THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP AND THE SEARCH FOR WMD

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Finding the Truth
The Iraq Survey Group and the
Search for WMD (U)
Charles A. Duelfer
66
Bringing
understanding to the
reasons behind
Saddam's decisions
concerning WMD...
99
Previously a senior State
Department officer and deputy
chairman of the UN Special
Commission on Iraq, Charles A.
Duelfer was appointed Special
Advisor for Iraq WMD by
Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet.
(U)
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 49, No. 2
Following Operation Iraqi Free-
dom and the fall of Saddam Hus-
sein, the Secretary of Defense
and the Director of Central Intel-
ligence (DCI) commissioned a
special team to search for and
conduct an investigation of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs, Working from
May 2003 to September 2004, the
Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
recorded its findings in the "Com-
prehensive Report of the DCI's
Special Advisor on Iraq WMD,"
also called the Duelfer Report.
This report not Only accounts for
the physical remnants of Iraq's
WMD, but also highlights the
dynamics underlying the Iraqi
president's decisions concerning
the program. At different times,
Saddam opted to have or not
have WMD. He chose to use
WMD on some occasions but not
use it on others. The report
brings understanding to the rea-
sons behind those decisions. It
presents a dynamic analysis of
an international security prob-
lem that vexed the world for
three decades. (U)
Characteristics of the ISG�
including its organization, investi-
gative approach, and access to
information�were frequently
unique and innovative. They
evolved to meet the requirements
of a developing situation. This
article examines which
approaches were successful and
which were not. (U)
The Duelfer Report came at a
time of crisis of confidence in the
Intelligence Community (IC) and
in the administration of Presi-
dent George W. Bush because of
its past firmly stated convictions
about Saddam's weapons of mass
destruction�which proved to be
wrong. The report provides a
basis for the reevaluation of
WMD estimates. As such, its
approach, the data it provides,
and the openness of its presenta-
tion contribute to a rebuilding of
confidence in intelligence projec-
tions of threat. There is still a
long way to go, but perhaps some
of the approaches used by the
ISG and the Comprehensive
Report can aid future tasks. (U)
Background (U)
Washington, having centered its
arguments for war against Sad-
dam on his non-compliance with
the United Nation's WMD-
related resolutions, prepared for
hostilities believing that chemi-
cal and biological weapons
existed in Iraq and could be used
against coalition troops. This
belief was based on IC analysis
recorded in a National Intelli-
gence Estimate quickly drafted in
October 2002.1 (U)
"Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction," NIE 2002-
1611C, October 2002 (classified
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Iraq Survey Group
Even before war started, plans
were being made for the confir-
mation of Iraq's possession of
WMD. The Pentagon sponsored a
conference in September 2002 for
former inspectors from the UN
Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) to draw out lessons
learned about hunting for WMD.2
The clear recommendation of the
inspectors was that the most pro-
ductive way to find such weap-
ons was through an investigative
approach drawing on assistance
from the Iraqis themselves. Nev-
ertheless, war planners created a
special unit, the 75th Expedition-
ary Task Force, and gave it
responsibility for planning and
executing a search for Iraq's
WMD during the conflict and
immediately afterwards. This
unit followed the invasion force
and hopscotched among loca-
tions identified by the IC as
potentially related to WMD as
the sites came under coalition
control. No WMD stocks were
found. (U)
2 UNSCOM was created by UN Security
Council Resolution 687, which ended the
1991 Persian Gulf War. It was charged
with verifying the destruction of Iraq's
WMD programs and monitoring to assure
the programs were not restarted.
UNSCOM operated in Iraq from May
1991 until December 1998, when,
following a series of crises, President
Clinton ordered four days of bombing
(Operation DESERT FOX). Commission
members were evacuated and Iraq never
permitted their return. The UN Security
Council was in disarray following
DESERT FOX and, after a year's debate,
voted to replace UNSCOM with another
organization, called UNMOVIC, which '
was given the monitoring mission. (U)
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The ISG received
ample funding from
DIA and drew upon
experts from across the
IC, Australia, and the
UK.
