IRAN: THE SEIZURE OF THE EMBASSY IN RETROSPECT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06070606
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-00493
• Publication Date: November 1, 1981

National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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� f�
Iran: The Seizure of the
Embassy in Retrospect (u)
A Research Paper
Secret
NESA 81-10022
November 1981
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Intelligence Sources
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
(b)(3)
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Cnetv."4.
Iran: The Seizure of the
Embassy in Retrospect (u)
A Research Paper
Information available as of 12 August 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This paper was prepared by the
Office of Near East�South Asia Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA
(u)
It was coordinated with the Offices of Soviet Analysis
and Global Issues, the National Intelligence
Officer for Near East and South Asia, and the
Directorate of Operations. (u)
Secret
NESA 81-10022
November 1981
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Iran: The Seizure of the
Embassy in Retrospect (u)
Overview
The seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and the prolonged crisis that fol-
lowed demonstrate that in a highly volatile political environment there is
little effective defense against an organized, determined group seeking to
disrupt US policy and interests. The political instability in Iran that
followed the fall of the monarchy in February 1979 was a major factor in
both the takeover of the Embassy in November and in the inability and un-
willingness of Iran's revolutionary leadership to bring the crisis to an end.
(c)
The Islamic militants who seized the Embassy adopted the return of the
Shah to Iran as one of their demands, but their primary goal was to force
the pace of the revolution. Their occupation of the Embassy was designed
to create a crisis in US-Iranian relations and thereby discredit the
pragmatic policies of the Bazargan government. The Shah's presence in the
United States served as a pretext for the occupation and a rallying point to
stir up revolutionary fervor, but as the crisis developed, the Shah's fate
became of only symbolic importance. (c)
The evidence suggests that Ayatollah Khomeini did not order the seizure of
the Embassy and that he had no prior knowledge of plans for the takeover.
Khomeini's anger over the Shah's travel to the United States and fear that
his presence there posed a threat to the revolution developed slowly. His
initial comments on the issue were comparatively mild. Analysis of his
statements indicates that the influence of his more moderate advisers
waned over time, however, while more radical members of his entourage
gained the ascendancy, reinforcing the radical themes in his thinking. (s)
The militants�the "Muslim Student Followers of the Line of the
Imam"�were not an established political or guerrilla group. During the 14
months of the crisis, however, a small leadership group and a core of 40 to
50 followers maintained strict discipline among themselves and over the
larger group of politically unsophisticated provincials they recruited for the
occupation. Throughout the hostage crisis the militants experienced both
cooperation and conflict in their relations with the government. A number
of administrative offices of the government, as well as "revolutionary"
institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and local revolutionary
committees, provided logistical support. (s)
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The seizure of the Embassy was conceived, planned, and directed by
Iranian militants with the support or acquiescence of Iranian political and
clerical leaders. Exhaustive review of the evidence reveals no indication
that any foreign government or political organization was directly involved
in planning or carrying out the takeover, or that a foreign government or
political organization significantly influenced policy decisions by the
militants during the prolonged crisis. The Iranian Government's assistance
to the militants and the facilitites available to them in the Embassy
compound�including supplies of cash, food, and communications gear�
precluded the need for foreign support once the seizure had been accom-
plished. (s)
US efforts to resolve the crisis were hindered by its political utility to
Khomeini and to factions of the revolutionary leadership. In the short term,
US policies were ineffective. US sanctions and diplomatic efforts imposed
costs, however, that the Iranians continually had to weigh against the
benefits of prolonging the crisis and the political risks of ending it. As the
political utility of the crisis waned, economic sanctions, international
isolation, and diplomatic pressure from intermediaries provided the incen-
tive and the means for the Iranians to bring the crisis to an end. (c)
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The Embassy Seizure as a Case Study for US Policy
Origins of the Crisis. The media has focused on the
decision to admit the Shah to the United States as
the event that triggered the Embassy takeover. In
retrospect, however, we believe that symptoms of
political disarray�the collapse of political authority
following the fall of the monarchy, conflict over the
goals of the revolution, and an institutionally weak
leadership relying on techniques of mass mobilization
to generate support and deflect popular dissatisfac-
tion�were the major factors in the crisis. (c)
Threats Posed by Militant Islam. The costs to Iran of
the prolonged crisis might serve as a deterrent to
other radical regimes tempted to flout generally
accepted standards of international conduct. Rejec-
tion of diplomatic norms because they are a reflection
of Western values imposed on the Islamic world,
however, is an element of the Iranian revolutionary
ideology. To fundamentalist groups elsewhere, the
"lesson" of the hostage crisis might not be that it was
highly costly to the state, but that it was a heroic
example of defiance of the West by a group of
believers unwilling to compromise and accept West-
ern values. (c)
A Model for Terrorist Operations. Terrorists seek to
attract international attention to their cause by sud-
den, dramatic acts of violence such as assassinations
or bombings or by hostage situations in which vio-
lence is threatened if conditions are not met before a
specific deadline. The Iranian militants�with gov-
ernment- cooperation once they had seized the Embas-
sy and popular support for their cause�set no dead-
lines, prolonged the crisis, and conducted a
sophisticated media campaign by releasing state-
ments and captured documents at intervals to main-
tain public interest and government support. (c)
Techniques of Crisis Resolution. US efforts to resolve
the crisis were hindered by its political utility to
Khomeini and to factions of the revolutionary leader-
ship. In the short term, US policies were ineffective.
US sanctions and diplomatic efforts imposed costs,
however, that the Iranians had to weigh continually
against the benefits of prolonging the crisis and the
political risks of ending it. As the political utility of
the crisis waned over time, economic sanctions, inter-
national isolation, and diplomatic pressure from in-
termediaries provided the incentive and the means for
the Iranians to bring the crisis to an end. (c)
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Iran: The Seizure of the
Embassy in Retrospect (u)
Background to the Embassy Seizure
The Embassy takeover followed months of instability
that had continued after the collapse of political
authority in Iran during the revolution. By the early
fall of 1979 a referendum had been passed sanction-
ing the establishment of an Islamic republic, and a
constituent assembly had been elected to debate the
terms of a new constitution. The politically diverse
coalition that had joined in opposition to the Shah had
fragmented, however, over divisive foreign and do-
mestic policy issues. (c)
Political turmoil and weak administrative authority
contributed to the seizure of the Embassy and to the
prolonged hostage crisis that followed:
� During late September and October 1979, schools
and universities were reopening. Politics among
rival Islamic and leftist student factions were at a
high point, and clerical leaders feared that student
unrest would undermine the regime's authority.
� Religious fervor, maintained at a high pitch since
the revolution, was whipped up by the pilgrimage
season, the climax of the religious year in the
Islamic month of Muharram, and the beginning of a
new century on the Islamic calendar.
� The Bazargan government, which had failed to
deliver on the promises of the revolution and which
had repeatedly shown itself powerless to defy the
self-appointed revolutionary committees, was fur-
ther weakened in October by a major political
scandal. (c)
Student Unrest. The opening of Iranian universities
between late September and mid-October after sever-
al weeks' delay was accompanied by persistent rumors
that there would be trouble when classes started. The
main Tehran universities as well as campuses else-
where in Iran were in administrative and political
disarray. Many professors had left the country, and
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course curriculums were uncertain. New heads of
universities had to deal with unruly committees set up
in the colleges as well as with rival political groups
among both students and faculty. (c)
A common concern was that the opening of schools
would lead to agitation against the Khomeini regime.
During the week before the occupation of the Embas-
sy the Islamic Associations and Muslim student orga-
nizations at the University of Tehran, for example,
addressed a letter to the Revolutionary Council charg-
ing that the revolution was on the brink of failure.
