PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA: STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05612467
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985

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Direct/-si
Central
Intelligence
cret
NR
Prospects for South Africa:
Stability, Reform, and Violence
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Se et
SNIE 73.2-85
August 1985
Copy 326
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SNIE 73.2-85
PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA:
STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE
Information available as of 29 August 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 22 August 1985
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE 1
KEY JUDGMENTS 2
DISCUSSION 7
Introduction 7
Key Developments Leading to State of Emergency 7
Botha Offers Limited Reform 7
The Unrest and Its Causes 8
Trends in the Violence 10
Critical Factors Affecting Future Course of Events 11
Prospects for Reform 11
Level and Nature of Unrest 15
White Resolve 17
Nonwhite Political Dynamic 18
The Soviet Role and Strategy 21
Outlook 22
Short Term (One Year) 22
Long Term (Next Five Years) 23
Prerequisites for a Government Collapse�A Worst Case
Scenario 23
Implications for the United States 24
ANNEX A: The Decline of Grand Apartheid 25
ANNEX B: Background on Soweto and
Sharpeville Violence 27
ANNEX C: South African Security Capabilities 29
ANNEX D: Indicators of Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change 31
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate assesses the prospects for stability, reform, and
violence in South Africa during the next year and for the remainder of
the 1980s. Such an Estimate is called for in light of developments in
South Africa during the last year that include:
� The worst outbreak of black unrest in South Africa's modern
history.
� Hundreds of attacks by blacks against nonwhites who -collabor-
ate- with the government.
� The declaration of a state of emergency in riot-torn areas.
� Some socioeconomic reforms by the ruling white minority, and
the beginning of political reforms designed to bring the blacks
into the government at the local, regional, and ultimately the
national levels.
� Growing international pressure on South Africa to abandon
apartheid.
The paper addresses those factors that will be critical in determin-
ing the future course of events in South Africa. These include:
� The level and nature of black unrest.
� White resolve and the security resources of the state.
� The government's reform strategy.
� The rightwing threat to the ruling National Party.
� The economic outlook.
� Capabilities of black protest groups.
� Efforts by the Soviets to exploit Pretoria's problems.
� Western reactions�including sanctions�to developments in
South Africa.
The Estimate also examines the effectiveness of the government's
program of racial reform and the prospects for evolutionary versus
revolutionary change in South Africa during the next five years. The pa-
per does not address in detail Soviet intentions in southern Africa or
South Africa's regional role, issues analyzed in recent Estimates.'
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Figure 1
Black Homelands and Area Affected by State of Emergency and Unrest
Sebokengti
Vereeniging
Sharpeyille'
Boipatrg
South
Atlaniic
Ocean
PRETORIA
0 Built-up area
10Kilometers
o 10Miles
South Af
Cape
Cape Town Crossroads
4
z
Venda
ozambiqu
0
e
0
.E*
Transvaal
Kwandebele Kangwane
*PRETORIA
Orange Owe Ow
Free State
Bophuthatswana
ca
t�sy,e, y
Ciskei /
.7"
. � . r.abamstown
Uden agear-.
yort Elizabeth
Swaziland
*MBAS
�������
AUTO
../
Natal A oN iRichard's
Bay
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Durban
Black homeland
"Independent" black homeland
Area under state of emergency
Site of major unrest
-- Province boundary
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
705742 (A02333) 8-85
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The white minority government, relying primarily on the coercive
actions of its security forces, will be able to restore a semblance of order
in the black townships during the next year. We believe that over the
next five years Pretoria's economic, political, and military resources
are sufficient to avert the collapse of the white regime. However, a
rough stretch of road lies ahead. We believe the black townships will re-
main tinderboxes during the next five years, with antigovernment
sentiment and socioeconomic pressures prompting more episodic but
containable violence.
At the same time, we must acknowledge internal and external
variables beyond the capacity of Pretoria to control that might
fundamentally change the attitudes of blacks and set in motion a
series of events that would have an impact impossible to forecast but
that could seriously threaten the white minority government. A new
breed of black youths may emerge who are determined to continue and
escalate their low-level war of the last year. Antigovernment groups
may be sustained by the belief that the government's reforms as well as
growing international pressures are a direct result of their protest
efforts. Moreover, if unforeseen developments limit Pretoria's ability to
suppress unrest or stabilize the economy, white resolve could begin to
crumble, especially if there is a white perception that the West has
abandoned South Africa. A white regime that realized it no longer held
the initiative might be forced to cut a new and more equitable political
deal with blacks or risk plunging South Africa into a bloody civil war.
The government's reform program is likely to achieve no better
than mixed results during the next five years. The program is an
evolutionary one intended to reduce tensions and lessen the chances of a
single isolated incident triggering nationwide disturbances on the scale
of the Sharpeville unrest in 1960, the Soweto riots in 1976-77, and the
recent violence. The program may co-opt some blacks, but we believe
the stigma attached to being a collaborator will make it difficult for Pre-
toria to persuade influential blacks to participate in any limited power-
sharing system.
Nevertheless, we believe President Botha will forge ahead with his
own agenda of reforms, including revision of laws restricting the
movement of blacks, while continuing to study alternative political
systems that retain white control and expand black rights. Over the next
year, Botha is likely to announce steps leading to the establishment of a
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confederal system linking the central government and the homelands; a
national advisory body for blacks outside the homelands; and a
multiracial government for the KwaZulu-Natal Province region. Con-
scious of his image with the white electorate, however, he is unlikely to
implement major political changes until the unrest abates.
Overall, the government probably will have to rely more on its
security resources than on its reform initiatives to protect its stability, es-
pecially in the short term. Pretoria's massive internal security apparatus
will continue to be able to contain most violence in the black townships,
the majority of which are located a great distance from white areas. We
estimate, for example, that 1 in 8 South African whites�that is, some
600,000 men and women�participates at least part time in some aspect
of internal security or defense, and that Pretoria is likely to carry
through with plans for a substantial buildup of its police manpower to
avoid calling in the Army in future disturbances.
The fundamental causes of black unrest will still exist. High black
unemployment, poor living conditions in the townships, police excesses,
widespread dissatisfaction with black schools, and a heightened political
consciousness among blacks as a result of their exclusion from the
multiracial government�which includes Coloreds and Indians�that
was established last year will continue to create a climate conducive to
violent protest in black townships.
Black militancy, especially among youths, is likely to increase and
may represent more of a threat to the government's interests than the
guerrilla campaign of the African National Congress (ANC). Thus far,
the unrest has been perpetrated largely by black youths who have little
organization. Despite government allegations, the vast majority are not
under the direct control of the large antigovernment groups, although
the rhetoric of these groups has helped raise the level of political
consciousness in the townships. The unprecedented level of attacks on
black "collaborators- and their families by other blacks is likely to
remain a common feature of black protests.
While Botha will face political criticism and challenge from those
in the white community demanding both more and less change, his
control of the white political structures and his overall support in the
white electorate are likely to remain strong. Aware of the failures of
grand apartheid policies to guarantee white security, Botha will contin-
ue his "adapt or die- rhetoric in an effort to strengthen the now
majority of the white constituency that favors gradual reform. While
the ruling National Party under Botha's direction has skillfully fostered
a broad coalition of whites who support its reform program, general
elections, expected to take place in 1989, will provide a major test.
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Botha must balance calls for reform with an image of a strong leader,
unpressured and in total control, or risk a rapid unraveling of his white
coalition.
Deteriorating security conditions over time could create new
opportunities for the right wing to gain support among many Afrikaners
who already view Botha's reforms as the first step on the slippery slope
leading to black majority rule. The right wing will benefit if white
disenchantment with the government's economic policies continues to
grow and if Botha institutes costly new programs for blacks at the
expense of white taxpayers. While the threat of a white backlash from
the right cannot be discounted, we believe Botha has the political skill
and support to blunt a serious challenge from whites frustrated over the
scope and pace of reform.
During the remainder of this decade, South Africa's average
annual rate of real economic growth probably will be no more than 3
percent, and could be lower if the price of gold falls or the world
economic recovery slows sharply. If this forecast holds true, South
Africa's already grim black unemployment rate�about 25 percent�
will rise. Economic sanctions and sustained violence are likely to have
only a limited immediate impact on South Africa's economy, but they
hurt investor confidence, encourage more capital flight, slow growth,
and shake white resolve.
The outlook for the most important black groups is mixed:
� The black protest movement's main weakness will continue to
be its lack of unity. Ideological disputes, tribal splits, a wide
generation gap, urban-rural divisions, and government divide-
and-rule tactics will remain potent factors limiting the ability of
these groups to challenge the government.
� The rapidly growing black labor movement will become in-
creasingly politicized, and will test Pretoria by further experi-
menting with antigovernment protests. Black union activity will
continue to be tempered by its vulnerability to government
countermeasures.
� The military wing of the ANC, the most popular group among
blacks, has been dealt several major setbacks in the region in the
last year and probably will not become a military threat to the
government. The group's bombing campaign is likely to contin-
ue, however, and may result in more incidental white casualties
than in the past.
� Prospects for the multiracial United Democratic Front are dim,
as the government appears determined either to ban the group
or to use stepped-up harassment tactics to keep it under control.
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/
� The government may be able to co-opt Chief Buthelezi's
influential Zulu group, Inkatha, by inviting it to participate in a
federal system in Natal Province.
Washington's relations with Pretoria are likely to be problematic
during the period of this Estimate. Apartheid critics in the United States
and around the world will continue to highlight the inferior political
status of nonwhites in South Africa and the repressive methods Pretoria
is likely to use to suppress the almost inevitable outbreaks of violence.
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DISCUSSION
Introduction
1. The ruling National Party under President P. W.
Botha has embarked in recent years on a new course of
racial reform that represents a departure from some of
the rigid tenets of orthodox apartheid. (See annex A.)
Chief among the changes has been Pretoria's pledge to
bring blacks into the political system "at the highest
possible level." The white minority regime's strategy is
to use limited political and economic concessions to co-
opt a large portion of the black majority while main-
taining and strengthening overall white control. Botha's
reforms are intended to lessen black resentment of the
government, forged during decades of harsh apartheid
rule, and to manage the rapidly growing black popula-
tion more efficiently and with less conflict.
2. Black anger over severe and worsening economic
conditions, coupled with the continued exclusion of
blacks from the national political system, led to out-
breaks of unrest beginning in September 1984. The
unrest continued and increased during the next 11
months, prompting the declaration on 20 July 1985 of
a state of emergency in selected areas. Relations
between the black community and the government
have worsened during the last year as a result of
Pretoria's often heavyhanded efforts to end the unrest
and its refusal to propose a specific agenda on expand-
ing black political rights. The violence has raised
Questions among many observers of the South African
scene about the stability and longevity of the white
regime, and about the prospects for its reform strategy.
