UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACT OF THE CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE ALDRICH H. AMES CASE - PREFACE TO THE REPORT FROM THE IG

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06088968
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-01770

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Unclassified Abstract of the
CIA Inspector General's Report
on the Aldrich H. Ames Case
PREFACE TO THE REPORT FROM THE IG
Procedurally, this has been an unusual report for the CIA IG
to write. In the first instance, our inquiry was directly
requested by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. Senate in late February
1994--shortly after Aldrich H. Ames was arrested. Normally, our
congressional oversight committees ask the Director of Central
Intelligence to request an IG investigation. On this occasion
their request was directed to the IG.
Second, the DCI chose to ask us to look. into the Ames matter
in phases-after Ames's arrest for fear of disrupting the Ames
prosecution. We were requested to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the CI investigation of.the Ames betrayal-what-
procedures were in place respecting CIA counterespionage
investigations at the time Ames volunteered to the Soviets in
1985; how' well did they work; and what was the nature of CIA's
cooperation with the FBI in this case. On March 10; 1994, the
DCI asked us to seek to detetmine if individuals in Ames's
supervisory chain discharged their responsibilities in the manner
expected of them and directed the Executive Director of CIA to
prepare a list of Ames's supervisors during the relevant periods.
The DCI also directed that awards and promotions for the
individuals on the Executive Director's list be held in escrow
pending the outcome of the IG investigation. I wish to state at
this point that neither I nor any member of the team .
investigating the Ames case have vie
wed the DCI's escrow list. We wanted to be as completely
unaffected by the names on the list as we could be in order to
discharge our responsibility to advise the DCI objectively of
possible disciplinary recommendations. As z precautionary.
measure, I did ask my Deputy for Inspections, who is otherwise
uninvolved in the Ames investigation, to view the escrow list to
advise of any individuals on it whom we might have failed to
intervieW through inadvertence. That has been our only
involvement with the escrow list.
Third, there was an unusual limitation placed on our inquiry
at the outset caused by a desire on the part of the DCI, the
Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern
District of Virginia to do nothing that would complicate the Ames
trial. We willingly complied with these constraints., confining
ourselves to background file reviews and interviews of
non-witnesses until the Ameses plSd guilty on April 28, 1994.
The consequence has been that we have had to cover a great deal
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of ground in a short period Of time to conduct this investigation
in order to have a report ready for the DCI and the congressional
oversight committees by September 1994. I am extremely proud of
our 12-person investigative team.
Apart from the unusual procedures affecting this
investigation, the Ames case presented several major substantive
problems as well. This case raised so many issues of concern to
the DCI, the oversight committees and the American people, that
we have not chosen to tell the story in our normal chronological
way. Instead, we have focused on themes: Ames's life, his
career, his vulnerabilities. We have tried to discuss how,
counterespionage investigations have been conducted in CIA since
the Edward Lee.Howard betrayal and the Year'of the Spy, 1985--in
the context of this particular case. Necessarily, we have made
analytical judgments about what we have learned--some of them
.quite harsh. We believe this is our job--not just to present the
facts, but to tell the DCI, the oversight committees and other
readers how it strikes us. We have the confidence to do this
because we. have lived with the guts of Ames's betrayal and his
unearthing for countless hours and we owe. our readers our
reactions.. In this sense ou
r 12 investigators are like a jury--they-find.the facts and make
recommendations to the DCI for his final. determination. � This
investigative team, like a jury, represents the attitude of the
intelligence professionals from whose ranks they are drawn and
from whom they drew testimony--sometimes shocked and dismayed at
what we've learned, often appreciative of the individual acts of
competence and courage, and always intrigued by the complexity of
the Ames. story.
In the end, the Ames case is about accountability, .both
individual and managerial. The DCI and the congressional
oversight committees have made this the issue, but if they had
not, we would have. As a postscript to my opening sentences, let
me note that the CIA IG had begun to look into the Ames case on
its own, even before the SSCI or the DCI had requested it,
because we believe that the statute setting up our office
requires it. The issue of managerial accountability has been one
of this office's principal points of focus since its inception in
1990--and we have enjoyed mixed �success in our reviews and
recommendations to promote it.
Seeking to determine managerial accountability in the Ames
case has not been an easy task. On the individual level, we have
uncovered a vast quantity of information about Ames's
professional sloppiness, his failure to file accountings, contact
reports and requests for foreign travel on time or at all. We
have found that Ames was oblivious to issues of personal security
both professionally-he left classified files on a.subway
train--and in his espionage--he carried 'incriminating documents
and large amounts of 'cash in his airline luggage; he carried
classified documents out of CIA facilities in shopping bags; and
he openly Walked into the Soviet Embassy in the United States and
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a Soviet compound in Rome. We have noted that Ames's abuse of
alcohol, while not constant throughout his career, was chronic
and interfered with his judgment. and the performance of his
duties. By and large his professional weaknesses were observed
by Ames's colleagues and supervisors and were tolerated by many
who did not consider them highly unusual for Directorate of
Operations officers on the "not going anywhere" promotion track.
That an officer with these observed vulnerabilities should have
been given counterintelligence' responsibilities in Soviet
operations where he was in a prime position to learn of the
intimate details of the Agency's most sensitive operations,
contact Soviet officials openly and then massively betray his
trust is difficult to justify. The IG investigative team has
been dismayed at this tolerantview of Ames's professional
deficiencies and the random indifference given to his .
assignments, and our recommendations reflect that fact.
Finally, on the grander scale of how the reaction to the
major loss of Soviet cases in 1985-86 was managed, our team has
been equally strict, demanding and greatly disturbed by what we
saw. If Soviet operations--the effort to achieve human
penetrations of the USSR for foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information--was the highest priority mission
of the clandestine service of CIA in 1985-86, then the loss of
most of our assets in this crucial area of operations should have
had a devastating effect on the thinking of the leaders of the DO
and CIA. The effort to probe the reasons for these losses should
have been of the most vital significance to U.S. intelligence,
but particularly to the CIA, and should have been pursued with
the utmost vigor and all necessary resources until an ,
explanation--a technical or human penetration--was found.
