(EST PUB DATE) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COMMUNIST CHINA THROUGH 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00659420
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-00405
• Publication Date: June 1, 1965

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SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE STUDY
TCS No. 4425/65
No. of Pages 80
25
Copy No.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
COMMUNIST CHINA THROUGH 1970
June 1965
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
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Scientific Intelligence Study
TCS 4425/65 (b)(3)
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
COMMUNIST CHINA THROUGH 1970
June 1965
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
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PREFACE
Communist China's significant advance toward nuclear weaponry
in recent months indicates a pressing need for comprehensive scientific
and technical information for use in estimating the industrial and
military strength of the Chinese. Hence, the Scientific Intelligence
Committee has undertaken this study to provide the intelligence com-
munity with an up-to-date background document of broad scope and
coverage depicting the current status of Chinese science .and tech-
nology and estimating future potentials through 1970.
Contributors to this interdepartmental study are:
Scientific Intelligence Committee/USIB
Electronics Subcommittee
BW/CW Subcommittee
Biomedical Subcommittee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee/USIB
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee/USIB
Non-Soviet Working Group
Economic Intelligence Committee/USIB
The study was approved by the Scientific Intelligence Committee
on 3 June 1965.
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE
PROBLEM
1
CAUTIONARY NOTE
1
CONCLUSIONS
1
SUMMARY
3
DISCUSSION
9
I. Introduction
9
Attitude of the Regime Toward Science & Technology
9
Foreign Relations in Science & Technology
9
II. National Objectives, Organization & Control
11
National Goals and Plans
11
Organization of Research & Development
11
Elements of Control
13
III. Resources
14
General
14
Scientific & Technical Manpower
14
Facilities for Research & Development
22
IV. Status and Trends in Research and Development
23
A. Scientific Disciplines
23
1. Physics
23
2. Mathematics and Computer Technology
24
3. Chemistry and Chemical Engineering
24
4. Metallurgy
25
5. Basic Electronics
26
6. Geophysical Sciences
28
a. Astronomy
29
b. Upper Atmosphere and Space
29
c. Meteorology
29
d. Geodesy and Gravimetry
30
e. Geomagnetism and Geoelectricity
30
f. Geology
30
g. Seismology
30
h. Oceanography
30
7. Medical Sciences
31
8. Biological Sciences
32
9. Agricultural Sciences
33
10. Nuclear Energy Research
34
Introduction
34
Fissionable Materials
34
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B. Industrial Technology
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
2. Basic Industries
a. Metallurgy
b. Chemicals
c. Fuels and Power
3. Machine Building
a. General
b. Machine Tools
c. Civilian Machinery and
d. Military Machinery and
4. Light Industry
5. Services
a. Construction
b. Transportation
c. Telecommunications
C. Military Technology
1. Guided Missiles
a. General
b. Missiles
Page
41
41
41
41
42
43
44
44
45
Equipment 45
Equipment 46
47
48
48
48
48
49
49
49
49
52
52
53
53
2. Aircraft Research and Development
3. Ground Weapons and Equipment
a. General
b. Infantry Weapons 53
c. Antiaircraft Artillery 53
d. Field Artillery Weapons 54
e. Combat Vehicles 54
4. Naval Weapons Systems 54
Present R&D Capabilities and Trends 54
Hull Design and Ship Construction 55
Ship Propulsion 55
5. Antisubmarine Warfare
6.
Koko Nor Complex
Lop Nor Test Site
7. BW/CW Activities
a. General 58
b. Biological Warfare 58
c. Chemical Warfare 58
8. Military Electronics Technology 59
Radar 60
Communications 60
Electronic Countermeasures 61
Computers 61
Infrared Devices 61
56
56
56
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57
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ILLUSTRATIONS
TABLES
Page
(Frontispiece)
At end of report)
Page
1. Number of Living Graduates of Higher Educational Institutions 15
2. Yearly College Graduations by Specialities, 1950-64 17
3. Cumulative College Graduates, 1950-64 17
4. Estimate of Surviving Graduates of Higher Education in
5.
6.