The letter noted that the government had made no
progress in meeting the revolution's promise of land
reform, altering the balance of power in society,
alleviating the housing shortage, or addressing a
number of other problems. (c)
The government's control and influence over the
university community was left uncertain after the
death in September of Ayatollah Taleqani, the princi-
pal broker of the students' interests with the political
and religious hierarchy. Repeated calls for unity
between students and religious leaders during October
reflected the clerical leaders' efforts to prevent the
emergence of a student movement directed against
the clergy. Clerical leaders probably overestimated
the strength of their opposition�the students were by
no means united against clerical participation in
politics�but anticlerical student groups were active,
contributing to the political ferment and the regime's
fears for its own survival. (c)
Religious Fervor. The seizure of the Embassy came
immediately after the 10 days marking events in the
annual pilgrimage to Mecca and only a few weeks
before the high point of the Shia religious year, the
month of Muharram, when the martyrdom of the
legitimate successors to Mohammad�in Shia eyes�
is commemorated. The association of political goals
with emotionally compelling religious themes has
been a common aspect of politics during the revolu-
tion. (c)
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Khomeini and other clerical leaders directly associat-
ed Iran's revolution with events on the religious
calendar in several speeches in late October, stirring
up popular support for revolutionary goals. Khomeini
placed himself directly in the tradition of the mar-
tyred successors to Mohammad on 23 October when
he commented on the approaching anniversary of the
death of his son, whom he referred to as a saintly
figure who had set an example for all Iranians. The
effect of Khomeini's words was to renew religious and
revolutionary enthusiasm. There were massive demon-
strations throughout Iran in response to his call for
unity against threats to the Islamic republic. (c)
During the last week before the Embassy seizure,
events on the religious calendar had strong associ-
ations with a more radical policy toward the United
States. On 30 October, the ninth day of the half�the
day when pilgrims gather at the hill of Arafat outside
Mecca�Khomeini addressed the Muslims of the
world, praising those who fought with faith and
"defeated a great power." On the next day Muslims
mark the gathering of pilgrims at Mozdalefa, where
stones are hurled at a place where Satan is said to
have appeared and been driven away; Khomeini often
referred to the United States as the "great Satan."
The final day of the hajj on 1 November, the Feast of
Sacrifice, Was marked in Iran by anti-American
demonstrations in most of the major cities.
Government Weakness. Throughout September and
October 1979, Prime Minister Bazargan's provisional
government experienced setbacks that so weakened its
authority that it was incapable of challenging the
militants' occupation of the Embassy. Bazargan had
been unsuccessful in bringing the numerous revolu-
tionary committees in government ministries, the
military, industry, and local administration under
control. The government was widely regarded as
ineffective and not entirely supported by Khomeini.
Bazargan complained bitterly in public that his gov-
ernment was a "knife without a blade." He continual-
ly counseled patience in the face of mounting de-
mands for revolutionary change. (c)
Bazargan's weakness was evident in early October
when a government ban on unauthorized demonstra-
tions, gatherings, and marches was ignored. On
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6 October more than 4,000 unemployed demonstrated
in front of the Labor Ministry, and a few days later
hundreds of protestors staged a march in Tehran. At
the same time, violence was continuing in several
provincial areas including Kurdistan, Baluchistan,
and Khuzestan. A political scandal in late October
further weakened the government's authority. The
Deputy Minister of Commerce went into hiding after
the discovery of his involvement in a $4 million fraud.
(c)
The government's weakness in dealing with students
was demonstrated in early October when various
student groups began seizing hotels in Tehran and
other cities for use as dormitories. The Tehran pros-
ecutor general protested the seizures but did not take
steps to evict the students. The government was put in
the position of having to defend the interests of
property owners against the demands of students
claiming to be revolutionary�they claimed to be
acting against capitalism and imperialism�and was
powerless to act. (c)
The Shah's Arrival in the United States
The Shah's arrival in the United States on 22 October
1979 to undergo a medical examination in New York
had little immediate impact in Iran. Public attention
was focused on internal problems. The absence of a
strong public reaction contributed to the apparent
confidence of moderates in the provisional govern-
ment�including Prime Minister Bazargan and For-
eign Minister Yazdi�that they could weather any
crisis resulting from the Shah's presence in the United
States. (c)
Iranian press treatment of the Shah's arrival in the
United States was light and relatively objective
throughout the period between 22 October and
4 November when the Embassy was seized. The day
after the Shah's arrival in New York the Tehran
newspapers carried wire service reports without com-
ment, in most cases burying the story. One Farsi-
language newspaper carried a front-page headline to
the effect that the Shah had been given a residence
permit in the United States, but the accompanying
wire service story was short and placed in the back
pages. (c)
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A survey of the Islamic Republic Party's (IRP) Farsi-
language daily newspaper between 22 October and 4
November reveals no significant effort to mobilize
public sentiment against the United States because of
the Shah. The Shah's travel was noted in a brief back-
page article on 24 October which noted both that the
Foreign Ministry had requested that the Shah not be
allowed to engage in political activity and that the
Shah had cancer. During the following 10 days, the
IRP newspaper covered various speeches in which the
Shah was mentioned and carried routine items alleg-
ing unspecified "US and Zionist plots" against Iran.
The paper's announcement of demonstrations made
no link, however, to the Shah's presence in the United
States. (c)
The first major demonstration to follow the Shah's
arrival in the United States came on 26 October when
millions of Iranians in Tehran and provincial cities
marched in support of the leadership of Ayatollah
Khomeini. The IRP called for the demonstrations,
and numerous Islamic societies and organizations
announced their support. In one of the few direct
references to the Shah and the United States during
the day's activities, IRP Chairman and Revolutionary
Council leader Ayatollah Beheshti told a crowd at
Tehran University that the Iranian people had suf-
fered martyrdom under the Shah for decades and now
the United States had welcomed him. Beheshti de-
manded that the United States clarify its position on
the revolution in Iran. (c)
A major demonstration called for by the IRP and the
Militant Clergy Society occurred at the Embassy on
1 November to protest "antirevolutionary plots spon-
sored by Western imperialists," "imperialist policies
of the British and US arresting Muslim Iranians,"
and "the US giving refuge to the deposed Shah." The
IRP organizers announced the night before the dem-
onstration that a planned march to the Embassy had
been called off and that the marchers should instead
move from initial gathering points for prayers to a
public square in south Tehran. The announcement
was repeated during the prayer services on the morn-
ing of 1 November. Nevertheless, a crowd numbering
4,000 or more gathered at the Embassy during the
3
day, chanting anti-American slogans. The crowd dis-
persed in the early afternoon. There is no evidence
that this demonstration was a "dry run" for the
demonstration on 4 November that preceded the
attack on the Embassy. (c)
Government Reaction to the
Shah's Arrival in the United States
The government's initial public comment indicated
that Iran had accepted US assurances concerning the
reasons for the Shah's travel to the United States. A
Foreign Ministry spokesman said on 24 October that
it was the government's understanding that the de-
posed Shah had gone to the United States only for
medical treatment and that he and his wife had been
given no right to engage in political activities. The
spokesman added that the Shah was suffering from
"terminal cancer." (c)
On 31 October, following what they claimed was a
review of the Shah's medical records and the failure
of Iranian physicians to gain direct access to the Shah
to confirm reports about his health, the government
delivered a formal protest to the Embassy. The note
conveyed Iran's position that it "did not accept the
American Government's excuses for granting entry
permission to the deposed Shah." The government
expected "that he should be expelled from the US
immediately upon leaving the hospital." Foreign Min-
istry officials told the Embassy privately that "outside
pressures" for a stronger reaction were increasing,
implying that Khomeini might order a break in
relations between Iran and the United States. (c)
Information available on planning for the Embassy
takeover suggests that the preparations were inten-
tionally concealed from anyone who might have op-
posed the plan and that the government was taken by
surprise on 4 November.
the Bazargan government had no ad-
vance warning of the militants' seizure of the
Embassy:
� Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister
Yazdi left Tehran for Algeria where they met with
senior US officials shortly before the Embassy
takeover.