It iS true that the spy was found, but the course to that
conclusion could have been much more rapid and direct. While
those few who were engaged in the search may have done the best
they could with what they had, in this investigation we have
concluded that the intelligence losses of 1985-86 were not
pursued to the fullest extent of the capabilities of the CIA,
which prides itself on being the best intelligence service in the
world. The analytical judgments and recommendations in this
Report reflect that conclusion. We wish it could have been
otherwise.
Frederick P. Hitz
Inspector Genera/
SUMMARY
1. In the spring and summer of 1985, Aldrich H. Ames began
his espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union. In 1985
and 1986, it became increasingly clear to officials within CIA
that the Agency was faced with a major CI problem._ A significant
number of CIA Soviet sources began to be compromised, recalled to
the Soviet Union and, in many cases, executed. A number of these
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cases were believed to have been exposed by Edward Lee Howard,
who fled the United States in September 1935 to avoid prosecution
for disclosures he made earlier that year. However, it was
evident by fall of 1935 that not all of the compromised sources
could be attributed to him. .
2. Later in-1985, the first Agency efforts were initiated
to ascertain whether the unexplained compromises could be the
result of a) faulty practices by the sources or the CIA officers
who were assigned to handle them (i.e., whether the cases each
contained "seeds of their own destruction"),.b) a physical or
electronic intrusion into. the Agency's Moscow Station or Agency
communications, or c) a human penetration within the Agency (a
"mole"). Although they were never discounted altogether, the
first two theories diminished in favor over the years as Possible
explanations for the losses. A "molehunt"--an effort to
determine whether there was a human penetration, a spy, within
CIA's ranks--was pursued more or less continuously and with
varying degrees of intensity until Ames was convicted of
espionage-in 1994, nine years after the compromises began to
occur.
3. The 1985-1986 compromises were first discussed in late
1985 with DCI William Casey, who directed that the Deputy
Director for Operations (DDO) make every effort to determine the
reason for them. In January 1986, SE Division* instituted new
and extraordinary compartmentation measures to prevent further
compromises. In the fall of 1986, a small Special Task Force
(STY) of four officers operating under the direction of the
Counterintelligence Staff (CI Staff) was directed to begin an
effort to determine the cause of the compromises. This effort,
which was primarily analytic in nature, paralleled a separate FBI
task force to determine whether the FBI had been penetrated. The
FBI task force ended, and the CIA STF effort diminished
significantly in 1988 as its participants became caught up in the
creation of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC). Between 1988
and 1990, the CIA molehunt came to a low ebb as the officers
involved concentrated on other CI matters that were believed to
have higher priority.
4. In late 1989, after his return from Rome, Ames's
lifestyle and spending habits had changed as a result of the.
large amounts Of money he had received from the KGB in return for
the information he provided. Ames made no special efforts to
conceal his newly acquired wealth and, for example, paid cash for
a $540,000 home. This unexplained affluence was brought to the
attention of the molehunt team by a CIA employee in late 1989,
and a CIC officer began a financial inquiry. The preliminary
results. of the financial inquiry indicated several large cash
transactions but were not considered particularly significant at
the time.
5. . Nevertheless., information regarding Ames's finances was
provided to the Office of Security (OS) by CIC in 1990. A .
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background investigation (BI) was conducted and a polygraph
examination was scheduled. The BI was very thorough and produced
information that indicated further questions about Ames and his
spending habits. However, this information was not made available
to the polygraph examiners who tested him, and CIC did not take
steps to ensure that the examiners Would. have full knowledge of
all it knew about Ames at the time. In April 1991, OS determined
that Ames had successfully Completed the reinvestigation
polygraph with no indications of deception., just as he had five
years previously.
6. In 1991, CIA's molehunt was revitalized and rejuvenated.
Two counterintelligence officers were assigned full-time to find
the cause of the 1985-86 compromises. The FBI provided two
officers to work as part of the molehunt team.
7. During this phase, attention was redirected at Ames and
a number of other possible suspects. In March 1992, a decision
was made to complete the financial inquiry of Ames that had been
initiated-in 1989. In August 1992, a correlation was made
between bank deposits by Ames that were identified by the
financial inquiry and meetings between Ames and a Soviet official
that the Agency and FBI had authorized in 1985. The joint
CIA/FBI analytic effort resulted in a report written in March
1993, which concluded that, among other things, there was a
penetration of the CIA. It was expected by CIA and FBI officials
that the report, which included lists of CIA employees who had
access to the compromised cases, would be reviewed by the FBI in
consideration of further investigative steps.
8. The totality of the information available to CIC and the
FBI prompted the FBI to launch an intensive CI investigation of
Ames. During this phase, the FBI attempted to gather sufficient
information to determine whether Ames was in fact engaged in
espionage, and the Agency molehunt team was relegated to a
supporting role. Every effort was made to avoid alerting Ames to
the FBI CI investigation. According to FBI and Agency officials,
it was not until a search of Ames's residential trash in
September 1993, which produced a copy of an operational note from
Ames to the Russians, that they were certain Ames was a spy.
After the FBI had gathered additional information, Ames was
arrested on February 21, 1994 and pled guilty to espionage on
April 28, 1994.
,9. The two CIA officers and the two FBI officers who began
working in earnest on the possibility of an Agency penetration in
1991 under the auspices of the Agency's CI,' deserve credit fot
the ultimate identification of Ames as a hostile intelligence
penetration of-CIA. Without their. efforts, it is possible that
Ames might never have been successfully identified and
prosecuted. Although proof of his espionage activities was not
obtained until after the FBI began its. CI investigation of Ames
in 1993, the CIA. molehunt team played a critical role in
providing a context for the opening of an intensive investigation
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by the FBI. Moreover, although the CIA and the FBI have had
disagreements and difficulties with coordination in other cases
in the past, there is ample evidence to support the statements by
.both FBI and CIA senior management that the Ames case was .a model
of CI cooperation between. the two agencies.
