulletin).
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� Expansionism�the areal extension of a State and
domination of neighboring States' territories and
peoples (Parker, 1988) or the claiming of others' ter-
ritories overseas (Christopher 1988).
� Irredentism�the claiming or taking of another
State's territory based on a cultural claim, whether
true or not. Nazi Germany's claiming and taking the
Sudetenland (in Czechoslovakia) in 1938 is the clas-
sic example.
� Separatism�the separation of one part from another,
whether partially or totally. If a regionally based
group causes friction between the region and the cen-
ter, accord may be achieved by the granting of auton-
omy as in Euskadi, northern Spain. Decolonization
and the granting of statehood due to demands from
within a colony is another form of separatism; it is
significant that most colonies obtained independence
within their colonially derived boundaries because
separatist threats were perceived to be too great to
permit otherwise.2 If an internal-to-a-State solution
to discord is not enough, the State may disintegrate
as a result of secessionism, whereby the territory is
divided into two or more parts as with the recent
breakup of Czechoslovakia.
Measures of Identity
All these territorial processes imply people. Of con-
cern here are people in groups. The word "people" has
legal meaning; it normally encompasses all the inhab-
itants of a State. All people living within Botswana,
for example, are said to be Botswana, whether or not
they all have allegiance to such a definition of group
"self." Some sub-State groups claim they are "people"
and thus deserve international recognition (Knight
1988; Crawford 1988). Many other terms are used to
describe groups of people, including nations, ethnic
groups, and tribes. All evoke feelings of self-worth by
members and feelings of suspicion toward nonmem-
bers. To get around the problems of evocative defini-
tions, I have offered the phrase "group territorial
2 This conservative View is under threat, as demonstrated by the
recent creation of Eritrea out of part of Ethiopia, a territorial break
that perhaps is but a prelude to territorial partitioning and new State
creation that could occur throughout Africa.
identity"; that is, if the group becomes active in a
political manner and makes it needs known with the
State, it becomes a "group politico-territorial identity"
(Knight, 1982):
Group territorial identities, involving as they do
numerous ways for people to identify and bond and
yet also to be separate, form an aspect of the geogra-
phies of the mind, because the links�while some-
times having physical expression, as with flags,
national anthems, favored symbolic sites (Zelinsky,
1988)�remain essentially in the mind, to turn off or
on. Each definition of group self implies some other
group, with different values, different attachments,
and different allegiances�the description of which
may not reflect reality from the perspective of that
other group (Said, 1993; Godlewska and Smith 1994).
Just as territory has inward and outward conse-
quences, so too does identity. Some groups look
inward, stressing the need for security, whereas others
are keen to look outward, seeking opportunities for
interaction with others. The concepts of territory and
identity thus share a fundamental tension between
these competing elements.
We operate at several levels of identity. At the center
is the self, normally set within a family. Beyond that,
we are amazing creatures because we have the capac-
ity to attach ourselves to many aspects of our group
identities, such as in a neighborhood, a religious com-
munity, a scout troop, a football team, a region of the
country, or even the nation�all of which are tied to
particular places (Tuan, 1977). We can flick a switch
in our minds and change attachments, as is appropriate
at the moment. But each of us ultimately gives priority
of belonging to a particular level of abstraction of
identity. For many people priority in the people-to-ter-
ritory link is at the level of the State. However, for
many others, priority is given to a lower order alle-
giance. For instance, some may have allegiance to a
regionally based identity, as to Punjab rather than to
India. Others may give primary allegiance to their
tribe/ethnic group/sub-State nation. The latter three
forms of group identity may be based on claims of
common ancestry; common language; (selective) his-
tory; traditions; and, above all, in the name of the
group, a particular territory.
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What is not well understood is why people can at one
moment share a higher level of identity that links two
or more separate identities but then drop back into plac-
ing their local level of identity first, thus leading to the
exclusion of previously accepted neighbors and, per-
haps, to conflict. For example, in Yugoslavia people for
a time accepted a trans-subgroup "Yugoslavian" iden-
tity but then, as the State apparatus rapidly crumbled,
shucked that ephemeral level of identity and returned to
giving priority to their age-old ethnic identities.
Territoriality
We are all territorial beings, exhibiting territoriality in
varying manners, depending upon in which culture we
are brought up. Although people vary from one cul-
ture to another in terms of what they regard as their
personal space, most will defend their home turf at a
personal scale�be it the home from burglars, the
team's territory during a hockey game, or the claimed
locations for our desks in the office. At a different
scale, ethnic and national territory may also be
defended if threatened. Groups, as with individuals,
exhibit territoriality. Geographer Robert Sack (1981,
1986) notes that territoriality is a powerful and indis-
pensable geographic strategy for controlling people
and things by controlling area. Territoriality implies
the need to possess, occupy, and defend a particular
territory.
Why should people sometimes link together and at
other times not? It is not a given that some people can
cooperate and share territory whereas others must be
divided. The link between territory, identity, and terri-
toriality becomes especially dynamic when discord
exists between two or more group territorial identities
that share a single space�such as Walloons and
Flemings in Belgium, Greek hrid Turkish Cypriots in
Cyprus, contrasting peoples in Sudan�or, indeed, lie
across the shared bounds of two or more States, as do
the Kurds in Southwest Asia.
Self-Determination
When the concern for identity, territory, territoriality,
and self-determination are combined, a dynamic defini-
tion is possible: "territory is.. . space to which identity
is attached by a distinctive group who hold or covet
that territory and who desire to have full control of it
for the group's benefit" (Knight, 1982, p. 526). Self-
determination is at once a legal concept that finds
expression in international law and a geographical con-
cept because it links identity, territory, and the desire
for control and has territorial processual consequences.
In the West there is a tendency to discuss human rights
from an individual basis, whereas in the former USSR
and in many Third World States stress is given to
group rights. Group rights form the basis for many
claims, especially when the nation is involved,
because most people today still put the needs of their
nation above personal needs�thus the call to arms is
so often heeded in times of danger. Group rights also
find expression in self-determination, for the term is
used to refer to groups, not individuals. Maoris in
New Zealand use the word turangawaewae to refer,
literally, to "the standing place for the feet." Implied
in this is "the rights of a tribal group in land and the
consequential rights of individual members of the
group" (cited in Knight, 1988, p. 126). This phrase
links identity, territory, and rights. Control is implied
too, for without control the people's rights and respon-
sibilities cannot be fulfilled, and the identity within
territory is threatened. Control over both identity and
territory is self-determination. Many groups, varying
defined, claim self-determination by maintaining they
have valid links between their identity and their terri-
tory and have the expectation of rights and control that
would come from the granting of self-determination.
Despite the clamoring for self-determination and its
application following World War I in many places in
Europe, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing, in 1921 believed that national safety, historic
rights, and economic interests should take precedence
over self-determination. He felt the term self-determi-
nation was "loaded with dynamite!" Thus Lansing
and other politicians then and later, even to this day,
have given priority to existing States (Knight 1985).
Although the UN Charter states that "all people have
the right to self-determination," the UN�which is
made of representatives of States, after all�gives pri-
ority to respecting the territorial integrity of existing
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States over any substate group politico-territorial
identity's claim to part of the State's territory; to do
otherwise would "dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the existing State" (UN General Assembly Reso-
lution 2625 (XV), cited in Knight, 1985, P. 259).
There is an out, for under international law, as cur-
rently written, secession may occur if the majority of
the people of the total State�or the government,
which claims to speak in their name�agrees to the
dismantlement of governmental authority in part of
the State and to its secession.
The concern for the territorial integrity of States has
recently been severely challenged by three things.
First, by the development of human rights expecta-
tions that are said to apply to all States. Second, by the
disintegration of the former USSR and the claiming of
self-determination by numerous formerly sub-State
groups�some of whom find themselves to be still
sub-State groups but now within different or restruc-
tured States. Third, by US-led UN interventionist
actions in several States. Perhaps we will soon see a
rewriting of international law. Any application of self-
determination implies change, whether change within
a territory or change as a consequence of the splitting
of a territory into at least two parts. In each case, peo-
ple, with distinctive identities, seek change.
Conclusion
The linked concepts of identity, territory, self-determi-
nation, and numerous territorial processes give power
and meaning to the actions of many group politico-ter-
ritorial identities who seek to better their lot. While a
variety of additional factors need to be considered
when examining potentials for ethnic or national con-
flict (Kliot, 1989; Gosar, ed., 1993), it is necessary to
appreciate the importance of the essential concepts
and processes discussed here to more fully appreciate
why certain conflicts are due to ethnic and national
tensions, bounded as they are within certain territorial
structures and influenced by�or which cause--cer-
tain territorial processes.
Pressures are mounting for territorial (and other) alter-
ations to the existing international system of States.
Some of the pressures are now severe, as evidenced by
savagery in parts of the former USSR and Eastern
Europe, where many distinct group politico-territorial
identities have sought or are seeking to establish their
own States separate from the politico-territorial units
in which they now find themselves. Is the day far off
before similar pressures mount elsewhere�in Africa,
Asia, or even the Americas�for secession, with or
without violence? Not all claims for self-determina-
tion need involve secession, as suggested above,
because accommodations are often reached within
existing State structures. Nevertheless, secession as a
recourse to discord remains�and, indeed, has become
increasingly�an option.
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References
Boundary Bulletin, Durham, England: International
Boundaries Research Unit.
Cohen, S. B. "Global Geopolitical Change in the
Post�Colonial War Era," Annals of the Association of
American Geographers, Vol. 81, 1991; pp. 551-580.
Christopher, A. J. The British Empire at its Zenith
London: Croom Helm, 1988.
Crawford, James, ed. The Rights of Peoples, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1988.
Godlewska, Anne and Neil Smith, eds. Geography
and Empire, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
Gosar, A., ed. "Ethnicity and Geography," special
issue of GeoJoumal, Vol. 30, 1993; pp. 199-364.
Gottmann, Jean. The Significance of Territory
Charlottesville: The University Press of
Virginia, 1973.
Gottmann, Jean, ed. Centre and Periphery: Spatial
Variation in Politics, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980.
Jenkins, J. R. G. Jura Separatism in Switzerland
Oxford: Clarendon, 1986.
Johnston, R. J. Political Geography and the State
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Kliot, Nurit. "Mediterranean Potential for Ethnic
Conflict: Some Generalizations," Tijdschrift voor
Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 80, 1989;
pp. 147-163.
Knight, David B. "Identity and Territory: Geographi-
cal Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism,"
Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
Vol. 72, 1982; pp. 514-532.
Knight, David B. "Territory and People or People
and Territory: Thoughts on Post-Colonial Self-
Determination," International Political Science
Review, Vol. 6, 1985; pp. 248-272.
Knight, David B. "Self-Determination for Indigenous
Peoples: The Context for Change," in Nationalism,
Self-Determination and Political Geography, R. J.
Johnston, D. B. Knight and E. Kofman, eds. London:
Croom Helm, 1982; pp. 117-134.
Knight, David B. A Capital for Canada: Conflict
Resolution in a Parliamentary System, Ottawa:
Carleton University Press, 1992.
David B. Knight. "Geographical Considerations in a
World of States," in States in a Changing World,
A. M. James and R. Jackson, eds. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Parker, Geoffrey. The Geopolitics of Domination
London: Routledge, 1988.
Rumley, Dennis and J. V. Minghi, eds. The Geography
of Border Landscapes, London: Routledge, 1991.
Sack, Robert D. "Territorial Bases of Power," in
Political Studies From Spatial Perspectives New
York: Wiley, 1981.
Sack, Robert D. Human Territoriality: Its Theory and
History, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986.
Said, Edward R. Culture and Imperialism, New York:
Knopff, 1993.
Tuan, Yi-Fu. Space and Place, Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1977.
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References (continued)
Whebell, C. F. J. "Political-Territorial Process," paper
presented at International Political Geography Confer-
ence, School of Geography, Oxford University, 1983.
Williams, Colin and A. D. Smith "The National Con-
struction of Social Space," Progress in Human
Geography, Vol. 7, 1983; pp. 502-518.
Zelinsky, Wilbur. Nation Into State, Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
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Summary of General Discussion
DR. POULSEN: I would like to elaborate on one of
the points that Dr. Murphy made about ethnic mobili-
zation and socioeconomic status as they relate to terri-
toriality. Dr. Murphy referred to the ability of the
Serbs to mobilize themselves on the basis of their
envy and resentment toward the Slovenes and Croats,
who are much more economically developed. Ethnic
group mobilization can work in the reverse as well,
when more developed regions resent the flow of
resources to poorer regions. For example, the Croatian
identity that developed since the 1960s certainly origi-
nated, in part, because this group was the productive
part of Yugoslavia and the Croatians felt that the reve-
nues they generated were being wasted in Serbia and
in the southern parts of the country. One can point to a
similar situation in Spain where the separatist feelings
that exist among the Basques and the Catalonians
come, not because they lack resources, but, again,
because they reside in the most productive part of
Spain�on a per capita basis�and their productivity
goes to the benefit of non-Catalonian and non-Basque
regions.
DR. MURPHY: That is an important point. I tried to
allude to this after saying there was Serbian resent-
ment of Croats and Slovenes because of the dispropor-
tionate share of tourism-related revenues that they
receive. The key to understanding socioeconomic pat-
terns in terms of relative location, which is the way I
framed it, is not simply to think that a map of socio-
economic well-being necessarily tells us something
about ethnicity, but rather to think about socioeco-
nomic well-being in relation to how it is understood
and interpreted. Whether you are well off or poor, the
key issue is whether you feel like your well-being is
threatened�a feeling of marginalization. That is what
is important in considering patterns of socioeconomic
differentiation.
QUESTION: Both the speakers have presented some
very tantalizing concepts that I think would fit well
into a strategy of conflict prevention, which I hope we
talk a little bit about in the next two days. I would like
to ask Dr. Murphy to say something about conflict res-
olution. Once people have decided to use guns to
readjust these territorial boundaries and once that
dynamic is engaged in places like Bosnia, what can
the geographic discipline tell policymakers that can
help us as we attempt conflict resolution�especially
in cases where the conflicts are violent?
DR. MURPHY: Conflict resolution is clearly one of
the most important issues that we have to deal with. It
is difficult to answer that briefly in a way that gets
beyond generalities. Nevertheless, let me say a few
things.
Understanding the issues of territory, scale, and loca-
tion is necessary to make sensible and intelligent pro-
posals to ameliorate existing conflicts.
First of all, conflict resolution requires an understand-
ing, in part, of the strategies that are likely to be
employed by the participants. This, in turn, requires an
understanding of how participants understand and per-
ceive territory. I think it is actually fairly clear why the
Serbian military has pursued aggression in particular
areas. It is further clear why that is happening in terms
of basic strategic concerns. An understanding of
underlying territorial motives and objectives, I think,
is helpful in formulating any kind of response to
something like the current conflict in the Balkans.
Another issue that it is necessary to understand in
terms of conflict resolution is that of scale. One must
be cognizant of the impact of a particular proposal for
resolving conflict. An important question that needs to
be asked is, "What does this solution mean for Bos-
nia?" "What does it mean for the larger Islamic
world?"
But third, and most important, is the need to have a
clear understanding of a region's territorial and ethnic
realities. Conflict resolution implies some kind of plan
to create a stable situation. I made some comments
about the inefficacy of the Vance-Owen plan. I made
them because the plan and other plans that have been
articulated for the division of Bosnian territory into
monoethnic regions fail to take into consideration sev-
eral fundamental territorial and ethnic realities�one
of which is that, for all the usefulness of the general-
ized ethnic map of the country, it hides as much as it
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reveals. We have to recognize that. It is not a reflec-
tion of underlying patterns of territorial ideology, nor
of functional patterns of interaction before the 1989
civil war. It is, in fact, not even really in any conceiv-
able way possible to create monoethnic territories in
that region. This implies the need for a different kind
of strategy to conflict resolution.
One would have to use different kinds of strategies in
dealing with other problems. In the case of Belgium, if
I were advising the Belgian Government on how to
keep its ethnoregional situation under control, I would
suggest giving the old provinces more political-terri-
torial significance within the state. Then their citizens
could vote on a fiscal issue and have it not always be
an ethnoregional issue. So the answer, of course, has
to be tied to the particularities of each case. It seems
that the issues of territory, scale, and location are part
of what has to be in the mix in order to make sensible
and intelligent decisions.
QUESTION: Is there a correlation between socioeco-
nomic status and ethnic conflicts? Would it be valid to
say that a commonality in socioeconomic status would
ameliorate ethnic conflict? Is socioeconomic status a
factor we should examine in attempting to determine
whether there is a potential for ethnic conflict?
How important is marginalization of the deprived
population a factor in ethnic conflict as opposed to
merely a difference in socioeconomic status?
DR. MURPHY: Is there a correlation? Yes. Is it reduc-
ible to socioeconomic differences? The short answer is
no. The key question�and this plays off of some of
Dr. Knight's comments�is one of perception. How are
socioeconomic differences understood and perceived?
To draw on the Belgium case again, one could take a
look at that country in the late 19th century and gener-
alize about the north. One could say that northern Bel-
gium was then less well off than southern Belgium, so
that must be a reason why the Flemish movement
mobilized at that time. That is a tempting interpreta-
tion if you think in simplistic regional terms�but the
modern ethnolinguistic regions of Belgium had no
meaning at that time. There were socioeconomic dif-
ferences between the north and the south, but they
were understood to be a rural-urban rather than a
regional phenomenon. Although a statistical correla-
tion existed between region and socioeconomic differ-
ences in the late 19th century, this did not really
explain ethnic mobilization at that time. The mobiliza-
tion had much more to do with the inability of Flemish
speakers to use their language in public life. That
issue, in turn, began to take on regional significance as
efforts to achieve greater language rights were frus-
trated.
Socioeconomic differences can be significant; the key
is to understand how these are perceived and used.
Would a commonality of-socioeconomic status mean
that conflicts would not be as intense in many cases?
Yes. Would it mean ethnic conflict would cease
entirely? Probably not, because there are lots of other
issues that correlate as well. I think we made a mis-
take about 15 years ago when we wanted to reduce
ethnicity to economics. Ultimately, it just does not
work.
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Ethnic and Territorial Conflicts in Eastern Europe
Ronald Whonan
Professor of Geography
University of Oregon
Introduction
Today's Eastern Europe consists of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Yugoslavia (con-
sisting today of Serbia and Montenegro), Albania,
Greece, and European (or Thracian) Turkey. One can
also add to this list Moldova (Bessarabia) and the
western part of Ukraine, as they are culturally, histori-
cally, and geographically tied to the rest of this greater
region. At this point in time, on the other hand, East-
ern Germany and Austria should not be considered
part of the East European realm. The reasons for
including Greece and Thracian Turkey in Eastern
Europe are both historical and cultural and represent a
reality important to the current geopolitical situation
in the Balkans. These last two regions have always
been part of the East European culture realm, but for
purely political and military reasons related to the
Cold War period they were classified differently.
Throughout Eastern Europe, there are serious issues of
nationalism that threaten the stability of individual
countries as well as the region as a whole. Most seri-
ous of these are conflicts stemming from ethnic- and
cultural-territorial�geographical�demands by one
or more parties. While some of the issues center pri-
marily on ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural
rights and privileges, others are manifested in
extremely serious demands for control of given
regions, in open conflict based on ethnic or territorial
claims or in international disputes over the recognition
or nonrecognition of given countries.
Most serious for Europe and the United States, how-
ever, are those that deal with territorial conflict based
on various ethnic claims that demand changes in
national control of these regions and/or population
exchanges or attempts at ethnic cleansing. Indeed,
many of the justifications for current actions are
related to experiences with ethnic cleansing and popu-
lation resettlement policies in the near or distant past.
We must be careful to distinguish between issues that
potentially could lead to serious conflict and those that
are merely local cultural demands. In the latter cate-
gory are issues related to simple demands for ethnic
recognition or the right to one or another cultural insti-
tutions (native language in the media and education,
native language press, or freedom of religion) that do
not threaten to destabilize any given state or nation or
that will probably not result in open hostility between
groups.
Quite serious to a rapidly changing picture of causes
for interethnic conflict in Fastern Europe is the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The current war in Bosnia
may be the precursor to an even greater war that might
involve many other nations, including America's
NATO Allies Turkey and Greece on opposite sides of
the conflict. In addition, the applied policies by the
Western powers toward this ongoing conflict affect
not only the Balkans as a whole but also other parts of
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The response, for
example, to Serbian territorial aggression and ethnic
genocide (ethnic cleansing) both sets a precedent for
other countries with problematic minorities and forces
others to assess their own situations relative to foreign
nations with exclave populations.
Before discussing ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe
today and the impact of Western policy in the "Yugo-
slav War," a brief discussion is provided on the dis-
tinction between the reasons for and justifications for
territorial claims. This distinction is necessary if one
wishes to obtain an accurate picture of ethnoterritorial
conflict in this diverse region. Claims to territory on
ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, and historical
grounds are common around the world. Sometimes
two groups claim the same territory with differing but
equally understandable reasons for doing so. The Jew-
ish/Palestinian conflict represents such a situation.
Here two peoples are fighting over the same piece of
territory, as it is tied to their current ability to exist as
distinct nations. On the other hand, many conflicts are
tied to far more distant issues in which historical
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events are distorted to provide a legitimacy for current
claims. The Greek claim to the name Macedonia is a
good example of the use of historical justification.
Reasons deal with actual situations related to actual
(or perceived) threats, actual security issues, or
attempts to redress recent injustices that have resulted
in serious problems for a given people, nation, or
state. Justifications, on the other hand, are excuses
used to legitimize the desires or actions of one or
another group to achieve their own aims. A variety of
historical�and more so folkloric-historical�justifi-
cations, for example, have played a major role in Ser-
bia's aggression against Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and in Greece's anti-Macedonian
stance. These two are deeply intertwined and explain
to a great extent Greece's open support for Serbia in
the current conflict in Bosnia.
Potential for Ethnic Conffict in Eastern Europe
We can divide the current issues of ethnic conflict in
Eastern Europe into three categories. The first repre-
sents the least problematic situations where individual
groups request recognition of minority rights. These
are composed of individual ethnic groups that do not
threaten the territorial integrity of any nation or whose
demands or requests will not result in anything more
than local demonstrations (even violent ones) or pro-
tests. The second category is made up of those ethnic
issues that may result in some degree of violence or
even territorial changes that are of local importance
only (for instance, those that do not threaten greater
instability throughout the region) or those that are
quite serious but in which the Western Allies (or the
United States individually) should not become
involved. The last category represents those ethnic
issues that could lead to serious regional conflicts, to
major international conflict, or to major regional
destabilization that may require outside intervention.
Minority Rights Issues
Minority culture groups exist in every country in East-
ern Europe. There are, for example, populations of
Jews and Roma (Gypsies) in every country. In addi-
tion, there are ethnic Germans in significant numbers
in Poland; the Czech, Slovak, and Croatian Republics;
Romania; and Hungary. Vlah communities exist in
various parts of former Yugoslavia, Albania, and
Greece.' In Latvia one also finds a territorially com-
pact group of Latgalians (Catholic Latvians who
speak a distinct dialect of the Latvian language)
around the city of Daugavpils. Similarly there are
Tatars in Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova who have
begun to ally themselves with the Turks in Turkey. A
full listing of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities
in the region is not useful because most are of little
importance other than in cultural contexts. These and
other cultural questions need not, and should not, be
given too much shrift by American policymakers.
In many cases, there are also small groups of one or
another nationality living in neighboring territories.
While those of the Russians, Serbs, and Hungarians in
neighboring countries present serious problems (albeit
to varying degrees), others do not. Although Slove-
nians in Slovenia hope that the Slovene minorities in
Italy, Hungary, and Austria will be treated fairly and
that support will be given to the survival of the Slov-
ene language and culture in those areas, there is little
chance that any major conflict will erupt involving
Slovenes in these countries in the near future. The
same can be said for the small colonies of Croats and
Serbs in Hungary, the Romanians in border areas of
Bulgaria and Serbia, or the Poles in Belarus or
Ukraine.
Potentially Serious Conflicts on a Local Level
The second category of ethnic issues in the region
comprises situations that may lead to serious conflict
between two or more peoples within a country or
between neighboring states. This last group is repre-
sented by two types of issues: those related to
The Vlahs are the descendants of Latinized Myrians from the
coastal regions of Dalmatia (Latinized during the Roman period)
who maintained a nomadic or seminomadic way of life through the
mid-20th century. For the most part, they have been assimilated by
other Balkan nations, but communities of Vlahs still live in Greece,
Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia. These peoples should not
be confused with Romanians who migrated out of Wallachia into
bordering areas of Serbia and Bulgaria but who are also locally
called Vlahs (Vlasi).
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demands for the return of territories deemed to be
unjustly under the control of foreign groups or states,
and those related to the liberation of coethnics living
in exclave communities in neighboring countries or
regions. In this first category, I include only those
issues in which the Western powers cannot or should
not become involved, in spite of the fact that they may
result in open warfare. In many of these, however,
diplomatic discussion before the outbreak of hostili-
ties may be useful.
There are six potentially serious local conflicts that
may arise in Eastern Europe that are based on ethnot-
erritorial issues. These include both claims to territo-
ries in other countries that are based on historical
grievances and issues of national liberation of ethnic
minorities living in someone else's country. Four con-
cern transborder peoples: 1) the Russian minorities in
Ukraine and the Baltic states; 2) the Moldovan ques-
tion, which includes both issues of ethnic rights for
Russians and Ukrainians in Moldova and border
issues between Ukraine and Romania; 3) a possible
secessionist movement in western Ukraine; and 4)
Hungarian minorities in neighboring Slovakia, Serbia,
and Romania. Two involve minority issues: Muslim
minorities living in the former Yugoslav lands and
Bulgaria and ethnic Turkish minorities in the Balkans.
Russians in Ukraine and the Baltic States
The collapse of the USSR and the declaration of inde-
pendence by the former non-Russian republics has left
millions of Russians outside Russia. Their situation is
debated both locally and in Russia and plays a major
role in the current political relations of Russia and
these states. In a few cases, the issue is not just cul-
tural and ethnic. In the cases of Ukraine and Estonia,
the Russian population has a significant presence on
the border of Russia, and in those two cases (as with
Kazakstan), Russian nationalists are demanding that
these areas be reincorporated into Russia. In eastern
Ukraine and eastern Estonia, this can be even more
serious because these regions are major industrial
areas vital to the economic well-being of these new
republics.
The situation of the Russians in Estonia is serious.
Here the Russian issue is not merely ethnic but also
territorial. On the eastern margins of Estonia one finds
a large Russian population. In the area north of Lake
Peipus (Chudskoe Ozero in Russian) as far as the Bal-
tic Sea, Russians form a clear majority of the popula-
tion. Indeed, Narve is a Russian city in Estonia. There
is a great potential for a Russian attempt to secede
from Estonia and join Russia itself. This would lead to
a great deal of conflict. Most of these Russians do not
represent the descendants of early Russian immigrants
to Estonia but rather part of the huge Russian popula-
tion that arrived after World War II.
In Latvia, Russians�when combined with Belorus-
sians and Ukrainians�account for slightly less than
half the country's population. In Riga, Slays far out-
number native Latvians. In both Latvia and Estonia, as
well as in neighboring Lithuania (where the Slays
compose only about 20 percent of the population),
there is a fear that Russia may use the presence of
these significant Russian minority populations as a
pretext (i.e., a justification) to reincorporate these
small countries into a new Russian-dominated state.
In Estonia, Latvia, and�to a lesser extent�Lithuania,
local governments are devising various forms of legis-
lation to induce the Russians to leave. Although it is
reasonable for Estonians and Latvians to demand that
citizens learn the local language and swear allegiance
to those countries�as all nations of the world demand
allegiance to the new homeland to obtain citizen-
ship�it is clear that the two states desire to get rid of
the Russians. Open hostility toward or attacks upon
Russians will provoke problems with Russia, so it is
left to a game of politics. This could escalate into a
serious conflict with Russia, especially if a Russian
nationalist government arises in Moscow. Regardless
of how this goes, it is clear that the United States and
its Western allies cannot and should not do anything in
the event of such a showdown. On the other hand, the
West's inaction in the Croatian and Bosnian conflict
may play a great role in increasing hostilities and con-
flicts in the Baltic region. This is discussed later in this
paper.
The Moldovan Question
Upon declaring independence from the USSR, Mold-
ova found itself in a unique position among the former
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Soviet Republics, Rather than seeking mere indepen-
dence, it proclaimed its desire to join, or rather rejoin,
Romania. The Moldovans are Romanians who as a
result of history found themselves under Russian rule.
While Russians in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and other
republics were in general not frightened of the inde-
pendence movements taking place in the non-Russian
republics, that of Moldova threatened to place them
under alien (Romanian) rule. Violent protests erupted,
and open warfare ensued in the Trans-Dniestr region,
which attempted to secede from Moldova and join
Ukraine.
Moldova itself became part of Russia as a result of
Russian imperial expansionism.2 Moldova was
annexed from the Ottoman Empire. After World War I
it was reunited with Romania, only to find itself being
passed back to the USSR after World War II. This war
resulted in a drastic diminution of the Jewish and Ger-
man populations, and many Tatars also left for Turkey
and Romania. On the other hand, Stalin deported
many Moldovans, attached the southern part of Mold-
ova (Budjak) to Ukraine, and induced the in-migration
of hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians.
In addition, the Trans-Dniestr region, which was for-
merly part of Ukraine, was added to Moldova (in an
attempt to gerrymander borders, effectively reducing
the Moldovan proportion of Moldova's population)
and Bucovina/Bukovina (the area around Chernovits/
Chernivtsy) was detached from Romania and trans-
ferred to Ukraine,
Deep antagonisms exist between Ukrainians and
Romanians, between Russians and Ukrainians in
Moldova, and between ethnic Russians and Moldo-
van-Romanians in Romania. Moldovan nationalist
talk of anschluss between Moldova and Romania has
led to uprisings among the Russians, Ukrainians, and
2 In the 19th century, the Russian Empire expanded into areas
under Ottoman-Turkish control. The region of Bessarabia was
taken by Russia. No Romania existed at that time. The population
of Moldova was changed dramatically as a result of this. It already
had a large Tatar and Jewish population that had come during the
period of the Ottomans, but, with incorporation into the Russian
Empire, Orthodox Christians from Bulgaria and other parts of the
Ottoman Empire (Bulgars, Greeks, Romanians, Gagauz, and even
some Albanians and Serbs) migrated to Bessarabia. In addition to
these, Cossacks from the northern Caucasus were settled there by
Catherine the Great, and Germans were invited to settle there as
well. Thus, by the 20th century, it already had a very mixed popu-
lation, even though the Romanians (Moldovans) were still in the
majority.
other non-Romanians of the region. This has the
potential to become a serious problem not only on a
local level but also in Romania as well. We should
remember that one of Ceasuescu's major demands
from Brezhnev was the return of Moldova to Roma-
nian control.
The Gagauz (Bulgarian Orthodox Turks) of Moldova
have also expressed serious concerns about the rise of
Moldovan-Romanian nationalism and fear the merger
of Moldova with Romania.' As such, they have allied
themselves with the Russian and Ukrainian popula-
tions in Moldova. In and of themselves they do not
represent a serious problem to Moldova, Romania, or
Ukraine. Their importance is transient and is tied to
the greater Slavic-Romanian split in Moldova.
Western Ukraine
The western part of Ukraine (Galicia and Ruthenia)
became part of the Russian Empire and the USSR for
the first time after World War II. In this area there had
been a strong Central European and Catholic influ-
ence. Here distinct dialects of Ukrainian are spoken,
and the Uniate Church has recently been reinstated as
an officially recognized religion. The Uniate Church
(Byzantine Rite Catholics) had millions of followers
among the Ukrainians, Slovaks, Romanians, and Hun-
garians. In most cases this religious institution was
declared illegal during the Soviet period. Although the
demands for its recognition are great throughout the
greater region of Ukraine, only in the western part of
Ukraine does it represent any potential threat to the
stability of a nation. Because western Ukraine became
part of the Soviet Union only in the post�World War II
period and because the Uniate Church in that region
used Ukrainian and not Russian as the language of the
church, it is considered by its members as the "true"
Ukrainian church. Among Ukrainians themselves
there is a deep cultural split between those who lived
under Russian and Soviet rule for the past 200-plus
years and those who lived under Polish or Austrian
3 The origin of the Gagauz is still debated. They are either linguisti-
cally Turkified Bulgarians, Bulgarian Orthodox Christianized
Turks, or a combination of both. Regardless of actual origin, today
they are Turkish in speech (for instance, Istanbul Turkish) and are
Bulgarian Orthodox in religion.
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rule. Western Ukrainians are demanding more cultural
and religious autonomy from Ukraine, and this may
create some potential for real conflict. As yet, how-
ever, it is merely cultural and not political and territo-
rial. Even if it were to bring about open conflict, this is
a purely internal matter and not of any concern for the
West or neighboring states.
Hungarian Minorities. The borders of current Hun-
gary were established after World War I and represent,
in the eyes of ethnic Hungarians, a diminished state.
Across those borders are a number of regions with sig-
nificant Hungarian populations. In some, like parts of
southern Slovakia and northern Vojvodina�in north-
ern Serbia�the Hungarian population forms the
majority of inhabitants. In Romania, Hungarian com-
munities exist throughout western Romania and in
Transylvania�a region with great cultural and histori-
cal significance to the Hungarian people. We must
remember that for more than 150 years Hungary was
under Ottoman Turkish domination. During that time
Transylvania and southern Slovakia, as Hungarian
regions, were independent of the Turks. Indeed, dur-
ing this time Bratislava (Pozsony in Hungarian) was
the capital of a free Hungary, and until World War I
ethnic Hungarians outnumbered Slovaks in this city,
the capital of Slovakia.
The division of Czechoslovakia into two states has
changed the sectarianism of living in the area.4 While
Hungarians were not subject to open policies of Slo-
vakization under the Czech-dominated Czechoslovak
Government, the situation today is different. The posi-
tion of the Slovak Government is that the Hungarians
are really Slovaks whose ancestors were forced to
become Hungarians (Magyars) during the 1,000 years
of Hungarian rule and therefore should be re-Slovak-
ized. The Hungarians consider southern Slovakia as
part of the Kingdom of Hungary historically. Indeed
Kossuth, the father of modern Hungarian nationalism,
was born in Slovakia (in fact he was a Magyarized
Slovak). Here we see the use of historical figures and
events by ethnic groups as the justification for current
demands on both sides.
4 The Hungarians saw the Czech majority as advanced and civi-
lized as themselves. The Hungarian view of Slovaks as a people is
quite different. Slovaks are seen as low in levels of civilization, and
the Slovaks are also far more anti-Hungarian than the Czechs.
At high levels in the Hungarian Government, it has
been made clear to the Slovaks that Hungary does not
claim territory from Slovakia but that it requests that
Hungarians in Slovakia be given full citizenship and
rights as a minority. This is the same position held by
the Hungarian Government vis a vis Transylvania and
Vojvodina. But many ethnic Hungarians and lower
level political leaders are demanding the "return" of
these "Hungarian lands" to Hungary. As a minimal
demand, the Hungarians in Hungary appear to be con-
cerned about the rights of their ethnic brethren in
neighboring countries but are not demanding border
changes. However�and this is a big however�this
stance is contingent on fair treatment of Hungarians
and a continued moderate position of the Hungarian
regime. Persecution of Hungarians in any neighboring
country may lead to a severe shift in Budapest's offi-
cial position. This is now being tested in Vojvodina,
where the Serbian Government is relocating Serbs
from other areas of Yugoslavia into areas dominated
by ethnic Hungarians and where young Hungarian
males are subject to the draft and are being sent to the
war zone in Bosnia. Many Hungarians have fled
Vojvodina to Hungary. This is leading to a rise in
rightwing Hungarian nationalism that may change the
official position of the Hungarian Government. The
impact of Western inaction in Bosnia on the Hungar-
ian issues in Vojvodina, Slovakia, and Romania is dis-
cussed later in this paper.
Muslim Minorities in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria
After the Ottoman Empire withdrew from the Balkans
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a number
of Islamicized groups remained. Among these were
Muslim Bosnians (now called Muslimani), Serbs
(mostly in the Sandzak and Kosovo-Metohija regions
of Serbia), Macedonians (called Torbesi), Bulgarians
(called Pomalcs), Greeks, and Albanians.5 Only
among the Albanians did the Muslim converts form
5 These Muslims should not be confused with ethnic Turks who
form a distinct ethnic minority in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Romania, and Greece and who are either the descen-
dants of Turks or of mixed Turkish and other ethnic backgrounds.
Their ethnic identity is with Turkey, and they do not consider them-
selves to be of local origin.
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a majority population in the given group. In all other
cases the Christian majorities attempted to force con-
version to Christianity or to have the Muslims reclas-
sify themselves as Turks and emigrate to Turkey. In
addition, a series of population exchanges took place
during which Muslim groups went to Turkey and
Christians were resettled in the Balkans. This was
especially true of the Greeks; hundreds of thousands
of Greeks emigrated from western and northeastern
Turkey and were resettled in what is today Greek
Macedonia and other parts of Greece.
After World War I, Serbian nationalists followed a
policy of intimidation of Muslims (both Muslim Slays
and Albanians) in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Macedonia (then called South Serbia). Tens of
thousands fled to Turkey at that time. Bulgaria has
continued to harass its Muslim Bulgarian population.
Policies outlawing Muslim cultural practices and
enforcing name changes (to Christian ones) led to
massive emigrations to Turkey as well. It was conve-
nient for Greeks, Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarians, and
others to purport that these were Turks not Slavic or
Greek peoples whose ancestors chose to adopt the
Islamic religion�and to promote emigration.
The Muslim subgroups, although persecuted, do not
pose serious threats to their regions. It is interesting to
note that the Torbesi of western Macedonia and many
Serbian Muslims of the Sanclzak and Kosovo have
reclassified themselves as Albanians, rather than
assimilate into the greater Serbian or Macedonian
nations.
The Turkish Minorities
The Turkish question is still an open one. To date,
however, the Turkish position (for instance, that of the
Republic of Turkey) is similar to that of the Hungari-
ans regarding their ethnic compatriots in neighboring
states. The Turkish Government basically expected
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to respect the Turks as ethnic
minorities in those countries. Recently, Bulgaria pres-
sured ethnic Turks into emigrating to Turkey. Approx-
imately 300,000 Turks left. Although the Turkish
Government protested this, it did not invade. The
Turks feel pressured by European powers who use the
issue of Turkish entry into the European Union as a
means of keeping Turkey out of intervention in Bul-
garia and parts of former Yugoslavia. In Turkey itself,
literally millions of Turks have ancestors who immi-
grated from various Balkan countries. These groups
lobby for Turkish involvement in their homelands to
protect the Turkish and Muslim peoples there. The
Turkish situation is discussed at the end of this presen-
tation with particular reference to its relationships
with Europe and the EU.
Potentially Serious Conflicts With Implications
Extending Beyond the Region
The Macedonian Question
A very serious situation exists regarding Macedonia,
in which major ethnic groups�Greeks and Serbs�
and their respective states are attempting to use histor-
ical issues and incidents as justifications for their posi-
tions regarding this territory.
The Greeks claim title to the name Macedonia based
on fallacious historical claims. They assert that Alex-
ander the Great was a Greek and that therefore Mace-
donia is Greek�a claim backed by historical records.
Not only do all early Greek sources make the point
that he was a non-Greek (the Macedonians were Illyr-
ians related to today's Albanians) but also that the
Macedonians were the enemy of Greece. Certainly the
Macedonian Empire maintained Greek language as
the lingua-franca of the Empire and had a policy of
Hellenism, but Macedonia was itself not Greek.
Rather than engage in debates about a man who lived
in the 4th century BCE, one should consider more
important historical facts as well as current realities.
Does the concern deal with the name, with Alexander
the Great's nationality, or with current ethnoterritorial
realities? Clearly it is the latter. After the arrival of the
Slays in Macedonia (including what is today Greek
Macedonia) starting in the 4th century CE, the Mace-
donian Slays maintained close relations with those of
Bulgaria. The Macedonian and Bulgarian Slays came
to form one people with a common language and
church. After the arrival of the Turks their territory
was administratively (not ethnically) divided. This
division lasted into the 19th century when Bulgarians
(with the help of the Russians) tried to reunite with
their ethnic Macedonian kinsmen. As a result of West-
ern intervention this was not accomplished.
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During the second Balkan War (1912-13) the Greeks
and Serbs, with the help of the Romanians, invaded
Bulgaria and took land from it. Romania seized
Dobrudja (Dobrogea) while the Serbs and Greeks
divided Macedonia between them. Not only did they
take the land, but also they instituted policies aimed at
eradicating the Bulgarian presence and claim. Serbia
renamed northern Macedonia South Serbia and out-
lawed both the Bulgarian language and church (those
used by the Macedonians themselves) and replaced
them with the Serbian language and church. It was
hoped that the Macedonians of South Serbia would
become Serbs. Greece was far worse in its treatment
of Macedonians. Slavic Macedonians (and Bulgarians
in Thrace) were forced to accept Greek names and call
themselves Greeks or flee the country. A policy of
Hellenization was instituted throughout the region.
Between the second Balkan War and World War II,
policies of Serbianization, Hellenization, and ethnic
cleansing were openly practiced in both Macedonia
and Thrace. The region was also ethnically cleansed
of Macedonians and Bulgarians, as was Greek Thrace,
which had a Slavic majority. In addition to this, hun-
dreds of thousands of Greeks from the Pontic region
of Turkey were resettled into those parts of Macedonia
under Greek control.
The Greek objection to the recognition of a Republic
of Macedonia derives from more than issues related to
an ancient conqueror. Greece fears the demand for the
return of the homeland by a free Macedonia and repa-
rations for past atrocities. Greece also fears that the
ethnic Macedonians will demand their homes back.6
This is potentially one of the most serious issues in
Eastern Europe, as it can involve Greece, Bulgaria,
Serbia, Macedonia, and even Albania in a real war.
More is said on this later.
The Serbs and Kosovo
A similar situation exists in Kosovo, a land claimed
by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Geographical evi-
dence (such as place names) clearly indicates a contin-
uous settlement of the region by ethnic Albanians. The
Serbian claim is based on a war that took place in the
6 Macedonians from Greek (Aegean) Macedonia fled to the Ser-
bian-controlled areas of Macedonia as well as to Bulgaria, Austra-
lia, Canada, and the United States after 1913.
early 13th century. According to legend, the Serbs
were defeated at the battle of Kosovo and later fled
north into what is today Greater Serbia.7 Historically,
however, the Serbs came from the north and were con-
centrated along the Morava valley in what is today the
heartland of the Serbs.8 It is important to note that it
was church policy to have geographical diocese
within which an official language was used. There is
no question that Kosovo was within the territorial
domain of the Serbian Orthodox Church, but that does
not mean that the population living there was Serbian.
The Battle of Kosovo, the role of Krali Marko, or
other folktales should not be accepted as a justification
for Serbian aggression against ethnic Albanians who
compose about 90 percent of that region today.
A propaganda campaign against ethnic Albanians was
part and parcel of Serbian policy long before the cur-
rent crises in Krajina and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Serbian propoganda claimed that the Patriarsija Con-
vent in Pee was burned to the ground by Albanians
and that the Serbian nuns there had been raped. I was
there one year after the alleged fire and rape, and the
Serbian nuns in the convent knew nothing about such
an event. The convent was still standing, and there
was no damage to it whatsoever. Claims were also
made that Albanians killed, raped, and tortured Serbs
in the region, yet the local Serbs in Kosovo declared
to me that that was a rare occurrence. Many Serbs of
Prizren, Pec, Orahovac, and Djakovica (in the western
part of Kosovo), on the other hand, told me that pov-
erty forced Serbs to sell their homes and move to Ser-
bia proper. Some laughed at the fact that many Serbs
who sold their homes to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
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7 Part of the claim is also that Prince Marko (1Crali Marko) was a
Serb and that he was killed at this battle. According to their own
sources, he came from Prilep (in Macedonia). As such, he is
claimed by Macedonians as a Macedonian and by Bulgarians as a
Bulgar. He may also have been a Vlah, a people renowned for their
military abilities at the time. One need recognize that Albanians
also have epic songs about this battle in which three Albanian
princes were killed, not only a Serbian one. We should not be dis-
cussing the right to rule Kosovo, as argued by Serbs and Albanians,
based on 13th century battles or folk songs, or we will have a Bul-
garian-Macedonian-Serbian war as well as a Serbian-Albanian one.
8 This is most likely the Kingdom of Morava (Moravia) referred to
in the ancient texts regarding the brothers Kiril (Cyril) and Meted
(Methodius), not Moravia in the Czech Republic.
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later claimed to have been forced out in order to get
special treatment (houses and jobs) in Belgrade and
other parts of Serbia where housing and jobs are in
short supply.
Milosevic and other Serbian nationalists used this type
of scare tactic to justify the Serbian invasions of east-
ern Croatia (Srem), Croatia's Krajina region, and Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. The threat to Serbian lives,
property, and security were used, in spite of the fact
that no such provocations existed. The same tactics
used in Kosovo were applied to other areas where
Serbs lived outside Serbia.
There is a great potential for conflict in Kosovo
because approximately 1.7 million Albanians reside
there and because the Serbs claim that Kosovo is not
only Serbian but also is the Urheimat (original home-
land) of the Serbian people. The Serbians are perse-
cuting Albanians�closing Albanian ethnic
institutions, engaging in summary arrests and torture
of Albanians, and expelling Albanians. The Serbian
regime is also now settling Serbs in the region. This
region has the greatest potential for ethnic conflict in
all of Eastern Europe. If the Serbs attempt a similar
policy as that applied in Bosnia to its native Muslim
population, it is most likely that Albania will not
remain inactive.
Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo
Directly across the border from Kosovo is Macedonia,
with a large Albanian population. In all Macedonia's
western communes (counties), the Albanians form a
majority of the population. In those bordering Kosovo
and Albania (like Tetovo and Gostivar), Albanians
compose over 90 percent of the local population.
Because Albanians in Macedonia boycotted the last
census and because the ethnic Macedonians were sat-
isfied that they did, it is unclear as to the actual popu-
lation of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia itself. Having
traveled there in 1990, it was obvious that throughout
western Macedonia the Albanians form a distinct
majority, and in much of northern and central Mace-
donia they form a significant minority. Should a war
break out in Kosovo, it is doubtful that Macedonian
Albanians would not become involved. Refugees from
Kosovo would flee into Macedonia, which would be
intolerable to the Slavic Macedonians who already are
unhappy with their large Albanian population. Thus, a
war in Kosovo would probably lead to Albanian and
Macedonian involvement. Such a war has the poten-
tial to also drag in Greece and Turkey.
The Implications of Western Nonaction in Bosnia
and Herzegovina
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in parts of
Croatia has destabilized the entire region. While some
may see this as only a local issue of those republics,
and, as such, not of vital interests to the United States
or its Western allies, others with more expertise and
experience in this region recognize the broader impli-
cations of this conflict. The situation of Muslims in
Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia has
worsened dramatically as a result of the Serbian poli-
cies in Croatia and Bosnia. It is not only Serbian
action but also the response by the West that has
added to the instability.
Fear of greater Serbian aggression is resulting in a rise
in anger among the Albanians throughout the region.
The "what if" scenarios are too numerous to discuss in
this paper because they depend on many other coun-
tries and issues. What is clear, however, is that Alba-
nians in Kosovo for the moment are resisting Serbian
attempts to get them to rise up and give the Serbs an
excuse to come in and smash them. In the event of a
real war, however, the violence in this region would
be far greater than that of Bosnia. On the one hand, the
Serbian attachment to Kosovo is far greater than that
to Bosnia, and, on the other hand, the Albanians are
not as traditionally docile as the Bosnian Muslims. In
addition, Kosovo borders an ethnically Albanian
nation-state.
The West's general inaction in Bosnia has also played
a major role in creating greater destabilization. While
many Westerners close their eyes to the greater and
broader implications of this war, members of other
countries and regions have watched keenly. Two dis-
tinct issues must therefore be addressed: 1) the prece-
dent set and its implications in Eastern Europe itself
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and 2) the implications for Turkey and the Middle
Fast. A possible scenario is presented at the end of
this presentation to illustrate the magnitude that these
events may take.
Regardless of actual motive in not aiding the Bosnian
Muslims or the Croats, the West has created a new sit-
uation throughout the region. Had the United States
and its European allies come to the rescue of the
newly established Croatian and Bosnian nations when
they were invaded by the Serbs, a clear message
would have been sent that the Western countries sup-
ported democratic multinational states in the newly
forming countries in Eastern Europe. Many of these
countries, as fledgling democracies, are struggling
with situations of multiculturalism and of having large
and influential ethnic minorities. By not supporting
such ideas in Croatia and Bosnia, the opposite mes-
sage was sent.
On the one hand, it was clear by implication that the
West would not interfere in the internal matters of
these states regarding ethnic issues and, on the other,
that ethnic cleansing and brutality were to be only ver-
bally censored. This leads to two problems regarding
ethnic stability in the region. One is the reaction of
countries to their ethnic minorities that they perceive
to be problematic. The other is to actions of states
fearing outside aggression in the guise of defending
coethnics in their states.
In the first case we have indicated to Russia that, if it
should so desire to reincorporate the Baltic states,
Ukraine, or Kazakhstan on the pretext of defending
the ethnic Russians in those territories, then the West
is unconcerned. This may add fuel to the existing Rus-
sian nationalist groups that demand the return of those
lands because: 1) they have ethnic Russians living
there who need to be protected, therefore these lands
should be under Russian control; and 2) lands once
under the Russian people must always be part of
Mother Russia. Similarly, Hungarian nationalists can
use the same argument to demand the return of Vojvo-
dina and parts of Slovakia and Romania. If it is all
right for Serbs to invade and ethnically cleanse in the
name of protecting Serbs in these other regions, then
why not allow Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, or
any number of other peoples to readjust national bor-
ders or protect ethnic minorities in other states?
The inaction on the part of the West to the plight of
Muslims and Croats in former Yugoslavia may open a
Pandora's box by promoting, rather than inhibiting,
ethnic nationalism. A green light has been given in
regions in which the fires of nationalism were already
rising as a result of their newfound freedom. In all
cases of decolonization, ethnic nationalism rises in the
newly created state. This often results in a demand
that the colonizer go home. Russians and Serbs today
are victims of such policies of decolonization, as were
the English, French, Germans, and others in lands for-
merly controlled by them.
When nothing was done to stop or punish the Serbs for
their outrageous behavior, the message was also sent to
nations that they better get rid of problematic minorities
now rather than risk intervention from the outside.
Romanians, Serbs, and Slovaks may perceive the Hun-
garian minorities as a greater threat because the Hun-
garian nationalists in Hungary may try to use the
existence of Hungarian colonies in neighboring coun-
tries as a pretext to change the borders. Similarly, Esto-
nians and Latvians will fear even more so the existence
of a large Russian population if the West has made it
clear that in principle it is all right for Russia to liberate
their people�the Russians�in Latvia and Estonia.
Estonian and Latvian nationalists may feel an even
greater urgency to induce the Russians to leave, so as to
minimize their chances of losing their independence.
If the United States and its allies do nothing to stop the
Serbs in their nationalist drive to ethnically cleanse
Bosnia and to incorporate other parts of the former
Yugoslavia, then why should the Serbs not do the
same in Kosovo and Vojvodina? If the West did noth-
ing in those cases, it most certainly is not going to do
any more over Kosovo. We have thus promoted more
Serbian aggression as well as paved the way for possi-
ble Hungarian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Estonian,
Albanian, or other acts of ethnic violence against other
nations and peoples.
Had the Serbs been stopped and punished (as the Ger-
mans were during World War II), a clear message
would have been sent that we do not accept undemo-
cratic behavior. Would it not be better to send the
message that multinational policies are what the West
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expects and that the well-being of these states, diplo-
matic recognition, and financial aid are contingent on
fair treatment of their ethnic minorities. That the West
bowed to the wishes of Greece and did not recognize
Macedonia's right to independence based on its con-
cern over a name showed a lack of resolve on the part
of the West and made it clear to all in Fastern Europe
that consistency, democracy, and recognition of the
principle of self-determination is not a part of current
Western thinking. The messages from this are all
too clear to the Bulgarians, Macedonians, Turks, and
others.
In addition, the example set by inaction in Bosnia
made it painfully clear to the Muslims in the Middle
East, including our important ally Turkey, that the
West does not stand up for the rights of Muslims as a
people. This perception has been reinforced by the
ultraright's win in Parisian elections (in which it took
80 percent of the vote) with the slogan, "Charles le
Magne stopped the Moors at the Pyrenees and Mitter-
rand gave them Paris and Marseilles," and the anti-
Turkish acts of violence in Germany. By not acting to
defend the Bosnian Muslims and by tolerating the acts
of rape, murder, and terror against them by the Serbs,
the message was given that the West is no friend of
either Muslims or of the Middle East.
We should add to this the lack of Western resolve to
stop the Greeks when they infiltrated Cyprus and pre-
cipitated the invasion by the Turks. Although Western-
ers did not condemn Greek acts of violence against the
Turks, they did condemn the Turks for invading the
island and partitioning it. The Turks ask themselves,
"Why are we condemned for saving the lives of our
people in Cyprus while the Serbs are permitted, in the
guise of defending their people, to murder innocent
Muslims?" During the summer of 1993 throughout
Turkey pictures were hanging on billboards of a Bos-
nian child with one leg cut off by Serbs with the cap-
tion Bosnanin En Kucuk Gazisi (Bosnia's Youngest
Warrior of the Faith). This was a tongue in cheek swat
at the Serbs who call the Bosnian Muslims Islamic
fundamentalists and claim that they (the Serbs) are
defending Europe against the Muslim menace.
If the West is truly concerned about the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism, then it should reevaluate its position
regarding the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Throughout the Middle East anti-Westernism and anti-
Americanism are rising as the Western democracies
that bomb Iraq, support Israel, and intervene in Mid-
dle Eastern affairs at will do nothing to stop a Chris-
tian country from annihilating a Muslim people.
A Worst Case Scenario
Given the above considerations, there is a possibility
of a major war breaking out in the Balkans. Serbs are
determined not to allow the formation of an Albanian
ethnic entity in Kosovo, as they see it as their original
homeland. Having ethnically cleansed much of Bosnia
of Muslims and Croats, they have become greatly
(continued)emboldened with their success. This has
been exacerbated by the lack of any real deterrents by
the Western powers. A Serb attempt to ethnically
cleanse Kosovo may trigger a series of events that will
draw other peoples and powers into the dispute. It is
doubtful that Albania will be able to remain neutral
under those circumstances, and it is most likely that
Kosovar Albanians would be forced to flee into Mace-
donia and/or Albania itself.
A regional war might break out that would create
great instability. The existence of Macedonia as a state
would again come into question. One possibility is
that Macedonia would seek reentry into a Yugoslav
entity. However, the large Albanian population would
oppose that, and war would be imminent between eth-
nic Macedonians and Albanians in such a case. Mace-
donia lies among hostile Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and
Albania, all of whom lay claim to its land.
In a war in the Balkans, it is highly possible that Tur-
key might get involved, especially if requested to by
Albania. We need also consider that hundreds of thou-
sands of Turks in Turkey today are of Albanian-, Bos-
nian-, Serbian-, Macedonian-, Greek- or Bulgarian-
Muslim extraction. Indeed, Kemal Ataturk, the
founder of the modern Turkish republic, was of Alba-
nian ancestry from Thesalonika (Greece). Just as eth-
nic Americans lobby our government regarding issues
in their ancestral homelands, so do Turks of Balkan
descent.
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The Turks probably would not heed a call from the
West to stay out of the conflict because they are abso-
lutely fed up with their so-called Western allies. Dur-
ing my visits to Turkey in 1992 and 1993, anti-
Westernism was apparent everywhere. The lack of
support for the Turkish position on Cyprus is only a
minor irritant as compared to Western callousness
over the issue of Islam in the Balkans. We should not
forget that it was the Turks who introduced Islam into
the region and who built the cities of Sarajevo,
Mostar, Jajce, Konjic, and others that are now sitting
in ruin. They identify greatly with the monuments
built by their ancestors and their coreligionists in that
region. The West has asked much of the Turks in past
decades�to be a bulwark against Soviet Communism
during the Cold War; to embargo goods from Iran and
Iraq (much to the detriment of the Turkish economy);
and, most recently, to act as a moderating influence
and as a surrogate for the West in many of the new
nations of Central Asia. In each case, Turkey has met
these requests. The Turks are understandably upset,
then, when the West does not respond to their call to
protect Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kos-
ovo or to protect ethnic Turks in Cyprus or Bulgaria.9
Involvement by Turkey in any Balkan conflict would
most assuredly guarantee that Greece would aid Ser-
bia. Of all their territorial and ethnic problems, the
Turks agree that it is the Greeks who are the most seri-
ous for them.
The worst case scenario probably hinges on the Bul-
garians, not only because their country lies between
Greece, Turkey, Serbia, and Macedonia but also
because they have real grievances against the Serbs
(over Macedonia) and Greeks (over Macedonia and
Thrace). Bulgarians are now, terrified about their
neighbors going to war; they wish to remain out of the
fray. However, in the event that Greece and Serbia are
fighting against Turkey and Albania, Bulgaria might
be forced into the war. Bulgaria could side with Serbia
9 Not only did Bulgaria maintain a Policy of intimidation and per-
secution of Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) during the 1970s and
1980s, which resulted in a substantial emigration of Pomaks to
Turkey, but also in the late 1980s and early 1990s more than
300,000 ethnic Turks fled Bulgaria as a result of extreme oppres-
sion. The West did little more than protest these acts. This was no
different from the West's reaction to the Greeks' infiltration of
Cyprus and the mass murder of ethnic Turks.
and Greece (their coreligionists) against the Muslim
Turks and Albanians, but the Bulgarians have a deep
hatred of the Greeks and Serbs, and Sofia would gain
nothing from such a situation. On the other hand, if
Bulgaria sided with Turkey and Albania, it could gain
territory that it has demanded for two centuries�
Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia, and Greek Thrace
(thereby gaining access to the Aegean)�and address
its grievances against Serbia and Greece. Turkey
would certainly prefer Bulgarian hegemony over
Thrace, thereby eliminating a border with Greece.