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� Minister of Justice Haj Seyed Javadi was uncertain
how to deal with the Shah's arrival in the United
States, had no plans, and was not coordinating with
the clergy on the issue,
� Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, then Director of Iranian Radio
and Television and later Foreign Minister, said that
when the Embassy was seized, he had no idea who
the militants were,
The cooperation of police and security forces in
allowing the demonstrators unimpeded access to the
Embassy compound on 4 November, however, sug-
gests some degree of prior coordination at least at
lower levels of administration. The general breakdown
in government authority and the chaos in the bureauc-
racy that allowed various offices to operate virtually
independent of central control suggest that it would
have been possible, even likely, for local police around
the Embassy to work out their own arrangement with
the militants. (s)
Khomeini and the Radical Clergy
Khomeini's increasingly inflammatory rhetoric fol-
lowing the Shah's arrival in the United States pro-
vided the militants with justification for seizing the
Embassy, but we do not believe he ordered the attack.
Analysis of Khomeini's statements indicates that his
anger and fear that the presence of the Shah in the
United States posed a threat to the revolution slowly
grew with the prodding of more radical members of
his entourage. There is conflicting evidence on wheth-
er the more radical clerics knew of plans for the
Embassy occupation and so pressed Khomeini in order
to prepare the way. It is likely, however, that some did
know of the plan, while others did not but then
quickly approved of the attack after it had taken
place. (c)
The statement that the militants later cited as the
basis for the seizure of the Embassy�Khomeini's
charge to students to "expand with all your might
your attacks on the US"�was not a speech, but
rather a signed statement issued by Khomeini's office.
We now believe such statements, which are clearer
and more policy oriented than Khomeini's speeches,
Secret
reflect the views of members of his entourage who
have pressed a certain view and then succeeded in
getting the Ayatollah to sign, indicating his assent. (s)
Khomeini's speeches during the period between the
Shah's arrival in the United States and the attack on
the Embassy give a clear indication that the influence
of his more moderate advisers waned over time while
more radical members of his entourage gained the
ascendancy:
� On 24 October, in his first public statement about
the Shah's travel in the United States, Khomeini
focused on the issue of the Shah's wealth. The
speech clearly reflected Foreign Minister Yazdi's
influence, and there is no indication of concern that
the Shah's presence in the United States posed a
threat to the revolution.
� In a speech on 26 October Khomeini mentioned
growing concern in Iran that there was a "plot"
involved in the Shah's presence in the United States,
but the balance of the speech dwelled on Khomeini's
often-repeated theme that Iran would be better off
if it could be totally separated from the United
States.
� On 28 October Khomeini returned to the same
theme, commenting that the argument that Iran
needed the West was an illness with which Iranian
society was afflicted. The nature of the speech
suggests that contending factions in Khomeini's
entourage�those favoring continuing ties with the
United States and those opposed�were arguing
their respective cases with Khomeini.
� By 30 October more radical, "revolutionary"
themes became more prominent in Khomeini's pro-
nouncements. He denounced the government bu-
reaucracy and called for a purge of administrative
agencies and the educational system.
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� Khomeini noted in a speech on 2 November that
Iranian physicians had told him the Shah could
have been treated elsewhere. He charged that this
was evidence that "the great powers and Satans"
wanted to use the Shah as a "tool." Khomeini
referred to the Shah as a "corpse," however, and
remarked that any attempt to use the Shah would
be futile. (c)
The speech on 2 November was Khomeini's last
before the takeover, and his prescription for action
remained vague. He "protested" the Shah's presence
in the United States and "demanded" that the Shah
and his wealth be returned. In contrast, the statement
issued over Khomeini's signature on 3 November
called for "students and theological students to ex-
pand with all their might their attacks against the US
and Israel." The careful phrasing of the statement
and the specific call for action suggest that the more
radical clerics in Khomeini's entourage, seeking to stir
up revolutionary fervor and to forge an alliance of
convenience with student groups, had gained
Khomeini's assent to their views. (c)
Although Khomeini apparently approved the call for
direct action, there is some evidence that he was wary
of radical movements among students and that he
feared losing control of the revolution. In his speech
on 2 November, for example, he was critical of
younger people who wanted to force the pace of the
revolution. He noted that these radicals "should not
constantly find fault with the courts, with the police
force, with the Revolutionary Guards, with the gov-
ernment, and with other things. All this shows that
they are lacking in political maturity." (c NF)
Hojat-ol-Eslam Musavi-Khoeni who was to become
the militants' clerical adviser, believed that Khomeini
might not have approved of the militants' plan if he
had been forewarned of it, but that he would go along
with it after the fact. In an interview after the
takeover, Khoeni said student leaders had approached
him in October with their plan and asked him to
obtain Khomeini's approval. Khoeni, by his own ac-
count, told them the plan was "in line with the
implementation of the Imam's views," but that as
leader of the revolution it might be "indecent" for
5
Khomeini to approve taking the hostages before the
fact. Khoeni related that he told the students to keep
their plan a secret. Once the operation was under way,
if Khomeini disapproved, they could vacate the Em-
bassy. (s)
We lack information about the role of members of
Khomeini's entourage�a loosely defined group of
clerical and lay followers�prior to the Embassy
takeover. Those closest to Khomeini, including mem-
bers of his family, probably did not know of the
militants' plans. His most prominent clerical followers
may have known. In their private comments to US
officials in late October, Ayatollahs Beheshti and
Montazeri maintained a restrained tone in dealing
with the issue of the Shah's presence in the United
States. Beheshti later said that had the members of
the Revolutionary Council known of the militants'
plans in advance, they would not have given their
permission. It seems unlikely, however, that the mili-
tants' clerical adviser Khoeni would have worked with
them without informing Beheshti in at least general
terms of their plans. (s)
The Embassy Takeover
The crowd that approached the Embassy between
0900 and 1000 on 4 November may have numbered
several thousand. Of these, a group of 300 to 400
entered the compound through the Embassy gates
shortly after 1000. About noon, some gained access to
the chancery building through a ground floor window,
while others checked and cleared the other buildings
on the compound. By 1330 they had control of the
compound and by 1500 had taken the Embassy staff
hostage. The 1400 Tehran Radio news carried a
report that a group calling itself "The Muslim Stu-
dent Followers of the Line of the Imam" had occupied
the Embassy. (s)
The evidence remains unclear on the militants' specif-
ic motivations for the occupation. One of the militants
claimed that planning for the occupation began
"about a week" before the event but gave no details
on the reasons for the decision. Another of the
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The matter was brought up by some of the reliable
students of the Islamic societies of the universities
who said that as long as Bazargan continues to
demonstrate a lack of ability, the waves of discontent
would increase. (u)
If we do not do anything, the Mujahedin and other
leftist groups will do something. Thus, on the morn-
ing of the fourth of November, a group of 400 people
set out to put this plan into effect. A large number of
them, like me, were unaware of what was going on
behind the scenes, and the general feeling was that it
was necessary to take some steps against America. (u)
It was established that the young people of each
university (Tehran, Industrial, Polytechnic, and Na-
tional) should separately come to the Bahar cross-
road, and from there we would head for the Embassy.