� 10. From its beginnings in 1986, 'however, 'the management of
CIA's molehunt effort was deficient in several respects. These
management deficiencies contributed to the delay in identifying
Ames as a possible penetration, even though he was 'a careless spy
who was sloppy and inattentive to measures that would conceal his
activities. Despite the persistence of the individuals who
played a part in the molehunt, it suffered from insufficient
senior management attention, a lack of proper resources, and an
array of immediate and extended distractions. The existence and
toleration of these deficiencies is difficult to understand..in
light. of' 'the seriousness of the 1985-'86 Compromises and �
especially when considered in the context of the series of other
CI failures that the Agency suffered in the 1980.s and the
decade-long history of external attention to the weaknesses in
the Agency's CI and security programs. The deficiencies reflect
a CIA CI function that has not recovered its legitimacy since the
excesses of Jame
S Angleton, which resulted in his involuntary retirement from CIA
in 1974. Furthermore, to some extent, the "Angleton Syndrome"
has become a canard that is used to downplay the role of �CI in .
the Agency.
11, Even in this ,context, it is difficult to understand the
repeated failure to focus more attention on Ames earlier when his
name continued to come up: throughout the investigatiOn. He had
access to all the compromised cases; his financial resources
improved substantially for unestablished reasons; and his
laziness and poor performance were rather widely known. All of
these are CI indicators that should have drawn attention to Ames.
Combined, they should have made him stand out. Arguably, these
indicators played a role in .the fact that Ames was often named as
a prime suspect by those involved in the molehunt.
12. One result of management inattention' was the failure of
CIA to bring a full range of potential resources to bear .on this
counterespionage investigation. There was an over-emphasis on
operational analysis and the qualifications thought necessary to
engage in such analysis, and a failure to employ fully such
investigative techniques as financial analysis, the polygraph,
behavioral analysis interviews, and the review of public and
governmental records-. These problems were exacerbated. by the �
ambiguous division of the counterespionage function between CIC
and OS and the continuing subordination by the Directorate of �
Operations (DO) of CI concerns to foreign intelligence collection
interests. Excessive compartmentation has broadened the.gap in
communications between CIC and OS, and this problem has not been
overcome despite efforts to improve coordination. CIC did not
share information fully with OS or properly coordinate the OS.
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investigation process.
13. These defects in the Agency's capability to conduct
counterespionage investigations have been accompanied by a
degradation of the security function within the Agency due to
management policies and resource decisions during the past
decade. These management policies emphasize generalization over
expertise, quantity over quality, and accommodation rather than
professionalism in the security field. This degradation of the
security function has manifested itself in the reinvestigation
and polygraph programs and appears to have contributed to Ames's
ability to complete polygraphs successfully in 1986 and 1991
after he began his espionage activities.
14. Beyond defects in counterespionage investigations and
related security programs, the Ames case reflects significant
deficiencies in the Agency's personnel management policies. No
evidence has been found that any Agency manager knowingly and
willfully aided Ames in his espionage activities. However, Ames
continued to be selected for positions in SE Division, CIC and
the Counternarcotics Center that gave him significant access to
highly sensitive information despite strong evidence of
performance and suitability problems and, in the last few years
of his career, substantial suspicion regarding his
trustworthiness. A psychological profile-of Ames that was
prepared as part of this investigation indicates a troubled
employee with a significant potential to engage in harmful
activities.
15. Although information regarding Ames's professional and
personal failings may not have been available in the aggregate to
all of his managers or in any complete and official record,
little effort was made by those managers who were aware of Ames's
poor performance and behavioral problems to identify the problems
officially and deal with them. If Agency management had acted
more responsibly and responsively as these problems arose, it is
possible that the Ames case could have been avoided in that he
might not have been placed in a position where he could give away,
such sensitive source information.
. 16. The principal deficiency in the .Ames case was the
failure to ensure that the Agency employed its best efforts and
adequate.resources in determining on a timely basis the cause,
including the possibility Of a human penetration, of the
compromises in 1985-86 of essentially its entire cadre of Soviet
sources. The .individual officers who deserve recognition for
their roles in the eventual identification of Ames were forced to
overcome what appears to have been significant inattentiveness on
the part of senior Agency management. .As time wore on and other
priorities intervened, the 1985-86 compromises received less and
less senior management attention. The compromises were not
addressed resolutely until the spring of 1991 -when it was decided
that _a concerted effort was required to resolve them. Even 'then,
it took nearly three years to identify and arrest Ames, not .
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because he was careful and crafty, but because the Agency effort
.was inadequate.
17. Senior Agency management, including several DD0s, DO -
Division Chiefs, CIC and CO officials, should be held accountable
for permitting an officer with obvious problems such as Ames to
continue to be placed in sensitive positions where he was able to
engage in activities that have caused great harm to the United
States. Senior Agency management, including at least several
DCIs, Deputy Directors, DO Division Chiefs, and senior CI and
security officials, should also be held accountable for not
ensuring that the Agency made a maximum effort to resolve the
compromises quickly through the conduct of a.focused
investigation conducted by adequate numbers of qualified
personnel.
What was Ames's Career History with CIA?
18. In June 1962, Ames completed full processing for staff
employment with the Agency and entered on duty as a GS-4 document
analyst in the Records Integration Division (RID) of the DO.
Within RID, Ames read, coded, filed, and retrieved documents
related to clandestine operations against an East European
target. He remained in this position for five years while
attending George Washington University, on a part-time or
full-time basis. In September 1967, Ames received his Bachelor
of Arts degree in history with an average grade of B-.
19. Ames originally viewed his work with RID as a stopgap
measure to finance his way through college. However, hp grew
increasingly fascinated by intelligence operations against
Communist countries, and, influenced by other RID colleagues who
were entering the Career Trainee (CT) program, he applied and was
accepted as a CT in December 1967. When Ames completed this
training nearly a year later, he was assigned to an SE Division
branch. He remained there for several months before beginning
Turkish language studies.
20. Ames's .first overseas posting took place between ,1969
and 1972. It was not a successful tour, and the last Performance
Appraisal Report (PAR) of his tour stated, in effect, that Ames
was unsuited for field work and should spend the remainder of his
career at. Headquarters. The PAR noted that Ames preferred
"assignments that do not involve face-to-face situations with
relatively unknown personalities who must be manipulated." Such
a comment was devastating for an operations officer, and Ames was
discouraged enough to consider leaving the Agency.
21. Ames spent the next four years, 1972-76, at
Headquarters in SE Division. Managing the paperwork and planning
associated with field operations at a distance was more
comfortable for Ames than trying to recruit in the field himself,
and he won generally enthusiastic reviews from his supervisors.
