CHILE (W/ATTACHMENTS)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01341618
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2022
• Case Number: F-2019-02353
• Publication Date: February 28, 1978

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3r.su
2 8 FEB 1978
Iio 33()
. ,
Exe L:utiva. Levistrp
121
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
FROM � Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division
SUBJECT Chile
REFERENCE
DCI Memorandum to DDO and IG re
dated 21 February 1978
Chile,
1. Action Required: None; for information only.
2. Background: Attached are the following documents
which will put into perspective Agency covert activities in
Chile:
a. Statement to Senate Select Codinittee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (Church Committee) by former DDO William E.
Nelson on 25 October 1975. (Attachment A)
b. Resume of contacts with ITT. (Attachment B)
c. General misconceptions (myths) regarding CIA
activities in the 1970 Chilean elections.
(Attachment C)
� /5/ George V. 1.-2urier
Raymond A. Warren
3 Attachments a/s
(b)(3)
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Statement
by
William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
Executive Session
before
United States Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
28 October 1975
SENSI VE
S RET
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CHILE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
CIA covert action in Chile over the past decade is an emotion
packed subject. As a result, the debate over the wisdom and propriety
of this action is often filled more with heat than light. Public understanding
of the facts of this activity and the intentions of the U. SI Government in
pursuing it have been obscured by a heavy cloud of mythology. In the
interests of subsequent clear discussion of the issues involved here. I
hope this morning to sketch briefly the facts of U. S. involvement in the
political affairs of Chile in the past ten years and to indicate what the
record reveals regarding the motives and intentions of U. S. policy makers..
First, the setting: Chile is a long narrow country strung out along
the southwest coast of South America. It has a population of some II million
people with a high rate of literacy, a substantial middle class and a considerable-
- industrial base. It has a democratic tradition and is one of the few countries
in Latin America where the military forces have historically been largely
non-involved in the political affairs of the country_
The 1964 Presidential election campaign. Large-scale U. S.
covert political action in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential elections,
This involvement had its origins in the results of the 1958 elections in which
SENS1 E
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t
z� '
Salvador Allende as the leader of a communist and socialist coalition polled
a surprisingly strong 28.9% of the total vote and came close to winning the
election. Allende was a self-professed Marxist, whose stated intent was to
bring about an "irreversible" Marxist revolution in Chile.
By 1962, Fidel Castro had consolidated his position in Cuba and,
as it became apparent that Allende's Popular Action Front was prepared to
make an all-out bid to win the 1964 elections,. concern grew in Washington
that the U. S. would be faced with another Marxist government in Latin
. America: Throughout 1959 and 1960, Allende was a I'requent visitor to
Cuba. He strongly endorsed Castro and even indulged in some revolutionary
rhetoric regarding the rest of Latin America, He professed to adhere to
the electoral route as his own means to power.
In 1962, funds were authorized to assist the Christian Democratic
Party in order to build it up as a democratic alternative to Allende's Popular
Action Front. Funds in 1963 were also authorized to support the leader and
candidate of the then moderate Radical Party.
In March 1964, it became clear as a result of the victory of the
Popular Action Front candidate in a major by-election that the Allende -
forces were a serious threat to win the September election.
2
SEC'RETr-i-ISITIVE
ONLY
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In April 1964, the Special Group, (a predecessor of the 40 Com-
mittee), approved the first installment of what was to develop into a $3
million dollar program to support the Christian Democratic Party candidate,
Eduardo Frei. Most of the funds provided were through a covert subsidy to
the Party with some lateral support by other groups and parties and support
to the Radical Party candidate to help him maintain his candidacy.
Frei won the election with 56% of the vote as against 39% for
Allende with 86% of the electorate voting.
Covert action during the Frei regime -- 1965 to 1970. In this
period money was authorized as follows:
1964
- $160,
000
support to
(b)(1)
grass roots organizations among slum
dwellers and peasants.
(b)(3)
1965
- $175,
000
was spent in assistance to democratic
candidates in the March 1965 Congres-
sional elections,. This program was
designed to assist 35 moderate candidates
representing all anti-Allende parties who
were considered to be involved in tight races
.against leftist candidates. Moderate,
3
S ,S1TIVE
SE 'T
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particularly (b)(1)
(b)(3)
candidates, scored impressive victories in
many close races.