It was emphasized that no one had the right to carry
weapons. (u)
In order to prevent the influence and participation of
other students. . . they had given each one of us little
cards which specified our later duties in the Embas-
sy. They also gave us special armbands which we
were to wear throughout the march. In addition, in
order to separate our line from others, we also had
pictures of the Imam which we had to pin on our
chests. This was to prevent anyone else from entering
our ranks. The movement of the young people against
the crimes of America had begun. (u)
�One of the militants
militants said that students from several universities
worked on the plans for "about 10 days." The group
decided that 4 November was the most appropriate
day for a demonstration and occupation of the Em-
bassy because the date marked the anniversary of
Khomeini's exile from Iran 14 years before. The date
also marked the first anniversary of the Tehran
University confrontation that led to the installation of
the Azhari military government and the last months
of the Shah's rule. (c)
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The timing of the militants' decision to begin planning
for an occupation of the Embassy suggests that the
Shah's arrival in the United States was one catalyst
for the event. Another major factor was what the
militants perceived as growing pragmatism in the
Bazargan government's relations with the United
States. The Embassy seizure was designed to create a
crisis in US-Iranian relations which would stop the
US "plot" to redirect the revolution along lines
acceptable to the West. (s)
A number of parochial issues may also have been
involved. The militants' clerical mentor, Khoeni,
claimed later that the occupation was calculated to
generate support for the students and opposition to
groups attempting to have the universities closed. The
militants' eighth public statement, issued the day
after the takeover, notes that "any act to close the
schools and universities . . . is condemned." (c)
The militants' first public statement, issued within an
hour after the Embassy takeover�suggesting that it
had been prepared in advance�contained no explicit
demands and attempted to portray the seizure of the
Embassy as a protest demonstration. The militants
quoted the statement issued by Khomeini's office on 3
November calling on the students to "expand their
attacks" on the United States to force the United
States "to extradite the Shah." Their careful use of
this statement appears to have been an attempt to
prevent a move against them by associating them-
selves with Khomeini's order. The balance of the
militants' first communique asserted that they had
seized the Embassy in an effort to focus world
attention on their "protests" against the United
States. (s)
The Militants' Initial Goals
The militants' first objective was to gain Khomeini's
support for their radical interpretation of his views,
and they were careful to avoid anything that could
provide Khomeini or Bazargan with an excuse to
move against them. Because the hostage-taking was
their greatest vulnerability, they moved quickly to
make it politically difficult for anyone to force the
release of the hostages or to discredit their action.
They referred to the hostage-taking as an attempt to
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Figure I. The US Embassy compound in Tehran. (14
carry out "the will of the Iranian people" and left the
fate of the hostages to "the will of the nation." One of
the militants, interviewed 12 hours after the Embassy
takeover, noted, "I should mention that my friends
entered the Embassy as demonstrators and not for a
military takeover .. . wherever the action leads to, the
final decision will be with the people . . . whether to
keep (the hostages) until the Shah returns or whether
to let them go . .. whether there will be an Embassy
or not will depend on them." (c)
Several statements issued by the militants on 4 No-
vember indicate their tactical concern to head off any
attempt by security forces to remove them from the
Embassy compound. The militants announced that
they had encountered resistance but had "patiently
tolerated great pain and treated it in an Islamic
manner." They noted that they had taken hostages
but that "no violent action has been taken against
them." They praised the Revolutionary Guards for
keeping order outside the Embassy, calling them
"true supporters of the revolution" and saying that
the Guards "understand our action well." The mili-
tants quickly announced discovery of "evidence" that
the Embassy was an "espionage center." (c)
7
The militants publicly adopted the uncompromising
position that the hostages would be released when the
Shah was returned to Iran only after Khomeini's
office issued a policy statement on 7 November. The
statement probably reflected the influence of the more
radical members of Khomeini's entourage. It noted
that a US special representative was on his way to
Iran and that Khomeini would not meet him. The
provisions of the statement prevented any member of
the Revolutionary Council or other "responsible offi-
cials" from meeting the US representative and set
Iran's terms: "Should the United States hand over to
Iran the deposed Shah .. . and give up espionage
against our movement, the way to talks would be
opened." The militants quickly supported the demand.
(c)
The Militants Win Support
Several key groups and individuals gave strong sup-
port to the militants almost immediately after the
Embassy takeover. The theological center in Qom�
an apparently strong influence on Khomeini�con-
demned relations between Iran and the United States.
Ayatollah Beheshti, addressing the constituent assem-
bly, acknowledged that diplomats should be protected,
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Figure 2. Flag burning on US Embassy wall. (u)
but supported the Embassy takeover on the grounds
that the United States had admitted the Shah. Aya-
tollah Montazeri, the clerical leader of Tehran and at
that time Khomeini's apparent political heir, support-
ed the occupation. Revolutionary Guard leader La-
huti said that the Guards were prepared to defend the
militants from any attempt to move against them.
Islamic societies and groups in a number of provincial
centers announced their support for the militants. (c)
Mass demonstrations in front of the Embassy on the
day of the takeover continued after the militants had
entered the compound. Many of the demonstrators
were probably in the streets because of a rally called
by the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) to mark the
anniversary of the Tehran University confrontation.
All of the routes of march given in the IRP newspaper
on 3 November indicated the university as the point of
convergence, but news broadcasts of the takeover
drew some of the crowds to the Embassy. At mid-
morning on the day after the takeover, a larger crowd,
estimated at over 6,000, formed at the Embassy, and
several religious leaders were present, leading prayers.
Leftist groups, including the Mujahedin, organized
their followers to keep a constant presence in front of
the Embassy. (s)
Secret
On 5 November Islamic student groups in Tabriz and
Shiraz demonstrated their support for the militants by
seizing the unoccupied US consulates in those cities
and issuing demands similar to those made by the
militants in Tehran. Members of these groups may
later have come to the Embassy compound in Teh-
ran�there were student groups from the universities
of Tabriz and Shiraz among the militants at a later
stage�but we lack evidence that there was a clear
link between the Embassy takeover and the seizure of
the consulates. (s)
Another group seized the British Embassy in Tehran
on 5 November but vacated it the same day after
failing to win public support for their action. On 6
November two groups seized Iraqi consulates in Ker-
manshah and Khoramshahr but vacated them after
the Iraqis responded by seizing Iranian consulates in
Iraq and after Khomeini issued instructions calling a
halt to the seizures. (s)
Over the following days and weeks crowds continued
to demonstrate in front of the Embassy, drawn by
religious and revolutionary fervor, the attention of the
news media, and active organizational efforts by
groups supporting the takeover.
The
militants tnemseives called tor demonstrations on
several occasions, although there were indications that
they were concerned to keep the demonstrations man-
ageable because they feared an unruly mob might
overrun the compound. (s NF NC OC)
The Fall of Bazargan's Government
With mounting demonstrations of public support, the
militants were emboldened by the second day of the
occupation to begin making open political demands
rather than only "protests." They remained careful,
however, to disassociate themselves from any political
"line" other than that of Khomeini. They denied
connections with any "group, organization, or party"
and indicated that their political positions were based
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on Islam and the thought of the Ayatollah. They went
on to say that they had seized the Embassy in order
to: _
� "Force the leaders of step-by-step politics to adopt a
revolutionary policy in the direction of the demands
of the majority of the oppressed Iranian nation."
� "Censure the suppressive US relations with Iran
and cut the military, political, and economic
dependence by expelling American consultants; dis-
solving bilateral contacts between Iran and the
United States; and abolishing the dependent capital-
ist system." (c)
Following a visit to the Embassy compound by Ah-
mad Khomeini on the second day�which served as
public confirmation of the Ayatollah's support for the
occupation�the militants went further and attempted
to put Khomeini in the position of supporting them
against the Bazargan government. The militants re-
ferred to the meeting between Bazargan and US
officials in Algiers: "How can we tolerate this, when
the responsible officials sit around one table with
American wolves, while you angrily shout that the
United States is the major enemy of the Muslim and
oppressed masses?" (c)
On 6 November the government resigned, and its
authority was vested in the Revolutionary Council at
Khomeini's order. The broad public support for the
militants' seizure of the Embassy and for the radical
break the militants advocated in relations with the
United States had proved the final blow for Bazar-
gan's cabinet. Bazargan's absence from the country
during the two days preceding the Embassy take-
over�he returned from Algiers at approximately the
same time the militants were moving into the Embas-
sy compound�had made it all the more difficult for
him to deal with the crisis. In any case, by 6
November public opinion clearly favored the mili-
tants, and the government had no alternative but to
resign. (s)
Khomeini's Reaction to the Takeover
Khomeini's public support of the occupation made it
virtually impossible for any group to act against the
militants without his explicit order. His backing re-
flected his hatred for the Shah, his hatred for the
9
United States and the influence of Western values on
Iran, and his desire to stay in step with public opinion.