One payoff from this improved performance was the decision in
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September 1974 to name AmeS 4s both the Headquarters and field
case officer to manage a highly valued Agency asset.
22. Ames's opportunity to expand his field experience came
with his assignment to the New York Base of the DO's Foreign
Resources Division from 1976 to 1981. The PARs that Ames
received during the last four of his five years in New York were
the strongest of his career. These PARs led Ames to be ranked in
the top 10% of GS-13 DO operations officers ranked, for promotion
in early 1932. He was promoted to GS-14 in May 1982.
23. The career momentum Ames established in New York was
not Maintained during his 1981-83 tour in Mexico City. This
assignment, like his earlier tour and his later tour in Rome,
failed to play to Ames's strengths as a handler of established
sources and emphasized instead an area where he was weak--the
development and recruitment of new assets. In Mexico City, Ames
spent little time working outside the Embassy, developed few
assets, and was chronically late with his financial accountings.
Further, Ames developed problems with alcohol abase that worsened
to the point that he often was able to accomplish little work
after long, liquid lunches. His PARs focused heavily, and
negatively, on his failure to maintain proper accountings and�
were generally unenthusiastic. In Mexico City, Ames also became
involved in an intimate relationship with the Colombian cultural
attach�Maria del Rosario Casas Dupuy.
24. Despite his lackluster performance in Mexico City, Ames
returned to Headquarters in 1983 to a position that he valued
highly. His appointment as Chief of a branch in an SE Division
Group was recommended by the officer who had supervised Ames in
New York and approved by Chief, SE Division and the DDO.. This
position gave him access to the Agency's worldwide Soviet
operations. Ames completed this tour with SE Division by being
selected by the SE Division Chief as one of the primary
debrief ers for the defector Vitaly Yurchenko from August to
September 1985. For his work in the SE Division Group, Ames was
ranked very near the lower quarter of Do operations officers at
his grade at this time.
25. By early 1984, 'Ames was thinking ahead to his next
field assignment and asked to go to Rome as Chief of a branch
where he had access to information regarding many operations run
or supported from that post. He left for Rome in 1986. He once
again began to drink heavily, particularly at lunch, did little
work, sometimes slept at his desk in the afternoons, rarely
initiated developmental activity, and often fell behind in
accountings, reporting and other administrative matters. Ames
was, successful in managing liaison relations with U.S: military
intelligence units in Italy, but he registered few other
achievements.
26. Ames's-mediocre performance for the Agency in Rome did
not prevent his assignment upon his return to Headquarters in
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mid-1989 to head a branch of an SE Division Group. Here again he
had access to many sensitive cases. When that position was
eliminated in a December 1989 reorganization of SE. Division, Ames
became Chief of another SE Division branch, where he remained
until late 1990. At this.time, Ames was ranked in the bottom 10%
of DO GS-14 operations officers. He appears to have been a weak
manager who focused only on what interested him.
27. Ames moved to a position in the Counterintelligence
Center in October 1990. In the CIC, where he remained until
August 1991, he prepared analytical papers on issues relating to
the KGB but also had access to sensitive databases. Discussions
.between Ames and the Deputy Chief, SE Division, resulted in
Ames's temporary return to SE Division .as head of a small KGB
Working Group between August and November 1991:
28. In 1991, Chief SE Division requested that a
counternarcotics program be established through liaison with the
states of the former Soviet Union. Thereafter, Apes began a
rotation to the Counternarcotics Center (CNC) in December 1991.
At CNC, where Ames remained until his arrest, he worked primarily
on developing a program for intelligence sharing between the
United States' and cooperating countries.
29. Ames was arrested on February 21, 1994. On that date,
DCI Woolsey terminated his employment with the Agency.
What were Ames's Strengths, Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities?
Performance Problems
30. Ames appears to have been most successful and
productive in assignments that drew on his:
Analytical skills, particularly collating myriad bits of
information into coherent patterns;
1 Writing skills, both in drafting operational cables and
crafting more intuitive thought pieces;
Intellectual curiosity and willingness to educate himself on
issues that were beyond the scope of his. immediate assignment;
and
� Creativity. in conceiving and implementing sometimes complex
operational schemes and liaison programs.
31. Ames was far less successful--and indeed was generally
judged a failure--in overseas assignments where the development
and recruitment. of assets was the key measure of his performance.
For Most of his career, moreover, a number of work habits also
had a dampening impact on his performance. These included:
� Inattention to personal hygiene and a sometime S overbearing
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manner that aggravated the perception that he was a poor
performer;
A lack of enthusiasm for handling routine administrative
matters. By the late 1970s, when Ames was assigned to .New York,
this pattern of behavior was evident in his tardy filing of
financial accountings and failure to document all of his meetings
in contact reports,. Ames's disdain for detail also manifested
itself in his pack-tat amassing of paper and his failure,
especially In Rome, to handle action cables appropriately and
expeditiously; and '
a Selective enthusiasm. With the passage.of time, Ames
increasingly demonstrated zeal only. for. those few tasks that
captured his imagination while ignoring .elements of his job that
were of little personal interest to him.
Sleeping on the Job
32. - A significant number of individuals who have worked
with Ames in both domestic and foreign assignments state that it
was not uncommon for Ames to be seen asleep at his desk during
working hours. This behavior often coincided, especially in Rome
and at Headquarters in the 1990s, with Ames having returned from
lunch where he consumed alcohol.
Failure to File Required Reports
33. The Agency has an established system of reports of �
various kinds that serve administrative, operational, security,
and counterintelligence purposes. Ames paid very 'little
attention to a variety of these reporting requirements. His
inattention to these matters was by and large ignored, to the
extent it was known by Agency management.
Foreign. Travel
� 34. Over the course of several years, Ames failed to report
foreign travel to OS as required by Headquarters Regulatiqn- -It
is difficult to determine whether and .to what extent management
was aware of his unreported travel. The official record includes
no mention, but fellow employees appear to have had some .
knowledge of his travels, especially in Rome.
