MEETING OF PRINCETON CONSULTANTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02233811
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: April 24, 1953

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24 April 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR/CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Meeting of Princeton Consultants
1. Confirming our conversation of this noon, the
next meeting of the Princeton Consultants will be on
Wednesday and Thursday, May 6 and 7. Most of our group
will go up on the 5 p.m, Pennsylvania train Tuesday,
arriving at Trenton at 8 p.m., where there will be taxis
waiting to take the group to the Princeton Inn.
2. On Wednesday we shall discuss the current Soviet
"peace" tactics and probable reactions in the non-Communist
world to these tactics. As background, the Consultants
will have read the minutes of the last meeting, of which
a copy is attached, and SE 42 and 43.
3. I hope very much that you can attend. We can
make arrangements for transportation and for a room at the
Inn.
(b)(3)
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Security rnation
Noe
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Nigel %we
CRET
SECURITY IMAION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTITMTM
26 March 1953
STAFF MENORANDUM NO. 336
SUBJECT: PRINCETON CONSULTANTS' DISCUSSION ON 18 AND 19 MARCH
1953 OF SE.392 "PROBABLE CONSEMENCES OF THE DEATH
OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALEMOV TO
LEADURSHIP IN THE 1J5SRn(10 March 1953)
CHAIWIAN OF CONSULTANTS' MEETING
Raymond Se Sontag
Consultants to Board of National Estimates
Samuel Flagg Bemis
Burton Fahs
Calvin Hoover
George Reiman
William Langer
Philip Mosey
Joseph Strayer
Board of National Estimates
DeForest Van Slyck
Staff Members of Office of National Estimates
John Huizen a
Nike �
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PRINCETON CEN3ULTANTS1 DISCUSSION ON 18.19 UARCH OF SE-39
'TUMBLE comErusums qv THE DEATH 0F STALIN AND OF
THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR"
(10 March 1953)
I. SMITIARY
1. The discussion fbauesed on the question of transfer of power
in the USSR and, spectate:11Y, on whether and with what degree of
risk the enorMous,power concentrated in Stalin personally could be
transferred to a successor or successors, The majority of the
consultants leaned to the view that1 in the process of solving the
transfer of power problem, the Soviet sywtom would probably be
weakened. In this respect the majority departed from the view
which has genaraIlrobtain:d in OM, that the transfer of power
would probably be accomplished without weakening the continuity
and effectiveness of the Soviet state.
2. Broadly speaking, two points of view emerged from the
discussions
a. The Majority, with the degree of confidence varying
with Individuals, argued largely on the basis of
historical. Analogy that the transfer of power might
shake the Soviet system. They viewed the structure
Of paver in the USSR as intensely personal. They
said that Malenkov lacks the majesty of Stalin and
is surrounded by aMbittous and fearful Men who, if
they egad, woad challenge what appears to be his
pre.emtnent position. These consultants also believed
that a man such AO Malenkev� reared in the shadow of
Stalin, may have qualities and deficiencies which
would make it difficult for him to succeed to Stalin's
power. These consultants conceded, however, that
despite the dangers which they saw menacing the Soviet
system, the tranefer of power may nevertheless be
effected without damage to the system,
b. The contrary view wan based upon nn analysis of Soviet
society itself, and concluded tha7, there was little or
no prospect that the transfer of rower would shake or
Nay, Nue
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disrupt the Soviet .system. These consultants said
that historical precedents were not relevant because
there ',memo historical exanple of a system of controls
such as Soviet power had developed. These controls,
they said, penetreted all the institutions ofpower
in the society so that even if a personal struggle
ocCurred on the to0 level it would be transient and
would not affect the stability of the *hole system.
II. THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTp
Ads, The ua4or1ty Position
3. Kerman began by itating flatly that any concept of solidarity
or cooperative committee relationships among the men in the top ruling
group was "utter nonsense." The relationships among these men had
been marked throughout the Stalin era by extreme tension, the most
delicate intrigue, and savagery. There wore enormous possibility of
violence implicit in this situation.
