THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05689079
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00812
• Publication Date: May 25, 1982

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
The Peace Movement
in Western Europe
Special National Intelligence Estimate
SIVE 2/20-82
25 Nay 1982
Copy
4
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(b)(3)
SNIE 2/20-82
THE PEACE MOVEMENT
IN WESTERN EUROPE
Information available as of 25 May 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
KEY JUDGMENTS
Page
DISCUSSION
5
I. INTRODUCTION
5
THE PEACE MOVEMENT: PAST AND PRESENT
5
111. COMPOSITION OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT
7
A. Youth
7
B. Churches
8
C. Labor
8
D. Environmentalists
8
E. Non-Communist Political Parties
9
F. Communist Panic �
9
IV. SOVIET AND COMMUNIST MANIPULATION OF PEACE
SENTIMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
10
A. Soviet-Sponsored Anti-INF Activities
10
B. Future Soviet Efforts
11
V. THE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL CLIMATE AND THE NEW
PEACE MOVEMENT
12
A. The Changing Military Balance and Nuclear Weapons
12
B. Perceptions of the Soviet Military Threat
13
C. Divergences in West European�US Interests
13
D. The West European Desire for Autonomy
14
E. Impact on Governments
15
VI OUTLOOK FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT
16
A. Vulnerabilities of the Movement
16
B. Violence and Civil Disobedience
16
C. Prospects for the Movement
17
VII, SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
17
A. The Peace Movement and the Geneva Talks
17
B. The Peace Movement and US Policies
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The peace movement, a longstanding and usually ineffectual force
on the West European political scene, has burgeoned in the last three
years. The roots of the peace movement are indigenous, but Moscow's
efforts have been an important factor in explaining why antinuclear
sentiment in Western Europe was mobilized so quickly and effectively
after NATO's December 1979 decision to prepare to deploy Pershing II
and cruise missiles and at the same time pursue arms control negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union.
Underlying the movement's new strength are widespread fears of
the consequences for Europe of rising Soviet-American tensions. Today
many West Europeans believe that they are no longer in charge of their
own destinies�and, especially, that they are threatened by a nuclear
cataclysm brought on by the superpowers. Many believe that the arms
race is out of control. Emerging from a period in which they had
become acclimated to the benefits of detente, adherents of the peace
movement are appalled by the uncertainties of growing East-West
tension.
The sources of the movement's new strength are many and diffuse:
the demise of SALT, NATO's INF decision, US rearmament efforts,
instability and heightened superpower competition in Southwest Asia,
and certain US rhetoric and actions that many West Europeans
regarded as bellicose. These factors accelerated trends that for some
time had been placing strains on Atlantic cohesion.'
These trends include the emergence of postwar generations less
receptive to a bipolar view of the world, perceptions of adverse changes
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, although recognizing that
there is significant support for the peace movement in Western Europe, do not believe it is as widespread
as the overall Estimate suggests. In their view, support for the peace movement centers primarily in
lef twing factions and organizations; these relatively small minorities, however, are strategically located
and highly active so that their impact on the fragile West European coalition governments is magnified.
Furthermore, they believe that the growing strength of the peace movement in the last few years reflects
the increasing sophistication of Soviet involvement. In this regard, they believe it is Soviet coordination
and direction that have given the peace movement much of its impetus and anti-US coloration. Working
through local Communist parties and front groups, the Soviets have been largely responsible for the
united effort of the various non-Communist peace groups. The overlapping memberships and director-
ates of the various groups involved have reinforced this integrative effort.
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in the global military balance and (paradoxically) of a low Soviet
military threat to Western Europe, images of the United States as a
-blundering giant,- and increasing Atlantic disagreements about deal-
ing with the Soviets.
The supporters of the peace movement have focused more sharply
on the United States than on the Soviet Union because many of them
believe that US initiatives have endangered detente and, in any event,
they cannot affect the USSR. Many protesters are concerned that the
United States�in seeking to redress a military imbalance�may be
willing to sacrifice arms control opportunities, and may take actions that
could exacerbate East-West tensions. By contrast, it appears to support-
ers of the peace movement that the Soviets�despite their deployment
of SS-20 missiles�have not launched initiatives that change the rules of
the game in Europe.
The peace movement constitutes a distinct minority, but it enjoys
broader public sympathy than the disarmament campaigns of the late
1950s. Although the movement is particularly attractive to European
youth, it includes sympathizers of all ages. And its ranks include
dedicated Christians (notably Protestant, though increasingly Catholic
as well), Communists, environmentalists and opponents of nuclear
power, students, civil servants, and workers. Non-Communist groups
have willingly accepted Communist participation in antinuclear events,
but are increasingly suspicious of the motives and tactics behind
Communist-directed activities.
. Moscow has embraced and aided the peace movement, and has
shaped its own peace campaign to persuade West Europeans that the .
United States is guilty of endangering Europe's security. As part of this
effort, the USSR and local Communists have provided the movement
with organizational arid financial assistance and with advice. The Soviet
campaign has been most effective in assisting and penetrating the peace
movements in Holland and West Germany; it has had less of an effect
on the peace movements in Italy, Great Britain, Scandinavia, and
France. Soviet support of the peace movement will continue even
though Moscow is concerned that Europeans�East and West�will
increasingly focus on the Soviet arms buildup in addition to INF.
The peace movement has achieved sufficient momentum that it
would remain a political force even in the absence of Soviet machina-
tions. And although it cannot by itself bring down any government in
Western Europe, the movement's influence severely constrains the
political leadership in Holland, West Germany, and Belgium.
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Irrespective of Soviet and local Communist help, the cohesion of
the movement might diminish if US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva show
signs of progress. Other developments could also decrease support for
and cohesion of the movement:
� Public revulsion with -street politics.-
- Violence associated with radical peace groups.
� Government and public concern over perceived US disenchant-
ment with its NATO allies.
� Growing repression in Poland or overt Soviet interference in
that country.
� Inept Soviet efforts to manipulate the peace movement.
Despite these potential vulnerabilities, the peace movement will
increase its activity as the time nears for implementation of INF
deployment or if the Geneva talks collapse. The movement in Western
Europe will also benefit from the growth of antinuclear sentiment in the
United States. The peace movement will mount major protest demon-
strations, for example, when President Reagan visits Western Europe in
June.
The primary short-term objective of the peace movement is to
block INF deployment. Should this be achieved, NATO cohesion would
be seriously weakened and the Soviets would attempt to direct the
peace movement toward subsequent, long-term objectives, which would
include the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe.
The United States is not able to affect directly many of the
underlying trends in Western Europe that nurture the peace movement;
antinuclear sentiment will continue to be strong, especially among a
younger generation in Europe that was not present as the strategy of nu-
clear deterrence was being forged, does not find it credible, and feels
less committed to maintain its current form. Moreover, the political
influence of the peace movement will continue to reflect US-West
European differences about how to assure the security of Western
Europe and will ebb and flow with public perceptions of the likelihood
of nuclear war.