Key Developments Leading to State of
Emergency
Botha Offers Limited Reform
3. The government's reforms to date have not
fundamentally altered the racial allocation of power in
South Africa, but they have created a momentum for
further changes. We believe President Botha's pro-
gram of limited racial reform is designed to help
Pretoria better manage its many problems involving
blacks while maintaining white control. Pretoria's
domestic policies have always been driven by demo-
graphics: already outnumbering whites by almost 6 to
1, the nonwhite population is growing rapidly. (See
figure 2.) Botha is well aware of the failure of past
Figure 2
Expected
Millions
Growth in South African Population
40
Total
ElJan 1985 South African Government figures 32.46
El Projected for 2000 by US Census Bureau 44.9
77%
35
30
25
73%
20
15
10
13%
15%
5
9%
8%
3% 2%
0
Blacks Whites Colored�. Indians
3C6515 8-85
grand apartheid policies to guarantee white security in
the face of an increasingly restive black population.
Large numbers of whites were genuinely alarmed by
the unrest in 1976-77. Botha's "adapt or die" rhetoric,
which grew out of these events, has come to be
accepted by most white South Africans, creating a
constituency for gradual reform.
4. We believe Botha's strategy is to use a mix of
incentives and regulations to keep much of the black
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population within the homelands while fostering a
more stable black urban working class that enjoys
expanded political rights and improved living condi-
tions and schools in the townships. Botha hopes, in our
view, that this urban class will develop its own political
and economic stake in defending the system against
those bent on using violence to secure more radical
changes. In addition, he also probably envisions that
his efforts to co-opt urban blacks will improve South
Africa's pariah status in the international community.
Pretoria, meanwhile, is likely to try to preserve the
conservative character of rural blacks by continuing
subsidies and reinforcing traditional tribal rule.
5. New Constitution. The two new houses of Par-
liament (Colored and Indian) established last year have
functioned with little difficulty and have offered no
real challenge to the white government. Only about 16
percent of eligible Coloreds and Indians voted in
elections last August for new Colored and Indian
chambers in the segregated tricameral Parliament.
The low turnout was largely a result of traditional
apathy in the two communities reinforced by a nation-
wide boycott campaign by antigovernment groups
protesting the exclusion of blacks from the system.
6. Black Political Rights. Botha this year has
made several landmark statements�most recently on
15 August�on the political status of blacks. He has
changed government policies on the homelands to
make "independence" optional, although stressing that
homeland independence is still the government's pref-
erence. While he has not made a definitive offer,
Botha has hinted that residents of "independent"
black homelands could regain their South African
citizenship.' This might pave the way for bringing the
black homelands into a limited power-sharing arrange-
ment with the white minority regime at the national
level. Botha announced two months ago that he will
hold summit meetings with homeland leaders in No-
vember to discuss ways of "improving government
structures." He has refrained from publicly speculat-
ing on the details of a new system, but an unpublished
report by a special Cabinet committee last year re-
vealed that Pretoria is considering a confederal-style
system with the white government and the indepen-
dent homelands as full members, and the other home-
lands as associate members. Under such a system, we
By 1970, all blacks had been designated as citizens of one of the
homelands, while retaining their South African nationality under a
1949 law. However, when a homeland becomes -independent,- as
four of the 10 have done to date, its residents lose their South
African nationality and legal rights.
believe homelands officials would continue to admin-
ister homeland residents in much the same way as they
do now, but presumably would gain a limited voice in
some national issues affecting South Africa.
7. Botha has invited black leaders who would re-
nounce "violent methods- of prompting change to join
in talks with the government on establishing a new
political system that also expands the rights of blacks
outside the homelands. Most black leaders, however,
have been reluctant to talk to the government because
they are skeptical about the prospects for a productive
dialogue, are angry at Pretoria's refusal to propose
publicly a specific agenda for talks, and are afraid of
being branded "collaborators.- In the last year, blacks
have drawn an increasingly sharper line between
nonwhites with ties to the government and those
outside the system.
The Unrest and Its Causes
8. Coincident with Botha's unveiling of the new
multiracial Parliament in September 1984, widespread
riots broke out in the black townships south of Johan-
nesburg. The unrest was touched off when township
residents staged large-scale protests in response to a 10-
percent rent increase (about $3 a month). Before the
increase, residents in these townships already faced a
higher cost of living than in any other black area in the
country. Some 30 blacks were killed in the first two
days of rioting in clashes with the police. Their deaths
triggered a cycle of violent protests by blacks and
reprisals by security forces that spread to nearby
townships. The riots tapered off in late November,
following large-scale arrests of black protestors and
activists. Some 160 blacks died during the three
months of unrest. (See inset.)
9. Violence broke out again in January 1985, but
was centered mainly in the eastern Cape Province
where school boycotts were occurring as student
groups protested the arrests of youth leaders. In March
1985, the police shot into a large crowd of blacks who
intended to transit a nearby white area (Uitenhage) to
get to a funeral for riot victims in an adjacent black
township; at least 20 blacks were killed. The angry
reaction to this helped to fuel more unrest, particularly
in the eastern Cape townships, over the next months.
In Soweto, South Africa's largest black township and a
center of black activism, there was relative calm until
mid-July, when riots erupted. Three days later, Pre-
toria�apparently motivated by memories of the
drawn-out violence in Soweto eight years ago�de-
clared a state of emergency in the riot-torn areas of
Transvaal and Cape Provinces.
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Key Events
1984
22-28 August
Elections for Colored and Indian chambers of Parlia-
ment; police clash with nonwhites calling for an election
boycott.
2-5 September
Thirty-one blacks killed by police during riots in area
south of Johannesburg to protest rent hike.
23 October
Seven thousand soldiers and police enter Sebokeng and
two nearby townships in Transvaal Province; hundreds
of blacks arrested.
5-6 November
Hundreds of thousands of black workers observe two-
day general strike in Transvaal Province; some 25
blacks killed and 13 strike organizers arrested.
December
Riots dissipate in Transvaal townships; rent boycott
continues in area south of Johannesburg.
1985
February
Rioting erupts in eastern Cape Province townships hit
hard by recession.
18-21 February
Eighteen blacks killed and over 250 injured in riots
provoked by rumor of government plan to relocate
Crossroads shantytown residents.
During Unrest
21 March
Police open fire on crowd of blacks marching to attend
funeral near Uitenhage, killing at least 20.
26 June
Six blacks killed by grenades rigged to explode prema-
turely; many blacks believe police posing as guerrillas
gave the boobytrapped grenades to inexperienced
activists.
28 June
Four activists murdered in eastern Cape Province;
widely believed to have been killed by government
agents.
15 July
Black consumer boycott of white shops begins in eastern
Cape Province.
17 July
Riots erupt in Soweto, country's largest black township.
20 July
State of emergency declared.
31 July
Restrictions placed on funerals for riot victims.
5-10 August
Riots, including large-scale confrontations between In-
dians and Zulus, break out in Indian and black town-
ships near Durban; 69 dead.
10-14 August
Consumer boycott spreads to Johannesburg-Pretoria
area and western Cape Province.
10. Many direct and indirect causes have prompted
the unrest. South Africa's black townships are tinder-
boxes because of socioeconomic pressures and non-
white resentment of apartheid.
11. Underlying factors contributing to the high
volatility of the townships include the following:
� The economic progress made by urban blacks
over the last decade has slowed considerably in
recent years during South Africa's worst recession
since the 1930s, which has hit blacks in eastern
Cape Province especially hard. Nationwide, the
black unemployment rate is 25 percent.
The political consciousness of urban blacks has
been raised by the vigorous criticism of the
government's political proposals by antigovern-
ment groups.
� Black urban areas have a high concentration of
bored, unemployed youths who sometimes enjoy
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sparking confrontations with the police. Half of
South Africa's black population is under the age
of 18. Households in which the father and moth-
er both hold jobs are common, and many parents
admit they cannot control their children.
� Education ranks as a prime concern of most
urban blacks, and there is widespread dissatisfac-
tion in the black community over the poor
quality of the schools, which since the early
1970s have been centers of organization for
disgruntled black youth.
� The normal complement of police in the town-
ships is inadequate to prevent flareups.
� Intrablack rivalries and black resentment of the
more privileged position of other nonwhites can
lead to flareups when these groups live in prox-
imity, as has recently happened in the Durban
area.
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Trends in the Violence
12. Attacks on Collaborators. Blacks have dis-
played during the unrest a new militancy that is
unlikely to fade away completely, and represents more
of a threat to the government's interests than the
guerrilla campaign of the African National Congress
(ANC). The most dramatic evidence of growing black
militancy has been the unprecedented level of attacks
on black, Colored, and Indian collaborators and their
families. During the past year, mobs have murdered at
least 18 black councilors and police and have attacked
the homes of over 500 collaborators. These attacks
may be the most effective protest tactic ever in terms
of gaining worldwide media attention and disrupting
government plans.
13. One result of these attacks has been the collapse
of Pretoria's black town council system. The system of
directly elected local black officials supervised by
regional white "development boards" was envisaged as
partial compensation to urban blacks for their exclu-
sion from the new multiracial Parliament. During the
period from September 1984 to June 1985, at least 240
black councilors resigned under pressure, and 29 of 32
black councils set up in 1983 are now defunct. Even
before the violence erupted, many black councilors
had been accused by township residents of maladmin-
istration and corruption, and most blacks were deeply
unhappy with the services provided by the councils.
The councils, which were expected to be virtually self-
sufficient, lack adequate funds to maintain the town-
ships and have accumulated huge budget deficits.
14. Interorganizational Attacks. Black-against-
black violence also has broken out in the last year
among several important nonwhite political groups,
including the multiracial United Democratic Front
(UDF), the black-consciousness-oriented Azanian Peo-
ple's Organization (AZAPO), and Chief Buthelezi's
powerful Zulu organization, Inkatha. These organiza-
tions are competing for influence in the black commu-
nity, and their supporters have long been at odds for
ideological and political reasons. The simmering rival-
ries recently have boiled over into violent attacks and
retaliations.
15. The violence among black groups has not posed
any major threat to the stability of the government,
which has strived for decades to sow divisions in and
among black protest groups as well as in the larger
black community. At times, Pretoria has even helped
one black activist faction at the expense of another.
For example, in 1983 the police permitted AZAPO to
establish a higher profile in South Africa to counter
growing support for groups such as the ANC and the
UDF. From Pretoria's perspective, the only negative
aspect of the intergroup violence this year has been the
widespread belief among many outside observers, as
well as blacks familiar with the government's divide-
and-rule tactics, that Pretoria somehow is behind it.
16. Security Tactics. Police antiriot measures em-
ployed during the unrest have varied in severity and
effectiveness, depending in part on the area of the
country involved. Antiriot squads often have consisted
of raw recruits with little experience or training who
have used live ammunition rather than birdshot or
rubber bullets. The police in eastern Cape Province
have at times appeared to be out of control and have
been a target of international criticism. There have
been numerous incidents involving casualties when
police confronted crowds, most dramatically at Uiten-
hage in March 1985. An official inquiry of the Uiten-
hage incident revealed that the police sent to intercept
the crowd were not in as great a degree of danger as
the government had claimed earlier. In Durban,
meanwhile, where the local police have long had
better relations with the nonwhite community, out-
breaks of violence have been handled with minimum
force.
17. Other security measures employed during the
unrest include the following:
� A state of emergency was declared in 36 magiste-
rial districts on 20 July that empowers the police
and Army to search and arrest without warrants
and allows for indefinite detentions. Curfews are
in effect in several of the riot-torn areas, and
restrictions have been placed on the funerals of
riot victims, which frequently have turned into
large-scale antigovernment demonstrations in the
last year.2
� The Army has supported the police by manning
roadblocks, helping to seal off townships, and
participating in joint patrols and large house-to-
house sweep operations. The biggest sweep oper-
ation occurred on 23 October 1984, when 7,000
2 Since 1976, outdoor gatherings of more than 12 people in South
Africa have required authorization by the government. Nonwhites
often seize on the opportunity provided by a funeral to stage mass
political protests.