1967
- $30,000
was spent to strengthen the moderate factions
in theLJ
(b)(1)
1968
- A program of $350,000 was authorized to assist
(b)(3)
moderate candidates in the March 1969
Congressional elections. The results show that
this limited program was relatively effective
in that 10 of the 12 candidates elected w(b)(1)air
(b)(3)
races. This program was run against a back-
ground of internal dissension within the
�
Party and a major push by the
to unite as many leftists and left of (b)(1),r
(b)(3)
groups as possible in preparation for the 1970
Presidential elections.
The 1970 Presidential election race. In the political maneuvering
orior to the September 1970 Presidential election, Allende again emerged as the
candidate for what was now called the Popular Unity Forces. He was opposed by-
4
Sc WIVE
SEC T
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SEN.) WE
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Jorge Alessandri, as the candidate of the center right, and Radomiro Tornic
for the Christian Democrats . In March 1970, the 40 Committee decided that
the U. S. should not support either of the candidates opposing Allende but (b)(1)
(b)(3)
should attempt spoiling operations against the
The
Committee approved $125, 000 to support a propaganda mechanism and some funds fo
selected individuals in the
votes the
Party to reduce the number of
Party could deliver in support of the
summer campaign wore on Alessandri lost popularity, Tomic's campaign
stalled and Allende's group continued to gain strength. Based on Arnbass--/"-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Korry's recommendation the 40 Committee approved an authorization for an
additional $300, 000 for anti-Allende propaganda.
As the� (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
Allende was a narrow winner in the three-way Preiidential e1ection(b)(3)
of 4 September 1970, gaining 36.6% of the vote as *compared to 35.3% for
Alessandri and 28.1% for Tomic.
The election law provided that, when no President receives a
popular majority, the Chilean Congress must choose between the two top .
candidates. This produced a period of intense activity in which efforts were
made by the U. S. Government to prevent Allende's confirmation by the Congress.
Covert action during the period between the Presidential election of
4 September 1970 and the 24 October 1970 vote by the Congress. On 14 September
SITIVE 5
SE T
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( SENSI
1970, the 40 Committee approved $250,000 for use at Ambassador Korry's
'discretion in an attempt to swing Congressional votes to Alessandri. These
funds were not spent. At the same time, on 15 September 1970. President Nixon --
called in the DCI and instructed him to attempt an effort to prevent Allende
from taking power when and if it appeared the Constitutional route would
not succeed. The Agency was instructed to carry out this activity without
reference to any other department of government. By early October it
became clear that action to swing Christian Democratic votes to Alessandri
would not be decisive and therefore contacts were established by CIA with the
Chilean military to determine the possibility of theit:..intervention to prevent
Allende from taking power.
There were a number of different groups in the Chilean military
involved in coup plotting. The Agency developed contact with one group.
headed by retired General Viaux and with another headed by an active duty
military General Valenzuela. The object of both of these groups was to attempt
to remove from office General Rene Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief
who was a major stumbling block to their plans for a military coup. Both
hoped to remove Schneider from the scene by kidnapping him.
Discussions with the Viaux group progressed rapidly but by 15 October
the decision in Washington was that Viaux had virtually no chance of launching
6
S 'TIVE
SECR
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SENSI
a successful coup. Accordingly, a message was conveyed to the Viaux group
.warning it against precipitous action. Contact with that group was terminated
on 18 October with no support given them.
Discussions with the Valenzuela group took longer to develop. This
group requested tear gas grenades and three sub-machine guns ancl-plaxined to
stage an alxluction of General Schneider on 19 October. This operation did not
come off however, although weapons were passed to the group on 22 October.
On 22 October the Viaux group, acting independently, carried out an abduction
attempt against General Schneider, who resisted and was shot. Schneider's
death.terminated any further attempts by the military to take action, and
Allende was confirmed by the Congress on 24 October 1970.
Covert action activities from 1970 to September 11. 1973. Allend.e's
first two years in powe r, 1971 and 1972, were marked by his use of all
Constitutional and legal means at his disposal to move Chile in the direction
of a socialist state. He began to nationalize Chilean major industrial and
commercial enterprises and brought others under severe government harassment.
The economic control was designed to weaken the political opposition by elirninatinz
the private sector which provided the financial support for the opposition's electora
political and media activities. The government also tried to silence the opposition
7
SE ITIVE
SEC
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LIc
.!
by action against the independent press. It first tried unsuccessfully to obtain
control over the distribution of newsprint, Then an extension on loans were
not granted by government ,banks, taxes on news media were raised and
government advertising and the revenue it produced was no longer available
to nongovernrnent aligned outlets. Revolutionary organizations of special
communal commands were established to control the distribution of essential
�
articles, mainly food. The Soviet and Cuban presence grew and by March 1972
Soviet Bloc credits of some $200 million had been�extended to Chile and the
Soviets were dangling an offer of $300 million to the Chilean military so that
they might purchase Soviet military equipment.
