NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06496682
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2018
• Case Number: F-2017-00912
• Publication Date: March 6, 1987

Approved for Release: 2018/12/19 006496682
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
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6 March 1987
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�Tap-Secret�
Special Analysis
INDIA: Gandhi Under Stress
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's frustration about the lack of
progress toward his foreign policy goals and the growing
Influence on him of his personal staff and of military and
intelligence officials probably presage an increasingly hardline
Indian foreign policy, particularly toward India's neighbors.
hough-GandhnraIns-personalltr.omnsitted-to-str-engthening
s-wffithe-USrheinay-become-mre1i�UwiUrwhat
---he-viewsaselay.s_in-r-eleasing-advanced-techno
Gandhi's reactions over the past seven months to three incidents
involving Pakistan�the war scare in January, the attempt on his life
in October, and the hijacking of the Pan Am airliner in Karachi in
August�demonstrate his frustration with his inability to improve
relations with Islamabad."
His public attacks on Pakistani
President Zia during each of the crises and his willingness to approve
a show of force during the recent border crisis eventually gave way,
however, to attempts at conciliation.
Gandhi's growing impatience with the performance of cabinet and
senior foreign policy officials has resulted in several abrupt firings and
resignations in recent months, reducing the influence of longtime
professional diplomats in the Ministry of External Affairs. He is now
consulting a few people on his personal staff and officials in military
and intelligence circles who have tended to take a hard line on India's
relations with its neighbors. They argue that the projection of military
power and covert action can advance Gandhi's goals.
Gandhi is also turning to high-risk physical activities, fast driving and
parasailing, probably to relieve the tensions he feels in his job. He has
told the press that he misses his privacy and time with h
resents the intrusion of security officers and procedures.
Changing Tactics To Achieve Goals
Caadhi-strows-n-o-sigrrof-abandoninglItIrof-strength-enibg
-ziftelists-Felatiens-with-the-US-while-maintaining-ties-to-the-USSR4ficof
spx-itringJndia's...preemiRenee-in-the-reOlonlIAlthough he prefers
deliberate, nonconfrontational diplomacy, Gandhi is likely to seek
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scapegoats for failures and to turn more frequently to hardliners in
the military and the intelligence services to help get things done,
particularly when dealing with neighboring states. (S NF)
India's recent agreement with Pakistan to withdraw military units from
the border has reduced tensions between the two countries, but
Gandhi will be looking to Zia to implement other agreements on trade
and antinarcotics trafficking, which they discussed last month, and to
take measures to control the infiltration of Sikhs into India. If there is
no progress on these issues, Gandhi may become receptive to those
who favor covert action against Pakistan.
New Delhi is probably headed for another round of high-risk
brinkmanshi� this spring over the Sin -In
Implications for the US and the USSR
Alndtlit-frustfations_ar_e_u_alikely-te-eatiee-dramatic changes in
cAvfatibTfs=with-the-6187-bptitrerrr_ raraffettiquw1Dethils,dipiona0c_
exetlafigesmwitb-WesliinciturraTitirinstrerirds-ef-tanepr.watvi\...
Difficulties in India's relations with the US, Pakistan, or China will not
New Delhi is disappointed with what it views as
inadequate Soviet diplomatic support during India's recent tensions
with Pakistan and China. If the Sino-Indian border heats up this
spring, the Indians are likely to look again to Moscow for strong public
support, which the Soviets will probably not be willing to provide.
necessarily translate into gains for the Soviets,,
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Approved for Release: 2018/12/19 006496682