99
In the aftermath of the war, mili-
tary and CIA teams indepen-
dently sought out key Iraqis
thought to have been connected
with WMD programs. Washing-
ton rapidly saw that this uncoor-
dinated approach was not work-
ing. Required was a new search
mechanism that would focus less
on protecting troops from WMD
and more on carrying out an
investigation in a post-conflict
environment. (U)
Creation of the ISG (U)
In a decision blessed by the White
House, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld agreed to pro-
vide funding and resources for a
special WMD investigative unit
that would follow the strategic
guidance of a senior civilian advi-
sor to be named by the DCI.
Thus, the Iraq Survey Group was
created in May 2003. Army Maj.
Gen. Keith Dayton was given the
fl
task of developing the organiza-
tion, and DCI George Tenet
recruited David Kay to be his
special advisor for Iraq WMD.
Kay had served as an Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency
inspector in Iraq in 1991 and had
led some of the confrontational
nuclear inspections at the time.
Charles Duelfer, past deputy,
chairman of the UN Special Com-
mission on Iraq, later took over
the role as senior civilian advi-
sor. (U)
\and attracted special-
ists from across the IC.
(U)
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In organizing the ISG, Gen. Day-
ton worked out of the Ba'ath
Party recreation area in the
southeast quadrant of Baghdad
International Airport. One of
Saddam's palaces on the com-
pound was turned into a secure
facility, with computers and com-
munications equipment. Staff
members, including the Britons
and Australians, were cleared to
Top-Secret SCI. All facets of
intelligence collection and analy-
sis were brought together at the
airport site, and ISG headquar-
ters was directly connected to its
own small maneuver units. About
1,600 personnel were involved,
including support staff and con-
tractors to provide logistics, hous-
ing, and meals. (U)
The key components of the ISG
were the following:
� Joint Interrogation/Debriefing
Center (JIDC), which interro-
gated and debriefed high-value
detainees. This pool also
debriefed individuals not in
detention and detainees held at
other facilities.
� Combined Media Processing
Center (CMPC) for translating
and digitizing documents found
in Iraq. Images of documents
and gists of their contents were
loaded into the national HAR-
MONY database.
� Chemical and Biological Intelli-
gence Support Teams (CBIST),
which consisted of mobile
teams of subject-matter experts
for time-sensitive exploitation
of sources with information on
chemical-, biological-, radiologi-
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 49, No. 2
High-level attention
facilitated
obtaining resources
and getting decisions�
made.
99
cal-, and nuclear-related
programs.
� Mobile Collection Team (MCT),
comprised of the necessary per-
sonnel and equipment to gather
in the field any documents,
media, and material of poten-
tial interest to the ISG mission.
� Survey Operations Center
(SOC), which oversaw and
managed DoD HUMINT and
technical collection.
� Survey Analysis Center (SAC),
for generating actionable and
timely intelligence from ongo-
ing exploitation activities.
Initially located in Qatar with
some personnel deployed in
Iraq, over time the functions of
the SAC migrated forward to
personnel collocated with case
officers in the SOC in Baghdad.
High-Level Attention (U)
The White House, heads of Wash-
ington agencies, the British gov-
ernment, and Canberra followed
the ISG's progress on a weekly
basis. This level of attention facil-
itated obtaining resources and
getting decisions made. It also
guaranteed that the work of the
ISG was subject to careful scru-
tiny. It is important to record,
however, that such scrutiny did
not translate into political guid-
ance. The only direction that DCI
Tenet gave Duelfer, for example,
was to "find the truth". It was
broadly recognized that if ISG
work were seen as politically
tainted, the effort would be worse
than doing nothing. (U)
The structure of the ISG
reflected military intelligence
practices and doctrine�essen-
tially, it was a military organiza-
tion with civilian elements laced
through it. Although the group
ultimately was a smoothly run-
ning machine, the machine and
the task were not perfectly
matched. Military intelligence
tends to be geared and trained to
address tactical intelligence
requirements: Are there enemy
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Iraq Survey Group
requirements leads to such prac-
tices as having detainee debrief-
ings run by professional interro-
gators who are not subject-
matter experts. (U)
The ISG mission�the hunt for
Iraqi WMD�was more akin to a
combination of a homicide investi-
gation and the preparation of a
doctoral dissertation. The task
required understanding things
that often happened years in the
past. At the beginning, much of the
investigation centered on checking
the sites and facilities that prewar
intelligence suggested were linked
to WMD. When this did not lead to
expected discoveries, tactics shifted
to investigating the circumstances
as they were found on the ground.