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Army troops and policemen moved into Sebo-
keng, a black township south of Johannesburg
that had been calm for several days following
earlier riots. Soldiers lined the streets as police
searched some 19,600 homes and arrested more
than 350 blacks.
� Mass arrests have been used against crowds of
rioters and to suppress antigovernment groups in
general. In particular, the government has de-
tained many leaders of the UDF, which Pretoria
claims is behind much of the unrest in concert
with the ANC. Overall, some 12,000 nonwhites
have been arrested or detained since last Septem-
ber, most of whom have subsequently been
released.
18. Economic Impact of the Violence. Black un-
rest and the threat of trade sanctions have weakened
foreign investor confidence in South Africa's economic
prospects and triggered capital flight, which has con-
tributed to an outflow of $2.2 billion in private capital
during the last quarter of 1984 and the first quarter of
1985 (see figure 3). The capital drain more than offset
a strong current account surplus of $800 million.
Pretoria has said it will respond by maintaining fairly
tight credit policies to rebuild foreign reserves and
reduce inflation, now running at 16 percent. Follow-
ing the government's restrictive policies, the impend-
ing loss of foreign financial credit, continuing high
inflation, and the curtailment of economic activity by
civil unrest and boycotts, real GDP will most likely
decline this year. Although blacks bear the brunt of
recession, slow growth and tight credit will reduce
somewhat the purchasing power of middle-class
whites.
Critical Factors Affecting Future Course
of Events
19. South Africa's stability and political future will
hinge on the interaction of the following critical
factors. Their relative order of importance is open to
debate and, in any event, is likely to change several
times during the period of this Estimate, depending on
the ebb and flow of domestic and international pres-
sures on Pretoria. Factors examined include the pros-
pects for reform, the level and nature of black unrest,
white resolve, and the nonwhite political dynamic.
Soviet influence among nonwhite South African
groups and Moscow's activities against Pretoria also
will be examined in this section, although at this time
they are not as critical as other factors.
Figure 3
South Africa: Selected Balance of Payments
Million US $
1,000
Current
account balance
Private
sector capital movements
500
0
�500
�1,000
�1,500 II Ill
IV
1984
Recent unrest began
1985
306493 8-85
Prospects for Reform
20. The government controls a powerful internal
security apparatus and believes this will allow it time
to pursue a long-term domestic strategy that includes
an evolutionary expansion of nonwhite political rights
and the improvement of black urban living conditions.
As long as the white minority believes it can control
black unrest, it is likely to view certain issues as
nonnegotiable, thereby ensuring that antigovernment
groups will continue to flourish. Government spokes-
men in the last year have stated frequently that new
political systems being considered must meet the
minimum requirements of guaranteeing the white
community both self-determination in its "own af-
fairs" (education, health services, and so forth) and
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safeguards to protect it from being dominated by
nonwhites in decisions on national issues such as
defense and foreign affairs. In essence, whites are
seeking a limited power-sharing system that retains
both white control and some features of apartheid,
such as racially separate schools and residential areas.
21. The. prevailing mood among large portions of
the urban black community is intense anger at the
government. That mood may soften somewhat in the
next five years, but many blacks will remain sullen. In
addition, economic conditions in South Africa during
the remainder of this decade will not be conducive to
upgrading urban black townships and schools on a
large-scale basis or offsetting high unemployment
among blacks. In monitoring the reaction of blacks to
the government's reforms in the period of this Esti-
mate, we must differentiate between the rhetoric of
black leaders and the attitudes of the majority of
blacks. Many militant black leaders are only con-
cerned with the end game, and their chief demands�
such as a one-man, one-vote system that would enable
blacks to dominate the government�have been reject-
ed consistently by the government. These leaders have
established a pattern during Botha's rule of rejecting
all government concessions, including nonpolitical
ones, as inadequate. What is more crucial is the
reaction of the bulk of the black populace, especially
as Pretoria's stability is only threatened when non-
whites in large numbers engage in violent protests.
22. The government's strategy may have some suc-
cess in the period beyond the scope of this Estimate,
but only if the living conditions of urban blacks
improve substantially in the interim. The government
is trying to persuade the restive urban black populace
to be satisfied with a bigger�but not the biggest�
slice of the political pie in return for limited improve-
ments in townships and schools and a loosening of
some of the strictures of apartheid.
23. The black reaction to social and economic
reforms, therefore, may be as critical to Pretoria's
plans as the predictable discontent among blacks over
their inferior political status. The power of socioeco-
nomic incentives in the black community can be
substantial. For example, prior to July 1985, Soweto
remained relatively calm for eight years despite its
reputation as a center of black activism. This can be
attributed in large part to the funds the government
poured into Soweto following the riots in 1977 to
improve schools and living conditions. It should be
noted, however, that unrest reoccurred in Soweto in
July 1985.
24. Economic Constraints to Reform. We believe
that spontaneous outbreaks of violence resulting large-
ly from the government's inability to satisfy black
economic demands will compound the threat to Pre-
toria posed by the efforts of nonwhite groups to rally
blacks to press for greater political rights. South Afri-
ca's likely economic performance in the period of this
Estimate will severely constrain any government pro-
grams to improve the living conditions and schools of
urban blacks. Economic austerity measures designed
to prevent a large current account deficit and reduce
persistent double-digit inflation will limit real econom-
ic growth and inhibit government spending on
nonwhites.
25. During the remainder of the 1980s, South Afri-
ca's average annual rate of real economic growth
probably will be no more than 3 percent, and could be
lower if the price of gold falls, the world economic
recovery slows sharply or strong Western sanctions are
applied. The economy presently needs to grow at an
annual rate of about 5 percent just to accommodate
about 300,000 new jobseekers each year. Meanwhile,
South Africa's black population is increasing at a rate
of almost 3 percent a year, and an even higher annual
economic growth rate will soon be required to keep
pace with the demand for new jobs. This means that
the government most likely will be struggling just to
stay even, and may have to adopt a strategy of
concentrating on the improvement of conditions in
townships on a selective basis, focusing initially on the
traditional trouble spots�like the eastern Cape
Province.
26. White Support for Reform. Botha has demon-
strated great political skill in developing a broad
coalition of whites who support his reform program.
(See inset.) He has presented his program in such a
manner that many progressive whites believe they
must endorse it or suffer the status quo, and many
conservative whites believe they must support it or risk
losing everything in time to a black revolution. The
reform program passed its biggest test to date when
two-thirds of white voters approved of the new multi-
racial Constitution in a national referendum in No-
vember 1983. Moreover, an estimated 30 percent of
those who voted against the new Constitution were
proreformists protesting the exclusion of blacks from
the new system. The next general elections, expected
to take place in 1989, will be another major test for the
reform program. In the interim, Botha must project an
image of being unpressured and in total control over
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NR
Major Racial Reforms Announced in 1985
January
Moratorium on forced resettlement of black com-
munities.
President Botha says urban blacks to be granted politi-
cal rights at "highest possible level."
February
Plans canceled for relocating three black townships near
Cape Town.
Blacks to be allowed greater freedom of movement
without losing urban residential rights.
Crossroads shantytown to be upgraded rather than
destroyed; some residents allowed to remain.
March
Plans abandoned to move five black townships from
"white area" of Natal Province to black homeland.
April
Blacks with 99-year leasehold rights to become eligible
for freehold rights.
Revisions to be made in system that controls movements
of blacks.
Government considering extending South African citi-
zenship to include blacks officially regarded as foreign
citizens of "independent" homelands.
May
Racial job restrictions in mines to be abandoned next
year.
Ban on multiracial political parties to be dropped.
Plans abandoned to move to homelands all black town-
ships within 50 kilometers of a homeland.
Some central business districts in "white" areas to be
opened to all races as early as September.
June
Ban on marriages and sexual relations between whites
and nonwhites overturned; some 17,000 cases had been
prosecuted under these laws.
More classes of train coaches to be opened to all races
on 1 September.
August
Blacks in nonindependent homelands to be given choice
of South African or homeland citizenships.
Botha hints at regional power-sharing system, perhaps
referring to plans for joint Kwazulu homeland-Natal
Provincial administration rule in Natal Province.
First Regional Service Councils to be set up on 1
January 1986; will consist of local authorities of all races
in metropolitan areas and will be responsible for public
services; designed to increase benefits to black town-
ships.
NR
the direction and rate of change, or risk seeing his
coalition of white support vanish quickly.
27. Whites, however, already hard hit by inflation,
recent tax hikes, and credit restrictions, are likely to be
unwilling to foot the bill for costly racial reforms in
the near term. Pretoria, therefore, will try to sustain
the momentum of reform by implementing changes
that do not cost very much but are designed to have
symbolic value to nonwhites, such as Botha's an-
nouncement on 15 August confirming South African
citizenship to blacks in the "nonindependent" home-
lands. Botha capitalized on white fears following the
Soweto riots in 1976-77 to launch his reform program;
he may be able to use white nervousness over the
recent spate of unrest to move faster�especially on
political issues�than otherwise would have been pos-
sible. Pretoria also can be expected to try to convince
whites that they will have to tighten their belts more,
and even accept a lower standard of living, if they are
to avoid becoming embroiled in a chaotic domestic
situation of persistent black unrest. However, the most
likely trend is that Pretoria will spend substantially
larger funds on blacks only during the good years in
the economic cycle rather than risk a major erosion of
white support.
28. The long-term future of the reform program
and its appeal among whites will hinge to a large
degree on the popularity and political talents of
Botha's successor. Botha, 69, is not expected to remain
active in politics after the next general elections, which
must take place by 1989. Although Botha is head of
the National Party and extremely powerful, he cannot
simply choose his successor; Botha's candidate must
satisfy a party caucus. A leading candidate to replace
Botha at this time, in our judgment, is Minister of
Education and Development Aid Gerrit Viljoen, who
is strongly supportive of Botha's reform efforts, but is
not as dynamic a figure. Nonetheless, he probably is
capable of keeping most of the National Party intact
and moving forward with reform, as would Chris
Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Development and
Planning, another leading contender.
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29. The reform program may falter if a more
conservative National Party candidate�like F. W. De
Klerk, National Party head in the Transvaal�gains
the leadership post. A conservative Nationalist in
power may choose to suspend indefinitely many re-
forms now being considered in a futile effort to restore
Afrikaner unity. Even if a more progressive candidate
wins the top spot, he may be forced to slow the pace of
reform until he is confident he controls the same
support that Botha now enjoys.
30. The Rightwing Threat. Botha's policies have
created new opportunities for the right wing to gain
support among many Afrikaners who view his reforms
as the first step on the slippery slope leading to black
majority rule. We believe that the right wing will
remain a threat during the period of this Estimate, but
that the National Party most likely will win the next
general elections by a comfortable margin, although
probably not as convincingly as in the last elections in
1981.
31. The National Party is still experiencing trauma
as a result of its shift away from orthodox apartheid.