1
FIGURES
19
35
39
Following Page
2
2. Cumulative SWF Graduates by Field Specialization for Se-
lected Year in Communist China 22
3. Cities Having Significant Research and Educational Facilities 22
4. Large, 25-Mev Cyclotron, at Peiping, Built with Soviet Aid 24
5. a. PA-I Model Electronic Digital Computer ( Soviet Model M-3) 24
b. JA-I Model Digital Computers Under Construction in
Communist China
6. Nanking Electronic Tube Plant. a. Workshop. b. Stem As-
sembly Room 28
7. Purple Mountain Astronomical Observatory at Nanking.
a. Buildings at the Installation. b. The 60-Centimeter Re-
flector
30
8 30
9 bixa t, awns. lhe Velvet Antlers of Sika Deer are Highly
Valued by the Chinese for Traditional Medicine 32
10. Lecture on the Sea Animal Amphioxus at Shangtung University 32
11. Students of the Oceanographic Department of Shangtung
University Measuring the Transparency of Sea Water 32
12. Aquarium, Part of the Marine and Limnological Museum,
Tsingtao, Shangtung 32
13. Edible Seaweed Grown by the Youth Brigade 32
14. Cultured Kelp 32
15. Civil Aircraft Play an Important Role in Checking the Spread
of Locusts 34
16
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Following Page
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19. Chinese-Manufactured 75mm Recoilless Rifle
52
54
20. 56
21. Students at the CPLA Chemical Warfare School Training
with Electronic Equipment 58
22. Smoke-Generating Demonstration at the CPLA Chemical
Warfare School 58
23. CPLA Smoke-Generating Equipment, Possibly of Chinese
Manufacture, Being Operated by Students of the CPLA
Chemical Warfare School 58
24. CPLA Assault Troops Training with Soviet-Type LPO Flame
Thrower 60
25. CPLA Engineer Troops Using Soviet-Type ROKS Flame
Thrower 60
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
COMMUNIST CHINA THROUGH 1970
PROBLEM
To assess Chinese Communist capabilities in science and tech-
nology through 1970, particularly in relation to military and industrial
programs.
CONCLUSIONS
1. China will continue to lag far behind the more
advanced nations of the world in the major areas of
science and technology over the next 5 years. The
country's ambitious research and development pro-
grams will continue to be retarded by major weak-
nesses, and accomplishments, in general, will be
limited to the gradual improvement of a generally
backward technology. This does not preclude sig-
nificant successes in a few priority areas, such as
in the advanced weapons field. Indeed, by shrewd
allocation of scarce human resources and with the
benefit of past Soviet aid, the Chinese have been
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able to explode nuclear devices, undertake a diver-
sified missile program, modernize their air defense
system considerably, and embark on other military
R&D programs of some significance.
2. The major shortage of research and develop-
ment resources seriously limits China's ability to
make significant progress except in selected mili-
tary research and development areas. Thus, de-
spite a body of about 850,000 living graduates in
the science and technology fields, there are only
enough competent scientists and sufficient research
materials to undertake a small portion of the host of
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interdependent projects necessary to meet military
and economic needs. At present, possibly as many
as 100,000 persons are supporting scientific research
and development. The availability of about a half
million engineers, nearly all of them narrowly or
poorly trained, presently means that China's re-
search and development effort is devoted to the
introduction of foreign technological advances and
their adaptation to China's industrial and military
programs. Over the next 5 years, despite con-
tinued progress in science and technology educa-
tion, the numbers available to make significant
contributions to research and development activities
will probably increase by only a few thousand.
3. The Chinese are making energetic efforts to
provide research facilities and equipment to support
their ambitious development plans for the next
decade. r-
Fol-
lowing the virtual collapse in 1960 of the 12-Year
Plan for Science Development ( 1956-67 ) which
was premised on sizable Soviet assistance, a new
and probably more realistic long-range plan for
research for the period 1963-72 emerged. We be-
lieve that the major objectives of the earlier plan
have been maintained, but its details are not known.
4. Although foreign research in the physical and
life sciences is energetically monitored and ex-
ploited in a systematic fashion by the Chinese,
virtually all indigenous efforts are concerned not
with fundamental research but with the solution of
urgent practical problems. Nevertheless, as the
number of trained scientists has grown, the amount
of fundamental research has slowly risen. While
there is no evidence of significant accomplishments
from this research to date, the vital base is being
enlarged at a steady pace. Thus, the chances of
wOrthwhile advances by the early 1970's will in-
crease.
