SOUTH AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR AN EXTENDED GENERAL STRIKE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05631851
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: June 2, 1986

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Central. Intelligence Agency
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Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 June 1986
South Africa: Prospects for an Extended General Strike
Summary
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Unless racial conflict intensifies significantly in South Africa,
we believe a nationwide general strike lasting more than one week is
highly unlikely. Despite the success of this year's May Day action, the
black labor union movement remains divided and a large pool of unemployed
blacks affords companies recourse to massive dismissals. Moreover,
most black labor leaders clearly recognize that the South African Government
would respond to a lengthy general strike by detaining organizers,
banning troublesome labor unions, and cutting food supplies to black
townships.
This said, the black labor movement has organizational strength
unprecedented among black groups in South Africa. If some event--such
as the death in jail of African National Congress leader Nelson
Mandela--were to catalyze black support for a long general strike in
spite of the likely consequences, we would expect severe repercussions
for the national economy. We believe, without its black workers, South
Africa probably could not sustain export production, especially in
the critical mining sector. As a stalemate strike dragged on, declining
export earnings, erosion of foreign investor confidence, and a slump in
the exchange value of the South African rand would hasten the advent of
a siege economy. Meanwhile, domestic production would hobble along on a
near-war footing, with many companies substituting white teenagers,
This typescript was prepared for Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs by of the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to the Chief, Africa
Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
ALA M 86-20026
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housewives, and security force members for unskilled black labor. In
our judgment, this temporary labor force--combined with commercial
stockpiles of goods--probably would save the economy from complete
collapse, at least during the initial months of a strike.
Faced with an extended nationwide general strike by black workers,
President Botha would respond with harsh security measures, perhaps
combined with some economic and political concessions intended
to weaken the resolve of striking workers. Such a strike undoubtedly '
would energize rightwing opposition to the government, but, on balance,
we believe rising anxiety among whites about their security would lead
most Afrikaners--and many English-speaking whites--to rally around the
government.
Short of an extended nationwide general strike, significant economic
repercussions may occur as a result of more limited strike activity. An
increase in short strikes and work boycotts already appears to have hurt
export earnings and business confidence enough to help set back a
budding economic recovery.
The emergence last year of a new labor federation that claims to represent some 60
percent of unionized blacks, and a massive one-day work stayaway on 1 May 1986 by
some 1.5 million workers raises the issue of South Africa's vulnerability to general strikes.
This typescript examines the prospects for a lengthy general strike, its implications, and
the outlook for more limited strike activity.
Prospects for a Lengthy General Strike
We believe that a lengthy general strike is highly unlikely under current conditions.
In our judgment, the prospects for an extended general strike ultimately hinge on how
black labor leaders assess the likely costs and benefits of such action, including their
ability to win continued support for a strike from rank-and-file workers in the face of
what almost certainly would be harsh government repression. In assessing the likely
consequences of a general strike, black labor leaders are likely to consider South African
labor history, the organizational strength of the black labor union movement, and potential
white counterleverage--and be dissuaded from such a risky enterprise. We believe that
these black labor activists would conclude that only one or two-day work
boycotts�staged as largely symbolic actions to pressure the government for reforms,
mobilize black political activism and attract international attention--are cost-effective in
the current political climate.
Cautious Lessons from History. A review of South African. labor history offers
little encouragement for black labor leaders contemplating an extended general strike.
Black groups have protested government policies with some 30 local or national general
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strikes lasting 1 day or longer over the past four decades.* Most of these efforts were
poorly organized and drew little support. Our review of these general strikes suggests
that the degree of support for politically-motivated strikes usually rests on the
organizational strength of groups calling for the strikes, the importance of the issues
involved to rank-and-file workers, the broader political and economic climate, and the
signals that workers receive on likely employer and government reactions:
Work boycotts that are limited to a particular township or
other narrow geographic area often can rely on the backing of �
established community-based organizations, but those at the
national or provincial level usually need the active support of
at least one major labor federation. Many successful strikes have
combined the efforts of labor federations and temporary strike committees
based in local communities.
-- Prerequisites for a high strike turnout apparently include adequate
lead time, good advance publicity, clear objectives, and, in many
cases, a mechanism for intimidating those who would otherwise ignore
the strike call.