The ISG continued to follow-up on
reports that surfaced after the end
of hostilities about hidden loca-
tions of WMD-related material,
but these reports almost never
panned out and frequently were
outright scams aimed at deriving
monetary rewards. The process of
developing the ground truth on
WMD came to depend on system-
atic exploitation of three major
sources of information�sites, doc-
uments, and people. (U)
A UK chemical agent detection dog with
handler. (U)
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Exploiting Sites and
Documents (U)
Prior to the war, a list of over 500
potential WMD-related sites was
compiled by the US military and
intelligence agencies. These
included known missile construc-
tion sites as well as all manner of
industrial facilities and laborato-
ries. Locations that had been
monitored by UN inspectors were
naturally on the list. ISG teams
visited many places thought to
contain WMD materials or pro-
grams. Because there was a com-
plete breakdown of order follow-
ing the fall of the Saddam's
regime, many sites had been
looted before they were visited.
ISG teams found no stockpiles of
weapons, although some activi-
ties and materials that should
have been declared to the United
Nations inspectors were discov-
ered. Documents and personnel
found at some sites did provide
important information. (U)
During Operation Iraqi Freedom
and the subsequent occupation of
the country, many key govern-
ment facilities were taken over
and thousands of boxes of docu-
ments secured. Sometimes this
was done in an organized fashion,
but often not. Once the ISG was
fully up and running, it operated a
triage system to organize the cap-
tured documents. A limited capa-
bility for translating and scan-
ning documents of immediate
interest waS located at ISG head-
quarters in Baghdad. A far larger
facility was eventually set up in
Qatar. This exploitation activity
ultimately employed hundreds of
linguists (most of them uncleared)
and a warehouse of documents.
Alter reviewing documents, staff
members would prepare short
summaries to place with scanned
images of the originals in an
electronic database. Analysts then
would review the gists and, if a
document appeared to be of inter-
est, request a full translation. (U)
Interviewing People (U)
It became clear very quickly that
the Iraqis who participated or
knew about WMD programs or
the regime hierarchy would be the
best sources for the ISG investiga-
tion. Many senior figures were
tracked down and captured by
coalition forces in the months
immediately after Baghdad fell.
Most of these were on the so-
called Blacklist, which had been
constructed by the US military
and intelligence agencies before
the war. These individuals known
as "high value targets," were held
at Camp Cropper, a special deten-
tion facility on Baghdad airport
property. (U)
While the Blacklist was an imper-
fect tool�founded on the same
prewar intelligence that was dem-
onstrated to be weak in other ar-
eas of inquiry about Iraq�many
of these senior detainees provided
extremely useful information and
perspectives. Several who had re-
sponsibility for former WMD de-
velopments were technocrats with
no particular love of Saddam or
3 Some documents relating to Iraqi WMD
that appeared to be of high interest were
found to be forgeries. The provenance of
these remains a mystery. (U)
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his regime. Over time, they filled
out much of the picture that even-
tually was incorporated into the
Comprehensive Report. (U)
Some Iraqi WMD participants
were not detained if they could be
called in for questioning as
needed. Initially most of these
individuals were amenable to
helping. Subsequently, however,
after some ill-advised public
statements by the United States
that WMD technicians might be
put on trial, they sought to avoid
contact with the ISG. Moreover,
as the anti-coalition insurgency
grew in Iraq, their reluctance
increased out of fear of becoming
targets for insurgent revenge. (U)
Altogether, the ISG interviewed
hundreds of Iraqis about the
WMD program and the Iraqi
regime. Interviews provided the
best way to elucidate and corrobo-
rate key aspects of the Iraqi pro-
grams, such as the regime's inten-
tions regarding the use of WMD
and the ultimate disposition of the
programs. (U)
The ability to
interview Saddam
himself lent
incalculable depth to
the investigation.