5. We now believe that a major share of all sci-
entific and technical resources is allocated in direct
or indirect support of advanced and conventional
weapons programs. The demands of these pro-
grams on S&T resources probably soared after the
withdrawal of Soviet aid. This concentration of
effort is believed to be retarding seriously the
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growth of a strong S&T base for the broader, longer
range needs of the economy as a whole. The exact
proportion of resources allocated to various sectors,
however, cannot be determined.
6.
The first nuclear test in October
1964 was the detonation of a 19-kt device/
Although there are still many uncertainties in this
program, the Chinese could now begin to stockpile
aircraft-deliverable bombs based on these initial
devices.
7. Along with warhead development, the Chinese
are believed to be developing a medium-range
( about 1000 nautical miles) ballistic missile. While
much of our evidence is indirect, we believe that
a few of these missiles with compatible nuclear war-
heads, in keeping with the above nuclear estimate,
could be ready to begin deployment in 1967 or
1968.
8. There is some reason to believe that the Chi-
nese may also be planning to develop a range of
other missiles for various weapon systems. They
have shown interest, for example, in short range
tactical missiles and coastal defense missiles. They
may desire to develop submarine launched and
patrol boat missiles. Limited deployment of a
SAM system of the Soviet SA-2-type, of which the
Chinese may be developing a modification, has al-
ready taken place.
9. Ample evidence of the development of con-
ventional weapons also exists, although items pro-
duced to date have been based primarily on for-
eign designs. At present, native design and de-
velopment of high-performance military aircraft
are believed to be beyond Chinese capabilities and
probably will remain so during this period. Serial
production of certain Soviet-designed aircraft, how-
ever, is within present Chinese capabilities, and
there are indications that production of one or more
of these may be resumed.
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\ In
naval weapons, although the Chinese have as-
sembled some Soviet-designed submarines, de-
stroyer escorts, and smaller vessels, the capability
for indigenous research and development is prob-
ably very limited. The capability in this area,
however, is expected to improve considerably by
the completion within the next couple of years of
a large installation which is believed to be a model
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11. The level of industrial technology in China
apparently varies sharply between sectors. On the
whole it is very backward, and in most industrial
fields progress has been extremely slow since 1960.
During the period covered by this study, significant
improvements in the level of industrial technology
probably will be confined to a few selected indus-
tries. By 1970, however, new industrial techniques
will begin to be introduced more generally.
SUMMARY
12. China's original 12-Year Plan for catching
up with the industrialized nations in science and
technology by 1967 was a casualty of both the
"great leap forward" (1958-60) and the withdrawal
of Soviet assistance, a keystone to the fulfillment of
the plan. A new 10-Year Plan for Research
(1963-72) was formulated both to fill the gap left
by the Soviet withdrawal and to support the Chi-
nese determination to attain a high degree of self-
reliance. This long-range planning for research
and development was done in a period of general
retrenchment characterized by ad hoc short-term
economic planning. The plan's adoption under
these circumstances points up the important role
assigned to research and development in China's
total effort to reach first class power status.
13. During the period extending from the present
through 1970, China will remain far behind the
world's more advanced nations in the major areas
of science and technology for several reasons.
Probably the key factor is the shortage of well-
trained scientists and engineers in the middle and
upper brackets of competence and experience in
almost all fields of interest. This shortage of
skilled manpower has caused most of the able
workers to be taxed to the limit. Another con-
spicuous weakness is the nationwide shortage of
research apparatus, test equipment, modern and
specialized machine tools, and various technological
materials that require sophisticated processing.
Efforts to strengthen science and technology have
included: (a) setting up a sound system of tech-
nical standards, (b) developing new sources for
the equipment and technical assistance formerly
supplied by the USSR, and ( c) strengthening the
quality of education.
14. China is gradually increasing its exploitation
of foreign science and technology and will con-
tinue to do so during the period of this estimate.
\ -China has been
obtaining technical data designs and prototypes
of reliable equipment, new instrumentation, highly
advanced methods and processes, unique apparatus,
critical raw materials, components, spare parts, and
production plant facilities.
