NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY 31 OCTOBER 1987

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06771892
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2018
• Case Number: F-2017-02496
• Publication Date: October 31, 1987

mosimomminummonorApproved for Release: 2018/12/04 006771892
Director of
t. Central
bp] Intelligence
C,-
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
31 October 1987
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Warning Notice
This Document Not To Be Reproduced
Intelligence Sources or Methods involved
(WN)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
This page Is Z--o7arden4ial.,.
I he National Intelligence Daily is prepared in the
Central intelligence Agency in cooperation with the other
US foreign Intelligence organizations.
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Contents
Philippines: Implications of Recent Killings
Afghanistan: Divisive Party Conference
Brazil: Military Unrest
Notes
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Central America: Peace Maneuvers
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El Salvador: Murder Derails Government-Rebel Talks
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Iran-USSR: Possible Progress on Key Issues
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South Asia: Third Regional Summit
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Suriname: Political Crisis Wanes
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Malaysia: Crackdown Continues
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Chad-Libya: Situation at Aozou Airfield
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Chad-Sudan: Habre Offers To Aid Sudanese Rebels
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In Brief
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Special Analyses
USSR: Leadership Conflict on Eve of Anniversary Speech
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Group of 7: Pressures To Change Economic Policies
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PHILIPPINES: Implications of Recent Killings
Communist insurgents remain the prime suspects in the murders
of US servicemen near Clark Air Force Base, but
he involvement of rightist elements cannot
be ruled out. An elite Communist ass
denied killing US servicemen
The Philippine Government has sent two companies of Constabulary
to Angeles City to help search for the killers and has increased
security around Clark Air Force Base. President Aquino has ordered
Chief of Staff Ramos to investigate the killings.
Comment: Recent press reports on the delivery of US military
equipment and other assistance and allegations in Philippine media of
US complicity in the coup attempt on 28 August may have provoked
party leaders to risk killing US citizens because they have been
sufficiently identified with assisting the counterinsurgency program.
The killings almost certainly will increase civil-military tensions and
further undermine confidence in Aquino's ability to maintain peace
and order. Such events play into the hands of rebel Philippine armed
forces officers who have been rumored to be planning another cow
attempt as early as this weekend.
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AFGHANISTAN: Divisive Pad Zy Conference
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Afghan leader Najibullah's tough rhetoric and harsh unifying
measures at last week's conference almost certainly 7111 weaken
and further divide the ruling party.
Najibullah and other senior officials told the conference that
factionalism is blocking the success of national reconciliation and
threatening the party's survival. He announced his intention to force
unity on the party and, according to press accounts, made each party
member sign a pledge to work toward that goal or face expulsion or
"punishment." Najibullah puraed the Central Committee on the eve of
the conference.
Najibullah reminded party members that the regime could not survive
without Soviet support. He noted Kabul's near total economic
dependence on the USSR and said the regime's military is "not
capable enough to independently and successfuliy resist the enemy."
Politburo member Ziray underlined the need for unity by implying the
party could not count on Soviet support indefinitely if factionalism
continued unabated.
anti-Najibullah dissidents exploded
a bomb that caused hundreds of casualties near party headauarters
' he morning after the conference.
Najibullah is facing a party in which most members oppose
him, his regime's subservience to Moscow, and the Soviet-mandated
policy of national reconciliation.
Comment: Further purges, which the Soviets apparently are backing,
risk driving Najibullah's opponents underground, where they will
become more dangerous and even less susceptible to party control.
Najibullah probably will begin to move against rank-and-file
dissidents soon. If his enemies are removed, the party that emerges
will be smaller and plagued�particularly in urban areas�by the
opposition of former party members driven to cooDerlate with the
resistance in some cases
Ziray's description of the finite nature of the Soviet commitment�
although meant to rally party factions to Najibullah's support�almost
certainly will renew fear within the party and government of an
imminent Soviet troop withdrawal. The combination of that fear and
aggressive purging will produce a regime increasingly prone to panic,
especially if Moscow decides to offer a 12-month troop withdrawal
timetable in the near future.
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BRAZIL: Military Unrest
Concern among the military about low wages and Brazil's
continuing political and economic disarray may force the hiuh
command to become politically more assertive.