Nevertheless, the growth of the movement may slow if the United
States is sensitive to European anxieties about nuclear conflict. And
popular support for it may erode if more Europeans are convinced of
the importance of nuclear deterrence in preventing war and of US
readiness to engage in arms control negotiations.
3
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DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
I. Underlying the revival of the peace movement in
Western Europe is diffuse but widespread unease over
sharpening East-West conflict and fear of nuclear war.
This unease has been fueled by differing US-West
European views of the value of detente and growing
doubts about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, both
of which have been exploited by the Soviets. The
peace movement also reflects a desire for revived East-
West cooperation, concern for the environment,
strains of nationalism, moral outrage and pacifism,
and outright neutralism�sometimes tinged by anti-
Americanism. The movement in Western Europe has
helped to stimulate peace sympathizers elsewhere (for
example, Japan) and is in turn being reinforced by the
burgeoning peace movement in the United States.
II. THE PEACE MOVEMENT: PAST AND
PRESENT
2. Organized opposition to nuclear weapons is not
new in Western Europe. From 1956 until roughly
1960, vigorous movements surfaced in West Germany
and Great Britain to oppose nuclear armaments. Sup-
porters were drawn from similar segments of society in
both countries�pacifists, leftwing socialists, Commu-
nists, students, and trade unionists; however, the
movements were independent of each other and re-
mained largely isolated from the dominant political
forces in their countries. Overall, the scope and appeal
of the peace movements in Western Europe in the
1950s remained relatively limited.
3. The contemporary European peace movement,
revived at a time of declining East-West detente and a
pessimistic public mood, stands in contrast to its
predecessor. In scope, it is a mass�albeit minority�
movement of continental dimension mobilizing People
across borders and attracting previously apolitical par-
ticipants. Its members, supporters, and sympathizers
are drawn from both the elite and general strata of
European societies and from all points along the
political spectrum (though predominantly leftist).
4. The current West European peace movement
benefits from the organizational and financial assist-
ance and the advice of the Soviets and local Commu-
nists. But the revival of the peace movement would
not have been possible in the absence of a long-term
evolution in US-European relations that produced
differing perceptions of world conditions on each side
of the Atlantic. New political, economic, and military
realities�evident since the early 1970s�and resur-
gent national awareness among NATO allies provided
necessary nourishment for dissatisfaction with NATO
policies and US leadership. There are increasing signs
that some European attitudes toward the Soviet threat,
arms control, and the Third World are at odds with US
policies within the Alliance. Other factors contributing
to perceptions of diverging interests have been:
Different historical experiences of West Europe-
an and American postwar generations.
� The increasingly competitive international eco-
nomic and monetary policies of the West�
especially in periods of economic stringency.
� NATO's continuing conventional military disad-
vantage versus the Warsaw Pact, a disadvantage
that has elevated the importance of nuclear
weapons even while the development of US-
Soviet strategic parity lessens the credibility of
the US deterrent in Western Europe.
5. Beginning in late 1979 a confluence of events
rapidly intensified the divergence of West Euro-
pean-US perceptions which had been slowly growing
during previous years and provided numerous new
recruits to the new peace movement:
� The demise of SALT brought an end to the
framework of arms control that had postponed
the necessity of coming to grips with knotty
US-West European differences over how to
defend Western Europe.
� The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accentuated
differing US-West European views about what
actions to take against the USSR.
5
--SteREZ._
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The collapse of the US position in Iran and the
1979 oil price increases intensified Western Eu-
rope's sense of vulnerability to events in the
Middle East, reinforcing US-West European
differences over the Arab-Israeli issue and other
parts of the Third World.
The subsequent US determination to rectify the
global military imbalance and high-level US
statements about the defense of Western Europe
promoted West European fears that a nuclear
war might break out and be waged in Europe.
Some US actions and rhetoric (on El Salvador
and Libya, for example) were believed by many
West Europeans to be bellicose and irrespon-
sible.
6. The demise of SALT was especially disconcert-
ing. When West European leaders agreed to interme-
diate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization in De-
cember 1979, they assumed that SALT II would be
approved and that additional arms control negotiations
(the second track of the -dual- decision) aimed at
eliminating Soviet SS-20s would be initiated. The INF
decision came to seem less reassuring after the SALT
treaty was withdrawn and US interest in results from
either INF or SALT negotiations appeared uncertain
to West Europeans.
7. The 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing II
and ground-based cruise missiles was a major catalyst
for the new European peace movement. Previous US
deployments were made after bilateral consultation
and without any formal commitment by the NATO
Alliance. Giving European governments a greater and
more visible responsibility for NATO nuclear strategy
also committed them to a series of controversial
political decisions that could become the focus for
protests.
8. The current peace movement in Europe has had
a far greater impact on political parties and govern-
ments than its antecedent. indeed, it has touched all of
NATO. In Holland, its activities almost certainly
preclude INF deployment for the foreseeable future.
In West Germany, it threatens to split the ruling SPD
and has created considerable political difficulty for
Chancellor Schmidt, who remains determined to carry
out the INF decision.' In Belgium, antinuclear senti-
ment in some regions has contributed to the govern-
ment's refusal to make a clear decision regarding INF
deployment. In Great Britain, the Labor Party has
officially endorsed the exclusion of nuclear weapons
from British soil. While the peace movement is riot as
well developed in Italy, this could rapidly change if
the Italian Communist Party (PCI) continues its recent
wholehearted support.
9. Since December 1979, when the NATO INF
decision was reached, there has been significant public
opposition to new deployments of nuclear weapons.
The start of arms reduction talks in Geneva and the
US zero option initiative have not overcome wide-
spread negative attitudes to such deployments. Ac-
cording to a February 1982 USTCA poll, 36 percent of
the British public remained unconditionally opposed
to the stationing of INF and 41 percent favored INF
stationing only on condition that arms control talks are
either in progress or have failed. Similarly, in West
Germany, 39 percent were unconditionally opposed to
stationing of INF and 41 percent supported stationing
when linked to arms control talks. In both cases,
unconditional opposition to INF deployment increased
during the preceding six months. As of December
1981, a majority of the Dutch public (52 percent)
unconditionally opposed the siting of cruise missiles in
their country, while 40 percent would accept TINE on
the condition that arms talks were in progress or had
failed. In Belgium, according to another February
1982 USIGA survey, a sizable majority opposed INF
(52 percent) even when informed of the SS-20 threat;
without that qualification over 70 percent were op-
posed. And as of October 1981, a majority of the
Italian public opposed INF basing regardless of the
SS-20 threat.
10. In West Germany public opposition to INF
deployment has complicated the government's effort
to reconcile its view of Alliance obligations with recent
American views of those obligations. West Germany's
geographical position and the number of nuclear
weapons already stationed there make it especially
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that, al-
though Chancellor Schmidt remains officially committed to carry
out the INF decision, the need to retain the support of the SPD
blueing faction and the furtherance of key SPD policies such as
-Ostpolitik" are likely to lead Schmidt to acquiesce in a postpone-
ment of INF deployment.