The controversy over Botha's reforms has split Afrika-
ner political, cultural, and religious institutions, and
has revitalized the white right wing in recent years.
While the National Party is losing some of its tradi-
tional Afrikaner support in rural areas, it is picking up
new support from English-speaking whites in urban
areas, enabling it to retain its tremendous popularity
overall and its hold on the government. (See figure 4.)
In the past two years, the two rightwing parties�the
Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Par-
ty�won approximately 40 percent of the popular vote
in 18 byelections held in districts composed mainly of
Afrikaners.
32. The National Party continues to hold an edge in
support in its traditional stronghold of Transvaal Prov-
ince, but the regions north of Pretoria may turn
increasingly to the rightwing parties. Botha himself
believes the rightwing parties would win as many as 20
additional seats in the white chamber of Parliament if
national elections were held today, although this
would not threaten the huge majority now enjoyed by
the National Party. He also must protect against
conservative Nationalists in Parliament switching over
to a rightwing party. The Conservative Party was
formed in March 1982 by 16 former Nationalists who
opposed Botha's plans for bringing nonwhites into the
government.
Figure 4
South African National Party Strength
Current Distribution of Seats
in Parliamentary Chamber
Number/Percent
New Republic Party 5/3
Conservative Party 18/10
Progressive Federal Party 27/15
National Party 128/72
Independent Survey
of Party Support
Over Past Three Years
Percent
Total seats=178
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
National
Party
Progressive
Federal Party
Conservative
Party
NNo Vote
New Republic
Party
Herstigte
Nasionale
1\ Party
Oct Mar May Jul Feb Jul Oct Feb Apr Jul
1982 83 83 83 84 84 84 85 85 85
306514 8435
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33. The right wing also may be able to capitalize
politically on white dissatisfaction over economic
downturns and the government's economic policies. A
recent nationwide poll of whites indicates that the
government's economic policies�including a 40-per-
cent hike in the cost of gasoline in January 1985�are
the biggest single cause of dissatisfaction among those
who describe themselves as increasingly disenchanted
with the government. South Africa's 70,000 white
farmers, meanwhile, are unhappy with agricultural
prices set by Pretoria, high interest rates, and inflation.
34. As the government moves forward with its
reform program and the polarization of the white
community intensifies, militant white conservatives
may become more active in using extralegal means to
undercut the reform process. Last year, there were
over 100 incidents of low-level intimidatory attacks or
vandalism against white liberals. The Afrikaner Weer-
standsbeweging (Afrikaner Armed Resistance) and the
Wit Kommando (White Commando) are rightwing
Afrikaner extremist groups with a combined member-
ship of less than 2,000 that may become more promi-
nent again after several years of relative dormancy
following a government crackdown in the early 1980s.
35. Most English-speaking whites favor more rapid
racial change in South Africa than the government has
outlined. The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), the
official opposition party and the main representative
of the white English-speaking community, will contin-
ue to press the ruling National Party to institute
reforms. The PFP is an important political counter-
weight to the conservatives, and might form an elec-
toral pact or coalition with reformists in the National
Party if the rightwing threat dramatically increases.
English-speaking white businessmen also are likely to
heighten their efforts to convince Pretoria to abandon
apartheid, especially the aspects of it that inhibit South
Africa's economy and industry.
Level and Nature of Unrest
36. A second critical factor that will help determine
the future course of events in South Africa involves the
level and nature of domestic unrest. Periods of unrest
in the nonwhite communities have long been a feature
of South African life and are likely to recur in the
period of this Estimate, regardless of the direction and
rate of reform, because of growing socioeconomic
pressures. The impact of future unrest on the govern-
ment's reform program, resolve, and stability will
depend to a large part on the degree to which the
violence is spontaneous or organized, episodic or sus-
tained, and includes or excludes attacks on whites. In
addition to the violence, another common feature of
domestic unrest in South Africa is nonviolent resis-
tance in the form of strikes and consumer boycotts for
political purposes.
37. Socioeconomic Pressures. The socioeconomic
pressures that play such a large part in creating an
atmosphere for black unrest are unlikely to abate in
the next five years, and probably will intensify as the
black population expands. The large numbers of
blacks who will move from rural to urban areas in the
coming years will create an even bigger strain on the
already overpopulated townships:
� Government statistics, which may be conserva-
tive, presently show a black housing shortage of
196,000 units in "white" areas. By the year 2000,
the 10-15 million blacks who are expected to join
the 9 million blacks already in urban areas will
require at least an additional 2 million houses.
� Largely as a result of the restrictive economic
policies pursued by the government, black unem-
ployment is likely to worsen in the future, de-
spite government allocations of $50 million for
short-term job creation in the 1985/86 fiscal
year.
� The black education crisis is likely to worsen as
the ranks of black school-age children expand.
Most black children today never make it to high
school, and the few who go on after high school
make up only about 3 percent of the enrollment
in technical schools and universities. The per
capita expenditure for white students is eight
times higher than for black pupils. The govern-
ment estimates that achieving racial parity in
schooling by 1990, assuming no inflation, would
require an annual additional education outlay of
$2.7 billion (18 percent of the total current
budget).
38. Spontaneous Versus Organized. Pretoria is
likely to continue to experience more serious problems
when confronted with outbreaks of spontaneous unrest
versus organized campaigns of violence. We believe
that the recent spate of unrest has been more sponta-
neous than previous drawn-out periods of violence and
that this trend may continue in the future. (See annex
B.)
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39. Since the National Party came to power in 1948
and began formally to establish apartheid, it has had to
contend with antigovernment protests by organized
black groups. In general, the efforts of black protest
groups have had little apparent impact on the govern-
ment's domestic policy. Pretoria has used its vast
security apparatus effectively to infiltrate and success-
fully counter the organized black resistance it has
faced over the years without making major conces-
sions. (See annex C.) The police are proficient at
rooting out activists and jailing ringleaders. The securi-
ty laws, including detention without trial, allow the
police great freedom in carrying out their duties.
Other key laws ban outdoor meetings without a permit
and any actions, such as an illegal strike or boycott,
that disrupt normal business and economic activities.
40. The security forces have a much more difficult
time suppressing outbreaks of spontaneous unrest,
which are often characterized by riotous crowds of
youths, rock throwing, and vandalism. A major securi-
ty response involving the Army has proved in the past
to be effective in ending these outbreaks, but such a
response incurs costs in terms of the government's
relations with the black and international communi-
ties. These outbreaks also have a more unsettling effect
on whites than has been apparent, for example, in
their response to the bombing campaign of the ANC.
Isolated terrorist attacks and organized protests seem
to make whites angry, whereas widespread spontane-
ous unrest makes them nervous.
41. Episodic Versus Sustained. The duration of
the violence also is critical. The dynamics of black
unrest in South Africa are such that widespread
violence�even if it can be confined to the town-
ships�becomes more threatening to government in-
terests the longer it lasts. Serious black unrest sets in
motion other pressures�such as sagging foreign inves-
tor confidence�that can weaken the government's
position and are difficult for Pretoria to counter
without ending the violence.
42. The government has survived episodic unrest,
cycles of which have lasted well over a year. Many
observers believe it is inevitable, however, that wide-
spread unrest will break out in South Africa and
persist without the lulls that in the past have afforded
the government time to review its options, enhance its
security resources, and reassure whites. The current
unrest already has lasted almost as long as the Soweto
disturbances, and there have been more incidents
spread out more evenly over the period.
43. Random Attacks on Whites. The direct threat
to whites from black unrest also is a crucial determi-
nant of the seriousness of the violence. During the last
year, only two whites�both civilians�have died as a
result of the township unrest; these deaths occurred in
the vicinity of black townships rather than in white
areas. The deaths received more coverage in the local
media and probably affected white attitudes toward
the unrest more than some other major incidents
involving large numbers of blacks killed.
44. A rash of random attacks by blacks against
white civilians�excluding an organized campaign of
terror by externally based groups like the ANC and
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)�would be unprece-
dented, and would greatly increase the pressure on
Pretoria to take tougher action than it has over the past
year, as well as cause a panic among many whites. We
believe such an outbreak is unlikely to occur in the
period of this Estimate, although measuring black
attitudes in this regard is extremely difficult. Black
attacks on whites have not been common, in part
because the white and nonwhite residential areas are
widely separated and the security forces generally
have prevented riots from spilling into white areas.
Antigovernment sentiments in the black community
have not yet been translated into militant antiwhite
fervor. However, once the psychological barrier is
broken�which might require only a handful of inci-
dents�random attacks on whites could become a
trend that hardens attitudes in both the white and
nonwhite communities.
45. Nonviolent Resistance. Politically motivated
strikes and boycotts and large-scale passive resistance
and civil disobedience campaigns have been used
frequently in South Africa in the last three decades,
but generally have not been successful in achieving the
objectives of their organizers. Campaigns of this type
also have rarely mirrored those associated with the
peaceful protests of Gandhi; they often have been
marred by intimidation measures on the part of
nonwhites acting as self-appointed enforcers of the
campaign.
46. We believe that the use of nonviolent resistance
tactics will continue and will result in more pressure
on the state than in the past because of the growing
strength of the black labor movement, the increasing
purchasing power of blacks, and the likely refinement
of tactics as a result of lessons learned from previous
mistakes. It is doubtful, however, that the government
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would be forced to yield to radical political demands
as a result of nonviolent resistance campaigns during
the period of this Estimate, although it may make
some economic and social concessions.
47. Strikes. Black groups have called for over 20
large-scale work boycotts in the last three decades to
protest government policy. Most of these efforts were
poorly organized and drew little support because
blacks generally have been unwilling to risk their jobs
for political objectives. The work boycott can be a
double-edged sword in South Africa, primarily be-
cause employers usually can find jobless blacks who
are eager to replace participants in a general strike. An
urban black who joins a boycott and loses his job to one
of the many unemployed blacks faces the threat of
being relocated in an impoverished homeland.
48. Even strikes that have been well organized and
strongly supported have had little impact on govern-
ment policy. The two-day general strike in Transvaal
Province in November 1984, organized by the UDF
and the two black labor federations, is a useful case
study. The strike probably was one of the most
successful ever in South Africa in terms of the number
of black workers who participated�an estimated 70
Percent of the black work force in Transvaal Province.
The participation rates were highest among union
members and residents of the townships hit hardest by
the previous months of rioting. Many blacks, however,
were unwilling participants who stayed home to es-
cape being injured by boycotters or because they were
unable to find transportation. Some bus companies
halted service to several townships after crowds of
blacks stoned buses and their passengers on the first
morning of the strike.
49. Many observers hailed the strike as an impres-
sive show of strength by its organizers and partici-
pants, and expected it to be the first of many. The
government, however, ignored the long list of political
and economic demands that had been compiled by the
strike organizers. Moreover, at least 23 blacks died in
clashes between police and boycotters and in attacks
by boycotters on fellow residents trying to commute to
work, about 13 labor leaders and activists who had
helped to organize the strike were arrested, and South
Africa's large synthetic fuel company (SASOL) fired
90 percent of its black workers�some 5,500�for
joining the boycott. Although most of the workers fired
were later rehired and many of the activists were
subsequently released, the strike organizers have not
attempted a repeat performance, mainly because the
union heads�fearing the economic and organizational
consequences of political action�have argued strongly
against it.