Drastically falling wages, reportedly the lowest in Brazilian military
history, have led to several protests by junior officers in recent weeks,
including the brief occupation of a provincial townhall and an angry
demonstration by Army captains at a military school in Rio de Janeiro.
A junior officer was arrested last week allegedly for planning a series
of bombings to protest the pay situation. In response to these events
and to pressure from the military ministers President Sarney granted
a 100-percent salary increase last week.
Former President and General Figueiredo has launched scathing
public attacks on Sarney, fueling press speculation about cou
plotting.
Comment: Sarney's pay raise will probably help defuse junior officer
discontent, although the new step-by-step Increases are unlikely to
keep pace with risina inflation�leavina the door open for renewed
agitation over pay.
Despite the growing unrest, however, there currently is no strong
support for a coup within the military. Nevertheless, the armed
forces�the country's most cohesive political force�are increasingly
frustrated
They see the administration as
virtually paralyzed, while the Constituent Assembly inconclusively
debates the President's mandate and powers and leans toward
scrapping the presidential system favored by the military. A
successful leftist challenge to the military's constitutional role as
guardian of the stability of the state in times of national emergency
might provoke a confrontation.
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Peace Maneuvers
Guatemalan President Cerezo is attempting to broker a deal in the
peace process in the face of Nicaragua's refusal to negotiate with its
insurgents. He has invited Nicaraguan President Ortega and
Salvadoran President Duarte to meet with him. Duarte told the
Embassy on Thursday that he has declined the invitation. The
Sandinistas already had issued a statement before the invitation that
Nicaragua will not implement a broad amnesty or lift the state of
emergency until the US stops aiding the rebels. The statement firmly
rejected even indirect talks with the guerrilla leadership, but Ortega
reportedly did hold out that prospect in informal comments
yesterday.
Comment: Cerezo probably fears that Nicaragua's position will
produce an impasse in the peace process. He may urge Ortega to
negotiate with the anti-Sandinistas in return for an immediate call by
the Central American Presidents for an end to outside support for the
guerrillas. Duarte probably declined to attend because he believed
Cerezo would argue that the democracies should make concessions
to Managua. Ortega may contend that party hardliners have tied his
hands on domestic liberalization unless Cerezo can persuade the
other democracies to press for an end to US aid.
EL SALVADOR: Murder Derails Government-Rebel Talks
Salvadoran guerrillas are using the murder of a human rights leader
earlier this week to break off cease-fire talks and try to undermine the
Duarte government's credibility on human rights. The guerrillas
boycotted negotiations that were to begin yesterday, and their
supporters in San Salvador staged demonstrations charging the
government and the US with complicity in the crime. Earlier in the
week, the only opposition member of the National Reconciliation
Commission resigned, citing the government's inability to control
violence. The government exempted the still-unknown killers from the
amnesty decree approved this week assigning the case to its special
investigations unit.
Comment: Although there is no evidence of official complicity in the
crime, it gives the guerrillas an excuse to torpedo the peace talks that
had put them on the defensive. By implicitly threatening the safety of
guerrilla political leaders who planned to return to San Salvador�
Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo�the murder serves the interests
of both the far right and the radical left. The far right fears that the
returning leftist politicians will engage in subversive activities, and
some guerrilla leaders may be worried that letting their political allies
into the electoral system would further erode the legitimacy of their
insurgency.
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IRAN-USSR: Possible Progress on Key Issues
Signs of Iranian-Soviet compromise on two divisive issues suggest
further progress toward improved relations.
Iran and Afghanistan plan to reopen their consulates in Herat and
Mashad, respectively. Afghanistan courted Iran's agreement through
gestures such as Foreign Minister Wakil's call for improved relations
at a recent party conference, declarations of peace zones in two
provinces on the Iranian border, and offers of regional autonomy to
Iranian-supported Shias in the Hazarat region
�
Comment: Moscow had refused to allow the return of technicians
withdrawn in 1983 and 1985 until Tehran could guarantee their safety,
and neither side has officially announced the return of any. But the
Soviets apparently are pleased with the muting of Iranian criticism on
Afghanistan and probably encouraged Kabul to make gestures
toward Iran that would facilitate a decision to reopen the consulates.
Iran, while willing to improve relations with Afghanistan to court
Moscow, is unlikely to abandon its political support for the Afghan
resistance or its demand for a full Soviet withdrawal. Vorontsov will
probably press Tehran for restraint in its war with Iraq.