In addition Khomeini supported the militants as a
means of assuring the broadest possible public approv-
al at a time when the constitution establishing the
institutions of the Islamic republic was about to be
submitted to public referendum, and at a time when
public dissatisfaction with the failures of the revolu-
tion was growing. (c)
Khomeini's public response reflected two additional
themes in his thinking: the powerlessness of the
United States to confront a revolutionary Iran, and
the strength of Iran as a nation of Muslims willing to
accept martyrdom. The hostage crisis provided an
occasion for Khomeini to draw on the strong religious
and emotional currents of the crusade against the
Shah by dwelling on the martyrdom theme. (c)
Despite his support for the militants, Khomeini was
wary of losing control over the pace of the revolution.
Two days after the Embassy seizure he chided a group
of students from the University of Isfahan, lecturing
them on the dangers of chaos. The speech may have
reflected a concession to departing Prime Minister
Bazargan, since his remarks on unwarranted seizures
of property and the importance of legal procedures
reflected Bazargan's thinking. But the nature of
Khomeini's comment suggests that he was addressing
the militants as well:
I advise you to be careful and not do something
that will let the world say that a bunch of savages
have gathered together in a desert, in Iran, and
everybody does what he likes; that there is no law,
no religious principles, no courts, no investigation.
. . . You should not do something that will let them
say Iran is following the law of the jungle and that
we are savages. . . . I have to tell you that if you
wish your country to be independent and free and
an Islamic country, the first thing that is incum-
bent upon all of us is to prevent disorder. (c)
In a speech to the same group a day later Khomeini
lashed out at young critics who charged that the
revolution had not gone far enough. He reminded
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them that the monarchy was gone, that the large
superpower presence was gone, and that political
freedom to hold meetings such as the one he was
addressing had been secured. Khomeini warned
against disruptions by the left and went on to urge the
establishment of the institutions of the Islamic repub-
lic. His determination to decide the pace of the
revolution himself and to prevent groups acting in his
name from achieving their own ends remained con-
stant throughout the hostage crisis. (c)
Government Assistance to the Militants
Throughout the hostage crisis the militants expe-
rienced both cooperation and conflict in their relations
with the government and with Khomeini. The pro-
longed occupation would not have been possible with-
out the continuing cooperation of a number of govern-
ment offices while the political successors of the
Bazargan cabinet argued over the fate of the hos-
tages. The complex pattern of this assistance to the
militants resulted from informal connections between
the militants and Iranian officials and from the
administrative chaos that made it possible for govern-
ment offices to operate virtually independent of cen-
tral control. (s)
One of the senior Embassy officers held hostage
characterized the political dynamics of the 14 months
of the crisis by noting the extremely fragmented
authority of the Islamic republic. "Everyone was in
charge, and no one was in charge." The significance
of the militants' use of Iran's civilian airline to
transport blindfolded and bound hostages within the
country, for example, was less the fact that the airline
was state run and more that the militants used it
unchallenged. Similarly:
� Revolutionary Guards and other security forces
provided security for the Embassy compound and
assisted during the dispersal of the hostages early in
the occupation and after the aborted US rescue
mission in April 1980.
� The judiciary system, including the Public Prosecu-
tor's office and prison administrators, provided var-
ious kinds of assistance including housing many of
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the hostages in two Tehran prisons for prolonged
periods. The militants told the hostages that the
Public Prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Jus-
tice were very much on the militants' side.
� One of the militants' committees within the Embas-
sy maintained direct contact with the Ministry of
National Guidance. Through this channel the mili-
tants learned quickly about what foreign news agen-
cies and newspapers were reporting about the hos-
tage crisis. In addition Iranian news media served as
a continuing platform for the militants to focus
attention on. the Embassy by releasing statements
and translated documents taken from Embassy files.
� There were contacts between members of the mili-
tants' leadership group and demonstration organiz-
ers probably associated with the IRP. One of the
militants later related an incident in which members
of the leadership group called on organized street
gangs (the "hezbehollahis" or "Party of God") to
stage demonstrations in their support during an
internal quarrel.
The Militants' Relations With the
Revolutionary Council
Flushed with their success in having contributed to
the fall of the Bazargan government, the militants
from the earliest days of the crisis denied that the
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Revolutionary Council had any authority over them.
They issued statements calling on the Council to carry
out its duties in a revolutionary manner after Kho-
meini delegated executive authority to the Council on
6 November. The militants repeatedly said they
would not obey an order from the Council to release
the hostages unless they received explicit instructions
from Khomeini to do so. They frustrated at least two
efforts by the Council to assume control of the
hostages. (c NF)
Several of the militants' leaders apparently main-
tained contact with Ayatollah Beheshti�and protect-
ed his interests by preventing the release of Embassy
documents covering his meetings with US officials.
Conflict among the militants over policy toward Be-
heshti and the IRP, however, reportedly led to a
major factional dispute and the subsequent "resigna-
tion" of some of the militants. Documents relating to
Beheshti's meetings with US officials were later made
public by one of the militants who was critical of the
policy decisions made by the leadership group
The militants' clerical mentor, Khoeni, together with
Ali Tehrani, another prominent cleric, may have
attempted a political power play against Beheshti by
threatening to reveal the documents shortly before
Iran's presidential elections. Beheshti clearly won the
match, reportedly forcing Khoeni's resignation from a
leading position with the Iranian Radio and Television
organization and dispatching Tehrani to "supervise"
presidential election balloting in Mashhad. As a result
release of the documents was held up, some of the
militants left the Embassy, and Khoeni apparently
moved to restore good relations with Beheshti
The more radical clerics used the militants and the
hostage crisis as a focus of popular attention in their
efforts to weaken their rivals politically. Tagging
moderates with the unpopular position of being "soft
on the US" helped assure the radical clergy's rise to
political dominance. In addition, leaders of the Qom
theological center instigated demonstrations at the
Embassy during the month of Muharram (late No-
vember and early December 1979) to keep popular
11
enthusiasm at a high pitch for the impending referen-
dum on the constitution. One of the militants later
complained bitterly that the hostage crisis had been
used by others to suit their own political ends. (s)
The Militants' Relations With Khomeini
Khomeini maintained contact with the militants
through his son Ahmad and through Khoeni. Charac-
teristically, given his style of leadership, age, and
health, he appears to have acted primarily as the final
arbiter of disputes and probably was not consulted on
day-to-day decisions. Khomeini met directly with
leaders of the militants on several occasions, contin-
ued to express support for the takeover as "the will of
the Iranian people," and supported some of their
specific decisions over the objections of members of
his government. Nevertheless, there were several in-
stances of conflict between the militants and Kho-
meini. (s)
The militants manipulated Khomeini by stirring up
popular support for their own radical interpretation of
his views. They formulated their demands�the re-
turn of the Shah and his wealth and an end to US
"interference" in Iran�by quoting from Khomeini's
statements. Their insistence that no compromise was
possible emulated Khomeini's tactic of achieving po-
litical victories by refusing to compromise. By mobi-
lizing popular opinion to support these radical strains
in Khomeini's thought, the militants limited the abili-
ty of Bani-Sadr and others to make concessions to the
United States and made it politically dangerous for
Khomeini to support a more moderate course. (c)
(b)(3)
Khomeini made at least two public statements in the
early stages of the crisis suggesting that he might
consider policies less extreme than those advocated by (b)(3)
the militants. In an interview on 18 November 1979,
he responded to a question about future relations with
the United States by saying that some degree of
relations was possible provided the United States
ceased its "interference" in Iranian affairs. He made
clear on several occasions that it would be the new
legislature and not the militants who would decide the
hostages' fate. In addition Khomeini maintained some
political distance from the militants by referring to
them only in general terms as "our young people" and
by frustrating their goals at several points. (C)
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Khomeini's order that American clergymen be al-
lowed to visit the hostages at Christmas 1979 appar-
ently went against the wishes of the militants. In
return, on one occasion the militants refused to allow
an American reporter into the Embassy compound
after Khomeini had approved the meeting. In early
January 1980 Khomeini frustrated attempts by the
militants to have the three Americans remaining in
the Foreign Ministry building transferred to the
Embassy compound. (C)
Khomeini balanced unfavorable decisions on the mili-
tants' requests with more favorable positions, follow-
ing his practice of keeping a balance between compet-
ing factions and reflecting shifting balances within his
entourage. In February 1980, for example, Ahmad
Khomeini met with the militants to discuss a response
to UN Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to re-
solve the crisis. The militants emerged from the
meeting arm in arm with Ahmad and shortly there-
after announced that neither they nor Khomeini
would accept any compromise. In March and April
1980 Khomeini refused to support the Revolutionary
Council's attempts to win control over the hostages.