Turkish seizure of the islands off its coast would also
guarantee Turkey full access to the Mediterranean
from Istanbul (something that is currently a problem
for them because Greece is uncooperative on passage
through its territorial waters by Turkish ships).
If such a war broke out, the Croats and Muslims of
Bosnia and Herzegovina would take revenge against
the Serbs, and Hungary might use that as a way to
seize some of the Hungarian-populated northern com-
munes of Vojvodina. Hungarian involvement in an
international dispute regarding Hungarians in another
country might lead Romania and/or Slovakia to
become aggressive against Hungary or the Hungarian
minorities in their countries.
If a major war broke out with Greece and Turkey on
opposite sides, what would the West do? If it backed
Greece and closed all possibilities of Turkey joining
the EU, Turkey would undoubtedly shift away from
the West to a more Islamic position. Clearly, internal
pressures in Turkey�which are already mounting�
would dictate such a move regardless of the desires of
the moderate government. Even a neutral stance by
the West would result in a Turkish popular backlash.
Of great importance is the position of Russia as a
major power. While Russia may back Serbia in its war
against Croatia or the Bosnian Muslims, it would back
Bulgaria and Turkey should they become allies against
Serbia. Russia's traditional ally in the Balkans has
always been Bulgaria and not Serbia (which in the �
Cold War sided with the anti-Soviet West). It would
also be useful to Russia to use such a stance to improve
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its relations with Turkey. Thus, in the event of a widen-
ing war, we may find Serbia and Greece isolated and
Turkey, Bulgaria, and Albania backed by Russia,
Croatia, Hungary, and many Middle Eastern States. It
is doubtful that we could do anything under those cir-
cumstances in terms of any involvement.
Although one can paint other scenarios, one thing is
clear�the West made a grave error in allowing and
promoting Serbian aggression. Some say it is too late
to do anything. That is an absurd position. In 1940 one
could say that Germany had won the war and that it
was too late to do anything to free Poland or Czecho-
slovakia. The Russians proved otherwise. Serbia is not
a great power and need not be feared. If after three
years of vast military superiority the Serbs still have
not won, they would be easy to push back. The main-
tenance of the embargo against the Bosnian Muslims
should be lifted and airpower should be used to liber-
ate Bosnia. It is certainly not too late to do that.
By continuing to legitimize Serbian aggression, we
are once again letting the people of Eastern Europe
know that we do not support democratic governments
or independent nation-states in that region. We should
therefore not be surprised that a greater and far more
serious war may be looming on the horizon. The
alienation of the Turks and of Turkey is a far more
serious issue in the realm of geopolitical reality than
the support of Serbian delusions of grandeur. We risk
not only a great Balkan war but also one that may
result in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey changing their
national borders. Inaction in Bosnia has also resulted
in a massive rise of anti-Western and anti-American
sentiment throughout the Middle Fast and other Mus-
lim areas. The United States should rethink its posi-
tion on Serbia.
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References
Banac, Ivo. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Ori-
gins, History, Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1984. A good account of the various national
issues in Yugoslavia. Especially valuable is the analy-
sis of the issues in terms of how and why they came
about and the political ramifications thereof.
Cvijic, Jovan. "The Geographical Distribution of the
Balkan Peoples." Geographical Review. Vol. 5., May
1918; pp. 345-361. Important work as it was used to
establish boundaries in the Balkans after World War
H. It is pro-Serbian and defines Macedonia as South
Serbian. An excellent example of the use of propa-
ganda (often using real historical issues) to justify a
given nationalist position.
Davies, Norman. God's Playground: A History of
Poland. Two vols. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982. One of the best accounts of the issues of
Polish nationalism and history. Frequently referenced.
Deak, Francis. Hungary at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence: The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. Excel-
lent work on the Paris Peace Conference.
Dragnich, Alex N. Serbs and Croats: the Struggle in
Yugoslavia. New York. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
1992; Emmert, Thomas A. Serbian Golgotha Kosovo,
1389. New York: East European Monographs, 1990;
and Morison, W. A. The Revolt of the Serbs Against
the Turks (1804-1813): Translations from the Serbian
National Ballads of the Period. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1942. These three books are
good sources on the use of Serbian nationalist stories
as a means to achieve a nationalist end. All represent a
Serbian nationalist position. Are useful to understand
the mentality and dimension Of Serbian nationalism.
Deletant, Dennis and Hanak, Harry, eds. Historians as
Nation-Builders: Central and Southeast Europe. Lon-
don: Macmillan Press, 1988. One of the best works on
Central Europe and the Balkans. It is especially good
in its discussions of how intellectuals, and particularly
historians, play a role in the rise of nationalism.
Erdei, Ferenc, ed. Information Hungary. New York:
Pergamon Press, 1968. Good on the Hungarian posi-
tion. It is not ultranationalistic while it presents the
Hungarian view.
Hobsbawn, E.J. "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe
Today." Anthropology Today. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1992. pp.
3-13. An excellent source on issues of ethnicity and
nationalism in contemporary Europe, including East-
ern Europe.
Home, Donald. The Great Museum: The Re-Presenta-
tion of History. London: Pluto Press, 1984. Good
source on the use of folktales, incidents, and heroes as
historical figures and issues in nationalism.
Jelavich, Charles and Barbara. The Establishment of
the Balkan National States, 1804-1920. A History of
East Central Europe. Eds., Peter Sugar and Donald
Treadgold. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Vol. 8, 1977. Presents a fairly unbiased history of the
Balkan region. One of the best texts on the subject.
Konnyu, Leslie. A Condensed Geography of Hungary.
St. Louis: The American Hungarian Review, 1971. An
excellent source as representative of ultra-Hungarian
nationalist views.
Mellor, Roy E.H. Eastern Europe: A Geography of
Comecon Countries. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1975. Good as a general geography text but not
very detailed and poor on issues of nationalism and
boundary disputes. Very encyclopedic.
Okey, Robin. Eastern Europe 1740-1985: Feudalism
to Communism. London: Hutchinson, 1986. One of
the best books on the subject of the historic evolution
of the states of the region. Also provides excellent and
unbiased treatment of nationality issues.
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References (continued)
Rugg, Dean S. Eastern Europe. New York: Longman,
1985. Excellent on the German influence (albeit quite
germanophilic in its bias) on the states of Central
Europe. It gives little shrift to issues of the Slays and
their contribution to the region and is very poor on the
Balkans.
Sugar, Peter ed., Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in East-
ern Europe. Santa Barbara: University of California
Press, 1980. This is one of the best books ever written
on ethnic issues in Eastern Europe. It is a classic.
Turnock, David:
The Making of Eastern Europe: From Earliest
Times to 1815. New York: Routledge, 1988;
The Human Geography of Eastern Europe. New
York: Routledge, 1989; and
Eastern Europe: An Economic and Political Geog-
raphy. New York: Routledge, 1989. These are good
basic texts with information on the geography,
economy, and politics of-Eastern Europe from a
geographical point of view.
White, George W. The Nation-State Ideal and the
Emergence of Modern Hungary. MA Thesis, Geogra-
phy Department, University of Oregon, 1990. One of
the best works on ethnoterritorial issues in Central
Europe. Deals with the concept of territoriality and
ethnic identity using the example of Hungarians and
Hungary.
Wilkinson, Henry Robert. Maps and Politics: a
Review of the Ethnographic Geography of Mace-
donia. Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1951.
An excellent work on how maps are used to promote
nationalist claims. It is especially good for its treat-
ment of the Macedonian question.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Thomas Poulsen
Professor Wixman has laid out both in the paper that
he wrote and in summary presentation some of the key
elements that explain the Bosnian situation. I would
like to underscore a few of them. The first element has
to do with the Serbian justification for their actions. A
concept that is helpful in explaining the Serbian posi-
tion is that of iconography, which was coined a num-
ber of years ago by the geographer Jean Gottman.
Gottman defined iconography as the sum total of the
perceptions of history, national symbols, and trivia
that go to segregate one nation from another.
According to Serbian iconography, they are a heroic
people. The Serbs believe that they saved Europe from
the Muslim hordes. They also believe that Yugosla-
via�the Yugoslavia created in 1918�was their
nation-state and that it was their rightful prize because
they had won World War I, which was just a continua-
tion of their long defense of Europe. This perception
can help to explain why the Serbs still see themselves
as victims in the current conflict when most outside
observers see them as the aggressors.
The Serbs also believe that their homeland was Kos-
ovo, a belief derived from the fact that they suffered
their greatest defeat in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389,
although Dr. Wixman can convincingly argue that this
belief is not based on fact. He could cite an examina-
tion of place names and a number of other features
that cast doubt on the Serbian assertion. But such
arguments would not change Serbian beliefs. All justi-
fications are real to the justifiers, and in the case of the
Serbs�as with most people�it's not what really hap-
pens that counts, but what people believe happened.
The Serbs were wrong in trying to maintain control of
all of Yugoslavia. They are wrong now in trying to
maintain control of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I
still think they have pretensions to the rest.
Another point that Dr. Wixman brought up that I
would like to comment on is that of the role of emi-
gres in defining national identity. There are some who
would attribute the Slovak separatism that led to the
demise of the Czechoslovakian state as much to the
effort of Americans of Slovak ancestry who returned
after the fall of Communism with images and feelings
of the 1920s and the 1930s as to any real problems in
the region. The same can be said, perhaps, for some of
the stronger original aspects of Croatian nationalism.
However, many Croatians who were content to live in
Yugoslavia and be proud of their Roman Catholic eth-
nic heritage became Croatian nationalists as a reaction
to Serbian action.
My last point deals with the issue of core and periph-
ery. It has been suggested that, in looking at the inten-
sity of national feelings, we should consider core
regions and intellectuals. Certainly�based on my
experience�for an extended period of time those in
Croatia who promoted a sense of difference and the
need to get Croatian "rights" somehow satisfied were
the professors, the schoolteachers, and the intellectu-
als. But in addition to students, those who were most
motivated to obtain such rights were not the people of
the core area but were, in fact, the people in the border
regions. This is a point that Dr. Wixman also made. In
Croatia, for example, the strongest members of the
Ustasha, the Croatian nationalist party during World
War II, did not come from Zagreb but from the outer
periphery, particularly in eastern Slavonia adjacent to
the Serbian region. There, they had been challenged in
their Croatian identity by living with Serbs. To use a
more local example, during my lifetime, one could
find "120-percent Americans" in the Canal Zone more
frequently than in the state of Oregon.
General Discussion
QUESTION: Professor Wixman, could you discuss
the origin of the Muslim population in the Sandzak?
DR. WIXMAN: The origin of the Muslim people is
the same as that of the Muslim peoples of Bulgaria
(Pomalcs), Macedonia (Torbesi), Bosnia and Herce-
govina (Muslimani), Albania, and Serbia, including
the Sandzak. When the Turks came into the Balkans a
major conversion of local populations occured. Most
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of the converts were related to the Nestorian Christian
movement (Bogomils) who formed a third Christian
group throughout the Balkans at that time�that is, in
addition to the formal Catholic and Eastern Orthodox
groups. Having been persecuted by these churches,
the Bogomils welcomed the Turks and willingly
embraced Islam. Those peoples of mixed ThrIcish
(usually the descendants of Turkish soldiers and
locally converted women) tended to call themselves
Turks, while those that were not of mixed ancestry
retained other appellations (as mentioned above). In
the Sandzak many locals adopted Islam, along with
many of the Albanians. It is important to note that
among the Greeks and Serbs when someone converted
to Islam they were rejected as members of those eth-
nic communities and were usually considered Turks.
On the other hand, among the Macedonian, Albanian,
and Bulgarian peoples there was a tendency to iden-
tify the converts as Moslem Macedonians, Albanians,
and Bulgarians, or just as Moslems. Those who con-
verted to Islam frequently intermarried with Turks and
with each other. The Sandzak Moslems of Serbia
were, as the other Muslim peoples of the Balkans, pro-
Turkish in their cultural and political leanings.
QUESTION: What role does religion play in the con-
flict in former Yugoslavia?
DR. WDCMAN: It is the position of the Catholic lead-
ers of Zagreb and the Serbian patriarch in Belgrade
that this is not a religious war. The religious overtones
of the current conflict are largely the result of the
elites�former Communist Party heads and intellectu-
als�of Zagreb, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Budapest
assigning identities to local populations who often did
not self-identify on the basis of religion. For example,
Muslim Serbs and Muslim Croats never defined them-
selves as a people. They never said that they were
Muslims. They called themselves Bosnians (Bos-
niaks). They were defined by the Yugoslav Govern-
ment in 1971 as Aluslimani. When the conflict got out
of hand in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade pressed
the idea that the Muslims must become Christian. In
the Sandzak no one thought of themselves as Serbs or
as Muslims. In the same way, the former atheistic Bul-
garian Communist Government said that, in order to
be a good Bulgarian, Turks had to change their names
to Bulgarian names�that means from Muslim to
Christian ones. In Albania, it was the reverse.
The Sandzak Muslims are under pressure to convert in
order to prove that they are true Serbo-Macedonians.
In terms of conflict, these Muslims know that they
have no choice but to ally themselves with Albanians.
There is an interesting demographic trend taking
place. The Muslims of Macedonia have made their
position clear: they are giving up Macedonian and are
beginning to speak Albanian. Albanianism has
become almost a rallying point for Muslims of Serbia
and Macedonia under the current context.
DR. POULSEN: To understand Bosnia, I think, per-
haps, a better perspective is to look at the situation in
Northern Ireland because that is not a religious war
either. Although people are identified on the basis of
the traditional religions that they have inherited, the
roots of the conflict lie in two different nations that are
warring in a very small area.
DR. WDCMAN: With regard to the situation in the
former Yugoslavia, the most important issue to the
Croats today is the Krajina. They will never compro-
mise on it and they cannot. If the Serbs take Krajina
and create a separate state or annex it to the new Ser-
bian republic of Bosnia, all coastal Croatia and Herze-
govina would be isolated and would fall of its own
accord. Serbs will temporarily accommodate Croatian
positions because they know that, as long as the West
insists that there be a peace treaty in which this
remains in Serbian hands, this falls tomorrow.
Serbian goals are to create a greater Serbia. The Serbs
of Serbia do not care about the Serbs of Krajina. The
Serbs want Krajina as a piece of geographical terri-
tory, and the Serbs who live there became their excuse
to get it.
QUESTION: Dr. Wixman, could you comment on the
conditions under which you think Albania might actu-
ally become involved in the Kosovo situation? I ask
this against the backdrop that many people think of
Albania itself as an ethnically homogeneous country.
In fact, as you well know and have written about, it is
a country divided between Tosks and Gegs, and the
Tosks are very much in control in Albania, yet it's the
Gags who are in Kosovo.
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DR. WDCMAN: I think that's very crucial to under-
standing why the Albanians never claimed Kosovo.
Of the 5 million Albanians in the Balkans, 3 million
are Gegs. But two-thirds of Albanians in Albania are
Tosk, and one-third are Geg. If Albania incorporated
Kosovo with its Geg majority�and, by the way, the
Geg and Tosk dialects are not close enough to be
mutually understandable, and the two peoples have
very different cultures�Albania would have been
dominated by Gegs. This is one reason why Albania
as a state and as a nation is cool toward the idea of
incorporating Kosovo. However, that said, the hatred
41
toward the Serbs is growing throughout the area. If the
Serbs really attempt to annihilate the Kosovar Alba-
nians as they did the Bosnian Muslims, can Albania
Sit back and maintain any credibility?
I think Albania thinks that it may be backed by Tur-
key, which in reality may be the case. The Turks are
improving their relations with Albania and are making
it clear that Kosovo is where they draw the line.
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Ethnic Conflict Within Western Europe
Conn H. Williams
Research Professor,
Department of Welsh
University of Wales
College of Cardiff;
Honorary Professor,
Center for Ethnic and Geolinguistic Research
Division of Geography,
Staffordshire University
Introduction
Ethnic conflicts that challenge the existing order are a
recurrent feature of the European political landscape.
A critical feature of European history, which has pro-
duced successive periods of ethnic conflict, has been
the relative lack of congruence among population, set-
tlement patterns, and the political organization of
space and territory. Sovereignty over European terri-
tory was initially determined by church and dynastic
settlements following periodic warfare and population
transfer. Indigenous majorities usually, albeit not nec-
essarily, formed the constituent population of essen-
tially multiethnic states and often discriminated
against nonnationals.
Central to the process of legitimizing some cultures
and alienating others has been the rise of the "territo-
rial nation-state." Most histories of state formation
and nation building have involved the institutional
denial of minority rights�initially justified on reli-
gious grounds and more recently reflecting the exigen-
cies of state nationalism. During the period of
chauvinistic nationalism and state expansion�
roughly 1789 to 1919�the destruction of-ethnic
minority cultures was deemed a necessary concomi-
tant of modernity and progress. As the uneven effects
of capitalism penetrated into the marginal, ethnically
differentiated peripheries of Europe, outmoded cul-
tures were considered to be anathema to the realiza-
tion of a fully integrated national market. "Nation
states" often sought to socialize their citizenry through
a number of pivotal agencies�principally the educa-
tion system, conscription into the armed forces, and
legislation. These new state-controlled domains struc-
tured the range of identities that were to be recognized
and sanctioned in the public realm. As a consequence,
many of the current conflicts based in part upon ethnic
considerations are the result of this historical lack of
congruence among self-determination, economic
development, and political representation.
I will address several types of ethnic issues facing
contemporary Western Europe, highlight the most
pressing, and draw implications for multiethnic
accommodation and adjustment to a changing global
order. My concern throughout will be to emphasize a
spatial perspective at urban, regional, and continental
scales.
Ethnic Tensions Along a Frontier Divide: Northern
Ireland
The Northern Ireland problem�misguidedly labeled
a religious conflict�is a classic illustration of the jux-
taposition of two ethnic groups, a common feature of
European borderlands. It is also the most persistent,
intractable ethnic conflict at present within the Euro-
pean Community. As a result of the English coloniza-
tion of Ireland, a process that was contemporary with
the English colonization of North America (see
R. Sack, 1986, pp. 138-140), a major "shatter belt"
was created in Ulster. This belt divided Catholic from
Protestant, Celt from Anglo-Saxon, the gavelldnd
from the primogeniture inheritance system, and an
agrarian economy from an industrial one (see T. Jor-
dan, 1988, pp. 89-146, 393-407).
A cultural border is evident in Belfast; the neighbor-
hood divide equates to a national, if not an interna-
tional, divide. The divide is a permanent focus of
stress and violence because it is not only a place-
specific frontier zone but also the cultural interface
between two opposing systems. In an excellent over-
view of the political geography of Belfast's main
troublespot, the Shankill-Falls divide, Boal and Liv-
ingstone (1983, pp. 138-58) examine the context in
which the conflict takes place.
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In coming to grips with the behavioral patterns in the
Shankill-Falls frontier,. . . it must be recognized that
the two territories forming the frontier zone do not
nest compatibly within the same state�they are parts
of two apparently incompatible nationalisms, the
Irish on the one hand and the Northern Irish version
of the British on the other.. .. Thus the orientation of
the Protestant Shankill is "Ulster and British" while
the Roman Catholic Clonard is "Celtic Irish" in incli-
nation. This suggests, therefore, that the local frontier
in the vicinity of Cupar Street is not just an expres-
sion of urban ethnic differences, but is a microcosm
of national division. Boal and Livingstone, 1983, p.
154. (See figure 2.)
Boal and Livingstone draw attention to the signifi-
cance of scale and the possibility of international ten-
sions being focused within an urban district.
Depending on which level in the scale hierarchy one
chooses, specific places, such as the Clonard and
South Shankill, can be successively interpreted as:
1) peripheries of West Belfast; 2) peripheries of their
respective national cores�Roman Catholic Ireland
and Protestant Northern Ireland; or 3) a periphery
within a periphery of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, what Seamus Heaney (1975, p. 60) has called
the "besieged within the siege." (See figure 3.)
In their discussion, Boal and Livingstone also bring to
the fore the question of how to interpret place specific
events in such a context. They analyze the influence
that culture, stress, violence, and lack of information
have on the conduct and intensity of group conflict
where key strategic locations are so infused with sym-
bolic meaning that any criminal act can be interpreted
as a "political demonstration of loyalty" to one side or
the other. This is the geographic equivalent of some
prisoners, who, as in the Easter Rising of 1916, refuse
to accept their classification as "common criminals"
but rather as "political prisoners of war" regardless of
the nature and type of offence committed. History has
a way of mythologizing the mundane, and often
squalid, acts of man as martyrdom and heroism.
This concept of a frontier divide could also be applied
elsewhere in Europe, for example, within Brussels and
along the Belgian linguistic divide. It also has mean-
ing for the cultural zone of transition separating Que-
bec from the rest of Canada.
43
The current cease-fire and complex negotiations to
reintroduce Sinn Fein into the political process as a
constitutional actor are finely balanced�dependent
on a combination of Republican political realism and
ConservatistfUnionist compromise. However, the
British-Irish border, together with the urban enclaves
of Republican support in Belfast and Derry, will be
significant geographic reminders that political ideals
and principles are often rooted in very specific locales
and are given real purchase by varying perceptions of
place.
Minority Nationalism
Ethnic minorities are an important element in the
political landscape of Western Europe. Much of the
power of minority autonomist nationalism in the
region lies in the ability of minority leaders to mobi-
lize people on the basis of their historical occupation
of the land. Territory figures prominently as a context
for sociopolitical processes and as a repository for a
threatened group identity and sustenance, while
nationalism�despite its potential for destruction�
provides a beguilingly complete sociocultural frame-
work for political and economic action. Herein lies the
significance of resisting harmful outside influences in
both material and cultural-ideological terms and the
concern with developing a comprehensive definition
of the nation and its territory to establish political
legitimacy that can provide the basis for a call for
some form of autonomy (Williams, 1994). A. D.
Smith (1993, p.11) has phrased its allure thus:
nations derive their profound hold over the feelings
and imaginations of the people because they are his-
torically embedded. They are rooted in older and
more long-lasting ethnic ties, myths, and sentiments
from which these modem nations draw much of their
emotional and cultural sustenance and much of what
makes them distinctive, even unique. If nationalism is
the normalization of the unique, then we should not
be baffled by its global power. It satisfies the dual
craving to preserve what is felt to be a collective self
and all its special culture values, while inserting that
self as a political community into the community of
nations by endowing it with the standard attributes of
the nation.
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Figure 2
The Distribution of Protestants and Catholics, South Shankill-Clonard Frontier Zone
SHANKILL - CLONARD
RELIGION
* Roman Catholic
� Protestant
771 Non - residential
Vid land on 'Divide'
�
I
� �
� �
� �
� �
�
/0, � 1
�
�
* �* �
* �
* * * * ***
** � * ** * * * *
� ** * � *
* � * * *
* * � *
* * � * * *
� * * C'** 1// / ,
* 21. ***:*I
* CUPAR
* ** **
* * * * *
** * * *"- A *-.-
it*
*
ShankiN Road
�
SC. �
��
� � � �
� � � � � �
� � � � �
SOUTH
SHANK1LL
/
*
0 metres 150
* * *
DATA SOURCE�SAMPLE SURVEY
DECEMBER 1987�JANUARY 1988
*
4
CLONARD
/
e
*
Source: Boal F., and Livingstone, D.N., "The Internal Frontier in Microcosm�The Shankill-Falls Divide," in Kliot, N., and Waterman, S., eds., 736069 6-95
Pluralism and Political Geography, page 143, 1983.0
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Figure 3
Multiple Peripherality and the South Shanldll-Clonard Area, 1981
CLONARD (C)
FALLS (F)
ROMAN CATHOLIC
IRELAND (RC)
IRISH
REPUBLIC (RC)
777.
PERIPHERIES
SOUTH
SHANKILL (SS)
SHANKILL (S)
PROTESTANT
NORTHERN
IRELAND
(13)
UNITED
KINGDOM
Source: Boal F., and Livingstone, D.N., "The Internal Frontier in Microcosm�The Shankill-Falls Divide," in Kliot, N., and Waterman, S., eds., 349176 6-95
Pluralism and Political Geography, 1983.0
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The inset in the column to the right outlines 10 struc-
tural characteristics of minority nationalism; figure 4
illustrates where such nationalism is most virulent
today.
Ethnicity and Territorial Separatism: The Basques
The most critical form of minority nationalism in the
European Union (EU) today is separatism, which is
manifest in a surprisingly large number of member
states and which in some respects acts as a counter to
the general thrust of globalization and integration so
suggestive of the so-called "postmodemist New World
Order" (Williams, 1993). The complex process of sep-
aratism can be schematized as in figure 5, which is
derived from a larger project on political territorial
adjustment being undertaken by C. F. J. Whebell.
In postwar Europe, separatism is best illustrated by the
Basque case, though it has relevance in explaining the
Corsican, Flemish, and various Celtic cases as well.
The Basques have enjoyed long periods of relative
autonomy before their incorporation into the Spanish
state; elements of their institutional distinctiveness,
the fueros, survived until fairly recently and were used
as evidence of a prior claim to legitimate statehood.
Their language and culture were deemed unique
because they were unrelated to any Indo-European
language group and were among the oldest surviving
elements of civilization in Europe.
Under the impress of state building, the government
sought to ruthlessly eradicate non-Spanish elements,
producing a deep resentment within the Basque com-
munity. State oppression was confirmed during the
Spanish Civil War and sustained thereafter when the
Spanish forces were regarded as constituting an inter-
nal colonial military occupation. This is similar to the
Irish Republican nationalist interpretation of the role
of British troops in Northern Ireland. Thereafter, vio-
lence and oppression characterized Basque-Madrid
relations as the Franco regime sought to eradicate
local political dissent and to destroy Basque cultural
identity.
The creation in 1957 of Euskadi ta Askatasuna
(ETA)�Basque Homeland and Liberty�reinvigo-
rated Basque nationalism. Robert Clark (1979, 1984)
Some Structural Characteristics of Minority
Nationalism
1. Defense of a unique territory, the homeland, and
the protection of a valued environment.
2. Defense and promotion of a culture and identity�
language, religion, social existence.
3. Resistance to centralist trends and relative power-
lessness over decisionmaking.
4. Perception of exploitation and underdevelopment�
structural discrimination.
5. Resistance to outsiders, immigrants, settlers, colo-
nizers.
6. Fear of loss of local dominance and influence
expressed through cultural attrition.
7. Violent and nonviolent expression of ethnic dissent
and discord�escalation of risks.
8. Group-learning, myth formation, persistent ine-
qualities that shape current ideology and define con-
temporary identity in light of historically significant
acts of oppression.
9. Antistate, antistatus quo political action intended to
realize a new basis of legitimacy.
10. Redefinition of the problem situation and of con-
flict in light of the most recent events and renewed
reforms, concessions, political accommodations, and
gains for beleagured minority within the dominant
system.
has provided an excellent overview of the growth and
development of ETA. He argues that it was the special
combination of the defense of traditional cultural val-
ues, rapid industrialization, and opposition to Spanish
internal colonialism, that nurtured and sustained the
46
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Figure 4
Selected Minority Areas in Western Europe
* Major centres of political violence
� Non-violent resistance
III Elected Assemblies
Selected minority areas of Western Europe:
1 Scotland
2 Wales
3 Ulster
4 Flanders
5 Welionia
8 Brittany
7 Alsace
8 Corsica
9 Euskadi
10 Catalonia
11 Galicia
12 Jura
13 South Tyrol
14 Sardinia
15 Sicily
113 ()soften!'
17 Friuli
DENMARK
47
�
SWEDEN
736070 6-95
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role of violence as a movement strategy. He has also
drawn attention to the manner in which the Spanish
state sought to placate ethnic demands for separatism
by offering a form of regional autonomy to Euskadi,
Catalonia, Gallicia, and Andalucia. The gesture origi-
nally generated much euphoria but was followed by a
decade of disappointment that was manifest in what
he calls the "rejectionist option"�whereby the major-
ity of the electorate in the Basque provinces consis-
tently voted in an anti-Madrid fashion. The trend is
obvious in each-of the seven elections held since the
Basque Autonomy Statute entered force. The situation
was compounded by the post-1987 trend in which
regionalist parties gained electoral strength in Valen-
cia, Aragon, Navarra, Majorca, Cantabria, and Canar-
ias�areas that had little, if any, sense of historical
regionalism.
The nature of Basque nationalism is likely to change
as postindustrial Spain continues to evolve and adjust.
The trend toward a loosening of the central grip_on the
constituent regions is gathering pace here as in many
other European states. Clark forecasts that:
as advanced industrial societies become more com-
plex, diverse, and pluralistic, they require regimes
that are more decentralized, disaggregated, and
autonomous. In Spain, where the existing local and
provincial units may be too small or too restricted in
other ways to assume a vigorous role in the manage-
ment of society, the solution lies in the creation of
middle-range political entities called `meso-govern-
ments,' smaller than the nation-state, but larger and
more encompassing than cities and provinces"
(p. 41).
This conclusion is valid for Italy, France, Belgium,
and the United Kingdom but unlikely to be adopted
willingly, especially in the latter.
If the drift toward separatism in Spain is contained,
however, a significant ethnic issue will remain in
Euskadi and Catalonia. There is increasing evidence
that the post-Franco reforms designed to introduce
Eusquerra and Catalan to new public domains, such as
education, commerce, the media, and the law, have
been less effective than anticipated in assimilating
nonindigenous Spaniards and North Africans into the
new nationalist social order.
The nation-state structure, though fiercely criticized,
is also a near-permanent political feature, and it will
structure the degree of regional autonomy available to
substate nationalities. A "Europe of the Nations" ideal
is still a long way removed from the regional eco-
nomic reality that most groups must face but, despite
the apparent impracticability of the desire for regional
autarky, remains one of the most strident voices heard
in Europe.
The Nation-State in Transition?
The nation-state is being challenged and reevaluated
by a number of contemporary forces, both from above
and from below. Within the new European order, two
trends have a particular bearing on the capacity of eth-
nolinguistic minorities to renegotiate their role in the
European division of labor. The first is the weakening
of national economic sovereignty and the transfer of
key economic powers from state legislatures to the
European Commission, and the second is the sharing
of political authority among units in the state system.
Despite the current difficulties with the European
Monetary Regime (ERM) and the post-Maastricht
negotiations, the European Union has gone a long way
toward an integrated management of the constituent
economies. It has established policies on competition,
trade, monetary exchange rates, science and techno-
logical research, and�to some extent�foreign
affairs. At the regional level the growth of agreements
such as the Four Motors program, which linked
Baden-Wurttemberg, Rhones Alpes, Lombardy, Cata-
lonia, and Wales, help sustain an element of relative
autonomy from the central state apparatus; this is par-
ticularly important for job creation and for construct-
ing a more diverse economic profile than has hitherto
been the case. In places like Catalonia and Wales,
where inhabitants continue to speak indigenous lan-
guages, this decentralization is an obvious way to
slow down outmigration and language shift, thereby
easing one of the key determinants of ethnic antago-
nism. Such moves represent a broader pattern of
attempts that seek to bypass some central state author-
ity and nurture regional-level power.
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Figure 5
Political Territorial Processes of Separatism
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Processes
leading
to
Separatism
�
Definition
�Po
VD of
Community*
(Alternative reiterations)
Institutional
Organization
Level
Mode of Conflict
Legal
Extra-legal
Political
Litigious
Violent r-r�
i
Non-violent 1
Culminating
Event
(War, Strike,
Judicial Ruling,
Law, Referendum)
Disband
New
Formal
Unit
*Community means "Politicogeographical community" � it may be formal (bounded) or informal, and may be
revised in successive "passes".
To other
processes
349177 6-95
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We may not need to establish a de jure Federal Europe
if many regions will increasingly operate as if they
were constituents of a de facto Federal Europe. This is
because both at the state and, to a lesser extent, at the
regional level, conventional political authority�tradi-
tionally encapsulated in the concept of sovereignty�
is increasingly shared among a number of units within
the state system. The absolute nature of the nation-
state can no longer be sustained as if it were a closed
system. Pooled sovereignty, permeable borders, Euro-
pean Community-wide socioeconomic and-environ-
mental policymaking, freedom of movement and to a
lesser extent shared foreign policy�through interre-
lated agencies such as the Western European Union,
NATO, CSCE�all characterize the contemporary
state system and render it more interdependent, both
on respective member states and on subordinate con-
stituent regions. Clearly such integration and mutual
dependence is not without its structural strains.
Ethnic Insiders and Ethnic Outsiders
The major ethnic issue facing Western Europe in the
coming decade is the question of the status of outsid-
ers. Since the 1960s several regions have experienced
an influx of migrants who are often religiously, ideo-
logically, and racially different from indigenous Euro-
peans. Approximately 30 million people entered
Western Europe between 1945 and 1975, one of the
largest migratory movements in modern history. An
estimated 13 million legally settled non-Europeans,
and perhaps as many as 2 million "illegals," are within
the European Union. Tension between indigenous
Community members and "outsiders" is present and
most likely will increase.
The "outsider" question has become significant in the
context of the collapse of the bipolar system and the
emergence of a new world order. At least two major,
contradictory processes are at work here. The first is
the opening up of Europe to democratic ideals and
representative politics, which follows the advance of=
capitalism eastward and its penetration and creation of
markets, resources, and supply sources. The other,
occurring simultaneously, is a reaction that seeks to
protect the individual character of West European
states by closing borders and limiting immigration.
The resulting tension in the hindrance of the free
movement of people, ideas, and goods is a major
source of ethnic tension. Neonationalism, facism,
crypto-Communism, and blatant racism are all too
obvious a response.
Race and Ethnicity
It might have been assumed that in tandem with the
so-called "ethnic revival" of postwar Europe would
have come an increased tolerance to racial as well as
-ethnic minorities. However, this is not the case. As
MacLaughlin (1993) demonstrates, both ethnicity and
race are being used to categorize groups and structure
policies in ways that defend the integrity of Europe-
ans. Within sections of the European media and the
political arena, ethnicity is increasingly used to refer
to the positive, quasibiological identity that links an
indigenous group to a specific place in Europe. Race,
in contrast, has come to "signify a set of imaginary
properties of inheritance that fix and legitimate real
positions of social domination or subordination in
terms of cultural differences between native and for-
eigner in the European Community," (MacLaughlin,
1993). As a classificatory category it reflects prima-
rily, if not exclusively, negative tendencies of dissoci-
ation and exclusion at state and EU levels.
Ethnicity, Migration, and Frontiers
For this crude distinction between ethnic and racial
categorization to be maintained in an increasingly
multiethnic world, Europe has to reinterpret its posi-
tion, to defend its frontiers from incursions from the
east, mass migration from the south, and refugee
absorption from the Balkans. What sort of society
would a fortress Europe thus conceived seek to con-
struct? Surely such isolationism, state-inspired nation-
alism, and racial cleansing is an anathema to the
European dream of free movement of labor and open
borders? Unfortunately not; the lessons of history
remind us that every generation since 1648 has fought
for the control of the Lotharingian Axis�the Rhine-
Rhone Corridor�and its associated networks.
Granted that the European Union exists in part to seal
the respective futures of West European societies
within one common framework, but the issues of
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movement and border vigilance have not been lost,
merely shifted further east. Geographers, who have a
long-established interest in Migration, displacement,
and territorial adjustment, are contributing to our
understanding of the changing patterns.
James Walsh (1992) has provided an overview that
suggests that in France the threat of increasing migra-
tion of Muslims animates racial passions. Fully
3.5 million foreigners make up 6.2 percent of the total
population. The migrants are accused of such things as
depressing average economic wage levels, refusing to
integrate, clustering in Islamic neighborhoods, and
undermining French culture and customs. Such
charges serve the cause of the National Front under
Le Pen, who won 38 percent of the November 1991
election vote and, in the regional elections of 1992,
gave the National Front a larger percentage of the vote
than the Socialist Party under Francois Mitterrand.
Bruno Megret, a leading theoretician of the National
Front, has announced a package of migration-curbing
proposals: 1) posting of $180,000 bond by all non-
European visitors, 2) mandatory AIDS testing,
3) review of the status of all aliens in France, 4)
stricter border control, 5) no family unity doctrine,
6) repeal of the agreement on freedom of movement
for EC-member migrants, 7) no social benefits to
migrant children, 8) priority for French citizens in
housing and social benefits, and 9) immediate deporta-
tion for migrants with improper or no official docu-
ments, (Walsh, 1992, p. 21). Clearly such blatant state
nationalism will not be adopted in policy terms by any
responsible French Government, but more subtle vari-
ants of these elements have entered the agenda of
respectable political parties and interest groups and
will be set in sharper focus as the key policy alterna-
tives each time urban racial violence occurs.
The former German Federal Republic was a logical
destination for many displaced Europeans and others
because of its historically sympathetic reception of
refugees that is enshrined in Article 16 of the German
Basic Law. It is estimated that some 400,000 asylum
seekers were processed into Germany in 1992. Walsh
suggests that 80 percent came from the Third World
and that the vast majority were Muslim; he argues that
an additional 4 million Turks and their families and a
further 310,000 de facto refugees should be taken into
account as constituting the non-German sector of the
population.
Since unification and its attendant economic and fiscal
difficulties, this liberal attitude has been openly chal-
lenged. Anti-immigrant violence has made many Ger-
man citizens wary of an extension of their open-door
policy, especially when the media are quick to point
out that 93 percent of asylum seekers do not have a
valid case. Thus, one inescapable conclusion is that
many places within Germany are going to witness
sporadic and deep-seated violence. When this general
trend is applied to the borders with Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Austria, it is evident that one major
cause of future conflict will be the manner in which
cross-border movement is handled.
51
The German state's response is to attempt to quench
the migration flow at the source through a massive
investment in the emergent capitalist economies of the
east and increased immigration control at external EU
borders. To some extent this will be welcomed by
dependent economies that will replace the ruble with
the mark, but it is also likely to create deep-seated
resentment and accusations of internal colonialism,
reminiscent of the first waves of German expansion in
previous centuries. Such border controls will facilitate
the removal of internal EU border checks but only to
the extent that each constituent country is as efficient
and determined as Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom in employing external controls, a doubtful
assumption.
The most recent migrants are incorrectly viewed as
economically dependent and relatively unskilled�a
drain on EU resources. Miles (1992, p.41) is especially
sensitive to this assumption. He argues that "this
homogenization of migration flows is factually mis-
taken and analytically problematic" and that "...large
numbers of recent migrants originate from Eastern
Europe, the migration of aussiedler into Germany
being of special significance; that the most important
category of internal labor migration within the EU is
that of skilled professional and managerial labour; and
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that one of the fastest growing categories on non-EU
migration into the European Union includes similarly
highly skilled nonmanual labor from other sectors of
the advanced capitalist world economy. In light of the
new immigration, the stereotyping of immigrants as
blacks originating from the Third World ironically mir-
rors and legitimates the discourse of EU states about
the problem of immigration." This is an important
qualification and should alert us to read between the
lines of official pronouncement and localized reaction.
The Implications of Globalization, Technology, and
Accessibility for Ethnic Relations
If we shift attention from the conventional territorial
and urban contexts for social interaction, it is evident
that a major source of ethnic-racial conflict will be the
differential access groups enjoy to information, space,
and power in Europe. The whole history of the West
has been a constant, if traumatic, dialogue between
periods of opening and closing, between diversifica-
tion and uniformity. The technological trends under-
pinning closer European integration suggest four
trends as they relate to the interaction of language,
ethnicity, identity, and the state system:
� First, we have already witnessed the emergence of
English as the lingua franca of Europe, if not of the
world. This has caused other international languages
such as French, German, and Spanish to jockey for
position in a secondary role within the educational,
legal, and commercial domains of a restructured and
enlarged Europe. Fears are already expressed about
the dominance of English and of the infiltration
thereby of non-European, for instance, North Amer-
ican influence. Thus serious consideration is being
given to the following proposals: a) there should be
two foreign languages for every EU citizen, b) a first
foreign language should be obligatory, c) English
should be taught as a second foreign language, never
as the first, and d) less information and cultural loss
will occur if the principle of multilingualism in most
affairs can be instituted.
� Second, indigenous language groups, such as Welsh,
Irish, or Basque (see inset on p.53) will be further
marginalized unless they can influence the patterns
of stable bilingualism with a much reduced language
switching than has hitherto been the norm. Evidence
of partial success is available in domains such as
education, public administration, and the law. The
key instrument is the degree of influence exercised
on the local state apparatus to institutionalize pat-
terns of language behavior and service provision in
new domains. One of the great ironies of many
lesser used language groups is that they are simulta-
neously witnessing the erosion of their traditional
strength in heartland areas and key cities while
beginning to harness the potential of mass commu-
nication and electronic networking.
� Third, and most intriguing from a geographer's
viewpoint, pressure will increase on local and met-
ropolitan authorities to provide mother-tongue edu-
cation and other public services to the children of
mobile workers and their families in multicultural
cities such as Milan, London, Paris, and Frankfurt.
This is set to become the major policy issue within
public administration if a fully functional European
Union is to be realized.
� Fourth, and most strategical, demand will grow at
the Community level to provide resources for the
instruction, absorption, and occupational integration
of the children and dependents of non-EU migrant
workers. An inability or a refusal to provide such
public facilities, especially in education, health ser-
vices, and community care, will undoubtedly
increase the scale of ethnic tension and call into
question the nature and direction of the multicultural
character of the European Union itself.
A more virulent expression of such tension will be the
continued importation of non-European conflicts into
the multicultural cities of the Community. One chief
characteristic of globalization is that the safety valve
of relative insulation from other countries' problems
and issues no longer operates in a "nationally
bounded" manner. In consequence, the "higher the
level of globalization, the narrower the scope for
escape alternatives. In this sense, globalization is also
a kind of totalitarianization of world space" (Mlinar,
1992. p. 20; Williams, 1993, p. 2).
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Western Europe's Lesser Used Languages
Belgium
German
Denmark
German
France
Breton
Catalan
Basque
Corsican
Dutch
German/Alsatian
Occitan Luxembourg
Letzebuergesch
Italy
French (Franco-Provencal)
Occitan
German
Ladin
Slovene
Friulan
Sard
Catalan
Greek
Croatian
Albanian
Germany
North Frisian Netherlands
East Frisian West Frisian
Danish
Polish Spain
Catalan
Greece
Arvinite
Turkish
Macedonian
Vlak
Ireland
Irish
Gallego
Basque
Occitan
United Kingdom
Gaelic
Scots
Cornish
Irish
Welsh
Conclusion
Ethnic mobilization is so often a surrogate for other
issues such as political struggle, economic depriva-
tion, and psychological adjustment to the status quo.
Ethnic issues, whether as purposive or reactive ele-
ments, are likely to increase in their salience as West-
ern Europe avers a more open, pluralistic society.
Geographers can play an important role in analyzing
the conventional elements of migration, distribution,
and territorial organization of Society. However, the
major challenge facing us is in interpreting the trends
that emerge as a result of the disjuncture between the
formally structured political units�at whatever scale
from local to superstructural�and the actual social
behavior of an increasingly autonomous and individu-
alistic citizenry. Coping with this new complex reality
by learning to read between the lines will be the chief
social skill required of both active citizen and special-
ist observer alike. Let me end by raising a few critical
questions that geographers and others will need to
address if Europe is to honor the basic rights of all its
constituent citizens:
� On what basis will the new European identity be
constructed�federal, regional, racial, or national?
� What effect will the enlargement of the European
Union have on the internal ethnolinguistic and
regional management of the Community?
� To what extent will border tensions spill into Com-
munity states, and how will these effect the grand
design of opening up the frontiers of Europe?
� How permeable are the new frontiers of the Euro-
pean Community?
� Will ethnicity, as a base for social mobilization,
increase or decrease with greater political-economic
integration?
� How will political organizations, especially metro-
politan authorities, cope with the increased diversity
of their constituent citizens and the newly enfran-
chised rights of cultural pluralism?
� What role will territory and place have in structuring
the life chances of hitherto discriminated minorities?
� Will we have a nested hierarchy of disadvantage
aggravated by global economic changes inducing
the expansion of domination and dependence of the
poor and the racially distinct?
53
� Who controls access to information within the
mother tongue and the working languages of the
European minorities?
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� Are minorities destined to a more dependant role,
even within their own countries, because of super-
structural changes favoring the dominant groups?
� Or will they achieve some relative sociocultural
autonomy through the adoption of mass technology
and internal communicative competence?
� What effect will globalization have on strengthening
or weakening the regional-local infrastructure on
which European ethnic minority groups depend?
� What role will intractable ethnic conflicts play in
triggering major regional clashes, and how will the
new security architecture of Europe react to such
conflagrations?
54
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Alexander Murphy
I would like to highlight a few things that I think are
particularly significant and to raise a couple of related
questions. At the heart of Professor Williams' presen-
tation is a dichotomy between two fundamentally dif-
ferent kinds of ethnic issues that Western Europe will
face in the years ahead. One concerns the longstand-
ing, regionally specific minority groups, and the other
concerns the migrants who have come in from North
Africa and the Middle East over the last 30 or 40 years
and more recently from Eastern Europe. It is impor-
tant to recognize that each of these poses a fundamen-
tally different problem for Europe in the 1990s. Most
obviously, their geography differs. Longstanding
minority groups often operate from a distinct regional
territorial base. The migrant groups, on the other hand,
are concentrated overwhelmingly in cities and do not
have the same kind of territorial base. The geography
of social disruption associated with each group also
differs. With longstanding minority and regional
minority groups, the issues, tensions, and conflicts, in
general, tend to be localized, whereas migrant group
issues tend to be focused for political mobilization at
the national level and are often far reaching in their
impact on society. These differences are evident in the
public reactions to them. I agree with Dr. Williams
that we are seeing a greater acceptance of the long-
standing minority groups and that the focus of opposi-
tion politics around the recent migrants is one of the
fundamental issues for Europe in the years ahead.
Having identified those twin issues, I will move on to
note what I see as the two key geographical perspec-
tives that Dr. Williams highlighted:
� First, ethnic conflicts play out at different scales, and
these scale differences have implications for our
understanding. Dr. Williams highlighted the impor-
tance of scale in his discussion of Northern Ireland.
� Second, of course, is the importance of territorial
setting for ethnic conflict. Some of the comments
about the changing significance of regions were par-
ticularly interesting in this regard.
A focus on the territorial setting for ethnic conflict can
highlight some issues that Dr. Williams did not touch
on but that are relevant for our thinking about what is
happening in Europe. First, differences in how States
define citizenship is critically important. One need
only think about the different ways in which the Ger-
mans, French, or British have defined citizenship his-
torically. Second, several different migrant groups
exist: older new migrants, newer new migrants, and
newer newer new migrants. The most recent come
from Eastern Europe and look different from earlier
migrants not only in terms of external characteristics
but also in terms of the kinds of skills they bring and
their potential level of acceptance within West Euro-
pean societies.
One of the critical contemporary issues is the effect
that the new immigrants are having on the old immi-
grants. The relatively highly skilled immigrants com-
ing in from Poland and the former western republics
of the former Soviet Union are likely to be more easily
integrated within the cultural traditions of the West. If
this occurs, Turks and other non-Western migrants
will be further marginalized.
Finally, Dr. Williams raises two critical questions. The
first is that the changing political geography of Europe
is affecting ethnicity and ethnic conflict. In my own
view, centralization as a component of European inte-
gration has currently gone about as far as it can go. A
key current issue is the importance of regions and
regionalization. An example of this is a map produced
by the Commission of the European Communities that
illustrates European integration from a geographical
perspective. It identifies development zones within
Europe. These development zones do not conform to
those defined by the European Regional Development
Fund; they are not based on political-administrative
regions within existing nation-states. Rather, the map
looks at Europe without nation-state boundaries, play-
ing off of some of the transboundary developments
currently underway that are beginning to define a new
kind of European political space.
57
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The second question is: how do we evaluate the poli-
cies of individual states in relation to minority groups,
in particular, territorial policies? There was an
extended discussion in the paper of the Basque situa-
tion, where power has been devolved to regions of a
quasiautonomous nature. Despite this devolution, a
continuation of fairly strong anti-Madrid bias can still
be seen in voting patterns in Spain. At the same time,
overt violence has been reduced. This raises questions
about the impact of state policies that acknowledge
the existence of ethnic concentrations and use territo-
rial policies to incorporate ethnic groups in the deci-
sionmalcing process. It may mean�as has happened
to a degree in the Basque case�that bringing a sepa-
ratist group into the decisionmalcing structure may
marginalize the more violent elements of the group.
General Discussion
QUESTION: With regard to ethnic issues, what poli-
cies are likely to best promote US interests in the
region?
DR. MURPHY: The United States has an interest in a
stable and economically vital Europe. This would sug-
gest that it is in the US interest to promote the kind of
policy options that lead to stability from an ethnic
standpoint. That may mean some of the kinds of terri-
torial policies that I suggested. It also means that the
United States should promote the idea of a European
Community that does not just look like a much more
centralized community but one that actually facilitates
the kinds of regional linkages that Dr. Williams has
outlined. We should be not be scared of the fact that
the nation-state is changing. It is in the US interest to
promote the kind of regional arrangements that will
lead to a more stable and outward-looking Europe.
58
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Ethnoterritorial Conflict in the
Former Soviet Union
Robert Kaiser
Professor of Geography
University of Missouri-Columbia
Introduction
The former USSR has been the scene of scores of
active and potential ethnoterritorial conflicts. More
than 200 ethnic and territorial disputes have been
identified in this region since 1989, encompassing
nearly all the territory of the former USSR (see
figure 6). However, not all the disputes have erupted
into violent conflict. In Latvia and Estonia, ethnic con-
flict has taken the form of "constitutional nationalism"
or "ethnic democracy," as Latvian and Estonian politi-
cal elites restructure ethnic relations through the use
of legislation to exclude nonmembers.' In Transcauca-
sia, ethnoterritorial conflicts between titular nations
and indigenous minorities began before 1991 and
quickly escalated to open warfare. In Central Asia,
sporadic outbreaks of ethnic violence against nontitu-
lar populations have occurred but have not been orga-
nized by indigenous political elites pursuing the
politics of territorial nationalism. In the Russian Fed-
eration, disputes over the level of territorial autonomy
for non-Russians have risen, but, aside from a few
specific republics, a process of political disintegration
comparable to that which occurred in the USSR does
not appear to be on the horizon.
Rather than provide a descriptive summary of all 200
plus ethnoterritorial conflicts, this paper explores the
factors underyling the regional variation in the ethnot-
erritorial conflicts that have arisen in the former
'The term constitutional nationalism ; its use by the political elites
of the dominant nation, the consequences of the new political real-
ity for nonmembers, and reactions leading to violent ethnoterrito-
rial conflict was recently elaborated by Robert Hayden (1992) with
reference to Yugoslavia. According to Hayden, "constitutional
nationalism envisions a state in which sovereignty resides with a
particular nation, the members of which are the only ones who can
decide fundamental questions of state form and identity." Ethnic
democracy has been defined by Smooha and Hanf (1992, 31) as "a
democracy in which the dominance of one ethnic group is institu-
tionalized."
Soviet Union.2 The factors and consequences briefly
discussed are generalizations drawn from comparative
research on nationalism and territoriality and from the
disputes that have emerged in the former USSR. They
are by no means the only important factors, and, to
fully understand why some ethnoterritorial disputes
escalated to violent conflict and others did not, it is
necessary to explore each dispute in detail and to
examine it from each side's perspective. Nonetheless,
it is also essential to understand the geographic vari-
ability in ethnoterritorial conflict in the former USSR
more generally and to place the events in this critical
world region in the context of a broader conceptual
framework.
Ethnoterritorial Conflicts: Factors Underlying
Regional Differences
The Degree of National Consciousness
The formation of a national identity is one of the most
important, but also one of the most difficult, factors to
grasp. Nationalists throughout this region tend to
depict their nations as "primordial organisms" that
were dormant during the oppressive Soviet period and
were reawakened during the Gorbachev era (for
example, RUKH 1989). However, it is more accurate
to view the Soviet period as crucial to the national for-
mation process, during which time nations became
mass-based communities of interest and belonging
that developed a sense of identity and a sense of
homeland more extensive than their local environment
(Kaiser 1994). However, even though this nationaliza-
tion process during the Soviet era resulted in a higher
and more mass-based national consciousness than
existed before, not all groups are equally national.
Because national consciousness is essentially subjec-
tive, it is difficult to measure the degree to which it has
become mass-based. Soviet censuses did ask a ques-
tion on national identity, and this data provided one
indicator of groups that were losing members as a
2 For such a descriptive summary of the conflicts that had emerged
by 1992, see Kolossor (1992).
59
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NIS: Ethnoterritotial Conflicts, 1992
60
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result of ethnonational reidentification or assimilation
over time (Silver 1986). According to this measure,
the least nationally conscious communities are the
small groups of people of the Siberian north and also a
number of Finnic groups such as the Karelians and
Mordvinians, whose members were undergoing a pro-
cess of reidentification toward Russians during much
of the Soviet period. It is also true that members who
live outside their home republics are more likely to
acculturate and assimilate through an intergenera-
tional process of reidentification (Kaiser 1988, 1994).
Although ethnic reidentification is a useful general
indicator of national consciousness, this measure does
have limits because it does not indicate the strength of
national consciousness amohg the population that
considered itself to be part of the nation (that is, those
who did not reidentify).
Another way of assessing national consciousness is to
study the behavior of individuals and to determine to
what degree each member of the nation behaves in a
way that is consonant with nationalism. Nationalism
here is defined as both an ideology and a political
strategy. In Nationalism and the State (1982, 3), John
Breuilly states that the political doctrine of national-
ism has three essential tenets:
� "There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar
character."
� "'The interests and values of the nation take priority
over all other interests and values."
� "The nation must be as independent as possible.
This usually requires at least the attainment of polit-
ical sovereignty."
National consciousness as discussed above is
addressed in Breuilly's first tenet. Beyond this, the pri-
macy of national identity and the political objective
that this inspires (that is, the attainment of indepen-
dence) are of crucial importance in understanding
nationalism as a political and geographic action pro-
gram. Applying this to the former USSR, it is rela-
tively obvious at this point that ethnoregional
differences exist in the degree to which nationalism
has become an activated strategy. The Baltic nations
have clearly been most nationalistic; close to the
entire membership turned out for independence ral-
lies�indicating a high degree of national conscious-
ness�and they were least willing to compromise on
the question of political independence. The least
nationalistic of the titular groups in the former Union
republics are in Central Asia. For example, Tajikistan
has erupted into civil war; the conflict is, at least in
part, intranational and interethnic, indicating a low
level of national consciousness and the continued pri-
macy of subnational, localized ethnic identities. The
degree of national solidarity is lowest in Central Asia,
and the nationalized elites have had the most difficulty
calling their groups to action.
As a final point regarding this factor, it is important to
note that there is a lack of correspondence between the
degree of national consciousness and the level of
interethnic violence. For example, the Tajik civil war
has resulted in much greater loss of life and disloca-
tion than has the constitutional nationalism pursued by
Estonians and Latvians.
Strength of Attachment to Place of Residence
A sense of homeland rises with national conscious-
ness (Kaiser 1991, 1994). As an ethnonational com-
munity becomes more nationalistic, this sense of
homeland becomes politicized and is converted into
territorial nationalism.' Nationalism is an explicitly
geographic ideology and strategy, a political action
program to make the borders of state and homeland
congruent (Williams 1989; Gettner 1983).
Nationality policies in the USSR facilitated the devel-
opment of a politicized sense of homeland. First, the
federal structure helped give definite shape, size, and
borders to homelands that for the masses of most
groups were only vaguely perceived in the 1920s (see
figure 7).
61
3 From a nationalist perspective, the ancestral homeland is the only
place where the nation can survive and prosper in the future. If
nationalists view the nation as a primordial organism, they also
typically view it as an organism that can thrive only when rooted in
the soil of the ancestral homeland.
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Figure 7
Federal Structure of the USSR, 1989
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Republics
(In addition to the
RUSSiafl Federation)
1. Estonia
2. Latvia
Uthuania
4. Belarus
5. Ukraine
6. Moldova
7. Georgia
8. Armenia
9. Azetbaydzhan
10. Turkmenistan
11. Uzbekistan
12. Tadzhikistan
Autonomous Republics i.� .�
15. Abkhazia
16. Adzharia
17. Nalchishavan
18. Kabardin-Balkar
19. North Ossetia
20. Chechen-ingush
21. Dagestan
22. Kalmyk
.-/
,-"`� '.
Ii.:
23.. �� N. -I I:
1 -,-� ..?
)�
A. ; V.A..) � .--,..) --f�
� . .... 43 C._ r tr'. A ..1. 1..7" ��:1
L. onega , ./-' � �� ' � 47 ����
` At, / ' - ?
- -I. .4'
r" 31 ,....,�"'/ ..r.ii II ..:,.
, �
24 i --,.... 46 1.. /
'�(.1:..21--71:,2,2,-6i.";�;X:4�IfiEr ''...FED ER ATED
%. -,..
e' i. � -'' ,.. ..... .
45
i-���......������
. 48
1 0)
'Z.,/
k 10
13. Kyrgyzstan
14. Kazakhstan
24. Mordvin
25. Chuvash
26. Mari
27. Tatarstan
28. Udmurt
Aral
Sea 14
13
12�
23. Karelia 29. Rashid&
30. Karaicalpakstan
31. Komi
32. Tuvinia
33. Buryat
34. Yakut
34
SOW XUSI
� .
r" 51 �
/
../
1 i
: ! i\
,.,. �,. c.., ...
I � i \� g.4. ,.....
'? 33'. ...._. N.'�
\ 42 i �:,
I !
04. ) 50 .., ! \---k\-/-2. 't
./�� 1�32 ("'"�;�- � .--r-� -
,.�,.......: ..."--.k. ..- .
Autonomous Oblasts
35. Adygey
36. KaracharChertess
37. South Ossetia
38. Nagomo-Karabakh
39. Gomo-Badakhshan
40. Gorno-Altay
41. Khakass
42. Jewish
49
Autonomous Okrugs
43. Nenets
44. Komi-Permyak
45. Khanty-Mansi
48. Yainalo-Nenets
47. Taymyr
48. EvenK
49. Usr-Ordin Buryat
50. Agin Buryat
51. Chukchi
52. Konjak
\i
- Republic boundary
�-� -Autonomous republic boundary
Autonomous �blast boundary
Autonomous okrug boundary
Source: Robert Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)0
736072-95
29Z�Z WOO 1.0/90/21.0Z raseala .101 panoidthof
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Second, Korenizatsiya (indigenization) policies that
targeted members of the titular nation for preferential
treatment in their home republic clearly fostered a
more ethnically exclusionary outlook regarding the
appropriate status of the titular nation vis a vis all
other nations in the republic. Most nationalists have
come to view all their former republic as homeland,
even while many nationalists lay claim to a more
extensive homeland.