During this early period. with 40 Committee approval, the Agency
was tasked with a broad spectrum of activities which were designed in the
main to keep alive the political.opposition to Allende and the sustenance of
private sector organizations and news media which were under heavy financial
pressure. A total of $6 million was expended in this effort.
Of the $6 million expended over half was in support of political parties.
particularly the Christian Democrats:. Another $1.5 million was expended to
' keep in publication, El Mercurio, a major independent daily in the country.
The remaining money was spent to support elements in the private sector and for
other media and propaganda support operations.
Popular disillusionment with Allende continued to grow during the
8 �
SECRE NS1TIVE
EYES 0
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latter half of 1971 and in 1972 and by 1973 the Popular Unity Front was able
to muster only 43% of the vote in the national Congressional elections. The
economy was rapidly deteriorating. Strikes by shopkeepers and truckers (which
were not supported by CIA) and boycotts by students were serving to bring
together widely divergent segments of Chilean society in common opposition td
Allende. By 1973, the government was declared to have placed itself outside the
law and the Constitution in .separate declarations by the Congress. ft-e. StATIpErne.Court
and the Comptroller General of the Republic.
�These confrontations between the Allende administration and the
other branches of the government caused growing concern within the Armed
Forces which until the fall of 1973, had scrupulously adhered to their historical
tradition of non-intervention into politics.
By September 1973, the country was faced with social and economic
-
chaos. Civil war was a growing pos.sibility. Allende had depleted a national
economy with reserves amounting to nearly $400 million despite considerable
delivered and promised aid from the Soviet Union and East Europeans. The
accumulation of concerns finally moved the military to seriously consider a coup.
This resolve was strengthened by the discovery that the Popular Unity Front was
attempting to penetrate, subvert and foment divisions within their commands.
During this period CIA had been in touch with members of the, Armed
Forces for purposes of intelligence collection. The Station Santiago was specifical:
9
SE SITIVE
SE
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prohibited from involving itself in any coup plotting on the part of the Chilean
military. It can be categorically stated that the Agency did not encourage or
support the 19 73 military coup which brought down the Allende Government and
resulted in his death.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
This is a brief record of the Agency's activity in Chile during the
period 19 64 to the present. Some of the basic facts are worth repeating:
All Agency activity as regards Chile was conducted with
specific approval by the 40 Committee and Presidents involved. The
desperation move in September of 19 70 to prevent Allende's coming
to power by a military coup was the exception to broad interdepart-
mental coordination on the subject of Chile.
....U. S. Government policy prior to 19 70 was to prevent
a devout Marxist from taking power and U. S. policy after 1970 was to.
SECR SENSITIVE
EYES Y
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SENSTSI
attempt to support and sustain until the 19 76 elections a democratic
opposition to a government which grew increasingly intolerant of
that opposition and by 1973 was clearly operating outside the
Constitution.
....During this period there were 31 separate briefings
of Congressional Committees of CIA's covert action program in
Chile.
The following statements or myth S- about the Chile program are
not true:
....There was never an effort to-"destabilize" the.
- Chilean Government during the period 1970 to 1973. As indicated
above the effort was to keep a free press and a.dernocratic
opposition alive. Democracy in Chile was done in not by�
CIA but by the ruinous economic policies of a Marxist ideologue
who finally brought about a 'situation in which the non political
military felt they had no alternative but to act.
....The Agency did not bring on or encourage the
military coup of September 11th 19 73 and did not play any role
in Allende's death,
....As you know from your exhaustive investigations
the Agency had broken off and provided no support to the group
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S RET
SENS YE
that shot General Schneider.
Mr. Chairman, U. S. policy from 1962 to 1970 was consistent in
attempting to prevent the takeover of the Government of Chile by Allende and
his communist and socialist compatriots. The course of events in Chile since
Allende's takeover prove the wisdom of that policy: The present Government
of Chile has a considerable way to go but military governments in Latin America
have been followed by more democratic alternatives.
There are honest differences of opinion about the wisdom and efficacy
of all of the policy decisions on Chile over the pat decade. It is worth noting that
the Cubans and the Soviets considered the course of events in Chile as a disaster
to their interests. The Soviets in their comments on Chile emphasize that Chile
proves the thesis that "socialist revolution" should never be attempted without
political control of the military forces � a lesson they have been working hard -
in Portugal to put into practice.