(s NF)
The Militants:
Origins, Organization, and Ideology
The militants who seized the Embassy were not an
established political or guerrilla group. During the 14
months of the occupation a small leadership cadre and
a core group of 40 to 50 followers maintained strict
discipline over their more transient larger member-
ship. A major factor in the leadership's ability to
maintain discipline was the lack of political sophisti-
cation of many of their followers. Most of the mili-
tants were provincials who were studying in Tehran,
and with the exception of the leadership they were
neither well traveled nor well read. (s)
Several aspects of the militants' occupation of the
Embassy differentiate the hostage crisis from terrorist
operations of the past 15 years:
� Many of the militants' decisions, including the
decision to prolong the occupation and hold the
hostages in exchange for the return of the Shah,
Secret
appear to have been ad hoc responses to develop-
ments outside the Embassy. There were internal
disputes in reaching these policy decisions which led
to the "resignations" of some of the militants.
� The broad public support the militants received and
the active cooperation from government security
forces removed the siege atmosphere of a terrorist
incident.
� The militants came and left the Embassy at will,
with only a few restrictions to maintain security. Of
the approximately 400 militants, a quarter were
always "off duty," at which time they were permit-
ted to go home or to their dormitories to change
their clothes and rest,
The average age of the militants' leadership was
about 28 years, and of their followers about 22.
Approximately a fourth of them were women. Most of
the militants were students of science, including
mathematics, chemistry, engineering, and medicine.
Some of the older militants appear to have been
recent students or graduate students who had partici-
pated in the politics of the revolution but had not
established themselves in any regular vocation. (s)
Origins. The origins of the group calling itself "The
Muslim Student Followers of the Line of the Imam"
were in the Islamic student organizations of the
universities in Tehran and the major provincial cen-
ters. Meetings with Khomeini and other senior cler-
ical leaders in seminars and political rallies provided
the initial setting for coordination between the organi-
zations in different universities. Khoeni, the militants'
clerical leader, claimed that five to seven students
provided the nucleus of a planning group for the
Embassy seizure and that they discussed their ideas
with him because of a previous association with him.
(c)
The militants were from diverse ethnic and social
backgrounds. At least two leaders of the group were
from middle class Tehran families and had spent
extensive periods in the United States as students.
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Many others were from the more traditional sectors of
the Iranian population�the bazaar and the lower
middle class where Islam is strong and Western
values are resented. (s)
The Islamic student organizations on the university
campuses which brought these students together are
loosely structured and appear in some cases to be ad
hoc gatherings that participate in demonstrations or
discussions with clerical leaders. The Islamic groups
were in some cases organized after the revolution, but
some were originally established during the Shah's
rule as a recruitment mechanism for the Mujahedin,
the Islamic-Marxist terrorist group. (s)
Some of the militants were drawn from one Mujahe-
din-associated group at the Tehran University of
Technology. Seven or eight of the militants were
identified as seniors from the university who were
members of the Mujahedin-e-Islam, one of the Isla-
mic subgroups of the Mujahedin. This group dominat-
ed a dormitory on the campus built to accommodate
poorer students from remote rural areas. The organi-
zation and the students of the dormitory that it
dominated may have provided more than the seven or
eight militants who were positively identified as its
members. (s NF)
Islamic organizations from other universities that
provided recruits for the militant leaders who planned
the takeover apparently had no association with estab-
lished political groups. None of the National Univer-
sity students were affiliated with any organized politi-
cal group, The militants
carefully avoided identification wita any group out-
side the Embassy, including the Mujahedin, and there
were indications that some of the more leftist mili-
tants who advocated closer relations with the Mujahe-
din or disagreed with policy decisions by the leader-
ship were driven out of the Embassy compound. (s NF)
Organization. The militants were well prepared for
more than a sit-in or protest demonstration when they
entered the Embassy compound. They came equipped
with blindfolds and bindings for use in what they had
planned as a several-day takeover. They had detailed
knowledge of the Embassy grounds�possibly ac-
quired from members of the irregular force that
13
occupied the compound for several months after the
attack in February 1979 on the Embassy, although we
cannot confirm this point.' Duties for the members of
the occupying group had been specified in advance,
and they had taken precautions to assure that mem-
bers of rival groups could not easily attach themselves
to the militants once they had control of the com-
pound. (s)
Leadership of the militants and basic policy decisions
were in the hands of a five- to eight-man Central
Council, or "Council of Cooperation." Below this
leadership group were several committees responsible
for information and public relations, translation of
Embassy documents, logistics, and security. The mili-
tants' clerical leader, Khoeni, provided general guid-
ance. According to one disaffected militant, Khoeni
spoke to the group when there were differences over
an issue, ostensibly relaying Khomeini's comments
but frequently adding his own, and usually backing
the decisions of the Central Council against dissent
from other militants. (c)
The militants devised a number of means of reaching
a consensus on policy decisions. The Central Council
members, who came from each of the universities
represented among the militants, originally met with
the students from their universities. Dissatisfaction
with this mechanism resulted in the creation of a
short-lived "Council of the Forearm," which had
eight members�two from each of the major Tehran
universities�and was supposed to meet regularly with
the Central Council. Some of the militants apparently
charged that the new council had been selected from (b)(1)
among the close friends of members of the Central
Council and consequently did not broaden the scope
of representation. In addition, group meetings in
which all the militants participated were held, but
there was apparently continuing dissatisfaction that
policy decisions were made with only the appearance
of consensus. (c)
'We lack information that would establish a direct link between the
seizure of the Embassy in November and the attack on the
compound nine months earlier. The earlier attack served as a
precedent, however, establishing that a group could attack the
Embassy with relative impunity. (c)
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Figure 3. Hojat-ol-Eslam Mu-
savi-Khoeni, the militants'
clerical mentor. (u)
Several additional councils with representation from
each university were created to deal with the practical
concerns of the committees. Differences developed
over the policy on releasing captured Embassy docu-
ments, for example, and a council was formed consist-
ing of one person from each university to debate the
question. An "activities committee," charged with
responsibility for security and holding the hostages,
had a membership of 40 to 50 people headed by a
student from the Industrial University. A four-mem-
ber representation council later took control of policy
for this group. The "services committee," which had
responsibility for preparing publications and posters
and issuing communiques and for maintaining contact
with the Ministry of National Guidance, was ulti-
mately taken over by the Central Council. (c)
Ideology. The shared conviction among the militants
that the Iranian revolution had stalled in a reformist
phase reflected a more developed ideology articulated
by the militants' leaders that contained elements of
both leftist idealism and Khomeini's populist Islam.
Contrary to press reports that the militants were
Secret
The militants' ideology mixed Islamic and leftist
themes. Their description of an "Islamic" economy,
for example, was based on Khomeini's populist rheto-
ric, Marxist ideas, and Leninist "anti-imperialism."
We believe that the individual, the worker, should
have the right of ownership of the means of produc-
tion. He should also have the right to own the land.
But this should be done in the framework of collec-
tive effort. For example, the peasant should have his
land, but he should share with the community the
water, the tools, and the machines.
