IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (5)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06765366
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00293
• Publication Date: November 2, 1998

Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
umau-kooiritu
(U) Iraqi Commander Memoirs on Missiles (5)
Identifiers:
Document Number: FTS19981125000179
(b)(3)
Dates:
Date Posted: 02-Nov-1998 19:00:00
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: Near East/South Asia, Near East
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: DNI
Office Name: OSC
Phone Numbers:
Email Addresses:
Attachments:
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Warnings: (U) This intelligence product may contain copyrighted material; authorized use is for
national security purposes of the United States Government only. Any reproduction,
dissemination, or use is subject to the OSC usage policy and the original copyright.
(U) Chapter III: Call Day (3) [subtitle]
(U) 15 December 1990 [subtitle]
(U) For me, that was a day unlike any other; I had the honor to meet with the president, an
occurrence that I entered in my diary. The meeting took place on 28 Jumada al-Awwal, 1411
hejirah.
(U) I returned to my residence elated at having met with the president. The longest-serving staff
officer had handed me an envelope from the directorate of the general military intelligence. The
envelope contained a sheet listing the national holidays on the calendar of the Zionist entity for the
year 1991. It had been a practice of mine to enlist such data on Iran and the Zionist entity so that
we would be able to be mindful of the days that could see either of the two nations contrive a
crisis. Both time whatever mischief they may want to create for the Arabs in general, and Iraq in
particular, to coincide with such occasions.
(U) I had obtained clearance from the president to return the rockets that had been previously
deployed in the open to a number of hangars to shield them from rain as winter was at hand.
Arrangements were made to secure additional hangars.
(U) 25 December 1990 [subtitle]
(U) I traveled to al-Nakhib, the area designated for the tests, their date having been amended. We
UNCLASSIFIED 1
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN UL/AJ J iritu
were determined that the tests take place, despite our knowledge that the enemy had completed
their concentrations on Saudi territory.
(U) At the successful completion of the test, I flew to Umm Qasr to conduct another in the series of
tests on "al-'Abbas" rocket and Iraqi-made launchers [qadhifat], and the test launch took place late
on the 28th day of December.
(U) The officers and other ranks in the rocket test crews were working flat out to get the
experiments done successfully. It was hard for them to go into cultivated or uninhabited areas to
set up bases or to look for rocket wrecks there. On that particular occasion, two officers went to
survey for a suitable site. They were met by a middle aged man, who was a tribal chief and who,
at finding out what they were about, feted them and slaughtered three sheep in their honor.
(U) 1 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) I entered in my diary the advent of a new Gregorian year, the first day of which corresponded
with the 15th day of the hejirah month of Jumada al-akhirah. He spent that night in the south
where Iraqi military units were deployed. He shared with our fighters there a banquet, the
ingredients of which he himself had prepared. Everyone had a good time in his company and felt
that having consumed food brought and prepared by him personally, they had virtually made a
promise; namely to gain the upper hand on the battlefront and, with God's will, beat off the
aggressors.
(U) 6 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) On the day marking the anniversary of the founding of the valiant army of Iraq, the political
guidance staff had prepared the paraphernalia for the celebrations to observe that glorious day:
Iraqi flags, colored strips of paper, and a local radio station putting on songs of victory and power.
(U) Our valiant military had now come of age, having attained supreme levels of capability and
strength and experience spanning 70 years of hard and sustained work that began in 1921.
(U) I had pictured our army as a formidable force well prepared to take on the most massive
military buildup history had ever known.
(U) Oh valiant giant: You will go down in history as the army of Arabism and principles on your
immortal day.
(U) 17 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) A day crammed full of work. At 0930 I received instructions from the chief of staff of the army
and from his assistant for operations explaining the evil designs of the foreign forces that had
massed on Saudi territory and ordering that no leave be given to any member of our units as of 12
January 1991.
(U) At 1000 I held a conference with the commanders of Brigades 223 and 224 to issue my
instructions as to their respective missions. Afterwards I checked to see how things were going at
Brigade 225 and how far along the maneuver plan was in the second battalion. I later again called
on the commanders of Brigades 223 and 224 and brought into the session the commander of the
maintenance unit and staff from the military industrialization to brief them on the special
ammunition.