Contact Reports
35. Ames also failed to file timely contact reports .
regarding many of his meetings With foreign' officials.. .While,
this failure_originally may have been relatecIto his laziness and
disdain for regulations, it became more calculated and had
serious CI implications once he had volunteered to the Soviets in
1985. Ames states that he deliberately avoided filing complete
and timely reports of his contacts with Sciviet officials in
Washington. If he had done so, he believes, Agency and FBI
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officials might have identified contradictions. Moreover, he
believes they would have seen no operational advantage to the
meetings, ceased the operation, and removed the ready pretext for
his espionage aativities. This also was true of his meetings
with Soviets in Rome,
Financial Accountings
36. Throughout the ,course of Ames's career, managers
reported that they frequently counseled and reprimanded him, or
cited in his PAR Ames's refusal to provide timely accountings and.
properly maintain his revolving operational funds. This is more
than a question of financial responsibility for.D0 officers. It
also provides DO managers with another means of Monitoring and
verifying the activities of the operations officers they.
-supervise-.
Foreign National Contacts and Marriage
37. Ames also did not fully comply with Agency requirements
in documenting his relationship with Rosario. He never reported .
his intimate relationship with her as a "close and Continuing" �
one while he was in Mexico City. Management was aware generally
of a relationship but not its intimate nature and did not pursue
the reporting. He did follow proper procedures in obtaining
approval for their marriage. However, Agency Management did not .
accept or implement properly the CI Staff Chief's recommendation
at the time that Ames be placed in less sensitive positions until
Rosario became a U.S. citizen.
Security Problems
38. Ames also seemed predisposed to ignore and violate
Agency security rules and regulations. In New York in 1976, he
committed a potentially very serious security violation when he
left a briefcase full of classified information.on a New York .
subway train. In 1984, Ames brought Rosario to an
Agency-provided apartment; a clear violation that compromised the
cover of other operations officers.. Ames also committed a breach
.of security by leaving a sensitive secure communications system
unsecured at the FR/New York office. On July 2, 1985, Ames
received the Only, official security violation that was issued to
him when he left his office safe open and unlocked upon departure
for the evening. Ames admits to using his home computer
occasionally when in Rome between 1986 and 1989 to draft
classified memoranda. and cables that he would print out and take
into the office the next day. In the most extreme example of
his disregard for physical security regulations, of course, Ames
wrapped up five to seven pounds of cable traffic in plastic bags
in June 1985 and carried it out of Headquarters to deliver to the
KGB.
Alcohol Abuse
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39. Much has been made Since his arrest of Ames's drinking
habits. While it is clear that he drank too much too often and
there is some basis to believe this may have clouded his judgment
over time, he does not appear to have been an acute alcoholic who
was constantly inebriated. Ames acknowledges the.presence of a
variety of symptoms of alcohol addiction. The term "alcoholic"
often conjures up images of broken individuals who spend their
days helplessly craving a drink, becoming intoxicated beyond any
self-control, and only breaking out of their intoxication with
severe withdrawal symptoms. As explained in the psychological
profile prepared by the psychologist detailed to the IG, alcohol
addiction is, in reality, a more subtle, insidious process. This
accounts for the fact that many of Ames's colleagues and a few
supervisors were able to work with Ames without noticing his
substance abuse problem.
40. In regard to why they did not deal with problems
associated with Ames's alcohol abuse, several Agency managers say
that alcohol abuse was not uncommon in the DO during the mid- to
late-1980s and that Ames's drinking did not stand out since there
were employees with much more serious alcohol cases. Other
managers cite a lack of support from Headquarters in dealing with
problem employees abroad.
41. Medical experts believe that alcohol, because it
diminishes judgment, inhibitions, and long-term thinking ability,
may play some role in the decision to commit espionage. At the
same time, because the number of spies is so small relative to
the fraction of the U. S. population that has an alcohol abuse
problem, statistical correlations cannot be made. As A result,
alcohol abuse cannot be said to have a predictive connection to
espionage and, in and of itself, cannot be used as an indicator
of any real CI significance.
Financial Problems
42. In 1983-85, Ames became exceedingly vulnerable to
potential espionage as a result of his perception that he was
facing severe financial problems. According to Ames, once.
Rosario moved in with him in December 1983 he had begun to feel a
financial pinch. Ames describes being faced with a credit
squeeze that included a new car loan, a signature loan that had
been "tapped to the max," mounting credit card payments, and,
finally, a divorce settlement that he believed threatened to
bankrupt him.
43. Ames claims to have first contemplated. espionage
between December 1984 and February 1925 as away out of his
mounting financial dilemma. Confronting a-divorce that he knew
by that time was going to be financially draining, and facing
added expenses connected with his imminent marriage to someone
with .already established extravagant spending habits; Ames claims
that his financial predicament caused him to commit espionage for
financial relief.
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Why did Ames Commit Espionage?
44. Ames states that the primary motivating factor for his
decision to commit espionage was his desperation regarding
financial indebtedness he incurred at the time of his separation
from his first wife, their divorce settlement and his
cohabitation with Rosario.' He also says that several otherwise
inhibiting. "barriers" had been lowered by. a) the opportunity to
meet Soviet officials under Agency sanction, b) the lack of
concern that he would soon be subject to a reinvestigation
polygraph, c) his. fading respect for the value of his Agency work
.as a result of lengthy discussions with Soviet officials; and d)
his belief that the rules that governed others did not apply to
him. Ames claims he conceived of a one-time "scam" directed
against the Soviets to obtain the $50,000 he believed he needed
to satisfy his outstanding debt in return for information about
Agency operations he believed were actually controlled by the
Soviets. He recognized subsequently that there was'no turning
back and acted to protect himself from the Soviet intelligence
services by compromising Agency sources first in the June 1985'
"big dump."
How were Indications of Substantial Changes in Ames's Financial
Situation Handled?
45. The financial inquiry regarding Ames began in November
1989 with the receipt of information from at least, one Agency
employee that Ames's financial situation had changed and he was
living rather extravagantly. Upon his return from Rome, Ames
purchased a home in Arlington for more than a half million -
dollars in cash and made plans to remodel the kitchen and
landscape the yard, sparing no expense. AMes was also known to
have purchased a Jaguar automobile and to have Filipino servants
whom he had flown to and from the Philippines. Ames's lifestyle
change was apparent to others as well and several employees state
that they noticed at that time a marked improvement in Ames's
physical appearance, including capped teeth and expensive Italian
suits and shoes.