99
The ability to interview Saddam
himself lent incalculable depth to
the investigation. Captured on
13 December 2003, the former
ruler was held separately from
other Iraqis, and his debriefing
was handled differently. Follow-
ing initial questioning, the FBI
decided that Saddam would have
only one interlocutor, an Arab-
American FBI agent with a back-
ground in homicide investiga-
tion, who was about the age of
Saddam's sons. Anything the
former ruler wanted or did was
worked out through this individ-
ual. Saddam was very coy in his
discussions of substance, but he
did have one incentive to speak
and that was to establish his leg-
acy. If he did not speak, the pic-
ture of his leadership left for pos-
terity would be drawn from the
Iraqi documents as found in the wake of hostilities, and after organization by ISG staff. (U)
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 49, No. 2
accounts of his top lieutenants�
individuals he knew would be
shaping the story to serve their
interests, not his. (U)
The technique of having a single
individual spend several hours
every day for several months
with Saddam allowed the cap-
ture of small bits of candor on a
range of topics. Ultimately, Sad-
dam said he felt he knew the
debriefer better than his own
sons. The close relationship they
developed yielded substantial
data that might not otherwise
have been obtained. (U)
The debriefer was excellent. He
took a great deal of time to learn
the intricacies of the WMD inves-
tigation so that he could channel
his conversations with Saddam
and could listen for revelations at
the most casual of moments. For
example, hints of Saddam's ambi-
tions for Iraq and himself sur-
faced amidst discussions of what
women found attractive in men,
(U)
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Comparing and testing the
descriptions of events and pro-
grains provided by Saddam and
the regime's other top leaders
was the most useful way to estab-
lish confidence in how the ruler
viewed WMD and why he made
the decisions he did. (U)
The Role of Analysts (U)
The ISG was fortunate to have
some analysts who had long
experience on Iraqi WMD issues,
both through careers in intelli-
gence organizations and as
former UN inspectors on the
ground. Some knew the Iraqis
very well. The background that
these analysts brought to bear
helped in deriving a working
hypothesis about the disposition
of Iraqi WMD from Iraqi debrief-
ing materials. A few of them were
also quite familiar with the rele-
vant sites in Iraq, which proved
invaluable in judging the credi-
bility of Iraqi claims concerning
some facilities and the programs
they hosted. For example, the
head of the ISG's analytic team
for delivery systems was a Brit-
ish former UN inspector with
long experience in working on the
Iraqi ballistic missile program.
Without this background, it
would have been far more diffi-
cult to build a credible picture of
how the missile program had
developed. Able to quickly deter-
mine if a detainee was dissem-
bling, he could debrief the lead
engineers and program manag-
ers in detail and assure that all
major aspects of the program
were understood. (U)
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Unfortunately, few analysts had
such strong credentials. The
United States had not had rela-
tions with Iraq for over a decade
and governmental expertise had
atrophied. US "experts" tended to
get all their data from intelli-
gence reports or open source
material, not from direct contact
with Iraqis. Moreover, when the
UN inspectors were active in Iraq
in the 1990s, IC analysts became
largely dependent upon their
data, which were more detailed
than what came in from other
sources, rather than building
independent channels that could
be relied on after UN inspections
ended. (C)
Due to the hazardous and
unpleasant conditions in Iraq
during the ISG's mission, many
analysts were unwilling to stay
for extended periods or come out
at all. As a result, some staff
members would just start to
become familiar with whatever
aspect they were assigned and
then they would leave. This prob-
lem even extended to those sent
out to lead the analytic teams.
Because of the shortage of avail-
able IC career analysts, the ISG
came to rely on contractors hired
by DIA. While these individuals
may not have had previous expe-
rience in Iraq, they at least had
the advantage of staying for the
duration of their contracts, which
usually ran for at least several
months. (U)
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Redirecting the ISG (U)
The DCI's first special advisor
for Iraq, David Kay, concluded
When case officers and
analysts worked
together for extended
periods, a symbiotic
relationship
developed.