SOUTH ASIA: Third Regional Summit
Heads of state from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal,
and Sri Lanka will attend the third summit of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation that begins tomorrow in Nepal.
Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo will represent President Zia. The
leaders will review progress on regional programs, such as narcotics
control, and explore prospects for a food security reserve and a
regional convention on terrorism.
Comment: The participants probably will agree to establish a reserve
of emergency food stocks to assist their members during drought and
floods. The leaders will avoid more sensitive bilateral issues, such as
the Indo�Sri Lankan peace accord, but the smaller nations almost
certainly will privately discuss their concerns about India's intentions
in the region/
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SURINAME: Political Crisis Wanes
IIMINIMIRIMIIIMINNI111111111111111111111111
A political controversy over elections in the three districts in Suriname
that are plagued by insurgency seems to have been resolved in favor
of Head of Government Bouterse. He has countermanded a decision
by the civilian supreme policymaking council to postpone elections
indefinitely in the three districts The
civilian leaders fear that the Army could readily carry out voter fraud
in the three areas, which are under its control. Party leaders have said
they would not contest elections in the disputed districts
Comment: Voter manipulation In the affected areas alone could net
Bouterse's political party 10 of the 51 seats in the new national
assembly. The likely failure of party leaders to stand firm on this issue
may encourage more maneuvering by Bouterse. A special session of
the appointed national assembly must be called if the electoral law
forbidding nomination of candidates less than 25 days before the
election on 25 November is to be bypassed. -lila assembly is likely to
vote to allow new candidates because such a ruling also would benefit
Bouterse, who has not yet announced candidates in two of the three
disputed districts
MALAYSIA: Crackdown Continues
Prime Minister Mahathir is continuing the move against opposition
elements begun earlier this week in a bid to defuse racial tension. The
number of those detained has risen to 88 and shows the same racial
composition as earlier arrests. Chinese leaders and activists have
been the hardest hit, with a few other minorities and Malay ruling-
party members included for balance. I /the arrests have been
nonviolent so far
Comment: The public's apparent support for Mahathir's actions
underscores Malaysian fears of a recurrence of the racial riots in 1969
in which several hundred people were killed and a national emergency
declared, probably strengthening his hand in dealing with both the
opposition and dissenters in his party. Mahathir will try to avoid an
incident such as a violent confrontation between police and Islamic
extremists that risks broader unrest. But the anniversary of the ruling
party this weekend might provoke an incident If party members
choose to defy a government ban on rallies.
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CHAD-LIBYA: Situation Situation at Aozou Airfield
Chad's buildup for an offensive against Aozou airfield appears nearly
complete, and Libyan forces continue to believe that an attack is
imminent. the Chadians have
not shipped arms or munitions to the Tibesti region since midmonth,
and moct ranent rialiveries have consisted primarily of food.
Libyan forces at Aozou airfield are continuing to
improve their defenses. At least 30 more heavy machineguns have
recently been deployed for use against troops and ground vehicles
along the airfield's northeastern and northwesrrn perimeter.
Comment: Although the resupply of Chadian forces in the north may
already be complete, a full-scale attack against the Libyan-held
airfield is unlikely until several key Chadian commanders, including
the Army commander in chief, arrive in the north to supervise the
positioning of what is expected to be a large attacking force. The
movement of the newly arrived heavy machineguns to the airfield's
northern perimeter�where most of Libya's forces are now
deployed�suggests that Tripoli expects the main Chadian thr7t to
come from that direction.
CHAD-SUDAN: Habre Offers To Aid Sudanese Rebels
Chadian President Habre's reported offer in mid-October of limited
assistance to the southern insurgent Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army
will sour Khartoum's relations with N'Djamena and raise new
problems for Sudanese Prime Knister Sadiq al-Mandi.
Sudanese military officials blame
Sadig's public support of Libyan claims to the Aozou Strip for Habre's
tilt toward the Sudanese rebels. The officers are concerned that this
development will enhance the southern insurgents' ability to gain the
cooperation of tribes in western Sudan, which are unhapor with the
government in Khartoum.