50. Consumer Boycotts. A black boycott of white
shops is another tactic used in the past as well as
during the current unrest. Black consumer boycotts of
white-owned shops have cost white businessmen in the
affected areas of eastern Cape Province up to one-
third of sales, and the boycott is being extended to the
Johannesburg and western Cape areas. We believe,
however, that the government is willing to let some
white shopowners suffer rather than substantially alter
its domestic policies. Previous consumer boycotts have
been difficult to sustain mainly because black shop-
owners charge hefty premiums; even basic foods like
bread usually cost three times as much or more in a
black shop than in a white one.
White Resolve
51. A third�and perhaps the most important�
factor affecting the course of events is white resolve.
Most whites are extremely nationalistic and deter-
mined to retain control. They firmly believe that black
majority rule inevitably would result in the loss of
their social and economic privileges and cultural iden-
tity, and that South Africa would resemble other states
on the continent that are plagued by tribal feuding
and severe economic mismanagement prompted by
ill-founded attempts at socialism. They are law and
order fanatics who have applauded strong measures to
restore order in the black townships. The present
emergency measures employed by the state are in no
way a maximum security response, and we believe
most whites would approve the imposition of harsher
measures�including martial law�if the unrest
continues.
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52. The white populace, however, is not a monolith:
� The almost 3 million Afrikaners, about 60 per-
cent of the white population, are themselves no
longer monolithic. There is now a large urban
class engaged in business and the professions,
often with international connections. Only 8 to
10 percent of Afrikaners remain on the land.
While still conservative, the urban Afrikaners are
more susceptible to international opinion and are
divided over the reform issue. Few Afrikaners
are likely to leave the country in large numbers
despite severe black unrest.
� Most of the 2 million English speakers are more
progressive on racial issues as a group, but have
little influence in the predominantly Afrikaner
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government. They also probably are less optimis-
tic about the state's ability to keep a lid on
domestic violence and more likely than Afrika-
ners to leave South Africa during major out-
breaks of unrest. Emigration is much easier for
some 800,000 English-speaking South African
nationals who hold British passports.
� The Portuguese community in South Africa,
which now numbers approximately 600,000�
many of whom have Portuguese passports�are
in the main recent immigrants with only tenuous
ties to South Africa.
53. Impact of Sanctions. The black unrest and
subsequent emergency measures have added to inter-
national pressure for economic sanctions, but likely
measures probably will have little short-term econom-
ic impact. The French ban on new investment stops
short of limiting trade. London, Bonn, and Bern,
Pretoria's key European trading partners, have public-
ly rejected the sanctions approach. Without their
support, most observers believe that sanctions will not
seriously hurt the South African economy. Moreover,
the country probably could weather even a major
cutoff in foreign economic ties for several years.
Reduced profits for South African businesses and
reduction in the quality of life for whites�which
sanctions could engender�would shake white confi-
dence, however.
54. Despite the limited direct impact of sanctions,
pressure for disinvestment reinforces investor concerns
about South Africa's economic prospects. Recent re-
duction of credit lines by US and West European
banks has triggered a panic in South African financial
markets and led to the temporary suspension of do-
mestic trading in currency and stocks. Pretoria has
expressed concern that increased reliance on short-
term debt is one of South Africa's few sources of
economic vulnerability. Even the withdrawal of other
major US banks is unlikely to precipitate a sustained
debt crisis, but will reinforce Pretoria's desire to
accumulate foreign exchange reserves and reduce debt
before promoting economic recovery.
55. The potential political and psychological impact
of strong punitive measures by the West are more
difficult to assess. Recently, South Africa has hinted at
some reforms that appear to be intended to head off
any further deterioration in relations with the West.
However, if countries like the United States and the
United Kingdom eventually join the growing ranks of
nations applying greater pressure, Pretoria would have
to choose between putting its reform program on the
shelf while enhancing its security capabilities and
ruthlessly suppressing black opposition or trying to
accommodate Western demands for change.
Nonwhite Political Dynamic
56. The Black Leadership Gap. A fourth critical
factor that will have a major impact on the course of
events is the nonwhite protest movement in South
Africa. Key elements examined include the absence of
a dominant black spokesman and the obstacles that
have long precluded the type of united, organized
protest activity that we believe would be necessary to
cause a rapid collapse of the white minority regime.
This section also assesses the prospects for some of the
leading nonwhite groups.
57. In response to the continuing unrest and attacks
on progovernment blacks, many whites and blacks in
South Africa agree that Pretoria must free imprisoned
ANC leader Nelson Mandela and negotiate with him
in order to avert a racial civil war and reach a political
compromise that satisfies black aspirations. Botha has
offered to set Mandela free if he would renounce
violence, most likely knowing that Mandela would
refuse to accept on principle. An unconditional release
of Mandela might be politically costly to Botha. Most
whites view his offer as reasonable, and probably
would see it as a sign of weakness if Botha suddenly
capitulated and released Mandela unconditionally.
Moreover, Mandela's release could introduce another
element of instability to the domestic scene�for
example, were he to call for a general strike. However,
we cannot rule out the freeing of Mandela by the
government in the hope of reducing racial tensions
and making it evident to blacks that he is not their
Messiah.
58. Obstacles to Nonwhite Unity. In the absence
of Mandela and the ANC on the internal scene, any
leader or group that hopes to unify the nonwhite
protest movement into an effective force for change
will have to overcome tremendous obstacles. Even
though apartheid alienates all nonwhites, there are
deep splits among the Colored, Indian, and black
communities. The three have shared some common
experiences under apartheid rule, but the differences
probably are more important from the perspective of
blacks:
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� Coloreds and Indians, like blacks, are required to
live in racially separate communities, but they
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schools; there is not a homeland system for
Coloreds and Indians, and they are not subject to
many influx control restrictions; and these groups
have been brought into the government while
blacks are still on the outside.
� Pretoria ignores Colored and Indian infractions
of certain apartheid laws while enforcing them
much more stringently against blacks. For exam-
ple, during the past 10 years, over 637,000 blacks
were arrested for not carrying an official identity
document, compared to no Indians and only two
Coloreds.
� The vast majority of Coloreds speak Afrikaans as
their first language, and in many ways are closer
culturally to whites than to blacks.
� Indians generally are a business class and�with
some striking exceptions�are apathetic toward
politics. Many Indians and their businesses have
been attacked, especially during the most recent
rampages by Zulus near Durban, reflecting deep-
seated black resentment. Indians also have not
forgotten that 50 of them were killed by Zulus
during riots in 1949 in Natal Province.
59. The Colored and Indian communities are
caught between the ruling white minority and an
angry black majority that sometimes views them as
opportune targets of violence. Colored and Indian
youth activists will continue to create problems for the
government by organizing school protests and by
participating in other demonstrations organized by
national groups like the UDF. Most Coloreds and
Indians, however, probably are silent supporters of
gradual political change that defuses tensions in the
black community and forestalls a black-dominated
government emerging in the foreseeable future.
60. There are strong divisive forces within the black
community that are likely to prevent the black protest
movement from becoming a threat to the regime
during the period of this Estimate. Some of the biggest
obstacles to greater black unity involve the following
factors:
� Tribal. There are nine major black ethnic groups
in South Africa that can be differentiated along
linguistic, cultural, and historical lines. The gov-
ernment has designated 13 percent of South
African territory for 10 linguistically based black
homelands where a total of about 14 million
blacks reside. The homelands are scattered
throughout South Africa, which helps reinforce
the cultural and linguistic differences among
black tribal groups. Moreover, in the larger black
townships, Pretoria has set up neighborhoods on
a tribal basis. Some tribal groups, including the
two largest�the Zulus (6 million) and Xhosas (5
million)�have long been hostile toward one
another.
� Urban-Rural. There are pronounced differences
among urban and rural South African blacks,
especially in their levels of political awareness
and activism. This is largely a result of the
relatively inferior educational opportunities in
rural areas. Moreover, most blacks who reside in
rural areas of the homelands engage in subsis-
tence agriculture and are out of touch with some
issues that concern urban blacks, such as union
activity, urban residency rights, and petty apart-
heid restrictions in the cities. About 9 million
blacks live in urban areas. The 14 million blacks
who reside in rural areas have never posed a
security threat to the white government.
� Ideological. One of the most divisive issues in the
black protest movement involves the role of
whites in the pursuit of racial reform. The
multiracial groups, led by the UDF and the
ANC, encourage white participation in antia-
partheid activities, although the memberships of
these groups are mostly blacks. Members of
"black consciousness" groups such as AZAPO, on
the other hand, argue against permitting whites
to join in the struggle for "black" (including
Colored and Indian) political rights.
� Generational. The generation gap is extremely
wide in South Africa's black townships. Young
urban blacks generally are more alienated, mili-
tant, and impatient than their parents, and be-
lieve their parents are politically unaware and
are weak for accepting the indignities of apart-
heid without offering resistance. A major shift in
the attitudes of either generation could have a
significant impact on the domestic scene.
61. Outlook for Key Groups. Government coun-
termeasures probably will continue to prevent the
African National Congress from transforming its pop-
ularity among South African blacks into large-scale
active support in the townships, a necessary condition,
we believe, if the group is to become a serious military
threat to the government. The ANC's dependence on
external bases has become increasingly problematic for
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the group, which has some 4,000 guerrillas, most of
whom are in camps in Angola. Pretoria's aggressive
regional strategy, highlighted by cross-border antiter-
rorist raids, has prompted nervous black states in the
region increasingly to circumscribe the activities of the
ANC. Despite its deteriorating position in the region,
we believe the group will be able to maintain a
campaign of sporadic but sometimes spectacular
bombings in South Africa.
62. There is a strong possibility during the period of
this Estimate that the ANC�or a splinter group from
it�will launch a campaign of harsher attacks in South
Africa. Many rank-and-file members are unhappy
over the lack of progress made by the group's 24-year-
old military wing and are pressing the leadership to
approve an intensified campaign that includes target-
ing white civilians. Pretoria's reaction to such a devel-
opment would probably include additional cross-bor-
der operations against the ANC presence in the region.
The ANC already is aware of its tremendous vulnera-
bility to an all-out counterterrorist effort by Pretoria,
which we believe is a major factor in the group's
reluctance to attack white civilians.
63. We believe a productive dialogue between the
government and the ANC is unlikely to take place in
the foreseeable future. The group recently decided at
its first major conference since 1969 not to enter into
talks with Pretoria. The consensus among top govern-
ment officials also probably precludes the possibility.
64. The Pan -Africanist Congress, the ANC's small-
er rival, may begin a renewed campaign of guerrilla
attacks in South Africa during the period of this
Estimate. The group, which has some 600 guerrillas
based mostly in Tanzania and Lesotho, has been
planning to launch a guerrilla campaign for several
years, but has been wracked by internal divisions and
a lack of adequate external funding, and are heavily
penetrated by South African security services. Some
new sources of aid in the region may be forthcoming
that allow the group to initiate attacks within the next
year or two. A PAC military campaign probably
would include some attacks on white civilians, but
would not represent a major threat unless the member-
ship of the group expands greatly, something which is
unlikely in the foreseeable future.
65. The black labor movement increasingly may
become the main fulcrum for black political leverage.