During the Shah's rule, the peasants starved because
of his "agricultural reform"; his "reform" made Iran
dependent on food imports. We should build up our
own agriculture, our own economy. We should stop
the economic dependence of Iran from abroad.
There is a great difference between the Islamic
economic system and the socialist one. Islamic econo-
my has a direction which is Allah. Socialism does not
have such a noble principle. In Islam, if we work to
produce better products, it is only through the will of
God. tf we struggle for a better life, if we work
harder, it is according to the will of God. This
economy has a purpose. The socialist one does not.
The above material is Unclassified.
Islamic zealots and therefore could not be Marxists,
the militants' ideology did not exclude Marxist ideas.
Indeed, a mix of "leftist" and "rightist" themes is
common among Iranian student radical movements
and guerrilla groups. (c)
The dominant element of the militants' thought�
which fueled their determination to retain control
over the hostages and prolong the crisis�was a
"revolutionary" naivete, a belief that refusal to com-
promise would ensure the success of their goals. The
militants saw the world in black and white. One of the
militants interviewed several months after the take-
over referred to the Shah and the United States in
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exaggerated terms: "No friendship with the person
who killed 60,000 of our people. No compromise with
the country which has ruined our agriculture and
industry." (c)
In addition, the militants saw the results of their
actions in sweeping terms: "When the Shah is re-
turned to Iran, imperialism goes down the drain.
Finished. The prestige of imperialism in all the re-
gions will break. Sadat will not be a puppet anymore.
Hussein will not be a puppet anymore. Why should
they be puppets? They will know that their end will be
like the Shah's." (c)
In their refusal to compromise and their exaggerated
vision of the impact of their action, the militants
reacted with bitterness to the discovery that the
Embassy occupation had become a pawn in the power
struggle between rival political factions. One of the
militants wrote of his reaction to being told by a
member of the Revolutionary Council that the hos-
tage crisis had helped ensure the ratification of the
new constitution: "This blow was sufficient to reveal
many of our illusions. Had we taken the American
spies hostage so that the constitutional law could be
ratified or to silence the voice of the people? Had we
not become the tools of forces behind the political
curtain? Had we not been used to remove rivalries
from the field?" (c)
The militants propagated their views through a series
of public statements released to the media and care-
fully controlled interviews with the press. Although
they hoped to have a major impact on national policy,
they were often preoccupied with tactical concerns.
Their calls for demonstrations, threats to try the
hostages, and release of classified documents appear
to have been directed primarily at keeping public
interest�and Khomeini's attention�focused on the
Embassy. The militants recognized that their ability
to play a role in national policy depended on the
extent to which they could mobilize public opinion
and extract statements of support from Khomeini in
order to exert pressure on clerical and government
leaders. (c)
15
The militants' 21st public statement, issued four days
after the takeover, called on the American people to
support them, suggesting the degree of their euphoria
over their success. The wording of the statement also
suggested an unconscious identification of the mili-
tant leaders with the radical students who participat-
ed in campus politics in the United States during the
1960s. The message read in part:
If we are sending you, the American nation, a mes-
sage today, it is because our leader, Iman Khomeini,
and the nation of Iran have always separated your
account from that of the US Government. We believe
you can pass a fair judgment, and that is why we ask
you, the American nation, to listen to us with sincer-
ity and pass your judgment on them.
0 nation of America, why do you allow the US
Government to use your name and your flag in its
Embassies in countries all over the world�Embas-
sies that have become centers of espionage for the
CIA spies�to threaten the independence and freedom
of freedom-fighting countries?
If today our nation is burning the American flag, it is
to make you realize that these conspirators who are
at the top of the US Government have turned your
flag, which to you represents independence and free-
dom, into a symbol of crime, plunder, and usury. It is
your duty, 0 American nation, to stop them from
tarnishing your flag so disgracefully.
0 American nation, it has not been long since you
were witness to the widespread and persistent demon-
strations in support of the brave nation of Vietnam
and your complaints against the intervention of the
US Government in that country. You can show that,
as Iman Khomeini has repeatedly emphasized, the
account of the nation of America is separate from
that of the US Government.
We call on you once again to demonstrate to the
people of the world that you are freedom loving. Halt
the plot of Carter's government in Iran and support
the just demand of the Iranian nation concerning the
return of the Shah to Iran.
The above material is Unclassified.
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The militants' concern to protect their tactical posi-
tion contributed to their decision to avoid identifying
themselves with any political group outside the Em-
bassy compound and their insistence on identifying
themselves with Khomeini alone. In an interview one
of the militants frankly admitted that "the people will
support us only as long as we do not belong to a
particular organization." Their tactical concerns also
introduced an element of caution into their policy
decisions. Habibollah Payman, a radical political
leader who acted as an occasional adviser to the
militants, complained that if he had had control over
the group, "they would not have yielded to pressures
from some of the clergy and from Khomeini not to
publicize all of the documents in the Embassy files."
(c)
The militants' dependence on public support forced
them to back down on several occasions when Kho-
meini and public opinion turned against them. Their
threat to try the hostages, initially made in November
and continued in December 1979, was quietly shelved
when Khomeini and the public focused on the Christ-
mas visit of the American clergymen and the arrival
in January of UN Secretary General Waldheim. In
March they offered�possibly as a ploy�to transfer
control of the hostages to the Revolutionary Council
when it appeared that Bani-Sadr was gaining political
momentum with his charge that the militants consti-
tuted a "government within a government." The
militants retracted the "offer" after public demon-
strations of support stalled and ultimately frustrated
the actual transfer. (c)
Foreign Involvement
An exhaustive review of the evidence provides no
indication that any foreign government or political
organization was directly involved in planning or
carrying out the takeover of the Embassy, or that a
foreign government or political organization signifi-
cantly influenced policy decisions by the militants
during the prolonged hostage crisis. We conclude that
the seizure of the Embassy was conceived, planned,
and directed by Iranian militants with the support or
acquiescence of Iranian political and clerical leaders.
Secret
Government assistance to the militants and the facili-
ties available to them on the Embassy compound�
including supplies of cash, food, and communications
gear�precluded the need for foreign support once the
seizure had been accomplished. (s)
USSR. The Soviets spoke approvingly of the Embassy
takeover from the outset and later attempted to
postpone a settlement of the issue by encouraging the
Iranians to insist on tough financial terms. Despite the
USSR's misgivings about the violation of diplomatic
immunity and its fear of massive US military inter-
vention to free the hostages, the Soviets decided that
the hostage crisis was, for them, a positive develop-
ment. Not only would the crisis serve to consolidate
anti-Western views in Tehran and reduce US pres-
tige, but it might also provide opportunities for the
USSR to expand its influence. (s)
The Soviet-sponsored radio facility "National Voice
of Iran," broadcasting from Baku, indicated support
for the Embassy occupation and the goals of the
militants the day after the takeover. The broadcast
called for "the eradication of all the evil vestiges of
the domination of US imperialism in the country."
Moscow paid only lipservice to the various diplomatic
efforts to free the hostages. The Soviets helped the
Iranians frustrate the impact of Western economic
sanctions by allocating scarce rail transit resources to
transport Iranian goods. Once the Soviets were rea-
sonably certain there would be no massive US mili-
tary intervention to free the hostages, they attempted
to portray themselves as the defenders of Iranian
interests and offered arms aid. (s)
PLO. Fatah officials initially attempted to mediate
the crisis, hoping to improve the PLO's image in the
United States and strengthen their ties with Iran.