(U) I had repeatedly sought additional special guidance equipment to boost our bomber potential
and could find no more than four pieces. (more) 3 nov
(U) 8 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) At 1000 sharp today, I received specific instructions from his excellency the president timed
UNCLASSIFIED
2
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN l, L/AJ Jiritu
1800 the previous day about the special weapons or the special warheads as we called them. The
instructions were conveyed courtesy of Staff Lieutenant General 'Ala' al-Janabi, the general
secretary of the general command of the Armed Forces spelling out how to coordinate with the
official in charge of military industrialization concerning the special warheads so that each would
be ready to use the moment a pertinent order is given or in the event of a massive strike against
Iraq. Our warheads would be launched at specific enemy targets wherever these may be, since
the Americans could launch massive strikes. The presidential order also directed that the general
military intelligence service share with us intelligence about the whereabouts of enemy
concentrations in the arenas close to Iraq.
(U) I felt the weight of responsibility and stayed up till late in the night planning practical measures
to put those orders in place, now and then lighting a cigarette and surveying the map hung on the
wall beside me. Palestine, one of the most scenic sites in the world, was one of its features.
(U) Early the next morning, a messenger's knock on the door of my office jolted me out of my
sleep. He found me hunched over my papers with a kettle of tea perched on the heater and
emitting a whistle as if announcing the outbreak of war.
(U) 9 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) That whole day and part of the night was occupied with charting a thorough plan to distribute
the rockets and conventional warheads and fuel. The plan covered areas in the south and western
regions of the nation--in al-Ramadi of al-Anbar Governorate; al-'Amarah in Misan Governorate;
and in al-Nasiriyah of Dhi Qar Governorate.
(U) Following is a breakdown of the plan:
(U) 1--Ten rockets for Brigade 224 and as many for al-Ramadi as a second line.
(U) 2--Eight rockets for Brigade 223, plus four vehicles.
(U) 3--Ten rockets each for the cites of al-'Amarah, al-Nu'maniyah, al-Suwayrah, at a medium
level alert footing.
(U) 4--Four rockets for the city of al-Nasiriyah, eight for al-Batha' region at a medium level alert
footing.
(U) 5--Rockets in other areas were placed at a low level alert footing.
(U) 6--The special warheads were dispersed in other places around the country.
(U) I spent that night planning until dawn. I issued orders that the training must continue and
specifying the duties assigned to Battalion 227, "Ababil," and I examined the formation of a joint
technical battalion so as to economize on our efforts. I also considered the establishment of an
auxiliary control center and a division of labor among the brigades and whether each should be
responsible for a specific region or whether they should all be controlled centrally.
(U) I issued orders specifying whether the rockets should remain deployed on vehicles or whether
they should remain on the ground ready for action, as well as concerning other small details. I
instructed that 14 rockets be at the ready in Baghdad. I noticed that the commanders were
absolutely comfortable with those measures, despite the fact that they addressed specifics. I had
stepped into an area that they considered to be integral to their specialization, including the
distribution of the iron levers that every brigade needed for loading. I also intervened in such areas
as the technical batteries and the first maintenance unit. The reason was that I felt that was
necessary if we were to guard against any confusion or lack of coordination when military action
began. (more) 3 nov
UNCLASSIFIED 3
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN UL/AJ J iritu
(U) 10 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) I requested a detailed chart of enemy targets in "al-Khafji" and "Ra's al-Mish'ab" from the
operational rockets control center and they obliged. On 15 January 1991 I directed that they
amend their plan so that it would provide for a simultaneous strike at the two targets and that all
units be prepared to collectively hit any one of the two. I spelled out my instructions in some detail
to satisfy myself that I was being fully understood. I also satisfied myself with respect to the
measures being taken at the center in regard to the exercise in the second battalion of Brigade
225 of each of the second corps and the command of the forces of jihad.
(U) Also on that day corresponding to 24 Jumada al-akhirah of the hejirah year 1411, I submitted a
report to his excellency the president incorporating the additional targets about which we had been
alerted by the general military intelligence service on 9 January 1991. My planning was based on
the president's directives that he had issued on 6 January 1991 and which I received on 8 January
1991. His excellency the president had already given clearance for our choice of targets in Tel
Aviv and Haifa and their environs as priority targets in the event of a strike being launched against
the Zionist entity.