Since Pretoria decided in 1979 to give black unions
official recognition and allow their participation in
collective bargaining, the size of the black labor
movement has mushroomed. Total trade union mem-
bership, representing all races, stood at approximately
1.5 million in 1984, of which about 700,000 were
blacks. Most black trade unionists�at least 500,000 in
1984�belong to newer groups formed since 1979 that
make up the so-called emerging black labor move-
ment. Despite the rapid growth of black unions, less
than 15 percent of the black work force outside of
agriculture, domestic service, and the public sector is
unionized.
66. After years of focusing almost exclusively on
narrow economic issues, the black labor movement
recently has become more active politically. For ex-
ample, two large black labor unions and the two black
labor federations, representing a combined total of
more than 350,000 black workers, helped to organize
the general strike in Transvaal Province last Novem-
ber. Some black labor groups also actively promoted
the nonwhite election boycott campaign last year.
Labor unions representing over 400,000 workers, most
of them black, after three years of negotiations plan to
launch a new federation in November. The organiza-
tion will link the powerful National Union of
Mineworkers with unions belonging to the UDF, as
well as an existing labor federation and several major
unaffiliated unions. Participation of UDF unions and
the mineworkers, who recently demanded an end to
the state of emergency, strongly suggests the new
federation will seek political gains for blacks.
67. The willingness of the black labor movement to
throw its weight behind political protests in the future
will be tempered to a large degree by its vulnerability
to government harassment. Black labor groups are
highly dependent on foreign funding, which can be
cut off by the government if the groups engage in
illegal activities, such as general strikes for political
ends. Some of the most stridently antigovernment
unions already have suffered from various government
harassment techniques, including the detention of top
officials. Despite these hazards, we believe the govern-
ment will be forced to contend with a more unified
and politically demanding black labor movement dur-
ing the period of this Estimate.
68. Chief Buthelezi's Zulu organization, Inkatha,
has some 1 million members and may become increas-
ingly important to the government's reform efforts, as
Buthelezi is one of the few black power brokers in
South Africa. Inkatha is despised by many other black
groups because of its cultural emphasis and Buthelezi's
position as Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland.
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Although a vocal minority of young urban Zulus also
oppose him, Buthelezi nonetheless is widely popular
among the Zulus whose warrior heritage and volatile
nature has made them feared by other nonwhite
groups. His moderate stance has won him growing
praise from many whites who generally are grateful
for the influence he has among the Zulus. Late last
year, he gained media attention in South Africa for
condemning the school boycotts, the violence in black
townships, and the general strike by black workers. He
publicly has chastized militant groups like the ANC
for underestimating the security resources of the state.
69. A decision by Buthelezi either to participate in
a new political system set up by the government or
join in an active campaign to maximize pressure on
Pretoria would be an extremely important develop-
ment.
The Natal provincial council also unani-
mously approved a general proposal in June 1985 to
establish a statutory body linking Natal and KwaZulu
administrations on matters of common concern. A
commission initiated by Buthelezi proposed a similar
power-sharing system in Natal in 1982 that was to be
controlled jointly by Buthelezi and a white provincial
administrator.
70. Pretoria may decide to experiment with a pow-
er-sharing system in Natal, where many progressive
English-speaking whites reside. However, many black
leaders probably would denounce a regional power-
sharing scheme incorporating the tribally based home-
lands, especially if Buthelezi goes along with it. Even
Buthelezi's support for such a plan, in our view, would
depend on the level of autonomy it offers him.
Pretoria also undoubtedly would face stiff opposition
to the plan from white farmers in northern Natal, if it
were to be controlled by KwaZulu.
71. The United Democratic Front has emerged as
the most active and important nonwhite, antigovern-
ment political group inside South Africa. It was offi-
cially launched in 1983 to unite groups opposed to the
new Constitution that excludes the black majority.
Today, the UDF is an umbrella organization that
claims a membership of over 600 groups representing
more than 2 million individuals, about 90 percent of
them black. Although the UDF does not have a
constitution, affiliate member groups must support a
declaration opposing apartheid.
72. The UDF's prospects are uncertain despite the
prominence it has achieved domestically and interna-
tionally. The new labor federation to be formed in
November will include 24 unions affiliated with the
UDF and may result in more joint UDF-black labor
action like the two-day general strike last November.
However, the UDF already has become a prime target
of government harassment tactics; the group's meet-
ings frequently have been banned and many UDF
leaders have been detained in the last year. In addi-
tion, the ongoing treason trial of 16 leading UDF
activists in Durban is designed to allow the prosecution
to submit a mountain of evidence�much of it circum-
stantial�that the government may use to justify out-
lawing the group.
73. There are several black groups that could attain
national prominence and be co-opted to support ac-
tively the government's reform program. One such
group is the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), the largest
South African black separatist church with a member-
ship of some 4 million. The ZCC denounces violence
and refuses to address political issues, although it has
maintained a warm relationship with Pretoria for over
two decades. About 1.5 million of its followers attend-
ed a 75th anniversary ceremony in April 1985 in
Transvaal Province where the keynote speaker�Presi-
dent Botha�was awarded a peace medal. The ZCC
has played an important role in teaching its mostly
rural and poorly educated members to respect both
homeland authorities and Pretoria.
The Soviet Role and Strategy
74. The Soviet Union's efforts to undermine the
white government in South Africa and foster links
with black antiapartheid groups to date have not
created any insurmountable problems for Pretoria.
The Soviet angle is important, however, largely be-
cause Moscow provides critical support to the ANC,
which is popular among South African blacks and is a
main irritant in Pretoria's relations with neighboring
black states where the group has a presence.
75. Moscow has identified the ANC as the leading
opposition organization in South Africa, and has
sought to build its influence with the ANC in a variety
of ways. First, the Soviets rely on the fact that
members of the South African Communist Party�an
exile party heavily dependent on Soviet funding and
support�occupy many key posts in the ANC, includ-
ing that of secretary general and chief military plan-
ner. In addition, the Soviet Bloc supplies virtually all
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of the ANC's military supplies and training. Finally,
the Soviets champion the ANC's cause in a number of
international forums. For its part, the ANC makes no
secret of its close relations with the Communist world,
but claims to be a nationalist organization committed
to revolutionary struggle. Moscow presumably sees the
ANC connection as its most effective means of ensur-
ing itself a role in what it sees as the long-term struggle
for control in South Africa. The Soviets will also
continue their intermittent contacts with the PAC to
take advantage of future developments in that
organization.
76. The Soviets have no formal relations with Pre-
toria and thus lack the range of diplomatic, intelli-
gence, and front organization assets inside South Afri-
ca that they are able to exploit elsewhere. In the past
year, however, the Soviet press has commented posi-
tively on the actions of the UDF and the black trade
unions and Soviet academics have noted their progres-
sive nature. This reflects Soviet interest in these bodies
as promoters of revolutionary change and, possibly, in
cultivating elements of such organizations to broaden
their connections inside South Africa. At the same
time, Soviet commentators have tempered this interest
by acknowledging that, for the moment at least, these
opposition forces are divided and vulnerable to gov-
ernment suppression.
77. Moscow relies heavily on propaganda and disin-
formation to promote its interests in southern Africa,
with the objectives of demonstrating Soviet solidarity
with black African positions, discrediting the United
States as a backer of apartheid, and derailing Western
negotiating initiatives. The Soviets often "play back"
black African criticism of South Africa in the Soviet
press, and are frequently able to place Soviet-originat-
ed material on supposed US-South African collusion in
African press organs, as well as carrying a variety of
such material in the Soviet media. At least twice over
the past year, for example, the Soviet media ran stories
accusing the United States and South Africa of devel-
oping an "ethnical weapon" that only worked on
Africans and "other nonwhite racial groups."
78. Soviet front organizations such as the World
Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity
Organization frequently use South African issues as
means of attracting Western and Third World support
for their activities, and the anti-South Africa theme
was prominently featured at the Moscow Youth Festi-
val. In addition, the Kremlin generally supports anti-
South Africa resolutions at the United Nations, al-
though it has not taken the initiative on UN sanctions,
preferring to follow the lead of black African states
and avoid casting South Africa as an East-West issue.
The Soviets will undoubtedly take a vocal role in
castigating Pretoria at the upcoming UN General
Assembly.
Outlook
Short Term (One Year)
79. We believe it is extremely unlikely that the
white government will collapse during the next year.
The vast security resources of the state and the firm
resolve of most whites will prevent the development of
a regime-threatening upheaval during the next 12
months.
80. The government, relying primarily on its coer-
cive powers, probably will restore some semblance of
order to many townships in the short term. Pretoria
undoubtedly will continue to rely on mass arrests in
townships where violence persists to weaken antigov-
ernment groups. If violence intensifies in other areas
of the country�for example, the western Cape or
Durban�the government may be forced to extend the
state of emergency to those areas as well. There are
almost certain to be more incidents of violence in the
months ahead as blacks protest against the state of
emergency and police excesses, flock to the funerals of
riot victims, and expand their nonviolent resistance
efforts. This unrest may prolong the state of
emergency.
81. As discussed earlier, however, the recent unrest
differs in some respects from earlier outbreaks, and
current security measures may prove inadequate to
restore order in the next year. Sporadic violence, for
example, has continued in some townships affected by
the state of emergency as black youths engage in
defiant acts such as throwing rocks at police patrols
and attacking collaborators. If violence persists, we
believe Pretoria would resort to even harsher counter-
measures. The actions taken by the government to
date in no way represent a maximum security response
by the state. If the situation deteriorates quickly,
Pretoria could decide to declare martial law, institute
a total press blackout in riot-torn areas, conduct more
house-to-house searches and wholesale arrests of dissi-
dents, and ban several protest groups. It also could
draw upon the vast reserves of the police and Army,
which it has not yet had to do to enforce the current
state of emergency.
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82. The government's political reform efforts in the
short term are likely to hinge largely on the nature of
unrest and on the level of international pressure. We
believe that when Parliament resumes in September
Botha will forge ahead with largely nonpolitical
changes�including revision of laws restricting the
movement of blacks�while continuing to study alter-
native political systems that retain white control and
expand black rights. During the next year, Botha is
likely to announce steps leading to the establishment
of a confederal system linking the central government
and the homelands, a national advisory body for
blacks outside the homelands, and a multiracial gov-
ernment for the KwaZulu-Natal Province region.
Conscious of his image with the white electorate,
however, he is unlikely to implement major political
changes until the unrest abates.
Long Term (Next Five Years)
83. We believe that over the long term the chance
of a government collapse remains unlikely, but in-
creases somewhat because existing trends may become
sustained or magnified. (See annex D.) As in the short
term, the state's security resources and white resolve
are critical; however, over a five-year period, the
interplay of such factors as the economy, black unrest,
reform, the cohesiveness of the ruling elite, and inter-
national actions against South Africa are more difficult
to predict.
84. The government's reform program is likely to
achieve no better than mixed results during the next
five years:
� We believe the stigma attached to being a collab-
orator is unlikely to fade soon, which will make it
very difficult for Pretoria to find influential
blacks other than homeland leaders to talk with
or persuade into participating in any limited
power-sharing system. Nonetheless, Pretoria may
move to implement a new system that expands
black political rights without waiting for a man-
date from blacks, much in the same way it
established the new multiracial Parliament with-
out first securing a mandate from the Colored
and Indian communities.