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sensitive to any perceived dangers of war or changes in
NATO strategy. Because of their national division,
West Germans are reluctant to endorse policies that
could be obstacles to improved ties with their brethren
in the East. On the one hand, West Germany retains
close ties to the Western Alliance; on the other hand,
many West Germans increasingly are restive at the
impediments to independent behavior and ties to the
East implied by Washington's efforts to rally Europe
against the Soviets.
11. In contrast, France�which is not directly in-
volved in NATO's INF decision�has riot had to cope
with a broad peace movement. It is not as exposed as
West Germany, possesses an independent nuclear de-
terrent, has a clearer sense of national purpose, and
reaps the benefits of NATO without surrendering any
political autonomy. President Mitterrand strongly sup-
ports INF as well as increased defense efforts to meet
the Soviet challenge, and has made known his concern
about -neutralist" trends elsewhere in Europe (par-
ticularly West Germany). Nonetheless, some members
of the governing Socialist Party remain skeptical about
the need for increased defense spending and more
sympathetic toward disarmament than the party or
government leadership. And as of February 1982, 30
percent of the French public unconditionally opposed
stationing INF in Western Europe. If the French
economy slows significantly, Paris would face difficult
choices about where to cut spending. French defense
expenditures could come under increased pressures,
particularly from the left, and the relatively weak
French peace movement could grow.
III. COMPOSITION OF THE PEACE
MOVEMENT
12. An important characteristic of the peace move-
ment is its transnational scope and eclectic composi-
tion, This diversity is both a strength and a liability, as
it projects an image of broad support for the move-
ment but also impedes any single, unified program of
action. Among the many elements in the peace move-
ment, the following are prominent and influential.
A. Youth
13. The overwhelming majority of participants in
public rallies against nuclear war and US nuclear
weapons have been young people. In most West
European countries, there is now a majority of the
7
population�which will reach two-thirds by 1990�
that does not directly recall America's postwar role in
Western Europe's reconstruction or the onset of the
Cold War. In Western Europe, nearly 50 percent of
the population was born after 1945. The members of
the first postwar generation have now reached their
thirties and are acquiring political leadership at the
local and national levels. Members of this generation
are accustomed to expressing their political views in
the streets as well as at the ballot box. Many have been
influenced by the strong critique of the establishment
fashionable in the media.
14. The young people who went through the uni-
versities in the turbulent years of the 1960s have by
now entered the educated middle class. In West
Germany this group constitutes the leadership of the
youth organizations of the major parties�the Jusos
(SPD), Judos (FDP), and Junge Union (GDU).3 The
Jusos, among the more vocal critics of West German
security policies, advocated in June 1981 overturning
the NATO double decision, a central European nucle-
ar-free zone, and a European counterweight within
NATO to reduce US dominance.
15. A second group, the product of the baby boom
years of 1956-62, is now entering the universities or
seeking places in the work force. In their early 20s,
these youths presently appear less tied to traditional
political parties and more concerned with -quality of
life- issues. Their concerns have contributed to the
growth of environmentalist and -alternative" parties,
which are important elements in the new peace
movement.
16. Several polls reveal an 18- to 30-year age group
that is more pessimistic about the future than their
elders. The perception that their elders are pursuing
draconian policies of fiscal austerity as well as preserv-
ing dangerous and outmoded security arrangements�
both of which they believe could threaten their future
economic, social, arid physical welfare�lends strength.
to their convictions that youth must try to change
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Assistant
Chief of Staff Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, the
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, believe that
significant numbers of West German youths are not politically
active but, even among those who are, most probably do not
support the extreme leftwing positions of the Jusos, the official
youth organization within the SPD.
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government policies. While such youth attitudes might
change over time, the present mood of dissatisfaction
currently shows few signs of disappearing. The peace
movement Wi11 remain an important vehicle for ar-
ticulating these frustrations over the next several years.
B. Churches
17, The active involvement of organized religion,
particularly in northern Europe, has provided the
peace movement with important moral backing as
well as indispensable organizational resources and
talents. The churches, especially Protestant, have been
increasingly involved in secular affairs since the early.
1970s, taking public stands on the importance .of East-
West detente, disarmament, and contact with the
Third World, In Holland, the IKV (Inter-Church
Peace Council, a political umbrella organization for
various Protestant groups with over 400 local chapters)
has led the opposition to INF deployment, Grass-roots
declarations in favor of "municipal nuclear-free
zones" has become a major IK V tactic to generate
opposition. In West Germany, the June 1981 Kircben-
tag in Hamburg provided an opportunity for the
Evangelical Church to protest against nuclear weap-
ons, exemplifying the Protestant churches' critical
attitude toward the State that has developed in the
postwar period. In Great Britain, the President of the
Methodist Church has called for churchgoers to fight
nuclear weapons deployment, and local groups have
responded with declarations for "atom-free zones" in
Britain.
18. In spite of a more hierarchical tradition that
officially abjures a Church role in secular affairs,
Catholic elements have also embraced the peace
movement. Pax Christi, a lay organization of the
Church, has coordinated its antinuclear activities with
the IKV and environmental groups throughout West-
ern Europe. Catholic bishops recently expressed their
dismay to Chancellor Schmidt over difficulties the
Church was having in keeping its members and priests
from joining the movement.
C. Labor
19. Western Europe's labor unions have also em-
braced the peace issue�cautiously in most cases, on
occasion directly. Labor-backed parties in Holland
and Britain have argued against new nuclear deploy-
8
ments and have been in the forefront of unilateralist
movements. The German Trade Union Federation
(DUB) specifically became involved in peace activities
to counter the anti-US coloration of and Communist
influence in the peace movement However, the
DGB's prohibition on official union representation in
the Bonn dern.onstration on 10 October did not pre-
vent many young trade unionists and their organiza-
tions from taking part. In France and especially in
Italy, several labor groups have been vocal in criticiz-
ing Europeans for caving in to the "logic of blocs" and
have protested the costs of the arms race.
D. Environmentalists
20. Environmental groups have added their organi-
zational efforts to the new West European peace
movement. Although amorphous, such groups have
been increasing their strength; they have formed
political parties in most West European states and
have won modest representation at the state arid local
levels in West Germany, Belgium, France, Norway,
and Austria. Strong opposition to further development
of nuclear energy is clearly linked to anti-INF
attitudes.
21.. In West Germany two large environmentalist
groups�the Federal Association of Citizens' Initiatives
for Environmental Protection (BBU) and the Green
List Party�have been instrumental in opposing INF
In October 1981, the BB U "peace manifesto" criti-
cized both superpowers' military policies, advocated a
bloc-free Europe, arid proposed the abolition of the
Bundeswehr. The Greens have recently shown impres-
sive strength in state and local elections and threaten
to erode SPD and FDP national electoral support. Last
fall, West German environmentalist leaders met to
plan a long-term program of anti-INF activities, in-
cluding potentially disruptive forms of civil disobedi-
ence. By mobilizing supporters in "action commit-
tees," these groups will pose even more acute
difficulties once INF deployments begin.
22. Until recently there has existed an alliance of
convenience between the environmentalists and the
Communists. However, in Germany at least, latent
differences between the two groups concerning both
leadership of the movement and the nature of its
protests have surfaced. Nevertheless, it remains uncer-
tain whether this rift will detract from the effective-
ness of the peace movement.