(U) I explained in my report the point of view of the rocket corps insofar with respect to strikes at
the concentrations of the American enemy and its allies who were based in Saudi Arabian
territory. It emerged that strategic rockets were not much use against certain targets, particularly
those that were somewhat distant or small in size or about which we knew very little. Accordingly,
we settled instead for "Dhahran" as a first priority Saudi target followed respectively by
"Dammam," "al-Jubayl," and "Hafr al-Batin." Before that, as of 13 August 1990, enemy targets in
"Dhahran" and "Mujamma' Baqiq" had for us a lower priority. I explained that our capabilities had
been stepped up so that we would be able to launch rocket attacks at 14 bases. I proposed that
we hit targets in Tel Aviv with eight rockets and in Haifa with six. As for enemy targets in "Riyadh,"
"Dhahran," and "Mujamma' Baqiq," I suggested that we had three choices:
(U) 1--Fourteen rockets to be launched at enemy concentrations in "Riyadh" or "Dhahran" or
"Mujamma' Baqiq".
(U) 2--To hit enemy targets in "Riyadh" and "Dahran" only.
(U) 3--To hit all of the three targets.
(U) The time frame that I proposed for an attack on the Zionist entity was 22 hours, followed 10
hours afterwards by an attack on enemy targets in Saudi Arabia.
(U) I made sure that the warheads were being loaded in accordance with the orders that were
issued on 30 August 1990; namely after the enemy had begun military action against Iraq. It
remained an open question whether we should wait for fresh orders to load or take action as soon
as hostilities began.
(U) In any case, I huddled with military officers and drew on a sheet of paper a plan for our first
priority strike including one target each in Haifa and Tel Aviv that would later be stepped up to
target four points in Tel Aviv and three in Haifa. I specified the plan of action for the meteorological
service and for the technical rocket preparedness and their order of priority and also touched on
such areas as transportation and contacts and time factors. The interval between the time when
the orders are issued and the launching of rockets was set at eight hours. I also offered my vision
of how things would proceed so that the following plan would serve as a guideline:
(U) A--At receiving orders and comprehending them in regard to any shift in the plan, the technical
units of Brigade 223 should begin preparing two rockets and the technical units of Brigade 224
should begin preparing as may rockets for the benefit of Brigade 223.
UNCLASSIFIED 4
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN l, L/AJ Jiritu
(U) B--The equipment of Brigade 223 should be rushed to forward shelters and with them the
levers and arms of loading. They shall be followed by the rockets.
(U) C--The technical battalion of Brigade 224 and the technical battery of Brigade 223 should
begin technical preparations for the benefit of Brigade 224 and the launchers of Brigade 224
should go forward so that they enter the emplacements at the last possible moment.
(U) D--The meteorological stations are placed at rear areas of the emplacements.
(U) E--Headquarters and units receive cables from their stations at the central axis [mihwar al-
tanaqqul].
(U) F--All technical units must ready another 14 rockets and push the ready rockets onto carriages
to forward shelters. In the meantime, the moment will have arrived for the launching of the first
batch at enemy targets.
(U) G--Technical units should send their equipment to forward shelters.
(U) H--Brigade 223 should return its empty carriages to forward shelters.
(U) I--Launchers of Brigade 223 should be hidden in alternative shelters while the launchers of
Brigade 224 go back to load at the places agreed upon in advance. Meanwhile, the rocket
carriages of Brigade 223 should be whisked to the emplacements and then be readied for the
launching of the second strike.
(U) J--Four rockets are to be readied for the benefit of Brigade 223 during the loading and
checking of the launchers of Brigade 224, during which time efforts should focus on meeting the
requirements of Brigade 224 because Brigade 223 will have more time to devote to technical
preparations.
(U) K--Launchers of Brigade 224 should be rushed to implement the second strike and then
technical preparations continue for 10 rockets for the benefit of Brigade 224. The operation
continues in that sequence and so as to suit breaking developments.
(U) In the end, I requested from the general staff that they send out the complete plan to the
brigades and units. (more) 3 nov
(b)(3)
(U) Brigadier General Faruq Fadil 'Abd-al-Karim al-Mu'awin, took charge of the rocket operational
control center from the commander of Brigade 225.
(U) I drew up the initial plan for rocket strikes for the second priority; namely "the southern task to
be executed against enemy targets and concentrations on Saudi territory" by Brigades 223 and
224 and by the commander of the first maintenance unit. The order spelled out options and
contingency plans for technical preparations leaving the door open for all possibilities. The plan
envisaged action on four locations and there were five options, with the first of them including
three possibilities, which, in effect, meant that I had put in place for them seven plans. I had also
shown the rocket deployment sites and a detailed description of the targets and the number of
rockets needed to strike at each, as well as the distribution of the weather forecast stations for
each of the options and possibilities.