46. The financial inquiry faltered over resource
limitations and priority conflicts, was reinvigorated in March
1992 and was not completed until mid-71993. The information.
obtained as a result of the Ames financial review, especially the
correlation between deposits made by the Ameses and the
operational meetings, was an essential element in shifting the
focus of the molehunt toward Ames and paving the way, both
psychologically and factually, for the further investigation that
resulted in his arrest. Yet the financial review was permitted
to stall for almost a year while other matters consumed the time
and effort of the single CIC officer who possessed the interest- .
and ability necessary to conduct it. Technical management
expettise.to oversee the investigator's activities and help guidp
him was lacking. Given the responsibility that was placed on the
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investigator and his relative inexperience in conducting and
analyzing financial information, he did a remarkable job. But
there was clearly a lack of.adequate resources and expertise
available in CIC for this purpose.
47. � If the financial inquiry had been pursued more rapidly
and without interruption, significant information.about Ames's
finances would have been acquired earlier.
Was the Counterespionage Investigation Coordinated Properly with
the FBI?
48. Under Executive Order 12333, CIA is authorized to
conduct counterintelligence activities abroad and to coordinate
the counterintelligence activities of other agencies abroad. The
Order also authorizes CIA to conduct counterintelligence
activities in the United States, provided these activities are
coordinated with the FBI. Under a 1988 CIA-FBI Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) the FBI must be notified immediately when
there is a reasonable belief that an individual may engage in
activities harmful to the national security of the United States.
49. CIA-FBI cooperation in the Ames case after the spring
of 1991 generally exceeded the coordination requirements under
the 1988 MOU. The FBI could have taken over the Ames case
completely in 1991 but apparently concluded that it did not have
sufficient cause to open an intensive CI investigation directed
specifically at Ames. The FBI officers who were part of the team
were provided unprecedented access to CIA information related to
Ames and to other CIA cases. These FBI officers indicate that
they had full access to all of the CIA information they needed
and requested. Once the FBI did take over the case in 1993, -CIA
cooperation with the Bureau was excellent, according to FBI and
CIA accounts.
Were Sufficient Resources and Management Attention Devoted to the
Ames Investigation?
50. In considering whether the resources that were applied
to the molehunt were sufficient, it is necessary to evaluate the
need for secrecy and compartmentation. If alerting a potential-
mole to the investigation was to be avoided at all costs,.then
concerns about the size and discretion of any group undertaking,.
the investigation would be paramount.. Nevertheless there must be
some balance betWeen secrecy and progress. Despite the arguments
for the small size of the molehunt team, many officers �concede
that more resources could have been brought to bear earlier on
the Ames investigation.
51. Even accepting the argument that the team had to be
small to maintain compartmentation and to manage a complex CI
investigative process, the resource issue remains because the
molehunt team members who were made available were not focused
exClusively on the task, but were frequently diverted to other
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requirements. The limited size and diffused focus of the
molehunt team does not support DO management's assertions that
the 1985-86 compromised Soviet cases were "the biggest failure a
spy Agency could have." Rather, the resources applied to. the
task force indicate lack of management attention to this most
serious of intelligence failures.
52. The resources that the Agency devoted to the molehunt
were inadequate from the outset, especially when considered in
light of the fact that the 1985-86 compromises were the worst
intelligence losses in CIA history.
Has Agency Use of Polygraphs and Background Investigations been �
Sufficient to Detect Possible Agency Counterintelligence Problems
at the. Earliest Time?
53. The fact that Ames conceived; executed and sustained an
espionage enterprise for almost nine years makes it difficult to
argue that Agency screening techniques functioned adequately to
detect a CI problem at the earliest possible time. The question
then becomes whether the screening techniques, particularly the
periodic polygraph examination, were adequate and why they did
not detect Ames. The available evidence indicates that there
were weaknesses in the polygraph methods that were used.
However, it is difficult to conclude that the techniques
themselves are inadequate since the major failing in the Ames
case appears to be traceable to non-coordination and non-sharing
of derogatory information concerning Ames.
54. Although this IG investigation necessarily focused on
the Ames polygraph and background investigations, many employees
of the Office of Security also raised more generic problems in
these programs. At a minimum, these expressions of concern about
the Agency's polygraph program reflect a significant morale
problem.
55.. In light of the dominant role that the polygraph plays
in the reinvestigation process, OS management came to be
interested in production. For most of the time since 1986--when
the. five-year periodic reinvestigation.program was begun�Unti1.
the present, the reinvestigation program has been behind
schedule. As a result, OS managers have stressed the successful
completion of polygraph examinations. Many examiners believe
that this requirement implicitly stressed quantity over quality.
In addition to the pressures of production, the lack of
experience, in the polygraph corps has detrimentally affected the
Agency's polygraph program: The 1988 IC reinspection of the �
polygraph program noted this loss of experience; Many current
and former OS polygraphers say that the OS policy of promoting
generalists has caused the loss of experience. Many individuals
also cite the lack of complete information on testing subjects as
a defect.in the Agency's polygraph program.
56. The 1986 polygraph of Ames was deficient and the 191
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polygraph sessions Were not properly, coordinated by CIC after:
they were requested. The'Offite of Security (OS) -conducted a
background investigation ply prior to Ames's polygraph
examination in 1991. This 1991 BI is deemed by OS personnel to
be a very professional and in-depth investigation of Ames's
personal and professional activities. The investigator who
conducted this BI deserves great credit for the competency and
thoroughness Of her efforts. Unfortunately, the results of this
1991 BI were not available to the polygraph examiners at the time
.they tested Ames nor was financial information that had been
developed by CIC. Ultimately, the miscommunication between the
'CIC and OS components that were involved led 'the individual
examiners to conduct standard reinvestigation polygraph tests .
that Ames passed. Both examiners say that having such detailed
information available could have significantly altered their
approach to testing Ames.
To what Extent did Ames Use Computer Access and Capabilities to
Engage in Espionage Activities?