On the one hand, the federal structure reduced the eth-
noterritorial conflict that might otherwise have
occurred�it provided the political geographic struc-
ture for a relatively peaceful dissolution of the USSR.
On the other hand, several of those national communi-
ties with units that were only autonomous have
attempted to secede from the successor states in which
their homelands are located. This has resulted in con-
flict escalation at the intrarepublic scale, which has
been particularly severe in the Caucasus.
Territorial nationalism is strongest in the regions
where nations are most fully formed. Again, Estonia
and Latvia�with their exclusionary citizenship laws,
constitutions, and so forth �may be seen as most
nationalistic. The state-building project in these two
republics is synonymous with the exclusion of ethnic
others, particularly Russians, even though their poli-
cies have excluded the population arriving since
World War II rather than all nontitular people.
Ethnic conflict is more likely where two or more
nations feel a strong sense of homeland toward the
same place, where both groups have become politi-
cized, and where the power relationship between the
two groups has shifted to favor one over the other.
This is certainly true in the case of conflicts over
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in Georgia.
A final note under this factor: it has become increas-
ingly apparent over the past few years that a Russian
sense of national consciousness and sense of home-
land are not well developed. Russians as the dominant
group in the USSR experienced an overlapping sense
of identity with the Soviet People idea, and with the
entire USSR as the Russian homeland/Socialist father-
land. Also, because of the great geographic dispersal
of the Russian population, a more localized, subna-
tional identity is also apparent. Both of these detract
from the strength of a Russian national identity and a
sense of homeland. As a result, there has been a lively
debate within the Russian community over the ques-
tion: "What is Russia?".
Ethnodemographic Trends
Most nationalists view the ideal polity as an ethnically
pure nation-state with all members of the nation in and
no outsiders present and with political borders drawn
on the basis of the (mythical) ancestral homeland, that
is, the state ideally is viewed as the political geo-
graphic embodiment of the nation. However, none of
the successor states encompasses one and only one
nation (see tables 1 and 2):
� Armenia is ethnically homogeneous but has the
highest percentage of members living outside a suc-
cessor state.
� Almost all Estonians, Latvians, and Georgians are
included in their respective states, but members of
nontitular groups are also present.
Demographic dilution of the indigenous nation in its
homeland, usually occurring as the result of the in-
migration of Russians, tended to exacerbate intereth-
nic relations and was a catalyst for rising nationalism.
Latvians and Estonians experienced the greatest
demographic dilution in their homelands between
1960 and 1990, and the feared demographic Russifica-
don became the cornerstone of their nationalistic pro-
grams (Panning, 1980). Ablchazians similarly cited
Georgian in-migration and Abkhazian dilution as a
critical factor in the need for Abkhazia to be indepen-
dent, and the Armenian declaration of independence
in Nagorno-Karabakh was preceded by a decade of
Azeri in-migration.
63
By way of contrast, Kyrgyzstan has about the same
level of demographic dilution as Latvia, but this has
not been a major issue in Kyrgyzstan. In the Central
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Table 1
National Composition of the Population, 1989
Population in thousands (and percentages)
Republic
Titular
Nontitular
Of Nontitular:
Russians
Indigenous Minorities
Neighbors
Russia
119.866
(81.5)
27,156
(18.5)
17,283
(63.6)
6,765
(24.9)
Ukraine
37,419
(72.7)
14.033
(27.3)
11,356
(80.9)
47
(0.3)
1,282
(9.1)
Belarus
7.905
(77.9)
2,247
(22.1)
1,342
(59.7)
716
(31.9)
Moldova
2,795
(64.5)
1,541
(35.5)
562
(36.5)
153
(10.0)
600
(39.0)
Uzbekistan
14,142
(71.4)
5,668
(28.6)
1,653
(29.2)
412
(7.3)
2,067
(36.5)
Kazakstan
6,535
(39.7)
9,930
(60.3)
6,228
(62.7)
1,123
(11.3)
Kyrgyzstan
2,230
(52.4)
2.028
(47.6)
917
(45.2)
695
(343)
Tajikistan
3.172
(62.3)
1,920
(37.7)
388
(20.2)
1,282
(66.8)
Turkmenistan
2,537
(72.0)
986
(28.0)
334
(33.9)
411
(41.7)
Georgia
3.787
(70.1)
1.613
(29.9)
341
(21.1)
260
(16.1)
745
(46.2)
Azerbaijan
5,805
(82.7)
1,216
(17.3)
392
(32.3)
391
(32.1)
186
(15.3)
Armenia
3,084
(93.3)
221
(6.7)
52
(23.3)
86
(39.0)
Lithuania
2,924
(79.6)
751
(20.4)
344
(45.9)
325
(43.4)
Latvia
1.388
(52.0)
1,279
(48.0)
906
(70.8)
158
(12.3)
Estonia
963
(61.5)
602
(38.5)
475
(78.8)
Note: Indigenous minorities include those ethnonational communi-
ties with autonomous territories in the Union republics of the
former USSR. In addition, in Moldova the Gagauz are included,
and in Ukraine the Crimean Tatars are included. The category
"Neighbors" includes the members of the titular nations of the
Union republics whose borders are adjacent to the republic in
question.
Asian republics, demographic indigenization rather
than greater demographic Russ ification has been the
trend for most of the postwar period.
Social Mobility and Relative Deprivation
Ethnoterritorial conflict tends to be more violent in
places where indigenous access to upward mobility is
blocked by socially mobilized outsiders, creating a
condition of "aspirational deprivation" (that is, where
a group's rising aspirations go unfulfilled) (Gurr
1970). This is particularly apparent in Central Asia,
where dramatic increases in the levels of indigenous
educational attainment during the 1970s and 1980s
resulted in equally dramatic increases in aspirations.
These aspirations were not met due to economic stag-
nation and more recently economic depression in the
region, resulting in rising unemployment, especially
among the young educated members of the indigenous
Source: Goskomstat SSSR, Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Nasele-
niia 1989 Goda, Volume 7, parts 1 and 2. Minneapolis: East
View Publications, 1993.
groups. Under these conditions, in-migrating "for-
eigners" tend to be blamed. Because Russians and
other European groups occupy the higher status posi-
tions in Central Asia's urban/industrial sectors, this
tendency is not unjustified. These socioeconomic con-
ditions provided the catalyst for sporadic antiforeigner
violence in Central Asia, often conducted by unem-
ployed educated indigenous youths against a vulnera-
ble population that was depicted as receiving
preferential access to scarce economic goods such as
housing, jobs, and food (for example, Meskhetian
Turks in Uzbekistan, Armenians in Dushanke).4
4 Byron Weiner (1978) found these same conditions underlying the
rise of indigenous nativism among India's so-called sons of the
soil. Nativism is defined by Weiner as "intense opposition to
minorities because of their foreign origin."
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Table 2
Ethnodemographic Trends, 1959-89
Percent
Titular Nation in the Homeland
Titular Nation in the Total Population
Republic
1959
1989
Percentage
Point Change
1959
1989
Percentage
Point Change
Russia
85.8
82.6
-3.2
83.3
81.5
-1.8
Ukraine
86.3
84.7
-1.6
76.8
72.7
-4.1
Belarus
82.5
78.8
-3.7
81.1
77.9
-3.2
Moldova
85.2
83.4
-1.8
65.4
64.5
-0.9
Uzbekistan
83.8
84.7
0.9
62.1
71.4
9.3
Kazakhstan
77.2
80.3
3.1
30.0
39.7
9.7
Kyrgyzstan
86.4
88.2
1.8
40.5
52.4
11.9
Tajikistan
75.2
75.3
0.1
53.1
62.3
9.2
Turkmenistan
92.2
93.0
0.8
60.9
72.0
11.1
Georgia
96.6
95.1
-1.5
64.3
70.1
5.8
Azerbaijan
84.8
85.7
0.9
67.5
82.7
15.2
Armenia
55.7
66.7
11.0
88.0
93.3
5.3
Lithuania
92.5
95.3
2.8
79.3
79.6
0.3
Latvia
92.7
95.1
2.4
62.0
52.0
-10.0
Estonia
90.3
93.8
3.5
74.6
61.5
-13.1
Source: Robert Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, in press), tables
4.1 and 4.3.
In Georgia a slightly different interethnic dynamic
regarding social mobility and relative deprivation
developed. The Georgians in Abkhazia, who view this
territory as part of their homeland, were angered by
the preferential treatment accorded Abkhazians as part
of the indigenization program. Abkhazians were only
17 percent of the population but, as the titular group in
Abkhazia, had a much higher percent of slots in
higher education, high status jobs, and political repre-
sentation reserved for them. In Nagorno-Karabakh the
demographic shift toward Azeris was coupled with
Azeri challenges to Armenian privileges in the region.
In both cases the Georgian and Azeri attempts to
remove or reduce Abkhazian and Armenian privileges
resulted in civil warfare, as Abkhazians and Arme-
nians in Nagorna-Karabakh sought to secede.
It is also true, however, that the most socially mobi-
lized titular nations, that is, the Estonians, Latvians,
Georgians, and Armenians-are also among the most
nationalistic. The Soviet case provides convincing
evidence that socioeconomic development or modern-
ization, and even the provision of indigenous privi-
leges, did not solve the national problem.
Nearly all non-Russians have used the rhetoric of
internal colonialism. The least developed, such as the
Tajiks, charge that the USSR did not live up to its
promise of interethnic and interregional equalization.
The most developed, such as the Estonians, charge
that they would be even more developed if they had
their independence. This feeling of relative depriva-
tion was a potent catalyst for rising territorial national-
ism that ironically was perhaps most influential in the
most developed republics because the message of
external exploitation and domination interacted with
the trend toward demographic dilution among nations
with a highly developed national consciousness and a
sense of homeland.
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Reaction by Members of Nontitular Groups to
Rising Territorial Nationalism
Acceptance and Accommodation
A certain segment of the nontitular population that
was ethnically marginal was undergoing process of
acculturation and assimilation either with the titular
nation or with the local Russian population. For the
most part, these were nontitular people who had lived
outside their homelands for several generations and
whose ancestors had moved from their homeland
before nationalization processes had begun (Kaiser
1994). Of this acculturating/assimilating segment of
the nontitular population, those who are becoming
acculturated to the indigenous nation will accept, and
even promote, the new ethnic reality if they are
accepted by the titular nation. On the other hand, those
undergoing a process of Russification may respond as
the local Russian population does. Conversely, the
process of Russification itself may be reversed. For
example, children with Russian and Ukrainian parents
who claimed to be Russians in the past may prefer to
identify themselves as Ukrainians, particularly in
states where titular nationalism is directed against the
local Russians (for instance, in Latvia and Estonia).
Beyond this ethnically marginal population, there is
also a segment of the nontitular population that has
lived in the same republic and locality for generations
and has developed a strong sense of homeland (see
table 3). Several indicators of acceptance have
become apparent, particularly for the Russians living
in the non-Russian successor states. For example, a
relatively high percentage of Russians favored the
independence of the republics they lived in and voted
for independence-oriented parties, and a relatively
high percentage of Russians also identified Estonia as
their homeland (Drobizheva 1991). Surveys of Rus-
sian intereflmic attitudes tended to show a willingness
to remain in the newly independent states, at least
immediately after independence. It may appear
counter-intuitive, but the Russian reaction to the new
ethno-political realities in the successor states appears
more accommodative than resistant thus far; this may
reflect the limited degree of Russian national con-
sciousness and nationalism. The republics where Rus-
sians comprised the highest proportion of nontitular
population are those without violent ethnic conflict.
Table 3
Population Born in the Republic of
Current Residence, 1989
Percent
Republic
Titular
Russians
Non-
Russians
Ukraine
96.4
56.7
67.5
Belarus
97.6
42.2
66.9
Moldova
98.1
52.0
72.1
Uzbekistan
98.2
55.0
82.4
Kazakhstan
95.1
66.6
63.5
Kyrgyzstan
98.5
59.1
76.4
Tajikistan
98.5
48.5
87.3
Turkmenistan
98.9
52.0
79.9
Georgia
98.8
48.3
89.1
Azerbaijan
96.7
65.5
87.9
Armenia
78.4
26.4
82.9
Lithuania
97.8
49.7
66.0
Latvia
96.9
54.7
35.9
Estonia
95.6
42.9
23.6
In successor states that have experienced violent conflict:
Georgia
Ossetians Abkhazians
97.1 98.3
Armenians
Azerbaijan 94.0
Azeris
Armenia 91.2
Moldova
Gagauz Ukrainians
96.0 67.0
Uzbeks
Kyrgyzstan 93.8
Source: Goskomstat SSSR, Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia
1989 Goda, Volume 12, (Minneapolis: East View Publications,
1993).
However, acceptance and accommodation are also
dependent on the behavior of the titular nationalists. In
the case of Estonia, nationalists seeking to reduce the
Russian presence have alienated Russians who had
behaved as Estonian patriots. A similar situation
occurred in Latvia. Under these conditions, Russians
are unlikely to remain accommodative of titular
nationalism. Russian opposition is on the rise in the
Baltic states, as well as in Kazakstan-two regions
where Russian acceptance and accommodations were
dominant through 1992.
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Emigration
Nontitular outmigration occurs in regions of violent
ethnic conflict such as the Transcaucasus and Central
Asia, and among nontitular populations without a
strong sense of homeland. The first wave of nontitular
emigration was primarily of those nonindigenes who
had recently immigrated to the region. In the past two
years, an increasing number of those nontitular mem-
bers with deeper roots in the regions are leaving, par-
ticularly in areas of interethnic violence. This latter
migration is referred to as refugee migration, and it
had exceeded 3 million by early fall 1993. I will limit
my remarks here because Dr. Schwartz will be provid-
ing the details of this aspect of ethnic conflict in the
former USSR later.
Resistance
Separatism. This reaction is more likely in areas of
nontitular concentration where the local population
has developed a strong sense of homeland that is
directly threatened by the territorial nationalism of the
titular nation. The nontitular group or indigenous
minority seeks to gain greater territorial autonomy as
a way to minimize the impact of titular nation's
nationalism. This nontitular reaction in turn has typi-
cally provoked a stronger counteraction on the part of
the titular nation, leading to conflict escalation. Of
course, early examples of this occurred in Transcauca-
sia (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkha-
zia), and in Moldova (Trans-Dinestria and among the
Gagauz).
Most autonomous units of the Soviet federation
declared their sovereignty immediately following the
declarations of sovereignty by the Union republics in
1990. But not all are equally separatist. Ethnic and
regional variations again depend on the degree of
national consciousness on the part of the indigenous
minority, the history of majority-minority relations in
the region, and the degree to which the territorial
nationalism of the majority group is perceived as a
threat to the future viability of the indigenous minor-
ity:
� Sovereignty declarations resulting in conflict escala-
tion include: Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, the Trans-Dniestrian Republic, and the
Gagauz Republic in Moldova.
� Russia narrowly averted conflict over Chechnya's
declaration of independence in 1991; the North Cau-
casus is the most likely region in Russia to become
the scene of conflict escalation in the future.5
� The Tatars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Tuvins, and Buryats�
more highly nationalized communities in Russia--
have pressed for greater independence in a more
confederal Russia. If they are unhappy with the new
constitution being worked out, the potential exists
for rising national separatism.6 Of course, this will,
and indeed already has, provoked rising Russian ter-
ritorial nationalism in the republic.
� Russians in Narva and Sillamae declared territorial
autonomy but backed down when the Estonian
Supreme Court declared these referendums illegal.
� Russians in Crimea have declared their autonomy
and their intent to secede from Ukraine. This has
been the site of rising interethnic tensions among
Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars returning
from exile in Central Asia.
� Russian nationalist parties in northern Kazakstan
have also proclaimed their goal of secession from
Kazakstan and merger with Russia, but thus far this
objective is not shared by a majority of Russians in
the region. This is in part because Kazakh territorial
nationalism has been muted in the republic by mod-
erate Kazakh political elites at least through 1992. It
may also be true that the demographic status of two
relatively equal communities has tended to dampen
titular nationalism.
Political Opposition. Nontitular groups have also
attempted to organize opposition political parties and/
or movements. For example, the Russian "interna-
tional fronts" in the Baltic republics developed in
opposition to the rise of titular "national front" move-
ments. Nontitular groups and indigenous minorities
have also boycotted referendums and elections. This
5 Conflict finally did erupt in December 1994.
6 The new Russian Constitution did represent a loss of autonomy
for the non-Russian indigenous minorities.
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type of resistance has typically not provoked the same
level of titular reaction that territorial autonomy/inde-
pendence movements have.
Conclusion
There are several important lessons that have been
learned in the emergent territorial nationalism found
in the former Soviet Union.
Conflict escalation to violent confrontation is an inter-
active process. It has normally started with territorial
nationalism of the titular nation, whose members
attempt to establish their hegemony in their home-
land.7 This in turn means that the rights and privileges
of nontitular peoples living in the emergent nationalis-
tic state are seriously eroded or restricted, resulting in
a reactive nationalism on the part of such nontitular
nations. Indigenous minorities have tended to react by
declaring their sovereignty over the geographic area
perceived as their homeland, and this has frequently
led to a strong reaction on the part of such titular
nation. This pattern of conflict escalation revolving
around territorial control is found in the Armenian-
Azeri dispute, in Georgia, in the North Caucasus, in
Ukraine (especially Crimea), and in Moldova.
In areas where the nontitular groups have not devel-
oped a strong sense of homeland with their local
places of residence, resistance in the form of political
opposition�as in the case of the Russians in the Bal-
tic republics. Alternatively, emigration or even accep-
tance if the nontitular group has come to identify with
the titular nation and its homeland are also reactions
7 See Hennayake (1992), who recently elaborated a theory of
"interactive ethnonationalism."
found among certain segments of the nontitular popu-
lation. Conflict escalation to violent confrontation is
not inevitable. Nontitular emigration is found among
nonindigenous groups in Transcaucasia and Central
Asia. Acceptance is found most often among nontitu-
lar groups that are ethnically similar to the titular
nation and whose members have lived outside their
ancentral homeland for generations.
As a final comment, several analysts of ethnoterrito-
rial conflict in the former USSR have argued that it
was the federal structure, based as it was on ethnic
homelands, that was the cause of the disintegration in
the USSR and the cause of interethnic conflict today.
They also state that the successor states are ethnically
mixed and that ethnonational identity and territorial
identity must be separated to avoid the kind of ethnot-
erritorial cleansing that has occurred in Yugoslavia
and in Transcaucasia. As laudable as this sentiment
may be, it does not accord with the reality of territorial
nationalism in the region. National identity and terri-
torial identity have been intimately interrelated, and a
rising sense of national consciousness has coincided
with a rising sense of exclusiveness toward the region
identified as the national homeland. Attempts to
decouple this geographic relationship between nation
and homeland will fail and are likely to cause height-
ened interethnic tensions and conflicts in the region. A
more informed approach to the problem of territorial
nationalism should begin with an acknowledgement
of the importance of homeland in the perceptions of
nationalists and attempt to regulate interethnic ten-
sions and conflicts that are likely to emerge as a con-
sequence of these perceptions before these conflicts
escalate to violent confrontation.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Ronald Wixman
I would like to discuss the region from a slightly dif-
ferent perspective. I think it is a grave error to view
the former Soviet Union as a unitary state. It never
was. It might be useful, instead, to view the Soviet
Union as a colonial empire that is now, as other colo-
nial empires have, going through the various stages of
decolonization. The former Soviet Union is the Rus-
sian empire, and the Russian empire is falling apart.
The situation is not unique, as evidenced by the situa-
tion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after World
War I. After Germany lost its holdings and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire fell apart, Germans were left in
such places as Moravia, Slilesia, and the Banat. In
fact, in the Banat, there were more Germans than
Romanians or Serbs. In many areas, they were in the
majority. But just as the Russians did in the outlying
republics, the Germans went from having majority
status to minority status.
The process of nativization of the republics has gone
through phases. The initial stage was not to produce a
Ukrainian Ukraine or an Uzbek Uzbekistan or an
Estonian Estonia. Instead, the Russians co-opted the
elites in the same way that the British co-opted the
Rajas of India. The next generation is ambivalent, and
after that a shift occurs in which many of these elites
produced by the state, and for the state, turn on it. The
Soviet Union went through this process of decoloniza-
don, when the native elite turned away from serving
Moscow and decided to serve their own peoples'
interests. This is what happened throughout Eastern
Europe after World War I, when the co-opted elite
turned against Austria, Hungary, and the Ottomans.
What does all this mean? We are seeing the newly cre-
ated republics in borders that did not exist before. The
borders of the Soviet republics were constructed spe-
cifically by the central government. Uzbekistan did
not create its borders, Armenia did not create its, and
you can be sure neither the Abkhaz nor the Georgians
created Abkhazia. These were created in Moscow, by
Moscow, and for Moscow. The policy toward Azer-
baijanis and the Azeri language was not created in
Azerbaijan. It also came from Moscow. So, to speak
of a federal structure is difficult. In the decolonization
policy, the people of the former republics are saying,
"our people, our language, and our culture are not
dominant." As in all other colonial areas, what hap-
pens to those people who are not members of this
majority? Should the leftover colonials learn the
national language? Should the French in Algeria have
learned Arabic? They did not have to become Muslim,
but should they have sworn allegiance to Algeria
rather than to France? Who comes to the United States
and keeps their allegiance to their old country and
cannot speak English?
The Russians are dealing with the issues of what they
can and cannot keep and of what belongs and does not
belong to the state. For example, Moscow claims the
Black Sea Fleet because the government built it.
Ukrainians say the fleet does not belong to Moscow
because they believe they built it as much as the gov-
ernment did. When Russians say that the Crimea is
Russian, Ukrainians say, "only because Moscow
never let Ukrainians move there."
The West needs to see the former Soviet republics not
only in the context of people finding a new national-
ism but also in that of the people directing anger
against the colonial state for having forbidden them
their rights in their own territory.
Similarly, the minorities in these republics have found
themselves in the same position that minorities have
found themselves in all other newly independent
former colonial states. The West has been viewing
East Europeans and the former Soviet peoples in a dif-
ferent light than it has viewed everyone else in the
world, and I think we should recognize this and
change the view. The former Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia have been suffering from a majority problem
for many years, not so much a minority problem.
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General Discussion
QUESTION: Dr. Wixman, if we accept your analogy
that the disintegration of the Soviet Union can be
compared with the disintegrations of previous
empires, can we also look at the Russian federation
now as an empire? Is there a possibility of the Russian
federation also disintegrating like the Soviet Union?
DR. WIXIVIAN: For the most part, no. There are very
few regions of the Russian federation within which
the Russians are not the vast majority. Siberia and the
Far East is now�whatever it was before�extremely
Russian in makeup.
The Russian Federation is basically Russia. The big-
gest threat to Russia today in terms of its internal terri-
torial integrity is not going to come from minorities. If
I had to guess where a problem might arise, and I was
just there for the sixth time in 10 years, it is in the
Russian Far East. I think that the Russians are going to
have more problems dealing with Russian territories
that perceive themselves as different and that resent
Muscovite rule than from the minorities themselves.
There is a strong movement in the Far East for that.
DR. KAISER: I agree with parts of what Dr. Wixman
has said. As I indicated in my presentation, a sense of
national consciousness is something that typically pre-
cedes the drive for independence, and it is really
absent for the most part in a lot of these smaller non-
Russian groups to the east. One region that Dr. Wix-
man didn't mention, which I think is critically impor-
tant, is the North Caucasus. It is an area without a
large Russian population. Russians are leaving that
area too, setting up the conditions through which a ris-
ing call for independence may occur.
The Chechen republic, first of all, declared its inde-
pendence from the Chechen Ingush ASSR and
declared its independence from Russia. It is the only
one that has actually declared its outright indepen-
dence. At the same time, a lot of the North Caucasian
peoples have joined together in a confederation. They
are still a part of Russia but almost once removed in
that sense.
The other thing we are seeing in Russia is not only the
non-Russians asking for or demanding as much inde-
pendence or autonomy as they can get but also Rus-
sians declaring their independence as republics. So a
federation of maybe 88 republics may exist when
everything is finished. Russian localism is, in part, a
response and a reaction against minority nationalism,
particularly among the nationally conscious groups
like the Tatars, but it also may reflect a limited level of
Russian nationalism itself that would be more centrip-
etal in its orientation.
QUESTION: Of the 22 republics within the current
Russian federation, one has seceded, several others
have threatened to secede, and some are developing
their own economic policies�in other words, eco-
nomically seceding. Is the center giving power to the
regions or are the regions taking power from the cen-
ter? In the latter case, is it really a camouflage confed-
eration?
DR. KAISER: This looks more to me like localism
and regionalism than it does territorial nationalism. It
is similar to the previous disintegrative process, but it
does not appear as though an impetus for outright
independence exists to the same degree that it did at
the level of the Union republics. I should add a caveat
here: not all Union republics were equally secession-
ist, and the Central Asian republics were not necessar-
ily all that proindependence when this process first
began. It was the Baltic states that were pushing this
forward, and a kind of diffusion occurred from there.
Some of the republics even accepted independence as
a fait accompli after August 1991.
71
In short, all the groups do not have to be nationalistic,
but the wave of territorial nationalism that is needed to
get the ball rolling toward the ultimate point of disin-
tegration currently does not appear to exist within the
Russian Federation.
DR. WIXMAN: The real issue within the Russian
state�with the few exceptions of some of the nation-
als on the periphery who are really inconsequential to
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Russia anyway�is a question of decentralization ver-
sus centralization, more than of ethnicity.
QUESTION: To what extent will patterns of trade and
commerce shift the regional identification of the Rus-
sians who live in the Far East from considering them-
selves to be Russians to considering themselves a part
of the Pacific Rim or the Northeast Asian community?
'Will such patterns accelerate the trends that you are
speaking of in terms of localization?
DR. KAISER: Dr. Wixman seems to see more of a
potential for separatism in the Far East among the
Russians themselves than I do. On the ethnic map of
Russia, the Far East is overwhelmingly Russian and
has been since about 1700. Even so, the region is
sparsely populated; only about 25 million people live
east of the Urals. I suppose a redirection or reorienta-
tion of the population could occur, because there is a
great deal of localism there. Two different regional
restructuring processes have been at work, however.
First, the Russians themselves are reorganizing and
directing their attention to the Pacific Rim and think-
ing more in local and economic terms; second, the
non-Russian population is banding together in groups_
and organizing to try to gain political clout. Neither of
these restructuring processes is on the same level as an
independence movement and certainly not on that of a
movement based on ethnonationalism. Instead, local
Russian areas are demanding more autonomy within a
more decentralized Russia and particularly seek
greater control over the economic wealth that flows
through their region. Because these Russians are not
sacrificing for the good of Mother Russia and all Rus-
sians, one could probably question the level of their
Russian national consciousness and their common
sense of homeland, but this localism/regionalism is
not on the same order of magnitude as separatist
nationalism.
DR. WIXMAN: I think the movement for autonomy
in the Russian Far East is greater than in even the eth-
nic regions. There is a strong anticentralist feeling.
There is no question that the population is Russian;
they are just as Russian as anyone else. But who
resides in the Russian Far Past? The descendants of
the people who fled to the Far Fast to escape central
authority before the Soviets took over and of those
people who were sent there after 1917. This is the
group_of people in the Russian empire who, more than
anyone else, has had an antagonistic attitude toward
Moscow for decades. They are located on the Pacific,
so a strong movement exists toward stronger ties to
Korea, Japan, the United States, and Canada.
QUESTION: Would you comment on the relation
between ethnicity and environment?
DR. KAISER: At the beginning of the independence
movements, a lot of national fronts�particularly in
the Baltic states and in Belarus�began as environ-
mental movements. Environmentalism and national-
ism�especially national independence�were very
closely tied, not only in the Baltic states but also in
many of the European republics.
This should not be surprising because people consid-
ered their soil to be sacred�as the only place where
their nation could survive and prosper�and they
became angry when it was polluted by forces outside
their control. Indeed, a lot of the region's polluting
industries were moved in at the behest of Moscow.
Along with them came Russians, so the ethnic feature
was added on top of the environmental one.
Since independence, environmentalism has often
taken a back seat to nationalism and independence.
For example, nationalists in Estonia who had
lamented the fact that Russians had set up an oil shale
mining operation there now say they need to keep that
operation going so as not to rely on Russia for oil. The
same thing occurred in Lithuania with the Ignalina
nuclear plant. The Lithuanians have talked about add-
ing a third unit to that nuclear facility�even though
before independence it was a symbol of Soviet
oppression and a symbol of the environmental degra-
dation of the homeland. In Ukraine, there is even talk
about keeping Chomobyl' (Chernobyl') in operation
and maybe expanding it as well. In Armenia, a nuclear
plant had been shut down by grassroots opposition
because it was on a geologic faultline and has been
damaged by earthquakes. Now the Armenians are
considering reopening it because they need local
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energy sources since the pipelines from Azerbaijan
and Georgia have been cut. Environmentalism is on
the back burner and has been decoupled from nation-
alism in these kinds of economic decision making pro-
cesses. Environmentalism was promoted when it was
useful to the nationalists and their struggle for inde-
pendence, but it is now seen as competing with the
nations' efforts to be less dependent on external
resources--especially those supplied by Russia.
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Geographic Factors in Ethnic
Conflict in Africa
Harm J. de Blij
Landegger Distinguished Professor
of Geography
Georgetown University
Introduction
Over the past decade, no geographic realm has suf-
fered as severely from ethnic conflict as Africa. Entire
countries have been devastated by years of ethnic
strife. Millions of Africans have become displaced
persons in their own countries or refugees in others.
Hundreds of thousands are imperiled by hunger and
starvation, and ruling regimes are in some instances
preventing food and medicine from reaching the dislo-
cated.
This paper will focus on the geographic realm of
Africa, not the entire African continent. Geographi-
cally defined, this realm extends from the zone of
Islamic contact along the southern margins of the
Sahara to the Cape of Good Hope. It includes nearly
50 countries, an area of more than 8 million square
miles, and�as of midyear 1994�a population of
572 million.
Factors Aggravating Ethnic Divisiveness
The prevalence of etImic conflict and dislocation in
Africa must be seen against a background of: (1) rapid
population growth, (2) a problem-ridden international
and internal boundary framework, (3) rising religious
fundamentalism, (4) persistent neocolonialism,
(5) historic animosities, and (6) stagnant or deteriorat-
ing economies�factors that serve to aggravate exist-
ing divisions.
In rural as well as in urban areas, Africa's high growth
rates contribute to the ethnic tensions and conflicts
that afflict the realm. As a world geographic realm,
Africa presently exhibits the highest rates of natural
population growth. This continues despite the AIDS
pandemic in tropical Africa and the realm's pernicious
and debilitating plagues and diseases. Such population
growth, attended by doubling times as low as 18
years, fills natural ethnic buffer zones, places further
stress on already overexploited environments, and cre-
ates a growing urbanward flow.
Sub-Saharan Africa's existing boundaries have con-
tributed to, rather than mitigated, ethnic conflict in
Africa. The framework of the continent's international
political boundaries, as has been said ad infinitum, is a
troublesome legacy of the colonial period. This is
more true in some areas (such as the Horn) than in
others (the South), but overall, such boundaries still
divide people of common origins; elsewhere they
throw a girdle around peoples with adversarial histo-
ries. Many African states have sought to accommo-
date the latter by manipulating their internal borders.
Rising religious fundamentalism in Africa mirrors
what is happening all over the world today, from
Algeria to India to America. A number of African
countries lie astride religious transition zones, includ-
ing Nigeria and Sudan, and religious fervor is contrib-
uting to ethnic strife in these countries.
Neocolonialism remains a factor in Sub-Saharan
Africa in various forms, ranging from outright inter-
ference in national affairs to economic intervention.
French forces have acted in support of governments in
countries plagued by ethnic strife; in effect, the French
involved themselves in ethnic conflicts�recently in
Burundi, earlier in Chad. US support for Zaire's
Mobutu has contributed to the continued comparative
stability of that vast country; it undoubtedly has
staved off-ethnic strife there, and it has played a useful
role�from the US viewpoint�in the war in neigh-
boring Angola. Accusations of-collaboration with
"neocolonial" interests often stoke the fires of ethnic
conflict.
Sub-Saharan Africa's economies, in aggregate, are
alone in showing an overall decline over the past
decade. Declining living standards tend to exacerbate
ethnic rivalries; in comparatively wealthy Europe, the
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economic slowdown has also been attended by
increasing ethnic strife. Even during the expansion of
the 1980s, African economies lagged; with the world
economy slowed down, African economies deterio-
rate. Economic growth provides opportunities and
lessens frustrations. In Africa, the opposite situation
prevails.
This is not the place to recapitulate the historical
geography of black Africa, but its outlines�West
Africa's cultural flowering, that region's ancient
savanna states, the arrival and diffusion of Islam, the
European colonial intervention, the imposition of the
boundary framework, contrasting colonial policies
and practices, and the rise of African nationalism�
must be kept in mind, for they are etched on cultural
landscapes, and they still influence interethnic rela-
tions today.
No African region has been immune from costly eth-
nic conflict. In West Africa, the most destructive con-
flict since the Biafra War has ravaged Liberia. In
Equatorial Africa, southern Chad and the southern
Sudan have been engulfed by war. In the Horn, Soma-
lia has become synonymous with ethnic strife, and
Ethiopia and Eritrea witnessed years of tribal fighting.
In East Africa, Uganda has been a caldron of ethnic
conflict, and today Rwanda and Burundi continue to
suffer. And in southern Africa? an uncertain truce has
quieted decades of war in Angola, while ethnic strife
is at least temporarily quiescent in South Africa.
This incomplete summary of current and recent ethnic
conflict notwithstanding, some African countries have
achieved ethnic accommodation against great odds.
Africa is divided into more than 1,000 ethnolinguistic
domains, creating cultural mosaics that make the
former Yugoslavia look uncomplicated by compari-
son. Political geographers often point to India as mira-
cle of multicultural stability, but Nigeria's continuity
may be a greater achievement still. Senegal, Tanzania,
Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia are other success
stories.
A Typology of Ethnic Conflict in Africa
Ethnic conflict in Africa has variable roots, suggesting
a typology that may help assess it. Along the Islamic/
non-Islamic transition zone in the north, the ultimate
cause of conflict often is religious, as is the case in
Sudan today and has been in Chad. This should not
imply that religion is the sole incentive, but it does
dominate here. In the case of Sudan, fear of Khar-
toum's imposition of sharia criminal law upon Chris-
tian and animist southerners is a catalyst for conflict.
A second form of conflict may be designated as tribal
and is exemplified by what is happening today in
Liberia. With a population well under 3 million,
Liberia incorporates more than a dozen major ethnic
groups, including the Kpelle (about 20 percent of the
population), Bassa (14 percent), Grebo (9 percent),
Gio (8 percent), ICru (7 percent), and Mano (7 per-
cent). In 1990 the country collapsed into civil war, in
which tribal loyalties were paramount. Tens of thou-
sands were killed, and nearly 1 million refugees
streamed across Liberia's borders.
A third kind of ethnic conflict has strategic origins: it
may have started as a tribal struggle but has worsened
by external interests. In early 1995, one of these con-
flicts had recently abated: the war between Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) forces in Angola. A fourth form of conflict
may be categorized as reformist. This has its origins in
the political transformation of a state. For example, in
Kenya during the runup to independence, the Mau
Mau rebellion was essentially a Kikuyu movement
aimed not only against whites but also against "collab-
orators." In fact, many more Africans than Europeans
lost their lives during that period, and animosities
between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu endured after inde-
pendence. The first clashes in Liberia involved the
ouster of the Americo-Liberian elite by the so-called
aborigines, as the indigenous peoples of Liberia were
called. In Zimbabwe, Mashona/Matabele conflict
arose in similar context.
In Africa today, the geographic dimension of ethnic
conflict is this: religious strife affects principally the
northern cultural transition zone; reformist conflict
prevails in the south; and tribal war not directly
related to external influences afflicts the central zone,
most severely in Rwanda and Liberia. Persistent stra-
tegic conflict has devastated Angola and, while quies-
cent at present, still looms in Mozambique.
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The Environment as a Factor
It is drought that has been, and continues to be,
Africa's greatest and most consequential environmen-
tal problem. The pulsations of the Sahara are now bet-
ter understood than they were during the 1970s, when
the word "sahel" became synonymous with environ-
mental disaster. Not only did that desertification phase
claim as many as a half million human (and countless
animal) lives but it also caused ethnic strife in coun-
tries to the south. The geographer Thomas Bassett
documented the results when cattle herders from the
desiccated savannas took their livestock into farm-
lands in the Cote d'Ivoire, where crops were trampled
and fighting broke out. Soon, the northerners were
blaming the (then) Abidjan-based government for not
supporting them effectively during the crisis, and
North-South relations�always difficult in coastal
West African countries�worsened.
In Ethiopia, several successive years of drought turned
out to be a more formidable adversary to the Marxist
regime in Addis Ababa than any insurrection was�
when the crops failed and people streamed off the land,
the insurgency became unstoppable. Now, with Eritrea
an independent state, Ethiopia is landlocked�its politi-
cal future far from certain. In addition, Eritrean ethnic
unity is a myth; for example, the Afar (who extend into
Djibouti and whose domain centers on the port of
Assab) have a claim to nationhood that may well
reemerge in the future. Environmental conditions also
contributed to the downfall of the Barre regime in
Somalia. Crop failures and famines in the south led to
the movement of people and livestock across traditional
clan-territorial boundaries, and in the ensuing clashes
lay the origins of the weak government's collapse. The
current conflict in Somalia, it should be noted, however
is not an "ethnic" conflict in the terms of this discus-
sion; it is not religious, tribal, strategic, or reformist.
The Somali nation s' ethnic and religious uniformity
does not extend to territorial unity: six major clans and
hundreds of subclans occupy bounded and inviolable
spaces not only in Somalia but also in eastern Ethiopia,
eastern Kenya, and southern Djibouti. Significantly, the
north, which suffered least from drought and resultant
dislocation, has been virtually untouched by the prob-
lems of the south.
Although news media have paid comparatively little
attention to it, searing, decadelong drought, the worst
in living memory, has prevailed over interior southern
Africa, affecting lives and economies from Malawi and
Zambia to South Africa (Tanzania and southern Zaire
also were affected). This drought, which came at a time
when nearly 1 million refugees from Mozambique
crossed into Malawi and when Angola was consumed
by a civil war, contributed to food shortages and politi-
cal unrest in Zambia; one is tempted to speculate that,
without it, Kenneth Kaunda still would be President.
Perhaps more important, the drought has done much
damage in Zimbabwe, where small fanners on the Afri-
can-owned lands suffered visibly while white owners of
large estates fared better As economic conditions wors-
ened and the Mugabe government's popularity plum-
meted the dormant land issue was revived�in the form
of the 1992 Land Acquisition Bill. Zimbabwe's commer-
cial farmers, who number almost 4,500 (nearly all
white) still own 30 percent of all of Zimbabwe. They
have sustained the agricultural economy, producing
about 80 percent of the country's cash crops. The Zim-
babwean Government wants to force the sale of half the
whites' land for the purpose of resettling black farmer
families. Although the program is opposed by Zimba-
bwe's donors and lenders, including Britain and the
IMF, it is likely to proceed All this is happening at a
time when multiparty democracy is being forced on a
government that controls 147 of the 150 seats in the
parliament. The drought forces the land issue; the land
issue will cause ethnic discord in a country long known
for its successful transition.
In a realm where most of the population continues to
live on and depend directly on the land environmental
swings soon lead to human dislocation, and dislocation
translates into conflict�often ethnic conflict. As the
growing rifts in the European Union remind us, intercul-
tural harmony is easiest to generate when economic
times are good. When livelihoods are threatened, the
human reaction is to blame outsiders�that is, noneth-
nics, whether they be North African or Turkish immi-
grants or local minorities. In Europe, the problem is
recession; in Africa, it is unpredictable, fluctuating envi-
ronments.
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Current Ethnic Conflicts
In Africa it often is difficult to distinguish ethnic con-
flict of the kind being discussed here from local or
temporary strife resulting from political processes.
The worldwide democratization movement is also
affecting African countries, and frequently this has
ethnic overtones because one-party rule tends to mean
one-culture dominance and because military rule often
(although not always) means the same. When multi-
party politics reached Togo, there were deathly riots
that might have led to ongoing ethnic strife, but that
did not follow. In Ghana, the continued rule of strong-
man Jerry Rawlings is greased by comparatively
strong economic growth, but ethnic issues are forcibly
submerged. In Chad, seemingly always on the verge
of civil war, successive coup attempts and French mil-
itary involvement punctuate the apparently hopeless
struggle toward representative government. Indeed, in
1994, full-scale ethnic conflict was in progress in sev-
eral locations.
Liberia
ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West Afri-
can States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force, has sup-
pressed but not eliminated the carnage. What began as
the ouster of the Americo-Liberian regime in Mon-
rovia (and thus as a reformist conflict) evolved into an
ethnic struggle involving supporters of the strongman,
President Samuel Doe, and two rebels, Taylor and
Johnson. Now a tribal conflict, the struggle has no end
in sight, and the survival of Liberia as an entity is in
doubt.
Sudan
The latest phase of four decades of regional conflict in
the Sudan is more than 10 years old. It is classic reli-
gious-ethnic struggle on the northern perimeter of
black Africa, but it is not simply a contest between
north and south. Sudan has a complex ethnolinguistic
mosaic. The northern provinces contain about 60 per-
cent of the total population, and, while the north is
overwhelmingly Muslim, only about two-thirds of the
northerners speak Arabic as their native language. The
Muslim but non-Arab northerners�including the Fur
and Zaghawa in Darfur, the Nuba in South Kordofan,
the Nubians of the far north, and others�have been
propaganda targets of the (south based) Sudan Peo-
ple's Liberation Movement (SPLM). In the years lead-
ing up to and following the coup that ousted Nimieri,
conflict among non-Arab Northern ethnic groups,
notably the Nuba and the Beni Amer in Red Sea Prov-
ince, continued even as the larger war intensified.
The SPLM's military wing, the Sudan People's Liber-
ation Army, began its war against "the North" in 1983,
in opposition to the Nimeiri government, which in that
year announced the imposition of the sharia law over
all of Sudan. The North-South war has swept back and
forth across the countryside, devastating infrastructure
and livelihoods and seemingly incapable of resolution.
In the southern provinces, too, joint opposition to
Khartoum's rule was not enough to submerge ethnic
conflicts. The schism between the Dinka-dominated
faction, led by John Garang, and the mainly Nuer fac-
tion, a breakaway group led by Riek Mashar, has pro-
duced a three-way struggle. (The Dinka are from the
west bank of the Nile, the Nuer, from the east, on the
Ethiopian border). In mid-1992, a further power strug-
gle produced still another split in the southern ranks.
In June 1992, the warring parties met but without a
settlement. In 1994, the North appeared poised to
overcome the divided Southern forces, and promises
of freedom of belief and religious observance, made
by the government in 1992 in Abuja during negotia-
tions under Nigerian auspices, were no longer heard.
The regime that took power in 1989 is intransigent
and virulently anti-Christian and anti-Western; in the
wake of the World Trade Center bombing, when the
United States declared Sudan a "terrorist state," it
expressed fears it shared with the southerners about to
come under Khartoum's sharia heel. The human cost
of the Sudan conflict is staggering: in 1994 there were
an estimated 7 million malnourished and 3 million
starvation-threatened refugees in Sudan. Both the
Khartoum regime and the southern factions have
impeded the flow of relief to these refugees on the
grounds that such aid has "strategic" value.
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Djibouti and Somalia
Although Djibouti and Somalia lie on the African con-
tinent, they are not, by regional definition, African
states. The situation in Somalia has been summarized.
In Djibouti, two dominant ethnic groups, the Afars (or
Danakil) and the Issas, have a history of conflict. The
Issas, who constitute about one-third of the total popu-
lation of about 500,000, inhabit the southern third of
the country. They spill over into Somalia (where they
number about 60,000) and Ethiopia (some 250,000).
In Djibouti, they constitute the majority. The Afars
inhabit the northern two-thirds of Djibouti; they form
about one-fifth of the total population. Their domain
extends into Eritrea as well as Ethiopia, where they
number some 600,000. Five other main ethnic groups
make up the rest of the population.
Power in Djibouti has resided with the Issas, who
dominate the armed forces. In 1991, a guerilla move-
ment arose in Afar territory, culminating in December
in the notorious Arhiba massacre in Djibouti City,
when government troops killed numerous Afars.
Although efforts were made (with French involve-
ment) to defuse the situation, things remained violent
and tense in 1993. Some observers suggest that the
independence of Eritrea will impel a reorganized Ethi-
opia to involve itself in Djibouti's affairs.
Rwanda and Burundi
This country lies between countries in which some of�
Africa's bloodiest ethnic conflict has taken place,
Uganda and Burundi. In Uganda, the Baganda were at
the center of the strife; in Rwanda and Burundi, the
long-term issue is between the Tutsi (Watusi) and the
Hutu. During four months in 1972, more than 100,000
Hutus were killed by the minority Tutsi in Burundi.
Ethnic strife in October 1993 and April 1994 added
more than 600,000 to the death toll.
Historically, the Tutsi were smaller in number, but
stronger in terms of power, than were the Hum. The
Tutsi, organized into kingdoms, acquired land and
subjugated the Hutu. Social standing more than tribal
origin distinguished Hutu from Tutsi. Repression,
rebellion, and chaos followed independence, with the
Hutu staking their claim to power and privilege and
the Tutsi fighting to retain it. The conflict always had a
lower profile in international affairs than the Amin
episode and its excesses in Uganda, but its costs were
nevertheless enormous.
The latest phase began in late 1990, when a contingent
of Tutsi refugees in exile in Uganda invaded northern
Rwanda. The (Hutu) Habyarimana government
responded not only by sending a defending army but
also by arresting and executing Tutsis in the country.
The Tutsi force, under the banner of the Rwanda Patri-
otic Front, survived an early setback and moved
toward the capital, Kigali. According to correspon-
dents on the scene, external forces also played a role
in the conflict. The French helped the Kigali govern-
ment, and there were reports of Ugandan support for
the rebels. French support was based, reportedly, on
the Francophone nature of Rwanda's upper crust; the
Tutsi had been "anglicized" in Uganda, and there were
French fears of Francophone loss in the event of Tutsi
success.
All this became moot in April 1994 following the
death of Rwanda's President in a suspicious plane
crash at Kigali Airport. Hutu militias embarked on an
orgy of (apparently planned and premeditated) murder
of Tutsis and "moderate" or "collaborationist" Hutus.
The ensuing refugee flow can-led as many as 2 million
Rwandans into Zaire and Tanzania; as many as
600,000 were killed. In March 1995, Tutsi in Burundi
attacked Hutu, and the cycle of violence returned to
this country. No end to this tribal conflict is in sight.
Angola
The disastrous and continuing conflict in Angola was
an ethnic conflict magnified by strategic forces, and in
the aftermath of the Cold War it continued unabated.
Dominant in the ethnic jigsaw of Angola have been
the Mbundu in the east, the Ovimbundu of the center
and west, the Balcongo of the north, and the Ovambo
of the south. Luanda, the capital, lies in the Mbundu
heartland. In the anticolonial struggle, each ethnic
group formed its own movement: the Mbundu-
dominated MPLA in the Luanda hinterland, the
Bakongo-run FNLA, and Ovambo-Ovimbundu
UNITA of the south. In the postindependence civil
war, the FNLA was quickly ousted, and a prolonged
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battle between the MPLA and UNITA began. Eventu-
ally this conflict became internationalized with Cuban
troops in support of the MPLA and South African and
other external assistance to UNITA. The role of Zaire
in the issue was significant. After the FNLA went into
oblivion, Zaire moved its support to UNITA; this was
a natural move, given Mobutu's dependence on the
United States. Zaire's taking sides in Angola's civil
war had the effect of creating behind-the-back secu-
rity for Savimbi's UNITA.
After the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the collapse of
the MPLA's sponsor�the Soviet Union�and the
withdrawal of South African support for UNITA,
mediation by Herman Cohen and his staff produced an
agreement for a multiparty election in 1992. In that
election, the Dos Santos�led MPLA was victorious,
winning 128 seats in the legislature to 71 for UNITA.
Neither Dos Santos nor Savirnbi received 50 percent
of the vote, however, creating the need for a presiden-
tial runoff election. Savimbi charged that the election
had been fraudulent, and, on 30 October 1992, fight-
ing broke out in Luanda and the civil war resumed.
Neither side appeared capable of vanquishing the
other completely, at least not without external, mas-
sive help. The question arose whether it should be US
policy to promote a partition of this large country; the
latitudinal morphology of the territory might make
such a solution the sole alternative to endless ethnic
strife. In 1994, renewed international efforts to medi-
ate the Angolan conflict again appeared to have suc-
cess, and a government was installed in Luanda. But
the fundamental divisions of Angola remain.
Potential Ethnic Conflicts
Latent ethnic conflict exists in many African coun-
tries. In Southern Africa, Mozambique has just
emerged from years of ethnic strife, but the situation
remains fragile, and many thousands of refugees have
not yet returned home. In Zaire, the inevitable politi-
cal transition may yield an explosion of long-sup-
pressed ethnic conflict. In long-stable Kenya, the risk
of ethnic strife has risen in recent years, apparently
stoked by official actions. In Chad, major conflict has
recurred for decades and is likely to take place again.
Other plural African societies, from Sierra Leone to
South Africa, contend with potential ethnic conflict as
a matter of course.
Nigeria
Nowhere are the risks as great, the stakes as high, or
the divisions as deep as they are in Nigeria, Africa's
most populous country. Nigeria's arid north lies
deeply embedded in Islamic Africa, and its palm-
fringed southern coastlines are part of Africa's Chris-
tian and animist world. British colonialism threw a
lasso around some 200 ethnolinguistic groups scat-
tered across a wide range of environmental and cul-
tural zones. The survival of Nigeria (despite a bitter
war of secession) is an African achievement of nota-
ble proportions. Now Nigeria's unity is threatened.
Nigeria's population may number 100 million or
more; the issue of census accuracy has roiled its poli-
tics for years. Among more than 200 ethnic groups,
three are dominant: the Hausa-Fulani of the North, the
Yoruba of the Southwest, and the Ibo (Igbo) of the
Southeast. These major nations (for such they are)
have considerable disdain for each other. Muslim
Hausa say that Yoruba are godless and uncultured. Ibo
describe the Hausa as backward and uneducated. To
Northerners, the Ibo are money-mad merchants who
will do anything for a price. Nigeria was born an
uneasy federation with three states centered on these
dominant nations; today it is a country of 30 states try-
ing to emulate not Westminster's system but Washing-
ton's.
The religious composition of the Nigerian population
is estimated as follows: Muslims, 50 million; Chris-
tians, 37 million; others (chiefly animists) 12 million.
(The much disputed 1991 census of Nigeria did not
require Nigerians to answer questions about religion.)
A substantial number of Yoruba, perhaps 2 million,
are Muslims, but Islam in Nigeria long has had a mod-
erate tone. Some geographers have described the
Yoruba as "middlemen" between Christian Easterners
and the more dogmatic Muslim Northerners, defusing
tensions that might have led to religious conflict.
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The rise of religious fundamentalism�not just
Islamic, but also Christian fundamentalism�threatens
Nigeria's future. In the North, where Islam predomi-
nates, Christianity has footholds, and coexistence has
been the rule. Despite sporadic skirmishes, tensions
along religious lines have excalated in recent years.
There are a growing number of Muslim preachers who
advocate Islamic radicalism and who call for an
"Islamic republic" in Nigeria. In 1991, a Muslim fun-
damentalist in Katsina whipped up anti-Christian fer-
vor that spread to Bauchi State and led to the killing of
more than 1,000 people in religious riots. In 1992,
hundreds of Hausa Muslims were massacred by Chris-
tians in Kaduna State. Significantly, that conflict had
ethnic as well as religious overtones�the Christians
were Katafs.
In the southern states, Islamic radicalism is viewed
with a growing concern. In 1986, General Babangida,
the country's strongman president, allowed Nigeria to
join the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), the global association of Islamic countries;
Christian leaders in the South were outraged and said
so from pulpits. For the first time since the Biafra War,
voices favoring secession are heard in the South, nota-
bly in the southeast, but also in Yorubaland.
Will things fall apart? The potential for conflict is
greater today than it has been at any time since the
Biafra War a quarter of a century ago. Frustration with
incompetent and despotic military government is rife.
Corruption is endemic. Infrastructure lies in ruins,
from impassable roads to shuttered universities. Dom-
ination of national affairs by Muslims is becoming an
issue in the South at a time when Muslim fundamen-
talism is on the rise.
Nigeria may dissolve into ethnic conflict much as
Sudan has, but, to the world at large, this prospect is
far more worrisome in Nigeria's case. Nigeria is an
African cornerstone, a country well connected to the
rest of the world, OPEC's fourth-largest oil producer,
and a model of Christian-Islamic coexistence on
Africa's troubled transition zone. The breakup of
Nigeria would be a geopolitical catastrophe.
South Africa
In terms of international importance, regional impact,
or virtually any other measure, the prospect of South
Africa's collapse into ethnic conflict would be incom-
parable. South Africa's multicultural society is a
microcosm of the world, with linkages to Europe,
America, and Asia. It remains Africa's most powerful
and productive economy. It is a land not only of great
potential for the long term but also of great danger for
the near future.
It may be inappropriate to place South Africa in a
rubric of "potential" ethnic conflict. In fact, ethnic
conflict has existed in South Africa for many decades,
even centuries. Today, thousands are dying every year
in ethnic strife as the apartheid system is dismantled.
South Africans of all races are trying to achieve a tran-
sition that has been accomplished by revolution else-
where; but some on several sides of this complicated
process are, or appear to be, intent on promoting con-
flict.
Actual and potential ethnic conflict in South Africa
exists at several levels: these may be categorized as
intraethnic, interethnic, and interracial.
Violent conflict within ethnic sectors of the South
African population rose with the political tide and
with the approach of constitutional resolution.
Although newspaper and television accounts some-
times give the impression that the Zulu nation (for
such it is) largely supports Inkatha and opposes Man-
dela's African National Congress (ANC), the fact is
that much of the deathly violence in Natal and on the
Rand was between Zulu Inkatha supporters on the one
hand and Zulu ANC members on the other. The Zulu
nation is fragmented by a myriad of clan lineages and
boundaries, and clan conflict has worsened severely as
a direct result of the political contest.
Violent conflict between ethnic groups in the republic
occurs in the squalid townships and sometimes on
railroad cars taking people to and from work, but, in
fact, South Africa has hitherto escaped widespread,
regional strife of this kind. Undoubtedly some of the
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ongoing Inkatha-ANC violence has ethnic overtones,
but given the circumstances in the country, interethnic
violence has been limited. This is undoubtedly due to
the multiethnic, indeed multiracial, character of the
ANC leadership. Just as Inkatha does not represent all
(or even most) Zulu, so the ANC is not an all-Xhosa
organization. Still, in the popular image, the Inkatha-
ANC political struggle often is seen, in the final analy-
sis, as a Zulu-Xhosa clash, a continuation of historic
rivalries, and the preamble to another round between
ancient adversaries.
This is not to suggest that interethnic conflict is not
latent and potentially explosive. The assassination of
Communist Party leader Chris Hani was done by a
white killer, but what might have happened had the
assassin been an African? So much now depends on
the lives of Mandela and Buthelezi.
The ultimate question, of course, is whether ANC
dominance of government will be followed by a strug-
gle among the victors in which, for example, those
supporting Winnie Mandela might play a crucial role.
In Kenya, the ouster of the colonialists was followed
by an interethnic struggle that relegated the Luo to
lesser standing in the Kikuyu-dominated state. But
that conflict claimed comparatively few lives, cer-
tainly as compared to what happened in Zimbabwe
after its independence. There, the Mashona-dominated
Mugabe regime ruthlessly suppressed the Nkomo-led
Matabele in regional/ethnic conflict of enormous cost
in lives and property. Since then, Bulawayo and
Matabeleland have been the disadvantaged corners on
Zimbabwe's map.
Observers argue that South Africa's considerable eth-
nic integration would be likely to mitigate such
events; there is so much ethnic mixture, the argument
goes, that regional conflict is unlikely. But in other
countries, such mixture also has led to chronic strife
(for example among Muslims and numerous Christian
minorities in Nigeria's North). Much will depend on
the political campaign now in progress and on the
ANC's ability to avoid factionalization along ethnic
lines.
The April 1994 elections that brought the ANC to
power also produced a delicate regional balance. As
early as February 1995, the Inkatha members of par-
liament grew restive under the new system and
walked out of the assembly, underscoring the potential
weaknesses of the system. The growing risk is that not
only Inkatha but also other components of South
Africa's polity will feel that the new order disadvan-
tages them.
Should the South African transition collapse into vio-
lence, that conflict will resonate in the United States
as perhaps no other could. The notion that economic
sanctions would hasten the end of apartheid led to
some voluntary and much involuntary adherence in
this country; those who argued that they would lead to
economic disaster that would doom a postapartheid
transition were branded as racists. In the streets and on
campuses, the prosanction movement generated
marches and demonstrations. One must therefore con-
template the impact in this country of ethnic and/or
racial conflict in South Africa: such conflict would
resonate in the United States, possibly with the feroc-
ity of Northern Ireland's conflict in Britain. Interracial
conflict in Zimbabwe could be ignored; interethnic
strife in Bosnia, complete with hundreds of thousands
of casualties and concentration camp honors, barely
roils American society. But South Africa has the
ingredients to force the issue: a growing link between
the US black community and ANC leadership; a latent
sympathy for the white plight in a revolution-torn
South Africa on the part of political conservatives in
this country; and the recent history of involvement,
first by businesses adhering to the Sullivan principles,
then by sanctions advocates in driving them out. For
the United States, there is more at stake, perhaps, in
South Africa's difficult transition than there is in the
ethnic conflicts of all other African countries com-
bined.