Public statements during this effort by Yasir Arafat
and his colleagues denying a mediation role and
stressing PLO support for Iran were designed to
ensure Fatah's continued access to Iranian officials
and to prevent the militants from misinterpreting
Fatah's motives. Following the failure of their initia-
tive, the PLO generally disassociated itself from the
hostage crisis. Fatah representatives attended the
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militant-organized Conference of Liberation Move-
ments in Tehran, but one of the militants commented
that "the encounter with the Palestinians was not
completely friendly and revolutionary and was marred
by pressure and threats." (s)
Others. The militants' attempts to associate them-
selves with world revolutionary movements received
some media attention but appear to have been unsuc-
cessful in substance. The four-day Conference of
Liberation Movements in January 1980 resulted in a
communique attacking the United States, supporting
the PLO, and obliquely critical of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. One of the militants commented that
in order to make arrangements for the meeting, the
organizing committee had to call on the assistance of
radical leaders outside the Embassy because the
militants themselves lacked contacts. Two militants
were sent to Algeria to meet with several groups, but
they "did not know how to encounter a revolutionary
country" and so "annoyed the Algerians." The atmos-
phere at the Conference, according to this militant,
was "very bad." (c)
The militants received basic training from a variety of
sources. Some were trained in the use of the kind of
light arms employed in the Embassy seizure by the
Revolutionary Guards. Some of the Revolutionary
Guards in turn had been trained by Palestinians;
however, there is no evidence that the Palestinians
were directly involved in training the militants. One of
the militants claimed to have fought with the Pales-
tinians and to have spent time in an Israeli prison,
although we cannot confirm this claim. Some of the
militants may have 'participated in radical student
politics while studying in the United States. Accord-
ing to one report, the 16 students who worked togeth-
er translating Embassy documents were members of
the Confederation of Iranian Students, the anti-Shah
student group active in the United States and Europe
during the Shah's regime. (s)
The Militants' Vulnerabilities
During the 14 months of the hostage crisis, diplomatic
efforts and attempts by moderate leaders within Iran
to take control of the hostages proved ineffective. The
militants were forced to back down on a number of
17
issues�they shelved their threats to try the hostages;
admitted the American clergy, the Red Cross, and
others to see the hostages; and failed in their effort to
move the three Americans at the Foreign Ministry to
the Embassy�but public and political support se-
cured their position. Backed by Khomeini, they had
few vulnerabilities:
� World opinion. UN resolutions, judgments by the
World Court, and approaches by the diplomatic
community proved ineffective. The militants and
the lay and clerical hardliners rejected international
law as a tool of the powerful to dominate the weak.
International attention, no matter how adverse,
fueled the militants' sense of self-importance.
� Humanitarian pleas. The militants' vulnerability to
the charge that the hostages were being mistreated
was indicated by their decision to allow the visits of
clergymen and others. Nevertheless, Khomeini's
frequent assertions that the hostages were well
provided for diminished the impact of these charges
within Iran. Khomeini responded to a humanitarian
appeal from the Pope by charging that the Iranian
people had suffered under the Pahlavi dynasty for
50 years and the Pope had never intervened.
� Islamic law. Khomeini and the militants appear to
have been sensitive to some extent to the charge that
the hostage-taking was contrary to Islamic law, and
they repeatedly attempted to make the case that the
Embassy was a "center of espionage" and therefore
exempt from these provisions. But appeals from
Muslim leaders were ineffective. Khomeini, who
saw himself as the leading Islamic jurisprudent,
would not be bound by provisions of law that he
could rationalize away.
� Sanctions and other coercive measures. Sanctions
and threats of the use of force appear ultimately to
have influenced the decision of the Iranian leader-
ship to move toward releasing the hostages. On the
other hand, the immediate impact of the threat of
force was to prompt Khomeini to invoke the theme
of martyrdom, rallying support and stirring up anti-
American feeling. The argument that the hostage
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crisis was harmful to Iranian interests appeared to
have made little impact on the militants, but the
threat of force did influence them in several ways.
They reportedly decided to continue the occupation
despite the possibility of armed conflict only after
prolonged and highly emotional debates. To mini-
mize the risks they took rudimentary security pre-
cautions in and around the Embassy compound.
� The rescue mission. Immediately following the res-
cue mission, the militants abandoned the plan of
defending the compound and adopted the tactic of
dispersing the hostages in order to frustrate another
rescue effort. Between April and the release in
January, groups of hostages were shuttled between
various provincial cities, and most were transferred
to two prisons in the Tehran area.
The political consequences of the rescue mission were
mixed. The news of the attempt redirected public
attention to the crisis, and rival factions among the
leadership attempted to extract maximum political
benefit frQm the failure of the mission and the failure
of Bani-Sadr's government to prevent the intrusion of
US forces into Iranian territory. On the other hand,
the use of the military appears to have reminded
Iranian leaders of the potential costs of prolonging the
crisis and probably contributed to the eventual deci-
sion to move toward a resolution.
� Declining public interest. As public interest in the
hostage crisis waned within Iran, the militants
became more vulnerable to government attempts to
take control of the hostages. Without an explicit
order from Khomeini to transfer the hostages, how-
ever, the militants were able to defy the government
while at the same time renewing public attention to
the issue and lessening their own weakness. (c)
The militants' greatest vulnerability was to the charge
that they defied the government and so contributed to
the continuing chaos in Iran by adding to the problem
of multiple centers of authority. Khomeini addressed
this problem by balancing the competing factions:
supporting the militants, but making clear that the
legislature would make the final decision on the
hostages. The militants responded by attempting to
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mobilize public pressure on the legislature to support
them. The new Majlis convened on 28 May 1980, and
the militants immediately addressed a message to the
representatives noting that Khomeini had supported
the occupation and that the hostage question was the
"great test" of the Majlis to demonstrate the power of
Islam. (c)
Movement toward release of the hostages began only
after Khomeini, hardliners in his entourage, and the
institutions of the government all agreed that the
priority of the war with Iraq, the increasing cost in
terms of Iran's isolation, and the declining political
utility of holding the hostages made it time to bring
the crisis to an end. When the consensus emerged in
September 1980�indicated by the statement issued
over Khomeini's signature establishing the conditions
for the hostages' release�the militants had no choice
but to wait while the mechanics of achieving a release
with minimal political damage to the clerical leaders
were worked out. Ultimately Khomeini provided the
final push, directing the Iranian negotiators to settle
the hostage issue before the new US administration
came into office. According to one source, Khomeini
said that he would accept only a credible excuse for
failure or the Rajai government would fall. (c NF)
Conclusions
The militants' seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran
and the prolonged hostage crisis that followed have
been referred to in Iran as the "second revolution."
The Embassy takeover was the final blow to the
Bazargan government and the reformist domestic and
foreign policies it pursued. The renewed public enthu-
siasm for "revolutionary" policies stirred up by the
Embassy seizure ensured the approval of the draft
constitution in the referendum in December 1979.
Renewed revolutionary fervor also weakened the re-
maining political moderates and strengthened the
hardline clerics by providing them with an issue to use
against their opponents. The political turmoil that
resulted distracted public attention from the failures
of the revolutionary leadership to deliver on their
promises and address basic social and economic prob-
lems. (c)
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Iran's "second revolution" was a product and continu-
ation of the first. The prolonged crisis was made
possible by several aspects of the continuing social
upheaval in Iran:
� The presence of a revolutionary leader who sanc-
tioned the destruction of the old order but failed to
provide administrative authority to those he charged
with building the new order.
� Consequently, the breakdown of governmental au-
thority and a struggle for political dominance
among competing factions of the leadership. Institu-
tions capable of enforcing decisions through deploy-
ment of police and security forces were weak.
� The deep xenophobia whipped up by the militants
and by the clerical leaders who thereby gained
immediate political advantages and focused popular
dissatisfaction with the revolution on an external
enemy.
� Social cleavages accentuated by rapid social change
in Iran over the past two decades that weakened the
new institutions. The revolution brought together
only temporarily several radically different
groups�clerical and secular, reformist and revolu-
tionary, old and young. (c)
The prolonged hostage crisis was also made possible
by two material factors. The militants found on the
large Embassy compound the physical facilities neces-
sary for a prolonged stay. The clerical leaders had
state revenues and financial reserves resulting from oil
production that allowed Iran the luxury of ignoring
world opinion for a prolonged period. (c)
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