99
that there was no WMD stock-
pile and left Iraq in early Decem-
ber 2003. DCI Tenet named
Charles Duelfer to replace Kay
in January 2004. Duelfer
adjusted the investigation to
derive the reasons behind the
decisions by the Saddam regime
to build or destroy WMD. With
the remarkable opportunity to
debrief all the key participants,
the ISG took a dynamic approach
to its analysis of regime decision-
making. This included investi-
gating the strategy for the future
of Iraq regarding WMD. Ideally
this could inform future policy-
makers concerned with control-
ling WMD proliferation. (U)
Within the ISG, a new task group
was established to investigate
the Iraqi regime's strategic inten-
tions with respect to WMD. The
world knew that Saddam had
had chemical and biological
weapons at least until 1991. His
top ministers had described to
UN inspectors how they had used
WMD in the war against Iran in
the 1980s; indeed, they credited
the use of CW and ballistic mis-
siles with forcing Iran to end the
war. Senior Iraqis also believed
that Baghdad's possession of
WMD strongly contributed to the
decision by the United States not
to remove the regime in 1991,
after Iraqi forces had been
pushed back from Kuwait. Hence,
Saddam had two experiences in
which WMD had saved him. Why
would he give up such weapons?
For how long would he forego
them? Under what conditions
might he have recommenced the
programs? These were important
questions the ISG was uniquely
positioned to address. With
access to the key Iraqi decision-
makers, including Saddam,
answering these questions
seemed achievable. (U)
The problem of understanding
Iraqi WMD policies and inten-
tions was simplified by the fact
that the regime was really one
person�Saddam. Unlike trying
to fathom the intentions or pre-
This ISG vehicle in which the authors had been riding was damaged in an attack and dict the behavior of a pluralistic
then destroyed by the US military to prevent capture of sensitive communication gear. (U) government, understanding Iraq
was reduced to understanding
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Saddam. This became one way of
bounding the collection and anal-
ysis problem. (U)
Following the Money (U)
A second way of bounding the
problem was to look at resource
allocation. The fact that Iraq was
under UN sanctions that included
limitations on oil sales offered an
opportunity to examine the
regime's priorities for the use of
its limited resources. With this
objective, the ISG obtained com-
plete access to oil ministry docu-
mentation, which remained in
good order following Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The ISG put
together a team of analysts to
examine oil sales records and
especially the data on the UN Oil
for Food (OFF) Program. This
turned out to be a very produc-
tive effort. The data on the growth
of resources available to Saddam
after he accepted the OFF Pro-
gram was a powerful tool for
understanding the regime's objec-
tives and how it was attempting
to achieve them. (U)
The analysis showed that Sad-
dam's highest priority was to free
himself from sanctions; the strat-
egy and tactics he used to achieve
this became clear through his
decisions on the export of Iraqi
oil. Oil was allocated to individu-
als and countries supportive of
his regime, especially those�
such as France and Russia�who
could influence the UN Security
Council's vote on sanctions. In
essence, he made these recipi-
ents stakeholders in the survival
and development of his regime.
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By following the oil
money, the ISG gained
substantial
understanding about
Saddam's WMD
priorities.
99
Vice President Taha Yasin
Ramadan headed the system for
deciding whom to favor. The
small group that administered
the allocation of Iraqi contracts
and favors provided guidance to
Oil Minister Amer Rasheed.
discussed these tactics at
length with Duelfer and others. If
Saddam's top ministers felt they.
were not getting all they should
from some favored countries or
individuals, they adjusted con-
tracts accordingly. The process
was carefully monitored to judge
results. (U)
Using this approach, the regime
was making considerable strides
toward eroding sanctions until
the world changed on 11 Septem-
ber 2001. Before the terrorist
attacks in New York and Wash-
ington, Baghdad had been
increasingly flooded with inter-
national businessmen, and Secu-
rity Council members were
actively violating the UN sanc-
tions on Iraq�with the knowl-
edge of their governments. By the
end of 2002, the impending mili-
tary action against Baghdad had
brought this activity to a halt.
(U)
By following the money, the ISG
was able to gain substantial
understanding of the regime and
its WMD priorities. Saddam was
directing resources to sustain the
capacity to recommence produc-
ing WMD once UN sanctions and
international scrutiny collapsed.
The collection of the oil data
allowed a very thorough analysis
of Iraq's Military Industrial Com-
mission. Saddam was replenish-
ing and reinventing this state-
run weapons complex as funding
became available. (U)
Analytic Mindset (U)
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In examining the data, it was vi-
tal for analysts to see the picture
through Iraqi eyes, or, more criti-
cally, through Saddam's mindset.
