AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02985806
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: August 18, 1978

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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Africa
-
Africa Review
18 August 1978
RP AR 78-003
18 August 1978
Copy
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AFRICA REVIEW
18 August 1978
CONTENTS
Nigeria:
1 NR
NR
South Africa: Strategy of Liberation Groups 10
The leaders of the African National Congress
and Pan Africanist Congress are concentrating
on fomenting internal unrest rather than pre-
paring for Rhodesian-style cross-border raids,
but realize they will have to cultivate greater
support among South Africa's blacks for this
to succeed.
FOR THE RECORD 13
NR
43EtREf
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NOP RN N CONTRACT OPCON
Nigeria:
18 August 1978
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
NR
1
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Islam and the Dynamics of Nigerian Politics
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2
SLeRET
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3
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The "Libyan Connection" With Northern Politics
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CECRET
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Alleged Conduits Conduits for the "Libyan Connection"
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SEeRM'
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5`ffERZT
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-s*eikrr
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S�EeitET-
Libyan-Nigerian Relations at the Official Level
Islam, Libya, and Nigeria's Future Orientation
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.SE�GR7P1`
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South Africa: Strategy of Liberation Groups
The leadership of the African National Congress,
the larger of South Africa's two exiled liberation or-
ganizations, is convinced that externally based guerrilla
warfare like that being waged in Rhodesia will not work
against South Africa. The ANC, therefore, is planning
to concentrate on fomenting industrial unrest and urban
guerrilla warfare inside South Africa to force the gov-
ernment to change its policies toward blacks. It claims
it has stored large caches of arms inside the country
for that purpose. Although the majority of South Afri-
can blacks are opposed to violence and realize that they
will be hurt most by urban terrorism, an increasing num-
ber see violence as their only recourse.
The ANC, the oldest existing South African political
organization, was founded in 1912. It functioned inside
South Africa until 1960 when it and the rival Pan Afri-
canist Congress were banned after the government became
alarmed over political protests following a massacre of
blacks by police at Sharpeville. The ANC, infiltrated
during the 1950s by members of the small, previously
banned South African Communist Party, receives modest
support from Moscow. White, Asian, and colored Commu-
nists are an important minority in the organization's
leadership.
The Pan Africanist Congress, the smaller and less
effective of the two exile groups, agrees in principal
with ANC strategy to concentrate on internal disruption
rather than cross-border raids. There is, however,
little coordination between the two groups. The PAC was
formed in 1959 by members of the ANC who rejected both
the multiracial approach and Communist influence in the
older body. The role of whites in a black-ruled South
Africa is still a main area of disagreement between the
two groups, both of which rule out a merger between them,
despite renewed attempts by the Organization of African
Unity to arrange a reconciliation. The PAC receives
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S.&GRET�
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some financial and military assistance from Peking. Both
receive funding through the OAU and are seeking expanded
support from African countries. The United Nations has
recognized the ANC as the "true representative" of the
South African people.
After languishing for more than a decade, both groups
were revitalized in 1976 by a large influx of students
who fled South Africa after the Soweto riots. Their
present strength is difficult to gauge. The South Afri-
can Government estimates that the ANC has some 3,000
members and the PAC some 1,000. These estimates probably
include many of the students now in refugee camps. Some
there are about 800 trained cadre in (b)(3) NatSecAct
military camps primarily located in Tanzania, Zambia,
and Angola, while about 100-200 with military training
are inside South Africa. The number of PAC members under-
going training or operating inside South Africa is con-
siderably less.
The South African military leadership agrees with
the ANC and the PAC that the Rhodesian model of armed
incursion from operational bases in neighboring coun-
tries is unlikely to happen in South Africa in the near
future. It bases this judgment on the belief that most
of the adjacent countries would be reluctant to support
large-scale operations because of the heavy military and
economic retaliation South Africa could inflict.
The military is aware of the steadily increasing
infiltration of trained terrorists into South Africa and
expects that acts of sabotage and terrorism will increase
in urban areas and eventually extend into rural areas as
well. Since July 1977, more than a dozen incidents, in-
cluding bombings and attacks against blacks and whites,
have occurred in Johannesburg and its black environs.
The ANC needs much more internal support than it
now has before the urban guerrilla bases it envisages
can be set up. Such bases would be difficult to hide
from South Africa's security forces, even among a sympa-
thetic populace. Moreover, the ANC is aware that the
black community, which is largely moderate and opposed
to violence, would be damaged most by urban terrorism
and unrest and that blacks are dissatisfied with the lim-
ited accomplishments of the liberation organization.
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indicates that the majority would rather negoti-
ate with whites than fight them. Nevertheless, 28 per-
cent of the blacks believe that their lot will (b)(3)NatSecAct
never improve unless they resort to violence, and a sig-
nificantly larger proportion of younger and better edu-
cated blacks support the need for violence than do their
elders. Only 10 percent were in favor of strikes as a
method of inducing change. That figure points up the
economically fragile plight of urban blacks and highlights
the growing belief among them that they have few alterna-
tives to violence as long as the government refuses to
grant genuine political concessions.
taken between the Soweto riots of (b)(3)NatSecAct
1976 and the massive police crackdown on black political
leaders and organizations last October, the ANC garnered
22 percent of popular support among black leaders, and
the PAC polled 7 percent. ANC President Nelson Mandela,
imprisoned in South Africa since 1974, received most of
the backing; the exiled leaders of both organizations
obtained minimal support.
The extent of support for the ANC and PAC is sur-
prisingly high considering that the organizations have
been outlawed for nearly 18 years and have thus been pre-
cluded from any open propagandizing or organizing. In
reality, the support may be higher than indicates
because many blacks would be unwilling to express support
publicly for the two groups for fear of police reprisals.
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FOR THE RECORD
NIGERIA:
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NOTE TO TO HOLDERS OF Africa Review, RP AR 78-003,
18 August 1978:
RP AR 78-003
18 August 1978
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Nigeria:
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