Was our role in Chile bad and anti-democratic? I think not. The U. S.
was acting within the broad mainstream of traditional U. S. policy in Latin America
That policy has been to resist the establishment governments in Latin America
with close ties to European powers -- in this case the Soviet Union. That policy,
around the world, has also been to oppOse the attempt by minority communist
and radical Marxist parties to takeover governments in the knowledge that once
in power these forces ultimately destroy the elements of democracy and diversity
that enabled them to gain power. What has been preserved in Chile is the chance to
begin again.
12
SE UWE
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atunsm,
Agency-ITT Relationships
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5. On 16 July 1970 Mr. William Brae, former Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division, (now retired), met with
Mr. Harold Geneen, President and Board Chairman of ITT, as
a result of a telephone call from Mr. Johh McCone, ITT
Director and former DCI, to former DCI Helms. At the meeting
Geneen said that ITT had decided to provide financial aid
to Chilean conservative National Party presidential candidate
Alessandri. in his race against Marxist candidate Salvador
Allende. Geneen asked if CIA would absorb ITT and other
U.S. business funds and channel them to Alessandri; if not,
would CIA advise as to the best means of getting funds to
Alessandri. Geneen was told that CIA could not and would
not absorb such funds nor serve as a funding channel;
however, CIA would explore possibilities for infusion of
funds into Chile. Geneen felt that the USG should be
involved in, the Chilean election in view of the USG guaranty
of the investment in Chile. Geneen was advised
that the USG was not supporting any candidate but was most
anxious Allende not be elected and were taking steps in this
regard.
6. In the pre-election period CIA actively pursued an
advisory role with ITT on where and how to use their funds
in support of Alessandri against Marxist candidate Allende.
In the interlude between election and inauguration of Allende,
CIA, along with other USG agencies, implemented a 29 September
1970 decision by the 40 Committee to undertake economic
pressure against Chile utilizing U.S. business firms with -
Chilean interests.
7. In the post inaugural period CIA maintained contact
with various ITT officials on an irregular basis, but did not
pursue any action program with ITT, although there. was, on
these occasions, an exchange of information.
2
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Myths and Facts
. 1. Myth: CIA unilaterally, without authority, undertook
covert action in the 1970 presidential election
in Chile.
FACT: All actions undertaken by the CIA in the 1970
presidential election were directed by the
40 Committee (Track I) or by President Nixon
(Track II).
2. Myth: CIA was responsible for the attempted kidnapping
and death of General Schneider. �
FACT: The CIA .did not participate in the bungled kid-
napping and death of Chilean Army Commander-in-
Chief General Rene Schneider. CIA had been in
� touch with the group that was responsible for
Schneider's death but CIA had broken off contact
with the group several days prior to that event
and had warned the group against taking any
precipitous action since it was .clear that they
did not have a chance of pulling off a successful
coup.'
3. Myth: The CIA continued to try to effect a coup but did
not keep the White House informed of such efforts
after 15 October 1970.
FACT: There was conflicting testimony before the Church
Committee that the White House (Henry Kissinger/
General Haig) stood down on efforts to promote a
military coup after 15 October 1970. CIA
officials testified that CIA activities in Chile
were known to and thus authorized by the White
House. There is no documentary proof that CIA.
was instructed to stand down after 15 October
1970L CIA activities in Chile after that date
were made known to the White House which did not
object to such activities, thus, in effect,
authorizing the continuance of these activities.
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-zJ4"
4 Myth: CIA sought the assistance of ITT to provide funds
for Chilean Presidential candidate Alessandri and
the major Chilean newspaper El Mercurio.
FACT: ITT, not CIA, initiated the dialogue on ITT assis-
tance to candidate Alessandri and the newspaper
El Mercurio as the result of a telephone call
TTom_ITT Director John McCone to former DCI Helms.
CIA did not accept any ITT funds nor serve as a
funding channel to Alessandri and his National
Party. Mr. Geneen, ITT Chairman, was specifically
told that CIA could not absorb any ITT funds nor
could CIA serve as a conduit to infuse ITT funds
into Chile.