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E. Non-Communist Political Parties
23. Political parties in varying degrees have been
influenced by antinuclear opinion. Unlike earlier
movements, opposition to nuclear weapons is not
limited to socialists alone, although it is strongest
among leftvving elements of West European political
parties. In the Netherlands and Belgium the strongest
political opposition to INF comes from labor and
socialist parties, which are often participants in coali-
tion governments. The Dutch Pvda (Labor) party is
openly opposed to NATO's decision to proceed with
INF deployment, as are the Flemish Socialist Party in
Belgium and the Radical Party in Italy. Elements
within Socialist parties in Scandinavia have also been
active in demonstrating against nuclear war and de-
manding a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NNWFZ).
24. In spite of the strong support of West German
party leaders Schmidt and Genscher for INF deploy-
ment, support for a deployment moratorium or out-
right rejection of INF is also widespread among state-
level organizations of the Social Democratic Party arid,
increasingly, the Free Democratic Party. The SPD
confronts the delicate task of retaining the support of
its eleetorally important left wing without alienating
its more important conservative labor wing. The Brit-
ish Labor Party, led by its left wing, continues to be
outspoken against Britain's continued reliance on nu-
clear weapons. While socialists in the UK and social
democrats in the FRG are divided over nuclear poli-
cies, the Italian and French Socialist Parties remain
officially supportive of INF
F. Communist Parties
25. Since the early 1950s, Communist parties in
Western Europe have been at the forefront of orga-
nized public opposition to nuclear weapons. In 1977
public uproar over enhanced radiation weapons
� The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps, believe
there is considerable evidence ,;hat the Communist parties are
more active participants in the peace movement than indicated in.
this section. They initiate and provide purposeful guidance of
peace movement activities. Further, the holders of this view believe
the role of European Communist parties, especially in West
Germany and the Netherlands, as instruments of Soviet policy is
greater than implied here.
(ERW), which received the full attention and strong
support of Moscow, created a new opportunity to
agitate against NATO's defense policies. The Dutch
Communist Party (CPN) has been one of the more
active, having worked closely with the IKV in organiz-
ing rallies against ERW and INF. Soviet guidance to
CPN leaders, at times without the knowledge of other
party members, has stressed the high priority Moscow
assigns to CPN's involvement in the peace movement.
Similarly, the German Communist Party (DKP) and
the West Berlin Communist Party (SEW) have found
in the peace movement an opportunity to broaden
their cooperation with and influence over other politi-
cal and environmental groups in West Germany. The
DKP, through the German Peace Union (DFU) and
other Communist front groups, joined with the Greens
and other -Alternatives- in organizing the so-called
Krefeld Appeal�a petition-signing campaign that
claims to have collected over I million signatures
against nuclear weapons�as well as other activities.
The SEW has also taken a direct role in the West
German peace movement, by participating in the
Berlin demonstrations during Secretary Haig's visit,
joining the October Bonn rally, and promoting the
West German Evangelical Church's peace week in
November 1981. It has shown a special concern that
the peace movement�via renewed petition cam-
paigns�reach larger numbers of workers and has
responded to Soviet pressure that the antinuclear
demonstrators not extend their criticism to Soviet
55-20 missiles.
26. Communist parties in other West European
states have so far been less successful in marshaling
broad public support against INF. The small Belgian
Communist Party has remained hesitant to embrace
the peace issue because Soviet actions in Afghanistan
and Poland have created internal party rifts over
whether it should follow the Soviet line on INF. The
Italian Communist Party (PCI) has continued to pro-
mote reductions in nuclear weapons and has been
increasingly aggressive in opposing INF. But the re-
cent ideological battles with the CPSI.T over Poland
promise to keep the PCI from wholeheartedly endors-
ing the Soviet position on nuclear weapons. In France,
the Communist Party (PCF) remains the only political
party that has organized public rallies against INF,
arid the poor turnouts have added to the reputat ion of
a PCF that is increasingly isolated within French
poli tics.
9
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27. With the exceptions of Italy arid France, most
Communist parties in Western Europe continue to
enjoy only minuscule popular support. Nevertheless,
the Soviets use them as vehicles for anti-INF propa-
ganda, and they have played a far more significant
role in the peace movement than their size or popular-
ity might suggest. In particular, their organizational
experience, dedication to single issues like INF (re-
gardless of electoral consequences), and the support
they receive from the Eastern Bloc has made them
formidable participants in the West European peace
movement.
IV. SOVIET AND COMMUNIST
MANIPULATION OF PEACE SENTIMENTS
IN WESTERN EUROPE
A. Soviet-Sponsored Anti-INF Activities
28. Moscow has had a longstanding interest in
exploiting peace groups in Western Europe, and the
Soviet role was significant to the revival of the peace
movement in 1979 and 1980. The current antinuclear
sentiment in Western Europe has been cultivated by
the Soviet Union both openly and covertly in order to
divide the Alliance and block INF deployment with-
out any need for Soviet concessions at Geneva. Mos-
cow has contributed propaganda themes, organization-
al expertise, coordination, and material and financial
resources to the peace movement. Some elements
within the Communist-front World Peace Council
have even expressed opposition to Moscow's obsession
with Western Europe to the detriment of activities
elsewhere, notably in the Third World.
29. The current Soviet anti-INF campaign is pat-
terned on the highly successful one in 1977-78 against
enhanced radiation weapons, and assets employed by
Moscow at that time were turned against INF relative-
ly easily, As in the earlier campaign, Soviet efforts are
directed from the upper echelons of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, especially the Central
Committee's International Department (ID) and Inter-
national Information Department (IID), and the Com-
mittee for State Security (KGB). The ruling Politburo
approves major policies and themes, and Politburo
members themselves participate in public diplomacy.
10
30. A wide variety of measures has been applied in
a concerted effort to defeat NATO's program:
� Diplomatic means (for example, Brezhnev's of-
fer of a unilateral moratorium on 55-20 deploy-
ment so long as INF modernization does not
commence) and economic pressure.
� Propaganda emphasizing Soviet -peace and
disarmament proposals and alleged US disinter-
est in continuing the arms control process.
� Mobilization of local Communist parties, inter-
national front organizations (for example, the
World Peace Council), local front organizations
(for example, the German Peace Union).
� Penetration of local peace groups (such as the
Dutch Interchurch Peace Council, the German
BB U).
� Utilization of sympathizers and agents of influ-
ence (for example, in the press and in selected
political parties), and forged US military docu-
ments and policy statements.
31. Soviet diplomatic initiatives and overt propa-
ganda have been supplemented by a covert campaign
using techniques and influence operations known in
Soviet intelligence parlance as -active measures." Ex-
amples of this activity include:
In Germany the Soviets have used journalists,
party officials, and academicians to try to influ-
ence decisionmaking on INF in Bonn. in some
countries the Soviet effort has bordered on
blackmail and bribery.
In Denmark the Soviets have provided funds to
Danish peace activists in order to publicize anti-
INF propaganda.