This was not easy, but it was vi-
tal. The ISG often had analysts
who had never worked in the field
before. They were dealing with
real people, places, and objects,
not imagery, SIGINT, and HU-
MINT reporting. Many analysts
had difficulty adapting. Placed in
a circumstance where they had
the real Iraq stretching before
them and virtually any idea for
investigation was encouraged,
they would nonetheless revert
back to a pedantic testing of pre-
war IC assessments. Forceful as-
sertion by ISG leaders that the
prewar assessments were irrele-
vant and what was needed was an
understanding of what had actu-
ally existed in Iraq was therapeu-
tic and helped steer the analytic
efforts. (U)
Analysts were reminded repeat-
edly that they must be aware of
their own assumptions, as this
would affect what they recog-
nized as evidence. Like a comput-
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66
er operating system that is trans-
parent to most users, analysts
can be unaware of assumptions
that shape their conclusions. A
standard example is the implicit
application of cost/benefit logic,
which holds that the least expen-
sive and most efficient method
will always be pursued. That log-
ic does not necessarily apply in
Iraq. Moreover, if Iraqis are try-
ing to deceive, they have the ad-
vantage: They have a far better
sense of what we are looking for
and how we perceive them, than
the other way around. Most of
the lead Iraqis had studied in the
West. No one in the ISG had ever
studied in Baghdad. (U)
A couple of points illustrate the
importance of recognizing bias and
assumptions. Under Saddam, Iraq
was a country where one person's
opinion was decisive. While Iraq
had many governmental proce-
dures that were like any other
government, there were also many
major decisions for which there
was no record. Because of the
nature of the regime, presidential
decisions were not always docu-
mented, especially those on sensi-
tive issues such as UN-prohibited
WMD. Therefore, the absence of
evidence was not the same as evi-
dence of absence. Likewise, given
the nature of Saddam's rule, and
the cost to even high-ranking lieu-
tenants of not satisfying the presi-
dent, the potency of implicit presi-
dential guidance was as great as,
and in some cases greater than,
explicit guidance. (U)
Analysts had to understand this
way of operating and the ten-
sions it placed on senior Iraqis.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 49, No. 2
Officials around
Saddam were
convinced WMD
programs would be
restarted once
sanctions collapsed.
99
Having a feel for the decision-
making environment would allow
a better understanding of
debriefing results and of what
evidence they should seek. (U)
Those around Saddam regularly
survived by being able to respond
favorably when Saddam asked
for something. To be successful in
that regime you had to be able to
anticipate what he would want.
This aspect of Saddam's rule
makes it understandable that
while senior officials around Sad-
dam all were convinced WMD
programs would be restarted
once sanctions had collapsed,
there is no documentation of this
objective. And analysts should
not expect to find any. (U)
The Timeline Tool (U)
To try to understand factors that
Saddam evaluated in making
WMD decisions, a timeline was
created and significant events
plotted. A number of inflection
points were identified when dis-
crete decisions were taken with
respect to WMD. Concurrent
events�such as Security Council
decisions, funding shifts from the
OFF Program, and significant
political events�were also plot-
ted on the timeline. This process
and the chart itself were used to
orient analysts and ultimately
readers of the Comprehensive
Report to Saddam's point of view.
Twice weekly meetings were held
to review all areas with the goal of
understanding the regime's stra-
tegic intentions. (U)
The mind shift was difficult for
many analysts, but ultimately
they produced a credible prod-
uct. This portion of the report
takes the reader into the regime's
mindset and allows a sufficient
understanding of its dynamics to
provide a basis for predicting
where the regime might have
gone in the future. The tech-
niques that the ISG used in iden-
tifying regime dynamics may
have utility in other cases where
predictions are demanded. (U)
Declassification of the Report
(U)
Inaccurate prewar assessments
about Iraq's WMD greatly dam-
aged the credibility of IC work
and, indeed, the credibility of the
United States at a time when the
country still needed to pursue
preemptive actions against ter-
rorist and other threats. It was
the strong view of the DCI Spe-
cial Advisor that the final report
on the WMD investigation should
be unclassified. Unless all inter-
ested readers, including Iraqis,
could examine the data and anal-
ysis, there would be eternal
doubt about the themes and con-
clusions. Support for declassify-
ing the text was strong at the
highest levels of the US govern-
ment. (U)
Nonetheless, substantial objec-
tions were raised from various
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Iraq Survey Group
46
quarters and for various reasons.