(U) 12 January 1991 [subhead]
(U) The president summoned me and I had the honor of meeting with him. I spelled out my plan
which I sent out on 10 January 1991. I then received final directives, which had met all our
queries. These were:
(U) 1--Conventional weaponry was to be the first option of response if and when an attack was
launched against Iraq.
UNCLASSIFIED 5
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN UL/AJ J iritu
(U) 2--Besides the president, those authorized to order an attack were members of the regional
command and the defense minister and, a requirement added afterward, the chief of staff of the
armed forces so that military operations would be sustained in case the president's headquarters
came under attack.
(U) 3--Direct transportation should be secured as I had planned.
(U) I left the president's office completely reassured that we were going to execute our operations
accurately and promptly. I had a clear conception of the priorities and the dynamics of action, both
of which I later explained to the commanders. We then placed our faith in the almighty God and
prayed that He guide us as we sought to defend the homeland against those who were lying in
wait to hurt it.
(U) I was confident that everything was proceeding according to plan: For the first time in history,
the Zionist entity was now within the range of an effective weapon held by the Arab hands of the
valiant soldiers of Iraq and which was the product of their ingenious and creative minds. At that
moment, I wished that at least some Arabs, both on the popular and official levels, were with us as
we stood ready to execute that mission. Had this been the case, I thought, Palestinian and other
Arab territory would not have remained under the occupation of the Zionist entity, not even for
hours. I reckoned that had this been the case, the Zionist entity would have backed down and
submitted to Arab will and to the people of Palestine who have been subjected to daily torment for
generations.
(U) I had carried out a faithful and accurate implementation of the functions assigned to me from
the moment the rockets were primed for action to the moment that they were fired and up to the
safety precautionary measures. I went over the rocket strike plan for the second priority related to
the enemy targets and its concentrations on Saudi territory. Thinking to myself, I considered the
irony of our search for an accurate map of Saudi territory just a few days previously and the bad
Americans who had sold the Arabs the false notion that Iraq was in fact covetous of Arab land. I
wondered what punishment should be meted out to those who sought to spread false ideas.
(U) We then had the wireless system hooked up to the president's office.
(U) 13 January 1991 [subhead]
(U) Iraq was seeking a fair solution in a world where double standards were the norm and where
nothing on earth, including the United Nations, had been spared the interference of the United
States. I thought about this world where bribery and threats were the prevailing pattern, with the
weaker countries coming under threats and the rest taking huge bribes as a price for looking on as
the crime of the age was being committed.
(U) That day Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN secretary general, arrived in Baghdad, his visit
taking place, as it did, on the 11th hour, as if to send the message that he was lending
international legitimacy to a declaration of war. It was as if he was visiting so it could be said that
diplomatic efforts to arrive at a peaceful way out had been exhausted. The game had not been lost
on Iraq, a point that it made to the UN chief without any equivocation. On 9 January 1991, that
same point was made by Tariq 'Aziz to James Baker, the US secretary of state. The world
understood that the United States was acting against the Arabs on behalf of the Zionist entity and
that the matter had nothing to do with the question of Kuwait. The US position was made amply
clear by the US President George Bush; namely that the United States was bent on doing
undeserved harm to Iraq. The US president said verbatim that "Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait in
itself was not enough; a solution of the crisis must provide for disarming Iraq and dismantling its
rockets and all its nuclear capabilities. Beyond that, Iraq must be made to pay full reparations for
the damage that has been caused to all regional parties." (more) 3 nov
(b)(3)
(U) There is no question that that statement had been dictated to the US president by Zionist and
UNCLASSIFIED 6
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN UL/AJ J iritu
other regional circles which had sensed that the huge progress made by Iraq had contrasted with
their diminished importance.
(U) I followed the performance of the fire support coordination center and then Lieutenant Colonel
Shabib Sulayman, a bodyguard of the president's, and I agreed on code-related details. A direct
phone line was then installed on the president's exchange.
(U) I sent out a list of the code words to the commanders and then I sent out complementary plans
to Brigade 223 and Brigade 224 and the maintenance unit with respect to the first and second
priority strikes. The plans covered the targets and locations and the technical preparations that
were needed for launching the rockets, and they also spelled out the responsibilities to be
undertaken by reconnaissance, transportation, and liaison teams.