Comment: Habre�long suspicious that Sadiq has tolerated a Libyan
military presence in western Sudan�apparently wants to raise the
costs of Khartoum's "good neighbor" policy toward Tripoli. Chadian
assistance to the Sudanese insurgents is unlikely to result in effective
cross-border attacks for some time, but Sudanese military officers,
already uneasy with Sadiq's policies, will have another reason to
criticize his leadership. Sadiq is unlikely to alter significantly his
dealings with Libya because of pressure from Habre. He probably
believes he can better weather Chadian machinations against him
than pressure from Libya.
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In Brief
Americas
Middle East
Asia
Europe
USSR
� Sandinistas shot down one of their own MI-8 transport helicopters
Thursday in northern Nicaragua,
... probably second aircraft accidentally downed by regime this
year.
� Israel offering to build bridge to Jordan to facilitate Palestinian
exports from West Bank... response to West Europeans'
pressure ... Amman, reluctant to appear to accommodate Icrali
occupation measures, unlikely to agree
� Mauritanian President Taya averted coup attempt by black
military officers last week ... reflects
growing ethnic grievances .. . President remains vulnerable.
� Taiwan to take delivery of first of two diesel-powered submarines
ordered from Netherlands in 1981, according to press ... will be
Taiwan's first modern attack submarine ... probably operational
in late 1989
Swedish Foreign Minister Andersson visiting Cuba, Central
America, Contadora countries next two weeks . . . likely to
promote peace accord, highlight Stockholm's disagreements with
US ... first high-level visit to Havana since 1975.
Provisional IRA's political arm wins two local Belfast council seats
over moderate candidates .. . result encouraging British effort to
impose antiterrorist oaths on local candidates in Northern Ireland
. may not affect political support for PIRA.
� Soviet Minister of Light Industry recently announced Politburo had
decided that defense industries would participate in reequipping
light industrial factories ... further evidence of leadership intent to
involve weapons builders in civilian modernization program
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Special Analysis
USSR: Leadership Conflict on Eve of Anniversary Speech
�
harp differences over the
scope and pace of reform led to recriminations between
members of the Soviet Politburo at the recent Central Committee
plenary meeting, and the turmoil may have limited General
Secretary Gorbachev's freedom of action in subsequent talks
with Secretary Shultz. The outcome of that conflict may be
reflected in how Gorbachev's speech on Monday�marking the
70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution�handles
controversial issues of Soviet history thlt have relevance to
current policy.
Soviet leaders engaged in
extraordinarily rancorous debate at the Central Committee meeting
on 21 October that discussed the anniversary preparations and
approved the outlines of Gorbachev's speech. Accounts of the clash
vary in detail but make clear that the chief protagonists were Moscow
party leader Yel'tsin, who is pushing for an acceleration and
expansion of reform, and First Secretary Ligachev, who has emerged
as the most vigorous advocate of a slower pace of change. Yel'tsin
reportedly threatened to resign his position, evidently out of
frustration with efforts by conservatives to block reform. Gorbachev
appears to be under pressure from both conservatives and radicals,
although his own policy preferences are closer to those of Yel'tsin's
than to Ligachev's views
A major focus of the debate was Gorbachev's interpretation of Soviet
history, a subject likely to be the centerpiece of his anniversary
speech. Gorbachev's Politburo ally Yakovlev is said to have prepared
a draft speech questioning the political-economic-social structure
created by Stalin, which is still largely intact. The Central Committee
reportedly ordered revisions that limited the extent to which such
controversial figures as Bukharin and Trotsky will be rehabilitated and
softened Gorbachev's criticism of Stalin's economic and cultural
policies.
Arms Control and the Summit
The sharp, unresolved differences within the leadership aired at the
Central Committee plenum may have contributed to Gorbachev's
unwillingness to move decisively on outstanding issues during the
Secretary of State's visit to Moscow, which began the following day.
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Contentious Historical Questions
The following historical issues are caught up in the debate over current policy.
� Collectivization. Some historians are now charging that Stalin violated Lenin's desires
by prematurely abolishing independent agricultural cooperatives and by forcing the
kolkhoz model on all farms. Endorsement of these charges in Gorbachev's speech
would boost the family contract and leasing proposals he is pushing in an effort to tap
individual initiative.
� The Stalinist Command Economy. Gorbachev's attempts to shake up the planning
and management bureaucracies, inculca1e accountability at the enterprise level, and
legalize small-scale "private" consumer services are reminiscent of Lenin's New
Economic Policy of the 1920s. Liberal historians have urged that Nikolay Bukharin�
Lenin's lieutenant and the architect of NEP who was executed by Stalin in 1938�be
restored to historical honor.