-- Calls for general strikes are more frequent during periods of
intense black unrest.
Support for general strike calls tends to be highest in those
instances where blacks believe that they are less likely to be summarily
fired or arrested for participating. For example, prior to the 1 May
1986 work boycott, many employers had indicated they planned only
to dock participating workers for one day's pay.
Although South African labor history includes many examples of general strikes by
black workers, general strikes that are well-supported and widespread rarely have lasted
longer than 2 days. The tolerance that employers and the government sometimes have
shown for short politically-motivated strikes usually has evaporated quickly. Indeed,
historical documents show that each of the four previous major periods of intensified
black labor unionism in South Africa has ended abruptly as growing political activism has
led Pretoria to arrest labor leaders and suppress troublesome unions (see Figure 1).
Organizational Strength. In our judgment, the unprecedented size of the black
labor union movement has enhanced its ability to sustain an extended general strike.
we estimate that black union membership has
doubled to one million workers since the end of 1982. The majority of these unionized
blacks belong to the Congress of South African Trade Unions, a new labor federation that
claims a total membership of some 650,000 workers (see Figure 2) and has promised to
* For information on past general strikes, see Appendix.
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use its economic leverage to seek political gains for nonwhites. Of particular significance
within COSATU is the National Union of Mineworkers, which now represents some
250,000 black miners; blacks in this key sector until recently had lacked a union for nearly
40 years after the government crushed the African Mineworkers Union.
In addition to improved numerical strength and organizational unity, the black labor
movement has been launching more strikes and employing more sophisticated tactics.
Strike activity�most of it motivated by workplace issues rather than political
concerns --has risen dramatically over the past few years,
Some recent strikes have incorporated factory sit-ins intended to disrupt
production, including an underground sit-in staged in a large gold mine earlier this year.
Others have been accompanied by consumer boycotts of the products of companies
involved in labor disputes.
Despite these organizational gains, black labor still has deep fissures which we
believe would widen in the event of a serious call for an extended general strike--thus
making it less likely leaders would call such a strike. Even within COSATU, for example,
tactical and ideological differences persist--especially over the extent to which the new
federation should pursue political versus economic objectives,
Outside COSATU, divisions are even sharper, with several union leaders
expressing dismay over COSATU's political rhetoric. We believe that black labor leaders,
on balance, would be wary of risking hard-won organizational gains in a direct
confrontation with the South African Government that almost certainly would precipitate a
harsh crackdown on participating unions.
White Counterleverage. From the perspective of black labor leaders and
rank-and-file workers, one of the strongest arguments against attempting an extended
general strike is the likely response from the whites.
Companies undoubtedly would try to break a general strike by
threatening--and quickly carrying out--mass dismissals of participating
workers, a credible threat in most industries given that the black
unemployment is about 30 percent nationally and as high as 60 percent
in those parts of the country hit hardest by recession, according to
academic studies.*
-- Government security forces have considerable discretion in
detaining strike organizers, and security legislation affords the
government ample latitude to ban unions or other groups organizing
a general strike.
* Despite a court ruling last year that offers workers some protection from mass
dismissals during the first few days of legally-sanctioned strikes, blacks would have no
legal protection from mass firings in the case of a general strike, according to reports in
the South African financial press.
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-- If needed, security forces could seal off townships to prevent food
and other goods from reaching striking workers. With little in the
way of strike funds or stores of food, black workers probably could
not sustain a lengthy strike.
-- Pretoria could offer economic or political concessions in an effort
to defuse anti-government feelings and sow internal divisions among
striking workers.
Implications of an Extended General Strike
We believe black labor leaders recognize the difficulties involved and are unlikely to
call a long general strike. Under a scenario where a lengthy nationwide general strike
nonetheless occured, the impact on the economy would be considerable. Moreover,
developments surrounding and sustaining such a strike--cohesiveness in black opposition,
inability of the government to starve blacks out of the townships, and attendant
heightened violence--almost certainly would create a sense of immediate crisis among
whites.