(U) I had cut down the number of the plans from seven to four. Certain plans were envisaged to be
fulfilled in 21 hours, others in 27 hours, depending on how far the targets were. On that day,
certain units carried out a final reconnaissance of their locations in the western area.
(U) 14 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) In the name of God,the most gracious, the most merciful: "Those advised by some to beware
of the force assembled to attack them have only become even stronger believers and were
convinced that God's support was more than enough for them." [koranic verse]
(U) I had just finished reading what verses I could given the time constraint from the holy Koran.
After a while sitting on my prayer rug, I rose to my feet. How comfortable both for my body and
soul that prayer session was. Before that, I had spent 10 solid hours at the office desk. I paced up
and down the room to stretch my legs but I felt dizzy. I had not had a moment's sleep since the
day before. I knew that it was possible that the war could begin that night, that day being the one
set by the UN Security Council for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, a resolution passed under
immense pressure from the United States, or else face a military strike. That was an unfair and
provocative resolution. It betrayed a treacherous intention regardless of whether Iraq remained in
or withdrew from Kuwait. If an attack was inevitable anyway, why, then, should Iraq give up its
principled stand? Saddam Husayn is not one to go for such an option. It was a historic and
decisive battle that went beyond the present and that should mark the Arab response to the
attitude of imperialists toward the Arabs.
(U) 16 January 1991 [subtitle]
(U) I had an afternoon nap knowing that a long sleepless night lay ahead, a night that could see
the evil forces launch an attack against our country, brushing aside the efforts that Russia had
been making to find a peaceful way out.
(U) In the early evening, I woke up from a dreadful dream in which I had to clear many obstacles,
but at clearing each hurdle I had to clear yet another one. Eventually, though, I found myself in a
green oasis that reminded me of one I saw on my first visit to Tunisia back in 1976, when I had
returned to Baghdad along with a Tunisian bride. I felt that the two oases were parts of the same
Arab homeland. Returning from Tunisia with a Tunisian bride I felt that I had crossed artificial
borders that separate our Arab countries. I felt that that hallowed bond had fulfilled a unionist
aspiration. (more) 3 nov ; (b)(3)
(U) I picked up the phone to call my wife and inform her that I was sending my car to pick up our
sons Ahmad and Muhammad if they were willing to come over. After the phone call, Major Thamir
'Ali, commander of the first camouflage legion was waiting to see me. I explained to him the
camouflage plan, after which a messenger came to inform me that there was no problem in regard
to the failure of big cables to match the bases of the launchers. We examined the problems and
came up with quick answers.
UNCLASSIFIED 7
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN UL/AJ J iritu
(U) We were racing against time. At 1800, the phone that linked my office directly to one of the
president's bodyguards rang. That was to make sure that the link was working, which the test
showed it was.
(U) My sons Muhammad and Ahmad arrived at the headquarters. On that day the number of the
men under my command had become 10,000.
(U) With the exception of the headquarters and its battery, which were to be transformed into a
headquarters detachment and an intelligence one during the war, the rocket battle system
consisted of the Rocket Brigade 223 which comprised of al-Husayn Rocket and Iraqi bases. It was
made up of three rocket battalions, one of which was not fitted with launching equipment, an
incomplete technical battalion, a light anti-air battalion, a meteorological battery, a technical repair
shop, a defense detachment, and a chemical company in addition to the brigade headquarters
battery. The brigade was under the command of Colonel Ahmad Jasim. In fact, the number of the
batteries under his command that were in working order were four plus two backup launchers.
Also under his command were Rocket Brigade 224 which was made up of al-Husayn Rockets and
foreign-made launchers that had been readjusted to accommodate the home-made al-Husayn
Rockets. The Rocket Brigade was formed along the same lines as Brigade 223 but the former's
units were complete. Indeed, a 10th battery was added to it, having been detached from the
combat training unit affiliated to the rocket school. That brigade was commanded by Col. 'Adnan
Anjad. There was also the Rocket Brigade 225 which included al-Ra'd rocket battalions, Luna,
which consisted of four battalions and a meteorological battery and a repair workshop. With the
exception of the fourth battalion, it operated in the Kuwait sector. It consisted of 36 launchers in 12
batteries. There was also the Rocket Brigade 226 and that consisted of al-Tariq Rocket Brigade,
which, in turn, was made up of three battalions and a meteorological battery and a repair
workshop in the Kuwait sector and it had 24 launchers distributed around six batteries. There was
the First Maghawir Brigade of the Fourth Corps. Then there was the maintenance ground-to-
ground rockets command which included three maintenance units and the rocket test detachment
in al-Anbar Space Research Base. There were also the Rocket Battalion 227, "Ababil," that had
been formed recently and protection units that were attached to our units and under our command.