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References
General
Berger, P. L. and Godsell, B., eds. A Future South
Africa: Visions, Strategies and Realities. Boulder:
Westview, 1989.
Best, A. C. G. and De Blij, H. J. African Survey. New
York: Wiley, 1977.
Blumenfeld, J., ed. South African Crisis. Beckenham:
Croom Helm, 1987.
Christopher, A. J. Colonial Africa: An Historical
Geography. Totowa: Barnes & Noble, 1984.
Christopher, A. J. South Africa: The Impact of Past
Geographies. Cape Town: luta, 1984.
Smith, D. M. Apartheid in South Africa. Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
Mountjoy, A. and Hilling, D. Africa: Geography and
Development. Totowa: Barnes & Noble, 1987.
Other
Schraeder, P. J. "Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From
'Eye of the Hurricane' to 'Boiling Cauldron'," African
Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 367, April, 1993.
Christopher, A. J. "Apartheid Within Apartheid," The
Professional Geographer, Vol. 41, August, 1989.
Morton, J. "Ethnicity and Politics in Red Sea Prov-
ince, Sudan," African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 350, Janu-
ary, 1989.
Decalo, S. "The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of
Democratization in Africa," African Affairs, Vol. 91,
No. 362, January, 1992.
De Blij, H. J. "Africa's Geomosaic Under Stress," The
Journal of Geography, Vol. 90, No. 1, January/Febru-
ary, 1991.
Rogge, J. Too Many Too Long: Sudan's Twenty-Year
Refugee Dilemma. Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld,
1985.
Suberu, R. T. "The Struggle for New States in Nige-
ria," African Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 361, October, 1991.
Rantete, J. and Giliomee, H. "Transition to Democ-
racy Through Transaction? Bilateral Negotiations
Between the ANC and the NP in South Africa" Afri-
can Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 365, October, 1992.
Smith, D. M. "Redistribution After Apartheid: Who
Gets What and Where in the New South Africa,"
Area, December, 1992.
Pedder, S. "Nigeria: Anybody Seen a Giant?" August
21, 1993. Vol. 24. No. 4. The Economist.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Rex Honey
I think we need to keep the African experience, as
with the former Soviet Union experience, in historical
context We need to look at precolonial Africa to
understand the Africa of today. Much of the culture of
contemporary Africa predates the colonial time. To
take a word from social theory jargon, the cultures of
Africa have been deeply sedimented within traditional
structures that resist change. Nevertheless, existing
structures, such as kinship and traditional social ties
are being battered by the kind of changes that are now
occurring.
This is not to suggest that, before the colonial period,
there was an Africa that was stagnant. In the 19th cen-
tury, the Islamic Jihad had an impact across the S ahe-
lian region and penetrated south. Sub-Saharan Africa
has traded with other areas, such as the Middle East
and Europe, for a long time. Of course slave trade was
a terrible aspect of that trade, but only part of it; there
was trade before and considerable trade afterward. In
addition, there have always been migrations of Afri-
can peoples.
During the colonial period, there occurred the imposi-
tion of protostates and, eventually, the European
nation-state model on Africa, I think it would be use-
ful to consider how European states came about, the
structure of these states, and the kinds of things that
led to successful or unsuccessful states in Europe, and
then to look at the African states to see how they com-
pare. A very telling description of the evolution of the
European national-state--and I will use that term
instead of nation-state, because it is broader�is, that
over the past millennium, successful states in Europe
were those that were able to accumulate capital�that
is to say, economic power�and to amass the power of
coersion to defend themselves, conquer others, and
maintain law and order.
The sad part of what has happened in Africa is that the
imposition of this European national-state has come
at a time when the technology for coercing is at the
greatest it has ever been in history�both in terms of
weapons and of the electronic media. As such, the
ability of states to get from their people what they
want has never been so high. The biggest difference
between the bullies of Europe in earlier times and the
bullies of Africa now is that those in Africa have a lot
more power in terms of weapons and communication
controls.
Another factor that is a legacy of the colonial time is
the introduction and spread of Christianity. Christian-
ity mainly came into Sub-Saharan Africa in the 19th
century and spread north at the same time that Islam
was spreading south. Colonial regimes impacted the
current religious map because they often controlled
where the missionaries were able to work. This was
certainly the case in Nigeria.
In Nigeria, about 50 percent of the population is Mus-
lim, about 40 percent is Christian, and 30 percent is
animist, and I do mean those numbers�they total
120 percent. The indigenous cultures of Nigeria are
still important in post�Cold War Africa. Cold War
influences have also been important; Professor de Blij
touched on some of that. Certainly, many Cold War
battles were fought, and some are still being fought, in
Africa. Angola, certainly, is an example. The impacts
of the Cold War have damaged Africa tremendously.
The African economies have been very much trans-
formed by the penetration of international capital,
largely with alliances of convenience between the
leaders of the African countries and the transnational
companies that have invested in them. It is no accident
that the wealth of Mobutu is purported to be about
equal to Zaire's national debt.
The politics of many of the Sub-Saharan African
countries is ethnic. The major prize within those coun-
tries is gaining control of the state, because control of
the state is the source of wealth. A client-patron struc-
ture, which is a modification of traditional structures
adapted to fit the current time, functions in many of
these states. In many ways, the traditional leaders are
stronger than they have ever been because the kinds of
power they have access to are now much greater than
those they formerly held.
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Individuals often retain their allegiance to an ancestral
group, but Americans probably misread what that alle-
giance is. My reading of Nigerians and of other West
Africans is that it is not an ethnic allegiance�rather it
is a more diverse allegiance to the ancestral place. The
Yoruba of southwest Nigeria are clearly the major
group, yet little Yoruba consciousness exists except
for such cases as the recently aborted election, in
which a Yoruba was elected president but not allowed
to take office. The Yoruba fight among themselves as
much as they fight with other groups, and the same
thing holds true for the Ibo. They are only pulled
together when they go up against the other groups.
In Nigeria, one major factor in modern political life
has been the hegemony of the north. Every Nigerian
president has been a general or a Muslim alhaji.8 In
most cases, they have been both.
In Nigeria, there has been a politicization of ethnic
identity and of ethnicity, even to the point of creating a
new ethnic group. According to a Nigerian colleague
of mine, the major ethnic group a the country, the
Hausa-Fulani of the north, is something very new.
Within Nigeria, there has recently been a reemergence
of the national question: is Nigeria a given? Professor
de Blij was right; Nigeria's continued existence is in
jeopardy.
The power of the state, of the current state, is
extremely important. The state is the source of money;
international money gets funneled into countries pri-
marily through the state apparatus, as do the revenues
from the country's major source of income�the
petroleum sector. The preeminence of the state in the
formal economy has been important, and, in looking
at how the economy works, we need to recognize that.
The power of the state to coerce has also increased.
What are the prospects? Clearly, economic depression
leads to violence; that occurs in a lot of places. Part of
Africa's problem is that, in immediate terms, much of
Africa is not crucial to the West. South Africa is more
crucial, given that country's wealth. That is not to say
that we should not pay attention but that we do not pay
attention.
g One who has made the hall to Mecca.
What can be done? We have to reconsider sovereignty
and the relationships of what goes on in states. When I
am optimistic, I look at the European Community as
the model to address some problems that Africans
face. In Europe there is a multitiered, flexible sover-
eignty that allows the movement of people and trade
within the larger area but maintains local autonomy
for cultural issues.
The colonial boundaries are a continuing problem.
The peoples of Africa never chose what their bound-
aries should be�they were imposed by outsiders. The
Organization of African Unity (OAU) has a policy on
boundaries that essentially says the boundaries are
fixed and should not be reconsidered; what would
happen if that policy got turned upside down? How
can we formulate some kind of political process so
that Africans can choose it without killing each other?
That presents a problem in terms of self-
determination; and without self-determination, how
do ethnic groups have rights? If ethnic groups do not
have rights, then conflict will occur in those groups,
and it is in out interest to take a look at that and see
what kinds of things can be done and how we can be
involved. I do think that important questions remain in
terms of what the United States can do alone, which is
not much. I would echo Professor de Blij's concern
that inserting our forces over there may simply exac-
erbate the problem.
General Discussion
QUESTION: What type of a role do you see the
United Nations playing in Rwanda and Liberia?
DR. DE BLIJ: The UN's policy has been either to
have a massive presence with a clear direction toward
a particular goal or to have no presence at all. It is one
of the tragedies of the New World Order that this con-
flict has to be allowed to run itself out as West Europe-
ans are allowing it to do in Bosnia. Political scientists
say that, when a situation like this occurs, an average
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ratio of 10 UN forces to 1 rebel force is needed to con-
tain the anarchy; with the UN's current resources, that
is not feasible. Furthermore, countries that participate
in the UN peacekeeping operations, as in Somalia, and
that experience casualties, will develop a great reluc-
tance to participate in support of this kind of policing
action.
Perhaps there ought to be standing regional forces in
Africa, South America, and Central America for
emergencies of this kind so that imperialist powers do
not get involved in the kind of peacemaking that get
soldiers killed. I am encouraged that ECOMOG, the
West African force, has achieved as much as it has. I
still believe that, with the UN's limitations, having
standing regional forces is the way for regional prob-
lems to be solved. I am a great believer in UN inter-
vention, but I am not sure that the United Nations has
the resources to intervene at the level it should have.
DR. HONEY: I think what really needs to be done is
to formulate a UN policy that provides a generic,
rather than ad hoc, structure for intervening. I think
the difficulty we have now is that we are building a
house without a blueprint. Obviously, the world is not
going to stop, but, if we really are going to have suc-
cessful interventions, we need to figure out institution-
ally how they will work. Then I think we will have a
chance of some successes.
QUESTION: You had mentioned the need for interna-
tional intervention in South Africa�potential UN
intervention. I know that, currently, we're talking
about election monitors. Is that sufficient to tide South
Africa over until the election and afterwards?
DR. DE BLIJ: In the case of South Africa, I think a
massive intervention that might keep the peace there,
should it be needed, would pay for itself for a century
to come, whereas that might not be the case in, say
Somalia or Rwanda.
DR. HONEY: I am more optimistic about South
Africa's future than Professor de Blij. We do not have
a crystal ball, but I have a hunch that pragmatism is
going to prevail. Clearly the ANC leadership, despite
its at least titular Marxist past, understands that it is
going to have to run that economy well to be able to
make it work. I think that there is going to be a tre-
mendous effort by the leadership to hold things
together. There are so many incentives in terms of the
potential for South Africa that I think the possibility
that people will actually get together and make things
work is every bit as high as the possibility that we will
have a conflagration.
DR. DE BLIJ: I think that Professor Honey might be
right except for the effect of sanctions. Those of us
who supported the sanctions helped create in South
Africa an ungovernable minority of hundreds of thou-
sands of young, uneducated Africans who said "liber-
ation before education." These youths will now be
Nelson Mandela's major problem and are the major
source of violence in the townships. Those people are
not retrievable. Unemployment in South Africa is 48
percent, not because there are not people to employ
but because they have no skills to employ them with.
These people are going to have a revolution of rising
expectations, and, believe me, a revolution South
Africa will get.
Another problem will be the integration of the armed
forces.
QUESTION: Regarding your point that US forces
should not be in Somalia, is that a reflection of what's
happening now or would you never have sent them
there in the first place?
DR. DE BLIP I never would have sent them in the
first place. I thought our job was to feed people. It
could have been done from the air. It could have been
done with the help of the agencies already there. I
think our tactics in Somalia were wrong. Frankly, it is
going exactly the way I though it would go. It is a
quagmire, and it may, in fact, lead to a fragmented
Somalia in the end, that is not what we had in mind. If
feeding the population is the objective, it ought to be
done from a distance. What is now happening�the
policing action that you can see coming�builds
resentment to the presence of a large foreign force and
is not acceptable.
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The Ethnic Challenge to National
and International Order in South
America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
During the 1990s: Geographical
Perspectives
Gary S. Elbow
Professor of Geography
Texas Tech University
Introduction
As in so many other regions of the world, there is
much ethnic diversity in Latin America and the Carib-
bean. In addition to the well-recognized Amerind,
African, and Iberian elements, one finds representa-
tives of nearly all major European ethnic groups as
well as many Middle Eastern and East and South
Asian groups. In contrast to many other areas of the
world, most of these ethnic populations are immi-
grants to the region who lack longstanding historic
associations with New World territory but who have
generally been well integrated into the national cul-
tures of the countries in which they reside. As such,
most are not considered ethnic minorities but rather
members of the national culture whose ancestors came
from a non-Hispanic area. Two countries, Argentina
and Peru, are currently governed by non-Hispanics,
Carlos Saul Menem, a Syrian-Argentine, and Alberto
Fujimori, a Japanese-Peruvian, respectively, and
members of these and other non-Iberian immigrant
groups are locally important in politics, business, or
industry. For example, the Bucaram, Nebot, and Sand
families are important in Guayaquil, Ecuador, as are
various families of Syrian and Lebanese descent in
San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and of Japanese descent in
Brazil.
In general, Latin America is less prone to ethnic con-
flict than many other regions of the world. Conflicts
within the region are more often related to class differ-
ences, declining standards of living, and unequal
distribution of access to resources, employment
opportunities, or political power than they are to
purely ethnic factors. For example, the guerrilla
insurgencies of Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru
in Peru, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, the
civil war in El Salvador, and recent outbreaks of vio-
lence in Venezuela are largely nonethnic conflicts.
Although these conflicts may involve disaffected
members of nonruling ethnic groups, the root causes
of the violence lie more in nonethnic issues. Fre-
quently, ethnic groups are drawn unwillingly into
political conflicts or are duped into participation by
one side or the other, even though there is no explic-
itly "ethnic" agenda in the objectives of the opposing
sides. Thus, the presence of minority ethnic groups on
one side or the other of a Latin American political or
armed conflict does not necessarily mean that it has its
origin in ethnic issues.
Although Latin America is not an area in which ethnic
conflict is likely to escalate to a level of international
importance on a par with, for example, the Middle
East, Africa, or the Balkan states, considerable tension
does exist among ethnic groups in South America,
Mexico, and the Caribbean. There have been frequent
ethnic conflicts in the past, and the potential for future
conflict, either armed or through political action,
exists in several parts of the region. The most active
conflicts at present, and probably for the remainder
of the decade and longer, are in areas of traditional
Indian occupation and involve encounters between
Indians and the state.'
Indian Populations and the State
The regional bases0f conflict between the Latin
American states and their Indian populations may be
divided conveniently into highland and lowland. In a
I Indian is a very complex term as used in Latin America because it
refers to cultural identity not biological characteristics. Thus. Indi-
ans are people who self-identify as Indians and who retain distinc-
tive characteristics of dress, language, economy, and beliefs that set
them apart from the Hispanicized population of the country in
which they reside. People who are born Indians may pass into the
mestizo majority by learning Spanish, leaving their community of
birth, and adopting other Hispanic cultural traits. This process has
occurred since early colonial times and accounts for a large share
of the mestizo population in many Latin American countries.
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general sense, these two areas equate with the geo-
graphic concepts of core and periphery.2
Highland Indians
The highlands have been core areas since well before
the Spanish conquest. Highland Indians are the mod-
ern descendants of the population of Indian states with
relatively well-developed political organizations, such
as the Aztec, Inca, and Maya who were the focus of
Spanish colonization beginning in the 16th century.
Spanish colonial interests focused their efforts in areas
that possessed large numbers of Indians who were
easily mobilized for employment in the mines and
agricultural estates that supported the colonial econ-
omy. As a result of as much as 450 years of contact
with and exposure to Hispanic culture, these Indians
are heavily acculturated and have developed more or
less stable relationships with the state and its represen-
tatives; nevertheless, they still retain strong Indian
identity. In the highlands, clashes often center around
a growing sense of "Indian consciousness," which is
expressed in demands by Indian communities for the
state to grant greater collective rights to political and
economic self-determination.
Core area Indians�often peasant farmers who work
marginal lands�are very sensitive to change in the
status of their land or in any subsidies or other benefits
they may receive from the state. When these issues
affect mestizo peasant farmers, and laborers, as they
often do, Indians may unite across ethnic lines with
them to defend their common interests. Core area
Indians may unite with lowland Indians to promote
ethnically related agendas such as the establishment of
autonomous areas, bilingual education, or defense of
Indian cultural heritage, as they have in Ecuador.
Guerrilla movements have taken advantage of indige-
nous hostility to national governments by recruiting
Indians to their cause. However, leftist guerrilla orga-
nizations are often steeped in Marxist theory, which
2 The core-periphery concept has two distinct senses. Their early
use was in reference to central, developed areas of a country in
contrast to those places that lie outside of them and do not share the
same levels of infrastructure development or other inputs from the
national government. Recently, the terms core and periphery have
been applied to international distinctions in economic develop-
ment, as between the "developed world" and the "underdeveloped
world." In this paper the terms carry their earlier meaning.
views ethnic issues as an extension of the class strug-
gle. For this reason guerrilla groups normally do not
include ethnic concerns in their programs, which lim-
its their appeal to Indians. One recent example is
Peru's Sendero Luminoso, which has Indian members
and which recruits in Indian communities but has no
explicitly ethnic elements in its revolutionary agenda
and has been guilty of mistreating Indians who are not
cooperative. It may be that Sendero Luminoso has
driven as many or more Indians to support the Peru-
vian Army as it recruited.
Where Indians make up a large share of the population
they may work toward the establishment of regional
or national political control. In Bolivia and Peru�
where they account for more than 50 percent and as
much as 25 percent of the population, respectively3�
Indians represent a potentially crucial element in
national politics if they can be induced to vote as a
bloc. Moreover, they have the potential to create con-
flict if they are denied the right to vote or if their votes
are negated by fraud and corruption. In Bolivia's
recent presidential election one non-Indian candidate
ran a "pro-Indian" campaign, and the winning vice-
presidential candidate was an Indian.
If political gains are not translated into achievement of
Indian agendas such as access to land, employment,
and some level of self-determination, more violent
forms of conflict are possible.' Exploitation and
repression of highland Indians has triggered conflict in
3 These estimates of Indian population fall at the high end of a wide
range. Because the identification of Indians is somewhat subjec-
tive, national policies such as those which favor integration of Indi-
ans into the national culture may influence estimates of Indian
population. Another factor is that increasing numbers of Indians
adopt mestizo culture and cease to self-identify with their cultural
origins. Furthermore, many Latin American countries do not col-
lect information on ethnic affiliation in their national censuses.
Thus, estimates of the percentage of Indian population in Latin
American countries varies greatly, depending on the source of the
information.
4 The case of Guatemala is especially instructive as an example of
how Indian demands for greater participation in the economic and
political life of a country may be met with a violent reaction from
the state. For details of this process, see the articles contained in
Robert M. Cannack, ed., Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians
and the Guatemalan Crisis, University of Oklahoma Press, 1988.
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the past. Indians in Bolivia and Peru are likely to pro-
test any attempt to reduce coca production in that
country if they are not matched with the development
of an alternative source of comparable income.
Because most pro'ducers in both countries are Indian
and because coca production and consumption are so
strongly linked to Indian culture, the issue of reducing
production may be seen as one more effort on the part
of the white-mestizo state to keep Indians from full
participation in the national economy. Nevertheless,
the immediate prospects for large-scale violent ethnic
conflict do not seem great in the Andean countries.
Lowland Indianf
Lowland Indians unlike their highland counterparts,
have been little influenced by European culture. Con-
tact between these indigenous groups and the state has
been relatively recent. Most peripheral or lowland
areas have been opened up for development�bring-
ing military, colonists, and developers into direct con-
frontation with their long-term Indian occupants�
only during the past half-century.
The incorporation of peripheral territories, formerly
considered empty and useless, into the effective
national territory of the Amazon states�Brazil, Sufi=
name, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
and Bolivia�has inevitably disrupted the cultures of
the unacculturated or partially acculturated native
inhabitants of the region. The unfortunate results of
these contacts are well documented. They include: the
spread of deadly diseases to highly susceptible popu-
lations, loss of land, forced acculturation to Western
life styles, and incorporation into the cash-based econ-
omy. In addition, many Indians have been killed by
the military, colonists, miners, and other intruders of
their territory. In the 500 years since the arrival of
Europeans in the Western Hemisphere, the number of
Indians in the Amazon Basin has been reduced from
an estimated 6-12 million to about 200,000. The pro-
cess has nearly reached its conclusion, since few, if
any, refuges remain where native peoples can avoid
contact with bearers of national culture.
Despite the declining numbers of lowland Indians,
contacts between them and outsiders have the potential
to produce conflicts that can escalate to international
levels. One excellent example is the August 1993 mur-
der of a number of Yanomami Indians by Brazilian
miners in the Brazil-Venezuela frontier area.5 This
incident had international implications for several rea-
sons. The Brazilian miners apparently attacked the
Indians in Venezuelan territory, which makes the inci-
dent of interest to that state, and the Indians have close
ties to cultural and environmental organizations in the
United States and Europe as well as within Brazil,
itself. Thus, the impact of this incident extended far
beyond the rain forests of the upper Orinoco River,
where it took place. It threatened to reinforce Brazil's
already negative image as a country that permits or
even promotes environmentally destructive develop-
ment, ignores or 'violates the boundaries of national
parks and cultural or biological reserves, mistreats
Indians, and has laws that favor concentration of
wealth in the hands of a small elite while millions of
poor barely survive in urban slums or on tiny farms.
These conflicts between native peoples and the state in
Latin America have parallels in other parts of the
world, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma,
Thailand, and the Philippines in Southeast Asia. In
these countries logging, mineral exploitation, resettle-
ment programs, and land development have displaced
or threaten to displace native populations with econo-
mies based on shifting agriculture or hunting and
gathering. Some African ethnic conflicts have similar
root causes, but longstanding disputes among ethnic
groups are more often responsible for setting off
hostilities.
5 This incident illustrates the difficulty of preventing conflict
between Indian groups and outsiders where valuable resources are
at stake. The Indians live in isolated areas where both military and
police protection is difficult to provide, even if the national govern-
ment wishes to provide it, which is not always the r.asP. And,
because of certain taboos or customs of the Indians, it may be diffi-
cult for outsiders to assess exactly how serious a conflict may be.
For example, the estimates of Yanomami killed in the August 1993
raid ranged from 20 to 73, with the final number probably lying
closer to the lower end of the range. The Yanomarni believe that
mentioning the dead will bring back their spirits to haunt the living
and their counting system does not extend beyond two; therefore, it
is extremely difficult to get them to reveal basic numeric data on an
incident such as the miners' raid.
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Growing Indian Militancy
One response by South American Indians to threats of
territorial invasion has been to organize into political
action groups. Indians have been aided in this effort
by Roman Catholic missionaries, anthropologists,
environmental organizations, and others. Noteworthy
among these groups is the Federation of Shuar Cen-
ters (Federacion de Centros .Shuar) in Ecuador, which
was organized in 1964 at a time when development
was first penetrating the local Indians' territory. This
group provides a model that has been followed by
many other Amazon Indian groups within Ecuador
and elsewhere. The Shuar Federation has allied with
other Indian organizations representing both lowland
and highland groups, and it also works with labor
unions, peasant farmer leagues, and other non-Indian
groups to advance common interests.
The objectives of newly emerging Indian militancy
have begun to extend beyond land, mineral, and biotic
resource-related issues to broader policy areas. In
Ecuador the Indian political action organizations are
working hard to change the government policy of
national integration aimed at eliminating ethnic dif-
ferences and creating a unified mestizo national cul-
ture. The policy, grounded in the assumption that
eventually all Indian peoples will be brought into the
mestizo-based national culture and that ethnic minori-
ties will cease to exist, is implemented through
Spanish-language education, indoctrinating Indians
in national history, and similar programs. The Indian
organizations�which support the idea of a plurina-
tional or multinational state that would accommodate
the various Indian ethnic groups, Afro-Ecuadorians
from the Pacific Coast, and the dominant mestizo
national culture�are working toward a plurinational
state that would grant a degree of political and cul-
tural autonomy to Indian groups. Similar agendas
exist in other Andean countries. For example, Peru
recognizes Quechua as an official language, and Indi-
ans in Bolivia are increasing their influence on
national government policy.
In Ecuador and other Andean countries, Indian inter-
ests clash with a number of national goals, both stated
and implicit. Thus fan differences over these conflict-
ing interests have generally been headed off by the
national governments or resolved peacefully through
the political process. However; as the Indian groups
become more militant, they will demand to have an
increasingly more active role in setting national policy
with respect to land, resource use, and cultural preser-
vation. The militancy of Indian organizations clearly
sets the stage for potential conflict with the non-Indian
groups who perceive that their interests may be under-
mined by granting greater autonomy to Indians.
Mexico's Indian Populations
Mexico has a history of ethnic conflict that began in
the pre-Columbian past and continues to the present.
Indians have been involved in the great revolutions of
Mexican history. They were recruited by Padre
Hidalgo at the beginning of the revolution against
Spain in 1811 and followed Emiliano Zapata during
the Revolution of 1910-17. Indian rebellions include
the Caste Wars of the 19th century in Yucatan and the
Cristero rebellion of 1926 in Michoacan, Jalisco, and
Colima. The land reforms that followed the Revolu-
tion of 1910, along with close control by the ruling
political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI), have limited Indian protests during the latter
half of the century. However, conflicts continue to
occur on a local level, and some have involved the
national government. Most of these conflicts are in the
southern part of the country or the Yucatan Peninsula,
where most of the traditional Indian communities are
located.
As in South America, ethnic conflicts in Mexico have
their roots in disputes over land, mineral resources,
and cultural preservation policy. Despite the claim of
the PRI to be a defender of the interests of the people,
Indian concerns consistently take a back seat to
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projects perceived to be of benefit to the government.
Mexico's Indians are, at best, little better off economi-
cally than Indians in other Latin American countries,
and they also encounter policies that promote adop-
tion of mestizo culture. Government-sponsored devel-
opment projects, expansion of the oil industry,
relocation of mestizo settlers in Indian territories, and
government ignorance of or attempts to suppress
Indian culture are all factors that contribute to conflict
between Indians and the state.
Other sources of potential conflict include land dis-
putes between Indian communities and the presence
of Guatemalan refugees. Most conflicts over land are
highly localized and involve differences between
neighboring towns over the boundaries of communal
land holdings. Many of these disputes originated dur-
ing the colonial period. The migration of refugees
from the Guatemalan civil war into the Mexican state
of Chiapas and their relocation to settlements in
Yucatan is also problematic. Although some of these
refugees have returned to Guatemala in response to
government repatriation programs, several thousand
others will probably remain in Mexico. It remains to
be seen what sort of long-term relationships these peo-
ple will work out with the Mexican Government and
with neighboring Mexican Indian and mestizo com-
munities.
The rebellion of the Zapatista National Liberation
Army in January 1994 is an example of the influence
of the factors noted above. Despite its rhetoric, the
Mexican Government has done little to incorporate
the Indians of Chiapas into the national economy.
Land the Indians had traditionally considered to be
theirs was claimed by mestizo farmers and ranchers
and, in some cases, incorporated into large landhold-
ings. Resettlement of Guatemalan refugees contrib-
uted to conflict, as did the Salinas de Gortari
government's decision to eliminate the constitutional
protections of ej ido land. The final straw for the rebels
was approval of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which was seen by the Indians as setting
the stage for further concentration of economic
resources in the more developed northern regions of
the country at the expense of Indian and peasant farm-
ers in the south.
Nonindigenous Flash Points: Afro-Americans/
East Indians
In the African-influenced areas, especially parts of
Brazil and the Caribbean, there is also potential for
racial or ethnic conflict, especially if a black con-
sciousness movement should develop. The root causes
of friction among members of African- and Asian-ori-
gin groups are quite different from those that involve
American Indians and representatives of the Hispanic
states.
Brazil, the Guianas, and the West Indies have large
Afro-American populations. In Brazil, African minor-
ities are not normally separated spatially from the
main culture as are Indians. Rather, they live in the
same cities and towns, and they usually share, to a
greater or lesser extent, most elements of the common
national culture. However, despite disclaimers about
the absence of racial prejudice, clear differences exist
in the social and economic attainment of blacks and
whites in Brazil. So far, these differences have not
resulted in racially based conflicts. Nevertheless,
given the myth of racial equality, if a black conscious-
ness movement should emerge in Brazil, it could pro-
vide a base for development of racial friction�
although the potential for this to occur does not seem
very great.
In some islands Afro-Americans are a single, domi-
nant ethnic group; these areas have little potential for
ethnic conflict. Suriname, Guyana, and Trinidad and
Tobago have mixed populations comprised of Afro-
Americans, East Indians, and�in Suriname�
Javanese.6 Creoles�Afro-Americans and Mulat-
toes�and East Indians tend to belong to different
political parties, to live in distinct areas, and to inter-
act largely within their own communities. In Trinidad
and the Guianas, where Afro-Americans and East
Indians share national territories, conflict reflects, to a
'Despite their location on the mainland, Guyana and Suriname are
culturally and historically much more closely linked to the Carib-
bean than they are to their culturally Iberian South American
neighbors.
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The Impact of Resource Development
The expansion of national cultures from the core to
peripheral areas is a direct product of the increased
demand for land and resources, and this, in turn, often
reflects national policies that govern the distribution
of resources in the previously developed core areas.
Colonization of the "empty" periphery often is viewed
by national policymakers as away of relieving pres-
sure for redistribution of land in the older core, where
a combination of concentration of land in the hands of
the elite, rapid population increase in rural areas,
degradation of peasant-controlled land through ero-
sion and declining fertility, awl lack of employment
opportunities contributes to substantial land hunger.
Moreover wealthy and influential members of the rul-
ing elites, along with members of the military or rep-
resentatives of international enterprises, often
promote colonization as a means of obtaining large
blocks of land. Mineral resource development, espe-
cially that related to high-value commodities such as
oil and gold, is another cause of conflict. Frequently,
mineral resource development is linked to multina-
tional enterprises such as oil companies or interna-
tional mining concerns. These developments may also
have international links through organizations such as
OPEC, the Latin American Free Trade Association, or
the Andean Pact.
Invariably, development of tropical lowland areas is
seen as favorable to national and international inter-
ests, and maintenance of land in an "undeveloped"
state is viewed as wasteful, even if it provides suste-
nance for native populations that have lived there for
centuries or millennia. Conservation interests lobby for
slow-growth or no-growth policies but to little avail.
Even when areas are set aside in parks or reserves,
effective provisions for protecting them are lacking, and
the allocation of large blocks of land to Indian commu-
nities may create a backlash anwng landless or land
hungry peasants and members of the urban working
classes, who fail to understand the reasons for giving so
much land to so few people. Often these protests are
supported by members of the upper and middle classes
who oppose the removal of large blocks of land from
access for large-scale development.
As might be expected, governments have not
attempted to solve the "Indian problem" by dealing
with the root causes that are noted above. Rather, they
have responded to pressure groups by passing legisla-
tion that is unenforced or by buying off the groups or
their leaders in other ways. Examples are minimalist
land reform legislation or creation of largely unpro-
tected national parks, reserves, or dedicated Indian
territories. If these time-tested Latin American strate-
gies fail to work, heavier-handed approaches may be
attempted, such as calling in the army or police; but
these strategies are resorted to less and less because
of their negative consequences, both internally and on
the country's international standing. Mexico's rela-
tively benign treatment of the Zapatista National Lib-
eration Army, at least until February 1995, is a good
example of how international opinion can affect gov-
ernment response to dissident groups.
In Brazil, the tendencies to expand development into
the Amazon Basin have been stimulated by the gov-
ernment's expansionist development policies. Since
colonial times Brazil has aggressively extended its
political frontiers at the expense of all its neighbors.
More recently, a national policy of building roads into
the interior and clearing the tropical forest for farm-
ing and ranching, which was fostered in part by the
geopolitical strategies of some military officers, has
led to large-scale development of that country's Ama-
zon lands. When Brazil builds road and colonizes near
its political frontiers, it triggers a counterresponse by
neighboring Amazon Basin countries such as Peru,
Colombia, and Venezuela, which build roads of their
own and encourage colonization of formerly undevel-
oped lowland tropical forests to counter what is seen
as a possible Brazilian threat to national sovereignty.
Ecuador has embarked upon a similar policy of set-
tling its Amazon lowlands with highlanders in
response to a longstanding border dispute with Peru.
It remains to be seen how the flare-up of fighting in
early 1995 will affect these policies.
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certain extent, differences in urban settlement pat-
terns, although a more fundamental cause of conflict is
over which group will control the national govern-
ment and gain the benefits that come from such con-
trol. Past Indians and Afro-Americans are roughly
equally represented in Trinidad-43 percent Afro-
American, 40 percent East Indian. In Guyana the East
Indians comprise 51 percent of the population and
Creoles account for 44 percent; but, in Suriname, Cre-
oles make up only 31 percent of the population while
East Indians, Javanese, and Bush Negro account for
37 percent, 15 percent, and 10 percent, respectively.
Relations among East Indians and Creoles have been
particularly tense in Guyana, where politics has been
characterized by violence and conflict between mem-
bers of political parties that are strongly linked to eth-
nic groups. Cheddi Jagan was elected President of
Guyana in October 1992, ending more than 25 years
of Creole domination of the government. The election
was accompanied by riots and violent conflict among
members of the two dominant political parties, but the
situation seems to have stabilized since then. As long
as Jagan remains in power, he may be able to limit
ethnic conflict, especially if he is able to improve the
country's depressed economic conditions and bring
better lives to both Creoles and East Indians. How-
ever, unless he is able to establish institutions that
break down longstanding ethnic differences, hostili-
ties may accompany the next election.
Other areas that might bear watching include Suriname
and the longstanding international dispute between
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In the latter, racial
and cultural differences and a history of-conflict, com-
bined with Dominican concerns about migration of
land-hungry Haitians, h-as led to repeated expulsions of
Haitian migrants. However, Haitians have been wel-
corned at times when Dominican workers were unable
to meet the need for agricultural labor in the country. If
large numbers of Haitians try to settle in Dominican
territory, there is always the possibility of another vio-
lent response on the part of the Dominicans.
Conclusion
Probably the most common source of ethnic conflict
between Indians and the state, whether located in the
lowlands or highlands, is the dispute over control of
territory and mineral or biotic resources. Ethnic group
autonomy and greater participation in the political
system are often secondary factors in ethnic conflict.
The principal areas of current ethnic conflict are in the
Amazon Basin and other lowland areas where native
Indian populations confront expanding national states.
These conflicts involve small numbers of people, but
they are locally important and may have international
implications when they occur in border areas or if they
involve international environmental or cultural protec-
tion organizations or political or lending organizations
such as agencies of the UN, the World Bank, and the
Interamerican Development Bank. Such local con-
flicts may cause problems for governments in the
affected countries, and they will undoubtedly affect
the course of natural resources development.
Indian political action organizations are likely to
become increasingly more powerful in national poli-
tics. They will receive help from international organi-
zations with whom they share common interests. To
the extent that national governments accommodate the
demands of these organizations, they may reduce eth-
nic tensions. If ethnic interests are ignored, conflicts
are likely to develop, as in Mexico in 1994.
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References
Arevalo-Jimenez, Nelly and Andrew L. Cousins,
"False Promises," Cultural Survival Quarterly, 16:1
(Winter 1992), pp. 10-13. An account of Venezuelan
Government policies toward the Yanomami people
and the creation of the Casiquiare Biosphere Reserve
in 1991. Indigenous people were not included in the
planning phases of the reserve, and it is unclear how
they will be affected by it. The authors' belief that the
park will be difficult to protect seems borne out by
recent invasions by Brazilian miners.
Burbach, Roger and Peter Rosset, Chiapas and the
Crisis of Mexican Agriculture. Policy Brief. Oakland,
CA: Institute for Food and Development Policy,
December 1994. A concise report on the problems of
land distribution and peasant agriculture in Mexico,
with a focus on the situation in Chiapas.
Burguete Cal y Mayor, Araceli, "Elections in Mexico:
Indigenous Suffrage Under Protest," Abya Yala News,
8:3 (Fall 1994), pp. 6-8. A brief report on Indian par-
ticipation in the August 1994 presidential election in
Mexico and efforts to develop a national Indian elec-
toral strategy. The article discusses voting in Chiapas
in August 1994.
Campbell, Howard, "Juchitan: The Politics of Cultural
Revivalism in an Isthmus Zapotec Community," The
Latin American Anthropology Review, 2:2 (Winter
1990), pp. 47-55. An account of the rise of a leftist
Indian political party in a Mexican Indian community
and of the government's reaction to its election vic-
tory. This is a useful article for understanding some of
the causes of ethnic conflict in Mexico.
Choque, Maria Eugenia and Carlos Mamani, "Recon-
structing the Ayllu: Toward Renewal of the Bolivian
State, Abya Yala News, 8:3 (Fall 1994), pp. 9, 33. A
brief but timely analysis of the Indian political move-
ment in Bolivia.
Collier, George A., with Elizabeth Lowery
Quaratiello, Basta!: Land and the Zapatista Rebellion
in Chiapas. Oakland, CA: Institute for Food and
Development Policy, 1994. An anthropologist with
30 years of experience working in Chiapas, Collier
places the Zapatista rebellion of 1994 in the context of
conflict over access to land at the local level. This
book is current up to the August 1994 presidential
election in Mexico.
Dennis, Philip A., Intervillage Conflict in Oaxaca.
New Brunswick and London, Rutgers University
Press, 1987. A study of the origins of conflict over
land between two Zapotec Indian villages. Conflict is
seen as a device that has served to isolate Indian com-
munities and to make them dependent on the state for
resolution of land disputes.
Eckstein, Susan, ed., Power and Popular Protest:
Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1989. A collection of
10 essays that deal with various aspects of Latin
American protest movements. Essays by McClintock
on Sendero Luminoso, Wickham-Crowley on guer-
rilla movements, and Nash on Bolivian mining com-
munities are the most relevant to the subject of ethnic
conflict.
Ewen, Alexander, ed. "Chiapas: Challenging History,"
Akwe:kon: A Journal of Indigenous Issues, 11:2
(Summer 1994). A special issue of the journal dedi-
cated to articles on the Chiapas rebellion.
Foley, Michael W. "Agrarian Conflict Reconsidered:
Popular Mobilization and Peasant Politics in Mexico
and Central America," Latin American Research
Review, 26:1 (1991), pp. 216-38. This article reviews
nine books, including four in Spanish and one in
English on Mexican campesino (peasant) movements.
The author attributes most conflict to agricultural
modernization, which has strengthened powerful eco-
nomic interests while causing a general decline in
rural living standards. Thus, "[e]thnic divisions, gen-
der issues, factional and familial rivalries, and plain
machismo may generate conflict and shape clashes
whose ultimate sources lie elsewhere."
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Foresta, Ronald A., "Amazonia and the Politics of
Geopolitics," The Geographical Review, 82/2 (1992),
pp. 128-42. Article contains a review of Brazilian geo-
political thought and discusses the ways in which its
application has affected Amazonian development.
Gopal, Manan M., Politics, Race, and Youth in Guy-
ana. San Francisco: Mellen Research University
Press, 1992. This study of the attitudes of Indian youth
toward changes in race relations in Guyana contains
interesting information on the history of race relations
in the country. The author concludes that there is con-
siderable sentiment on the part of Guayanese citizens
(as expressed by the youths who were interviewed) for
unity across racial lines but that government manipu-
lation of the electoral process prevented this from hap-
pening.
Greenberg, James B., Blood lies: Life and Violence in
Rural Mexico. Tucson: The University of Arizona
Press, 1989. Analyzes violence in rural Mexico
through use of the biography of an Indian man from
the village of Yaitepec, followed by scholarly analysis
of the reasons for violence. See especially chapter
12 on land conflicts and the following Part II, "Expla-
nations of Rural Violence in Mexico."
Hecht, Susanna and Alexander Cockburn, The Fate of
the Forest: Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of
the Amazon. London & New York: Verso, 1989. This
book has become one of the most quoted sources on
the policies and processes that account for environ-
mental and human destruction in the Amazon Basin.
The focus is on Brazil. This book is essential reading
for background on ethnic conflict in the South Ameri-
can lowlands.
Hemming, John, ed., "The Frontier After a Decade of
Colonization," Change in the Amazon Basin, vol. II,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985. A
collection of 20 papers that deal with the impact of
colonization in the Amazon Basin. This volume deals
with the processes and impacts of colonization but not
explicitly with ethnic conflict.
Jeffrey, Henry B. and Colin Baber, Guyana: Politics,
Economics and Society, Beyond the Burnham Era.
London: Francis Pinter and Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1986. A survey that provides interesting
historical background and analysis of the Guyanese
situation through the end of the Burnham era.
Kimmerling, Judith, Amazon Crude. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1991. An informative but
polemical report on the impact of oil production on
the environment and people of the Ecuadorian Ama-
zon.
Little, Paul E., Ecologia Politica del Cuyabeno:
El Desarrollo no Sostenible de la Amazonla. Quito:
Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones
Sociales (ILDOS) y Ediciones Abya-Yala, 1992. A
timely analysis of impacts of oil exploration and pro-
duction on Ecuador's Cuyabeno National Park and its
population. This book is a useful introduction to the
principal points of conflict within the Ecuadorian
Amazon.
Mallon, Florencia E., "Indian Communities, Political
Cultures, and the State in Latin America, 1780-1990,"
Journal of Latin American Studies, 24: Quincentenary
Supplement (1992), pp. 35-53. A review of the history
of the role of indigenous political cultures to the for-
mation of nation-states in Latin America. The author
concludes that Indian movements will play an increas-
ingly important role in resolving the region's cultural
and environmental conflicts.
Mars, Perry, "Ethnic Conflict and Political Control:
The Guyana Case," Social and Economic Studies,
39:3 (1990), pp. 65-94. A review of the history of eth-
nic conflict in Guyana before and following indepen-
dence and up to the death of Forbes Burnham in 1985.
The author concludes that there is a close connection
between ethnic conflict and class conflict. Also, ethnic
conflict varied depending on the nature of the political
environment, with plurist pre-independence systems
leading to relatively peaceful relationships while the
authoritarian Burnham government intensified ethnic
conflict.
Nietschnamm, Bernard, "The Third World War," Cul-
tural Survival Quarterly, 11:3 (1987), pp. 1-16. The
recognized expert on ethnic conflict among geogra-
phers reviews conflicts between states and "autono-
mous nations," (traditional ethnic minorities) around
the world. A fundamental introduction to the topic.
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Russell, Philip L., The Chiapas Rebellion. Austin
Texas: The Mexican Resource Center, 1995. The
author is a journalist with years of experience in Mex-
ico who presents detailed background information on
the long-term abuses of Indian rights in Chiapas. The
book is current through the August 1994 presidential
elections.
Schminlc, Marianne and Charles H. Wood, eds., Fron-
tier Expansion in Amazonia.. Gainesville: University
of Florida Press, 1984. A collection of 20 papers from
the Second Conference on the Amazon, held at the
University of Florida in 1982. The focus of the papers
is on colonization policies ok the Amazonian nations,
and some papers have become widely cited near clas-
sics.
Starn, Orrin, "New Literature on Peru's Sendero
Luminoso," Latin American .Research Review, 27:2
(1992), pp. 212-226. A comparative review of six
recent (1989-91) books on Peru's Maoist guerrilla
movement. Five of the six books reviewed are pub-
lished in Spanish in Peru. This review notes the lack
of "any appeal to `Indianness' in Sendero's official
ideology" cited by "many recent observers."
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo, "Challenging the Nation-State
in Latin America," Journal of International Affairs,"
45:2 (Winter 1992), pp. 421-440. This brief paper by
one of Mexico's most highly. regarded social scientists
presents a clear and succinct survey of changing rela-
tions between the state and Indians in Latin America.
This article provides important background for under-
standing current state-Indian relations in the region.
Urban, Greg and Joel Sherzer, eds., Nation-States and
Indians in Latin America. Austin: The University of
Texas Press, 1991. A collection of 12 essays describ-
ing various aspects of the relationship of Latin Ameri-
can Indians with the state. These essays provide a
theoretical framework for analysis of Indian responses
to conflict with national governments.
Winant, Howard, "Rethinking Race in Brazil," Jour-
nal of Latin American Studies, 24:1 (February 1992),
pp. 173-92. The author argues that racism exists inde-
pendently of class in Brazil. Black political organiza-
tions are named, and the emergence of the race issue is
explored. The paper concludes that politicization of
race has become a fact of life in Brazil.
Yelvington, Kelvin, ed., Trinidad Ethnicity. Knoxville:
The University of Tennessee Press, 1993. This book
contains 12 essays that cover various aspects of ethnic
relations and ethnicity in Trinidad and Tobago. Offer-
ings range from social and political topics to literature
and music.
Zapeta, Estuardo, "Guatemala: Maya Movement at
the Political Crossroads," Abya Yala News, 8:3 (Fall
1994), pp. 10-13. Analysis of the Maya Indian politi-
cal movement in Guatemala. Concludes that the
movement has great potential for gaining political
power but so far falls short of achieving its promise.
The Army is a significant barrier to achievement of
true power.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Mac Chapin
Although we all saw a good deal about Central Amer-
ica on television and in the newspapers during the
1980s, interest in the region has been eclipsed in
recent years by events in Eastern Europe, Russia, the
Middle East, and so forth. Central America is a rela-
tively tiny area; it has less than 5 percent of the land
surface of the United States and about one-tenth of its
population. One of the big differences between this
part of the world and the other regions that we have
been discussing is that we are not going to find sepa-
ratist indigenous groups in Latin America. Certainly,
in Central America, there are no Indian groups that are
going to attack the central governments.
I want to talk about the indigenous people who are,
aside from a few isolated groups in Central America,
virtually invisible. The region's indigenous peoples
are located primarily in two regions, the Guatemalan
highlands and the coastal regions adjacent the Carib-
bean Sea. Both locations are classic areas of refuge.
Mayan Indians speaking 22 different languages
inhabit the densely populated Guatemalan highlands.
Numbering approximately 4.5 million people, they
compose half the country's population and half the
indigenous population of Central America. Virtually
all the other Indians of the region are found stretched
along the Caribbean coast between the southern por-
tion of Toledo district in Belize and Panama.
At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, most of the
6 million Indians then living in Central America were
located in population centers along the Pacific side of
the region where there were much better soils, a more
hospitable climate, and less rainfall. After the Span-
iards arrived, approximately 80 percent of the popula-
tion was killed off largely through diseases;
demographically, the Indians are just now starting to
recover.
Many of the region's Indian populations, who were
not either assimilated or exterminated, moved to areas
where the Spanish had no interest. Some groups
moved to the highlands of Guatemala�where they
did not even send priests for several centuries�and
others migrated toward the Atlantic coast jungles.
The region has three countries of some importance
from an ethnic standpoint: Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua. The largest concentrations of Indians
in Latin America are found in the Guatemalan high-
lands. The hatred between the country's Latinos and
Mayan Indians is palpable. This intense ethnic hatred,
which has grown over time, was most recently mani-
fested in the extremely bloody civil war that reached
intensity in the mid-1970s and that lasted until about
1983. Dt7fring that period 100,000 Indians were killed.
Scorched earth policies were practiced by a number of
Guatemalan leaders. It was a war of extermination.
The Guatemalan Government used the military
against the ethnic population.
The situation in El Salvador is similar to that in Guate-
mala. El Salvador currently has an Indian population
of about 500,000. Over the centuries, there have been
a series of attempts to eliminate the Indian popula-
tions. In the 1880s the last communal territories were
abolished by decree and the Indians were displaced.
The last ethnic war in El Salvador was in 1932 when,
within the space of about a week, the military
marched out and killed about 35,000 Indians. It con-
sciously searched out people who were dressed like
Indians, who looked like Indians, and who spoke an
Indian language. There have been no ethnic conflicts
in El Salvador since that time. The conflict has really
shifted; the rural poor have become the surrogates for
the ethnic population. An extension of the same battle,
it is essentially over land and resources. During the
1980s the target was principally peasants�in contrast
to the Indians, who were organized.
During the Nicaraguan civil war, the Mosquito Indi-
ans who inhabit the Atlantic coast region with its for-
estry and offshore marine resources were forcibly
relocated. Since the end of the war they have returned
to their homes but have been in the middle of attempts
by multinationals to cut down the coastal forests.
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I would like to reiterate a point that Professor Elbow
made, which is that virtually all the conflicts today in
Central America and also in South America are over
land and resources. Indian populations inhabit rich
forested areas, and there is a push�not necessarily by
the state but often by a combination of corrupt and
greedy government officials, landless peasants, and
multinationals�to resettle the Indians and to take
resources away from them.
In Central America the problem areas will be the low-
lands. An examination of the remaining forestry
resources of the region shows the correspondence
between the forests and the lands currently inhabited
by the region's Indian populations. Although there are
incipient indigenous group organizations throughout
the areas, they are not strong enough to present any
real opposition to outside forces. These organizations
will need to be nurtured if they are going to be helpful
in protecting the region's remaining natural endow-
ment.
General Discussion
QUESTION: Would either of you like to comment on
the possibility of racial strife in Cuba?
MR. CHAPIN: I don't think that's an issue.
DR. ELBOW: Most of the whites are living in Miami.
What's left, from my understanding, is a fairly pre-
dominantly mulatto and black population.
QUESTION: Would either or both speakers comment
further on the role of nonstate actors such as NGOs
and industry in conflicts in the region? I'm thinking in
particular of attempts to develop oil in Ecuador.
DR. ELBOW: Yes, I am quite familiar with the case of
Ecuador. Both industry�in particular, but not exclu-
sively, the oil industry�and NGOs are active. They are
engaged in a sort of holy war, if you want to think of it
that way, over the Amazon. The NGOs are trying to
preserve what's left of the resources, and the oil compa-
nies and the government are attempting to mine them.
Ecuador has, according to the latest reports, something
on the order of about 20 years worth of oil left, and,
as far as I can determine, industry and government are
trying to get it out in 15 years. The government has
allowed the oil companies to move into areas that are
supposedly reserved for Indians and are not supposed
to be exploited. The oil companies can pretty much go
wherever they want to. Now, because of bad press, the
government and the oil companies as well have had to
do a little bit to clean up their act. So pollution has per-
haps been reduced, but the real problem is that where
oil companies go, others follow. The development of
roads by the oil companies has led to the opening up of
the region to colonization. When oil companies clear a
little stretch of road that is 10 meters or more wide, the
colonists come in and take out the rest.
MR. CHAPlN: Initially, when the oil development
started down in the Amazon area, CONOCO and an
Indian group was involved. Then the National
Resources Defense Counsel and others became
engaged. The theory behind the outside involvement
was that negative publicity would pressure CONOCO
to act responsibly. A lot of NGOs then got involved,
Indian groups protested CONOCO actions, and
CONOCO pulled out. When CONOCO left, a number
of small wildcat groups, who could not be pressured
on anything, went in and started taking it over. So that
is the current situation.
QUESTION: The UN working group on the rights of
indigenous people has been developing a declaration
that will eventually work its way up in the UN system.
This declaration addresses the issue of rights and con-
trol of resources by indigenous peoples. Do you see
much of a chance for this declaration being passed by
the UN, and, if so, how would that impact upon the
relationship between indigenous peoples and the
state? Would it tend to lessen friction or increase it?
MR. CHAPIN: I don't think it will have much effect
at all simply because any resolution passed by the
UN has no legal status in any of these countries. If
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anything, it antagonizes the government. Most of
these governments have laws that any subsurface min-
erals belong to the state.
DR. WIXMAN: In the former Soviet Union, there is a
very interesting movement that I think parallels some-
thing happening in the United States in the environ-
mental movement. The preservation of indigenous
people, such as the native American and, in the case of
the former Soviet Union, the native Siberian, are por-
trayed as synonymous with the preservation of the
natural environments. Indigenous people who no one
had ever heard of or cared about have become a politi-
cal symbol. Do you see a movement of this type tak-
ing place in Latin America among any of the young
people in which the survival of a particular indigenous
group symbolizes either the survival of the country as
a whole or of its environment? Are there young Cen-
tral Americans, let us say among students in universi-
ties, that are beginning to hold up the Indian as the
symbol of the preservation?
MR. CHAPIN: Yes, especially in Mexico but also in
other places to some extent.
DR. ELBOW: It is occurring in Ecuador. One of the
things that I think is an interesting, unexplored topic,
is what causes a green movement to develop in certain
countries and not in others. Why Costa Rica? Why
now an emerging green movement in Ecuador, for
example?
QUESTION: Professor Elbow, you had mentioned, in
general, that there was not much in the way of evi-
dence for the ethnic conflict in South American. You
touched on two countries, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago, where there are mixtures of ethnic groups and
a lot of conflicts. The Trinidadian press is quite con-
cerned with the general upswing in violence. Is it your
impression that this is due largely to this ethnic inter-
action or to the economic downturn, or is it a combi-
nation of both?
DR. ELBOW: I suspect it's a combination of both.
Trinidad had, 10 years ago, the highest per capita
income in Latin America. In addition, local political
parties have been built essentially upon an ethnic base.
Ethnicity is used, or perhaps exploited, as a political
tool. That is also true in Guyana.
QUESTION: What are the sources of support for
reform in Central and South America?
DR. ELBOW: That is a difficult question. To the
extent that reform is taking place, it comes from a
combination of groups and institutions. In the Guate-
malan case, it has been a cooperative movement with
inputs from the Catholic Church, the Peace Corps, and
NG0s. Benefits from these efforts include: leadership
training, education, the breaking down of linguistic
barriers so that the Indians can communicate with
each other in Spanish, and the development of Indian
self-awareness and a sense of Pan-Indian identity.
Ironically, often, it is when it looks like the Indians are
going to begin to have some political power and to
make some impact, that the tendency for a backlash
begins. In some cases the army has stepped in and
countered the development. If you look at Ecuador,
you can see this sort of scenario developing. In 1991
the Indians had a big sit-in in the National Cathedral.
In 1992 they had demonstrations against the 500th
anniversary of Columbus's landing. Ecuador is not
Guatemala, however. It does not have the same history
of-violence that Guatemala has, but I could still imag-
ine the government getting to the point where it feels
so squeezed that the military steps in and says it has
had enough.
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Ethnicity and Nationality in the
Middle East
Marvin W. Mikesell
Professor of Geography
University of Chicago
The Middle East, with its immense petroleum reserves
and unique role as a crossroads between Europe, Asia,
and Africa, is a region of manifest global importance.
It is also a region of inherent instability. Tension, if
not open conflict, between states and among groups
within states is a persisting reality. Add extreme dis-
parity between wealth and poverty, numerous disputed
boundaries, the problems created by frustrated Pales-
tinian and Kurdish political-territorial aspirations, the
spreading influence of Islamic fundamentalism, and
the prevalence of nondemocratic governments and it
is no wonder that the Middle East is perceived univer-
sally to be a region of contention and danger.
The Mirage of Arab Unity
It is ironic that a region blessed with a high degree of
cultural unity should exhibit so much evidence of dis-
cord. Arabic is the official language of no less than
18 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Moreover, with
the exception of Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon, Sunni
Muslims are the majority religious group in each of
these countries. This remarkable degree of linguistic
and religious commonality might have inspired a per-
vasive feeling of unity. In fact, the 18 Arab countries
have seldom been able to function as a geopolitical
bloc, and rivalry among prospective Pan-Arab leaders
has produced and doubtless will continue to produce
tension in the region.
Attempts to merge various of the Arab states�for
example, Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic
during 1958-61�have been sporadic and ephemeral.
Nor has any of the great cities of the region�Cairo,
Damascus, and Baghdad�been able to function as a
Pan-Arab capital. Why there,are 18 Arab countries
rather than one continues to be a perplexing question
for the people and contending monarchs and dictators
of the region. At the end of the Cold War�as was the
case at the end of the two world wars�most of the
countries of the Arab realm are anachronistic and, for
the most part, are arbitrary units of former empires.
Nevertheless, jealousy or suspicion of neighboring
states plus the ambition of state leaders has fostered
keen feelings of nationalism even in countries that had
only provincial or mandate status before their inde-
pendence.
"Turkistan"
A similar perplexing question must now be posed in
regard to Pan-Turkish aspirations. Before the breakup
of the USSR, the world had only one Turkish state�
or two if we include the dubious "Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus." With the independence of the
former Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakstan, ICirgizstan, and Uzbekistan, there are five
additional ones. To date, concern about the character
of this enlarged realm and indeed of a "Turkistan" that
might include other Turkish-speaking peoples has
centered on practical issues such as what alphabet
should be used, economic reforms, and the efficacy of
secular or religious forms of government. The present
and potential influence of Russia, Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan, and China in this vast area has invited
considerable speculation. It is possible that develop-
ments in "Turkistan" will be influenced by more spe-
cific ethnic interests. For example, it is easy to
imagine Azeri-speakers from Iran serving as volun-
teers in the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Conflict in Persian-speaking Tajildstan has already
encouraged participation by the well-armed Tajiks of
northern Afghanistan. Conflict elsewhere in Central
Asia could encourage participation by Turkmen from
Iran and Kazakhs and Uzbeks from Afghanistan or
even from China. The fact that the Turkish- and Per-
sian-speaking countries of the former Soviet Union all
have substantial minority groups complicates the pic-
ture considerably. From an American or European
perspective, Turkey's aspiration to be a Western-ori-
ented role model for Central Asia has obvious appeal.
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It must be remembered that this aspiration derives
from awareness of linguistic affiliation rather than any
realistic assessment of Turkey's political influence or
economic power.
"Nations" in the Middle Eastern Context
"Nation-states," although often alluded to, are rarely
found in the modern world. Perhaps only Iceland can
be regarded as a perfect example. In the Middle East,
Tunisia (minus its several communities of Berber
speakers) is an approximate example. Most Middle
Eastern countries include more than one linguistic or
religious group and so can be described as multina-
tional states. For example:
� Syria has Kurdish and other non-Arab ethnic minor-
ities, and�besides its Sunni Muslim majority�has
significant Christian, Druze, and Alawite religious
groups.
� Iran has both Shia and Sunni Muslims and a number
of non-Persian linguistic groups, including Azeri,
Arabs, Kurds, Baluchi, Luri, Basseri, Balchtiari, and
Turkmen.
� Lebanon has six major religious groups�Maronite,
Greek Catholic, and Greek Orthodox Christians;
Sunni and Shia Muslims; and Druze.
