PROSPECTS FOR A GREEK CYPRIOT INSURGENCY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05458960
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01647
• Publication Date: October 1, 1974

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Background Use Only
Prospects for a Greek Cypriot Insurgency
Summary
October 1974
The occupation of 40 percent of Cyprus by Turkish troops has created a situation
in which Greek Cypriots might vent their frustration by waging a terrorist campaign
against the Turkish troops or Turkish Cypriot population. The likelihood of insurgency
depends to a large extent on the outcome of negotiations over both the final
demarcation between the Greek and Turkish held portions of the island and the
provisions for exchange of prisoners and refugees. A small insurgency could be led by
any one of three factions�the rightist EOKA-B organization, a leftist group (either
EDEK or AKE L), or a movement unofficially under control of the Greek Cypriot
government.
Many physical and political obstacles make it unlikely that a large-scale insurgency
movement would be mounted or could be successfully carried out:
- Turkey has taken seriously the possibility of guerrilla warfare on Cyprus
and has augmented its occupation forces with three special battalions
(one commando and two trained in population control) to cope with this
eventuality.
- The Turkish lines run through a broad area of cultivated land, facilitating
the observation of infiltrators. Furthermore, the small size of Cyprus
would permit Turkish military reaction in any part of the island.
- Throughout their area, the occupation forces have instituted tight
control over population movement.
- Turkish occupation forces probably are prepared to use massive reprisals
against the Greek Cypriot population to counter any Greek insurgency
operations.
The long distance from Greece to Cyprus would permit Turkish naval
and air forces to interdict incoming supplies.
- A Greek Cypriot insurgency would involve territorial risks for the
Cypriots and for Greece should Athens support the movement. The
Turks might overrun the entire island or invade Greek islands near the
Turkish coast.
- Little outside support could be expected by a Greek Cypriot insurgent
movement. Thus far, neither the major powers nor any other states have
actively supported the Greek Cypriot populace against the Turks, and
other than humanitarian relief cannot be expected.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1974
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Prospects for a Greek Cypriot Insurgency
The unsettled postwar situation on Cyprus could
foster a Greek Cypriot insurgency against the Turkish
community and occupation forces. Officials of both
the Clerides government in Nicosia and the Karamanlis
government in Athens, as well as such self-proclaimed
Cypriot leaders as Nicos Sampson, have referred to
the possibility of guerrilla warfare on Cyprus. In-
surgency could grow out of a continued frustration
of the efforts of Greek Cypriot military and political
leaders to effect what they view as a reasonable set-
tlement with the Turks. Thus the likelihood of in-
surgency depends to a large extent on the outcome of
negotiations over both the final demarcation between
the Greek and Turkish held portions of the island and
the provisions for exchange of prisoners and refugees.
Potential Leadership
Any of three political parties on Cyprus or the
Greek Cypriot government could sponsor insurgency
operations against the Turks:
The EOKA-B, a right-wing organization dedi-
cated to union of Cyprus with Greece, might
attempt to assume leadership of an insur-
Note: This memorandum was prepared in the
the Office of Strateyic Research
in consultation
with analysts of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Comme.:Ls
and queries may be directed to
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14.
gency movement. This group could count on
the support of rightist Greek Cypriots, but
could not depend on the Cypriot government
or leftist elements for help.
The left-wing forces, through the EDEK (non-
Communist leftist party) or the AKEL (Commu-
nist party), might be inclined to mount
insurgency operations, primarily for their
own political gain. However, the AKEL prob-
ably would be dissuaded from violent action
against the Turks by the Soviet Union. Neither
of these elements would be likely to gain the
support of the EOKA-B or mainland Greek
officials.
The relatively well-disciplined Greek Cypriot
national guard could "unofficially" be employed
by the Greek Cypriot government as the core
force for guerrilla-type operations. Further,
the national guard is presently integrating
EOKA-B militiamen into its ranks.