� The economy�suffering in part from the effects
of sanctions and diminished investor confi-
dence�probably will be unable to support any
comprehensive government programs to amelio-
rate conditions in the urban townships, which
probably will add to the numbers inclined to
protest for greater political rights. Pretoria, how-
ever, may be able to improve conditions some-
what in the more troubled townships, and would
be able to do more if the price of gold climbs.
� Pretoria's piecemeal eradication of petty apart-
heid laws�the legal barriers separating the races
in public places and social relationships�most
likely will lead to greater racial mixing in offices,
shops, restaurants, and even in some schools and
residential areas. While it will offend some
whites and increase conservative opposition, the
net effect will be to increase the number of
whites who view racial changes as inevitable and
irreversible.
85. We believe it is virtually certain that, during
the next five years, Pretoria will experience additional
black unrest as a result of both growing socioeconomic
pressures and continuing political grievances. During
this period, the unrest probably will be cyclical, as in
the past; some cycles may last longer and be more
violent than before, but the government will be able to
restore order for a time in between cycles as blacks
grow weary of the violence and are discouraged by the
overwhelming power of the state.
86. It is less likely, however, but still possible, that
South Africa could begin to experience more sustained
and intensified violence. Black youths may be under-
going a psychological transition as a result of their
daily confrontations with security forces. Rather than
fleeing the country to join the ANC as thousands of
young blacks did during the Soweto riots, these mili-
tant black youths may wage a constant low-level war
against the government in the townships. In addition,
black protest groups may be more effective in rallying
the support of the traditionally passive black majority
by pointing to the government's reforms as a sign that
their foe is responsive and weakening, and by citing
growing international pressure as evidence that their
antiapartheid activities are influencing world opinion
and getting results.
Prerequisites for a Government Collapse�A Worst
Case Scenario
87. For a government collapse to occur in the next
five years, we believe a significant number of blacks
would have to engage in a pervasive campaign of
violence that rapidly eroded white resolve and para-
lyzed the security forces. A catalyst�such as a security
action that results in hundreds of blacks killed at once,
or the assassination of a key black figure�could spark
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such a campaign. The command and control structure
of the security forces might break down in the face of
nationwide outbreaks of violence that ravaged both
nonwhite and white areas. White resolve might crum-
ble quickly should blacks�heretofore passive�turn
into random killers of whites.
88. A campaign of widespread violence�even
without significant white casualties�also could accel-
erate forces that might lead to an economic crisis and a
dissolution of white resolve:
� The international community is likely to tighten
the screws on South Africa in response to the
repressive, bloody measures we believe the gov-
ernment would use initially to try to counter
escalating violence. The initial measures imple-
mented in the last year could snowball into a
complete economic embargo�including the de-
nial of landing and port rights to South African
planes and vessels�and the expulsion of South
Africa from all international organizations.
� A severely deteriorating domestic situation might
send investor confidence to an all-time low,
prompt Western banks to recall loans to South
Africa, and hasten capital flight.
� The black labor movement might very well make
its presence felt through a series of protracted
general strikes that could bring industry to a halt.
� The security forces may write off the worst black
townships as "no go" areas and halt efforts to
restore order there. This would pave the way for
guerrilla groups to set up an infrastructure in
those areas and dole out weapons to young black
firebrands.
� Smelling blood, the Soviet Union probably would
step up its support to the ANC and press black
states bordering South Africa to do likewise.
Some of these states undoubtedly would allow
the ANC greater freedom of action if the South
African security forces were tied up stamping out
brushfires in the black townships.
89. We believe that even under this scenario blacks
would be unable to overthrow the white government
�by force in the next five years. Even before these
developments occur, however, the government, faced
with growing violence and having exhausted its securi-
ty options, probably would agree to more far-reaching
political reforms and attempt to negotiate with black
opponents to avert a civil war.
90. Alternatively, if a groundswell of white opposi-
tion to reform develops during the next five years�
something we believe is possible but unlikely�the
ruling National Party might abandon its reform pro-
gram, purge itself of reformists, or split into opposing
camps. If the Party shifts away from reform�or is
replaced by a coalition of rightwing parties that does
so�unprecedented levels of black unrest may result.
Implications for the United States
91. Washington's relations with Pretoria are likely
to be problematic during the period covered by this
Estimate. The white regime's responses to endemic
violence�whether repressive measures at home or
cross-border operations against ANC targets in the
region�are guaranteed to preoccupy apartheid critics
in the United States and around the world.
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ANNEX A
The Decline of Grand Apartheid
1. In the 1950s former Prime Minister Hendrik
Verwoerd developed the black homelands scheme that
until recently served as the political cornerstone of
grand apartheid," which refers to the concept of
separate, self-ruling black nation states. In 1950, Ver-
woerd introduced the Promotion of Bantu Self-Gov-
ernment Act, which set guidelines for the political
evolution of the black homelands into independent
states and was designed to strip blacks of their South
African citizenship. Under this plan, all blacks, even
those residing outside the homelands, would become
nationals of new independent states. Prior legislation
had set the stage for the Self-Government Act: The
Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 set aside 13 percent of
South African land for tribally based black homelands;
separate administrative structures for blacks were set
up in the 1920s. The Bantu Authorities Act in 1951
resurrected a tribal local authority system in the
homelands.
2. The primary objective of Verwoerd's policy was
to protect white control against the threat of a rapidly
growing nonwhite population. He presented his home-
lands scheme as the only alternative to an integrated
South Africa that he feared eventually would be
dominated by blacks. Verwoerd also viewed the home-
land administrations as a necessary outlet for rising
black political aspirations, as evidenced by the wide-
spread protests in the 1950s. In addition, he hoped the
plan would defuse international criticism, which had
been mounting since the government began moving in
1951 to eradicate the limited political rights of non-
whites. Under Verwoerd's plan, the government has
moved up to 3 million blacks from white areas to the
homelands since the 1960s, frequently resorting to
force to gain compliance.
3. The ruling National Party recently has admitted
publicly that its grand apartheid doctrines are badly
flawed and in need of revision. The Party's rethinking,
in our view, is a result of the dramatic failure of the
homelands scheme to achieve the National Party's
Political objectives. Rather than guaranteeing white
control, the denial of South African citizenship and
basic political rights to blacks has promoted unrest.
Black political aspirations have not been satisfied by
the homeland administrative structures, which are
filled largely with moderate blacks and tribal authori-
ties who are scorned by most urban blacks for working
within the government's system. In addition, no state
other than South Africa has recognized the four
homelands that to date have evolved into -indepen-
dent" states, and some homelands, including KwaZulu,
have refused independence.
4. The homelands also are a tremendous economic
burden, and have virtually no chance of becoming
economically viable in the coming decades. Even the
government has admitted recently that the homelands
eventually will be able to accommodate only 40
percent of blacks at the most. Even though Pretoria
spent some $1.25 billion last year on developing and
maintaining the homelands:
� GDP per capita in the homelands only increased
from $20 in 1970 to $23 in 1980, making them
among the poorest areas in the world.
� Pretoria's expensive job creation program for the
homelands has provided work for only 7 percent
of the resident potential labor force.
� Infant mortality in the homelands is among the
highest in Africa.
� The homelands only contribute 3 percent of
South Africa's GDP.
� About 85 percent of rural households and 15
percent of urban households located in the home-
lands have incomes below the minimum subsis-
tence level.
� Earnings of homeland residents who work out-
side of the homelands in white areas of South
Africa make up 72 percent of the total income of
the homelands.
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ANNEX B
Background on Soweto and Sharpeville Violence
1. Sharpeville. On 21 March 1960, some 300 police
shot into a crowd of 5,000 that had gathered in the
township of Sharpeville to protest the "pass laws"
requiring blacks to carry identity and work documents
and restricting their movement and residency in white
areas; 69 blacks died, and some 180 were injured. The
protest had been organized by the Pan- Africanist
Congress, which also played an active role in the
violent aftermath of the shooting. The PAC and other
groups organized a general strike in Sharpeville that
spread to most industrial areas of the country. The
strike was most effective in Cape Town, where it
lasted almost three weeks and paralyzed industry in
the area; 50,000 of the 60,000 blacks in the area
participated.
2. Some of the underlying causes of the Sharpeville
unrest were similar to the present outbreak. Three-
fourths of Sharpeville's population of 36,600 were
under the age of 18, and the high schools in the area
could not accommodate all of them. Unemployment
was high and rising. Over a third of the residents were
defaulting on their rent payments. The area of Trans-
vaal Province in which Sharpeville is situated had
been hit hard by the government's program of forcibly
resettling communities. The local police were notori-
ous for vigorously enforcing the pass laws.
3. The government responded to the Sharpeville
incident by declaring a state of emergency in 24 major
cities and towns. The police headed the security
response, backed by the regular Army and 18 regi-
ments of reserve soldiers mobilized after the shooting
incident. On 8 April, the PAC and ANC were out-
lawed. The state of emergency was expanded on 11
April to include 122 of approximately 300 magisterial
districts (compared to the 36 magisterial districts now
affected), even though by then much of the violence
was abating. On 31 August, the state of emergency was
lifted. There were 11,503 arrests made (slightly more
have been arrested so far during the 1984-85 unrest).
4. Black-on-black violence occurred during the
Sharpeville unrest on a small scale, including the death
of a policeman, the ransacking of numerous homes of
policemen, and the murder of a Colored man who had
driven two white journalists into a black township near
Cape Town. Like the current unrest, the violence
generally was contained within the black townships.
The notable exception was a protest march by 30,000
blacks from a township near Cape Town to the
Parliament building in the center of the city that
ended in a violent clash with police and the dispersal
of the crowd.
5. The international community was outraged at
the Sharpeville incident and its criticism of apartheid
rose sharply. The unrest greatly accelerated an outflow
of private investment funds that was not reversed until
1964. Whites in South Africa generally were shaken by
the violence. The deeply held belief among Afrikaners
that they are God's chosen people was bolstered,
however, on 9 April when a bullet fired at close range
by a crazed white gunman miraculously passed
through the face of then Prime Minister Verwoerd
without killing him or damaging his brain. The 1960s
was a period of heightened repression as the govern-
ment responded to Sharpeville by driving subversive
groups into exile and intensifying its effort to relocate
urban blacks in the homelands.
6. Soweto. The disturbances began in Soweto (with
a population of 1.25 million at the time) on 16 June
1976, when some 20,000 black students gathered to
protest the introduction of Afrikaans as a teaching
medium in two courses at local schools. After several
students died when police shot into a crowd, youths
went on a rampage, destroying government offices
and vehicles in Soweto. Within two months, antigov-
ernment violence had spread to some 80 black com-
munities; by the end of 1976, the number had risen to
160 (compared to the 155 communities involved in
disturbances in the 1984-85 unrest). Durban was the
only major city that saw little or no violence, primarily
because the local police used restraint in handling the
student protests that did occur.