� Egypt has a large population (about 10 million) of
Coptic Christians.
� Turkey has several million Kurds and many smaller
minority groups, including Arabs, Laz, Greeks,
Tatars, and Circassians.
The idea that the Arabic or Turlcish languages might
be the basis of a multistate nation has already been
alluded to and dismissed as having only tentative or
hypothetical meaning. "Arabistan" and "Turkistan"
are debatable concepts rather than geopolitical reali-
ties. The same can probably be said of the idea of a
"multistate nation of Islam." More important in the
context of the Middle East are nonstate nations, of
which Palestine and Kurdistan are the most conspicu-
ous examples. Finally, the linguistic complexity of
Afghanistan and the religious complexity of Lebanon
are so striking that these countries might be described
as nonnation states.
Significant Minorities
In addition to the major groupings that create the
impression of a three-part linguistic division (Arabic,
Turkish, Persian) or a two-part religious division
(Sunni and Shia Islam), the Middle East has numerous
minority groups, and some of these have political
agenda that are in conflict with national policies. The
tension between substate identity and national affilia-
tion, evident in most of the world, has several clear
manifestations in the Middle East.
Minority�or otherwise unempowered�groups that
have expressed separatist ideals or at least a desire for
an enhanced degree of national recognition include
Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan; Baluchi in Iran;
Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon; Christians in Egypt,
Syria, and Iraq; and Arabs in Israel and Israeli-occu-
pied territory. Each of these groups has aspirations
that are in conflict with policies formulated by ruling
groups in the respective countries. The region's most
serious conflict along these lines is in southern Sudan
where Arab or Arabized Muslims have been fighting
linguistically diverse Christians and animists for sev-
eral decades.
The largest minority group within the Arabic realm is
not politically significant. About 40 percent of the
people or Morocco and about 20 percent of the people
of Algeria speak Berber rather than or in addition to
Arabic. However, the scattered distribution of these
people, mainly in mountain areas, the numerous dia-
lects they speak, and the lack of any written or stan-
dardized form of their language have precluded the
development of any separatist movement among Ber-
bers.
Some other minority groups are too weak numerically
to pose a threat to national authorities or compel rec-
ognition of their linguistic or religious identity. The
Assyrians (Aramaic-speaking Christians) of northern
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Iraq exemplify this situation, in spite of claims made
on behalf of autonomy for them by Assyrian immi-
grant groups in the United States. Nor have the Arabs
of southeastern Turkey or in the Khuzistan Province
of Iran posed a serious threat to Turkish or Iranian
authority. Indeed, when the Iraqis invaded Iran in
1980 they expected the Arabic-speakers of Khuzistan
to welcome liberation from Irinian rule. Instead, as
Shiites, the Arabs in this part of Iran had good reason
to see benefit in the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini and
danger for them in the Sunni or secular bias of the
government of Saddam Husayn. The same religious
bond explains why the Azeri of northern Iran rejected
the prospect of merger with the neighboring Soviet
Republic of Azerbaijan during World War II.
The Problem of Kurdistan
Estimates of the number of Kurds vary widely, from
less than 15 million to more than 30 million. In the
negotiations that accompanied the division of the
Ottoman Empire after World War I, various prospects
were suggested for the Kurds, ranging from local
autonomy to independence. In fact, they became a
shadow nation in northwestern Iran, northern Iraq, and
southeastern Turkey. During World War II, when
Soviet troops occupied northern Iran, Kurds enjoyed
some autonomy and, under the Mahabad Republic of
1946, even a brief period of nominal independence. In
1974, after several years of civil war, Kurds in north-
ern Iraq were granted a high degree of autonomy,
including recognition of the coequal status of Kurdish
and Arabic as official languages of the region. Most of
the provisions of this agreement were never imple-
mented, and Kurdish autonomy became a dead issue
when the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980. In Turkey,
Kurds, often called "Mountain Turks," have sought to
achieve recognition and hen0 to resist assimilation.
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey developed in response
to denial of such recognition and the enforcement of
laws inspired by Article 57 of the Turkish constitu-
tion, which forbids "activities that aim at destroying
the ethnic unity of the Turkish people." In response to
the Gulf war and some pressure from the European
Community, the Turkish Government is now enter-
taining thoughts of at least qualified recognition of the
Kurdish people and the lifting of some of the restric-
tions on the use of the Kurdish language.
Kurds have adopted different strategies for promotion
of their cause, depending on opportunities available in
the countries where they reside. They have seldom
expressed enthusiasm for the benefits of Iranian, Iraqi,
or Turkish citizenship. It is Kurdish citizenship that
they desire or at least autonomy as a transitional stage
en route to independence. The frustration of Kurdish
nationalism has been a consequence of its collision
with Iranian, Iraqi, and Turkish nationalism. The loca-
tion of the Kirkuk oilfield in northern Iraq is an addi-
tional complication. Kurdish successional aims in Iraq
have been supported by Iran and, to a lesser extent, by
Turkey, while Kurdish nationalism in both these coun-
tries has been suppressed. Because assimilation is
rejected by Kurdish leaders, Kurdistan is and doubt-
less will remain a nonstate nation.
Kurdish nationalism is an even more intractable prob-
lem than Palestinian nationalism. Although the latter
problem has a large international dimension, it relates
essentially to the relationship between two nonassimi-
lable peoples: Arabs and Jews. The nonstate status of
Kurdistan derives from a more complicated relation-
ship among Kurds and Arabs, Turks, and Iranians. In
each case they have been or can be regarded as candi-
dates for absorption. Although autonomy may be a
realizable aspiration, independence within a territory
relinquished by three states is difficult to imagine.
Kurdistan is best described, therefore, as a cultural
geographic reality that happens coincidentally to be a
political geographic impossibility.
101
Lebanon in Retrospect
The disastrous conflict in Lebanon offers a useful
focus for examination of the circumstances that can
transform instability, present in many Middle Eastern
countries, into warfare. For three decades Lebanon
seemed to be functioning not only is a plural society
but, more remarkably, also as the world's only plural-
istic theocracy. We now know that it was only an
unsuccessful experiment.
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Lebanon was created by the French as a homeland for
Christian Arabs, especially the Maronites. The French
began to treat the Maronites as proteges early in the
19th century when Paris was competing with London
for economic and political influence in the Middle
East. In 1860 the French intervened militarily to pro-
tect their clients during a Muslim-Christian civil war.
After that intervention the Maronite area enjoyed priv-
ileged status as an autonomous province of the Otto-
man Empire. The dismemberment of the Empire after
World War I permitted the French to exercise direct
control over this district and also over the much larger
adjacent territory of Syria. The French desire to create
a state for their Christian proteges posed an interesting
dilemma. The territory occupied predominantly by
Maronites (roughly the northwestern quarter of mod-
ern Lebanon) would have been too small to be an
effective state. Therefore, they added land from their
Syrian mandate and announced the birth of a "Greater
Lebanon," three times the size of the Maronite area.
This larger territory included a substantial number of
Sunni and Shia Muslims, non-Maronite Christians,
and Druze.
A French-sponsored census of 1932 suggested that
Christians formed a slight majority of the population
of Greater Lebanon and that Maronites, with about
30 percent of the total, were the largest specific group.
This was Lebanon's only formal census, and a vast
array of subsequent problems can be traced to doubts
about its accuracy. Suggestions that a new census
should be made were checked by insistence that
Maronites and other Christians "temporarily living
abroad" should also be counted. Because the number
of Christian Lebanese abroad could be ascertained
only by those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was
never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable
data on the size of religious groups in a country where
citizenship was defined by religion and political
power, and even minor government positions, were
allocated on the basis of religious affiliation inhibited
the development of any collective sense of national
identity.
The list of problems inspired by the census contro-
versy is long and melancholy. For example, the ten-
dency of each religious group to try to get more than
its dubious "official" share of government largess
encouraged persistent tension. Moreover, because the
Lebanese who found employment abroad and sent
remittances from abroad were almost exclusively
Christians, the country soon developed a pattern of
extreme disparity in standards of living. The deeply
rural Shia areas of southwestern and northeastern Leb-
anon were conspicuously backward. Even in the more
prosperous Christian districts, democracy was com-
promised by nepotism and the inability of elected
leaders to think of national rather than sectarian inter-
ests.
If Lebanon had been able to remain aloof from the
Arab-Israeli conflict, its tensions and ambiguities
might have been countered by faith that the country
was somehow better off than its neighbors. When Pal-
estinian refugees acquired sufficient strength in Leba-
non to wage their battle from Lebanon, the tottering
Humpty Dumpty created by the French could not
remain on the wall. The reason why the country disin-
tegrated so rapidly can be explained not only by its
inherent cultural problems but also by the ineffective-
ness of the small national army, which consisted
mainly of Christian officers and Muslim enlisted men.
Caught in the crossfire of Palestinians already in Leb-
anon, Israelis who felt free to attack them anywhere in
Lebanon, and Syrian "deterrent" forces that occupied
the eastern half-of Lebanon, it is no wonder that the
Lebanese Army went AWOL. With its departure the
Lebanese Government, no longer able to protect its
citizens, could not prevent the proliferation of divisive
militias and the beginning of a civil war�immensely
complicated by foreign interventions�that led to the
de facto partition of Lebanon into areas controlled by
Maronites, Shiites, Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians.
The Middle East in the Coming Decade
Scholars devoted to the Middle East have often been
able to offer convincing retrospective explanations of
developments in this complex and troubled region.
Examples of-successful prediction are more difficult
to find. Within the past two decades, surprising events,
such as the collapse of the regime of the Shah, the
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subsequent revolutionary rule of Ayatollah Khomeini,
the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait, have had a profound effect on the
entire region. Uncertainty isa certainty in Middle
Eastern studies. This a priori generalization is sus-
tained by another equally obvious generalization.
Each of the dictators and monarchs is mortal, and we
can only speculate on what their departure might
mean for the region. Taking account of the many dis-
puted boundaries in the region (for example, Iraq-Iran,
Israel-Syria, Libya-Chad, Morocco-Algeria) invites
additional speculation.
The diffusion within the regidn of various expressions
of Islamic fundamentalism is a cause of further and
more serious uncertainty. Islamic fundamentalism can
result in persecution of heterodox Muslim groups,
such as the Druze, Alawites, Yezidis, and Bahais, and
can exacerbate the tension between Sunni and Shia
Muslims and among Muslims who might be labeled
variously as worldly or other-worldly, pro-Western or
anti-Western, and moderate orradical. At present, Iran
is the principal exporter and coordinator of move-
ments designed to subvert and eventually supplant
secular authority. This movement has crossed the
region's Sunni-Shia faultline, now presents a serious
threat to the Governments of Egypt and Algeria, and
is a potential threat elsewhere. Even Turkey, officially
secular since the time of Ataturk, has experienced
unrest inspired by Islamic zealots. Because it is mili-
tary rather than civil authority that is most likely to be
effective in blocking revolutionary religious move-
ments, Islamic fundamentalism acts both directly and
indirectly in the frustration or delay of democratic
development in the region. The thinly disguised Army
coup of January 1993 in Algeria is a good illustration
of this principle.
In spite of this recitation of circumstances that make
prediction hazardous in the Middle East, it is possible
to point to some happy and unhappy constants regard-
ing minority groups. For example, it is safe to assume
that the Arabization of the Berber areas of North
Africa will continue without interruption. As a result
of improvements in communication and education,
mountain and desert peoples who now speak only
Berber will become bilingual and eventually speak
103
only Arabic. This process of gradual, voluntary assim-
ilation should also result in the Arabization of the
speakers of several languages in the Sahelian zone. On
the other hand, some numerically small groups,
defined by either language or religion, may avoid or
be able to resist assimilation, especially if they have
low national visibility. The non-Iranian linguistic
groups in the Zagros Mountains may exemplify this
prospect. Christians will doubtless survive and even
prosper in countries that are able to resist the pressures
of Islamic fundamentalism. Lebanon, Syria, and pos-
sibly Iraq could exemplify this prospect. The alterna-
tive situation, in which non-Muslims are threatened,
would occur inevitably in any country that is captured
by Islamic fundamentalists.
Finally, it is probably safe to assume that the problem
of Palestine is not likely to be solved completely
within the coming decade. The various ideas that have
been entertained for solution of the Israeli-Palestinian
problem seem without exception to have inherent con-
tradictions. Trading land for peace presupposes Israeli
willingness to trade enough land to satisfy Palestinian
aspirations. This unrealistic formula also presupposes
that Jewish settlers in potential Palestinian territory
could be persuaded to leave. Again, Palestinians may
be willing to accept autonomy rather than indepen-
dence, but only if this is a transitional rather than a
permanent arrangement. Thoughts of a Palestinian-
Jordanian confederation are also being entertained,
but this prospect merely defers questions about the
character and area of the Palestinian part of the union.
Because it is not likely that Arabs will ever be able to
live contentedly in a Jewish state or Jews in an Arab
state and no realistic proposal has been advanced that
could result in the separation of the two peoples, the
Arab-Israeli problem probably will be with us for
many years.
The problem of Kurdistan also seems to be intractable
and so can be regarded as a constant in the Middle
Eastern cultural-political equation. If the area now
occupied by Kurds were to become an independent
state, it would be no less viable than many of the
existing states in the region. It would have abundant
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land suitable for cereal farming and horticulture, a rich
petroleum field, several cities, and a population of
15-30 million. None of these observations distracts
attention from a reality that precludes any prospect for
the creation of an independent Kurdistan because a
Kurdish state could come into being only if Iraq, Tur-
key, and Iran were to display unprecedented coopera-
tion and generosity.
These speculative remarks reinforce a comment made
at the beginning of this review: the Middle East is and
will continue to be an area of contention and danger.
As the only superpower and, indeed, the only external
power capable of influencing events in the region, the
United States has an unavoidable responsibility. At the
least, we might hope that our experience since 1776
could be a source of illumination for those Middle
104
Easterners�the vast majority of them�who have
never known democracy. Other hopes can be enter-
tained. By encouraging government reforms, discour-
aging excessive military expenditures, exposing
human rights abuses, seeking by diplomatic means to
promote peaceful settlement of border disputes, and
organizing boycotts when such are required to prevent
or punish reckless national behavior, the United States
could expect to play a constructive role in the Middle
Fast. We also need to recognize that the United States
has been, and will continue to be, viewed with suspi-
cion and even contempt as a new colonial power, well
aware of the natural resources and strategic position of
the region but incapable of understanding the aspira-
tions and frustrations of its "difficult people."
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References
The primary source of information on all aspects of
the geography of the Middle East is the Tubinger Atlas
des Vorderen Orients (Wiesbaden, 1968-1993). The
several hundred sheets of this serial publication and its
many supplementary monographs include a wealth of
information on most of the linguistic and religious
groups in the region.
The coverage of the Middle Fast in Atlas Narodov
Mira (Moscow, 1964) was remarkably explicit at that
time and is still useful as a source of information on
the location of linguistically defined groups.
The Middle East Journal and Asian Bulletin are good
sources for information on recent events.
105
A convenient list of useful literature on the human and
physical geography of the region appears in the
section devoted to Southwest Asia and North Africa
in A Geographical Bibliography for American
Libraries (Washington, DC: Association of American
Geographers, 1985).
The London-based Minority Rights Group has issued
several reports on Middle Eastern topics. No one vol-
ume deals adequately with ethnicity and nationality in
the Middle East. However, Carleton Coon's Caravan:
The Story of the Middle East (New York, 1951) is still
useful and stimulating in spite of its early postcolonial
date.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Mildred Berman
In contrast to some areas we have talked about, the
Middle East is relatively small in terms of total popu-
lation. It contains some 300 million people�only
about 6 percent of the world's population�although it
certainly takes up a disproportionate share of the
headlines.
This is an area with a long cultural history. Three of
the world's most influential religions have come from
here. It has been an area of the 'first domestication of
crops, first settlement, first cities, and so on.
In addition, this is a place through which tribes as well
as empires have moved, changed, and reinvented
themselves. This means, then, that the areal extent of
the region keeps shifting like the sands. We have
heard the area called the Near East, the Hither East,
and Southwest Asia. The terms Near East and Hither
East included the Balkans because they were part of
the Ottoman Empire. Today, the term Middle East is
common, but during World War II the Middle East
Command went as far south as Kenya.
One of the terms that geographers and anthropologists
use when discussing this region is "mosaic." It is a
very poetic term and appropriate because of the won-
derful mosaic floors left by the Romans and the
mosaic work on the mosques throughout much of the
area. But a mosaic implies symmetry, and, as you have
just heard from Professor Mikesell, the intense variety
of people here is not very symmetrical. In talking
about mosaics, I recently read something very inter-
esting. After Jerusalem was retaken by the Saracens
under Saladin in the 12th century, many tiles of the
Dome of the Rock had to be replaced because they
had begun to fall off. The people who put the tiles
back were not Muslim artisans, but Armenian Chris-
tians; one of the great monuments in the Muslim
world was repaired by laborers from another religion.
I would like to comment on two of the issues that Pro-
fessor Mikesell addressed: the Kurdish situation and
Lebanon.
The outlook for Kurds achieving a state is grim. Pro-
fessor Mikesell says it is impossible, and maybe it is.
But in this region we can never say never, as evi-
denced by the recent gasp-provoking handshake
between PLO Chief Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin on the lawn of the White House. In the past,
some outside assistance has gone to the Kurds in an
effort to destabilize the regime in Iraq. During the
1970s, for instance, Israel and the United States sent
in arms to shore up the Kurdish cause, but, as we all
know, this did not work. Since the Persian Gulf war,
there has been a fair amount of pressure brought to
bear on Turkey in the hope that it might promote some
Kurdish autonomy in the area, but this does not seem
to be working. The tragedy is that, with so many other
things going on in this part of the world, the Kurdish
cause is definitely on the back burner.
Regarding Lebanon, that country�a very unsuccess-
ful experiment as Professor Mikesell has so rightly
described�was programmed for failure from the
beginning. The separation of Lebanon from Syria
overlooked the fact that members of the country's
17 individual sects had loyalties not only to their reli-
gious groups but also to tribes and villages as well.
This has continued until the present time. Lebanon
then has had no real political control over its many
peoples.
The country began to unravel in the 1970s with the
establishment of individual fiefdoms and, again, with
the PLO ministate, which was destroyed by the 1982
incursion of the Israel Defense Forces. Today, the
infrastructure in Beirut and Southern Lebanon is in
shambles. It is uncertain whether the country will ever
reemerge as a banking center, tourist attraction, or an
air transport hub.
The Syrian Army presence remains a real danger;
there are 40,000 Syrian troops in the country, and they
show no sign of moving. The Christians are very
much concerned about what may happen if the Syri-
ans move to annex Lebanon. They fear that this will
be bad for them, and many Muslims in the area also
fear the repressiveness of the Syrian regime.
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Finally, the major concern the Lebanese currently
have is the 300,000 Palestinian refugees who are in
the southern part of their country. They would like to
see them moved out. This is another of the destabiliz-
ing aspects of the human geography of the Middle
East.
General Discussion
QUESTION: I'd like to focus the Kurdish question on
Turkey. What do you think the prospects are for
Turks�who seem adamantly opposed to any kind of
acknowledgment of the Kurds at all�to ever try to
solve the Kurdish problem politically or socially
rather than just militarily? Is this insurgency ever
going to end?
DR. MIICESELL: The recent statements from Prime
Minister Ciller simply reinforce what has been said
before. When asked about this, she said, "Why is there
a problem? The Kurds have the same rights as all
other Turkish citizens." In other words, the Turks are
quite emphatic in the idea that, although they recog-
nize they have minorities, they cannot have minority
citizenship.
There is a Kurdish party represented in the parliament
in Ankara. When the delegates arrived and wanted to
use the Kurdish language, however, they were accused
of treason and violation of law,
107
The Turks see themselves as living in a unitary state, a
nation-state. They know a lot of diversity exists in the
country, but they have not allowed allow citizenship to
be defined in reference to anything other than Turkish
identity.
QUESTION: Do you think that there will be an alien-
ation of those Kurds who have been integrated into
Turkish society, particularly within the military and
the intelligence services?
DR. MIICESELL: Turkey has used military conscrip-
tion as a way of promoting national identity, and,
when a Kurd is drafted into the army, he gets shipped
away from Kurdistan. The Turks have used military
service and crash programs in literacy to try to Turldfy
the non-Turkish population. It would be very difficult
to find out how much assimilation has taken place,
however, because Turks are so sensitive to this issue.
Regardless, I can't imagine an assimilated Kurd who
has changed his name and who knows Turkish going
back to being a Kurdish nationalist.
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Ethnicity Theory and Ethnic Conflict
in China: The New Politics of
Difference
Dru Gladney
Research Fellow,
Program for Cultural Studies
East-West Center
The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to
family and clan with the result that in China there
have been familyism and clanism but no real national-
ism. Foreign observers say that the Chinese are like a
sheet of loose sand. . . .The unity of the Chinese peo-
ple has stopped short at the clan and has not extended
to the nation . . .
Sun Yat-sen, Three People's Principles (1924:2,5)
Shenzhen is Hong Kongized, Guangdong is Shenzhen-
ized, and the whole country is Guangdongized.
Popular saying in southern China
Introduction: The Disuniting of China
In his recent statement to the United Nations, the Rus-
sian Foreign Minister Andrey V. Kozyrev declared
that the threat of ethnic violence today is "no less seri-
ous than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday."
Although most people would agree that this is cer-
tainly true for the troubled regions of the former
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, and much of the Americas, few would acknowl-
edge that China is also faced with such a threat. While
the former Soviet Union, in particular, is seen to be
riddled with ethnic and nationalist strife, China is still
regarded as a relatively peaceful monolith that is dom-
inated by a militaristic centralized power structure
intent on maintaining its control at all costs. This
paper will not dispute that received wisdom. Rather, it
will seek to demonstrate why we continue to see
China in this way and to attempt to illustrate some of
the potential faultlines in the system, should it ever
begin to come apart at the seams. The real subject, it
seems to me, when we examine China in this regard,
is "which seams."
With the rise of a unipolar world led by the United
States, the question of China's domestic integrity
becomes paramount (Garver 1992). However, geopo-
litical strategists and scholars may be tempted to aban-
don their interest in the minorities of China�key
players in the border disputes between the two former
neighboring adversaries�who were often only of
interest as potential irritants to Sino-Soviet relations.
China now shares a much reduced border with Russia
and is instead faced with several new nations with
much less political clout. This may lead scholars to
disregard the ethnics within and without China as no
longer of strategic or political interest.
What are the pressures within China for ethnic con-
flict, and why have they changed with the demise of
the USSR? How do we begin to conceive of China as
something more than a monocultural society with a
6,000-year written history? Do the politics of differ-
ence make a difference for the average Chinese citi-
zen? This paper will seek to address these questions as
I outline what I see to be some of the ethnic "contours
of power" (Yang 1989) within Chinese society.
Although Sovietologists could never have predicted
the rapid events that dismantled the USSR at the
beginning of this decade, and I do not envision the
immediate dissolution of China, attention to the preex-
isting faultlines within these superpowers might yield
significant insight into the political maps that charac-
terize their present and possible futures. (See figure 8.)
Ethnic Faultlines
The Rise of Southern Nationalisms
There is a new feeling in China, reflected by the
popular saying: "Northerners love (ai) the nation;
Southerners sell (mai) the nation." Accompanying
the dramatic economic explosion in southern China,
Southerners and others have begun to assert their
cultural and political differences. Recent studies by
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Figure 8
Segmental Oppositional Hierarchy
G H
E F
C D
A
736073 6-95
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Edward Friedman (1993), Emily Honig (1991), and
others have demonstrated a new rising importance of
the politics of ethnic and cultural difference within
China proper. Not only have the "official" minorities
in China begun to more strongly assert their identities,
pressing the government for further recognition,
autonomy, and special privileges, but also different
groups from within the so-called "Han" majority have
begun to rediscover, reinvent, and reassert their ethnic
differences.
In the south especially, there has been a recent rewrit-
ing of history, illustrated by a newfound interest in the
southern Chu Kingdom as key to southern success.
Edward Friedman reports the establishment of muse-
ums throughout southern China dedicated to the glori-
ous history of the southern Kingdom of Chu, as
manifested in both the Warring States period,
475-221 BC and the Three Kingdoms 220-265 AD.
Many Southerners now see the early Chu as essential
to Chinese culture and as distinct from the less impor-
tant northern dynasties. In a significant departure from
traditional Chinese historiography, southern scholars
are beginning to argue that by the 6th century BC the
bronze cultures of the Chu spread north and influ-
enced the development of Chinese civilization, not the
other way around. This argument supports a reevalua-
tion of the importance of the south to China's past, as
well as economic and geopolitical future (Friedman
1993).
Rising consciousness of the southern Chu, or Can-
tonese, is paralleled by reassertions of identity among
the Hakka people, the southern Fujianese Min or Hok-
Iden, the Swatow, and a host of other peoples empow-
ered by economic success and embittered at age-old
restraints placed on them from the north. Many people
are beginning to note the southern leanings and ori-
gins of central party political figures, and it is not
unusual to hear reports that so-and-so is a Hakka and
therefore has acted in a certain way. Leading figures
considered to be Hakka or part Hakka include Deng
Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Ye Jianning�father of
Guangdong's previous governor. It is now widely
known that all members of the Chinese Communist
Party's (CCP) southern bases in the 1920s and 1930s
were Hakka, as were their leaders. Mao successfully
mobilized Hakka hatred against other Southerners and
their landlords. People now often praise Zhou Enlai by
stressing his southern Jiangnan linkages. And even
Jiang Jieshi�Chiang Kai-shek�was praised as a
Southerner who knew how to get money out of the
United States.
Liao Ping-hui (1993), a Taiwanese sociologist, reports
that Taiwan is also experiencing a dramatic reasser-
tion of the gaoshan "aboriginal" peoples to their
indigenous rights and claims. Age-old Taiwanese/
Mainlander ethnic cleavages (Hill Gates 1981) have
given way to a predominance of Taiwanese language
and political figures in everyday life as well as a host
of other groups maneuvering along traditional cultural
and linguistic grounds for political power.
The assertions of the politics of difference within the
majority Han society militate against traditional
assumptions about the "homogeneous" Chinese, the
monoculturalism of China, and the predominance of a
91-percent Han majority nationality. Local differences
are now becoming recognized as "ethnic," (Honig
1992), whereas previously most China scholars dis-
missed them as merely "regional." This semantic
shift, from "regional" to "ethnic" reflects a new
salience placed upon the politics of difference in the
People's Republic.
Traditional China studies emphasized "China" as one
civilization, one country, and one culture. Rarely was
there serious attention paid to cultural and political
difference in China studies unless it concerned the
"exotic" minority border peoples, almost always
regarded as marginal to power and politics in the Peo-
ple's Republic. Most studies dealt only with ethnic
differences as related to the 55 official minority
nationalities of China. While two recent collections in
Daedalus and two new edited volumes on Chinese
national identity have begun to address this issue,
most of them approach the issues of cultural identity
from the other direction, that is, asking what binds the
Chinese together�Confucianism, Communism, state-
authoritarianism, familism, or language�rather than
what might be pulling them apart. Conflicts with
China's long divisiveness over cultural, linguistic, and
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historical power lines are noted in Frank Dikotter's
recent book, The Discourse of Race in Modern China.
During the Qing, interethniq conflicts (fenlei xiedou)
or "armed battles to separate types (lei)," became
comtnon between Han and Muslims; Haklca (a minor-
ity group of southeast China) and Hoklo (Holckien-
speaking Chinese); and Halcka and Punti (native Can-
tonese). Ethnic feuds strove to "clear the boundaries"
by ejecting exogenous groups from their respective
territories. Such ethnic clashes could be extremely
violent: a major conflict between the Hakka and Punti
in 1856-67 took a toll of 100,000 victims. The
reformers' interpretation of racial war was based on
lineage feuds. This vision was sustained by the
semantic similarity between zu as lineage and zu as
race. "Race," as will be demonstrated in the next
chapter, would create nationhood. On the basis of
internal conflicts between lineages, the reformers
constructed a representation of external conflicts
between races (DikOtter, 1992: 70-71).
In an articulated hierarchy of escalating opposition,
interlineage conflicts became the model for anti-
foreignism�"us" against "them," our race against
theirs. It is this awareness of internal conflict, lineage,
ethnic, and racial difference that drives a deep-seated
anxiety about the possibility of China breaking up.
The Chinese, in my opinion, never take China for
granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is
because most Chinese are all too aware of how easily
and naturally China could break into its constituent
parts. It was widely believed for a short period follow-
ing the Tiananmen crackdown that the Beijing-based
forces were more loyal to their city's residents and
would refuse to obey the command, while other
armies, such as the Wuhan-based military district,
were loyal to Deng Xiao-ping. At one point, heavy
gunfire was widely reported to be heard on the out-
skirts of the city. It was thought to be between the var-
ious military forces converging on the city. These
deep-seated fears reflected a concern that China was
on the verge of spiraling into a civil disunion reminis-
cent of the warlord era, when local militarists com-
manded personal armies and built up cultural,
linguistic, and regional political power bases.
The "Official" Minority Nationalities and Ethnic
Separatism
China is a multinational, multiethnic nation with
55 "official" minority nationality groups, identified
mainly in the 1950s, that now total more than 92 mil-
lion in population (see Dreyer 1976). This includes
10 Muslim nationalities�with a total population of at
least 20 million�located primarily on China's bor-
ders with Russia and the new mainly Muslim Central
Asian States. In the south, there are nearly 12 million
Austro-Malay�speaking Zhuang people on the Viet-
nam border and more than 24 separate minority
groups in Yunnan Province alone, where cross-border
relations with Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand have
increased dramatically in the past few years. The state
has assigned levels of minority autonomous adminis-
tration. There are five autonomous regions, scores of
autonomous districts, and hundreds of autonomous
counties and villages. Autonomous here primarily
means that there is more local control over the admin-
istration of such things as resources, taxes, birth plan-
ning, education, and legal jurisdiction. It does not
mean that control is in minority hands. Although most
minority regions and districts have minority govern-
ment leaders, the Communist Party in all these areas is
dominated by the Han majority, reflecting China's
active watch over these so-called autonomous areas.
111
The recent detonation of two bombs in a Kashgar
Hotel in southern Xinjiang that killed at least six peo-
ple convinced Beijing that its fears were well founded
regarding Uighur separatism and the increasing influ-
ence from the newly independent Turkic states on its
borders. The longstanding struggles of Tibetan inde-
pendence movements are also well documented (see
Goldstein 1990). This supports the 1970s prediction
by Victor Louis, understood to be a Soviet intelligence
operative, who wrote in The Coming Decline of the
Chinese Empire that China would fall apart due to the
"national aspirations of the Manchu, Mongols,
Uighurs, Tibetans, and other non-Chinese peoples"
(cited in Friedman 1993: 270).
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Until now, most China scholars have dismissed the
possibility as remote, and the violent incidents on the
margins of China's great landmass were not consid-
ered a serious threat to the monolith. The Uighur,
Kazakhs, Tajiks, Mongols, and even the Tibetans are
still felt to be insignificant minorities: politically and
militarily inept, internationally isolated, and expected
to go the way of the Manchu and others who have
been thought to be long assimilated into the Chinese
mainstream. Although I am not predicting or advocat-
ing the dissolution of China along the lines that Victor
Louis predicted, in this paper I argue that recent
events among the Uighur in Kashgar are related to the
Haldca in Canton and explain why these linkages have
generally been ignored by China scholarship.
I suggest that we need new ways of thinking about
ethnic and regional identity that often leads to local
conflict along unexpected lines. What is going on in
southern China is linked to the rise of local ethnic
nationalisms�the rise of the Cantonese, the assertion
of the Halcka, and the galloping economy of the south-
ern Fujianese�to traditional nationalisms on China's
borders as well as global trends that have affected
China domestically and internationally. My research
parallels work in contemporary anthropological and
ethnographic theory, which rejects notions of homoge-
nized cultures and posits the existence of multiple
identities and shifting associations.
Despite the frequent wishing away of ethnic and
nationalist loyalties, we are witnessing the rise of eth-
nic nationalisms that define the arenas of conflict
across the globe. This flies in the face of-earlier predic-
tions by both modernization theorists and even Marxist
ideologues that ethnic identities would fade in favor of
individual, secularized, economic-based behaviors.
"Tribalism," thought to be a thing of the past, is now
the watchword of the 1990s. Most people are surprised
at the viciousness with which people, who were long
thought to be assimilated, modernized, and secularized,
are assaulting and "cleansing" others in the name of
primordialized self-identity, self-determination, and
ethnic nationalism. What is going on here?
National identities, although imagined, are never arbi-
trary but arise in particular sociopolitical contexts in
relational opposition to specific others. To follow Ben
Anderson (1983), it is the feeling of "otherness" one
experiences while in exile or, I would add, while being
incorporated and dominated into a nation-state that
may more than anything lead to a strong sense of eth-
nicity. To follow Dorine Kondo (1989:43), the notion
of relational identity stresses "multiplicity, contextual-
ity, complexity, power, irony, and resistance." It is the
articulation of the multiplicities of these identities,
within the context of where they have been expressed,
that these identities become salient.
Nationalism is not just an idea but also a certain style
of representation that is now most often defined by
interactions within or resistance to the nation-state. As
Hobsbawm argues, "Nationalism is a political pro-
gram . . �Without this programme, realized or not,
'nationalism' is a meaningless term," (Anthropology
Today 1992:4). Nationalism is not arbitrary, but nei-
ther is there any core content to it. It has no essential
essence. It is not shifted and redefined.
I began to think much more about the nature of what
relational and oppositional identity means (see Glad-
ney 1991) after interviewing Turkestani refugees and
emigres in Turkey. It convinced me that much of what
I had been reading in Foreign Affairs and other jour-
nals about the resurgence of "tribalisms" in Central
Asia now that the Soviets have withdrawn was very
wrong. I became convinced that these people were
profoundly different than they were before their domi-
nation by the centralizing states of Soviet and Chinese
Central Asia and that their multifaceted identities are
anything but tribal.
Han Nationalism and the Rise of the Chinese
Nation-State
As yet, no larger studies of the creation of Han nation-
alism have emerged�mainly because it is assumed by
sinologists trained in the dominant tradition that
"Han" is generally equal to "Chinese"�a tradition
created and maintained by the current regime in
power. Studies of Chinese nationalism have generally
ignored the issue of the creation of the Han majority in
favor of the larger question of Chinese identity. Few
have questioned how the Han became the 94-percent
majority of China. Perhaps, the traditional Confucian
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preoccupation with order and harmony in a society
held tenuously together by proper relationships may
be one reason why these categories have never been
challenged. The very Confucian practice of the "recti-
fication of names" (zheng ming) is of primary concern
to the Chinese ethnographers; once the Han and all the
minority nationalities have been identified or named,
order is restored, and all is well in the world. I would
argue that it is the anxiety about differences within
Chinese society, not the affection shared within, that
has managed to hold China together.
The notion of "Han ren" (Han person) has existed for
many centuries as those descendants of the Han
dynasty, which had its beginnings in the Wei River
valley. However, I submit that the notion of "Han zu"
or "Han name (Han nationality) is an entirely modern
phenomenon�it arises with the shift from empire to
nation, as argued above. While the concept of a Han
person certainly existed, the notion of a unified Han
nationality that makes up 94 percent of China's popu-
lation gained its greatest popularity under Dr. Sun Yat-
sen. Dr. Sun was most certainly influenced by strong
currents of Japanese nationalism during his long-term
stay in Japan. Sun argued that the ruler-subject rela-
tion that had persisted throughput China's dynastic
history would need to be fundamentally transformed if
a true nationalist movement were to sweep China and
engender support among all its, peoples. More practi-
cally, Dr. Sun needed a way to,mobilize all Chinese
against the imperial rule of the Qing, a dynasty
founded by a northeastern people who became known
as the Manchu. By invoking the argument that the
majority of the people in China were Han, Sun effec-
tively found a symbolic metaphorical opposition to
the Manchu to which the vast majority of peoples in
China would easily rally.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen advocated the idea that there were
"Five Peoples of China" (wuzu gonghe): the Han, the
Man (Manchu), the Meng (Mongolian), the Zang
(Tibetan), and the Hui�a term that included all Mus-
lims in China who are now divided into the Uighur,
Kazakh, Hui, and so forth. This recognition of the
Five Peoples of China served as the main platform for
his Nationalist revolution, which overthrew the Qing
empire and established the first "People's Republic."
One must have peoples if there is to be a people's
revolution. The critical link between Sun Yat-sen's
Five Peoples policy and his desire to unify all of
China is made crystal clear from his discussion of
nationalism�the first of his Three People's Principles
(Sanmin Zhuyi). It is here that Sun argued the Chinese
were a disconnected, loose sheet of sand, with no
sense of the nation.
It is also not at all surprising that Dr. Sun should turn
to the use of the all-embracing idea of the Han as the
national group, which included all the regional peo-
ples and Sino-linguistic speech communities. Sun Yat-
sen was Cantonese, raised as an overseas Chinese in
Hawaii. As one who spoke little Mandarin, and with
few connections in northern China, he would have
easily aroused traditional northern suspicions of
southern radical movements extending back to the
Song dynasty (10th century) that were, of course, well
known to him. This recurring historical pattern and the
traditional antipathy between the Cantonese and
northern peoples would have posed an enormous bar-
rier to his promotion of a nationalist movement. Dr.
Sun found a way to rise above deeply embedded
north-south ethnocentrisms. The use and perhaps
invention of the term "Han minzu" was a brilliant
attempt to mobilize other non-Cantonese, especially
northern Mandarin speakers, and the powerful Zhe-
jiang and Shanghainese merchants into one overarch-
ing national group against the Manchu and other
foreigners during the unstable period following the
Unequal Treaties. The Han were seen to stand in
opposition to the "Others" on their borders�the Man-
chu, Tibetan, Mongol, and Hui, as well as the Western
imperialists. By distinguishing these "Others" in their
midst, the nationalists cultivated the imagined identity
of the "we" Han, as opposed to the "they" minorities
and foreigners. In Ben Anderson's terms, Dr. Sun was
engaged in "stretching the short, tight skin of the
nation over the gigantic body of the empire."
The Communists stretched this skin even further, fol-
lowing the Soviet model and identifying not five, but
55, nationality groups, with the Han in the 91-percent
majority. My argument is that both for the nationalists
and the Communists, it was not only the political
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necessity of enlisting the support of the ethnics on
their borders that led them to recognize minority
nationalities but also the desire to unify the nation
against the outsiders in order to overcome internal dif-
ference. Now that there is no longer an external threat,
it is this internal difference that will most pull them
apart.
The best analogy here is that of Europe and the
Roman Empire. Lucien Pye (1993) has recently
observed that "China today is what Europe would
have been if the unity of the Roman Empire had lasted
until now and there had not been the separate emer-
gence of the separate entities of England, France, Ger-
many, and the like." China is a multilingual nation
with large populations that can be divided among the
six major language groups. Linguists such as John De
Francis and Jerry Norman have demonstrated that
there is as much diversity "among the Chinese dialects
as. . . among the Romance languages .1. . .To take an
extreme example, there is probably as much differ-
ence between the dialects of Peking and Chaozhou as
there is between Italian and French; the Hainan Min
dialects are as different from the Xian dialect as Span-
ish is from Rumanian," (Norman 1988). Much like
Latin in the Middle Ages, China's diverse language
groups all are served with one standard writing sys-
tem, Chinese ideographs that vary in some styles, such
as Cantonese, although the speech communities are
mutually exclusive. What holds these diverse commu-
nities together is oppositional hierarchy. The politics
of difference, until now, have not reached to this level.
Ethnic and Oppositional Identity
It is oppositional hierarchy, the shifting nature of iden-
tity, that now enlivens Chinese cultural nationalism.
This relates to the popular Arab Bedouin proverb:
Me against my brother, my brother and I against our
cousin, our cousin and us against you.
As the great Central Asianist Bartold once said:
"When you ask a Turkestani what his identity is, he
will answer that he is first of all a Muslim, then an
inhabitant of such or such city or village. . ,or, if he
is a nomad, member of such or such tribe." But as
Nazif Shahrani pointed out, later Muslim travelers
noted that the only reason the Central Asians first told
Bartold they were Muslims was because they per-
ceived him as a European Christian and part of the
Czarist colonial project. In similar fashion, Halcka
have always told anthropologists that they are Han
persons, but, among themselves, they and most South-
erners believe they are Tang persons.
By looking at ethnic identity and conflict in relational
terms, one can immediately understand why a person
from a certain lineage in southern China can be
Toisan, Cantonese, Southern, Han, and a Chinese citi-
zen, all at once or selectively, depending on to whom
they are talking�foreigner, non-Han, Northerner,
non-Cantonese, or non-Toisan Cantonese. It is finding
out when and how one assumes these different identi-
ties that is key here, not what any one identity will be
in some essentialized permanent form that exists out-
side of historical contingency.
Sir Edmund Leach (1954) was the first anthropologist
to argue that ethnic identity is formed as the result of
power oppositions; the Kachin in Highland Burma
only acted ethnically when in opposition to the Shans.
Evans-Pritchard's (1940) classic study of the Nuer
determined the unique expansive-contractive nature of
hierarchical segmentary lineages among nomadic
societies that lack a distinct leader. When the Nuer
were confronted with an outside power, they unified
and organized to a high degree of political complexity
in order to respond to the challenge. When the threat
subsided, they diversified and atomized.
Ethnic identities are often seen to coalesce and crys-
tallize in the face of higher order oppositions. These -
ethnic identities form and reform according to articu-
lated hierarchies of interaction with the particular
oppositional power in question (see diagrams). In
From Empire to Nation, Rupert Emerson (1960) pro-
vides a perceptive definition of the nation as "the larg-
est community, which when the chips are down,
effectively commands men's loyalty" (cited in Connor
1984). Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon proposed: "A
'nation' has been cynically but not inaptly defined as a
society united by a common error as to its origin and a
common aversion to its neighbors."
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Now that the global map is most defined by the
nation-state, the peoples within must define them-
selves vis-a-vis the nation-state. E. K. Francis, in his
Interethnic Relations (1978); argued that the rise of
ethnic identities and interethnic conflict was a phe-
nomenon tied most directly to the nation-state. It is the
nation-state that takes upon itself the task of legislat-
ing identity. Empires were consumed more with rul-
ing, rather than legislating and identifying the peoples
under their spheres of influence. In the modern era, it
is often the nation-state apparatus itself with which
ethnic groups find themselves in opposition. By agree-
ing to articulate their identities along the contours
shaped by ethnic identification policies and censuses,
ethnic groups demonstrate their desire to form coali-
tions at the highest possible level in order to interact
as a powerful collectivity with the state apparatus.
These ethnic identities are "imagined" in Ben Ander-
son's (1983) terms, but they are never arbitrary. They
form according to cultural, historical, and political
power oppositions and alliances. What we are wit-
nessing today with the end of the Cold War is the
moving down of oppositional alliances to levels that
now emphasize the importance of the politics of dif-
ference below the level of the Han. The opposition to
the West, to imperialism, and. to the Japanese is no
longer a motivating force binding China together.
Ethnic Nationalism in China: Some Policy
Considerations
The increasing importance of playing the politics of
difference for personal and corporate gain out of
response to stigmatized identities, or just out of a
renewed sense of the meaningfulness of one's history
in China, has important implications for how we
understand ethnic identity and the potential for con-
flict. Although this paper does not predict ethnic con-
flict along any predetermined lines, the argument here
is to suggest the importance of certain faultlines,
should fragmentation, most important at the center of
the state's power structure, occur. The Uighur will
never become independent as long as Beijing is in
firm control, but Beijing is increasingly dependent on
Canton, and, if Canton should make a move, many
Uighur would be only too glad to take advantage of
the situation. Analysis and policy decisions regarding
ethnic conflict in China should consider several issues,
which follow.
Cultural nationalism and ethnic difference should be
taken seriously. This is true not only among the "offi-
cial" minority nationalities, who are stigmatized or
empowered because of that designation, but also
among at least two other kinds of groups: applicant
groups and sub-Han groups.
Applicant groups are seeking or have sought to be rec-
ognized as "official" minority nationalities. Many of
these groups were not recognized in the 1940s and
1950s during the nationality identification programs,
and some have sought, indeed militated for and politi-
cally organized around, nationality recognition. There
are at least 15 groups who have applied and are under
consideration for nationality recognition by the State
Commission for Nationalities (guojia minzu shiwu
weiyuanhui). These groups include the Chinese Jews
(you tai ren), Khmer, Sherpas, Ku Cong, Deng (a
Tibetan sub-group), Chuanqing, and several others
(see Heberer 1990). Some 900,000 people in Guizhou
Province alone applied for minority recognition in the
early 1980s, and the 1982 census reported that
799,705 "unidentified" people remained in China. Of
interest are the Chinese Jews, once thought to be
extinct but now claiming a membership of 8,000 and
under consideration for rapid recognition due to
China's official diplomatic ties to and improving rela-
tions with Israel. Although this group is certainly not
militant, it stands to benefit considerably from recog-
nition, perhaps leading to local-level rivalries with
other groups, particularly with Hui Muslims, to whom
many of the Chinese Jews formerly belonged. Another
group, the Ku Cong, presently classified as a branch of
the Lahu nationality in Yunnan and known as the Yel-
low Lahu, are worth noting because one of their mem-
bers, Wang Zhengcun, was the elected leader of the
Tiananmen Square Nationalities Institute's student
democratic group and was sought and arrested as
number 3 on the most wanted list. He has long been
known as a "Ku Cong" nationalist, seeking recogni-
tion of his people, illustrating the importance of this
issue for political activism (see Gladney 1990).
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As noted above, other groups to watch outside the
official nationalities are particularly those so-called
"sub-Han" groups that have maintained local, linguis-
tic, and ethnic ties throughout the CCP period, despite
lack of recognition. Especially important are those
with outside transnational links or large populations
outside the China mainland, such as the Halcka in Tai-
wan and Hong Kong; the Swatow in Hong Kong,
Thailand, and Indonesia; and the Min-speaking (1-lok-
'den, Fujianese) populations in Southeast Asia and
Taiwan. Although other local level ethnic differences
are important in regional and ethnic politics through-
out China, it is these groups that have the economic
and international clout to make a difference in the
domestic scene. This again does not suggest that any
one of these groups alone is sufficient to destabilize a
region of China or engage in strong political activism.
Instead, I am arguing that, as Rbpert noted above,
when the "chips are down" these are the kinds of
groups best positioned to exploit their cultural and
political resources.
Closer attention should be paid to debates in the Chi-
nese community within and outside China regarding
the construction of Chineseness, or Chinese national
identity. Like Sun, Yat-sen's own historic formulation,
the outcome of these debates may determine the direc-
tion of public policy, whether it be pluralist, federalist,
monoethnic, or even racist. At the same time, studies
of "sub-Han" national identity and cultural difference
have become popular in the mainland, with Xu
Jiexun's (1985) series of publications, New Explora-
tions in the Han Nationality's History and Culture,
being just the beginning of this important trend (first
begun perhaps with Fan Wenlan's 1957 collection).
Xu, a historian and political scientist at the Guangxi
Institute of Nationalities in Nanning, has effectively
used the Han categorization as a "nationality" (minzu)
as a means to study cultural difference within the Han.
Study of minority nationalities in China should focus
not only on their traits, population, history, and culture
but, more important, also on their interconnected-
ness�the articulation of their identity across regional
and national boundaries. In the international sphere,
this has certainly been important for Tibetan; Mus-
lim�especially the Uighur, Kazakh, Tajik, and Hui;
Korean (the most educated and economically
advanced nationality in China); and Mongol groups.
Domestically, it has been important for their establish-
ing national networks, often through state institutions
such as the Nationalities Institutes, Islamic and Bud-
dhist Associations, and regional Nationality Commis-
sions. It has also been important for the reawakening
of national consciousness, such as among the Manchu,
who have established three new autonomous counties
in the northeast during the past 10 years.
Population politics should be watched closely. As
China more severely enforces its one-child policy,
minority recognition will become more important as a
means to having more children. In the past, China has
been rather reluctant to enforce restriction on minority
births in rural areas; minorities were "encouraged" to
limit births to one more child than the Han in their
area, but in general they had as many as they wanted.
Now the government is attempting to enforce this pol-
icy despite strong opposition. Minorities are reluctant
to adhere to increasingly applied birth planning poli-
cies. For example, the requirement to limit births to
three among minorities led to riots among Uighurs
and Mongols in 1989 and 1990. Chinese often rede-
fine themselves as minorities. Children of mixed mar-
riages are almost always opting for minority identity,
and minorities are increasingly preferred as potential
marriage partners. This has led to a phenomenal popu-
lation growth of 35 percent between 1982 and 1990
among minorities, while the Han population only
grew by 10 percent. Some groups grew dramati-
cally�the Manchu grew by 114 percent, the Tujia by
140 percent, the Hui by 40 percent, and the Uighur by
40 percent. The Gelao�a Yunnan minority�grew by
an incredible 714 percent. The vast majority of these
increases are due to redefining and reregistration of
people who were previously classified as Han (see
Gladney 1991: 240 if.; Banister 1987).
The administration of minority privileges should be
watched. Both the extent of the privileges�such as
tax breaks, birth planning, educational incentives, and
economic development investment�and the effect
they have among the majority population should be
considered. In any society affirmative action programs
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often alienate the majority, and in China this has led to
resentment and ethnic conflict in some areas. This is
particularly true for groups such as the Hui, Manchu,
She, and Zhuang, who closely, resemble the Han
majority in their areas. It has led to accusations that
these groups are faking ethnic identity in order to have
more children or receive special government assis-
tance (see my discussion of the "two-child Hui" Mus-
lims, Gladney: The Journal of Asian Studies).
Popular culture should be monitored as an indication
of the rising importance of ethnic or cultural differ-
ence. In Beijing, whereas only a few years ago South-
erners and southern accents were pilloried and
stigmatized by many "crosstalk" comedians and enter-
tainers, Cantonese terms and aecents are now highly
valued and affected. Canton, Shenzhen, and Hong
Kong songs, movies, clothing styles, and entertainers
are extremely popular throughout China, even though
they are frequently not understood. At the same time,
"ethnic art" that exoticizes, romanticizes, and often
eroticizes the minorities in Yunnan and Tibet, is
extremely popular inside and outside China, leading to
the founding of the Yunnan Art School (see Gladney:
Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern
States of East and Southeast Asia).
The ethnic makeup of "floating populations" and other
labor groups should be examined, particularly as it
relates to large migrations of peoples and the growth
of ethnic economic niches. Dorothy Solinger in a
series of articles has documented the rising promi-
nence of "floating" migrant populations but has not
analyzed why it is that most of the groups are mem-
bers of certain ethnic sub-Han communities. For
example, almost all shoe repair in China is dominated
by Zhejiangese from a certain county; child care
workers and domestics in Beijing almost all come
from one part of Anhui; the Subei people dominate
specific "unclean" occupations in Shanghai (see
Honig 1991); Cantonese now cbntract almost all of
their agricultural labor to Hunanese peasants; and,
until recently, the Uighur dominated the moneychang-
ing black market.
117
The Taiwan aboriginal movement should be monitored
as to its impact on Republic of China policy and its
coverage in the People's Republic of China media. The
outcome over this debate about indigenous peoples'
land rights, their desire for native language training,
and the need for cultural preservation will have serious
repercussions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
The military has been drastically overhauled since
questions were raised about regional loyalty during
the Tiananmen incident. Further attention should be
paid to the origins and cultures of the officers in
charge and of the forces under their commands.
China's military districts occupy important macrore-
gions that William Skinner (1965) once argued were
entirely separate focuses around which the rest of
China moved. Although China, unlike the USSR, has
not employed many "official" minorities in the mili-
tary, many commanders and their forces may have sig-
nificant local and regional attachments. Military
researchers have tended to dismiss these local and
regional differences because of certain assumptions
about Han and Chinese identity. The ethnic and cul-
tural makeup of the military may not have much influ-
ence on military decision making, nonetheless, it may
effect the relationship with the local populations, as
we saw briefly in Beijing.
In the mid-1980s, political scientists initiated a series
of studies and conferences under the rubric of "bring-
ing the state back in" (see Skocpol 1985), leading to a
stronger consideration of the role of the state in defin-
ing state-society relations. This was an added correc-
tive to earlier, particularist studies, which emphasized
microeconomic and community or individual-actor�
based approaches. However, in both approaches cul-
ture as a political force was somehow lost. As a politi-
cal and cultural anthropologist, I am arguing for the
necessity of bringing culture back into the debate, not
as a determining force in social relations but as an
important factor in understanding the options avail-
able to political actors in the field of social relations.
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Geographic and Ethnographic
Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in
Southeast Asia
Eric Crystal
Coordinator
Center for Southeast
Asia Studies
University of California at Berkeleyl
Geographic/Ethnographic Overview
Few regions of the world present so wide a range of
natural environments and sociocultural adaptations as
does Southeast Asia. The enduring geographic and
ethnographic diversity of the region has been com-
pounded in recent decades by the forces of national-
ism, impact of ideology, intervention of external
powers, and differential pace of development in the
10 nations of the region. In brief, Southeast Asia today
provides an extraordinary range of economies, societ-
ies, cultures, and geographical regimes. Per capita
income ranges from $17,000 per year in Brunei to
$120 per year in Laos. The stability and technological
sophistication of Singapore, the newly industrialized
status of Thailand, and the burgeoning agroindustrial
base of Malaysia contrast strongly with the stark real-
ity of brutal military rule in Burma, the current
attempt at national reconciliation in Cambodia, and
the efforts to emerge from a subsistence economy in
Laos.
In the brief time allotted to me here, I wish to discuss
the past, present, and prospective dangers posed by
ethnic tensions in a region that, in the past decade, has
evidenced an average rate of economic growth (7 per-
cent) higher than any other on the globe. Although
poverty and lack of human and natural resources may
contribute to ethnic tensions, so also may the rise of a
middle class and the perception of the monopolization
of power by discrete minorities in the most economi-
cally successful of Southeast Asian states.
'The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.
Identifying Key Issues in Ethnic Relations
For purposes orthis discussion, I will focus on four
key aspects of ethnic tension in the Southeast Asian
region. The first factor relates to environmental issues
and the competition for agricultural land in highland
regions. The second factor is centered on religious
affiliation, identification, and proselytization. The
third factor focuses on tensions in the border regions
of Southeast Asia. The fourth aspect relates to vesti-
gial ideological conflicts in this region often articu-
lated in terms of ethnic interest.
Highland-Lowland Ecological Distinctions and
Ethnic Tensions
From the perspective of precolonial India and early
China, Southeast Asia was a frontier region, inhabited
by exotic races and peoples. Relatively low in popula-
tion in comparison to India and China in prehistoric as
well as more recent times, Southeast Asia yielded
valuable tribute and trade products such as aromatic
sandalwood, exotic bird of paradise feathers, and
much coveted rhinoceros horn (Hickey, 1982; 33-34).
From late neolithic times to the present, the geograph-
ical distinction between the alluvial plains and moun-
tain hinterlands tended to define interethnic relations
in the area and from the earliest articulation of state
society�perhaps in the second century AD�to the
present a sharp division between lowland and high-
land populations has obtained in Southeast Asia.
Plains dwellers adapted and refined wet-rice cultiva-
tion, producing surpluses and articulating stratified
societies well over 2,500 years ago. Early kingdoms in
Southeast Asia such as Oc-eo in Vietnam and Funan
in Cambodia further articulated the development of
culture to the level of the state. Kingdoms in the
region from Myanmar (Burma) to Cambodia soon
adopted the religion and the buttressing ideology of
Hinduism, which was brought in the wake of Hindu
trade missions to the wealthy frontier states in "the
lands below the wind" in Southeast Asia (Reid; 1988).
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In contrast to the largely homogeneous lowland irri-
gated-rice-tilling peoples, the mountain inhabitants
were fragmented into many small tribal groups. A
stability of economy and polity naturally emerges
from irrigated rice agriculture. By contrast, shifting
cultivation in the mountains normally dictated the
cyclical mobility of tribal peoples, offering as well
opportunities for new migrating groups to till South-
east Asian fields in the wake of the unyielding expan-
sion of Han populations in southern China. The
different languages, religions, socioeconomic adapta-
tions, and political loyalties of the lowlanders and
highlanders engendered tension and conflict even in
precolonial times.
Presently the frontier of the Southeast Asian mountain
hinterland seems to be in the final stages of closing.
Until three decades ago, highland slash-and-burn cul-
tivators could always count on another forest or an
additional mountain swidden field to provide subsis-
tence sustenance in the wake of the exhaustion of old
farming plots. Today, throughout Southeast Asia, pop-
ulation expansion, commercial exploitation of timber
and mineral reserves, and initiatives to conserve the
rainforest constrain�if not absolutely deny�the tra-
ditional exploitation of the highland farming environ-
ment by minority tribal peoples. In the past
lowlanders were content to conduct barter trade with
upland tribal societies, secure in the knowledge that
the only constraint on the expansion of their irrigated
plains was the lack of available labor. Today the plains
have in many areas reached their absolute carrying
capacity. For the lowland rural poor and landless
laborers, survival strategies include migration to urban
areas or colonization of upland regions that have been
the historic preserve of minority cultivators. With
each passing decade the pressure on tribal peoples to
permanently settle, abandon their claims to wide
expanses of land, and assimilate to national culture
have intensified. Government population-transfer pro-
grams lend the legitimacy of state planning to the shift
of lowland populations to the uplands. Highlander
perceptions of second-class citizenship status (if such
citizenship is recognized at all) clearly pose the threat
of conflict. The role of major powers in the highlands
of Southeast Asia in the recent past clearly deserves at
least passing mention in the context of this confer-
ence. Colonial divide-and-rule policies, perhaps
refined earlier in other parts of the world, oftentimes
were articulated by the English in Burma, the Dutch in
Indonesia, and the French in Indochina in maintaining
the social and political control of majority lowland
peoples. Highland minorities oftentimes were given
strategically crucial roles to play in colonial armed
forces. Often such tribal groups were the first to be
weaned from traditional religion by Christian mission-
aries dispatched with official sanction from the metro-
pole.