Geography
Both the relatively small size of Cyprus and its
long distance from Greece would hamper insurgency in-
volving large units. The oversea supply route from
Greece is at least 350 miles long and susceptible to
Turkish interdiction. The relatively small size of
the island would facilitate any attempt by Turkey to
blockade the Greek side and to employ air strikes and
commando troops in attacks on Greek insurgent bases
which might be located in the Troodos Mountains.
The division of Cyprus by the Turks along their
present lines would hamper Greek abilities to stage
infiltration raids into Turkish territory. Turkish
positions, except those in a wooded area on the
northwest coast, would extend through a wide belt of
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cultivated fields, facilitating Turkish observation
of personnel movements. Infiltration over such ter-
rain by Greek units larger than squads of a few men
would be almost impossible.
Resources
Stocks of arms, ammunition, and demolition equip-
ment would be sufficient to support sporadic Greek
raids and terror campaigns. The years of tension
and recent fighting on the island have given cause
for almost every Greek Cypriot group to acquire
weapons. The Cypriot national guard lost most oi its
tanks and some artillery in the July and August fight-
ing, but at least some antitank and antiaircraft
weapons are being reintroduced by importing Greek
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materiel. The shortage of heavie/ weapons probably
would not hinder a limited terror ::ampaign.
Turkish Resistance
Turkey has taken seriously the possibility of
guerrilla warfare on Cyprus, and ha deployed troops
specially trained for antiguerrilla operations. Two
battalions of Jandarma troops--specially trained for
population control--have been incorporated into the
occupation force. One commando battalion also was
put ashore, charged with responsibility for combating
guerrilla activity.
Turkish authorities have been careful to estab-
lish tight controls over population and movement
throughout their areas. Greek refugees have been
carefully screened when allowed to return to Turkish-
held areas--males of military age generally have not
been permitted to return to villages. The Turks seem
intent upon maintaining a Turkish majority throughout
the occupation zone.
The disposition of Turkish forces is intended to
provide the maximum counterinsurgency capability. The
Turks nave sufficient armor and armored vehicles to
maintain security on all roadways in their zone, and
the troops are primarily mobile infantry, capable of
constantly patrolling to guard against infiltration by
raiding forces. Moreover, the Turks have kept their
armor and other major equipment dispersed so as not
to provide large targets for sabotage.
Turkish occupation forces probably are prepared to
use massive reprisals against the Greek Cypriot popu-
lation to counter any Greek insurgency operations.
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Political Risks
Greek Cypriot factions are seriously divided and
have not been able to coordinate effectively their
efforts against the Turks. If either a right-wing or
left-wing organization were to call for guerrilla war-
fare little unified direct support from Cypriots of
the opposing persuasion could be expected. Although
the Athens government, working through the Greek
Cypriot government, probably could obtain broad po-
litical cooperation on the island, it probably would
recognize that an attempt at insurgency operations
would be fraught with problems and risks:
A Greek-supported insurgency effort might
precipitate an offensive by the Turks to
establish control of the entire island.
Militarily, the Greeks cannot expect to
expel the Turkish forces, and the potential
for personnel losses would be great.
The Greek islands in the Aegean would be
placed in danger of attacks by Turkey. This
is particularly relevant to the islands of
Limnos and Lesbos, both of which are in the
area of disputed oil concessions.
The Turkish population in Greek Thrace could
start its own sabotage campaign.
The Greek Cypriots could expect little outside
support for any insurgency struggle on Cyprus. The
major powers in Western Europe, the US, and the USSR
probably would remain aloof. The Arab states and the
Palestinian organizations also would be unlikely to
support the Greeks. Although there has been some
contact between the EDEK and various Arab governments
on the basis of socialist fraternalism, political
sympathy probably would not override religion-based
support for the Turks on Cyprus.
Limited Prospects
Should insurgency operations be attempted, the
prospects for success on any significant scale are
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dim. It is unlikely that any of the groups which
could initiate such operations would receive ade-
quate support from the others. Other important
factors in the Cyprus situation--the geography of
Cyprus, limited military capabilities, and the cur-
rent political situation--militate against success-
ful widespread guerrilla warfarr and make attempts
at other than small-scale harassment of the Turkish
forces unlikely.
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