Also under our command were the operational rocket control center that was active alongside the
general headquarters of the armed forces in the south of the country. I created two provisional
legions that were to take responsibility for camouflage and the ground-to-ground missiles schools.
(U) We settled for the following lineup of forces shortly before the aggression was launched :
(U) The third corps-the third battalion minus a battery from Brigade 225, the first battalion minus a
battery from Brigade 226.
(U) The third corps-the first battalion minus a battery from Brigade 225, the second battalion from
Brigade 226.
(U) The sixth corps,the third battalion from Brigade 225 and the third battery from Brigade 225 and
the second battery from Brigade 225.
(U) The seventh corps,the second battery and the third battery from Brigade 225 and the first
battery of the first battalion from Brigade 226. These were to be commanded by the operational
rocket control center to back up the reserve forces-the second battalion minus one battery from
Brigade 225.
(U) Shortly before midnight I was in my aboveground headquarters, to which was attached an
underground operations shelter. I held a small calculator checking some figures.
(U) In the still of the night, I had time to go over what I had done during the day and to review
action plans for strategic rockets. The actions that had to be carried out remained constantly on
my mind:
UNCLASSIFIED 8
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN l, L/AJ Jiritu
(U) 1--The formation of new units; namely Rocket Brigade 223; the first rocket maintenance unit
which had to be added to such strategic units as Rocket Brigade 224 and the technical battalion
and the command of the maintenance unit and the Rocket Brigade 225 and the Rocket Brigade
226. That was to ensure a flexible work pattern and in line with presidential orders that we begin
training and preparing until such time as arms procurement is complete. (more) 3 nov (b)(3)
(U) 2--The preparation of the western operations theater by deploying fixed rocket launch pads so
as to ensure that the set targets in the Zionist entity are attacked according to plan.
(U) 3--Close coordination with the directorates of the general military intelligence and military
survey department to get reliable intelligence and accurate maps.
(U) 4--We had to study the national days observed in the Zionist entity and also to take into full
account our own national days so that our units are never taken unawares.
(U) 5--We had to undertake drills in which our units and formations engage in trial communications
in preparation for the battle.
(U) 6--We had to reorganize the rocket headquarters so as to secure good running of the rocket
units.
(U) 7--We had to undertake early reconnaissance of potential targets and make us aware of any
piece of information that we may obtain about them and we had to ensure that our military units
share such information.
(U) 8--We had to make sure that our stockpiles of rockets were kept in good working order and to
devise a plan whereby they would be deployed.
(U) 9--We had to make sure that we collect intelligence about our intended targets and analyze the
usefulness of attacking them using various military and civilian maps and aerial photos. We had to
make use of coordinates taken by our pilots.
(U) 10--Attention must be given to the issuance of orders to various formations and units and the
use of passwords and clear code words so as to save the time.
(U) 11--We had to continue conducting rocket launch experiments in coordination with the Military
Industrialization Organization with a view to improving the precision of the rockets.
(U) 12--We had to plan the possible progress of the battle in detail taking into consideration each
of the stages of the war.
(U) 13--We had to extend transport across as wide an area as possible and make sure that the
tracks are covered as soon as possible.
(U) 14--We had to make sure that specifics of implementation are reviewed with subordinates with
a view to correcting mistakes and calling attention to important points.
(U) 15--We had to make preparations for building underground shelters at every launch site
making sure that these are set at such distances from each other that would not lead to their being
discovered.
(U) 16--Security aspects of the war could not be overstated.
(U) 17--We should make as much use of Liaison officers as possible. They play a crucial role in
communicating orders and urgent information.
(U) 18--We had to beware of the enemy guidance systems [baykanat al-dalalah], which point I had
guarded against for years.
UNCLASSIFIED 9
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN l, L/AJ Jiritu
(U) 19--We had to make sure of the importance of the element of boosting the morale of the ranks
on every possible occasion.
(U) 20--We needed to form a first legion for the first duty in the western region and the second
legion for the second duty in the south for purposes of camouflage. We also needed to set up
camouflage launchers and explain how these could be used.