121
No discussion of ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia
could proceed without direct reference to the conflict
in Indochina. In Laos the highland-lowland geo-
graphic division took on special significance. Here the
handful of French-trained Hmong soldiers were sub-
sequently nurtured by American operatives as the core
cadre of a large, secret army based at Long Chieng
(Hamilton-Merritt; 1993). For nearly 15 years this
superbly motivated, well-armed, amply supplied, and
professionally advised force struck as guerrilla units
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, fought a rear guard
action to try to hold territory in northern Laos, and
assisted in the rescue of downed US airmen. The
"secret army" consisted of not only Hmong but also of
Mien and Lahu peoples of the high mountains of
northern Laos. In the end their loyalty was not recip-
rocated. Some 250,000 highlanders who were aban-
doned in the spring of 1975 eventually fled their
native Laos, while untold numbers fell victim to eth-
nic reprisal inside Laos. Over the past 17 years, at
least 100,000 highland Laotians who qualified as
political refugees have resettled in the United States.
In Laos, low-intensity conflict has persisted to the
present, pitting highland rebels against the central
government.
Highland-lowland geographic distinctions articulated
in conflicts over land, political control, and ideology
are amply demonstrated by the example of Laos. The
fundamental question for the future is the role that
nongovernmental organizations (NG0s), multilateral
lending agencies, and national aid programs will play
toward ameliorating these conflicts. In the past,
national intelligence agencies have oftentimes pur-
posefully aggravated extant tensions, the better to win
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the loyalty, allegiiince, and cooperation of ethnic
groups whose interests were perceived as similar
to those of the funding agency. But, as the recent
example of Afghanistan indicates, it is often easier to
inflame ethnic, religious, and tribal passions than to
control them.
Religious Tensions
Southeast Asia has generally been regarded as a
region of religious tolerance. Indonesia, the nation
with the largest Muslim population, is located here, as
are the majority of the world's Theravada Buddhists.
Major Christian communities are found here as well
not only in the Philippines but also as minorities in
almost all the nation-states of the region. In the cities,
Chinese�Southeast Asians worship at Buddhist, Con-
fucian/Taoist, and�increasingly�at Christian sanc-
tuaries. In the recent past, ethnic, religious, and
ideological conflicts have sometimes been bound as
one.
The most gruesome expression of intracommunal con-
flict since the close of the colonial era in Southeast
Asia transpired in Indonesia�largely on Java and
Bali�in the wake of an abortive Communist coup in
1965. As the Indonesian Army moved to seize power
from President Soekarno, a massive slaughter of Com-
munist and Communist-affiliated intellectuals, peas-
ants, and workers was sanctioned (Hefner, 1990:
193-215). The victims were depicted as godless trai-
tors. The executioners were largely drawn from
fanatic Muslim youth groups. The rhetoric was that of
national salvation through righteous retribution. The
reaction of the Western world to these events was gen-
erally one of unrestrained approval. In the context of
the Cold War, the destruction of the largest Commu-
nist party outside the Eastern Bloc was deemed to be a
major victory for the West. The conflict with the Com-
munists was carefully couched in religious terms in
Indonesia to generate maximum support for the new
regime.
A little noted but clearly significant element in the
Southeast Asian religious landscape is the rapid
spread of Christianity in recent years. The tradition-
ally animist highlanders across much of the region
have opted for Christian conversion as a means of
maintaining their distinct identity in the face of Bud-
dhist or Muslim lowland pressures to assimilate. As
Christianity advances, both in the mountains and also
in distinct urban and lowland mainstream communi-
ties, the potential for tension rises. Such tension may
be based on longstanding differences between the
established religion in the lowlands and the new world
religious affiliation in the highlands. Such tension may
also result from newly acquired skills in literacy,
enhanced ethnic consciousness, and strengthened
resistance in the face of perceived lowland cultural
assimilation policies.
Tensions in Malaysia and Indonesia between Muslim
majority populations and Christian minorities has led
to violence in the past and may do so in the future. In
Indonesia tensions between Christians and Muslims
have been rising, especially in light of the ongoing
advance of Christianity in remote outer island regions
and in parts of Java formerly inclined towards pre-
Hindu religious affiliation. Similarly, in Malaysia the
underlying tensions between Christian and Confucian
Chinese and Muslim Malays has erupted in significant
violence in the recent past (1969) and could certainly
do so in the future. In Vietnam largely clandestine for-
eign missionary operations are underway in many
parts of the country. These could engender internal
conflicts and ignite ethnic and nationalist passions in
ways unintended by their proponents. Highland Bur-
mese rebels, especially in Karen and Lahu regions,
have, since independence, always manipulated their
Christian affiliation as one of the several aspects of
regional independence threatened by Burmese nation-
alism as defined in Rangoon. In Thailand, the rela-
tively small highland population�about 9 percent of
the country�is increasingly constrained from practic-
ing shifting cultivation. Pressure on the land has led to
accelerated conversions among groups such as the
Karen and the Alcha in recent years. Such affiliation
may indeed strengthen the will, resolve, and capability
of formerly isolated peoples to resist incursions upon
land and culture. As the case of Burma indicates, eth-
nic conflict can result if the relations between minority
and majority communities fail to be negotiated with
tact and understanding.
Border Regions
In a region as diverse as Southeast Asia, subprovincial
district borders are often isomorphic with linguistic
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and cultural distinctions. National borders inevitably
demarcate major ethnic distinctions marked by unique
linguistic, religious, and historical traditions. Of
course there is no reason why the existence of national
distinctions as demarcated by the borders of neighbor-
ing states should necessarily induce conflict. Yet a
closer look at a few key border regions should at least
occasion cause for reflection.
Indonesia�Papua New Guinea. Indonesia, fourth-
most-populous nation on earth, presents a generally
positive example of national integration in a multieth-
nic, geographically fragmented state. Indonesian
nationalists in this century have successfully promul-
gated a national language, wrested independence from
an intransigent Dutch metropole, welded a disparate
archipelago of 5,000 inhabited islands into a coherent
national entity, and confronted and contained a host of
regional insurrections and irredentist rebellions. Nev-
ertheless, several problem regions continue to trouble
policymakers in Jakarta.
The Indonesian state extends deep into the cultural
heartland of Melanesia on the island of New Guinea.
Here a low-level transnational conflict has festered for
years. The issue is not one of border demarcation. It
relates, more specifically, to the future of the indige-
nous Melanesian population of the Indonesian prov-
ince of Irian Jaya�population, 1.6 million. This area
was not ceded to Indonesia by the Netherlands at the
transfer of sovereignty in 1949. Indeed, only after
Indonesia threatened to invade in 1962 did US pres-
sure and UN administrative machinery facilitate
Dutch withdrawal in 1963. Since that time the local
population has become increasingly marginalized in
Irian urban areas as thousands of entrepreneurial
migrants from central Indonesia have poured into the
resource-rich province. The languages and cultures of
the indigenous population are distinct from those of
central Indonesia. Rebel forces have frequently found
refuge across the border in Papua New Guinea (PNG).
Both Indonesia and the PNG national government
have worked hard to minimize border incidents. Still,
this border area could pose serious problems in the
future, problems that arise from fundamentally dis-
tinct perceptions of interest of the indigenous Irianese
population on the one hand and the government in far-
off Jakarta on the other.
A subtext on the Irian border problem is that of East
Timor. The world was shocked to learn of the Santa
Cruz cemetery massacre there in 1991. There is every
indication that during the 1975-80 period when Cam-
bodia was wracked by the autogenocidal policies of
the Khmer Rouge violations of human rights on an
equal scale were underway in Fast Timor. The armed
Timorese independence movement has been largely
quashed. The aspirations, identity, and yearning for
dignity and self-governance of the people of East
Timor clearly remain strong. Hopefully the current
international pressure being brought on Indonesia may
result in a reasonable compromise, perhaps facilitating
the establishment of the region as an autonomous area
within the Indonesian Republic. Administrative prece-
dents for such action�Aceh in northernmost Sumatra,
Yogyakarta in central Java�have worked reasonably
well. If the current military repression continues, rebel
forces there may in the future successfully regroup.
The case of East Timor is a clear example of selective
Western interest in human rights abuses (Dunn; 1983).
The Indonesian invasion of the area occurred shortly
after the fall of Saigon. Jakarta was concerned that the
leftist Fretilin independence forces would prove to be
a major security risk to the republic. Washington
assisted the Indonesian military with significant
equipment sales�OH-10 Bronco aircraft directed
specifically toward the counterinsurgency require-
ments of the Indonesian armed forces in Timor.
China-Vietnam. The China-Vietnam border wit-
nessed a major military conflict in early 1979. The
history of Vietnam is essentially that of a relatively
small country defending national territory against an
aggressive colossus to the north. The wars with France
and the United States are fundamentally subtexts on
the unique cultural and politicomilitary relationship
between China and Vietnam. Because both states are
currently ideologically consistent, ancient animosities
and contemporary trade and territorial disputes�the
Spratly and Paracel Islands�most probably will
remain muted in the near future. Chinese military
expansion and internal armament procurement are of
concern throughout Southeast Asia. This is particu-
larly true in Vietnam, where disputes over the South
China Sea islands have broken out in fierce, if abbre-
viated, conflict in the recent past.
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Cambodia-Vietnam. Cambodia remains a cause for
major concern. Once the greatest of precolonial
nation-states in Southeast Asia, the kingdom of the
Khmer has been in decline for many centuries, victim-
ized by cohesive and stronger Thai and Vietnamese
forces and by an unusually fractious elite. The enmity
expressed by Cambodians toward their Vietnamese
neighbors courses deep and is widely shared among
the populace. The Cambodians feel that Vietnam is
determined to swallow up what remains of their cul-
ture and country�much as ancient Vietnam destroyed
the coastal kingdom of Champa in 1471 (Tarling,
1992; 156). In the past Cambodian demagogues have
manipulated such sentiments to their own ends.
Anti-Vietnamese pogroms have facilitated the careers
of Lon Nol and Pol Pot; anti-Vietnamese rhetoric has
been consistently employed during the recent UN-
supervised election campaign. At present, it seems as
if the long internal nightmare of Cambodia is coming
to an end. If things go wrong, however, violence
directed against the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia
and along the Cambodian Vietnamese border could
again arise.
Laos-China. A final border area of some interest is
that which divides Laos and China. At present this
area is calm and hopefully will remain so. During the
Indochina conflict, China, the USSR, and the Pahet
Lao worked closely together. Despite the efforts of the
United States, aided by its tribal allies in the moun-
tains of Xieng Ithuang and Nam Tha in northern Laos,
Communist forces consistently advanced, supplied
overland by Chinese trucks. After 1975 Laos quickly
was drawn into Vietnam's political orbit. As a satellite
state hosting some 40,000 Vietnamese troops, Laos
after 1979 expressed the same hostility towards China
as did Vietnam. Vietnam responded by arming and
training highland rebels. Indeed, many tribal guerrillas
who formerly had fought for the United States now
rallied to a cause supported by Beijing. China's sup-
port for such movements has ceased, and currently
significant efforts are underway to develop a trade and
communications infrastructure that will link south-
west China to the sea through Laos and Vietnam.
Tribal rebels these days operate, as far as is known,
without the support of-any major government,
financed by opium sales and by fund transfers from
relatives in the United States. If the Vientiane govern-
ment demonstrates interest in assuring development
equity for the highlands, respects minority cultural
rights, and assures land title to upland farmers, the
Laos-China border area may become a new develop-
ment growth pole in the future. Failure to carefully
negotiate the mutual interests of the government in
Vientiane and minority highlands in the north could
ignite further conflict between the lowland Lao and
the Hmong, Mien, and Lao in this sensitive border
region.
Ideological Conflicts
Of the five Leninist regimes current functioning in
today's world�China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos, and
Vietnam�two are situated in Southeast Asia. What-
ever the threat of the expansion of Communism may
have been in the past, it is certainly clear that this
threat does not exist in Southeast Asia today. Laos, a
workers' state with precious few industrial workers,
generates most of its meager foreign income by sell-
ing electricity to Thailand. Overseeing the poorest,
least developed, most remote country in Southeast
Asia, the present and previous Lao administrations
have experienced considerable difficulty in governing
their highly diverse populations, much less in interfer-
ing in the affairs of other nations. Vietnam is clearly in
the process of reintegrating itself into the East Asian
economy. Vietnam is receiving considerable foreign
investment, manages its infrastructure with demon-
strable talent in the face of meager resources, and
shows every indication of an economic recovery from
the policy disasters of 15 years ago (Jamieson, 1993;
373). In sum, the end of ideology as a factor in
national conflict can clearly be perceived in Southeast
Asia today. But this situation hardly portends "the end
of history," about which so much has been written in
recent years. Indeed, it is the burden of history, and
not of ideology, which has driven the ethnic enmities,
national disputes, and international conflicts that have
beset this region during the current century.
Conclusion
Given the expanse and complexity of the Southeast
Asian geographical region it would be impossible to
recount all the past, present, and possible ethnic
distinctions, rivalries, and disputes in this region. I
have mentioned a few areas of-concern and noted that
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environmental/highland-lowland, ethnic, religious,
border area, and ideological concerns have in the past
driven the engine of ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia.
Ethnic divisions and incipient tensions exist every-
where in the world. The management of such conflicts
is part-and-parcel of the business of government and
increasingly the concern of a unipoIar international
community. In the recent past agencies representing
world powers have intentionally inflamed and exacer-
bated such tensions in the process of furthering the
short term strategic concerns of their national capitals.
The consequences of such actions are sometimes trag-
edies writ in Homeric proportions. Did such involve-
ment occur in the physical annihilation of the
Indonesian Communist Party? Did the massacres of
Vietnamese civilians living in Cambodia in 1970 at
the birth of the Khmer Republic occur in a political
and strategic vacuum in the context of the Vietnam
war? Some 70,000 tribal La9tians currently reside in
the state of California; what conundrum of political
and social policies conspired to transport so remote a
people to so alien and unfamiliar a land?
Governments have often endeavored to build national
consensus on the basis of majority ethnic loyalty and/
or justify foreign adventures on the basis of threats to
ethnic security or purity. The exacerbation of what
anthropologist Clifford Geertz has termed "primordial
sentiments" by agencies skilled at the manipulation of
media and the mobilization of mass organizations has
often unleashed forces difficult to subsequently con-
trol (Geertz, 1973; 259-269). The modern history of
Southeast Asia is rife with examples of such manipu-
lation of ethnic passions. In the wake of the Cold War,
somewhat more evenhanded concerns for human
rights are already emerging. That differences in ethnic
identity, religious affiliation, ideological persuasion,
or linguistic preference obtain in Southeast Asia is
fundamental to the local social landscape. Southeast
Asians have formed nation-states of "imagined com-
munities" on the bases of colonial entities erected on
the ruins of ancient civilizations (Anderson; 1991).
The same passions that inflamed modern European
nations 100 years ago (or that are presently at work in
the Balkans) are liable to remain potentially threaten-
ing in the relative young national entities of Southeast
Asia.
Although it would be easy to suggest that the Govern-
ment of the United States follow a strict policy of non-
involvement in overseas ethnic disputes, such is not
my view. If the United States were to be totally unin-
volved, then major rescue operations such as that
in Somalia or refugee efforts such as that on the
Thailand-Cambodia border in 1979 would have been
of no concern to the American public. Given the
uniquely threatening nature of ethnic disputes and
controversies, there is no choice but to actively moni-
tor and to intervene positively where necessary. Inter-
vention in the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic
conflict should never be justified. Intervention, as we
have seen in the recent case of Congressional action
on East Timor, can serve as a wake-up call to govern-
ments that once could cavalierly dismiss overseas
concerns about internal repression as the remonstra-
tions of the political periphery. The nature of such
positive intervention might take the form of channel-
ing foreign aid to rural regions with wide disparities in
household income or constraining trade opportunities
for governments deemed repressive and insensitive to
ethnic minority demands. Support could be provided
for indigenous NGOs equipped to mediate disputes
and negotiate issues that obtain between opposing
groups. The most important contribution developed
countries can make to the amelioration of tension
between ethnic groups is to address issues of social
inequality, which so often are the root cause of con-
flicts and clashes. If a mountain tribal people is
awarded rights to permanent agricultural land, if
schools are built for minority children and clinics are
built to address urgent health needs, and if roadways
are constructed to facilitate commerce, then the root
cause of resentment and rebellion will be effectively
addressed. Resources that once were invested in heavy
armaments might in the present circumstance best be
invested in the tasks of reducing infant mortality,
enhancing family incomes, and facilitating equity in
national development in Southeast Asia. With
resources currently at hand, the tragedies of the past
need not necessarily serve as prologue for the future.
Understanding the past role of intelligence agencies in
directly influencing the ethnic conflicts during the
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Cold War will undoubtedly be of some help in formu-
lating future policies and plans. Until recently, access
to sensitive records on such subjects was extremely
restricted. Next year information on developments
over the past 30 years in Indochina and Indonesia
should be much more readily available. A clear vision
of the future will most probably be enhanced by an
objective and unbiased understanding of the recent
past. Perhaps before long we shall learn much more
about the role of foreign intelligence agencies in the
generation of clandestine tribal armies in northern
Laos, in the overthrow of the Cambodian monarchy in
1970, and in the assumption of power of a Western-
oriented military regime in Indonesia. As events have
often proven, the short run triumphs of political tacti-
cians can sometimes result in the ruin of long-term
strategic plans (i.e. Iran). Scholarly investigation of
the past may prove to be of more than passing utility
in charting the future.
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References
Anderson, Benedict 1991. Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,
Verso Press, New York.
Dunn, James 1993. Timor: A People Betrayed, Jacar-
anda Press, N.S.W., Australia.
Geertz, Clifford 1973. The Interpretation of Culture
Basic Books, New York.
Hamilton-Merritt Jane 1993. Tragic Mountains, Uni-
versity of Indiana Press, Bloomington.
Hefner, Robert 1990. The Political Economy of Moun-
tain Java, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Hickey, Gerald 1982. Sons of the Mountains, Yale
University Press, New Haven.
Jamieson, Neil 1993. Understanding Vietnam, Univer-
sity of California Press, Berkeley.
Reid, Anthony 1988. Southeast Asia in the Age of
Commerce, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Tarling, Nicholas The Cambridge History of Southeast
Asia, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge and New York.
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Summary of Discussion
General Discussion
DR. WDCMAN: I would like to make two comments.
First, I think that we need to keep in mind that our
analysis is colored by our own Anglo-American or
Western ethnic perspective and that it affects the way
in which we perceive the rest of the world geopoliti-
cally. Second, with regard to the hierarchical context
that Dr. Gladney discussed, I think one has to recog-
nize that context is key to our understanding on the
international and political level as well. When people
ask someone if they are Uzbek, the answer is yes.
When they ask them if they are Central Asian, the�
answer is yes. When they ask them if they are Muslim,
the answer is yes. It all depends on the set of-circum-
stances, the context. In one case, these groups will
fight each other; and in another, they will fight
together against the "outsider." I think one of the
problems in making foreign policy is that often we
focus on the local level and miss the bigger picture.
One issue that we need to take into account when
making foreign policy is that, although two groups
may hate each other, if we get involved, they may be
drawn together against us.
DR. GLADNEY: Yes, the old proverb that I referred
to earlier, "You and I against each other, you and me
against my brother, my brother and I against our cous-
ins, our cousins and I against you," articulates such a
hierarchy. I am very uncomfortable with this whole
discourse on tribalism. The notion of the tribe was
basically refuted 60 years ago. Now, suddenly, it is
back. A simplistic interpretation of the notion can lead
to misunderstanding. For example, many assume that
the Soviet Union somehow held back these ethnic ten-
sions, and now, with the Soviets out, these tensions
have bubbled to the surface. In fact, in many cases�
such as the Tajik versus the Uzbek or the Uzbek ver-
sus the Uighur�the Soviets created the divisions and
ethnic conflicts between groups who are essentially
very similar peoples. Scholars and analysts need to
look at the historical processes and historical contin-
gencies. As anthropologists, we are always looking in
terms of context-1�when, where, why, and how�and
are not drawing these broad generalities.
QUESTION: Would you comment on the issues of the
potential for the rise of Southern Chinese nationalism?
DR. GLADNEY: There is the potential for an enor-
mous shift of focus in terms of our understanding of
China as Hong Kong becomes the issue of the late
1990s. I am not saying Cantonese separatism is going
to pull China apart, but I am saying that a strong feel-
ing of difference exists in the south, and the politics of
difference are becoming very important for China's
domestic future. We have tended to focus on border
minorities, yet, when I travel in China, I find that the
Chinese are not worried about the Tibetans or
Uighur�they are concerned that the Cantonese are
getting rich and that they can buy their country three
times over, and they are worried about those people
who are poor and who keep coming into our city tak-
ing all their jobs�this whole issue of floating popula-
tion. The government can no longer say, "Hey, keep
these differences at bay because we have the Soviets,
the Americans, or the Japanese to worry about." I pre-
dict that these local level conflicts will become more
important.
QUESTION: I'm puzzled by two seemingly contra-
dictory trends in China. One is an increased economy
and international trade, which appears to imply peace-
ful pursuits, and the other is an increased military,
including substantial offensive capabilities. How do
these fit together?
DR. GLADNEY: It is a very complex situation, and, in
my opinion, the whole issue has to be framed in terms
of this post�Cold War society. China no longer sees
itself in opposition to the Soviets. It is interested much
more in microlevel issues. The economic aspects of
this drive a lot of these issues, particularly China's rela-
tionship with the Middle Fast in terms of exporting
military hardware. But I think also the issue is a feeling
of internal insecurity. During the Tiananmen Square
incident, there was a rumor that the military was not
obeying the leadership's orders to crack down on pro-
testers. Since then, and I referred to this in my paper,
the government has reorganized the military, fired gen-
erals, and tried to put more loyal people in their places.
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However, many of them have regional loyalties that
Beijing can no longer trust. The economic discrepan-
cies between the south and east, on the one hand, and
the north and west, on the other, are extraordinary. You
have the Fourth World and First World side by side in
one country. The people in the south are becoming
very tired of carrying the north. I think Hong Kong
may be an issue. I think, in some ways, a military
buildup may be also for domestic concerns. I do not
think people have focused on that issue.
COMMENT: Dr. Crystal, when you spoke of Cambo-
dia, you focused mostly on the anti�Vietnamese senti-
ment. What are your thoughts on the country's other
ethnic problems?
DR. CRYSTAL: The animosity toward the Vietnam-
ese remains the most significant source of ethnic ten-
sion. Hopefully, this tortured land will have some time
to reconstitute its policy. The Vietnamese have with-
drawn, the United States seems to have played a
benign role during this recent election, and the UN
peacekeeping force was a success�despite the pre-
diction of most everyone. Hopefully, we can look for-
ward to a time when these inflamed ethnic passions
will subside.
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Evolving Ethnicity in South Asia
With Particular Reference to India
Joseph E. Schwartzberg
Professor of Geography
University of Minnesota
Introduction
The following survey of evolving South Asian ethnic-
ity generally supports the position of Paul Brass
(1991, p. 8), who asserts that:
. .. ethnicity and nationalism are not 'givens' but are
social and political constructions. They are creations
of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fab-
ricate materials from the cultures of the groups they
wish to represent in order to protect their well-being
or existence or to gain political and economic advan-
tage for their groups, as well as for themselves.
[Further] ethnicity and nationalism are modern phe-
nomena inseparably connected with the modern cen-
tralizing state.
I would attach more importance than Brass does, how-
ever, to the so-called primordial loyalties that inhere
in one's birth. While these may not be immutable giv-
ens, they do represent a reservoir of cultural identifiers
from which elites can draw as they assess specific
political situations and make a calculus of the costs
and benefits of seeking to elicit particular types of
support. Among these identifiers are caste, religion,
sect (which may be locally important, but which I can-
not explore in this brief paper), language, dialect (also
not discussed), and regional loyalty. Birth within a
particular group does matter. Cultural norms may be
plastic, but they are not putty, to be molded at will.
They are potent and they tend to endure. Hence, politi-
cians can go only so far in reshaping ethnic identities.
I would also stress more than Brass and other political
commentators do the importance of geographic are-
nas. I repeatedly refer in this paper to changes in polit-
ical boundaries and show that the political actors
thrown together within the administrative limits of
any newly reconfigured country or state adjust their
ethnic agendas accordingly. They base them not only
on their own social and economic interests seen in iso-
lation but also on their perceptions of the interests of
others in the same arena with whom they must com-
pete for limited political assets. Ethnic groups have
sought to advance their interests by a wide variety of
means. These include the formation and support of
political parties and other organizations; selective sup-
port for nonethnic political parties and sympathetic
candidates; discriminatory legislation when an ethnic
group controls the government at a particular level;
and, when the group is out of power, propaganda,
strikes, demonstrations, economic boycotts, and so
forth. Groups may also deliberately resort to the use of
force, even to the point of large-scale insurrection.
More often, however, violence occurs when confron-
tations with other groups or with the government get
out of control. Violence has, in fact, at times marked
virtually every type of ethnic movement discussed in
this paper and has repeatedly affected every major
region and virtually every state of India, as well as the
other countries of South Asia (figure 9).
The Government of India has responded to the politi-
cal demands of ethnic groups in ways no less varied
than those used by the groups themselves. On numer-
ous occasions, as in regard to state reorganization and
the demand for quotas, it has bowed to organized pub-
lic pressures. At the other extreme, it has often
resorted to the use of substantial force, especially in
dealing with secessionist movements in its border
regions, whether they be of tribals in the northeast or
Sikhs or 1Cashmiris in the northwest. Between these
extremes, numerous options existed. At times the gov-
ernment successfully co-opted the leadership of spe-
cific groups, made expedient compromises with them,
or acquiesced in their control over local polities, pro-
vided they did not transcend certain limits. Alterna-
tively, the central government has used its substantial
control over fiscal resources and other economic
levers to gain favor or punish dissent; it has also inter-
fered in numerous ways in local politics�a cause of
particular alienation in the case of Kashmir�declar-
ing certain groups and activities illegal, jailing dissi-
dents, and frequently suspending the elected
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Figure 9
Ethnic Violence in India, 1972-1990
Months of Ethnic Violence
as a Percentage of
Total Number of Months
Percent
35
20
.
0 ..41
--- State or union territory boundary
736075 6-95
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legislative assembly and imposing President's or Gov-
ernor's Rule.
The potential for serious and enduring damage to
existing polities from ethnically rooted violence, both
intranationally and internationally, is great and
appears to be increasing. From 1972 to 1980, India
experienced serious ethnic violence in 67 percent of
all months, and South Asia as a whole experienced
such violence in 95 percent of all months. For the
period 1981 to 1990, the figures rose to 94 percent and
100 percent for India and South Asia, respectively.
From an ethnic perspective, South Asia is arguably the
most complex and one of the most turbulent regions of
our planet. Its political map is far from frozen. One
may safely anticipate a number of changes in the fore-
seeable future, many of which will be driven by agen-
das of specific ethnic groups. Whatever these changes
may be, they will, in turn, surely give rise to new
manipulations of ethnic identities to suit the needs of
new situations.
This presentation considers the various historical pro-
cesses that have shaped ethnic identities in South
Asia, concentrating, because of limitations of time and
space, on India and on the postindependence period. It
also discusses specific bases for establishing ethnic
identities and the periods, situations, and locales in
which they assumed importance. It also notes the
means by which ethnic groups seek to advance their
interests and by which governments respond to such
efforts. I shall not, however, strive for completeness�
the topic is simply too vast. Omitted from consider-
ation here is any discussion of ethnic relations in
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Even for India, I
shall do no more than touch lightly on the two most
troublesome contemporary ethnic problems: the Sikh
struggle for an independent Khalistan and the com-
plex struggle in Kashmir being waged simultaneously
by forces seeking independence, on the one hand, or
merger with Pakistan on the other. Virtually all the
empirical data that I shall be presenting are drawn
from the updated 1992 edition of the Historical Atlas
of South Asia, which synthesizes information from a
multitude of sources, only a small part of which are
noted in the bibliography accompanying this paper.
Although the interpretations of those data are my own,
I doubt that any are wholly original.
Processes of Ethnic Identity Formulation
Birth into a particular group still matters far more in
South Asia than it does in areas of other major civili-
zations. One is expected to be "true to one's salt";
one's essence and traditions are all determined by
birth.
Jati, which generally connotes caste, translates liter-
ally as birth. One is born into a particular caste in
accordance with one's karma�the net merit or
demerit of actions performed in previous existences. If
one properly follows in the present life the forms of
behavior appropriate to caste status, one may aspire to
rebirth in a higher caste. This axiomatic belief forms
the essence of Hindu dhartna, which may be trans-
lated either as duty or religion. These observations are
made with specific reference to Hinduism but are
equally applicable to Buddhism and Jainism. The
behavioral norms on which they are based have
strongly influenced communities of other coexisting
faiths of South Asia as well, even Muslims, for whom
the very notion of caste is theoretically anathema. For
example, few Indian Muslims, before the creation of
Pakistan, would have hesitated to identify the social
group to which they belonged by a name that would
conjure up in the minds of their non-Muslim neigh-
bors a particular caste-defined set of roles and a spe-
cific genre de vie.
For most South Asians and for most of the region's
history, caste was the principal referent of one's place
in society. The vast majority of the population lived in
villages in which their appropriate social and eco-
nomic roles were rooted primarily in caste. Social and
intellectual horizons in such a setting were typically
very limited, and political action, such as it was, was
generally confined to a narrow spatial arena. Affairs of
state were the domain of small classes of elite.
Although the encompassing sacred realm of Bharat, or
India, found a place in the consciousness of Hindus,
communal activities at an all-India level were nonex-
istent. At a regional level, devotion to the cult of a par-
ticular deity or to a saintly figure and participation in
major fairs and pilgrimages did provide some feeling
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of community, but the sensed bonds of religion, I
would argue, were generally weaker, at least among
Hindus, than were those of caste.
The unification of India under ,the British and the
accelerating expansion, thereafter, of the transporta-
tion and communications network, literacy, the press,
and notions of democratic governance brought about a
number of important changes in the way that people
saw themselves and in their patterns of interaction.
While identification with and loyalty to one's caste
remained important, other social attributes became
increasingly salient as wider arenas of economic and
political interaction were established. New, more-or-
less Westernized commercial and bureaucratic elites
came into being. Although they were mainly Hindu,
these new elites drew also froth other religious com-
munities and from many linguistic regions. In some
situations, especially after the creation of the Indian
National Congress in 1885, they formed the nucleus
for an emerging PanIndian, nontraditional, national-
ism. In other contexts, however, socially and cultur-
ally defined groups vied with one another for privilege
and power. Thus, in addition to their caste and reli-
gious identities, many Indians became increasingly
aware of regional attachments that were previously
only dimly sensed within areas dominated by a partic-
ular language or dialect. The range of politically rele-
vant primordial loyalties�those that form the basis
for what we now recognize as ethnicity�was
expanded accordingly. In a sense, then, we may say
that one's identity�or jati�today means much more
than caste alone.
The British rulers recognized the latent potential for
disunity inherent in the social and cultural complexity
of the subcontinent, and they responded fitfully and
often grudgingly to Indian demands for greater control
over their own destinies. In each of a series of major
constitutional reforms, such as the Indian Councils
Act of 1909 and the Governmeht of India Acts of
1919 and 1935, they acknowledged the claims of spe-
cific minorities to separate electorates to guarantee
some semblance of fair representation in the evolving
legislative apparatus. At first only the Muslim popula-
tion was accorded special recognition. Subsequently,
concomitant with an expanding franchise, elected
seats were reserved also for Sikhs, Indian Christians,
Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Scheduled Castes as
well as for such special interests as Indian commerce
and industry, European commerce, landholders, labor,
and even women. Whether the course adopted was an
attempt to gradually establish a liberal representative
democracy or a cynical policy of "divide and con-
quer" depends on whose version of history one
chooses to believe. In any event, a policy of recogniz-
ing the en bloc claims of particular constituencies to a
share of the political pie was set firmly in place,
thereby reinforcing ethnic sensitivities.
The establishment of quotas remains a part of the
political modus operandi to this day, although the
rules for fixing quotas varied from one context to
another. Some quotas are in strict proportion to popu-
lation. Depressed groups�officially designated
"Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes"�are
guaranteed certain numbers of seats in national and
state legislatures, of positions in various lower and
middle levels of government employment, and of
acceptances to institutions of higher education. Rules
of this type are institutionalized in the Constitutions of
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Other informal quo-
tas for places on party tickets, for participation in state
and provincial ministries, or for a share of the eco-
nomic largess over which certain agencies of govern-
ment have control, are more flexible and situation-
specific. These informal quotas are often determined
by deals made by party bosses in response to promises
of support or various pressures by specific groups.
Institutionalized religious quotas are presently
unthinkable within the secular democracy of India, but
the Muslim voting bloc�roughly one-ninth of the
total Indian electorate and much more than that in sev-
eral regions�retains an informal claim to a share of
power. In Pakistan the small Ahmadiya sect, which
the Constitution has declared to be outside the pale of
Islam, has been allotted reserved seats in both the
national and provincial legislatures, as have other
minorities and women.
133
Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been
fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups,
some ascending and others descending in the local
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social hierarchy,, has been abundantly documented. So
too has been the frequent creation of new groups
through fission of older ones and the less common
amalgamation or fusion of-groups when that suited a
particular purpose. While these processes have oper-
ated since ancient times, the pace of change has accel-
erated greatly over the past century. Many new forms
of identity have been socially, and often deliberately,
constructed in response to the evolving corporate
agendas of would-be players on the political stage.
The institutionalization of-democracy and the atten-
dant politicization of more and more previously inert
groups underlie these changes. Clever politicians have
recognized that "pushing the right buttons" to elicit
some sort of ethnically rooted response�whether
based on religion, language, caste, tribal affiliation, or
regional sentiment�was the most efficacious way of--
attracting a following and attaining power. Temporary
alliances of convenience with others playing the same
game were often established. This strategy was espe-
cially common in regions where few persons held
deep ideological convictions.
Types of Ethnic Identity in the 20th Century
Emergent Nationalism
Two political parties acted as the vehicle for the
expression of emergent Nationalism during the pre-
independence period. The creation of the Indian
National Congress in 1885 was an outcome of a newly
nascent Indian nationalism. The Congress quickly
became the principal Pan-Indian vehicle for the free-
dom struggle. When the Muslim League came into
being in 1906, however, it embarked on a more paro-
chial course. It set its agenda as much by its percep-
tions of the likely effects of Congress activities on the
welfare of India's Muslim community as on its views
of the British raj. Not surprisingly, the League vacil-
lated between periods of cooperation with the Con-
gress and periods of fierce opposition to it. As powers
were devolved toward the provinces, the importance
of success in electoral contests gradually widened the
rift between the, two parties. Yet it was not until 1940
that the die was irrevocably cast in favor of establish-
ing a separate state for India's Muslim community.
The requisite ethnic rationale invented for that state
was Muhammad Ali Jinnah's "two-nation" theory. It
was the idea that India's population consisted essen-
tially of a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation whose
core identities and goals were so fundamentally differ-
ent that there was no hope that they could coexist
within a single independent state without serious
adverse consequences for the Muslim minority. In
1947, Jinnah's dream of-an independent Pakistan was
fulfilled. At the same time, the Congress dream of a
secular, all-embracing Indian nation was shattered.
Partition and the massive population transfers that fol-
lowed still left roughly a third of South Asia's Mus-
lims in India; this concentration continues to provide a
basis for ethnic tensions. The more than 100 million
Muslims in India today constitute by far the world's
largest ethnic minority. Few parts of the country are
without a significant Muslim presence. Within the
Indian-held portion of the disputed state of Jammu
and Kashmir, Muslims form a substantial majority.
The dispute over Kashmir has been the cause of two
wars between India and Pakistan, and the area also fig-
ured prominently in the war that led to the indepen-
dence of Bangladesh. Within Kashmir a bitter
multisided insurrection is now in progress as some
separatists seek an independent state and others union
with Pakistan. Sustained Indo-Pakistani enmity peri-
odically makes life precarious for India's Muslims
despite the country's constitutional commitment to a
secular state with religious liberty for all.
Muslims, of course, are not the only significant reli-
gious minority in India. Five of India's 25 states have
Sikh, Christian, or animistic majorities (figure 10),
and, with the exception of the mainly tribal state of
Arunachal Pradesh in the far northeast, all have been
scenes of bitter ethnic struggles in the postindepen-
dence period. The most intense of these struggles is
that of Punjab's Sikhs for an independent Khalistan,
waged intermittently since 1981. The present period is
one of relative quiescence, but the problem remains
unresolved. I shall defer till later discussion of the eth-
nic struggles of several tribal regions.
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Figure 10
Distribution of Non-Hindus in India, 1981
1
34
42
��;
14
33
Leading Religion in Area
of Non-Hindu Majority
AN
BUDDHIST
CHRISTIAN
MUSLIM
SIKH
Areas in which non- -
Hindus comprise
25-50% of population
State or union territory boundary e,
40
Figures in each state or union territory indicate T
non-Hindu proportion of total population as of 1981
736076 6-95
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Linguistic Affiliation as an Organizing Principle
Language, formerly of relatively little political impor-
tance, has since 1947 emerged as a potent political
force in Hindu-majority areas despite the lingering
role of religion as an aspect of ethnicity in postparti-
tion. As a matter of organizational convenience, the
Congress Party, beginning with Bihar in 1908, began
to organize itself into linguistic provinces, even
though most of the provinces of British India and sev-
eral of the larger princely states were multilingual
entities. It was not until 1920, however, that the Con-
gress Party established linguistic units throughout
British India and made the creation of linguistic
administrative provinces a plank in its platform for
political reform. As Congress saw it, the arbitrariness
of the political map that resulted from the unplanned
history of British territorial acquisition in India was an
affront to the natural aspirations of-India's major lin-
guistic groups. In any event, the call for linguistic
provinces was overshadowed as an issue by the more
inclusive agenda of Gandhi's noncooperation move-
ment. Conceivably, an unstated motive in the Con-
gress Party's call for linguistic provinces was to divert
popular attention away from communally based poli-
tics.
The first postindependence demand for a linguistic
state came from Telugu speakers, the largest among
several major minorities in the then Tamil-dominated
state of Madras. The demands persisted, and Congress
conceded by establishing the new Telugu-speaking
state of Andhra in 1954. This opened the floodgates to
calls for additional states based on linguistic criteria.
The government then established a States Reorganiza-
tion Commission to study the problem, and ultimately
the States Reorganization Act of 1956 led to a radical
redrawing of the political map. The 1956 Act, how-
ever, failed to divide the essentially bilingual state of
Bombay and the putatively bilingual state of Punjab.
These intentional departures from the new linguistic
state norms were short lived. Bombay was partitioned
in 1960 to form the Marathi-speaking state of-Maha-
rashtra and the Gujarati-speaking state of Gujarat. In
1966, Punjab was also partitioned, allegedly on a lin-
guistic basis, but in actuality on communal grounds;
when the government acceded to the Sikh demands
for a reconfigured Punjab, the reduced area of-the new
state was one in which Sikhs became an absolute
majority. Figure 11 reveals the extensive changes
wrought by linguistic reorganization over the period
1951-72.
The government's conciliatory attitude in regard to
linguistic reorganization did not mollify linguistic
groups sufficiently to guarantee their loyalty to the
Union government. Within Madras, in particular, a
demand arose for an independent Dravidian nation�
sometimes dubbed "Dravidistan"�to comprise the
four new linguistic states in which Dravidian lan-
guages were spoken. As matters transpired, the three
other Dravidian states of South India showed rela-
tively little enthusiasm for a Tamil-led Dravidian
nation, and the movement lost its momentum. But one
lasting outcome was the rise to power of the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a Tamilian ethnic party
established in 1949. Alone or at the head of-a multi-
party coalition, the DMK has ruled Madras, or Tamil
Nadu as it was renamed in 1969, for all but six years
since it first came to power in 1967. Arguably, the pru-
dent willingness of the Congress Party to allow ethni-
cally minded Tamil politicians to enjoy the rewards of
power did as much as the lack of separatist ardor in
neighboring Dravidian states to blunt secessionist
demands. Had the movement succeeded, it would
almost certainly have led to the Balkanization of
India.
Demands for reorganizing the political map of inde-
pendent India were not all rooted in linguistic con-
sciousness. Several newly created linguistic states
contained regions that lagged notably behind others in
levels of economic and social development. As a rule,
areas that had formed a part of British India were gen-
erally more advanced than those previously ruled by
the less progressive princes, such-as the Nizam of
Hyderabad. Regions lagging behind the political core
areas of the states to which they were joined soon
sensed that the state was not doing enough to rectify
the ill-effects of past neglect. This, in turn, led to sev-
eral demands for separation, fueled by local politi-
cians who sought to harness local discontent as the
vehicle for furthering their own political ambitions. To
what extent those politicians and their followers were
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Figure 11
Linguistic Minorities in India
99ZEZ1.000 1.0/90/91.0z :aseaia JOI peAaiddV
-
Linguistic Minorities as a
Percentage of State or
Union Territory Population
.iii
II
..
ti
%
vr"
Percent
90
50
25
10
0
Uncensured Areas and Sikkim
State or union territory boundary
1972
%
736077 6-95
99ZEZ1.000 1.0/90/91.0Z :aseaia JOI pancuddV
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able to construct a regional sense of ethnicity cannot
readily be determined, but none of these attempts to
achieve a separate state succeeded.
Another outcome of states reorganization was the
escalation of what have been called "nativistic" move-
ments. In such movements the dominant linguistic
group of a particular state, styling themselves as "sons
of the soil," sought, by a combination of legal mea-
sures, intimidation, and violence, to limit the opportu-
nities of immigrant groups from other states�and
sometimes of indigenous Muslims as well�and, in
some instances, to create legal obstacles to their settle-
ment. The strongest of these movements were in
Assam and Maharashtra.
Tribal and Caste-Based Ethnicity
A number of tribal groups who aspired either to state-
hood within the Indian union or to full independence
were disregarded in the initial phase of the linguistic
reorganization. In the mineral-rich Chhota Nagpur, in
the northeast of peninsular India, tribals had estab-
lished a forerunner of the present-day Jharkhand Party
as early as 1939. The party has campaigned intermit-
tently for a tribal state since the parliamentary elec-
tions of 1957. Other groups, most notably the Nagas
and later the Mizos along India's northeastern borders,
resorted to armed rebellion. Many among these fron-
tier tribals were Christians, almost all spoke languages
unrelated to the major languages of the states in which
they lived, and very few had reason to fuel a deep
sense of loyalty to India. Their struggles were at times
abetted by foreign Christian groups as well as by Pald-
stan and China, all of which provided them with moral
and/or material support.
The Indian Government's attitude in dealing with
tribal demands was generally less conciliatory than it
was in respect to other ethnic groups. Ultimately,
however, through a combination of military suppres-
sion, co-optation of compliant leaders, and other tac-
tics, accommodations were reached with elements of
each of the rebellious frontier groups, and many new,
tribally dominated administrative units�either union
territories or fullfledged states�were established. The
much more numerous, but also more pacific, tribal
groups, however, continue to find their political aspi-
rations frustrated.
The role of caste in the postindependence period has
changed considerably. In the past, power at the local
level was typically shared by the dominant landhold-
ing group and the ritually supreme Brahmans. Each
group legitimized the role of the other in its appropri-
ate sphere. With the coming of democracy, however,
numbers, rather than ritual ascendancy or other claims
to elite status, became increasingly important determi-
nants of power. Throughout India, at all levels of gov-
ernment and across the political spectrum, parties
appealed to particular types of caste constituencies to
gain support. Local magnates�believed to control
large "vote banks" of their caste followers�offered
their support to specific parties in return for a place on
the ballot. Single castes rarely composed an absolute
majority of the electorate; alliances among various
caste groups were therefore common.
Anti-Brahmanism had become a potent political force
in some regions even in the preindependence period.
The appeal of Charan Singh to a wide spectrum of
middle-level peasant castes over much of the Hindi-
speaking area of India was a key factor in catapulting
the Janata Party to power in 1978, following the
period of emergency rule initiated by Indira Gandhi in
1975. The desire for empowerment among middle-
level groups found expression during the period of
Janata rule in the creation of the Mandal Commission,
which drew up a report in 1982 suggesting a new set
of quotas for the numerically strong so-called Other
Backward Castes (OBCs) similar to those that the
Constitution already guaranteed to Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. Although the Janata Party did
not remain in power long enough to implement the
provisions of the Commission's report, the decision to
do so by a new National Front government in 1990
touched off a wave of violent protest over large parts
of India and contributed to the government's collapse
shortly thereafter.
Below the OBCs in India's social hierarchy are the
Scheduled Castes, formerly untouchables, who com-
pose roughly a sixth of the nation's total population.
Their struggle for equality before the law and for
humane treatment by traditionally superior groups has
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been a difficult one, reminiscent in many ways of the
American civil rights movement in respect to blacks.
In some parts of India, especially Bihar, the peas-
antry�for whom the Scheduled Castes mainly work
as landless laborers�have responded with incredible
brutality to attempts by Scheduled Castes to better
their lot. In other areas, most notably Maharashtra,
large numbers of the group have adopted a new ethnic
identity by conversion to Buddhism, employing a
social dynamic comparable to that of the Black Mus-
lim movement among blacks in America. Other Hari-
jans have been converting to Islam.
Hindu Nationalism
Hindu ethnicity sank roots even before the turn of the
present century. Within the Congress Party there
emerged the powerful conservative voice of a Marathi
Brahman, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who perceived in the
increasing Westernization of India's elite the seeds of
the destruction of Hindu culture. He sought, some-
times violently, to oppose the British presence. No
less conservative in some respects, but far more toler-
ant of non-Hindu perspectives, was Mohandas Gan-
dhi. Gandhi's commitment to nonviolence and his
fruitful collaboration with the liberal and secular-
minded Jawaharlal Nehru lessened the following for
Tilak's brand of Hindu nationalism for decades but
could hardly extinguish its appeal. Even before Tilak's
death in 1920, Hindu nationalism was institutionalized
in various guises, beginning with the Hindu Mahas-
abha, founded in 1907 in part as a reaction to the cre-
ation of the Muslim League. Although never posing a
serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was
particularly influential in the period before and just
after partition in fomenting anti-Muslim activities and
in giving credibility to Jinnalis aforementioned two-
nation theory. Also noteworthy is the militant and fas-
cistic Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Vol-
unteer Association), one of whose members
assassinated Gandhi in 1948. Founded in 1925, it
remains a potent force, especially in Maharashtra, the
region of its inception.
Despite their high visibility and local prominence, no
Hindu nationalist party in the postindependence
period even came close to gaining control over any
state legislature, not to mention Parliament, until
1990. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, however, gained
heightened respectability by being admitted into the
hodgepodge anti-Congress Janata coalition that swept
to power in 1977. The period 1990-91 witnessed a
dramatic rise in the strength of the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), successor to the Jan Sangh. This was
especially marked in India's conservative Hindi heart-
land.
Some observers of the Indian political scene anticipate
that the BM' will be able to form the next government,
either alone or at the head of a new anti-Congress coa-
lition. The changed fortunes of the Hindu nationalists
may be attributed to a variety of factors. Among them
are the termination of the Nehru family dynasty, the
decline in public confidence in the long-ruling and
increasingly corrupt and scandal-ridden Congress
Party, and the failure of any other ideologically based
party to win the allegiance of a major segment of dis-
enchanted Congress supporters. No less important has
been the BJP's ability to project the sense that it stands
for the true India. It appeals mainly to the landed,
albeit nonelite, segments of the rural population and to
the lower middle class of the urban population. Nei-
ther of these groups has previously enjoyed a large
share of political power over any sustained period.
Implicit in the appeal of the BJP is a certain rejection
of Western influences, along with a generous dose of
anti-Islamic sentiment vis-a-vis both Pakistan's and
India's own Muslim population.
The BJP's cynical exploitation of popular Hindu emo-
tional sentiment in regard to the controversial destruc-
tion of a 16th-century mosque allegedly built over the
site of Lord Rama's birth put the BJP at the center of
public attention and was instrumental in bringing on
the most serious wave of Hindu-Muslim communal
violence since the period of partition. This led to the
dismissal of BJP ministries in four states in December
1992 and their replacement by President's Rule. (This
is shown on figure 12.) Some commentators argue that
the BJP leadership is more representative of the true
India than was the Congress Party�as well as less
corrupt�and anticipate that, once in power, the party
will act with a considerable degree of responsibility
and will restore stability to the nation. I am inclined to
doubt that assessment.
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Figure 12
Proportion of India's Population in States Governed by Ethnic Parties, 1965-1993
Percent
40
35-
30-
25-
20-
11)-
5--
0
1966
For purposes of this graph, regional parties are considered as ethnic and the
Union Territories of Delhi, Goa, Pondicherry, etc., are treated as States.
The number of States or Union Territories governed by ethnic parties
is noted for each year.
Figures for each year are as of the month of March.
65
3
3 2 5
IIII I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993
349178 6-95
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Postscript
In legislative assembly elections held in November
1993, the BJP suffered dramatic losses in three of five
states in which it was formerly the ruling party,
including Uttar Predesh, India's most populous state.
On the other hand, it bettered its formerly dominant
position in Rajasthan and won a smashing victory in
Delhi. To a considerable extent, BJP losses were
reflected in Congress gains. Whether, as some observ-
ers suggest, the 1993 elections signal that the BJP tide
has crested and begun to fall remains to be seen.
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science together with critical commentary.
David, Kenneth, ed., The New Wind: Changing Identi-
ties in South Asia. The Hague and Paris: Mouton Pub-
lishers, 1977. The 17 papers in this anthology, all by
anthropologists (including 10 from South Asia itself)
are mainly theoretical and deal with identities in con-
texts that, although generally not ethnic, nevertheless
will provide numerous insights applicable to the study
of ethnicity.
Gleason, Henry Allan, Jr. Religious Communities in
the Indias. Fancy Gap, Virginia: 1946. An empirical
study marked by historical depth and exceptionally
detailed maps of individual religious groups in many
regions of South and Southeast Asia.
Grierson, Sir George Abraham. Linguistic Survey of
India. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967-68. 11 vols.
[1st ed. Calcutta: Office of the Superintendant of Gov-
ernment Printing, 1903-221 Despite its early date and
its largely technical nature, this pioneering and monu-
mental study retains remarkable utility.
Harrison, Selig S. India: The Most Dangerous
Decades. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1960. A penetrating and prescient look at the
political dynamics of the early period of Indian inde-
pendence, focusing, inter alia on regional elites, caste
lobbies, and various ethnically based stresses.
Kothari, Rajni, ed., Caste in Indian Politics. New
Delhi: Orient Longman, Ltd., 1970. Includes nine case
studies of caste movements and of-the involvement of
castes in specific political contexts from a wide vari-
ety of regional contexts.
Mahar, J. Michael, ed., The Untouchables in Contem-
porary India. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona
Press, 1972. An excellent anthology providing a
diversity of views and empirical studies relating to the
formerly untouchable castes of India.
Maloney, Clarence. Peoples of South Asia. New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974. Written as a
textbook, this work provides a very balanced, easy to
comprehend overview of the many factors that con-
tribute to South Asian identities.
Mandelbaum, David G. Society in India. vol. I, Conti-
nuity and Change and vol. 2, Change and Continuity.
Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1970. This work covers much the same ground as that
of Maloney but in greater depth and with more
emphasis on changes over time.
Raza, Moonis and Ahmad, Aijazudduin. An Atlas of
Tribal India, With Computed Tables of District Level
Data and Its Geographical Interpretation. New Delhi:
Concept Publishing Company, 1990. Mapping of data
on tribal population from the 1961 and 1971 censuses
of India, throwing much light on the distribution and
social and economic status of tribal populations.
Risley, Sir Herbert Hope. The People of India. 2nd
edition, ed. by W. Crooke. Delhi: Oriental Books
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References (continued)
Reprint Corporation, 1969. (Original edition, Cal-
cutta: Thacker, Spink, 1915). Although its anthropo-
metrically based views on Indian races are antiquated,
its maps of caste distributions and discussion of how
castes are regarded, often stereotypically, by Indians
themselves are useful.
Schermerhorn, R. A. Ethnic Plurality in India. Tuc-
son, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1978.
Focuses on 10 minorities: Scheduled Castes, Sched-
uled Tribes, seven religious minorities, and Chinese,
with emphases on identity formation and group mobil-
ity.
Schwartzberg, Joseph E. "The Distribution of
Selected Castes in the North Indian Plain," The Geo-
graphical Review. vol. 55, no., 4, 1965, pp. 477-95
plus a large folded insert. Based on extensive field
research, this work employs a combination of maps
and graphs to indicate, at various scales, how castes
are distributed over a large part of northern India.
Schwartzberg, Joseph E., ed., A Historical Atlas of
South Asia. New York: Oxfora University Press,
1992; updated edition (1st edition, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1978.) Maps Indian perceptions of
their own geography at various periods, beginning in
Vedic times. For the modern period, maps show the
distribution of religions, sects, languages, dialects,
and castes based on various censuses from 1872 to
1961. Maps, graphs, and discusses ethnically related
disturbances throughout the past century, but particu-
larly in the postindependence period.
Singer, Milton and Bernard S. Cohn, Structure and
Change in Indian Society. Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Co., 1968. (Also published through Current Anthro-
pology for the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthro-
pological Research, Inc., 1968? Viking Fund
Publications in Anthropology, No. 47.) Includes
numerous studies on caste, language, and social struc-
ture, among which several focus on intergroup
dynamics and recent social change.
K. S. Singh. The People of India: An Introduction.
Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, 1992. This
is the largely methodological introductory volume to
the Anthropological Survey's massive People of India
Project, begun in 1985 and destined to provide "a
brief, descriptive anthropological profile of all the
(4,635!) communities of India, studying the impact on
them of change and the development process and the
linkages that bring them together."
K. S. Singh, ed., Tribal Movements in India (two vol-
umes). New Delhi: Manohar, 1982. Presents papers
given at a seminar organized by the Anthropological
Survey of India at which 36 ongoing tribal movements
were identified. Fourteen of these, all in the northeast,
are treated in volume one and the remainder, from
other regions, in volume two.
Smith, Donald Eugene, ed., South Asian Politics and
Religion. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1986. The four major sections of this excellent
anthology are "South Asia: Unity and Diversity,"
"India: The Politics of Religious Pluralism," "Paid-
stan: The Politics of Islamic Identity," and "Ceylon:
The Politics of Buddhist Resurgence."
Sopher, David E., ed., An Exploration of India. Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1980. Includes,
inter alia a critical overview of Indian regions by
Bharat L. Bhatt, a valuable study of linguistic bound-
aries by Charles J. Bennett, and a highly original over-
view of the regional patterning of culture in India by
the editor.
Wallace, Paul, ed., Region and Nation in India. New
Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. and American
Institute of Indian Studies, 1985. Particularly useful
are a wide-ranging bibliographical and historiographic
essay on regionalism by N. Gerald Barrier and sub-
stantive essays on regional cultures by Ainslie T.
Embree and on linguistic states reorganization by
Joseph E. Schwartzberg.
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References (continued)
Weiner, Myron. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Eth-
nic Conflict in India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1978. Detailed analyses of migration
to Assam, Chhota Nagpur, and the city of Hyderabad
and local responses, followed by theoretical discus-
sion of nativistic movements and of the legal aspects
of various situations stemming from migration.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Robert Stoddard
I am going to try to achieve two things: first, integrate
content with what Alex Murphy said yesterday about
general principles through an illustration in South
Asia, using Sri Lanka as an example and, second,
build upon what Dr. Schwartzberg has said about the
background of ethnic diversity in South Asia, but giv-
ing a slightly different prediction about India's politi-
cal future.
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is primarily between
the Sri Lankan Tamils and the, mostly Sinhalese gov-
ernment. The Tamils want greater political control
over their lives; therefore, they seek greater autonomy
or even sovereignty over a specific territory. My com-
ments pertain to the controversy over the delineation
of such an area, a territory I will call "the Tamil
region."
At first glance, it would seem that a map showing the
spatial distribution of people according to their ethnic-
ity would provide a fairly objective method for draw-
ing boundaries. However, even so-called objective
regionalization depends upon agreement about, at
least, four conditions which involve fundamental geo-
graphic issues. These are:
� The definition of the pertinent population. What
constitutes membership in the ethnic group being
regionalized is illustrated in Sri Lanka by the uncer-
tain status of those classified as Indian Tamils.
Because the Indian Tamils have an uncertain citizen-
ship status, have been less politically active, and
generally belong to a lower caste than the Sri Lan-
kan Tamils, they are usually omitted from the popu-
lation that defines the Tamil region. But such an
omission is not universally accepted and, as I will
presently show, the inclusion of Indian Tamils can
make a difference.
� The definition of ethnic territory. Territorial belong-
ingness is normally based upon the existence of a
demographic majority. But in a census unit where no
group exceeds 50 percent, a case can be made for
defining territorial belongingness to the group hav-
ing only a plurality. In most administrative subdivi-
sions of Sri Lanka, one or another of the ethnic
groups has a very large majority, so the potential for
this kind of controversy is limited to only a few
areas. But these few areas are the critical places of
conflict and are where "ethnic cleansing" is most
likely to occur. Even though intense fighting has
taken place in the Tamil heartland of Jaffna, some of
the severest suffering by noncombatants has
occurred in the peripheral or frontier areas, where no
ethnic group possesses a majority.
� The size of the areal units. The real crux of the terri-
torial problem is one of scale because the homoge-
neity of a region depends upon the size of the areal
unit that is being clustered to form a regional whole.
� The decision about the necessity for regional conti-
guity. There is a strong argument for avoiding ethnic
enclaves in any administrative unit. In the Sri Lan-
kan situation, it is difficult to achieve complete con-
tiguity because of the spatial distributions of the
ethnic populations.
Let us examine this regionalization task�that is, the
objective delineation of a Tamil region�by looking at
the distributions of ethnic populations at three areal
scales.
On the provincial level, eight of the nine Sri Lankan
provinces have large majorities consisting of only a
single ethnic group. Furthermore, their geographic
arrangement does not violate the goal of contiguity
(figure 13). In the Eastern Province, however, the larg-
est group has only a plurality. Sri Lankan Tamils, who
have the plurality in this province, insist that it should
be part of their region of control, even though it differs
a little bit from the traditional historical lands. The
government disagrees.