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SUBJECT: Chile
CONCUR:
Jchn L Sei4 1
/qDeputy Director for Operations
Date
DDO/C/LA/STB/WSturbitts:esm (X9127) (28 Feb 78)
Distribution:
Orig &I - DCI
1.- DDCI
1 - Ex Reg
1 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - DDO Reg
1 - OLC
2 - C/LA
1 - C/LA/STB
2
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The Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Wash 'Vaal C 20SOS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
IROM: Stansfield Tbrner
Director
SUBJECT:
18 March 1978
Recommendation That TWo ITT Officials Be Prosecuted
for Violation of Federal Law in Connection With Their
Testimony Concerning ITT Activities Related to the
1970 Presidential Election in Chile
REFERENCE: The Attorney General's Memo, Same Subject, Dated 17 March
-
1. The Attorney General's memorandum of 17 March declares his intention
to proceed with the prosecution of Robert Berrellez and Edward J. Gerrity for
various criminal offenses. I cannot say to you that these offenses were not
committed. Nor obviously can I say that there is not an important governmental
interest in prosecution. What I can do and I think nust do, is to give you
my general estimate of the potential impacts of prosecution in these cases.
I have outlined these considerations in great detail to the Attorney General,
both orally and in writing.
2. Even assuming the necessary proof can be kept within the narrowest (b)(1)
possible bounds, the potential consequences are as follows: (b)(3)
-- First, we will suffer losses, ranging anywhere from anger and
yet another loss of confidence in CIA to a total breakdown in inte3,-(b)(1)
ligence relationships, in] A cut-off or (b)(3)
reduction of would be especially
damaging given the growing importance of
I I also cannot ignore the possibility that CIA personnel
in both] will be placed in some personal
jeopardy as a result of the disclosures that a Lvial will require
and the flare-up of anti-CIA feelings that it will stimulate.
Second,?
are very likely to be exposed.
would thus produce the spectacle of the U. S. Covernment
its intelligence agents by its own deliberate act.
The trial
compromising
(WO
(1D)(3y,
I
(WO
(b)(3),, 1
I I
(WO )
(b)(3)
(b) (3)
c..
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3. These oases have been under investigation for more than two years.
The Agency has declassified hundreds of documents to assist the investigation.
We have leaned over backwards to avoid any charge that a national security
blanket has been thrown over the case to prevent a prosecution. But I
cannot in good conscience, or faithfully to my oath of office, declassify
information that in my judgment will lead to serious impairment of our
capacity to conduct the intelligence functions of the United States.
4. The Attorney General said in his memorandum that there can be no
guarantee against further demands for information if the case goes forward.
Ny own sense is that further demands will be inevitable, and in great quan-
tity. It is nearly certain that any trial will be protracted and highly
publicized, both here and abroad. It is clear that many former and. current
Agency officers will be called as witnesses. We also know that in 1970 xrr
and CIA were following parallel programs to influence the political succes-
sion in Chile. That circumstance threatens to draw into question and to
open up at any trial a wide range of properly authorized Agency activities
and relationships, and counsel for Messrs. Gerrity and Berrellez will have
every inducement to exact the disclosure of national secrets to bolster
their defenses and to make the going as painful as possible for the prosecu-
tion. If as I suspect the eases spread out and begin to reach their broader
dimensions, there would then be put at risk, among other matters, informa-
tion having to do with the identity of former and current agents; communica-
tions intelligence capabilities; the Agency's worldwide propaganda network;
the Agency's various cover
arrangements ofgreat sensitivity and other intelligence teChniques; and
the cooperative and highly confidential efforts of
in support of U. S. opposition to the formation of an Allende
regime in Chile.
5. At no� time have I taken the position that the Justice Department
could not use whatever documents or witnesses it regards as necessary to
maintain a prosecution. However, I have taken the position that it is not
for me to declassify information that I believe would injure vital national
intelligence interests if disclosed. If the potential consequences of a
trial in this case are acceptable, so be it, but in fairness both to you
and the Attorney General it has seemed to me that I have no choice except
to spell out those consequences as I see them. I cannot guarantee that
these consequences will actuRlly occur any more than the Attorney Gneral
can guarantee the opposite. I can tell you that the events over the last
few years have endangered the Agency's capacity to function effectively, and
that agents, foreign intelligence services, and U. S. corporations are all
�
-2--
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more and more reluctant to cooperate with us. The trial of the Gerrity
and Berrellez cases will do still further damage, which is bound to be
substantial and could be worse depending on the scope of the information
that is disclosed.
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BRIEFING NOTE - CIA/ITT/Chile Investigation
I. Background
A Since the end of 1974, the Criminal Division of. the Department
of justice has investigated sworn testimony of former DCI
Richard Helms and others, Agency operations in Chile in
the late 1960's and, early 1970's and related matters, .
including Agency relations with ITT. Over 51 thousand
items from CIA files have been _reviewed. More than 2,000
documents were declassified to the greatest possible extent.