4. Uoreover, there had been signs in recent months of a peak
of tension which pointed to a power for struggle. It was possitae
that Malenkov was not Stalin's choice in the final weeks of his life;
it was also posaitae that Stalin has been dead for some Mee and that
a struggle has been going on in consequence of his death, The
abolition of the Politburo at the 19th Congress was "an act of epoch.
making significance," for which Stalin did not take personal respensi-
bility. *Molotov's attitude toward Malerkov in the funeral speeches
was not the same as Berta's, which mgynoan that Uolotev is at �die
with the other two and that they cannot eliminate him nosrbecause he
has support in the Party. The sudden prominence given the army.,
both before and after Stalin's death* suggests that Ualenkov maybe
intriguing with the arner for its support. The res.emergence of Zhukov
fits this, for his earlier banishment was a personal act of Stalin.
Kennan concluded that "whatever the apparatus of power is at this
time, it is not unified."
5. Langer asked whether the doctors' ;got, with its indirect
attacks on Eerie, had issued from a Stalin4olotev combination against
Ualenkov and Beria. He speculated further that there might have been
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a policy difference between the two factions, Stalin.nblotov
representing a "cautious" element and Ealenkowaeria a "forward"
element,
6. Kennan's reply -was that the alignment or personalities
suggested was quite possible, although the policy issue which mipAt
lie behind it was obscure'. Ho felt that a divergence of views had
developed within the Soviet heirsrchy early in 1952 over the response
which the USSR should make to developments in the West, particularly
VS rearmament and the possibility of Lest German rearmament. One
school believed that these developments were of ouch a magnitude
that the Us3R most decide at once either to fight or to negotiate,
and that the letter course was preferable. The other achedl felt
that developments in the West did not Inv-cave such a threat and that
the USSR could afford to sit tight. Kennan saw two indications to
support his belief that there had been a struggle along these lines.
One was the distinct impression he had in Hosaow last :wager that
a studied effort was being made in certain quarters to keep him away
from Stalin and Melotovuwhich he supposed Was related to the issue
of whether the USSR should negotiate with the US. The other evidence
was that he detected a pattern of wavering in Soviet policy on
Cermany. He thouert that the Harch,note refloated a temporary victory
of the "negotiation" camp, whereas the later notes witlidimmr the bid
which was implicit in the.. arch note. The Stalin article appeared
to settle the issue, at leapt temporarily, for it stated that
developments in the ljest did not constitute a throat, that war was
not inevitable, and therefore, by implication, that negotiations
were not necessary, It placed Soviet palcy in the peatiret "No
concessions and no negotiations,"
7. Sontag then summarized Kennan's position as fellows: (a) there
was evidence of a struggle for some time aMong the possible heirs of
Stalin, and there was also evidence that this struggle had not been
resolved at Stalin's death; (b) there was involved in the struggle a
difference of views on policy-toward the Vest; (c) the present structure
of power represented a compromise which, given.the nature of the relations
among Communist leaders, is most unlikely to be maintained.
8. Kennan accepted this smeary and than added a further observe.
tion, He said that much would depend =whether the Vest confronted
the Soviet leaders with the necessity of making nailer policy decisions,
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If they they were so confronted, a great strain would be placed on their
present relationships. Differences among the tap leaders would than
be reflected in the Satellite and other Ccomunist parties, the loaders
ofvhich would not respond to Monkey's authority as they had to
Stalin's, so that a tremendous strain would be placed on the unity of
the entire Communist movement.
� 9. . Langer asked whether a Western initiative Would not units
the leadership, since historically that had been the effect of a
foreign throat Upon a. divided leadership. Kennon replied that 8 1-estern
(US) move should not involve any threat. He said that Germany was a
potentially divisive issue among the Soviet leaders, and he believed
that a nevrWestern proposal on Germany would split them vide open.
The Minority Position
10. In support of the view that the transfer of paver was not
likely to shake the Soviet system, Measly offered a different version
of what had been taking place in, the USSR as well as a. different
picture of the nature of the Soviet power system. He believed that
Stalin had .given much thought to the succession problem and that he -
had placed Maim:kov in a position to assume power with a minimum riek.
The last real struggle for the succession had taken place between
Malenkav and Zdahnov, and Malenkov had von. He had been intimately
involved with the work of the Secretariat for at least 14 years,
This was a. key .position, for it meant control of personnel from
-colonel Ain in the arroyo from the raion up in the Party, and from the
managers of enterprises up lathe bureaucracy. All pereonnel arrange-
ments had boon confirmed by the recent Congress.