� Purge. Gorbachev's drive to eliminate the most egregious official violations of Soviet
laws and to redraft the criminal code has been accompanied by more frank
acknowledgment of Stalin's purges and abuses of basic civil rights.
� Party Dictatorship. Recent interpretations of Lenin show him�unlike Stalin�as
dominating the party by force of argument and able to tolerate other viewpoints.
Pravda has quoted Lenin as arguing that elected officials are the "only reliable means
of destroying jureaucracy," thus providing a rationale for democratizing election
procedures for lower level officials. Rehabilitation of Trotsky, Stalin's archrival, could
imply a move toward legitimizing factionalism, officially banned in Lenin's final years.
� The Roots of Stalinism. Some Soviet scholars have hinted that Stalin was the creature
of the system Lenin built. Ligachev, however, has castigated those who contend that
the system made a "wrong turn" after Lenin. Gorbachev has continued to idealize
Lenin, and Soviet media have been cautious in replaying criticisms that imply the
system was flawed from the outset.
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\Only after the
Politburo had a full discussion of the issues that were raised at the
plenum and in the discussions with Secretary Shultz
did the Soviet leadership appear ready to address US concerns and
agree to go ahead with a summit and to send Foreian Minister
Shevardnadze to Washington.
Gorbachev's Speech
The balance of forces in the Politburo may be reflected in the way
Gorbachev's speech treats Soviet history, especially the authoritarian,
centralized system created by Stalin. Gorbachev apparently believes
that he must attack the Stalinist model in order to institutionalize his
reforms and that filling in the "blank spots" of Soviet history will
enhance the party's credibility and facilitate a rapprochemen/
between state and society.
Other leaders�especially Ligachev and KGB chief Chebrikov�have
publicly taken issue with historical interpretations advanced by
Gorbachev and his allies, partly because of reservations about
policies Gorbachev is promoting but also out of concern that any
exposure of past mistakes risks undermining party legitimacy.
�
If Gorbachev has compromised significantly on the text of his speech,
it might signal a slowing of the reform momentum he has been so
successful in maintaining thus far. He might view this as a purely
tactical retreat, but radicals like Yel'tsin may grow impatient with
Gorbachev's willingness to accommodate�or inability to
outmaneuver�Ligachev and other more conservative leaders. If so, it
would greatly complicate the General Secretary's ability to maintain
leadership backin while keeping the reform process moving forward
at a safe speed.
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Special Analysis
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Special Al alysis
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Special Analysis
GROUP OF 7: Pressures To Change Economic Policies
Renewed concern about exchange rate instability in the
aftermath of the stock market fall has deepened divisions in the
West's Group of 7 and created pressure for changes in US,
Japanese, and West German economic policies that Bonn and
Tokyo will continue to resist unless the US dollar continues to
fall.
Bonn and Tokyo probably doubt that the downward slide itself
will have a major impact on world economic growth or on their
economies, and they remain reluctant to go beyond providing short-
term liquidity to their economies to limit the sense of crisis. The
steady decline of the dollar over the past week has raised more
serious fears among other G-7 leaders that their exports will be hit
hard. They fear that speculation among foreign exchange dealers that
G-7 economic coordination is breaking down would weaken the dollar
further and do still more damage to their exports.
A further sharp fall of the dollar would strengthen the West German
mark against other currencies and aggravate existing tensions within
the European Monetary System.
The dollar's fall and fears that it will depreciate further are
strengthening the hands of factions within the West German and
Japanese Governments that favor expansionary policies, but it would
have to fall substantially more before policy stalemates on those
issues could be broken.
Tokyo probably would move fairly quickly to increase spending if the
dollar fell sharply to about 100 yen, a rate that would lower growth in
Japan to about 1.5 percent. Similarly, Bonn would be likely to
stimulate the West German economy if a major decline in the dollar
slowed growth to 1 percent.
If Washington puts a significant deficit reduction plan on the table,
Bonn and Tokyo would probably feel obligated to offer at least limited
concessions on growth. Incoming Prime Minister Takeshita might
view such a US move as an opportunity to stimulate the Japanese
economy by increasing public works spending. Bonn is unlikely to
offer a large stimulative oacka e but miciht try to et the Bundesbank
to reduce Interest rates.
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