Upwards of 40 current and former, CIA employees, a
number of whom are now or have been under cover, have
been identified as possible witnesses. .Taken as a
whole, the 2,000 documents furnished to Justice give a
full account of how CIA plans and carries out a covert
action program.
B. The following damage assessment sets forth the potential
consequences of a trial where these 2,000 items plus at
least part of the remaining 51,000 items may be required.
II. Damage Assessment
A. Definite Consequences
1. An Agency covert action operation which was ordered by the
President and designed to influence the political succession in
a foreign country would be fully revealed.
2. Relations with(
\would be adversely affected upon
exposure of their involvement.
a.
- Offered to provide equipment,to
prevent an Allende government from taking power
and offered / Agent
assets
b. Contact with CIA on the Chilean
succession problem.
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�%.
as well as similar
media assets/organizations many
c.
intelligence service not only provided intelligence
information, but
had
be
the
arced out
actually handled CIA assets. They
responsibilities should the U.S.
Similar involvement by
Agency documents reveal specific Western European,
/other Latin American
�of which are still cooperating
and
would damage individuals.
4. Agency penetrations of the
names of
collaborating politicians are revealed in Agency documents. Careers,
and in some cases lives, would be endangered.
5. Collection capability in Chile would be adversely affected
and key sources endangered.
6.. Ability to recruit new sources would be impaired. One
very specific impact has already been felt.
7. r
/collaborated with the CIA during the period in
question and is a continuing source. This reporting would be
lost and serious personal consequences to the individual could
result.
This individual would
be in personal jeopardy.
9. Agency documents contain true names, cryptonyms and
descriptions ofFlof our most sensitive "agents of influence" in
Latin America and Europe.
10. CIA relationships with prominent U.S. persons would
be revealed, for example:
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a.
businessman,
b.
o encourage the latter to Move against Allende.
Co., was used as an intermediary with the
Ito strongly oppose an
Allende government..
helped line u
opposition tO Allende government.
11. CIA contacts/relationships with
would be revealed.
12. Intelligence methods would be revealed:
. Special.CIA
officials
b. CIA
C.
"Stay-behind" contingency planning involving the.
. Use of false flag officers and a covert base.
B. Possible Consequences
1. Political reprecussions could result from the revelation that:
- At our urging,/
made a special trip
with Frei, each time urging Frei to act.
b. At our urging,
sent a special emissary to Frei .with a
message of support and encouragement.
c.
seek support of the/
- At our behest, U.S Ambassador
I and their
opposition to Allende. Similar approaches were made to the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)M(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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. CIA helped to organize/
3. Contacts with President Frei, Chilean military Commanders
and with many lower ranking officers would be revealed and careers
adversely affected.
4.
would be revealed.
5. A large number of Agency employees (conservatively: and
their cover situations would be identified publicly. Apart from
the obvious damage (and danger) to the individuals and to the continued
viability of cover arrangements, the signal to other employees, to
recruitment prospects for the clandestine service and to potential sources
of would be strongly negative.
6. More than
Agency stations/bases abroad would be surfaced.
C General Consequences.
1. There would emerge from the record of a public trial a complete
picture of a complex/sensitive CIA covert action operation.
2. Hostile intelligence services could accurately assess U.S. intel-
ligence capabilities, identify modus operandi and locate weaknesses.
The covert hand of;Lthe U.S, Government could more easily detect at an
early stage and action taken to neutralize/frustrate these efforts.
Deceptions using this information could make it appear that the U.S.
Government was interfering When it was not.
3. Foreign agents and liaison services may lose confidence that
such collaboration can be kept secure.
4. Prospective agents are difficult to recruit under ideal
circumstances. Recruitment would be impossible if there was not an
absolute faith that their identity and the fact of their collaboration
would be tightly controlled.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
5. Declassified ITT/Chile documents detail the complex relationships
of the.Agency \
land the nature of classified research/development contacts.
(b)(1)
6. Exposure of these relationships would be traumatic to those in (b)(3)
the United States who provide expertise or make it possible (b)(1)
for CIA to harness the special capabilities of U.S. Persons. The willingnes5(b)(3)
of U.S. citizens to provide CIA with confidential information mo)
and services depends on a guarantee of confidentiality from CIA. These (b)(3)
(b)(1)
of them could not be expected to risk their careers and businesses without 030)
the firmest CIA commitment to protect the fact of their collaboration.
citizens have much at stake and even the most patriotic
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