If we look at the district level, the complexity of the
territorial issue is even more evident. In over half the
24 districts, the majority ethnic group exceeds 80 per-
cent of the population. In only three districts does the
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Figure 13
Ethnic Composition in Sri Lanka, 1981
9.
By Province'iVduIi
By District
11101rilito
AO 4,
trol
lb*
Vitiogo"
By Division
�
1/
�
Sinhalese Majority
Sinhalese Plurality
Sri Lankan Tamil Majority
Sri Lankan Tamil Plurality
Indian Tamil Majority
Indian Tamil Plurality
Moor Majority
Moor Plurality
736079 6-95
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percentage drop below 50 percent. However, the loca-
tion�and here we come into the geographic aspects
that were emphasized by Dr. Murphy�of these three
districts complicates the task of regionalization. Two
of the plurality districts�Trincomalee and Amparai�
are in Eastern Province and present the same defini-
tional problem as produced by the larger provincial
units. The third district, Nuwara Eliya, is located in
the center of the country, where it is surrounded by
Sinhalese majority districts. Furthermore, the ethnic
population that holds the plurality is the Indian Tamil
community. Therefore, if a definition of "Tamil popu-
lation" were to be expanded tp combine both the Sri
Lankan and Indian Tamils, the resulting different eth-
nic map would produce a Tamil region having a non-
contiguous exclave.
Minor civil divisions below the district level are too
small for political autonomy. that does not mean,
however, that these units cannot be used as a basis for
a regionalization scheme. However, the spatial frag-
mentation of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the peripheral
zone persists at this scale. In the 'Trincomalee District,
the population residing along a narrow coastal sliver
forms a plurality consisting of a third ethnic group�
the Moors. The geometric complexity of ethnic con-
centrations is partially solved if the Sri Lankan Tamils
and Indian Tamils are considered as members of the
same ethnic category because the plurality population
of this coastal strip shifts to being Tamil. Although
such a redefinition of the Tamil population tends to
solve some of the problems of contiguity along the
east coast, as noted above, it complicates the regional-
ization task in the central part of the country.
Thus, it is evident that a major contributor to ethnic
conflicts is the distributional pattern of contending
populations. Also, this Sri Lankan situation reinforces
the generalization made yesterday: the areas where
atrocities are most likely to occur, and from which
most refugees would originate, are the zones of ethnic
transition between the regional core areas of the dif-
fering ethnic groups.
Now, let me shift to the second topic which concerns
India, where I would like to deal with a nonterritorial
conflict. My own interests haye usually focused upon
ethnoregionalism more than on the nonspatial inter-
class struggles for power. However, interclass strate-
gies have real implications for the Hindu nationalist
movement.
It is critical to note that we are dealing with two major
perspectives on Indian nationalism, the secular and the
Hindu. Indian secular nationalism is well illustrated
by the leadership of Nehru, who expounded, prac-
ticed, and institutionalized the pluralistic society.
From this perspective, the Indian nation-state is based
upon a syncretic view of Indian culture and a federal
system of government. All religions, all jatis, all lan-
guages, and all people within the territory of this
country have equal opportunity under the law, accord-
ing to the Constitution. The laws of the land accom-
modate both the wishes of the majority, as expressed
by free and democratic elections, and the rights of the
minorities.
In contrast, Hindu nationalists believe that the nation
should be based not only on common culture but also
upon the religion of Hinduism. The more extreme
forms want to rule India as a Hindu state and rid the
country of all non-Hindu persons and influences. The
more benign forms of Hindu nationalism seek unity
among the various castes and languages in India
through the common heritage of living within a "Hin-
duized" land.
From the perspective of the Hindu nationalists, Bud-
dhists, Jains, and Sikhs already share a more or less
simliar sacred geography. Because of their origins,
their holy lands are within the same Hinduized land.
The Jews and the Parsis came from foreign areas, but,
because these communities are small, they have not
been a particular problem. On the other hand, Hindus
view Christians and Muslims�with their doctrinaire
ideas�as a problem. The nonacceptance of Muslims
is especially strong because:
� Muslims are associated with the invasions from
circa 1000 to later than 1500.
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� Some Muslim leaders, insisting that Muslims belong
to a separate nation, carved Pakistan from a "part of
India."
� The Indian Muslim population is large enough to
make a significant difference.
If the BJP were to gain national power, it is difficult to
predict whether stability would be restored to the
nation. But we can predict that, if the right wing of the
Hindu nationalists should gain power, there would
most likely be mass, even widespread, conflicts in
areas where significant Muslim populations now live.
A plausible scenario would be massive outmigrations
similar to those that occurred during partition. A worst
case scenario would be another war between India and
Pakistan�this time with nuclear weapons.
In spite of several conditions that can lead to conflict,
there are strong reasons for believing that India will
not erupt into major ethnic wars, with the possible
exception of Kashmir. Other than Kashmir, there is
strong evidence that India is not as ethnically volatile
as many other regions in the world. First, note that the
population of India exceeds all of Africa, all of Latin
America, or all of Europe, none of which is in a single
nation-state or single country. All these other regions
are splintered into many states, and the people within
each show little evidence of uniting politically. In con-
trast, even with all the diversity among the people of
India, the nation has remained together for almost half
a century. Furthermore, this has been accomplished
within a mostly democratic environment again, some-
thing that has not been achieved in Third World coun-
tries in Africa or in Latin America. It also contrasts
with the situation in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, where ethnic feelings were suppressed
by dictatorial governments. That success provides a
basis for predicting that ethnic conflicts will not be
more severe in India than elsewhere.
A second reason for predicting fewer ethnic conflicts
within India than in many other major world regions is
based on the Indic culture. Maybe India's success is
just a happenstance of outstanding secular leadership
at the time of, and immediately after, independence
and, therefore, will dissipate with time. Yet, secular
nationalism does seem to have a firm foundation,
namely the Indic culture, which has nurtured tolerance
and has accommodated differences through the ages.
The eclectic and nonideological nature of Hinduism
and the other indigenous religions of South Asia cer-
tainly provides a deeply ingrained cultural propensity
for the acceptance of differences. It is true that
throughout most of history the people of the subconti-
nent did not live in a single political unit and that the
various regional states did engage in fighting, but
most conflicts did not result from the kind of major
ideological crusade that separates people for centuries
and produces long-lasting hatreds.
Certainly it is in the best interest of the United States,
as the leader of the democratic world, to support the
forces of pluralism in South Asia.
General Discussion
DR. GLADNEY: I am always, and I think everybody
is, amazed that India is still together. You mentioned
the term success in that regard. I wonder if you could
talk a little bit more about why this is a success, par-
ticularly considering the poverty of India, the civil
strife, the Hindu-Muslim clashes, and the separatists
like the Kashmiris. Why is it that keeping the country
together is successful?
DR. STODDARD: Maybe the term "success" is a lit-
tle bit strong, especially if we define a successful state
as one that eliminates poverty, as well as reducing
civil strife. And, I do not deny that the Hindu-Muslim
clashes are just as worrisome in India as religious con-
flicts in Northern Ireland, in the Caucasus, or in Leba-
non. Furthermore, half a century may be too short a
time to declare full success. Moreover, the durability
of India as a state may partly reflect the lack of a
highly politicized populace. After all, the 67 percent
of the population that resides in rural areas live a life
that is pretty much circumscribed by their local envi-
ronment. Although there is a rising politicization, as
expressed by the percentage of people who have voted
in the recent elections, the stability of a peasant agrar-
ian economy or agrarian society probably goes a long
way toward explaining the relative success.
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DR. SCHWARTZBERG: The Indian Government has
been willing to pull back. This has not happened yet in
Kashmir and Punjab, however.
QUESTION: Would you comment on the Kashmir sit-
uation?
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: I plan to work on Kashmir
during the coming year. The people in Kashmir are
alienated to a degree that will, preclude their reconcili-
ation with India. I cannot predict exactly the shape of
the future of Kashmir, but I will predict that there will
be a significant change in the situation there.
I am more optimistic in the case of Punjab, a richer
area and strategically much more important. There
seem to be signs that India ha,s the Punjab situation
Reverse Blank 149
under control. However, the raid on the Golden Tem-
ple will not soon be forgotten, nor the many other
human rights abuses that the Indian Government has
committed in the name of quelling that insurrection. I
believe, however, that the prospects for reconciliation
exist, and many people who know Punjab better than I
do say that, even at the worst of times, the majority of
Sikhs were always moderate and that the extremists
never represented the Sikh rank and file.
One fundamental difference between Kashmir and the
Punjab is that the dissociation of Punjab from India
would probably let loose an unstoppable Balkaniza-
tion of India, while dissociation of Kashmir would not
necessarily result in such an outcome.
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The Demographic Backdrop to
Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic
Overview
Gary Fuller
Professor of Geography and
Population Studies
University of Hawaii
Introduction
Following the breakup of the former Soviet Union,
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan strongly criticized
US intelligence estimates that, he alleged, had ignored
Soviet demographic and health statistics. Moynihan
argued that any society that exhibited the symptoms of
the USSR�which included rising overall mortality
and a high incidence of alcoholism�could not be a
legitimate economic or military threat to the United
States. The criticism is unfair in one sense, since it
does not require national health or sobriety to launch
missiles. Nevertheless, Moynihan's observation about
the role of demographic statistics in intelligence anal-
ysis is insightful.
States sometimes go to great lengths to disguise data
about their economies and societies, usually with the
motive of misleading their enemies (and perhaps their
own citizens as well). More commonly, however,
accurate data are elusive because they are difficult and
expensive to collect, analyze, and interpret. I once
spent several months visiting arrizl collecting data from
remote family planning clinics in Chile, and I was
struck with how different the,situation at the clinics
was compared with the officiel reports in Santiago.
My experience is highly typical, I think, and is shared
by most who have done field research.
Demographic data are almost,always the best data that
are available for a society. This is not to say that they
are good; indeed, they are often very poor. I am only
here advancing a comparative judgment. Govern-
ments collecting demographic data (whether censuses,
vital registers, or surveys) can call upon an impressive
body of international experience and knowledge con-
cerning the planning, execution, interpretation, and
151
adjustment of demographic data. Most such data,
moreover, are not seen as threatening by governments.
Certainly there are cases where certain population
information is viewed as terribly dangerous (Lebanon
or Iraq's religious compositions, for example), but,
even when this is the case, other demographic data
unrelated to policymakers' phobias may be unaf-
fected. Finally, censuses have to be conducted openly.
Information about their quality and the nature of their
biases is widely circulated in the demographic com-
munity, and sometimes "corrections" are advanced by
demographers outside the country. The only effective
way to keep demographic data secret is not to collect
them.
Demographic Indicators of Instability
Consider also that certain demographic trends corre-
late highly with socioeconomic variables; were it not
for this fact, demographic transition would be an
arcane model of little interest to any but abstract theo-
rists. Thus, it requires only a small logical step to see
that socioeconomic data and trends (perhaps closely
guarded or disguised) are imbedded in demographic
data that are open and aboveboard. Hungary offers an
interesting example. As a former Warsaw Pact mem-
ber, Hungary was quite guarded in releasing social
and economic data, but its population data are among
the best in the world.
I do not mean to imply either that censuses ought to
replace electronic surveillance in the intelligence kit
bag or that demographic data can entirely compensate
for a lack of socioeconomic data. My point is that
population data are a rich vein that is not mined suffi-
ciently and that academic researchers and intelligence
analysts have the opportunity to use census data in
creative ways that give new insight into societal
tends. Perhaps because the data are easy to come by,
their value is not fully appreciated.
A comprehensive case for the value of the demo-
graphic perspective in assessing intelligence issues
would require more space than I have available. I hope
a few aspects of the "correlation" I mentioned earlier
will suffice.
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A society whose fertility begins to fall rapidly is
undergoing a profound transformation. Most basically,
it has begun to trust the permanence of lowered infant
and childhood mortality, something that is hard to per-
ceive at the family level, and something that may
require denial of firmly embedded beliefs. The society
has otherwise begun to change its traditional way of
life by moving away from rural, agrarian values and to
embrace the smaller family norms associated with
urbanization and economic development.
Rostow's term "takeoff," which used to describe a
stage in economic development, has been largely dis-
credited by other economists (although it is not clear
whether this is because Rostow was overall simplistic
or because he went to work for US President
Johnson). "Takeoff," however, seems appropriate to
describe certain changes in fertility and growth that
change the "momentum of growth" from positive to
negative. Brazil and Mexico are both at that point
now, and, while any number of observers of different
stripe continue to focus attention on the problems of
severe poverty that haunt sectors or regions of both
countries, the demographic picture is reasonably opti-
mistic. Rely on the pessimistic reports if you will, but
the economic transformation of both societies is inher-
ent in their current demographic profiles.
Infant mortality data offer a measure of societal well-
being that is highly sensitive to change. Public health
authorities argue that the infant mortality rate is the
best measure of the health of-a society, and, even if
this is hyperbole, surely there is a high correlation
between such mortality and the prosperity of a society.
Overall mortality is also a valuable indicator. Mortal-
ity remained constant in Eastern Europe from the mid-
1960s until the late 1980s�and actually increased in
the USSR during the same period�while mortality
was falling in virtually all other countries. There is,
indeed, good reason to suspect that these mortality
trends have real meaning, just as Moynihan pointed
out.
Within the context of this discussion, demographic
data should be considered as analogous to an air photo
in which "signatures" of various kinds indicate a dan-
gerous ground truth. My initial investigations into this
area have led me to some hypotheses about demo-
graphic processes that correlate strongly with societal
troubles. It is important at the onset to understand that
such correlation is modest at best with general popula-
tion growth. That, of course, is why so many extreme
neo-Malthusians insist very loudly that you believe
them; the ideology is strong, but the evidence is weak.
I will limit my remarks here to a single case of ethnic
strife, that of Sri Lanka's two postwar insurgencies.'
The Youth Bulge in Sri Lanka
As Professor Stoddard implied, if you look at the his-
torical or cultural context of the ongoing conflict in Sri
Lanka, a complex situation emerges. Indeed, political
scientists and analysts in the State Department and
elsewhere have accounted for this in many ways.
Many cite ancient animosities between Tamils and
Sinhalese.
The demographic data suggest another reason behind
the conflict, however. Figure 14 shows the age struc-
ture of the two ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Using Dal-
las Fernando's method of looking at the Sri Lankan
population by revenue district, we are able to break
down ethnic group data to determine age structure of
the populations. This graph reflects two distinct demo-
graphic transitions�a leading transition for the Sinha-
lese, who predominantly live in the country's wet
zone, and a lagging one for the Tamils, who live in the
dry zone. It reveals a correlation between the incidents
of conflict between the two ethnic groups and the pro-
portion of each population that is youthful (ages 15 to
24)�those who are in demand of land, jobs, higher
education, opportunity, and other kinds of resources in
the society.
When the British left Sri Lanka, they left these
resources largely under Tamil control. After all, the
Sinhalese had resisted British penetration, while the
Tamils had worked in the civil service not only in Sri
Lanka but elsewhere in the empire as well.
' See Population Geography, June 1984, pp. 1-11.
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Figure 14
Sri Lanka: Youth Bulge
99ZEZ WOO 1.0/90/91.0Z :aseaia JOI panaiddV
Percentage of-total population,-age 15-24 -
Sinhalese insurgency
� Major anti-Tamil rioting in Colombo
Peak of Tamil insurgency, September 85
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
Critical level*
�Sri Lanka total
Sinhalese
Tamil
16 1950 55
60 65 70 75 80
The critical level is the point at which youths make up 20 percent
or more of the population.
90 95 2000 05
349179 2-86
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When the proportion of the Sinhalese population who
were young adults reached 20 percent of the total pop-
ulation�what we term a youth bulge�the Sinhalese
insurgency of 1970 occurred. Although other factors,
which I do not mean to diminish, were behind the
uprising, it is more than coincidental that the peak in
that age group took place as conflict broke out.
Indeed, a former US Ambassador to Sri Lanka told me
that all the insurgents in the rebellion were under 24
years old.
The Tamil population shows a similar story. At the
time of the Sinhalese insurgency, the percent of the
Tamil population that was age 15 to 24 was low and,
thereby, caused no problem. In response to the Sinha-
lese insurgency, the government made changes in the
allocation of resources, jobs, land, and higher educa-
tional opportunities. So by the time the Tamil youth
bulge occurred, numerous institutions and laws were
in place that favored the Sinhalese rather than the
Tamils. As such, the outbreak of a much more serious
episode of violence took place coincident with the rise
of the Tamil youth bulge. This bulge, incidentally, has
lasted such a long time that it has become entrenched
in the society. Even when it goes away�probably by
1995�its effects are going to linger because of its
longevity.
Let me switch the venue to the case of India. My grad-
uate student, Joan Butler-Qazi, meticulously went
through numerous Indian newspapers and other publi-
cations and came up with measures of violence for
each of the country's districts. Then she correlated
these measures of violence with the size of-the 15-to-
24 age cohort in 1981. The correlation for India as a
whole was an R squared of 0.77.2 Here, the overall
demographic variable is driving ethnic conflict gener-
ally.
Conclusion
We have also examined the youth bulge situation
more broadly, not only as it relates to ethnic conflict.
For South Korea, for example, we predicted flatly that
youth riots would taper off and eventually disappear
as a result of the shrinking of-a youth bulge.3 Finally,
one tremendous advantage in using demographic vari-
ables for analyzing conflicts, including ethnic ones, is
that often the data are quite easy to come by.
2 The publication of this research is forthcoming.
3 See Political Geography, January 1990, pp. 9-21.
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Ethnic Conflict and Population
Displacement
Martin Kenzer
Associate Professor of Geography
Florida Atlantic University
Historical Review of Postwar Refugee Populations
In large measure, today's so-called ethnically driven
refugee populations are the extension of territorial
conflicts that were waged immediately before or just
after World War I. To one degree or another, that war
partially resulted from particular territorial tensions
released by the collapse of former empires. The same
ethnic or territorial zones were then, again, suspended
by the onset of World War II,' which was another eth-
nic contest that eventually foOd most of the world's
peoples fighting either for or iagainst what often
became known as ethnic virtue. During the war, how-
ever, the battle focused not on the individual ethnic
groups that had been fighting one another for genera-
tions but on larger, national, territorial campaigns.
When World War II ended, the focus quickly switched
to the emerging superpowers�two foes who were
able to stifle domestic ethnic conflicts by squaring off
powerful armies against one another. Internal ethnic
conflicts were squelched in order to amplify national
unity and the projecting of a front.
Also following World War II, it was believed that the
world's refugee problem would soon disappear. Moti-
vated at the time by both geopolitical and humanitar-
ian concerns, the predominant powers�principally
the victorious West�sought to accommodate the
needs of the many and diverse dislocated groups. Sev-
eral local, regional, national, 1.nd international refugee
relief and repatriation/resettlement agencies�many
associated with the United Nations�were established
to deal with the day-to-day needs of the then-homeless
peoples and political refuge,es. These also promoted
the eventual settlement of those peoples to either his-
torical or new homelands. The postwar New World
Order architects, who were also the founders of the
United Nations, generally perceived that these dis-
placed peoples and the refugees were a problem but
did not see them as a symptom of the international
geopolitical restructuring that they had themselves
engineered.
The common view of the various organizations that
came into being after World War IT was that they
would provide for the security and welfare of the
uprooted only until the needs of the displaced were
accommodated. It was fully believed after the war that
agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (UNHCR) would only exist for a short period
because they would soon get everyone resettled and
all problems would go away. Obviously, this proved to
be erroneous.
The Current Picture
Recently, another empire, the former Soviet Union,
has collapsed, and, once again, the world is experienc-
ing a wave of territorial/ethnic tensions. To one degree
or another, almost all these tensions are expressions of
dormant territorial hatreds that in some locales date
back centuries. They have been inactive for decades
because the two major superpowers have muffled
them and/or used them to their own respective needs.
Today, there are far more displaced peoples than there
were at the end of World War II, and they are found on
more continents. Forced migrations have increasingly
come to dominate the patterns and processes involved
in international population movements. Ironically and
tragically, however, a majority of these people, despite
their refugeelike experience, do not find themselves
protected or cared for by national or international ref-
ugee relief agencies because they still do not fall
under the legalistic, post�World War H definition of
"refugee."
155
As officially defined, refugees are persons who have
crossed a recognized political border and who have
then registered with an official group, which most
often is the UNHCR. If a person does not do that, the
international community does not recognize him or
her as a refugee. Today, many, even in the United
Nations, argue that this definition has become increas-
ingly blurred. Indeed, the distinction between who is
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and who is not a refugee is probably irrelevant, given
the ever-expanding number of groups worldwide who
are just as persecuted and uprooted as official refu-
gees.
The problem of accurate accounting of refugees goes
way beyond the definitional problem, however. Every
day, we hear new figures about how many refugees are
here or there. Refugee statistics are fraught with
untruths and inaccuracies. Do not believe any of the
figures you hear; they are all made up. Most of these
figures are from thirdhand or fourthhand sources,
many of whom are unreliable. There are vested
groups�including the refugees themselves�who
want those figures either inflated or deflated for their
particular interests. The numbers only provide a rela-
tive approximation of how many are in one region vis-
a-vis another, and they change dramatically over time.
Today, official recognized bona fide refugees�those
who register with the UN after crossing an interna-
tional border�number over 17 million. Broken down
regionally, they include:
� In Africa, 5.7 million. This is so far below the actual
number; it is not even close. Africa is one of the
worst regions.
� In Europe and North America, 3.4 million. Of
course, this does not include what is going on in
Georgia.
� In Latin America, 107,700, primarily in Central
America.
� In East Asia and the Pacific, 399,000.
� In the Middle East, 5.5 million.
� In South and Central Asia, 2.3 million.
More important than these numbers, however, are the
50 million internally displaced people who are not
recognized as refugees. These are the people who
have never had any form of internationally recognized
status and who are probably never going to attain
nationhood. They are not counted. They are the
majority of displaced peoples in the world. They do
not consider themselves to be part of-any country and
have no sense of belonging to an individual, extant
country. That is the case whether we are talking about
Georgia or Burma or Afghanistan.
Meeting Refugee Needs
In terms of who attends to refugees, it is quite telling
to look at where the money comes from to support ref-
ugee aid. In absolute terms, the United States devotes
the most money, while the European Community as a
whole devotes the second-largest amount. I think a
better way to look at this, however, is on a per capita
basis. North European countries�notably, Norway�
give a disproportionate amount of money to the care
and treatment of refugees. Using this criteria, the
United States falls to about 10th or 11th place.
There are strings attached to all this money. When a
country donates money to the UN, it always attaches a
string dictating where its aid can go. Aid from the
United States and the European Community always
goes to countries and regions where strong trade alli-
ances exist with the donor.
In any case, the people with the power and the money
are in the United States and Europe; they do not give
money to Africa until conditions there get out of con-
trol. And often, the humanitarian situation in Africa is
muted because many of-those affected are not, by def-
inition, real refugees because they have not crossed
any international borders. As far as the displaced are
concerned, however, when they leave their tribal or
clan homeland, they have crossed a border; they do
not need to go any farther than that. (Indeed, many
Africans do not recognize international borders on
their continent except as lines on the map.) As such,
money is not earmarked for most African areas until
conditions flare up to the extent that they become of
international concern. This usually occurs only after
the situation has already spiraled out of control.
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Forced Migration and Ethnicity
Lee Schwartz
Office of the Geographer
Department of State
Introduction
The main reason for deciding to speak on forced
migration and ethnicity is because I recently
addressed that topic at a conference�organized by
the International Geographical Union's Commission
on Population Geography in Ljubljana, Slovenia�
which focused on the topic of ethnicity and geogra-
phy. Obviously this is a topic that is of current concern
not just in the United States but also in other areas of
the world; indeed, one of the major causal factors�
and consequences�of forced migration in the world
today is ethnic conflict. When I found out that Dr.
Kenzer was going to speak on a similar topic, I
thought I would attempt to organize my comments
today more broadly in order to address also some
related humanitarian issues; after all, this session is
titled, "Perspectives on Demographic and Humanitar-
ian Issues." I think my role here today, therefore, will
be to highlight a few of these perspectives, some of
which have already been mentioned and others of
which may be new.
When dealing with the topic of forced migration�
particularly in trying to understand its ethnic compo-
nents�three themes come to mind. These are some-
what in line with what the current administration
probably considers its priorities:
� Human rights. From a global perspective, human
rights with respect to migration are severely limited
because little freedom of movement exists on an
international scale. Both refugee movement and
"free," or economic, migration are heavily con-
trolled by increasingly stringent regimes and quotas.
� Democracy. We have heard about a lot of geo-
graphic concepts�such as national territoriality,
regionalism, homeland, and frontier�at this confer-
ence. It is instructive to see how these might mani-
fest themselves in terms of democratic principles,
157
particularly concerning the right of self-determina-
tion in a world where the traditional state system is
admittedly breaking up (if not down). Where do you
draw boundaries? Which people get to determine on
which territory lies the future of their own ethnic
communities? Another factor to consider is access to
power; when people are eliminated from access to
power, it often is a causal factor of warfare, which
tends to produce forced migrations.
� Conflict resolution. I think Wade Hinkle yesterday
raised a good point. Hindsight is 20/20, and geogra-
phers have been strong in terms of trying to under-
stand regions and relationships between ethnicity
and territoriality, but geographic knowledge is not
necessarily sufficient in terms of trying to come to a
resolution of some conflict that has already begun.
Most geographic analysis has not been predictive in
terms of where conflict will break out. I think that
geography and geographers can best contribute to an
understanding of ethnic conflict by focusing not on
conflict resolution but on preventing conflict exacer-
bation.
Typology of Forced Migration
My office director, Bill Wood, has developed a typol-
ogy of forced migration that we have applied to differ-
ent regions to help understand different causal
components of forced migration (see figure 15). It is
not necessarily important in this model to draw dis-
tinctions between refugees, forced migrants, and inter-
nally displaced persons, although when it comes to
providing humanitarian aid or support, refugees are
favored over both internally displaced persons and
illegal immigrants, who tend to "disappear" and are
not accorded rights in the countries in which they live.
There is also an ethnic component to each of the three
subsets shown on figure 15. It is strongest in the cate-
gory of political instability and civil unrest�largely
governmental persecution. That is because this perse-
cution is often directed toward a particular ethnic
group or may have consequences for specific ethnic
groups. Ethnicity is a factor when looking at forced
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Figure 15
FORCED MIGRATION FLOWS!
Subnational Causal Factors &
International Migration Categories
-Political _
-Instability/----
.1 d.
7. /../../
_72-47.1-4.
-.., /-e-e,/,,e
- _Trezz-c-I_rz-,
.1 Ad." A
7.,-,.,. 7�1`7'7. "'V .P./7'
.C4C7.1-4.7-r47
e7.,rL7_r4-7_7.r-c7_retr
,,,, /.
:2",63-,_rc:747-,.;c3-72-Z-1.1-e-3- EntrenchedI;
_-Civil Unrest/
� /-/-/ 76 /-/ s' .0-/-/ v.16V7W-/ 0./7' / / / / / / / / . ..
� 47-TL7-.7. -" r.e.r.e.,,,e, Life-
:Governmental 41.- �
-Persecution
ISPLACED
A- 4-� "FORCIBLY�
-E
A
t, v ,bii, ,,,,,,,,,,,
4 Al\i�/�
4:r_r A!,:�,,;�\s,,, � �"/,,"/,,,
x< A, �
tt.tch}k 4::-1 4Aeke qA ,/e/e,�,/e
CrkT."1" .s.1� -MtAl �raa k A4AAelev)� .0 /....
%-3.. �T ---% -c..0-k.--14 k,,,I. 44r.v�e',4,,,�40,s�I' �
, , -,...k.,..,-�,.....T.,.43.,_ "�.�v, r,;;;,,50 � , ,
, , , , , , , . ,
, ,
, ,. .. ,, ..,...�........2,.,,�,,
, , ,,.,, ,
, .,..,..,,.,
UllUtakiital�`
%- % \ \ % % x % % r,
% \ \ % % t Llegradationo�;�,������
\ \ \ % \ . \ � \ � % \
Threatening �`;�\��`,�
Natural �'k`���
�`��`�'`��
isasters\ - `�\`�'`
%,
Subnational
International
,
Economic;
',Poverty;
Refugees/ Illegal
Asylum Seekers Legal Immigrants
Immigrants/
'Guest Workers'
Fora full description of this typology, see William B. Wood, "Forced Migration: T t�cal Conflict and International Dilemmas," 349179 6-95
Annals of the AAG, Vol. 84, No. 4, Dec. 1994: 607-634.0
158
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migration, not just at the source but also at the destina-
tion as well. Whether a group is territorially concen-
trated or not, if its members move from one territory
into another, they are changing the ethnic balance in
two regions; it is a source-and-destination dynamic.
During periods of economic decline, a high percent-
age of forcibly displaced persons are members of cer-
tain ethnic groups that are underprivileged or in the
worst poverty-stricken regions. These are also often
the first ones who are susceptible to famine or ecolog-
ical disasters. So the way to look at the ethnic dimen-
sion of people who have fled and need to be
supported�whether they be forcibly displaced refu-
gees or internally displaced persons or illegal
migrants�is in a typology such as that in figure 15, in
which an ethnic component can be identified in each
of the three subsets.
Forced migration has traditionally been thought of as
a process that produces refugees, who are defined as
such because they cross international boundaries. It is
quite clear, and every speaker has touched on the facts
that increasing mobility and decentralization, devolu-
tion of political power, the breakdown of one-party
state systems, and the rise of territoriality�be it
regional or national�make it 'incumbent on us to
increasingly think of forced migration processes at the
intrastate level. It is a question of scale, I think, in
terms of how we do our analysis.
From the humanitarian perspective, the different cate-
gories and classifications for migrants not only tend to
lose their importance but also can often infringe upon
the civil rights of certain groups that are mobile. In
many cases, those accorded refugee status are privi-
leged forced migrants. The new restrictive definitions
and laws being imposed in Europe, for instance, have
produced an upsurge in illegal migrants�many of
whom are disenfranchised in the country in which
they reside�most of whom are not counted. There are
reports out of Bosnia that tens.,of thousands of Bos-
nian Muslims are still movinginto the rest of Europe.
Now that the European refugee regime has become
stricter, however, they have found ways to enter as
illegal immigrants and never get counted.
159
Another important point to raise, which Dr. Kenzer
touched on earlier, is that internally displaced people
are not being accorded sufficient attention by the
international community. With regard to humanitarian
concerns, the internally displaced are often the most
problematic. In these cases, many of the geographic
concepts mentioned at this conference can be applied:
the question of core and periphery relations, for
instance�most of the internally displaced are located
at the peripheries of states and are often the first to
cross borders and become refugees.
Crossing Boundaries
In fact, many refugees were first internally displaced
people before crossing an international border. What
made them refugees is that they managed to cross
such a border and were thereby accorded official refu-
gee status. Many internally displaced people can be
considered to function as refugees, particularly
because internecine conflict often leads to situations
where borders within states begin to function more as
international borders. Look at the situation in the Cau-
casus or with Gorno-Badalchshan in Tajilcistan, where
the internal borders are functioning virtually as inter-
national ones with regard to population movements. In
many cases, therefore, whether someone being forced
to move is called an internally displaced person or a
refugee is a moot point in terms of how the interna-
tional community needs to support them or deliver aid
to them.
We should also be thinking more about the changing
nature of political boundaries. The international com-
munity is increasingly recognizing that the sacrosanct
nature of these boundaries is not as strong as it once
was. Although many members of the international
community considered Serb and Croat discussions
about territorial exchanges to be an anathema, there is
nothing sacrosanct about these boundaries just
because they have been in existence and have been
fairly permanent for so long. We are definitely seeing
grudging change in this direction. At the same time,
we should not underestimate the state boundaries in
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Africa, for instance. While they might not necessarily
have a great deal of meaning to the local peoples, they
have a tremendous impact in terms of how the interna-
tional community officially views various popula-
tions.
Ethnicity and Identity
Another concept related to forced migrations, which
Dr. Knight referred to yesterday, is the primacy of
identity and the inability of people to adjust quickly
their primary identity. It is important to understand in
this context the role of a catalyst or a trigger that
might cause a nation either to latch more strongly onto
a specific identity or to change its primary identity.
Ethnicity in most of the world, in fact, is quite dor-
mant most of the time; it is only once ethnic forces are
activated that they become politicized and can lead to
conflict. We can try to understand ethnicity and the
relationships between ethnic groups and regions, but
that alone has little predictive value. That is why when
addressing policy options�trying to be proactive as
opposed to reactive�it is not enough to know a
region and the nature of its ethnic groups. What might
be a passive ethnicity can very quickly become acti-
vated if something is denied a particular group or if a
group perceives a threat to its territorial homeland,
language, culture, or religion. The interrelationship
between ethnicity and territory is quite complex.
I want to mention, briefly, the factor of warfare. War-
fare is quite obviously the major cause of forced
migrations in terms of-generating ethnic populations
on the move, and national territoriality is frequently
the underlying cause of much of this fighting. What is
important to understand about situations where territo-
riality acts as a catalyst to politicize ethnicity is that,
even in warfare situations that are not based on ethnic
conflict, groups are often dislocated because of their
ethnicity. Warfare leads to ethnic-selective disloca-
tions when a particular region that has been overrun
has a concentration of one ethnic group or contains
groups that are economically vulnerable or culturally
isolated. So that even when the cause of a conflict is
not rooted in ethnicity, it can result in ethnic "modifi-
cation" of a region by selectivity of the forced
migrants.
Geography of Refugee Populations
What can probably be agreed upon in trying to under-
stand ethnic conflict is the importance of scale and of
having the appropriate approach to investigate events
at the substate or intrastate level. I want to briefly
present a few maps here to show how different scales
might operate in terms of attempting to understand the
ethnic components of forced migration.
Africa is the most turbulent continent in terms of num-
bers of refugees (see figure 16). Most African refugees
tend to be the economically deprived and, as a result,
they do not move far across neighboring borders. The
African continent is also where the largest number of
internally displaced peoples exists; when they cannot
cross the border, they tend to congregate along the
fringes of states, often beyond the limits of central
authorities. In Africa, there are three or four times as
many displaced persons as refugees.
In the former Soviet Union, there is a combination of
short- and long-distance migration (see figure 17).
Most of this movement is based on national conflict in
the non-Slavic south. The economically able groups
can move farther, often before the outbreak of vio-
lence.
Bringing it down to a larger scale, within the states of
Tajikistan and Georgia, for example, one gets below
the ethnic and into the various historical and factional
clan conflicts that are at the basis of groups attempting
to reestablish historical regions by pushing people off
territory and back from whence they came (see figure
18).
160
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Figure 16
South
Atlantic
Ocean
3==1� FORCED MIGRMION; 100,000+
FORCED MIGRATION; 10,000 - 99.999
X.* REPATRIATION; 100.000+
REPATRIATION; 10,000 - 99,999
Forced Migration/1993 Population (x):
Ezzi 20X+
10X - 19X
Eal IX - 9%
--- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
---- OTHER UNE OF SEPARATION
!MP
ek� zrvi.
REFUGEE FLOWS FROM COUNTRIES WITH
HIGH LEVELS OF FORCED MIGRATION: AFRICA
Indian
Ocean
6/93
736082 6-95
161
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Figure 17
?R 'PS
c.r.
. ssesensr-
Sochi
F.
S.
Black Sea
cHERKEssu r. xA _
ABKHAZIA rt
/4%16
AJARIA
� BALKAIR4.
NOR
TURKEY
05501.4
GEORGIA
Tbilisi *
/-
Major Cross-Border Refugee
Flows in the Former
Soviet Union, 1989-1993
Over 100,000 refugees
10,000 to 100,000 refugees
I
��
1,000 to 10,000 refugees =Ea..
The boundary between Inquehatia and
Chechento has not been detenoined.
Caspian'.
Sea
AZERBAIJAN
�
IRAN
A
CJIECHENIA.
UNOUSNEM�
0
ARMENIA
Yerevan*
NAKIRCHEVAN
(eZEREIN.W1)
�f"
DAGESTAN
AZERBAIJAN
NAGORNO
KARARAKN
IRAN
Map At
The Caucasus
Caspian
Sea
Baku
To Germany.
Russia, and
Ukraine
( Map
Central Asia
K AZAKSTAN
Lake
Aral Bolkhash
Soo
To
Russia
UZBEKISTAN
TAJACIS AN
zo� ,w4/
AFONAMSTAN
Alma�
*Ato
*Bishkek
KYROYISTAN
PMUSTAN
CHINA
�
162
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Figure 18
Tajikistan: Major Flows of Refugees
and Displaced Persons, December 1992
KAZAKSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
Tashkent
�Kokond
Khudzhand
0
Garm region
Dushanbe* Ns.... )Digrowscf
/
( Pamir
).� I I Mountains
) I .1 Kulyab
C 1 0
Kurgan-e I
Twbe I
1 0
Termez 1 Khorog
International boundary
Selected oblast boundary
0 Administrative center
osmesuasx Direction of flow of refugees
and displaced persons
0 7,S kilometers
0 7I5 mles
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
KYRGYZSTAN
� Shaartuz
�
40,000
refugees
'Kholm
16 60,000 AFGHANISTAN
Wilgus
�Konduz
Primary Location of
Internally-Displaced Tajiks*
CHINA
PAKISTAN
2164 11-92 STATE (INR/CE)
Dushanbe City
120,000
Kurgan-Tyube Region
120,000
Garmi Region
50,000
Pamir Mountain Region
60,000
736084 6-95
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Conclusion
Let me conclude by noting one of the main problems
of the international response to forced migrations with
ethnic components. That is, that migration regimes are
set up on a bilateral basis that impinge on multilateral
responses to regional problems. Individual states are
setting laws while the responses to refugee-producing
crises�often related to ethnic conflict�are multilat-
eral.
Further, the UN is increasingly finding it difficult to
intervene in many countries; they do not have the full
mandate to deal with the internally displaced. In con-
clusion, it is difficult for policymakers to do more than
react to the latest refugee crises. By attempting to mit-
igate refugee flows by tailoring policies to react to
events at local and regional levels, it will be easier to
respond to, if not predict, ethnic conflict that disrupts
the entire state. If that is done, governments will be
able at least to reduce the trauma of forced migrants
and refugees, if not eliminate the cause of their move-
ment altogether.
164
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Summary of Discussion
General Discussion
DR. WDCMAN: While we often hear about high birth-
rates being major causes of nationalism, the reverse�
that is, where low fertility is one of the primary rea-
sons for rises in nationalism�is also important. In the
former Soviet Union, for example, the rapid rise in
Russian nationalism was very much tied to a sense of
rapidly declining fertility. In Germany, the lowering of
the birthrate is also one of the primary factors in the
rise of the German national consciousness. Are there
people doing work on the correlation between declin-
ing fertilities and the rise of ethnic national conscious-
ness?
DR. FULLER: Yes, exactly along the lines you say
and for exactly the reasons that you say. In fact, I can
say that the people that are spOnsoring this conference
have published a paper along exactly those lines.
QUESTION: Why does the United States distinguish
between ethnic and political refugees in the way they
are treated?
DR. SCHWARTZ: Frankly, in part to keep out people
from coming in who are seen as potentially draining to
the economy. This is a complicated issue, however.
DR. DE BLIJ: The distinction between refugees is a
holdover from the Communist period. The current
definition of refugees is related to the political system
they leave when they come here.
DR. SCHWARTZ: The definitions come from the
1951 UN convention and the 1967, protocol. The 1951
convention was based on the post-World War II refu-
gee regime, while the 1967 protocol was attached onto
that in order to deal with peoples from other areas of
the world. Dr Kenzer, do you want to elaborate on
that?
165
DR. ICENZER: You can sum it up in one word, poli-
tics. How can you say that Cubans are refugees and
Haitians are not? It's a political issue. People do not
want to hear that underlying our definitions for entry
are issues of race and other things.
DR. SCHWARTZ: There is still the distinction
between economic migrants and political refugees.
The United States does not have a category of an eco-
nomic refugee.
DR. DE BLIJ: We do not. It's irrelevant. The defini-
tion of a refugee is someone from a Communist coun-
try.
DR. KENZER: The distinction is becoming an impor-
tant issue. We are going to see refugees being cast in a
different light; all emphasis is going to be on Central
Americans and people beyond.
DR. SCHWARTZ: A good test case would be Nicara-
gua, from where we once accepted political refugees
but after the government changed, the departees
became economic migrants.
DR. DE BLLT: We also do not accept people from
Communist China, but we do take people from Com-
munist Cuba.
QUESTION: We do accept Chinese refugees; they are
the ones who are allowed to have only one child.
DR. DE BLU: You are right.
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Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative
Examination
Thomas M. Poulsen
Professor of Geography
Portland State University
The conventional political map of the world displays
170 political geographic features that properly are
termed sovereign states. They constitute the habitual
framework for contemplating international affairs.
Unfortunately, the conventional map can be a most
misleading instrument in presenting the political
geography of the world. The map depicts relative sizes
and shapes of countries and the locations of their capi-
tal cities, but these are among their least significant
qualities. Indeed, it should be noted that traditional
political maps of the world typically distort the size of
states because their customary Mercator projection
creates great area disparities between tropical and
polar regions. Although Greenland is about one-sev-
enth the size of South America, it actually appears
larger on most political maps.
Among features of a state critical to governmental
functioning that are ignored on political maps are:
� The territory really under effective control of the
state's government.
� The area of the state actually settled and productive.
� The degree of centralization of governmental deci-
sionmaking and authority within the state.
� The dependence of the given state upon another
state.
� Whether the state is a nation-state or a multination
state. The last-named is the most pivotal.
Nations
A key element in understanding the modern world is
to appreciate the fact that occupying space concur-
rently with states are more than 250 mutually exclu-
sive nations, and these have few outer limits that are
coextensive with state boundaries. The term nation is
a useful generalizing concept that can be applied to a
variety of human groupings. At the simplest level,
nations may be viewed as collective, subjective states
of mind in which individuals habitually segregate
other persons into "our folks" and "foreigners." Many
of the world's ills are the result of conflicting national
identities. However, nations can also be appreciated
for some positive effects, including providing legiti-
macy to governmental actions and facilitating eco-
nomic interdependence through a climate of trust.
The concept of nation is questioned by some because
of the great diversity of circumstances the notion
embraces, with resulting difficulties in definition and
measurement. Unfortunately, although most national
groups share a number of elements in common, each
nation, like each state (and virtually every other phe-
nomenon studied by geography), ultimately is a
unique entity. Questionnaires and other techniques
that may effectively identify members of a nation in
one region may prove inappropriate or erroneous
when applied to groups in another area. The great
diversity among nations does not make the concept
any the less useful, however. Although some individu-
als may have a problem with the subjective quality of
the abstraction, this does not mean that idea is errone-
ous or that nations do not exist because they cannot be
measured.
The advantage of thinking in terms of nations rather
than the more diffuse "ethnic groups" is the political
dimension inherent in the concept. The most impor-
tant common denominators distinguishing nations
from tribes, castes, and other human groupings are
collective self-awareness and a consensual political
agenda. Members of a nation are conscious of that
identity, and most believe that their interests are best
served by having a state of their own.
Numerous ethnic groups throughout the world do not
satisfy these two criteria. Although anthropologists
and other social scientists may identify common ele-
ments that stamp a given population group as distinc-
tive from its neighbors, a lack of group awareness of
individuals beyond extended kinship patterns or
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shared religious beliefs and the absence of common
political goals makes it more appropriate to designate
such groups by the more neutral term peoples. Nations
may be viewed as peoples who have become group
conscious and politically activated. The process is a
continuing one and now is occurring among Quechua-
speakers of the Oriente of Peru, galvanized by the
Sender� Luminoso guerrillas.
The commonly accepted starting point for the appear-
ance of-nations is the French Revolution. The inhabit-
ants of France not only transformed their state at the
end of the 18th century, but also in a sense they
became Frenchmen for the first time. Before that time
few associated themselves with the Kingdom of
France. Their identities were with family and locality
and, at a higher level, with their true Christian faith.
Following the Revolution they increasingly gained a
sense of personal participation in a greater cultural-
political organism. They were manipulated by the
Jacobins, dedicated believers in "the people," who
denigrated traditional Catholicism and enthusiasti-
cally preached a new form of belonging that cele-
brated the interests of the "masses." This
revolutionary system of beliefs took hold because tra-
ditional religion no longer was able to meet spiritual
needs in the challenges of a rapidly changing society.
Urbanization and industrialization presented difficult
problems for individuals for whom traditional reli-
gious establishments had no answers.
From the beginning, language proved a critical ele-
ment in national identity. To be French meant sharing
of French culture, and this meant particularly the
French language. Among proposals voiced in France's
revolutionary parliament was expulsion of all Alsa-
tians across the country's "natural border" of the
Rhine because they were "foreigners'; their vernacu-
lar was German, not French.
The new ideas proved exciting and satisfying, and
Napoleon's troops spread them across the territory
they conquered. However, talk of "liberty, equality,
and brotherhood" by enthusiastic French soldiers did
not co-opt civilians speaking German, Italian, and
other languages into becoming part of the new French
nation. Although large numbers readily accepted the
secular ideas of their occupiers, each linguistic group
evolved a separate national identity.
Language still plays a fundamental role in the identity
of virtually all nations. Linguistic homogeneity is a
characteristic of every national group, with the notable
exception of the Swiss, and even there group tensions
exist, particularly between the Italian-Swiss and the
German-Swiss. One of the most common causes of
ethnic tensions within a state is a group's opposition to
perceived threats to its language. Attempts by Mag-
yars to impose Hungarian as a uniform language
throughout their kingdom in the 1870s stimulated
Croatian-speakers to become the nation of Croats. A
century later, Croatian intellectuals again used a lin-
guistic threat as a national rallying symbol, decrying
the degrading of the Croatian literary language by
attempts of the Yugoslav regime to blend it with Ser-
bian vocabulary and usage to form an "artificial"
Serbo-Croatian statewide language.
Religious tradition also plays a role in the identities of
most nations. The militancy of the Croatians about
their literary language was a symptom of deeper divi-
sions among the South Slays based upon their differ-
ing religious heritages. Croatian culture has been
bound up for more than a millenium with the Roman
Catholic world, while Serbian traditions stem from an
F-astern Orthodox inheritance. It should be stressed
that religious dimensions of modern national identities
need not derive from active worship but generally
come from the shared values, customs, and images
accumulating in a society from a common religious
legacy. Avowedly atheistic members of the League of
Yugoslav Communists, although speaking a common
Serbo-Croatian language, remained always partitioned
into distinctive bodies of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims,
separated from each other by their respective religious
cultures. A similar cultural disparity separates
English-speaking Roman Catholic partisans of the
Irish Revolutionary Army from Protestant supporters
of the Ulster Defence Association.
Thus, although a common language appears to be a
major element of national identity, in itself it does not
provide a sufficient base for identification with a
nation. The French nation never managed to incorpo-
rate the adjacent French-speaking Belgian Walloons
or the Swiss francophones of Geneva. Closer to home,
although virtually all citizens of the United States and
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two-thirds of Canadians exclusively speak English,
they remain separate nations. There are 20 different
nations in Latin America who speak Spanish and at
least 17 different Arabic-speaking nations in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa.
Since language appears to be an essential but not deci-
sive element in national identity, the question remains
of what distinguishes Americans from Canadians,
Germans from Austrians, or Uruguayans from Argen-
tineans. Certainly a key element is an association with
a particular "homeland." This is the hallowed land of
forefathers, whose legacy of monuments and struc-
tures are encountered every day. A number of other-
wise homogeneous and exclusive peoples have failed
to forge themselves into nations because they lack dis-
tinctive territories of their own, including Gypsies in
Europe and Parsees in India.
Homeland is a key part of what the French political
geographer Jean Gottman termed the "iconography"
of nations. He included in the concept the sum total of
"icons" shared by a given group, including their
national symbols, perceptions of history, traditional
myths, poetry, pastimes, and a host of other elements
that otherwise can be termed little more than "trivia."
To be a Canadian is to love ice hockey, to be senti-
mental about the song "0 Canada," and to resist the
"colossus of the south." Americans share George
Washington's mythic cherry tree and contact football.
The traditions of Islam and the values of Buddhism
are foreign to both groups, however much a minority
of their individuals may treasure them.
Iconographies are the products of inherited traditions,
indoctrination in the education process, and mass
media. They also are subject to change. Bing Crosby
was once a significant element in the American ico-
nography; his place has been taken by Elvis Presley
and Garth Brooks.
Americans have difficulty in contemplating the notion
of nationhood. Unlike Europeans, most of whom
dwell within 100 miles of an international border, few
Americans ever face challenges to their national iden-
tities. Also, our society is a multicultural one, some-
thing increasingly celebrated. Our principal ethnic
minorities, Hispanics and African Americans,
although manifesting characteristics that distinguish
themselves from other Americans, have not forged
separate nations as major minorities have done in
most other countries. This is primarily because they
are dispersed throughout the United States and thus
lack a specific homeland in which they are a majority.
Although Hispanic Americans have the potential to
become a separate nation within this country through
retention of their distinctive Spanish language, their
religious traditions, and for many their association
with Mexico, it should be noted that separatists among
African Americans have always faced difficulties in
attempting to mobilize political sentiments because
their group shares with all other Americans a common
language and religious-derived values and traditions,
in addition to their scattered location.
Part of the American iconography in recent years has
been an increasing distrust by many of anything that
smacks of "nationalism." This properly should not be
seen as the same as "national identity." Nationalism
refers to active political movements that play upon
national group values, symbols, and prejudices.
National identity is a passive shared state of mind that
most individuals would consider a natural way of
looking at things. When asked about their own
national identity, many highly educated Americans
would profess a lack of such. However, they cannot
escape the fact that they are members of the American
nation, living in a world of Babe Ruth, "we the peo-
ple," and "liberty and equality for all." Accustomed to
life in a successful melting pot, Americans cannot
understand why Serbs, Croats, and Muslims cannot be
just Yugoslays or why Europe has had such difficulty
uniting, now that 1992 has passed. However, it is
ironic that some of the most avowedly nonnationalists
or antinationalists in America opposed the North
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) because
it will export "our" jobs to "those" Mexicans.
Part of the minimal active awareness of national iden-
tity of Americans is the lack of a long history of
English-speaking settlement in North America. Dis-
counting the structures of Native Americans who
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established impressive civilizations long before the
advent of Europeans to the New World, the oldest
buildings Americans see in their homeland are less
than four centuries old, and on the West Coast they are
barely 150 years old. In contrast, Europeans daily
walk past cathedrals erected 1.0 centuries or more ago.
European perceptions are of a national continuity with
the forebears who constructed those buildings, even
though the national identities to which they adhere are
products primarily of the 19th century.
Overlapping Patterns of States and Nations
Lack of coincidence between the patterns of states and
nations is a principal driving force in world affairs.
Present configurations are a consequence of historical
processes and events unique to each area. In many
cases, including that of the Japanese and the Portu-
guese, the nation is clearly a product of an ancient
state and coincides closely with it. In other instances,
such as that of the Croatians oi Belarusians, the nation
emerged despite strong efforts at suppression by state
authorities.
Although the vast majority of ptates feature single
dominant nations, most also contain inconvenient
other national groups. In many cases this asymmetry
is the result of past state-building when petty units
were melded together with no thought given to cul-
tural characteristics of inhabitants. A degree of homo-
geneity resulted from imposition of the ruler's
religion, although language resisted assimilation. In
other instances, the intermixture of groups in frontier
zones between culture areas made impossible the
drawing of boundary lines between new nation-states
that did not include minorities. Thus, all the states
formed in the East European "shatter zone" after
World War I encompassed minorities approaching 20
percent or more. Similarly, no ideal line could be
drawn between Muslims and Hindus when indepen-
dence came to India and Pakistan and tragedy
resulted�and continues in Kashmir�when a line was
established.
In surveying minority nations, a meaningful distinc-
tion rests between those that are self-contained and
those that are "irredentist." The latter term is derived
from an appellation applied by Italians to their "unre-
deemed" fellow nationals who lived outside the King-
dom of Italy. The concept has become a universal one
applied to members of nations living outside the
boundaries of a state dominated by people like them-
selves. Irredentist minorities pose particular problems
to world peace because their causes may elicit active
support from adjacent states governed by members of
their nations.
World Patterns of Nations and States
The pattern of nation-and-state combinations differs
from region to region around the world. Only a few
states may be classed as pure nation-states lacking
minority nations that seek autonomy or separation.
Interestingly, France, which often is held out as the
archetype of the nation-state, is not one of these. It
embraces at least four minority nations that increas-
ingly seek recognition of their distinctive status and
territories: the Corsicans, Bretons, Basques, and Occi-
tanians.
More than three-quarters of the states of Europe are
multinational, although this percentage has decreased
in recent years with the divisions of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovalcia. However, newly independent Mace-
donia must deal with a 20-percent minority of Alba-
nians, and Slovakia must accommodate 10 percent of
its citizens who are Magyars and 7 percent who are
Ruthenians.
The former Soviet Union held the dubious distinction
of being the most diverse state in the world, with at
least 30 groups that could be termed nations and more
than 70 other peoples inhabiting its land space. The
dominant Russians numbered barely half its total pop-
ulation. Despite the USSR's fragmentation, few of the
Soviet successor countries can be termed nation-
states, as witnessed by Azerbaijan's problems with
Armenians and Georgia's difficulties with Abkhazians
and Ossetes.
Despite the seeming homogeneity in religion and lan-
guage of the Middle East and North Africa, virtually
none of the region's states are without minority prob-
lems. Several, including Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, and
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Iraq, have endured violent ethnic strife in recent years.
African states likewise are diverse, with clashes
occurring particularly along the Sahelian fault zone
between Arabic and Sub-Saharan cultures. For a vari-
ety of reasons, few nations have emerged south of the
Sahara. Extreme tribal and linguistic diversity charac-
terizes most Sub-Saharan states. Nigeria contains
more than 300 distinctive groups and Zaire more than
200.
Diversity also characterizes the states of South Asia.
India long has encountered secessionist movements in
its northeastern and northwestern wings, and it has
mounting troubles with its Sikh and Dravidian minori-
ties. Pakistan already has lost Bangladesh and faces
severe problems with Pathans, Sindhis, and Baluchis.
Even a tiny state like Bhutan must contend with an 18-
percent regional minority of Nepalese.
Although the states of mainland and insular Southeast
Asia are typified by well-developed dominant nations,
each contains numerous minorities, some of which
now are evolving into true minority nations. Burma,
Indonesia, and the Philippines endure continuing strife
in their outer areas. In contrast, East Asian states are
remarkably homogeneous and calm, with the notable
exception of China. Although 92 percent of its popula-
tion may be considered members of the Chinese
nation, the remaining 8 percent dominate more than
60 percent of its total territory.
The Anglo-American, Latin-American, and Australa-
sian states are notable for minimal minority problems.
The chief exception is Quebecois separatism in Can-
ada. The indigenous population in many states of
Latin America shows signs of restiveness, however,
particularly in the Andean region and in Central.
America.
Factors Aggravating or Ameliorating
Ethnic Conflict
The currently escalating frictions among nations
within states can be ascribed to a number of factors,
including the increasing media avenues for promoting
nationalist views and the post�Cold War drying up of
superpower funds that often were used by client states
to appease or suppress troublesome minorities.
Although a number of political geographers have
addressed questions of ethnicity, they have not come
up with a viable theory that would allow identification
of what circumstances escalate diversity into conflict
or prediction of when and where such conflict is likely
to occur. This is not to say that they have not devel-
oped interesting insights. One of the more useful theo-
retical concepts that have been developed in recent
years is that of "core-periphery" relationships. In
many states the capital city and its surrounding area
dominate the economy, politics, and culture of a coun-
try. The American geographer Mark Jefferson
observed this recurring regularity at the turn of the
century and called it "The Law of the Primate City."
In core-periphery theory, the metropolitan center
exploits peripheral areas, a high proportion of which
differ from the dominant area in ethnicity and stan-
dard of living. Although attractive for its seeming uni-
versality, core-periphery theory proves to be of little
use as a guide to specific problems. While its premise
fits many states, it runs counter to the situation in
many others. Thus, the peripheral areas of Catalonia
and the Basque region long have dominated the econ-
omy of Spain, and living standards in Alsace-Lorraine
are higher than in most of the rest of France.
Ethnic conflict is unpredictable. Each state situation
constitutes a unique combination of differing groups,
inherited traditions, and external circumstances.
Although one may wish to see recurring regularities or
scientific laws at work, there are simply too few cases
that individually differ too much to permit an elabora-
tion of theory comparable to that of the physical sci-
ences.
The unpredictability of-conflict perhaps is best seen in
the internecine struggle in Somalia. Of all the states of
Sub-Saharan Africa, internal strife would seem least
likely to occur in that country due to its homogeneity
in language and religion. However, Somalia's unique
clan system has much in common with national diver-
sity in Europe and elsewhere, and warfare between
clans came on the heels of the failure of a highly cen-
tralized, despotic regime.
Despite the seeming impossibility of formulating a
viable theory to examine potentials for ethnic conflict,
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a generalized framework is feasible. First, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between unstable group circum-
stances and triggering actions that lead to strife.
Almost by definition, the presence of a minority
nation constitutes an unstable situation. Identifying
the presence of such nations is an essential first step.
Next, it is important to consider possible elements that
can set off conflict. Regimes control volatile internal
situations through a variety of devices, ranging from
totalitarian suppression to m6aningful autonomy. No
matter how successful a policy may be, even in the
long term, it will not satisfy all individuals. Extremists
for a national cause can find ways to manipulate group
opinion that is disaffected for: any reason. A dramatic
change of circumstances can provide the extremists
with strong levers. We recently witnessed the mobili-
zation of latent national antagonisms in Yugoslavia,
despite more than four decades of universal indoctri-
nation of the population in the slogan of "brotherhood
and unity." A disastrously deteriorating economy, a
model of political change presented by a collapsing
Soviet Union, and unwise actions by a federal army
attempting to suppress autonomy allowed nationalist
true believers to mobilize their nations. Once ignited,
national passions fed upon themselves, each group's
reactions engendering counteractions from the others.
Virtually nobody remains a "Yugoslav" any more.
Some Suggestions for American Policy in Dealing
With Ethnic Conffict Abroad
Political geography has evolved some truisms over the
years that are useful for considering ethnic conflict.