Soviet front groups�the World Peace Council,
the International institute for Peace, the inter-
national Liaison Forum for Peace, the World
Parliament of Peoples for Peace�at Soviet di-
rection have sponsored or exploited a number of
conferences, symposiums, and demonstrations
organized to oppose the NATO INF decision.
The Soviets are actively trying to broaden the
bases of support of these fronts by attracting
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non-Communist participation in their activities.
National Communist parties have set up their
own front groups or are trying to exploit or
infiltrate other organizations opposed to the
NATO decision.
� In early 1982, two officials of the Soviet Com-
munist Party Central Committee met with sen-
ior officers of a West European communist
party to emphasize that this is the critical year
for mobilizing opposition to INF deployment.
The Soviets offered additional support for prop-
aganda efforts to play down Poland, play up
Soviet and East European social and economic
"achievements," and promote the theme of a
"US threat- to Western Europe.
32. The Soviet anti-INF campaign has perhaps had
its greatest effect in the Netherlands, where popular
sentiments were already receptive to an early peace
initiative. The mushrooming of the peace movement
in Holland provided impetus to the West German
movement, which the Soviets were quick to exploit.
Moscow's endeavors have been less successful else-
where in Europe. Where successful, Soviet efforts have
been facilitated by the willingness of left-leaning
activists and church groups to accept Communist
assistance and to participate in "popular front"
activities.
33. Soviet attempts to manipulate the peace move-
ment have sometimes been counterproductive. Revela-
tions about the connection of the KGB to Danish peace
groups have alienated public opinion and cast a
persistent shadow over peace groups throughout Scan-
dinavia and, along with the grounding of a Soviet
submarine in Swedish waters, have discredited recent
Soviet overtures for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free
zone.
34. Moscow's efforts have, nevertheless, constituted
an important factor in explaining why antinuclear
sentiment in Western Europe was mobilized so quick-
ly and effectively after NATO's double decision in
December 1979. The existing mood in Western Eu-
rope is more amenable than at any time since World
War II to Soviet techniques that had been applied
previously with only modest success. However, even in
the absence of further Soviet assistance, the peace
11
movement would have sufficient momentum to main-
tain pressure on NATO governments.
B. Future Soviet Efforts
35. In the near future, Soviet-sponsored peace ef-
forts will be targeted at President Reagan's visit to
Europe, the United Nations Special Session on Disar-
mament (SSOD) this summer, arid the SPD special
party congress in the autumn of 1983. The World
Peace Council, which is receiving renewed Soviet
attention and aid, is concentrating on preparing disar-
mament propaganda that especially criticizes NATO
INF deployments. The Soviet-sponsored "World
Peace Conference- in Moscow in mid-May 1982, to
which major religious figures�including Americans�
were invited, was also intended to add to these efforts.
36. Moscow, however, is showing signs of discom-
fort as West European peace advocates focus increas-
ingly on the Soviet arms buildup as a fundamental
element in the security debate by calling attention to
Soviet SS-20 deployment. And the Soviets seem unable
to put a stop to this development. Soviet publications
on the nuclear balance with the United States�
appearing in late 1981 and early 1982�indicate a new
propaganda campaign by the CPSU aimed at refocus-
ing the debate on US modernization. Elements of this
campaign include the Soviet early moratorium propos-
al and the recent pledge that Soviet SS-20 deployments
will be halted for the duration of the Geneva talks and
so long as INF deployment does not proceed.
37. Soviet approval for participation by some East
European regimes�specifically the GDR�in the
West European peace movement seems to be having
unwelcome effects. The effort served to stimulate
peace sentiment among members of the Lutheran
Church and draft-age youth in East Germany who
hope (with little chance of success) to modify govern-
ment resistance to alternative service programs. The
recent high point for the East German movement was
the 13 February peace demonstration in Dresden,
which the authorities tolerated. Since then the regime
has attempted to constrain the movement lest it
develop into a Solidarity-type political opposition.
Some activists have circulated an appeal calling for a
European nuclear-weapons-free zone and the with-
drawal of all foreign troops from the two German
states.
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V. THE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL
CLIMATE AND THE NEW PEACE
MOVEMENT
38. Many West Europeans are increasingly appre-
hensive because nuclear war�particularly one fought
on European soil�now appears "thinkable- as never
before to decisionmakers. The NATO decision to
deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles as a land-based
force in Western Europe was in part taken to strength-
en the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella; para-
doxically, the proposed basing mode has intensified
European fears because of its visibility and promi-
nence. The abhorrence of nuclear war is especially
reflected in West Germany, where a superpower
confrontation could take place. Over the years, a
stable majority of West Germans has been willing to
defend the country against military attack (64 percent
in 1980), but just as consistently only a small minority
(15 percent in 1980) is prepared to counter that attack
if the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated.'
39. To many West Europeans, current Soviet
American tensions seem to threaten arms control
efforts, which they view as an important forum for
US-Soviet political dialogue and the most visible sym-
bol of the superpowers' interest in avoiding nuclear
war. In the context of a nuclear and conventional
military balance that appears to be increasingly disad-
vantageous to the West, West Europeans tend to view
serious political dialogue through SALT and now
START�quite apart from any results�as necessary
for the avoidance of war. At the same time, they
regard nuclear balance as the West's only reasonable
goal.
A. The Changing Military Balance and
Nuclear Weapons
40. Perceptions of changes in the global military
balance have reinforced European fear of nuclear war
through crisis escalation or political miscalculation.
The belief held in the 1960s by most West Europeans
that the United States was militarily superior to the
USSR has given way to perceptions of approximate
East-West parity. On the one hand, sonic Europeans
(including political leaders like Hehnut Schmidt) be-
Allensbach public opinion poll. May 1981.
lieve that relative balance at the strategic level, com-
bined with Soviet advantages at the theater level,
lessen the credibility of the US guarantee to defend
Western Europe. On the other hand, many supporters
of the peace movement believe that rough strategic
parity provides greater deterrence stability than did
US dominance and are concerned that the United
States is attempting to regain a strategic advantage,
which would destabilize the deterrence equation.
41. The idea that the United States might seek to
limit a nuclear war to Europe, repeated over and over
in a multitude of forums (not least by Soviet propagan-
dists), has alarmed West European publics. Yet, the
perceived conventional weakness of NATO tends to
reinforce fears that any war on the continent would
have to become nuclear. Although large majorities in
Western Europe continue to favor adherence to
NATO, few Europeans appear convinced that in-
creased NAT() defense efforts can prevent an attack
On Western Europe or resist such an attack if it occurs.
Constant allusion by allied leaders and spokesmen to
the Ominous growth of Soviet military power has not
produced public support to rectify the imbalance
between Western and Soviet military forces in Europe.
The stark portrayal of Soviet power feeds European
apprehensions about their security environment. In a
1981 poll taken in West Germany, for instance, 48
percent declared they would be prepared to live under
Communism rather than risk nuclear war.