The wisdom of providing the pub-
lic with information about how to
evade sanctions was questioned.
Concern was expressed about
exposing information useful to
those wishing to pursue denial and
deception activities. And some par-
ties�notably at the State Depart-
ment�strongly wanted to avoid
the international political fallout
from the report's explicit descrip-
tion of the actions of countries on
the UN Security Council that vio-
lated the very sanctions passed by
the Council. 4 (U)
In congressional hearings on the
Comprehensive Report, however,
many expressed deep satisfaction
that the product was accessible to
all. And the positive response since
the report's publication has clearly
demonstrated the value of making
as much information as possible
unclassified in similar reports.
Classified assessments can be sub-
jected to a great deal of public
skepticism, whereas unclassified
reports, with all the supporting
data present, have the advantage
of being defensible. Moreover, if
readers do not like the way the
author connects the dots, they are
free to connect them some other
way. (U)
Template for the Future? (U)
Three features of the ISG's inves-
tigation are not likely to be dupli-
4 In fact, a subsequent series of
investigations into the corruption of the
UN Oil-for-Food Program based on the
data published in the Comprehensive
Report created a major diplomatic stir. (U)
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Support for
declassifying the
report was strong at
the highest levels of
the US government.
99
cated: First, its task was largely
historical�i.e., its mission was to
discover what happened to Iraq's
WMD; second, the ISG received
high-level attention over a sus-
tained period; and third, the Spe-
cial Advisor was given ultimate
decisionmaking authority over
the direction of the investigation
and the resulting report. The last
two features allowed the ISG to
operate quickly and with inde-
pendence. (U)
Other aspects of the ISG process,
however, might serve as useful
models for future investigations.
First, a forward-deployed, inter-
agency�even international�
task force organized to accom-
plish a defined mission is an
effective way of applying intelli-
gence resources. Bright, ener-
getic analysts and collectors can
think creatively about intelli-
gence needs and how to satisfy
them with available collection
tools. Moreover, the ISG's direct
links to all US and UK intelli-
gence community headquarters-
based databases and national col-
lection systems was a tremen-
dous help to its work. Such
access should be duplicated in
support of similar missions. (U)
The ISG's dynamic ability to
develop and implement intelli-
gence collection in real time on the
ground served the investigation
ISG nuclear team, accompanied by members of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate,
inspects condition of potential dual-use equipment. (U)
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Iraq Survey Group
66
well. This flexibility was demon-
strated in a subset of the ISG's
work having to do with determin-
ing the connection between the
insurgents and the former regime's
CW capabilities. Dubbed the Al
Aboud investigation (after the loca-
tion of a suspected Iraqi CW labo-
ratory), team members swiftly
reacted to information developed
from raids, designed new target-
ing packages, conducted more
raids, and progressed through a
very thorough process that ran
down the threat. In all likelihood,
The ISG's ability to
implement intelligence
collection in real time
served the
investigation well.
99
it preempted a potential risk from
evolving into a real CW threat. (U)
Although the ISG's configuration
was geared more toward dealing
with tactical threats than carrying
out a long-term investigation, it
did work�and for some tasks, it
The ISG's timeline chart, which stretched 15 feet, helped in analyzing Saddam's WMD
decisionmaking. (U)
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 49, Na. 2
worked very well. It offers a fine
example of how a lean and agile
team can collect, analyze, and,
when connected to appropriate
maneuver units, prosecute a cam-
paign against appropriate targets.
It also demonstrates ways analy-
sis can be improved, in particular
through close interaction between
case officers and analysts. With
proper management to prevent
conflicts of interest, such close
interaction of case officers and
analysts can yield, perhaps, the
biggest improvements growing out
of the ISG experience. (U)
Duelfer testifying before Congress in Octo
ber 2004 on the ISG and the Comprehen-
sive Report. (U)
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