57. Ames reports that he bought his first computer in the
late winter or early Spring of 1986 just prior to leaving for
Rote. Ames's interest, however,- was limited to computer
applications rather than the technical aspects of computer
science or programming. Ames admits to using his home.computer.
occasionally when in Rome to draft classified memoranda and
cables that he would print out and take into the office the next
day. Ames admits to writing all his notes to the Soviets on his
home computer using WordPerfect word processing software while in
Rome. these notes, however, were passed only in paper form..
Ames began preparing at home and passing computer disk to the
Soviets after returning to Washington. These disks had been
password-protected by the Russians. The information contained on
the disks, according to Ames,. consisted only of one or two-page
messages from him to his handler. All other information he
passed was in the' form of paper copies of documents. The intent
was for Ames to leave a d
isk at a drop site and have the same disk returned later at his
pick-up site.
58. Ames says that passing disks and using passwords was
entirely his idea. Although Ames admits to discussing Agency
computer systems with the Soviets, he says' it was obvious that.
his handlers had little or no expertise in basic computer skills.
Ames describes his handlers as- being "rather proud of their
having been able-to turn a machine on, crank up WordPerfect and'
get my message on it."
59. Ames states consistently that he did not use or abuse
computer access as a means for enhancing his espionage .
capabilities. He explains that the computer systems to which he
had access in. CIC, SE/CE'Division and Rome Station were "really
no more than bona fide electric typewriters." He does say,
however, that this changed after he was given access to the CNC
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Local Area Network .(LAN). .That LAN featured the DO's message
delivery system (MDS). However, the CNC terminals differed from.
po LANs in that the capability to download information to. floppy
-disks had not been disabled in the CNC. LAN.. The combination of
having the MDS system. available on terminals that had floppy disk
-'capabilities represented a-Serious system vulnerability.
60. Ames clearly viewed his access.to the CNC LAN as a very
significant event in his ability to conduct espionage. The
broadened access, combined with, the compactness of disks, greatly
enhanced the volume of data he could carry out of- Agency
facilities with significantly reduced risk. Fortunately, he was
arrested before- he could take full advantage of this system
vulnerability.
61. No specific precautions were taken by Agency officials
to minimize Ames's computer access to. information within the
scope of his official duties: In fact, there is, one instance
where Ames was granted expanded computer access despite .
expressions .of concern by CIC and SE Division management at the
time about his trustworthiness. Ames states he was surprised
when he signed on and found that he had access to information.
about double agent cases. This allowed him to compromise a
significant amount of sensitive data from the CIC to which he did'
not have an established need-to-know.
Is There any Merit to the Allegations in the "Poison Fax?"
62. In April 1994, an anonymous memorandum was faxed to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence criticizing CIA
counterintelligence policies and practices. That memorandum,
which came to be known as the "poison fax," also alleged that an
SE Division manager had warned Ames he was suspected of being a
KGB mole and that a message from the field confirmed this. These
allegations were featured in the press and raised questions in
the Congress. No evidence has been found to substantiate these
allegations. Has CIA Been Effectively Organized to Detect
Penetrations such as Ames?
63. During the period of the Agency molehunt that led to
Ames, the CI function and its counterespionage element was
divided between the DO and OS. This division created problems'
that adversely affected the Agency's ability to focus on Ames.
Although attempts were made to overcome these problems by written
understandings and the assignment of OS officers to CIC, these
attempts were not altogether successful.
64. Senior security officials have pointed out that there
always has been a "fault line" in communications between the CIC,
and its predecessors, and the OS. This division has created a'
number of problems, given the disparate cultures of the two
organizations. Attempts are being made to employ CIC-OS teams to
overcome these problems, but the problems are inherent to the
division of CI responsibilities. The'division-of responsibility
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for CI between,CIC and OS interfered with a comprehensive
approach .to the molehunt. When financial leads were Obtained in
1989 and 1990, cIC essentially turned the matter over to OS for
Ames's reinvestigation but failed to communicate all the relevant
facts effectively with the OS personnel who were involved in the
reinvestigation.
65. Many senior managers and other officers, have strong
opinions regarding whether the Agency's CI element, at leaSt the '
portion that handles possible penetrations of the Agency, should
report through the DDO. A number of officers believe that taking,
the CI function out. of the DO would permit the' addition of
personnel who'are not subject to the limitations .of the DO -
culture and mindset. Other officers view the prospect of taking
counterespionage outside the DO as impossible and potentially
disastrous. Doing so, they argue, would never work because.
access to DO information would become more difficult. Some
.officers also argue that reporting directly to the DCI would be
copying the KGB approach, which proved over the-years to be
unworkable. As a counter argument, however, former DCI Webster
believes, in retrospect, that the CIC he created in 1988 should
have reported to him directly with an informational reporting
role to the DDO.
Were CIA Counterintelligence Personnel Who Conducted the Molehunt
Properly Qualified by Training and Experience?
66. Of the four officers who were assigned to the STF in
1986, one remained when the molehunt team was established by CIC
in 1991 'to continue to pursue the cause of the 1985786,
compromises. That officer was chosen to head the effort
primarily because she was an experienced SE Division officer, was
familiar with the KGB and wanted to pursue the compromises.,
According to her supervisor, there were not many other employees
who had the years of experience, the operational knowledge, the.
interest, the temperament, and the personality to persist in this
effort. She was joined by another officer who had headed the
Moscow Task Force inquiry charged with doing the DO damage
assessment concerning the Lonetree/Bracy allegations. A third
officer, who had been on rotation to CIC from the Office of -
Security was chosen to assist the team because of his background,
and CI experience, although he was not actually made a team
member until June 1993. While this investigator-was certainly
not the only person in CIA who was
capable of performing a financial analysis, he was the only one
who was known to, and trusted by, the team leader. He was ideal
in her view because of his previous work with her on other CI
cases. In addition, two FBI officers were assigned to the
effort.
67. Put most simply, the consensus view of those in CIC who
were directly involved in the molehunt seems to be that good CI,
officers have both innate and learned characteristics that make
them effective. In addition to innate CI ability, a good CI
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analyst needs a great deal of general and particular knowledge to
make the mental connections necessary to conduct a CI
investigation. General knowledge in the molehunt context refers'
to knowledge of the KGB, while particular knowledge refers to
knowledge of the 1985-86 compromised cases. In addition, many
CIC employees say that operational experience is essential to CI
work. Although this general and particular knowledge can be
acquired through study, for the most part it is obtained over
years of experience actually working on foreign intelligence
operations and CI cases in a particular subject area.