42. Believing that the threshold of nuclear conflict
is dropping, sonic West Europeans are DO longer
persuaded that nuclear deterrence is a rational or
workable strategy. West European concern about de-
terrence has grown over the years, initially after the
1950s doctrine of massive retaliation was discredited
by a Soviet strategic nuclear capability and presently
as the "flexible response" doctrine has been challenged
by Soviet conventional and theater nuclear superiority;
a return to "countertorce" doctrines and renewed
emphasis on the nuclear options within the flexible
response strategy have created their own anxieties.
Some West Europeans appreciate that these latter
doctrines allow for the possibility of war in Europe,
the prospect that the West might resort to nuclear
weapons before the USSR, and a war-fighting (as
opposed to purely preventive) role for nuclear weap-
ons in Western Europe.
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43, In addition, US rhetoric and actions in recent
years have exacerbated existing West European doubts
about the wisdom of NATO's military doctrine. In
particular, West Europeans were alarmed by official
American comments about a limited nuclear war in
Europe, US announcements about the production of
ERW, and ambiguous statements by high-level offi-
cials about the possible use of nuclear weapons for
demonstration purposes. Such developments have
been particularly disturbing to West Europeans who
were not persuaded that the United States was serious-
ly interested in the resumption of arms control negoti-
ations with the Soviet Union, and many of these
people have joined the peace movement. Protesters
had seen an alarming pattern in President Carter's
Presidential Directive 59, with its emphasis on target-
ing Soviet offensive forces, and in the US failure to
ratify SALT II. Proposals to modernize the US chemi-
cal warfare arsenal in Western Europe will almost
certainly reinforce these fears,
B. Perceptions of the Soviet Military Threat
44. Paradoxically, West European recognition of a
less favorable East-West military balance does not
translate into perceptions that the USSR intends to
attack Western Europe. In 1981�57 percent of Italians,
55 percent of West Germans, 48 percent of Britons,
and 42 percent of the French who were polled
professed to be either not very" concerned or "not at
all" concerned about the prospect of a Soviet attack
against NATO. In all four countries, increasing ten-
sions between the United States and Soviet Union were
cited as more threatening than Soviet military expan-
sion. Large percentages of the population were either
very" or "fairly" apprehensive about the threat posed
by US-Soviet tensions: UK (72 percent), Italy (68
percent), West Germany (59 percent), and France (59
percent). Finally, approximately half of those who
were queried were either "not very" or "not at all"
concerned about the prospect of Soviet political in-
timidation of Western Europe. For the most part,
concern about Soviet expansionism continues to take a
back seat in much of Western Europe to more paro-
chial issues like Flemish-Walloon rivalries in Belgium,
terrorism in Northern Ireland., economic difficulties in
Great Britain, and the prospect for socialist economic
change in France.
13
45. Rather than perceiving the military takeover
and repressive measures in Poland as a threat to
themselves, West Europeans are more likely to inter-
pret them as steps in the deterioration of the Soviet
Bloc. Many West Europeans, in fact, are disturbed lest
Western pressures on the Soviet Union provoke the
Soviets to invade Poland. They see the Soviets as
reluctant to take such an action but fearful of ideologi-
cal and political contamination of the Bloc, and
obsessed with historic security interests,
46. Another important difference in US�West Eu-
ropean perceptions concerns the balance sheet of
Soviet "successes" and "failures" in the world. Many
West Europeans see signs of Soviet weakness�or at
least constraints on Soviet behavior�in Poland's "rev-
olution," China's hostility to the USSR, Romania's
independent course in foreign affairs, Hungary's quiet
economic reforms, arid Soviet inability to control
events in Afghanistan and Ethiopia. Accounts of Soviet
economic difficulties and technological backwardness
tend to reinforce these views and strengthen the belief
that Moscow's military might does not threaten the
West except as a "desperate" reaction to Western
provocation.
C. Divergences in West European�US
Interests
47, The peace movement has clearly benefited
from emerging US�West European differences over
their respective political arid economic interests. De-
tente's role in Western security policies has become
the focal point of this greater Atlantic discord, Surveys
conducted in early 1981 reveal that far more West
Germans (65 percent) and French (54 percent) than
Americans (34 percent) believe that the West has
benefited as much from detente as has the East.' To
many West Europeans, detente signaled the end of a
period of recurrent crises in Europe that sometimes
seemed to threaten war. In addition, for West Ger-
many detente opened the possibility of improved
relations and human contacts with the 17 million
Germans under Soviet domination in East Germany,
and revived hopes for eventual reunification.
'USICA, Mareb 1981.
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48. There is a belief in Western Europe that de-
tente should be divisible, and many Europeans are
apprehensive that American strategies aimed at con-
fronting the Soviets worldwide will jeopardize the
continuation of detente in Europe. They have repeat-
edly counseled the United States not to regard Third
World conflicts as tests of East-West relations.
49. Many West Europeans regard arms control in
Europe as the most important and perhaps the most
likely victim of deteriorating Soviet-American detente.
The 1979 NATO INF decision to deploy modern
intermediate-range nuclear forces was made possible
only because West Europeans insisted that it be joined
with an effort to negotiate, which could obviate the
need for such weapons and return the United States to
a process of dialogue with the Soviet Union.
50. West European sensitivities to US policies to-
ward the Soviet Union are further reinforced by
Western Europe's greater stake in economic relations
with the East. A willingness to continue major energy
projects with the Soviet Union in the face of US
pressure for economic sanctions against Poland and the
Soviet Union has heightened West European apprecia-
tion for how their own economic interests diverge
from those of the United States. The slowdown in
domestic economic activity enhances the West Euro-
pean stake in East-West trade.
51. The Soviets have clearly recognized West Euro-
pean interest in trade. Thus, during his recent meeting
in Bonn with Chancellor Schmidt, President Brezhnev
adroitly linked together trade and security issues,
declaring that the USSR urgently desired to undertake
additional large-scale joint economic ventures with the
Federal Republic but could not do so until conditions
permitted the curtailment of military expenditures.
52. Western Europe's economic difficulties have
played an important, albeit subtle, role in fostering the
sociopolitical malaise that provides recruits for the
European peace movement. The political conse-
quences of West European economic pessimism go
beyond changed voting patterns to increased social
strife and public demonstration of frustration. Unem-
ployed workers in Holland have joined peace marches.
Some West German trade unionists are speaking open-
ly of political alliances with leftists in order to alter the
14
Bonn government's "guns-versus-butter priorities. In-
deed, the relative political quiescence of German
leftists that was partly purchased by the "economic
miracle- and welfarism is ending.
53. Identification of the United States with pres-
sures for increased defense spending reinforces the
American role as the principal target of peace activists.
Most West European governments find themselves
with little maneuverability between their publics and
the United States over NATO defense spending goals.