Economic Impact. The potential economic implications of the implied massive cuts
in the available work force and export earnings are staggering, and far outweigh the
consequences of any plausible economic sanctions scenarios, in our judgment. Black
workers constitute 70 percent of South Africa's economically-active workforce, and are
especially important in mining, manufacturing, and construction, according to government
statistics (see Figure 3). Without black labor, whites probably could not sustain significant
mineral production, which accounts for 76 percent of South African export earnings,
including mineral products such as steel, according to our estimates based on
government data. for example, white employees at the
Phalaborwa copper mine failed in their ettorts to sustain production during the 1 May
work boycott this year, and a white supervisor was killed accidentally while attempting to
use mining machinery with which he was unfamiliar.
A lengthy general strike would isolate South Africa internationally. To date, largely
symbolic Western economic sanctions have cut South African fruit, gold coin, and coal
exports, but left the vast bulk of its foreign trade intact. Declining creditor confidence
has limited the country's access to international credit, and some foreign investments are
being withdrawn. South Africa has yet to experience the sort of economic siege that
Rhodesia faced in the last couple of years before majority rule, but it appears headed
gradually in that direction. By contrast, a general strike would bring South Africa quickly
to a state of economic siege, slash export earnings, and prompt many companies and
individuals to use extralegal means to get funds out of the country. As a result of falling
exports and rising capital flight, the value of the South African rand would slump.
Pretoria probably would respond by freezing all legal capital outflows. In addition,
repressive tactics intended to end the general strike likely would precipitate tougher
Western economic sanctions.
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In sharp contrast to the unrest to date, which has had little direct economic impact
on whites, a lengthy nationwide general strike would--at a minimum--cut the disposable
incomes of the vast majority of whites and disrupt their normal patterns of life and
business. As the economy moved to a near-war footing, we would expect Pretoria to
direct increasingly the allocation of resources between various sectors of the economy.
Growing white uncertainty and declining standard of living undoubtedly would add to
emigration, especially among the 800,000 whites holding British passports.
Nevertheless, all production in South Africa would not grind to a halt under .a
lengthy black general strike. Most state-run companies, for example, traditionally have
hired a disproportionate number of Afrikaners, and probably could continue to operate
without black labor. This would allow many basic services, such as electricity and
transport, to continue, although at perhaps reduced levels. Likewise, highly mechanized
production processes, including much of the modern agricultural sector and oil refining,
would continue. Pretoria undoubtedly could mobilize many white teenagers and
housewives to fill relatively unskilled positions in industry and commerce. Even the
reduction in revenues available for the purchase of imported intermediate
goods�principally oil and capital equipment--would affect production only gradually
since the country could tap its considerable oil reserves and delay replacing older
machinery.
Political Impacts. We believe that President Botha would respond to a lengthy
general strike with tough security measures in an attempt to break the unity of the
strikers. His exact response would depend on how events unfolded�particularly if the
strike were coupled with random attacks on whites--but we believe that his primary
concern would be to avert a general insurrection. The government probably would use
its maximum security response, including mobilizing Army and police reserves, who could
be used as factory labor if not needed immediately for security purposes. If necessary to
break the strike, Botha would be likely to promise, at least as a tactical step, far-reaching
concessions, possibly including an offer of some form of power-sharing to blacks.
A general strike probably also would add to the growth of rightwing opposition
forces, including both those groups participating in Parliament--the Conservative Party
(CP) and Hertistge Nasionale Partie (HNP)--and those vigilante groups remaining outside
formal political process, especially the Afrikaner Resistence Movement (Afrikaner
Weerstandsbeweeging, AWB). On balance, however, we expect that the immediacy of the
security threat would cause most Afrikaners and many English-speakers to rally behind
the government and its efforts to break the strike. In our view, the growth of rightwing
opposition, to a large extent, reflects the fears of some Afrikaners that President Botha's
reform program may jeopardize their future--both as a people and as individuals. These
rightwing groups generally have less quarrel with Pretoria's response to security issues.
Indeed, along most other whites, they tend to applaud forceful suppression of black
unrest and foward strikes against African National Congress (ANC) intallations in
neighboring states.