Among them are the following:
� The present configuration of states is far from ideal
and embodies tensions that have the potential to
result in fragmentations and shifts of territory.
Attempts to preserve the existing status quo in the
name of peace can well exaCerbate unstable situa-
tions and even hasten conflict. It is unfortunate that
the United States Government tacitly supported the
Serbian-dominated regime's attempt to maintain
intact the Yugoslav state in the face of escalating
national minority demands for secession. A firm
statement to the Yugoslav Government that the use
of force to maintain unity was intolerable to the
United States might have obviated the current
conflicts in that tortured land and allowed a peaceful
transition to separate states.
� Maintenance of an unsatisfactory ethnic status quo
is generally futile for a country and certainly can be
costly in terms of transfer payments and policing.
Although the United States sided with Gorbachev in
attempting to preserve the Soviet Union intact, Rus-
sia's loss of its Central Asian territories was of long-
term benefit to the Russian people in stemming the
outflow of funds to a region that has grave social
and economic problems.
� Gains or losses of territory generally affect only the
local inhabitants of the areas involved, with little
impact upon the overall economy and standards of
living. Although difficult to believe, even the United
States could cede Texas or California to Mexico and
still maintain much the same well-being of its
remaining inhabitants, whether or not NAFTA came,
into existence.
� Small independent states can flourish if they are
willing to yield economic sovereignty to a broader
common market. The inhabitants of 999-square-
mile Luxembourg have done quite well for them-
selves as part of Benelux and now the European
Community. Communist Albania, in contrast, com-
mitted economic suicide by cutting ties to all neigh-
bors and potential partners.
171
� Allowing national groups to form states of their own
does not inherently result in more intense national-
isms and potentials for greater international strife
but, on the contrary, can have a sobering effect.
Latvians and Slovaks are having second thoughts
about their national quests for independence as they
must now assume full responsibility for maintaining
themselves.
Above all, it is important to perceive states in terms of
their total political geography. More specifically, it is
the ethnic content of a state that is important, not its
external boundaries. This was a principal fallacy of
geopolitical thinking, which laid stress upon the
geometry of states, their positions, sizes, and
"resources," rather than upon their degrees of unity
and the abilities of their governments to elicit support
from inhabitants for "my country, right or wrong."
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C. H. Williams, "Minority Groups in the Modern
State," Progress in Political Geography, Michael
Pacione, ed., London: Croom Helm, 1985, 111-151.
C. H. Williams, Linguistic Minorities, Society, and
Territory, Multilingual Matters No. 78, Clevedon:
Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1991.
R. Wixman, The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethno-
graphic Handbook, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1984.
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Summary of Discussion
General Discussion
QUESTION: Do you think that political arrangements
have very little to do with the consolidation of nation-
alism of our nation states?
DR. POULSEN: Geographers are concerned with
things that give character to territory; we look at
nations as one of the critical components of such.
The way governments adjust their institutional
arrangements to accommodate the national diversity is
a question more properly in the province of a political
scientist. Nevertheless, many geographers will agree
that one of the most important characteristics of terri-
tory is the prevailing national identity in that territory.
One cannot understand this section of the United
States without knowing that English is the common
language and that Americans share a lot of common
images and values that help make the country go.
Where You have diversity within the state, serious
problems exist. I made a particular point of-distin-
guishing between nations and other groups; the caste
system in India, for instance, is a very fundamental
part of understanding India and really does not fit into
this otherwise useful framework.
DR. HONEY: I would suggest that our notion of the
nation-state is really oversimplified and that we would
be better off if we adopted Tilly's definition of the
national state. There are few really national states, as
you pointed out, and, where the countries are very
strong, there are more national states than nation-
states. They clearly are very important actors and, in
most states, they are not forcing people into a single
form. Clearly, that is the case in the United States, in
Britain, and in France. National identity is important,
but it is not necessarily an identity that requires every-
body to be the same. As we look at the newer states of
the world, the states that have been created after
World War II, virtually none of them come anything
close to the nation-state. They are national states.
DR. POULSEN: Well, we obviously differ on this.
One of the fundamental facts is that the world is parti-
tioned into states, and this cannot be ignored. The
states are very significant in determining what is pro-
duced, how people do things, and the like. But at the
same level, we have, in fact, national identities so that
within a state there may be two quite different simul-
taneously operating systems based upon this identity.
If we go the way of the anthropologist and look at
every single grouping of people�and this is certainly
a valid way of looking at things�we do not get to
some of the big problems that generate conflict. The
interrelationships between nations within states and
also of national interests between states are the key
ingredients in conflict.
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Patterns, Trends, and Regional Comparisons
Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Marvin W. Mikesell
In discussing nations and states, there are various
terms that we can use:
� Nation-state. An example is Iceland.
� Multinational state. There are many examples; India
would fit very well.
� Multistate nation. "Germania," "Francophonia," and
many others fit that category.
� Nonstate nations. In this group we have Khalistan,
Kurdistan, Palestine, and others. 1,
� Nonnation states. Two unhappy examples would be
Lebanon and Afghanistan; a happy example is the
Vatican.
It struck me that in all the presentations thus far we
have been dealing with pathology rather than any kind
of medicine or cure. In fact, in some cases, death cer-
tificates have even been written, but we have had very
little in the way of looking for good examples of
where accommodation has occurred rather than con-
flict. Part of the problem is that countries just do not
learn from other countries on issues of minority rights,
human rights, and questions of culture and nationality.
This is surprising because legal codes are borrowed;
entire constitutions are virtually plagiarized from one
country to another. Yet it is rare to find one country
saying to another country, "You seem to have a nice
situation here; maybe we can learn from you."
An interesting case would be Estonia. The Estonians
are making terrible blunders in dealing with their Rus-
sian population. All they have to do is go to Helsinki
and examine what Finland has done with its Swedish
minority; it has anticipated their needs and, in a sense,
treated a 10-percent minority as though it were a
49-percent one. Finland has bilingual signs even
where they are not needed for any functional reason.
Now, if you tell an Estonian, "For Heaven's sake, get
on a boat and go to Helsinki and learn something," he
would say, "Well, it's a totally different situation.
These Russians are occupiers. They're colonists."
We also have examples of states than denounce mis-
treatment of minorities in neighboring states while
seeming to be surprisingly indifferent to parallel cir-
cumstances within their own borders. Until quite
recently, for example, the Turkish press bitterly
denounced the treatment of the Turkish minority in
Bulgaria. They were denied recognition and forced to
change their names. If a Bulgarian Turk tried to regis-
ter a child or get a driver's license, he would immedi-
ately be told he must have a Bulgarian name. This
effectively was nonrecognition of a minority that
composed about 10 percent of Bulgaria's population,
and the Turks were furious about this. At the same
time, the Turks were treating their country's minority
Kurds exactly the same way: not recognizing their
language, refusing to register names, not even allow-
ing music with Kurdish lyrics on the radio.
That is the problem: we do not have transfer of wis-
dom. We do not have people going into Finland from
Bulgaria, Turkey, Sri Lanka, etc. to study what hap-
pened there since 1918. They could learn from it.
Discussant: Mildred Berman
One of the references to which I immediately turned
when I was invited to come to this conference was
Isaiah Bowman's The New World. That book has a
very fine analysis of what led up to the ethnic prob-
lems that resulted in World War I, plus a lot of good
maps. Bowman says, "But the world's people are fun-
damentally unlike, and the road to success passes
through a wilderness of experiment." I think that is
what we have been hearing these two days.
I would like to address population, particularly fertil-
ity. Indonesia recently has been successful in cutting
its fertility rate down to a little more than two children
per woman. The Indonesians could get it down to
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replacement level soon. This is encouraging, because
Indonesia is the world's most populous Islamic nation.
It is not a highly industrialized state, but the govern-
ment keeps pushing the idea publicly that small fami-
lies are happy families. I think that is worth
considering in many parts of the world that are grow-
ing rapidly.
General Discussion
DR. WDCMAN: In light of a comment made by Pro-
fessor Mikesell, I agree that, in terms of conflict reso-
lution, the example of Finland is superb. Why did the
Finns give such rights to the Swedes? Because they
had been under Russian rule. A little earlier in history,
when Rtsia took Finland from Sweden, it was anti-
Swedishism that became the symbolism in pro-Russi-
anism.
What we need to look at in terms of conflict resolution
is how reconciliation can take place. The reason
Armenians still hate Turks is that there has never been
reconciliation. Similarly there will be no ability for
Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims to live together
until reconciliation occurs.
DR. MIKESELL: Another example of a government
maintaining a keen awareness of minority-group
needs would be that of the Netherlands. About 10 per-
cent of the country's population is Frisian, but only
10 percent of the Frisians vote for the Frisian National
Party. There is a Frisian academy; there are chairs in
the language in Dutch universities. It is almost as
though the government has said to the Frisians, "You
are recognized. We would be pleased if you would
engage in activities to promote your identity. We'll
even subsidize it."
Also, Switzerland recognized its Romansche-speakers
before they clamored for recognition. This is partly
because Mussolini considered Romansche to be an
Italian dialect, and that frightened the Swiss. But we
have so few other examples of that happening. I
would say that treating a 10-percent minority as
though it were a 49-percent minority works, but it
requires extraordinary sophistication on behalf of the
majority side.
There are four core-applied questions that come to
mind:
� Under what circumstances do ethnic groups become
politicized in the first place?
� Under what circumstances do politicized groups
come into conflict?
� What circumstances aggravate or ameliorate con-
flict?
� What are the implications of conflict for national/
international order?
Those are, it seems to me, the strongest set of applied
questions we should deal with. If there is a message
related to those questions, each one of which could be
addressed at some length, it seems to me, it is that we
are not living in a simple world. I will avoid the ugly
term complexification, but it seems to me that what
continues to come across is that context matters, and
context is a complicated array of things that come
together.
If there is a value to geography, it is not that it studies
a particular thing but that it tries to look at how things
come together and interact with core concepts like ter-
ritory, location, and environment. The key advantage
of a geographical perspective is its ability to try to
think about the relationships among and between phe-
nomena in places. This is where political science and
geography really come together. Politics and power
are expressed territorially, and looking at the relation-
ships among and between the territorial units and the
expression of powers is critical to understanding the
circumstances that lead to each of those four applied
questions that I noted.
DR. DE BLU: The examples that Dr. Mikesell men-
tioned of countries that were gracious to their minori-
ties were also countries that were relatively well off at
the time they made those concessions.
When Germany was thriving, the Turkish minority
was welcome. When Germany had an economic
recession, the Turkish minority became disliked.
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There is some relationship to the well-being of a state
that has chances of overcoming ethnic disrepair and
the economic downturn that might presage it. This
relates a little bit also to what Dr. Fuller said earlier. It
might also mean that we ought to think twice before
we use sanctions and economic destruction to achieve
our aims in a foreign country. I still feel that, had sanc-
tions not been imposed on South Africa, the democra-
tization process might have taken longer but would
have cost far fewer lives and have had a more satisfac-
tory outcome.
DR. MIKESELL: I would say of all national policies,
the one that is most likely to result in violence is non-
recognition; to say simply, "You don't exist. Your lan-
guage is merely a dialect. Your religion is a
heterodoxy." It drives people crazy to be told that they
do not exist. It hardly seems conceivable that Musso-
lini's policy toward South Tyrol would be the model
that the world wants to emulate and, yet, this indeed is
happening all the time. It is the redundancy of this
pathology that I find so depressing.
QUESTION: If this policy of nonrecognition is a key
aggravating factor, can you identify the flip side of
that? Can you put a name on a key ameliorating factor
that is helping to contain that?
DR. MIKESELL: That would involve cases where
there seems to be accommodation, such as the extraor-
dinary examples of Finland, where a minority group
was made a partner from the beginning. In this case,
the Finns anticipated the needs of the Swedish minor-
ity, rather than waiting until the Swedes were shouting
and demonstrating. Unfortunately, there are very few
examples of this enlightened policy.
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US Policy Perspectives:
A Conceptual Approach
Jon Gundersen
US Department of State
Americans are uncomfortable with ethnic politics.
Why shy away from distinction based on race, reli-
gion, or nationality�at least in our public rhetoric.
During the Cold War, ethnic conflicts were under-
standably ignored by Western policymakers. Forty
plus years of finely crafted and cleared NATO talking
points provided all the answers we seemed to need in
a bipolar world. In a brave new Europe, without an
identifiable enemy, we now have to think for a living.
The ethnic killing fields of Bosnia confronted the
West with a number of options�all of them unattrac-
tive. Compassion fatigue set in when our initial
attempts to draw up convoluted ethnic maps were
rejected and scenes of starving babies became all to
commonplace on CNN. Was this fratricide not a
uniquely Balkan curse, Europeans silently wondered?
Could we not quarantine the carriers? This approach,
of course, provided a convenient rationale for Western
noninvolvement. It is also proved to be wishful and
dangerous thinking.
Setting aside the humanitarian rationale, there is a
compelling strategic argument for Western engage-
ment. The nations of the East already perceive them-
selves in a political, economic, and security vacuum.
Without a sense of being part of a larger community�
governed by accepted rules of behavior�neo-Com-
munist and ethnic nationalists may once again set the
rules. Already the unprecedented flows of refugees
from the East have spilled over even to prosperous
avenues of Paris and Frankfurt. Xenophobia and eth-
nic politics have become forces to be reckoned with
throughout the West.
Ethnic conflict will be on the international agenda for
the foreseeable future. This paper traces the historic
and philosophical reasons why Americans have been
so ill prepared to confront the issue and then suggests
a conceptual framework to deal with ethnic conflict in
Europe. First, it argues that we should look at the eth-
nic issue through the prism of individual and human
rights, not group entitlements. Second, it calls for a
Europe that is both more united and more autono-
mous. More autonomous in the sense that decisions
are made�on a practical, not ideological basis�at
the lowest possible administrative level. At the same
time, autonomy can lead to anarchy and increased eth-
nic strife unless guided by universal, shared values.
Therefore, the paper suggests ways to create civil
societies in the East and to integrate these societies
into a democratic family of nations.
Ethnic Issues in Bipolar World
Since the end of World War II, we viewed our policy
in Europe through the optics of the Cold War. The pol-
icy of containment�with NATO as its operative man-
ifestation�aimed at providing collective defense
against a real Soviet threat. In this regard, the policy
was extraordinarily successful. We deployed our
forces and accomplished our mission without a shot
being fired. In the process, we helped build viable
democracies and, ultimately, witnessed the systematic
and systemic defeat of our main adversary.
In a bipolar world, however, other issues, such as eth-
nic conflicts, were largely ignored by Western policy-
makers. In the West, the emphasis was on centrally
organized solutions to security and economic prob-
lems; for example, NATO and the EC. While these
organizations have fulfilled their primary Cold War
missions of uniting Western Europe, they have tended
to avoid, perhaps understandably, issues such as
national identity, regional autonomy, and ethnic con-
flict. Few commentators were prepared, for example,
for the anti-Brussels backlash following Maastrict. In
the East, more ominously, long-simmering ethnic dis-
putes remained submerged or suppressed by totalitar-
ian regimes controlled by Moscow. There was no
chance to resolve differences in an open and evolu-
tionary manner. Moreover, generations of Western
diplomats, scholars, and journalists working out of
Moscow�and Belgrade�rarely journeyed to the
provinces. If they did, they were greeted by party loy-
alists who owed their positions to the central authori-
ties. In a sense, we tacitly accepted the Leninist
imposed view of the new man shorn of ethnic identity.
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The Return, Not the End, of History
Western policymakers were thus ill prepared to antici-
pate the breakup of the Soviet empire or the disinte-
gration of Yugoslavia. We believed that a democratic
Soviet Union could solve the messy nationality prob-
lems ignored or suppressed by czars and commissars
for centuries. In August 1990; in his famous "Chicken
Kiev" speech, President Bush cast his lot with the cen-
tral authorities in Moscow, dOding "suicidal nation-
alism" and averring that "democracy does not mean
independence." Three weeks later Ukraine declared its
independence; five months later the Soviet Union col-
lapsed. Later in that same year, Secretary of State
Baker declared a "one Yugoslavia" policy, thereby,
according to many, encouraging Milosovic to pursue a
"one Serbia" policy. By the end of the year, the world
had become all too familiar with the term "ethnic
cleansing." Far from witnessing the "end of history,"
we are witnessing the "return of history," which all too
often in Europe has been characterized by ethnic
strife.
Russians: "Can't Live With Them, Can't Live
Without Them"
We are also witnessing the geopolitical legacy of
Stalin's ethnic policies. By reMoving ethnic minorities
from their homelands and often replacing them with
ethnic Russians, Stalin laid the basis for today's seem-
ingly irreconcilable tendencies of independence and
interdependence. The former Soviet Republics all
have economic and blood ties to their Russian big
brothers. And they all resent it.
Group Versus Individual Rights
In addition to these historic reasons, Americans have
another, perhaps more fundamental, reason for our
inability to come to terms with ethnic conflict in
Europe: we hold the individual, not the group,
supreme. European nations have long recognized and
promoted the concept of "group and ethnic rights,"
even if Europeans have as much difficulty in defining
these rights as they have in coming up with an all-
European recipe for sausage.
Americans intuitively approach this subject from a
different perspective. Group rights, in our view, serve
to delineate and emphasize differences among people
and tend to separate rather than unite. From the time
of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution,
especially the Bill of Rights, we have held that indi-
vidual rights are primary and not subordinated to the
rights of a particular group, some of whom may also
belong to national minorities. Even in a politically
correct age, many Americans are uncomfortable with
distinctions based on race, religion, and nationality.
American Ideals and European Solutions
In practical terms, what principles guide the American
policy maker in addressing the issue of ethnic conflict
in Europe? Is the concept of individual rights applica-
ble to ethnic and minority issues Europe? Or is it too
anachronistic and too American for dealing with 21st-
century Europe? Can we respect the right of individ-
ual and group self-determination and, at the same
time, defend the territorial integrity of existing nation-
states? In other words, are the Helsinki Final Act prin-
ciples valid or even reconcilable in formulating our
policy toward ethnic conflict? In a changing Europe,
we will be increasingly confronted with uncomfort-
able choices. Without a conceptual context, we will be
forced to rely on ad hoc solutions.
It is perhaps easier to begin to answer some of these
questions by identifying what should not be our pol-
icy. Many Europeans and Americans are ill at ease in
this brave new world. They view the alleged stability
of Cold War Europe with some nostalgia; some even
seek solutions in monolithic ethnically pure states.
Both of these remedies are false and dangerous. The
Cold War resulted in the systematic suppression of the
most basic human and national rights in much of
Europe and a massive misuse of scarce resources.
Solutions based on ethnic purity violate the most basic
tenets of Judeo-Christian beliefs. They are particularly
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repugnant to a pluralistic society such as the United
States. Ultimately, instability is not caused by demo-
cratically expressed claims by individuals and
national communities but by the denial of these
claims.
The above solutions should be categorically rejected.
Other policy prescriptions offer more traditional solu-
tions. In the name of stability, the Realpolitik school
calls for working within the existing state system. The
so-called Sonnenfeld Doctrine of the mid-1970s, in
effect, accepted the status quo in Europe; that is,
spheres of American and Soviet influence. The propo-
nents of this school emphasize Principles 3 and 4 of
the Helsinki Final Act, respectively the inviolability of
frontiers and respect for territorial integrity. What they
fail to recall is that the Helsinki Final Act is a care-
fully balanced document based on centuries of sad
European history. Using time-honored Jesuitical logic,
the Helsinki drafters declared that "all principles are
equal." The first Helsinki principle, for example, notes
that "frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and
agreement. Thus the United States recognized the
peaceful unification of Germany in 1990 and the
peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The Wilsonian model, on the other hand, stresses the
promotion of ethnic rights through national self-deter-
mination. It has certain academic allure. However, as
much as European statesmen paid lipservice to this
ideal at Versailles, it was more honored in the breech
than the observance in the interwar period. Moreover,
carried to its discouragingly logical conclusion, this
model, like Russian nesting dolls, might well lead to a
state structure composed of increasingly small (and
untenable) states�Yugoslavia divided into five or six
states; Bosnia divided into three states; or the Soviet
Union divided into 15 states, Russia (or Georgia)
divided into x states, ad infinitum.
From Marx to Milosovic
For many the collapse of the Soviet Union represented
the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy.
Marxist-Leninism had been thoroughly discredited
as a method of-organizing society. Moreover, for the
first time in over 400 years, no major power sought
hegemony in Eastern Europe. With visions of a new
Marshall Plan, the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union understandable,
if naively, believed that the West would willingly open
its doors�and coffers�to their former adversaries.
Despite rhetorical sympathy, this has not been the
case. Perhaps it was inevitable, but new (and age-old)
problems�ethnic strife, ultranationalism, and mas-
sive migration�quickly replaced Soviet Commu-
nism as the primary threats to Europe. When the walls
came down in the East, economic and other barriers
were erected in the West. European governments,
beset by recession, worried more about halting the
westward flow of goods and people than about inte-
grating the economies of the East into the European
Community.
Adrift between East a�nd West, the countries of the
former Warsaw Pact perceive themselves in a politi-
cal, economic, and security vacuum. And dema-
gogues, often seeking ethnic scapegoats, plow fertile
fields of public discontent. Without a sense of being
part of a larger community�governed by accepted
rules of behavior�neo-Communist and ethnic nation-
alist may once again set the rules.
The Nation-State and Ethnic Rights
What type of state structure can best protect the ethnic
groups of Europe? The European nation-state has
been both the traditional protector and persecutor of
indigenous ethnic groups. Historically, both Germany
and Russia have assumed a special responsibility for
their ethnic counterparts wherever they might live.
(Even today, Germany grants automatic citizenship to
all ethnic Germans.) These same nation-states, how-
ever, have a melancholy history regarding the treat-
ment of-other minority ethnic and religious groups. By
the same token, the decline of the nation-state, partic-
ularly in the East, can also lead to increased ethnic
tensions, as we have witnessed in the former Yugosla-
via. If the traditional nation-state system has often
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failed to protect ethnic minorities, the collapse of the
nation-state has not offered an appealing alternative.
Can Europe's ethnic problems be solved by redrawing
state frontiers? National and ethnic identities existed
for centuries before state borders were drawn and
redrawn, usually by outside interests. What year
would we use to define the nation-state structure in
Europe? 1993? 1989? 1945? 1917? Clearly, there is no
magic formula. While we should not encourage that
ethnic conflict be solved by changing national bound-
aries, we should not exclude that these boundaries can
be changed by peaceful means. As in the case of a
reunified Germany, border changes can be counte-
nanced by the international community if they are
accepted by all interested parties and accompanied by
guarantees protecting individual rights and minority
communities.
A Kinder and Gentler Europe
Is there an ideal�or even preferable�state structure
for Europe today? Perhaps this is the wrong question.
We should rather ask how Europe can best accommo-
date individual rights, as well as national and ethnic
pluralism? Clearly, there are no simple answers. How-
ever, we might begin by contemplating a Europe that
is both more united and less centralized. While the
nation-state remains the most. significant unit in
Europe today, its political role is increasingly being
supplemented by both supernational and subnational
units. This development is fraught not only with dan-
gers but also with opportunities for a kinder and gen-
tler Continent.
A Europe, which respects individual and ethnic rights,
can only be achieved on a deMocratic basis if there is
grass roots involvement in the process. Logically,
decisions are best made at the lowest possible level.
Europeans have dubbed this concept�in the best
Brussels bureaucratese�"subsidiarity'; Americans
might call it "federalism." This very American
approach can lead to practical, not ideological, solu-
tions to local problems from garbage collection to
minority rights, from electing regional governments to
establishing native-language schools.
Autonomy can lead to anarchy, however, unless it is
accompanied by rules of the road to guide the devel-
opment of a civil society in the East. Without an active
partnership with the West, it is doubtful whether this
model can flourish in nations unaccustomed to unre-
strained democracy. Thus, the process of devolution
of power, particularly in the East, could exacerbate
ethnic tensions and ultimately threaten democracy
unless it is guided by institutions based on shared val-
ues. The only appropriate Western response is to inte-
grate the countries east of the Oder-Niesse line to the
family of democratic nations. This must be done in the
political sphere by supporting Rnstern reform and
reformers, in the economic sphere by opening Western
markets to Eastern goods and in the strategic sphere
by opening Pastern Europe and eventually nations of
the former Soviet Union into Western security struc-
tures.
NATO: A New Mission
The security of Europe is indivisible. Ethnic conflict,
ultranationalism, or massive flows of refugees any-
where threaten stability everywhere, including the
most advanced West European democracies. What
happens in Central and Eastern Europe also has a
direct bearing on the fate of the Newly Independent
States (NIS)�and vice versa. Without the successful
expansion of the democratic community of nations to
the East, the stability of Europe cannot be guaranteed.
A stable security framework, in the view of many
Eastern democrats, is a precondition for building
democracies and strong economies in their part of the
world. While this argument can easily be turned
around�building viable economies is the best way to
ensure security�there is no doubt that this perception
is widely shared.
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Three times in this century the United States has been
drawn into European wars (two hot, one cold). We
have learned through painful history that the United
States cannot remain indifferent to threats to European
stability. The ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
should serve as a poignant reminder that Europe is
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still a dangerous place and that only one institution
has the operational capabilities and habits of coopera-
tion to preserve peace and stability on the Continent in
the post�Cold War era: NATO.
To accomplish this mission, however, NATO must
transform itself from an Alliance based on collective
defense against an identifiable threat into an Alliance
committed to projecting democracy, stability, and
crisis management throughout the Continent. This
cannot be done without engaging the nations to the
East. The real and potential hotspots in Europe all lie
in this area. If NATO does not deal with these nations,
it will become increasingly irrelevant�a closed,
chummy club without a mission or a message. Any
new security structure, therefore, must be inclusive
rather than exclusive; it should not lead to the redivi-
sion of Europe into blocs.
Over time, therefore, NATO must be open to new
members, largely to the Fast but also to include the
neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. This
approach�which has been called the "Partnership for
Peace" program�would provide a framework within
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for
enhanced political and military cooperation. Under
this rubric the militaries of East and West would plan,
train, and exercise together. Active cooperation in this
partnership could lay the foundation for full NATO
membership. In short, future expansion should be evo-
lutionary, inclusive, and aimed at enhancing the stabil-
ity of Europe.
Trade, Not Aid
While the Soviet empire was fragmenting, West Euro-
pean officials smugly maintained that they had
resolved their remaining differences at Maastricht. A
united and prosperous European Community, they
believed, could be protected from the economic and
political instability in the East. The euphoria was short
lived. Many Europeans now conclude the Maastricht
Treaty was drafted "too soon and too quickly." Faced
with depressed economies and weak governments,
European polities, like their American brethren, seek
national solutions to global problems. Western Europe
threatens to define itself and its world role narrowly.
Neither parochial nor EC-only solutions, however,
address the unavoidable fact that the West cannot
insulate itself from economic decline, ethnic strife,
and political instability in the East. Their fates are
intertwined. Ethnic minorities have perhaps most at
stake in a stable and prosperous Europe. In times of
recession, populist leaders seek scapegoats, most
often ethnic minorities. Such conditions create eco-
nomic refugees throughout Europe.
While Europeans must ultimately determine their own
economic architecture, Americans have a large stake
in the outcome. A successful Uruguay Round of the
world trade talks, to a large degree, hinges on the ame-
nable conclusion of inter-European and US-EC nego-
tiations. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to
decrease trade barriers and to increase market access
to our respective markets.
European economic integration is of particular interest
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
NIS. Without an outlet for their products, many of the
leaders of these countries will be tempted to return to
the false stability and the failed statist policies of the
past. Just as in the security field, American policy-
makers should seek to extend the zone of economic
prosperity eastward. We should encourage the expan-
sion of the EC eastward. We should welcome the
greater integration of the former East Bloc into the
global trading system. We should lower or eliminate
inefficient subsidies. In short, trade, not aid, is the best
guarantee for a prosperous Europe.
CSCE: Conscience of Europe
The CSCE has recently been called the conscience of
Europe. European statesmen from Vacel Havel to
Margaret Thatcher to Andrey Sakharov have credited
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the founding document
of CSCE, for providing the intellectual basis for the
demise of Communism. The CSCE has not always
received such good press. In 1975 the Soviet leader-
ship believed that the Final Act legitimized the Soviet
presence in Europe; that is, a sphere of influence.
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American critics, including Ronald Reagan, con-
curred; the West had sold out to Moscow.
However, the leaders who founded the CSCE, perhaps
unknowingly, began a process that would ultimately
lead to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. By acknowl-
edging that certain principles are inherent and univer-
sal, Moscow, in effect, acknowledged limits to its
power. It did not have the sovereign right to transgress
the Helsinki principles either in its colonies or even in
Mother Russia. Of course, this did not prevent succes-
sive Soviet leaders from ignoring these principles;
they did, however, lose their intellectual cover. The
CSCE, with its broad definition of security founded on
human rights and democracy and its inclusive mem-
bership, helped win the Cold War.
The CSCE can now help win the peace in Europe by
establishing human rights norms, protecting ethnic
minorities, and pursuing low-intensity conflict preven-
tion and peacekeeping activities. Helsinki's broad def-
inition of security also encompasses the conciliation
and crisis management. To cope with existing and
potential crises, largely fueled by ethnic conflicts, the
CSCE has deployed monitor missions to Kosovo, Ser-
bia proper, and Macedonia to prevent a spillover from
the Bosnian tragedy. It has also deployed or is consid-
ering deploying missions to deorgia, Estonia, and
Moldova in the former Soviet Union. It has brought
the parties of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute to the
table.
We should build on these quiet successes. For
instance, the CSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities now has the authority to provide "early
warning" and, as appropriate, "early action" to
national minority issues, which have "the potential to
develop into a conflict." The CSCE can play a role
that neither NATO, the EC, nor any other European
institution can play in preventing Bosnia-like conflicts
and, ultimately, in integrating Eastern Europe and the
MS into a new Europe.
Conclusion
The United States is a nation of idea�not of blood,
birth or creed. It has largely avoided ethnic strife
because it has not attempted to build a state based on
ethnic, racial, or religious homogeneity. If human
rights and fundamental freedoms belong to the indi-
vidual, then group or collective rights can best be
addressed through the protection of individual rights.
As long as ethnicity is seen as the only basis for sort-
ing out human relations or creating nations, we will
have ethnic conflict in Europe. Group rights can have
no meaning if the basic human rights are ignored by
ethnic zealots.
The best way to address ethnic conflict in Europe is
through a united, but decentralized, Europe governed
by mutually accepted rules of behavior. The integra-
tion of Western Europe into institutions�NATO, the
EC, and the CSCE�founded on fundamental human
rights, has gone a long way to eliminating territorial
disputes, irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances
among and within its member states. We must now
find creative ways to use these institutions to deal with
emerging ethnic�and other subregional�tensions
before they erupt into shooting conflicts. We must
avoid the situation where every crisis presents a
choice between inaction and military intervention. We
must now extend these habits of cooperation to the
Fast.
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Ethnic Conflict and US Policy
Wade Hinkle
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Policy Planning Department of Defense'
My task in the next eight minutes is to discuss ethnic
and national conflict and the US policy response to it.
Let me tell you what a difficult task it will be; it took
more than eight minutes for the conference coordina-
tors to describe to me what it was they wanted me to
cover. Nevertheless, let me take a shot at it.
Clearly, the last four years have been an exciting time
to be a planner in defense and national security strat-
egy. I subscribe to what Dr. Gundersen said about the
end of the Cold War being, in a military sense, the end
of a very comfortable period of time, when the uni-
verse and its problems were well understood and well
bounded. I think, however, that we have made some
progress in the last four years in thinking through
these issues in the perspective of US national security.
I also think that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin made
a good start in his conceptualization of this problem
by talking about what he called the four dangers to US
national security in the post�Cold War era:
� The new nuclear danger Partly an artifact of the
Cold War, this involves the security of the 30,000 to
45,000 nuclear weapons that were present on former
Soviet territory when the Soviet Union broke up.
Also it involves the possibility of weapons of mass
destruction proliferating throughout the world.
� The danger to democracy. This is the possibility of a
failure of reform in the former Soviet Union.
� The new economic danger. The Clinton Administra-
tion believes that, without a robust and growing
economy in the United States, the United States will
not be strong domestically and will be unable to be
an effective actor internationally. This danger also
1 Dr. Hinkle has since left the government and is now a member of
the Institute for Defense Analyses.
involves an understanding that the notion of eco-
nomic prosperity abroad is an important component
of US national security.
� Ethnic and national conflict. Mr. Aspin clearly sees
this as one of the principal challenges to US national
security in the post�Cold War era.
The United States is in the process of making substan-
tial reductions to its military forces and military bud-
get. By the time the reductions envisioned in the
Clinton defense program have been implemented, we
will have eliminated over 1 million people in uniform
and another quarter of a million civilians from the
Defense Department. We will have eliminated one-
quarter to one-third of our military forces, and defense
spending by the end of 1997 will be down to below
3.5 percent of gross domestic product�the lowest
level since 1939.
From the perspective of the defense planner, one of
the main concerns in making reductions of that scale
is the possibility that ethnic and national conflict may
occur in ways that will challenge American and
defense interests. Some debate has occurred in my
field of conflict studies, about whether the demise of
the Cold War has increased or decreased the possibil-
ity of ethnic and national conflict.
George Kohn's database on conflict shows that there
have been about three large-scale ethnic and national
conflicts per year since 1945. This rate did not tail off
as a result of the end of the Cold War. In terms of non-
state conflict, there have been about nine serious eth-
nically motivated coup attempts each year since 1987.
But whether ethnic and national conflict is increasing
or simply remaining at high levels, it clearly poses a
danger not only to participants and nearby neighbors
but also to us. This is either because the conflict is
occurring in critical areas�as with the case in the
Persian Gulf�or because some of the participants
are gaining access to increasingly deadlier and more
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far-reaching weapons and technology. So the Defense
Department, and the US Government in general, has
quite an interest in this phenomenon and is trying to
understand it and construct a:,strategy to address it.
In attempting to grapple with this issue, initial think-
ing on a Clinton national security strategy has focused
on three elements:2
� Engagement. The United States is committed to
remaining engaged in international affairs.
� Prevention. We want to prevent or contain the
effects of ethnic conflict. We want to use all the ele-
ments of national power, development assistance,
and trade assistance to prevent conflict, and, if that
does not work, we want to act early to keep the con-
flict small.
� Partnership. We want to expand the core group of
like-minded democratic countries that we forged
during the Cold War and have this group work as a
2 In July 1994, the Clinton Administration published its first com-
prehensive national security strategy, which used as its concep-
tional framework the elements of "engagement" and
"enlargement."
partnership to either prevent or to contain conflict.
We need to work together in a variety of multilateral
and bilateral ways to marshal all those resources
together as a partnership for addressing the issue.
The government needs much more analysis to under-
stand in a robust way the phenomenon of ethnic and
national conflict. We need academic researchers to
turn toward applied robust, rigorous, and predictive
research that we can bring inside the government in
testable ways and see if we can motivate policy. We
are not interested in sponsoring more original
research; as Dr. Ted Gun wrote in his book on conflict
a few years ago, there are 686 books on the theory of
conflict�we do not want a 687th. What we want are
robust, testable, applied research and models that we
can bring inside the government. We take this problem
seriously. It is a critical issue of US national security.
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Summary of Discussion
General Discussion
QUESTION: In your studies of conflict resolution,
can you give us some examples of effective outside
intervention into situations of aggressive ethnic
nationalism. The only good example I can think of is
the tremendous commitment that was necessary to
stop Nazi Germany, an aggressive ethnic nationalistic
state. These kinds of examples are important as we
think about getting into the situation in Bosnia.
DR. FINKLE: My field is microstates, and I can tell
you it worked pretty well in Grenada. But I take your
point. That is why I think that the emphasis really
should be on prevention, not intervention. That way,
you can act more effectively at lower cost and not be
in the position where you are dealing with interven-
tion.
Imagine if Saddam Husayn had actually succeeded.
Twenty years from now, he would have effective con-
trol of 45 percent of the world's oil reserves and
would be industriously working to build nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. If we
had the foresight in 1958 to act to facilitate a demo-
cratic transition in Iraq, however, we would not have
needed the level of resources we used in Desert Storm,
and the world might be a happier place. Even in
Grenada, if we just had the foresight to spend a couple
hundred thousand dollars to preempt the revolution of
1979, we would have saved 108 American casualties
in 1983.
QUESTION: When there was a bipolar world, it was
fairly easy to identify the strategic interests of the
United States and the Soviet Union. How would the
United States feel in regard to Russia resolving ethnic
conflict in the former Soviet Union.
DR. GUNDERSEN: We view the issue of conflict and
peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union from the
outlook of preventive diplomacy. We do not want to
see a reenactment of the old view that there is a sphere
of influence of Russia over the Soviet Union. As long
as Russia's involvement in its former periphery is
mandated by an international body�be it the UN or
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe�and as long as certain rules are followed and
the interests of all the parties are taken into account,
we are not, in principal, opposed to Russian involve-
ment.
We also want to contain any ethnic difficulties before
they spill over. In Tajildstan, more people are being
killed every day than in Bosnia. We do not hear about
it because CNN is not there, but certainly there are
Iranian, Chinese, Turkish, and Russian interests in
Tajildstan, so we cannot ignore the situation there. I
think we should be a little more involved in preventive
diplomacy there. We have limited funds, however, so
it is difficult going between ends and means.
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Concluding Comments: Implications for the
United States and the International Community:
Problems and Prospects
Stanley D. Orunn
Professor of Geography
University of Kentucky
During the past two days we have heard a number of
formal presentations about ethnic conflict and national-
ism in various world regions. These examinations of
ethnic and cultural composition and conflict, as well as
the panel discussions, illustrate the ways geographers
look at the world and how they envision contemporary
and future worlds. In summarizing the conference, I
would like to make the following observations:
� We live in two different worlds. First, I would like to
thank those individuals for organizing a conference
devoted specifically to ethnic conflict, nationalism,
and changing world order and for inviting academic
geographers to share with members of the Intelli-
gence Community what they know�and do not
know�about the current political world. I see this
conference as serving many useful purposes, one
being that while "we live in two different houses,"
we share much in common, especially our interests
in being able to understand what is happening around
the world�whether in regard to ethnic conflict,
nationalism, or emerging democracies. It is impor-
tant that the avenues of communication and informa-
tion sharing between those in the university and
government intelligence communities remain open.
� How do we look at the world? How we look at the
world reflects our backgrounds as well as our day-
by-day work experiences and assignments. These
experiences are of utmost importance in helping us
and others see how we look at our culture vis-a-vis
others.
The Dynamic Political World
What Is the State of the World Political Map?
At any time it is useful to remember the state of the
world, or, better stated, the world political map. That
map reflects constant dynamism in name changes�
border adjustments, political realignments, as well as
flashpoints and conflict. There are a wide variety of
states with varying degrees of stability and instability.
It is important to keep in mind that world order and
disorder can be viewed in a variety of contexts. While
the term new political order may be in vogue this year,
there is not just one order, but many. At various times
and places on the world map, order or disorder can be
observed at local, regional, and macroregional levels.
We Live in Shared/Divided Spaces
All humans live to some degree in "bounded spaces."
Some of those may be spaces defined by majority pop-
ulations, others defined by outside powers. Within
those bounded spaces, we often find people of varying
ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial, or other heritages.
The distribution of various groups often overlap.
Those groups may live in harmony�sharing the same
work, play, worship, and family spaces or they may be
divided.
We Live in Local and Global Worlds
The world political map is much more complicated
than the standard reference maps that depict close to
200 political states. There are many scales at which
groups and communities interact. Some interactions
are local, others are global. It is important that those of
us who analyze political development acknowledge
these complexities.
Are We "Prisoners" of Our Maps?
In listening to the presenters the past several days and
in the discussions among panel members and the audi-
ence, it seems that we may, in fact, be "prisoners" of
our maps, especially the familiar political map of the
world�which simplifies political space and rein-
forces the status quo. Do we still use time-honored
Mercator projections, which distort the spaces in the
high latitudes? Are the maps we use Europe centered,
as if subtly conveying the notion that Europe is the
most important region of the world? How do we look
at polar areas, with maps that have such areas at the
"top" and "bottom"? How do we look at the Pacific
Rim countries, with maps splitting the Pacific Ocean
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at the left and right sides? Or do we have maps with
the Pacific Ocean in the middle and the Asian and
American landmasses at the left and right. Perhaps
one of our difficulties is using old maps with old
boundaries and names, which tend to convey mes-
sages of stability at global and regional levels. Do we
regularly in our research, classroom, and lectures uti-
lize maps that portray boundary stability, ethnic har-
mony or complexity, or gradations of tyranny and
democracy? Powerful messages are conveyed through
maps and projections. As an instructor, I am reminded
how more valuable the maps are in the State of the
World Atlases�including the specialized ones on
women, military, and environment�than are those in
our textbooks and frequently used atlases. We would
do well to develop other innovative maps for various
users.
Which Way Are We Looking as We Approach the
Next Century?
At this time it is useful to think about how we
approach the study of the future. Are we looking back-
wards as we look ahead or do we look ahead without
the burden of hindsight? The question might be simi-
lar to that raised above about map projections. Are we
too frozen in our thinking to look at the dynamics
occurring around us? Certainly the next 10 to 20 years
will call for looking at the world differently than the
past 10 to 20 years. Will we try to use models, theo-
ries, and policies from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s�
many of which did not help us then�for the future?
Or will we be willing to realize the need for working
constantly with alternative systems and models that
may be completely non-Western in logic, purpose, and
design? The true test will be whether scholars, and
those communities that rely on scholarly inquiry, will
be able to be imaginative and creative in exploring the
purposes and cross-purposes of what is being
observed, written, and practiced.
Major Issues Meriting Attention
As a geographer interested in global politics, I identify
six major areas that I think will be important within
the next 20 years. They are the environment, religion,
secularization, sports, territory, and information/com-
munication.
How "Green" Is Your Thinking?
Environmental questions are being raised in all areas
of human livelihood. This includes making decisions
about where crops will be grown as well as where
industries will locate. Although there is much support
for environmental thinking and policies, progress is
not attained easily, in part because many people have
difficulty seeing the need to incorporate green think-
ing into education, religion, politics, and economies.
A true test is whether those who teach political geog-
raphy will successfully incorporate green thinking
into spheres traditionally excluded from such thought.
Religion as if Politics Mattered
As the events of the past couple decades have demon-
strated, religion is an important element in our exami-
nation of foreign affairs. It is not only the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism�again, a Western label�in
the Middle East that illustrates the significance of this
issue but also militancy in the name of religion in Ire-
land, Israel/Palestine, India, and Pakistan. Evangelical
groups and liberation theologians have confronted the
politics in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In South
Africa as well as in former Eastern Europe, the church
at times has been active in pushing for political
reforms. In many countries, those seeking political
office are courted and supported by certain religious
groups. The importance of religion as a component in
the politics in many states and regions cannot be over-
looked. Leaders often look to the state-church or to
important church leaders for support and encourage-
ment. To dismiss the growing importance of religion
in emerging democracies, the blurring of church-state
separateness in others, and the importance of the spiri-
tual dimension in human life is to neglect an important
component of raison d' etre in many societies. Aca-
demics and policymakers would be wise to devote as
much time to studying a society's religion as they do
its economy in order to understand the decisions and
actions of leaders, political parties, and citizen groups.
The Rise of Secularization
The rise of secularization in the world is not ques-
tioned. I do not see this emergence as a corollary to
what I stated about religion above. But I observe there
is a growth of a secular society, including emphasis on
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consumerism and, especially, 'American products; the
demise of traditional institutions, including political
ideology; and the rise of a "here and now" mentality
that stresses individualism, the appearance of wealth,
and a veneer of globalism in foods, clothing, music,
and lifestyles. Secularization on the rise leads to a
decline in traditional institutions, be they family and
community, formal political parties, the role of the
church, the functions of schools, or the importance of
collective memories.
Sports and Society: The New Ball Game
One of the emerging forms of social identity in many
countries is sports. Sports not'only represent outlets
for a public's need for entertainment but also some-
thing deeper about society's need for identity and rep-
resentation. What started out during pretelevision days
as teams of athletes who were paid to entertain local
or regional audiences has now changed into national
teams that somehow stand for and represent a city, a
region, or even the state itself, As audiences follow
favorite teams, more and more teams have been cre-
ated, further increasing local identity, regionalism, and
national pride�all in the name of "friendly" competi-
tion. Nevertheless, more than one local conflict has
emerged between fans of one national team fighting
fans of another. The political geographer or policy
consultant interested in understanding the seculariza-
tion of a society would be wise to ferret out the role
sports play in the political identity of a group or soci-
ety.
Land: Yours or Mine
Land or territory was historically associated with the
definition of the state. This raison d'etre was impor-
tant in conveying to those within the state that certain
spaces gave the state and people identity. Those
spaces were to be protected from outsiders, should
they decide to enter. The past several centuries of
Europeanizing the world conveys strongly the impor-
tance of land, territory, ownership, governance, and
protection. Those spaces "on the ground" and on the
map further gave legitimacy to strongly held views
about ownership, symbolism, and identity.
While many of the bounded spaces on the planet may
seem static, there are dynamics linked to some spaces;
That dynamism is associated with groups within those
defined spaces who want their own spaces; in short,
their own places to govern themselves. Those who
support self-determination claim that they cannot be
represented by majority populations in the bounded
spaces who have little interest in minority group con-
cerns. Those minorities may be religious, ethnic, or
linguistic. These "stateless" peoples believe that they
have a legal claim to govern themselves; in some
cases, they present historical claims to spaces that
were previously taken from them by outsiders.
It is not only the territory that is in question but also
what is in and on that land. The land may contain
places of historical settlements, ceremonial and burial
grounds, and sites of sacred rivers, mountains, or for-
ests. These places may be an important part of the
unwritten histories of minority and disenfranchised
groups. The importance of land is not to be dimin-
ished as we approach the next century. It seems very
likely that there will be emerging claims and counter-
claims to land and water spaces by competing groups
now living in the same spaces. National and interna-
tional courts seem likely to be involved in the litiga-
tion efforts by unrepresented and underrepresented
groups.
Information and Communication
Whether scholars and government offices and officers
are or will be able to understand the role of the United
States in the world community of states during the
next few decades rests in large part on how much they
understand about information and communications.
These two areas of postindustrial society were not key
20 to 40 years ago but are becoming more important
each day. In the same way that leaders and practitio-
ners will need to know the role of environment, reli-
gion, and secularization, so they will need to grasp the
realities of global information and communication. I
have identified several crucial issues that relate to
those with interests in ethnicity, conflict, social
change, and political decisionmaldng:
� The information blizzard. How do we decide what is
important and what is not? With the volumes of
information that cross our desks, deciding what is
most and least important is crucial. One might well
expect the information load to increase at least
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50 percent within the next decade as more informa-
tion is generated and stored but not necessarily ana-
lyzed or understood. Sometimes, I think "we don't
know what we don't know." Such information gaps
are especially apparent when working with new
democracies, new ideologies, and problems related
to human welfare.
� How do we communicate? How we communicate is
always a problem and will remain so far among
those who attempt to understand global political
changes. The introduction of faster and cheaper
modes of communication�modems, FAX machines
and e-mail�literally place more locations on the
planet within easy reach of others that are con-
nected. It is important to know from where the infor-
mation comes and its credibility.
� CNN and photographs. CNN, out of Atlanta, is
replacing the standard news organizations and
sources. This "global newspaper of the air" reaches
all parts of the world. What viewers see are CNN's
views of the world. Literally, we could say that "We
are watching CNN and CNN is watching us." The
second part of This instant television of the-world is
the growing importance of images conveyed to glo-
bal audiences by CNN and other television net-
works. Photos are replacing words and speeches as
the important elements in many international policy
decisions.
� Surveys and polls. One of the consequences of the
information revolution is the increased use of polls
and surveys at local, regional, and global levels.
Those groups surveyed may have narrow or broad
support among a state's population; for this reason,
the geographic results of surveys and polls take on
added meaning. The use of these surveys, whether
designed and conducted fairly or manipulated, can
form an important weapon on the part of the state to
conduct specific policies in certain regions and with
certain groups.
Learning About Conflict and Cooperation
Much of the discussion during the past few days has
focused on ethnic conflict within states and regions.
As we have learned, there are multiple causes of local
and regional conflict, and conflict assumes different
forms in different locations and political settings.
There is no question that the geographies and politics
of conflict�especially ethnic and racial conflict�will
assume center stage in many regions during the next
few decades.
While we spend time and energy studying the causes
and geographies of conflict, we also would be wise to
investigate conflict resolution. That is, what are the
alternatives to keep conflict? What are useful local
and regional strategies that governments and other
institutions�including religious, educational, and
volunteer ones�might implement to conflict situa-
tions from emerging. Or, once conflict has surfaced,
what can be done to lessen or resolve the conflict or
prevent it from spreading. Much of the conflict resolu-
tion literature focuses on information�who knows
what about another group. Understanding conflict and
conflict resolution is best not left only to experts in the
government or universities who study cultural, poli-
tics, and social change. It also must be an integral part
of the educational system in early and middle school
years. Just as one learns to hate and practice discrimi-
nation, so one can learn strategies to reduce conflict,
hatred, and discrimination and see the benefits of rec-
onciliation.
Looking Ahead
In closing, I think it is important to train and retrain
professionals for the future geopolitical worlds of the
next 25 to 50 years. This entails an understanding and
appreciation of the new global diversities that the
planet's leaders and citizens will face. There are not
one or two best solutions to problems, but potentially
a host of alternatives. Somehow it is important to
develop familiarity with various models and method-
ologies ranging from scenario writing to complex
mathematical computer gaming. Specialists need to be
constantly investigating creative alternatives to exist-
ing or anticipated problems. Being bold, creative, and
imaginative are more important than being bound by
disciplinary strategems, traditional solutions, and regi-
mented ideologies and philosophies.
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Finally, there is much discussion these days about
inventing and reinventing institutions. These terms
potentially could usher in new thinking in universities,
governments, and the private sector. The major issues
of the next 25 to 50 years will call for specialists
trained differently than in the past and today. Already
I have indicated that information, communication,
environment, religion, conflict, and secularization
need to be pervasive threads in learning and practice.
Rather than delegating "x" subject to one discipline
and "y" to another, those are best examined in trans-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary contexts. To accom-
plish this will most likely call for an overhaul of many
of the ways we learn, conduct business, and solve
problems. This is a challenge best met by transdisci-
plinarians and by specialists who look both backward
and forward and have both local and global outlooks.
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Summary of Discussion
Discussant: Rex Honey
I would like us to be able to understand history but not
be trapped by it. One of the things that makes resolv-
ing some problems in Africa more likely than in Bos-
nia is that the Africans do not have the kind of written
history that dates back several hundred years. As such,
they cannot pinpoint who the villains were: the names
of the groups have changed.
We need to understand that oppressed people have
legitimate grievances, and we need to make sure that
we do not support oppressive regimes. 'With the Cold
War over, the latter may not be as likely as it has been
in the past. But we need to be a part of a forward-look-
ing movement that will establish institutions to help
prevent problems and to respond to existing ones.
In addition, we need to support human rights globally,
not just in terms of individual rights but also in terms
of cultural rights. This includes being able to study
in your own language rather than in an alien one. If
people see themselves as being treated justly, then
existing problems will be lessened, and we will be
able to prosper along with the people with whom we
share this globe.
Discussant: Harm J. de Blij
I was born in the Netherlands, and I'm interested in
the news of the day from there. Today, the news from
Holland had two items relevant to our discussion.
First, Curacao is considering holding a vote on whether
to reenter the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a prov-
ince or a colony. Things are not going well economi-
cally in Curacao, and the island is seriously considering
becoming the Martinique of the Netherlands' empire.
Second, the Province of Zeeland discovered about a
month ago that in 1648, when the seven states of the
Netherlands signed a peace agreement with Spain, it
did not sign the agreement. Although 7PP1and is now
planning to sign the agreement and is inviting Spain
to the signatory ceremony, the issue of paying the
reparations that were not made three centuries ago
has also been raised. Reparations are a serious issue
because it is the objective of certain ethnic groups to
raise the issue of who did wrong to whom and who
should pay for that wrong.
I would also like to make an observation on environ-
mental change as it relates to changes in the sociopo-
litical sphere. Although many people are sceptical of
interlinkages, I want to suggest seriously that many of
the problems that we are seeing in the world today,
such as fragmentation, dislocation, migration, sunbelt
movements, and other locational changes, are in part
an instinctive human reaction to environmental
change. I would refer you to a book by Jean Grove
called The Little Ice Age. It may be that our behavior,
including ethnic strife, has something to do with the
deteriorating environments in which relations among
groups are being played out.
General Discussion
DR. WIXMAN: An interesting point that came out
particularly in this last session is that we talk about
voluntarism on the part of the peoples involved.
The falling apart of the Soviet Union will probably be
followed by a restructuring, and what Estonians,
ICazalchs, and Ukrainians can do voluntarily through
mutual respect and independence is probably a lot bet-
ter than the situation when the Soviet Union was dom-
inated by the center.
I think one of the keys to future stability is not to
oppose the secessionist movements but to allow such
movement. This almost invariably leads to better rela-
tions between the seceder and the parent state.
DR. DE BLU: But the problem with that is, "where
does the secessionist sequence end?"
DR. WIXMAN: True.
DR. DE BLIJ: Someone today talked about the neces-
sity of providing recognition. Well, the problem in
the case of Bosnia was that recognition was given
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prematurely. This then precipitated a concern on the
part of Serbs who did not want to be a part of an inde-
pendent state in which, they felt, their human rights
would be threatened.
Take the case of Georgia. Georgia, which seceded
from Russia, is now trying to ,stop Abkhazia from
seceding. Where does it all end? This trouble comes
with every secession. Unless there is some way in
which that can be codified and stratified, it will be
chaos.
DR. HONEY: I agree with you. Virtually no state in
Africa has an order that was determined by African
peoples. Why should the peoples of Africa not have
the same kind of self-determination that at least some
non-Africans have enjoyed in other places?
DR. WIXMAN: But what often happens when the
secessionist movement is denied? Are we going to
dictate that people live together in shotgun wedding
relationships? Should we say to Croats, Muslims, and
Serbs, "You must live together," when we would not
do that ourselves? I agree that'there are perils of seces-
sionism, but the peril of not doing it, I think, is equally
dangerous.
Do we tell Moldova that it cannot become indepen-
dent from the Soviet Union because 12 percent of its
population would be unhappy? Do we tell Georgia
that it should not secede because 100,000 out of 6 mil-
lion people will be unhappy? I think countries need to
be prepared for independence, not leap into it, but the
lack of preparation is the problem.
DR. DE BLIJ: May I make one other point? That
relates to the issue of boundaries. In 1992 the United
States went to the Baltic stated and talked about solv-
ing problems within existing borders. When this
occurred, I cringed; just as pipelines and roads can be
moved, boundaries, which are here to serve us, can be
moved. If it is time to move them, let them be moved.
You are never going to have total agreement on mov-
ing boundaries. In fact, hundreds of thousands of
casualties occurred when Pakistan was separated from
India. Nevertheless, this action probably saved mil-
lions of lives. All countries and all people should be
able to argue about moving their boundaries.
DR. MURPHY: Dr. de Blij's last comment, in a sense,
touched on a point I wanted to make. When we think
about the issue of potential fragmentation, what are
we thinking about in terms of the units we end up
with? I think our tendency is to think about conven-
tional units of sovereign states.
One of the most remarkable things Dr. Williams
alluded to yesterday was that, in Western Europe, the
major threats are not seen as the regional secessionist
movements. Why is that the case? It could well have
something to do with the changing nature of sover-
eignty in Europe. It could also have to do with the fact
that it is possible for someone in a region within a
state to feel multiple layers of identity, some of which
are attached to being a European.
DR. HINKLE: We seem to be, in one sense, moving
toward an international norm of the rule of law in gov-
erning intrastate relations, individual human rights,
and collective group rights. It is going to be hard to
reconcile that with the proposition that you cannot
allow norms of international behavior to stand in the
way of a rational adjustment of international bound-
aries just because it seems to balance out in terms of
demographics or some other factor.
DR. DE BLU: But we are trapped in such a boundary
in South Africa. In that country, partition, even some
sort of a temporary confederal arrangement, might
ease the fears that are presently ripping the place
apart. What is so great about keeping South Africa in
one piece? It has no history of integration. It has
always been a divided country.
DR. HONEY: Dr. Gundersen said we should not ask
for redrawn boundaries because such change would
have to be agreed upon by all parties. Well, if it is
democratic, what does that mean? Democratic can
mean 50 percent plus one.
DR. GUNDERSEN: I would just refer to the facts of
the last two years. In alluding to the statement by
former Secretary of State Baker on Yugoslavia and the
statement by former President Bush on Kiev, I was
saying that the United States was trapped in a certain
east-west bipolar context.
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Today, we have 53 states in Europe; there were 32 in
1991. That is a major change. It is the largest change
in Europe since 1917 or 1648, depending on how you
look at it. It has been done largely without violence
and largely within a relatively democratic context, and
it has been agreed to by those states. The United
States has recognized those states: the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and the other states that
have emerged from the former Soviet Union, as well
as those from Yugoslavia.
So it is possible to reconcile the idea of-accepting the
concept of territorial integrity and that of peaceful
changes of borders. It is difficult, but I do not see any
major intellectual pitfall. I think US policy has cer-
tainly evolved over the last two years on this quest.
DR. SCHWAR1ZBERG: One of the things that I
think we can do is to try to empower the only interna-
tional organization that ought to have universal legiti-
macy�the United Nations. One of the UN's major
organs, the Trusteeship Council, has virtually nothing
to do any longer. There is no reason why the- Council
should not be transformed into a Human Rights Coun-
cil and be run by a high commissioner for human
rights, who would have greatly expanded powers.
While very few nations are not guilty of some
excesses in regard to human rights, some are much
worse than others, and those are the ones that have to
be tackled first. We need an agency with legitimacy to
do that.
The UN can do that. It will make mistakes to be sure,
but we should get behind the UN and give it power to
address global problems. Global problems require glo-
bal solutions. The UN ought to be the global instru-
ment.
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