11. Mosely agreed with Kaman that the doctors' plot had been
a blow: at Berle, but the announcement of it meant that the struggle
was already resolved, not that one vas in progress. The replacement
of Abaleuaov by Irpatiev, a key personnel shift in Beriate sector of
responsibilityvshoved that Berta's sector had been reprimanded, but
not Beria pe.sonally. The aspersions east on the securitY Organii in
the samouncement of the doctors' plot was away of conveying to the
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Party that Berta had subordinated himself in the power strurgle.
?lonely said he thought it possible that the lialenkov-Beria
relationship had been worked out last spring and that the mention
of prominent generals as targets of the doctors' plot was an
attempt to convey that the leading figuree in the armed farces were
supporting lialenkova Vesely did not regard the abolition of the
Politburo and its replacement by an enlarged Presidium at the
19th Congress as simifioant. The Presidium contained the three
elements It doh had always formed the top echelon of powers the
leading personalities in the Politburo, the second string younger
men in positions of great admineitrativo responsibility, and the
regional satraps. The important thing was that Stalin had wanted
one dominant successor, and he had worked tut the personal relation-
ships so as to place tialenkov's hands on the levers of power*
12. This version drew a number of questions from those
consultants who inclined toward the view outlined by Korman.
In replying to these questions, liosely further clarified his
position*
a. When asked to explain the perfunctory tributes
paid to Stalin &t his funeral and the apparently
rapid deflation of the Stalin myth, Llosely replied
that Valenkov-was probably-responding" to a feeling
in the party that the deification of Stalin had
been overdone. (Kennan noted in this connection
that in the last year or so there had been "strange
hiatuses" in the press treatment of Stalin* He
epeaulated that Stalin miOlt have become "fed up
witethe Malonkov-Beria codbinatien and had been
engaged in a struggle to destnyy them. He thought
it significant that Deria popped up into prominence
as soon as Stalin died.)
b. When asked to explain whether Stalin's Bolskevik
article had not undermined nalenkovis position, tiosely
replied that he believed that tho Bolshevik article
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represented/Salankov's line toward Europe, 1.e.,
The West was no threat and the USSR had room for
maneuver (nalenkov's speech to the Congress).
&aelyexplainedvhytho Bolshevik article had
been published by wpeculaitng that Stalin had
planned to give the article at the Congress as a
speech, but that because of failing health he had
been unable to deliver such a major address. His brief
appearance was intended to sanctify the proceedings and
to place a seal of approval upon Valenkov's report.
(Here Kerman and others introduced the hypothesis
that Stalin may alroacti have boon dead at the time of
Congress and had been represented by a double.)
13. Strayer said he thoudit there wore two prinoipal flaws in
Mosely's interpretation. It made it difficult to explain, first the
rebuke to Berta before Stalin's death and then his sudden build�up
after StFain's death, and second, the abolition of the Politburo and
the erection of the Presidium at the Congress followed by what
amounted to the restoration of the former after Stalin's death.
Kennan added that he was sure there was no real paver in the Presidium
because it was too big, He pointed to the theses introduced by
Kruschev at the Congress, which specified that the Secretariat, not
the Prodsidium, would have control over personnel. This moant that
the Preaidiumwas a purely formal body and that Molotov prior to
Stalin's death had not been in a position to exercise any influence
over personnel.
14. ,Sontag asked whether it was possible to believe that a
man who had struggled bitterly for power, as Stalin had dyne, would
* arrange a succession. The picture of an orderly transfer of power,
sinply out of a spirit of service to the cause, did not fit the
history of revolutions, llosely replied that the factor of Stalin's
failing health due to heart trouble over a long period should be taken
into account, for Stalin had probably long realized that he midit have
to relinquish power at any time.
Niro' -.baGZET
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L. Hoover said that boob:tallyho agreed with Kennants thesis,
but that he did not think that the Kerman and rosely interpretations
were incompatible. He thought that Nalenkov was undoubtedly Stalin's
choice, but he considered it most unlikely that Stalin mould have
actually traneferred power as an irrevocable trust. The doctors'
plot and the reversal of Congress decisions after Stalin's death
indicated that the succession had not boon decided and that Halenkov
had to and actually did seize power. Although Malenkov held power
now, there was a. poesibiTrrthat others who felt threatened mirAt
combine againnt him. Personal power was vastly moro important to these
men than policy differences. Hawkey undoubtedly fat the need to
associate other top figures with himself temporarily, but in tine he
mad 'wish to rid himself of them. If Berle or Molotov showed the
elightest sign of disloyalty, blood mould flew. There was therefore
a potentially explosive situation, although none of the ()there would
make the slightest challenge to Malelikov unless they could do so in
combination, Kennan inter:lee/ad Lenin's remark that Russian history
alternated betweenowild violence and the Most delicate deceits."