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Impact of Narrower Strike Activity
Although we judge a lengthy general strike to be highly unlikely under current
conditions, we believe that the recent upsurge in strike activity--including short
politically-motivated work boycotts, wildcat strikes, and legally-sanctioned labor
disputes--already has hurt a fragile economic recovery. Based on preliminary data,
record-high strike activity in the mining sector appears to have impacted on gold
production. Likewise, according to data compiled by local business groups, the �
confidence of South African investors declined in March and April, coincident with the
upsurge in work boycotts. In our view, these trends probably explain a fall in first-quarter
1986 GDP after a fourth-quarter 1985 upturn; most other factors--such as higher export
prices, lower interest rates, and progress in rescheduling South Africa's short-term
foreign debt--had pointed to a continued economic recovery.
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Figure 1. Chronology: Four Waves of Black Labor Activism, 1918-1976
1918-1930
The first significant black union, the Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU), is formed and
calls unsuccessful dock strike over wages. Membership reaches 100,000 by 1927 as ICU
becomes increasingly political. ICU founder Clements Kadalie is arrested in 1930, and
black union activity effectively collapses.
1938-1946
Trade Union Coordinating Committee is formed as a loose black labor federation, and
gives way to the more formal Council of Non-European Trade Unions in 1942. Union
membership grows rapidly, reaching 158,000 by 1945, as labor movement again becomes
increasingly political. Illegal strike by 74,000 black miners results in arrests that weakens
significantly the black labor movement.
1954-1961
South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) formed in 1954 as labor wing of
Congress Alliance, claiming a peak membership of about 100,000. A smaller
politically-oriented black labor federation, the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of
South Africa (FFATUSA), is formed by black nationalists in 1959. SACTU functions briefly
in the early 1960s as front for the African National Congress and the South African
Communist Party following the banning of the ANC. The arrest and banning of activist
union leaders and the burden of repressive legislation contribute to effective collapse of
SACTU and FFATUSA in early 1960s, though remanants of SACTU continue to survive in
exile.
1972-1976
The Trade Union Advisory Committee, a black labor coordinating body, is formed in Natal
Province in 1972. A spontaneous outburst of strikes in Natal the following year adds to
black organizing efforts as six new black unions emerge. Total membership in black
unions reaches a peak of nearly 60,000 in 1975. Following the riots that began in Soweto
in 1976, however, Pretoria cracks down on black political activism, banning 26 individuals
involved in the black labor movement.
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Figure 2.
South Africa: Estimated Black Union Membership
TUCSA
21%
FOSATU
21% ---""
1982 Total: 500,000
CUSA
18%
UNAMIJATED
40%
1986 Total: 1,000,000
TUCSA
8%
KEY: AZACTU: Azanian Congress of Trade Unions
COSATU: Congress of South Africaq Trade Unions
CUSA: Council of Unions of South Africa
FOSATU: Federation of South African Trade Unions
TUCSA: Trade Union Council of South Africa
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FIGURE 3: =Employment :by Race
1984
90
80 �
70
60
40 �1
30
20
10
\
MINE MAN. CON. ELEC.
Sector
WHITES
V/
/ A \
TRADE TRANS FINAN. GOV.
\N
BLACKS
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
Appendix
South Africa: Notable General Strikes, 1946-1986
1946
An African Mineworkers' Union (AMU) strike by some 60,000 black miners leads the
Council for Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) to call for a week-long general strike in
sympathy. Police raid AMU headquarters and arrest leaders. Underground sit-in 'strike
broken with 12 dead and 1200 injured, according to academic studies. Massive police
presence in townships used to break general strike. Crackdown weakens black labor
movement and effectively destroys AMU, isolating black miners from significant union
organization for 36 years.
1950
Two one-day work boycotts are called for 1 May and 26 June. May Day strike is called
to protest wide-ranging security legislation and low wages. Strike call apparently is
well-supported in Transvaal Province, and 18 people die in clashes with police. Second
1950 work boycott called to protests deaths. This time, support apparently is weak in
Transvaal, better in Port Elizabeth and Durban. The strikes are organized from with
townships rather than workplace.
1952
Well-supported one-day work boycott is called in Port Elizabeth area to protest laws
limiting black movement, residency, and political rights.