(U) 21--We needed to analyze the capabilities of the enemy in line with incoming data from the
directorate of military intelligence and work out plans to forestall the enemy.
(U) 22--We had to keep shifting the sites of shelters and to make use of natural and other curtains
and to intensively use camouflage equipment and make sure that relevant procedures are applied.
(U) 23--We needed to set out the sequence in which the rocket attacks will take place. We also
had to set the priorities under which the strikes must take place so as to economize on time. For
example, in August 1990 we were able to cut the time that we needed to respond to the first wave
of aggression on Iraq with rockets to just four hours.
(U) 24--Our fighters had to be made adequately conscious of their tasks. I made sure that all
concerned knew about my ideas and what they should do in an emergency.
(U) 25--We had to make sure that electronic calculators were used in the field and that a shooting
timetable was drawn up.
(U) 26--We had to make sure that a summarized model was prepared to regulate the sending of
reports about the strategic and operational rockets. Also the troops should be trained in the
sending of easy and simple codes.
(U) 27--We had to make sure of flexibility in amassing troops so as to ensure that our limited
resources are made to serve the function set for them. (more) 3 nov
(U) 28--We had to ensure smooth cooperation between the military and the Military
Industrialization Organization whenever there was a need for that.
(b)(3)
(U) 29--We had to place the first rocket maintenance unit, assigned to al-Husayn rocket unit, under
the control of the command operations so that they would be run directly by me.
(U) As to the operational rocket units in the southern sector, that set me thinking about the
preparations that we had put in place:
(U) A--We prepared numerous launch sites for every rocket unit at the rate of 10-15 in the areas
where they were deployed so as to ensure the implementation of the combat duties and sufficient
protection for equipment.
(U) B--We engaged in reconnaissance practice and daytime and nighttime movements under all
kinds of circumstances.
(U) C--We prepared and carried out drills practicing moving the rockets from their shelters to the
launch sites taking into account the crucial time element.
(U) D--We carried out drills moving the rockets between the alternative shelters and the alternative
sites to make sure that the camouflage was working properly.
(U) E--We made sure that the second legion played an important role in camouflage.
(U) F--The units made exchange visits and they shared with each other information about their
respective duties so that they could be better able to carry them out as planned.
UNCLASSIFIED 10
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN l, L/AJ Jiritu
(U) G--Radio and other communications were secured with an emphasis on civilian telephone
lines.
(U) H--A number officers from each unit had to be assigned the duty of communicating orders in
the event of a breakdown in the communications systems.
(U) I--Units had to be furnished with engineers from the rocket teams because the resources of the
former were in short supply.
(U) J--Anti-aircraft batteries and infantry units were assigned the duty of protection.
(U) Five anti-aircraft batteries and one infantry company and a chemical detachment were
assigned duties in the southern sector.
(U) K--Tens of rockets had to be stockpiled and placed under the command of the operational
rocket control center.
(U) The messenger asked if I cared to have dinner, to which I responded that it was still early. I
asked if the children had had dinner, to which he said that they had and that it was already
midnight. My sons had retired to their bedroom which was adjoining my office. They had gone
there either to go to bed or to play while I was engaged in work. What remained for me to do was
to read the day's newspapers, the 16th day of January 1991. Afterward, it should be possible for
me to get a few hours sleep until the break of dawn and the early morning call to prayer. I tried to
open the room next to my office, but the door had been locked by Muhammad. So, I forced my
way in to find that flames and smoke were billowing from the oil stove.
(U) Iraqi Commander Memoirs on Missiles (4)
- FTS19981123000171
Collection: FB
Creator:
#1
Agency Acronym: DNI
Office Name: OSC
Phone Numbers:
Email Addresses
#2
Compilation Title: Al-'Arab al-Yawm
(b)(3)
Description: (U) Chapter III: Call Day (3) [subtitle]15 December 1990 [subtitle]For me, that was a
day unlike any other; I had the honor to meet with the president, an occurrence that I entered in
my diary. The meeting took place on 28 Jumada al-Awwal, 1411 hejirah.I ret
Language: en
Precedence: R
Source:
Publisher Type: open-source
Sourced Text: null
UNCLASSIFIED 11
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366
U IN l, L/AJ Jiritu
Language: ara
Source ID: 3779047
Source Type: Undetermined
City: Amman
Compilation Title: Al-'Arab al-Yawm
Originating System: OSC
Subject: MILITARY
UNCLASSIFIED 12
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765366