Approximately 70 percent of the publics in West
Germany, Holland, Italy, and Belgium favor either
keeping defense expenditures at present levels or
reducing them. When West Europeans are asked to
weigh priorities between defense spending and social
services, support for defense spending further dimin-
ishes. Given this choice, increased defense spending is
supported by only 4 percent of the public in France, 5
percent in Italy, 9 percent in Norway, percent in
Holland, 15 percent in West Germany, and 17 percent
in Great Britain:
D. The West European Desire for Autonomy
54. Perceptions of US-West European political and
economic differences do not directly yield anti-Ameri-
can sentiments. A recent poll, for example, reveals that
a higher percentage of West Germans (though not the
young) "like- the United States today than at any time
since the mid-1960s. The signs of anti-Americanism
found in the West European peace movement prob-
ably arise from�in addition to the effort of Commu-
nists to push the movement in that direction�a belief
that the United States is a major obstacle to European
autonomy. Leaders of the peace movement have
expressed resentment over -American pressure- to
deploy theater nuclear forces and have suggested that
their countries take steps to regain a measure of
autonomy in security issues. West Europeans, they
argue, must hold the United States at arm's length in
order to avoid being drawn into great power collisions.
Moreover, many peace activists believe that they
cannot affect Soviet decisions and so direct their
energies against Western armaments in order "to do
something."
' US1CA, March 1981.
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55. Fears of nuclear war and the belief that the
superpowers control their fate have contributed to
sentiments that Western Europe must somehow "es-
cape" from the US-Soviet competition arid regain
control of its own destiny. The peace movement has
been colored by such strivings for more autonomy,
which has given a boost to various shades of national-
ism more than to a supranationalism for Europe as a
whole.
56. In Holland, nationalism takes the form of a
belief that the country can protest "irrational" super-
power behavior in order to set a moral example that
does not endanger the vital interests of either. In
Britain, it appears that public sentiments favor contin-
ued national control over nuclear weapons, including
INF.8 An articulate minority in Britain, however,
espouses the pacifist variant of contemporary national-
ism in Europe. And in West Germany, there is some
sentiment (particularly, though not exclusively, on the
left) in favor of "nationalist neutralism" based on a
vague belief that the current flux in both West and
East may provide an opportunity for both Germanies
to move closer together arid so jointly to recover
control over their political arid economic destinies. In
fact, some members of the left wing of the SPD aim
consciously at achieving eventually a reunited and�in
a return to a long-discarded party objective�a neu-
tralist Germany, a goal that is in line with the
objectives of many current peace movement activists.
E. Impact on Governments
57. The scope, diversity, and respectability of the
peace movement present today's political leaders�in
stark contrast to the I950s�with political opinions
that can be discounted only at their own peril. The
mounting difficulties of governing during a period of
economic crisis, heightened international tension, and
declining public confidence have made all political
parties more sensitive to public moods and expressions
of discontent than before. Official concern about
adverse public opinion has tended to make some
political leaderships cautious, nondirective executors
of public anxieties and fears.
8 According to a 1981 MORI poll, 52 percent favor an independ-
ent British deterrent, while 59 percent oppose US nuclear weapons
in Britain.
15
58. The peace movement has not attained sufficient
political influence of its own to bring down NATO
governments that have supported the 1979 INF deci-
sion. However, for governments already suffering
from internal party divisions over economic and social
policies (for example, the FDP and the SPD in West
Germany) or fragile multiparty coalitions (for exam-
ple, Belgium and Holland), the peace movement has
become an additional threat to their survival and
constrains their maneuverability on security issues.
Security policy disputes within and among the SPD
and FDP in West Germany might cause a breakup of
the coalition before the scheduled 1984 elections." As
the 1983 deployment date approaches, coalition strains
in West Germany, Belgium, and Holland will increas-
ingly stem from government decisions related to de-
ployment preparations (for example, site surveys, con-
struction bids, and initial base construction). In the
Netherlands, massive street' demonstrations would be
organized against any steps to implement the deploy-
ment decision, and these would probably trigger a
major government crisis. �
59. The media's coverage of the peace movement
and security issues has heightened West European
public sensitivity to the deployment of new weapons
systems and complicated government efforts to ex-
plain the INF issue. Television and radio have been
particularly significant in publicizing the European
peace movement across state borders. Publicity for
"peace happenings- in one country provides inspira-
tion, information, and momentum to sympathizers in
neighboring countries. Polls show that the long-estab-
lished goals of NATO and the importance of US
defense guarantees are understood and valued by the
public. However, media coverage of current security
issues has contributed to the psychological and politi-
cal environment that underpins the peace movement
by:
� Sensitizing publics to the uncertainties of and
risks in nuclear deterrence.
� Articulating European uneasiness about devel-
opments in East-West relations and the US
administration's policies.
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that the
SPD will gradually accommodate to the vocal supporters of the
peace movement within its ranks rather than risk their defection in
the next national election.
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Magnifying the impact of peace themes and
events.
Providing a continental dimension for local and
national protests.
Offering, in some cases, a conduit for pro-Soviet
propaganda.
VI. OUTLOOK FOR THE PEACE MOVEMENT
60. President Reagan's proposal of the zero INF
option combined with the beginning of US-Soviet
negotiations in Geneva gave pause to the peace move-
ment and brought greater balance to its themes. A
combination of bad weather and public attention to
events in Poland also contributed to reduced peace
activities during the past winter. However, there is
widespread pessimism about the success of the Geneva
talks, and the steam has not gone out of the peace
movement. Large Easter demonstrations have oc-
curred, and planning continues for scores of additional
demonstrations during the next few months.
61. Many peace movement leaders view the zero
option as a cynical public relations effort to deflate the
antinuclear campaign, and they believe that advocacy.
of unilateral disarmament and criticism of US policy.
must continue in order to sustain political pressure on
West European governments. Moreover, peace activ-
ists probably believe they are partly responsible for US
endorsement of a zero option, as well as for President
Reagan's recent proposal for START negotations, and
that such demonstrations of their influence argue for
renewed efforts.
A. Vulnerabilities of the Movement
62. The peace movement's diversity will serve to
anchor antinuclear sentiment in broad sections of West
European public opinion, but it could also provide
important faultlines in the movement's solidarity if
any of a number of conditions develop:
� Heightened violence, terrorism, or disruptive
civil disobedience could diminish mainstream
support from church groups and party organiza-
tions. The leadership of the Dutch IKV, for
instance, is concerned that the Dutch political
mainstream could be alienated if demonstrations
during President Reagan's visit to Europe turn
violent.
16
Public concern, already evident among Europe-
an elites, at the possible growth of anti-Ameri-
canism in Europe and American isolationism
could weaken popular sympathy for the peace
movement. There could be a backlash against
government indulgence of "street" politics, espe-
cially if the movement is seen as threatening the
basis of the NATO Alliance.
� The peace groups are already somewhat split
over how to respond to Poland, and Soviet
intervention would accentuate these divisions,
New examples of Soviet or Communist manipu-
lation could also increase divisions in the peace
movement and lead to disillusionment of non-
Communist supporters. Leaders of the West
German Greens, for example, have denounced
Communist attempts to stage-manage demon-
strations planned against President Reagan in
June and prevent criticism of the Soviet Union.
B. Violence and Civil Disobedience
63. Mainstream peace groups are ideologically op-
posed to violence and seek to disassociate themselves
from terrorists, but are divided on the question of civil
disobedience. Violence�if directly linked to the
movement�would tarnish its claims to legitimacy.