1957-1958
One-day strike in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth is called by South African Congress of
Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1957 primarily to push for minimum wage. The 1957 strike
receives good support, but turnout is comparatively poor for similar strike in 1958. The
later strike suffers from confused signals, with initial week-long strike call being pared to
3 days, and then called off after 1 day. Lack of labor union involvement also hampers
strike.
1960
A series of work boycotts begins on 21 March. Initial impetus is a campaign by the Pan
Africanist Congress against laws restricting black mobility, but the killing by police of 69
protestors at Sharpeville near the steel town of Vereeniging becomes a cause for
additional strike activity. In Vereeniging, smaller industrial and commercial establishments
are affected by a 10-day strike, but the steel and metal industries maintain production. A
strike by as many as 60,000 black and Colored workers in Cape Town slowly gains
momentum, and stretches over 20 days. Cape Town industry is brought to a standstill.
Police and army units are used to cordon off nearby townships, and some 1500 people
are arrested. Elsewhere, a one-day work boycott on 28 March is widely observed in
Johannesburg, Durban, and Port Elizabeth.
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1961
Three-day strike called by SACTU to protest the proclamation of Republic of South Africa.
Pretoria counters with nightly police sweeps through the townships, 10,000 arrests, and
road blocks. Work boycott is organized by labor unions in factories and special strike
committees in townships. Although the strike is called off on second day, it appears to
have disrupted industry in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and Port Elizabeth, as well
as smaller urban areas.
1976
The Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC) calls a series of three
well-supported work boycotts in Johannesburg in the midst of the riots that had begun in
June. The first two strikes each lasted 1 day, while the third lasted 3 days.
the SSRC strikes were characterized by greater use of indimidation
than past general strikes.
1984
Following two smaller one-day work boycotts, the Transvaal Regional Stayaway
Committee organizes a two-day general strike in Transvaal Province with support from
the antiapartheid United Democratic Front and two major black labor federations. Press
estimates on the number of black workers who participate vary from 300,000 to 500,000.
The participation rate is highest among union members and residents of townships hit
hardest by earlier rioting. Press reports indicate that intimidation and lack of available
transportation to work make many township residents unwilling participants. At least 23
blacks die in clashes with police, 13 labor leaders and activists are arrested, and
thousands of workers are fired.
1985-1986
Between March 1985 and April 1986, at least 14 localized work boycotts are held with
varying degrees of success across the country. Most last 1 or 2 days, but a few extend
longer. During one strike, white schoolchildren are used to substitute for black labor.
Most of the stayaways are organized locally, but entail national political demands, such as
the lifting of the government's declaration of a state of emergency and the release of
Nelson Mandela. The incidence of work boycotts is especially high in March and April of
this year, culminating in the massive 1 May strike by some 1.5 million workers. May Day
strike is organized by COSATU and rival Council of South African Unions, as well as UDF
and various local groups.
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SUBJECT: South Africa: Prospects for a Lengthy General Strike
Distribution:
Original -- Charles Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
1 -- Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
1 -- Robert CabeIly, Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs
1 -- Ambassador William Kontos, Executive Director Advisory
Committee on South Africa
1 -- Anthony S. Dalsimer, Director, African Affairs, State/INR
1 -- Noel Koch, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for
International Security Affairs
1 -- Jeffrey S. Davidow, Director, AF/S, State Department
1 -- Peter W. Lande, Director, Economic Policy Staff,
Department of State
1 John Clingerman, United States Information Agency
1 Mark Edelman, Agency for International Development
1 Acting DIO for Africa, DIA
1 James L. Woods, Assistant, ISA/OSD
1 Alan Van Esmond, South Africa Working Group,
Department of State
1 -- Ashley Wills, AF/S, Department of State
1 -- Director of Central Intelligence
1 -- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
1 -- Executive Director
1 -- Deputy Director for Intelligence
1 -- National Intelligence Council
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 Chief, Africa Division, DDO
1 Intelligence Liason Staff
1 Chief, Production Evaluation Staff, DDI
1 Director of African and Latin American Analysis
1 Research Director, ALA
2 Production Staff, ALA (one sourced copy; one clean copy)
5 OCPAS/IMD/CB
4 ALA/AF
2 ALA/AF/S
4 ALA/AF/S
ALA/AF/S:
(29 May 1986)
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