7. The protests on 16 June followed 18 months of
growing frustration in Soweto over the forced teaching
of Afrikaans in some classrooms rather than the tradi-
tional medium of English or a tribal dialect. Over-
crowded classrooms in Soweto resulted from a dramat-
ic government push in the early 1970s to educate more
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blacks, even though the number of secondary schools
in Soweto rose from 19 in 1972 to 41 in 1976. The per
capita expenditure for white students in 1976 was
about 15 times higher than for black students. The
economy was in a deep recession and unemployment
was high and rising, which angered the growing
numbers of black high school graduates. Soweto, like
other black townships, for over three years had been
under the administration of a new system of black
local authorities that had resulted in the deterioration
of the townships and widespread dissatisfaction with
local services. In 1975, 85 percent of the houses in
South Africa's black townships had no bathrooms and
66 percent had no hot running water.
8. Student groups were at the forefront of most of
the disturbances. They organized several general
strikes, including one that at its zenith achieved about
60 percent absenteeism in Johannesburg, and attacked
blacks who ignored the strikes. A black consumer
boycott of white stores during the 1976 Christmas
season also was highly successful. In addition, at least
350 schools were damaged, most of them by firebombs
in the hands of militant students who were advocating
school boycotts. Students destroyed hundreds of gov-
ernment-run taverns and chided their parents who
attended them.
9. At least one black policeman was murdered in
the unrest, and there were several instances in which
suspected police informers were killed by crowds.
Students also attacked the homes of several black
policemen. The worst black-on-black violence oc-
curred when Zulu migrant workers in Soweto�an-
gered in part by the attacks on taverns, and suspected
of being encouraged by the police�clashed with local
residents; some 70 blacks died. Similar violence�
pitting migrant workers from the homelands against
local black residents�broke out in black townships
near Cape Town; 26 died, 106 were injured, and 186
homes were destroyed during two days of riots.
10. The Soweto unrest deeply frightened many
whites and worried foreign investors. Two whites in
Soweto on the first day of the riots were beaten to
death, and several others died in the following months.
In Cape Town, black demonstrators roamed through
some white residential areas stoning cars. A few
unprecedented large-scale riots also took place in the
center of Cape Town as police clashed with protesting
students. Immigration figures reflected the level of
white concern: in 1975 there was a net gain of some
40,000 whites in South Africa; two years later, there
was a net loss of more than 1,000, despite a steady
stream of new arrivals who had fled the guerrilla war
in Rhodesia. Moreover, the second half of 1976 was a
boom period for gun dealers in South Africa as
frightened whites rushed to buy handguns and rifles.
In addition, the riots immediately contributed to a loss
of investor confidence and a subsequent new outflow
of foreign capital in South Africa.
11. Police responses to the student-organized pro-
tests were generally heavyhanded. Most clashes in-
volved the police using tear gas, batons, and shotguns
against students. The death toll after the first week
stood at 176. In July 1976 Pretoria banned meetings of
antigovernment groups, but with little effect. By
October 1977, the death toll had risen to some 660.
Over the 16 months of unrest, police arrested and
convicted 1,556 people (1,122 under the age of 18) and
detained 2,430 -for questioning." The unrest ended
after a crackdown on 19 October 1977 in which the
government banned the leading student groups and
almost all black consciousness organizations�which
reached the height of their popularity during the
unrest.
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ANNEX C
South African Security Capabilities
1. South Africa's white minority has invested heavi-
ly in a pervasive and growing internal security appara-
tus that enforces and defends apartheid. We estimate
that one in eight South African whites�that is, some
600,000 men and women�participates at least part
time in some aspect of internal security or defense.
Combined police, prison, and defense expenditures
account for almost $2.7 billion, or 18 percent of the
budget.
2. Police. The South African Police (SAP), a nation-
wide paramilitary organization with some 45,000
members, forms the backbone of the internal security
apparatus. This national force includes secret police
and riot control components as well as traditional
uniformed and detective units. It is backed up by a
vast array of security legislation that permits detention
without trial and wide powers of search and seizure. In
addition, the government can limit press coverage of
the security forces and their activities.
3. The SAP has recruited nonwhites since its incep-
tion, and they make up about half of the force. Of the
nonwhites in the SAP today, 80 percent are black, 14
percent are Colored, and 6 percent are Indian. The
position of nonwhites in the SAP has improved in
recent years, but the leadership remains overwhelm-
ingly made up of conservative Afrikaners.
4. The government has stated publicly that it plans
to expand the size of the SAP by 60 percent as funds
become available. The number of police in South
Africa per capita presently is about half that in New
York City. This statistic is misleading because the SAP
usually does not maintain a major presence in most
black townships and devotes few resources to prevent-
ing or investigating crime in nonwhite communities;
consequently, some black townships in South Africa
are among the highest crime areas in the world.
5. The government in October 1984 empowered
black local authorities to establish and control new
black police units that will be separate from the SAP
and responsible for law enforcement in the townships.
In January 1985, Pretoria announced that 16 black
local authorities initially would set up these units.
According to a South African official, the plan is
designed to nurture and protect a progovernment
grassroots leadership in black urban areas and to
extricate the central government from the violent
unrest. The first contingent of 117 -peace officers"
finished training by SAP instructors in May. One black
council at the center of the unrest has begun recruiting
a 289-man force that will cost about $1.5 million
annually when fully staffed in two years.
6. Army. The South African Defense Force (SADF)
plays a key role in assisting the SAP in maintaining
internal order. Military units share border security
responsibilities with the police, provide vital support to
large-scale police sweep operations and manhunts in
rural areas, and assist the SAP during major internal
disturbances. Moreover, the Army's Commando
Force, comprised of local home guard units scattered
throughout the country, help prevent attacks on im-
portant government and industrial facilities. White
males are conscripted for two years' full-time duty,
and are liable for part-time duty from the age of 20
through 54. Civilian-staffed Civil Defense units under
the direction of the Minister of Defense operate
throughout South Africa and are buttressed by numer-
ous white gun clubs and neighborhood defense groups
(about 35 percent of whites own firearms).
Military (SADF) Manpower
Total
393,500
Active duty
93,500
Ready reserve
125,000
Commandos
175,000
7. Other government security units include the
7,000-man Railway and Harbor Police, responsible for
protecting the country's airports, harbors, and rail-
ways, and the 15,000-man Prison Service. The black
homelands also have security forces that work closely
with South African units.
8. Loyalty of Nonwhite Security Personnel.
There have been no reports thus far of nonwhites
defecting from the security forces. Black policemen
have a reputation of being tougher on blacks than are
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white policemen. In addition, there have been some
reports of black policemen from certain tribal groups
being deployed in areas predominantly populated by
blacks from other hostile tribal groups. Only 3 percent
of the active Army is black. If thousands of black
policemen began deserting, the government could
replace them with personnel from the all-white police
reservists or the Army. Historically, the white minority
regime in southern Rhodesia experienced almost no
defections from its largely black security forces despite
their being targeted by insurgents.
9. Security and Town Planning. Security is para-
mount in town planning. Most black townships are
purposely separated by great distances from white
residential and urban areas and accessible only by a
few roads. By using roadblocks, police can quickly seal
off a township. In a crisis situation, the government
could shut off water and food supplies. Security
considerations have also played a major part in deter-
mining the internal design of black townships. Regula-
tions governing the design of black townships have
long been intended to provide riot police with maxi-
mum maneuverability. General guidelines followed by
civil engineers and architects planning black townships
near Durban in the 1950s called for:
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� Township roads wide enough for a South African
armored personnel carrier to make a U-turn.
� Houses built no closer than a specified distance so
as not to impede police weapons fire and to make
it more difficult for a fugitive to evade authorities.
� Convenient vantage points for police vehicles to
gather and monitor wide areas of the township.
� A distance between the boundaries of the town-
ship and main highways in the area that exceed-
ed the range of a high-powered rifle, presumably
to protect travelers from snipers and even errant
police shots in the event of a serious disturbance.
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ANNEX D
Indicators of Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change
The following are checklists of evolutionary and
revolutionary indicators for developments in South
Africa. None of these indicators should be interpreted
in isolation, but the likelihood of either scenario
unfolding will increase if the pattern of events in the
next few years mirrors one set of indicators more
closely than the other.
Evolutionary Change
The new political structures set up to include blacks
function even though many blacks choose not to
Participate.
Black-owned stores multiply dramatically in both
white and black areas.
The ANC continues its bombing campaign, but is
increasingly wracked by internal dissension.
The government receives increased revenues that
allow for greater expenditures on services to blacks
without raising costs to whites�for example, a rise in
gold prices or sale of parastatals.
Pretoria enters into fruitful talks with the UDF or
ANC.
The government offers various options to the home-
land administrations, including joining a confederal
system.
New black police units in the townships drastically
reduce the high crime rate in the townships, protect
progovernment blacks, and prevent flareups from
spreading nationwide.
Nonwhite student demonstrations continue sporadi-
cally but increasingly are viewed by the black commu-
nity as disruptive and counterproductive.
Pretoria writes off rent arrears that have accumulat-
ed in various areas of the country as a result of
boycotts.
The new Regional Service Councils become con-
duits for expanded funds to develop black townships.
The government relaxes its housing standards, and
private industry responds by providing low-cost pre-
(b)(3) NatSecAci
fabricated units that are built on the periphery of
existing townships.
The National Party wins elections in 1989, losing a
marginal number of seats to the Conservative Party
but picking up seats from a floundering Progressive
Federal Party.
A smooth transition occurs as Botha retires and is
succeeded by a leader who continues a reform pro-
gram and has good relations with the nonwhites in
government.
Almost all petty apartheid laws�the legal barriers
separating the races in public settings and social
relationships�are eradicated, although residential ar-
eas remain largely segregated.
The government creates new opportunities and
incentives for black upward mobility, substantially
altering South Africa's racial caste system. in the
process.
Revolutionary Indicators
The ANC's military wing establishes active cells in
all black townships and begins to systematically chip
away at white resolve with terrorist attacks and spec-
tacular bombings.
The Indian and Colored chambers in Parliament
stage a walkout as a result of police excesses in
suppressing black unrest.
The economy goes into a tailspin as a result of
declining gold prices, capital flight, and the collapse of
the rand.
Pretoria's efforts to recruit new black policemen are
unsuccessful.
South Africa is hit by another devastating cycle of
drought that prompts rural blacks to pour into the
already overcrowded urban areas.
A white backlash to reform leads many National
Party members of Parliament to defect to the Conser-
vative Party.
Nelson Mandela dies in prison, leading to violent
protests and work strikes nationwide.
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A militant black consciousness ideology becomes
popular among nonwhites and fuels growing antiwhite
sentiment and attacks.
Inkatha moves into active opposition to the
government.
Botha is assassinated by black or white extremists,
and a succession crisis develops that paralyzes the
government or leads to a new regime that abandons
reform.
The police make only a halfhearted effort to stop
rightwing militant groups from carrying out attacks
against white liberals and progovernment blacks.
The black labor movement expands rapidly and
initiates an all-out campaign to extract political con-
cessions from the government.
Nervous whites in rural areas begin shooting "suspi-
cious-looking" blacks.
The Transvaal and Orange Free State provincial
branches of the National Party split off to form their
own party and slow down reform.
Various homeland administrations come under sys-
tematic attack from militant black groups and
collapse.
Blacks increasingly engage in industrial sabotage
and random attacks on government property.
Marxist-Leninist doctrines become more popular
among black students and activists who indoctrinate
growing numbers in the townships; government efforts
to stop the trend only increase the ideology's appeal.
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