Hoover's personal ruess was that ZIalenkovis chances of consolidating
his power mere good, for Usienicov was in abettor position than
Stalin after Lenints death dile to the control system which had been
developed,.
16, Sontag questioned whether a comparison with 1924 was valid,
in view of the increased size Of the. Soviet empire, the complexity of
the eynotem and the pressures engendered by the effort to operate a
planned economy under forced draft. nes it not possible that, in any
sunk' 61�801y articulated structure* hesitations might be fatal, and
therefore was it not true that personality was still decisive? rosely
replied that there had been a great administrative development since
1924 which male the system largely self.sustaining. It had weathered
the shock of the great purges without a sign of breakdown.. The control
of key mon from the Secretariat reduced the heed for personal
ventions,
17. Kennon said he believed that modern totalitarianism inevitably
degenerated into personal dictatorship. Stalin had become more and
more like Hitler. For the general poptlation.a myth could be built .
around Halenkov, and he could be fitted into Stalin's role with relative
ease, For the people at modium,levels.in the apparatus of power, it
was a real question; they had probably been left in a trauma by Stalin's
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death and only gradually would they ask themselves whether his
towering personality weld be replaced. But at the very* top level
there was surely a terrific tension. We could not poordbly predict
whether they would receive it in violence or by polite maneuver.
The injection of complicated problems of empire -. relations with
VW and the Satellites made the new relationship far novo difficult.
le. Vesely roplied that the key question was whether any
struggle at the top level could revolt in an in clash:
that int whether my top leader in resorting to violence could
cell upon the army or the secret police as a unit. He did not
believe this was poseibile because of the interpenetrating nature of
the controls in all the instruments of power. Halenkov had long
operated this system based on the card indexes of the Secretariat.
Hoselyrbelieved that he still controlled it and that therefore no
institutional clash, was likely.
le. Kennon said he thought the personal element in this control
system aught not to be overlooked for it demanded continual juggling.
He was convinced that Stalin maintained his power by an intentional
preservation of instability and tension. In the last years of his
life, he lacked the vigor to give the continuous attention which was
required, and coagulation had developed in organisations or the state
and the Forty. If nalenkov had to compromise with institutional
solidarities, he was lost.
20. Langer said that even if it were conceded that nalankor
had succeeded to Stalin's power, the real question wan whether he
could operate the system with the same skill as had Stalin himself*
On the question of Haenkovis appal:Atlas; there did not seem to be
enough evidence to forma jhdgment.
III. OTHER ISSUES
21, The consultants suggested modifiestions of 3E.3e in several other
respects:
=4,1F
Nov,
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Langer said ho dicliked the flat statement in
paragraph 3 that the peoples of the 'USSR wore
*unlikely to participate actively* if a strugris
for power should break out. He suggested that it be
modified at least to read that the peoples of the
US3R are.nnlikely to initiate or to participate
actively in the early stages of the struftle.*
bo On the whole, there was an inclination among the
consultants to believe, at least more than SE.39
convoyed, that Stalin's death might result in the
weakening of Soviet controls in the Satellites and over
Communist parties outside the Bloc.. However, Hoover,
11oseg4, and Fibs opposed the majority on this. There
was a similar division of opinion on the enestion of
whether Tito had prospects for increased influence in
the Satellites and other Communist parties. Kerman
in particular held that Tito's influence would increase,
00 While there was no serious objection by any of the
consultants to SEN.39's statement on the probnble
effects of Stalin's death on Sino-Soviet relations,
Lancer thought it important to stress other fnctors
than appeared in the paper. He argued that if no
great change in Sino-Soviet relations were to be expected,
it was primarily, because (a) the two states would be
held together by their common interest in the Korean
war, and (b) China would long be dependent on the USSR
for industrial aid and the Rus6ians would with to exploit
this dependence to maintain effective influence. While
not disputing the general position nor the argument under
(a), Kerman said he thotightthat Howie calld not give
much industrial aid to China and that in addition
Russian penetration and influence In China Were far leas
than was gaherallybelieved,
Nov
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