68. In the judgment of the IG, these criteria for
qualification as a CI analyst and for the process of conducting a
CI investigation reflect a very narrow view of the scope and
nature of CI investigations. In the Ames case, it was unduly
cramped and justified an unfortunate resistance to adding more
personnel to the molehunt unless they were deemed by the team
leader to be qualified. Further, this view of counterespionage
presents significant risks both to the Agency and successful
prosecutions in the future. In the Ames investigation, the
equities of any future prosecution were protected by the fact of
FBI participation. Law enforcement officers bring an
understanding of investigation procedure critical to building a
successful prosecution. Without FBI participation, the risk of
the narrow CIC view is that prosecutions may be jeopardized in
future CI investigations. In addition to protecting Agency and
prosecutive equities, training in law enforcement and other
investigative techniques would expand the scope of information
and techniques available to the Agency's CI investigators.
69. Despite these general shortcomings in CI training and
methodology, the molehunters performed admirably. Their work
included useful analysis that helped advance the resolution of
the 1985-86 compromises significantly. On occasion, their work
also went beyond the scope of what had been considered an
adequate CI investigation to that point. Thus, they advanced the
art form of CI investigations within CIA. In the final analysis,
they contributed substantially to catching a spy.
Was the Molehunt that led to Ames Managed Properly, and Who was
Responsible?
70. Supervisory responsibility for the molehunt that
eventually led to Ames shifted over time as managers,
organizations and circumstances changed.
71. The primary responsibility for the molehunt within the.
Agency rested with officials in the CI Staff, later the CIC, as
well as senior DO management. Management of the molehunt during
the initial, analytic phase was inconsistent and sporadic.
Although keen interest was expressed from time to time in
determining what went wrong, the resources devoted to the
molehunt were quite modest, especially considering the
significance to the DO and the Agency of the rapid compromise of
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essentially all major Soviet sources. Those directly engaged in
the molehunt also had to contend with competing assignments and
were distracted from the molehunt by other possible explanations
for the compromises, such as technical penetrations and the
Lonetree/Bracy case, that eventually proved not to be fruitful.
Senior CI managers at the time admit that they could, and
probably should, have devoted more resources to the effort.
72. In the CI Staff, the early years of the molehunt were
primarily analytical and episodic, rather than investigative and
comprehensive. Although information gathering and file review
are important, little else appears to have been done during this
time. A number of CI cases concerning Agency employees were
opened based on suspicious activity, but none were brought to
resolution. No comprehensive list of Agency officers with the
requisite access was created and analyzed during this stage.in an
attempt to narrow the focus of the molehunt.
73. SE Division management must also assume some
responsibility, given the fact that the 1985-86 compromises
involved major SE Division assets. SE Division management should
have insisted upon an extensive effort and added its own
resources if necessary to determine the cause of the compromises.
It is not sufficient to say, as these and many other officials
now do, that they did not more closely monitor or encourage the
molehunt effort because they knew they were suspects themselves
and did not wish to appear to be attempting to influence the
matter in an undue fashion. The distinction between encouraging
a responsible effort and improperly interfering in the progress
of that effort is considerable. In any event, another senior SE
official who was not on the list could have been given the
necessary authority and responsibility.
74. Given the importance of the compromises and the need to
determine their cause, the DDOs during this phase also must bear
responsibility for not paying more attention to and better
managing the molehunt.
75. Beyond those in the DO and CIC who had direct
responsibility for the molehunt during this phase, OS should have
done a better job of developing leads that would have assisted
the molehunt team in focusing its attention on Ames as early as
1986. In the mid-1980s, OS had fallen behind in its
reinvestigation polygraphs, and many officers had not been
repolygraphed for periods much longer than the required five-year
intervals. Ames had not been polygraphed,for almost ten years
when he was scheduled for a reinvestigation polygraph in 1986.
That polygraph raised several questions but failed to reveal any
problems despite the fact he had begun spying for the Soviets a
year earlier and he reports he was very apprehensive at the time
about being exposed.
76. The reorganization of OS in 1986 was followed in 1988
by.the creation of the CIC which included a large OS contingent
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operating as an integral part of CIC. While one of the purposes
of CIC was to consolidate all of the Agency's CI resources in a
single component, the result was an overlap of missions,
jurisdictional struggles at the highest levels of OS and CIC, and
a failure to share information. According to.a May 1991 Office
of Inspector General Report of Inspection concerning OS, these
problems were caused by the failure of Agency .management to .
define the relative responsibilities of the two components, to
provide a mechanism for a smooth flow of information between
them, and to establish policy for managing cases of common
interest.
77. CIC and the FBI can be credited for initiating a
collaborative effort to revitalize the molehunt in April 1991.
However, CIC management must also bear responsibility for not
allocating sufficient dedicated resources to ensure that the
effort was carried out thoroughly, professionally and
expeditiously. The delay in the financial inquiry can be
attributed largely to the lack of investigative resources
allocated., to the effort. The CIC investigator de-Serves a great
deal of credit for his initiative and interest in financial
analysis and it appears clear that an inquiry into Ames's
finances would not have occurred to anyone else in CIC had he not
been available to suggest it and carry it out. However, the
failure to either dedicate the investigator fully to this inquiry
before 1992, or to bring in other officers who would have been
able to conduct a similar or more thorough financial analysis of
Ames, represents one of the most glaring shortcomings of the
molehunt. This failure alone appears to have delayed the
identification of Ames by at least two years.
78. In 1993, when the FBI opened an intensive CI
investigation of Ames, the Agency was fully cooperative and
provided excellent support to the FBI's investigation. CIA
deferred to the FBI's decisions regarding the investigation and
allowed Ames continued access to classified information in order
to avoid alerting him and to assist in developing evidence of his
espionage. The common goal was to apprehend Ames, while
safeguarding evidence for a successful prosecution. As has been
stated earlier, the CIA/FBI working relationship during the FBI
phase appears to have been a model of cooperation.
* Soviet East European Division, later renamed Central Eurasia
Division, directed operations related to the Soviet Union and its
successor states.
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