Some West German environmentalists, in fact, have
plans for a three-year campaign of civil disobedience
against the deployment of INF in Western Europe�
including surveillance of and publicity about nuclear
sites, demonstrations against military barracks, and
interference with NATO maneuvers and military road
traffic. In the Netherlands, one military ammunition
train has already been stopped by protesters. Anti-
nuclear environmentalists in Western Europe have
also disseminated and published relatively accurate
information regarding the location of nuclear weapons
sites.
64. Some terrorist groups have discussed the possi-
bility of seizing a nuclear weapon in transit to or at a
weapons site, or attacking such a site under the guise
of peace activities. Over the past year, both the Italian
Red Brigades and the West German RAF have intensi-
fied their attacks against NATO in order to attempt to
tap the antinuclear, anti-INF, and anti-NATO senti-
ment associated with the European peace movement.
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C. Prospects for the Movement
65. While the peace movement has succeeded in
inducing governments to show caution in proceeding
with INF, it has not yet been able to force any of them
to reject the 1979 decision. And this failure is produc-
ing frustration among radicals, especially in the Neth-
erlands. However, the movement will almost surely '
become more strident if it appears to West Europeans
that the United States is responsible for stalling the
INF or START negotiations. Leaders of the peace
movement will, in any case, try to take advantage of
upcoming political party congresses, state visits, and
NATO summit meetings to mobilize followers and
assure enough momentum for concerted action if arid
when INF deployment decisions are definitively taken
or actual stationing begins. Soviet propaganda efforts
during the Geneva talks�such as Brezhnev's SS-20
freeze proposal�will assure the peace movement of
numerous opportunities to capitalize on popular con-
cern about nuclear weapons.
66. Divisions will continue to trouble the movement
over the next year or so. While many diverse groups
will coordinate their planned demonstrations, not all
will necessarily participate in each activity. Simmering
ideological disagreements�for example, whether the
peace movement should criticize Poland's martial law,
how much emphasis should be placed on the East's
arms buildup, and how closely non-Communists
should work with Communist-sponsored organiza-
tions�will tend to keep the movement from develop-
ing a unified program. -Unity through diversity,
however, has become a slogan for activists who wish to
prevent any major schisms among church organiza-
tions, environmentalists, Communists, arid party youth
organizations. But when a peace issue or event arises,
the movement will probably be able to pull itself
together and mount demonstrations, some of them
impressive.
67. Future demonstrations are likely to be spurred
on not only by the impact of renewed Soviet propa-
ganda and arms-control proposals but also by publicity
surrounding US military policies�especially in Cen-
tral America. Increasingly, demonstrations reflect
criticism of US military aid to El Salvador and alleged
American support for repressive government measures
in that country and elsewhere. Closer to home, West
17
European media are covering US plans to augment its
chemical warfare arsenal for use in Europe, and peace
activists have added the theme of -no CW- to their
anti-INF, anti-ERW slogans.
68. The Netherlands will remain the West Europe-
an country most vulnerable to peace movement pres-
sures, and the odds remain heavily against INF de-
ployment there. In West Germany, on the other hand,
the peace movement on its own now lacks the strength
and unity necessary to cause a rejection of INF
deployment, but developments within the SPD in
1983 might raise the danger of indefinite delay. In
Belgium the peace movement is currently not strong
enough to block deployment, but a West German.
rejection of INF deployment would also lead to rejec-
tion by Belgium. An independent Belgian rejection of
the 1979 decision could occur only in the improbable
case that both the Flemish and Walloon Socialist
Parties assume a strong anti-INF stance and their
participation is required to form a coalition govern-
ment. The peace movements in Britain and Italy
would have a significant impact on INF deployment
decisions only if major changes occur in the political
landscapes of these countries�for example, in Britain.
the accession of the Labor Party to power.
VII. SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
A. The Peace Movement and the Geneva Talks
69. The ongoing INF negotiations will affect impor-
tantly the fortunes of the peace movement, even
though many peace activists believe that both super-
powers use arms control talks simply to perpetuate the
arms race. Many leaders are not impressed with
Washington's interest in a US-Soviet zero option; they
favor unconditional and unilateral West European
rejection of INF deployments, although some are
increasingly impatient with Soviet security policies as
well. Indeed, many peace activists advocate unilateral
nuclear disarmament as a more effective instrument
than arms control talks. Nevertheless, the peace move-
ment's ranks�and thus its political effectiveness�will
be increased or decreased according to the progress of
the negotiations. A stalemate in Geneva would exacer-
bate antinuclear protest as the time for missile deploy-
ment draws closer.
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70. As negotiations proceed and the 1983 deploy-
ment date approaches, domestic pressures on NATO
governments will grow. The Geneva negotiations are
likely to lead to one of the following situations:
The talks break down with the Soviets refusing
to reduce forces and the United States insisting
on full INF deployment, In this event, the
overall European peace movement would be
revitalized�regardless of which superpower
was seen to be at fault.
The talks drag on inconclusively, with the Sovi-
ets promising to reduce their forces only if
NATO abandons INF. In such an event, the
peace movement would become increasingly
restless, but West European leaders would have
some room to exercise influence over their pub-
lics and to encourage the United States to modi-
fy its position.
� The talks continue but hold out the promise of
agreement on something short of the zero op-
tion, requiring Soviet reductions and allowing
partial INF deployment. With the exception of
unilateralists, many of the supporters of the
peace movement could reconcile themselves to
such an outcome, especially since many of them
value the appearance of progress in arms control
and superpower dialogue almost as highly as
they do actual weapons reductions.
B. The Peace Movement and US Policies
71. The US-European dialogue over the proper
relationship between defense and detente is likely to
remain contentious, however. West European political
18
elites are nevertheless anxious to find areas of agree-
ment with the United States, if only to avoid exacer-
bating the American perception that Western Europe
is no longer a reliable ally. Some leaders of the peace
movement, however, would point to recent US con-
gressional threats of troop withdrawals as confirming
their beliefs that it is the United States�not the Soviet
Union--that is trying to blackmail Western Europe.
72. The United States is riot able to affect directly
many of the underlying trends in Western Europe that
nurture the peace movement; antinuclear sentiment
will doubtless continue to be strong, especially within
the younger generations, and protest based on anti-
nuclear or other -peace" issues will have a dispropor-
tionate influence because of the fragility of several
European governments. West European perceptions of
the US-Soviet military balance will also be resistant to
rapid change, and accelerated US defense programs
may even serve to heighten fears of war rather than
reduce them. Moreover, enough popular doubt and
uncertainty will persist in Western Europe about the
advantages and risks of Alliance defense strategies that
the arguments of the peace movement will appear to
some as simple and correct�correct, perhaps, because
simple.
73. Even so, the effectiveness of the peace move-
ment over the next few years will vary from state to
state. More important, US policies touching on defense
and nuclear weapons will remain targets of criticism so
long as Western Europe remains dependent on Amen-
can security guarantees. And the longer term US
interests lie in convincing West European publics that
these guarantees remain solid and that there is no
effective substitute for Atlantic security cooperation.
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