15. China is also using science and technology
as a basis for enhancing its relations with the less
developed countries. Scientific and technical co-
operation agreements have been signed with a
number of such countries and contacts have been
made through scientific conferences and sympo-
siums, touring delegations, scientific survey teams
and training of foreign students in China. By such
means, China has attempted to increase its pene-
tration and domination among the less developed
countries.
16. Chinese work in the physical and life sci-
ences is primarily applied and concerned almost
wholly with urgent practical problems. There are,
however, some examples of original fundamental
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research being conducted on a small scale in such
areas as molecular biology, low-energy physics, and
medicine. We do not expect any significant ad-
vances from this small basic effort over the next
5 years, but because of the increasing amount of
good applied work, significant technological ad-
vances could occur at any time. Foreign research
and development accomplishments, both basic and
applied, are readily available to the Chinese who
monitor and exploit them routinely. During this
period, it is unlikely that the Chinese will tie up
their limited scientific manpower in extensive basic
research.
17. In physics, China has accumulated a good
foundation of research data that will aid normal
scientific growth and support the general needs of
the nation, but outstanding research achievements
are lacking. The amount of basic solid-state work
is increasing in several areas, but none of it is likely
to result in startling advances. China has made
modest achievements in low-energy nuclear physics,
but accelerators available for research are relatively
few in number and variety. High-energy physics
in China is confined largely to theoretical aspects
because of a shortage of experimental facilities.
However, some scientists are being trained in this
field at Dubna in the USSR.
18. Chinese mathematicians are competent and
fairly active, especially so by comparison with the
situation in 1949. Their work follows the lead of
foreign mathematicians and most of it deals with
applications in the areas of computers, automatic
control, statistics, operational research, and linear
programming.
19. In computer technology, native competence
is growing, but China will remain behind the West
for some years. Although the Chinese now are
producing industrially general and specialized pur-
pose analog and digital-type computers, no achieve-
ments of note in computer technology are known.
The availability of computers is marginal for many
highly technical needs, and strict allocation of com-
puter time is required to solve priority economic
and military problems. Nevertheless, an increasing
number of special purpose analog computers and
fairly high-speed digital computers are becoming
available for various types of routine scientific and
technical computations.
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20. Current research projects in chemistry and
chemical engineering are concerned chiefly with
mastering known processes and adapting them to
conditions in China in order to support present
military, industrial, and scientific programs. The
research results are neither outstanding nor very
original. Much good work in analytical chemistry
is conducted by the Chinese, particularly on the
methods of analysis, separation, and preparation of
pure materials, especially for applications in the
fields of electronics and nuclear energy. Some of
the research could be valuable in the development
of other areas of interest. Chinese organic chem-
istry is far behind Western work. A small amount
of very good original work, however, has been per-
formed on pharmaceuticals. The program on high
polymers is a major undertaking, yet workers are
capable of only a small amount of high-quality basic
research. A sizable amount of generally low-level
chemical research supports the agricultural needs
in the preparing of insecticides.
21. Specialty steels have a high priority in
China's metallurgical research program. This pro-
gram is attempting to satisfy the needs of the agri-
cultural chemicals industry and the military services
for corrosion- and heat-resistant steels. A large
part of the metallurgical effort also is directed
toward the development of substitute alloy com-
positions that require a minimum of scarce alloy-
ing materials, such as nickel. China is producing
a modest variety of alloy steels, including ordinary
grades of stainless steel, high-speed tool steels, and
some spring steels. By 1970, the Chinese should
have acquired sufficient experience with modern
alloy melting and refining techniques to make pos-
sible at least small-scale production of specialized
alloy types, such as precipitation hardening stain-
less steels and maraging high-strength steels that
may be required in some missile applications. The
improvement of welding practices continues to be
the subject of widespread work throughout China.
22. Little is known about China's ability to pro-
duce and fabricate titanium, but there are no indica-
tions that the work has progressed beyond labora-
tory scale. Some research is in progress on proc-
esses for extracting the nonferrous metals, such as
zirconium, hafnium, and tantalum. Investigations
of the processing of the more common nonferrous
metals, such as aluminum and copper, emphasize
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improvements in ore beneficiation and reduction
techniques. Although substantial progress is being
made, China's metallurgical research effort still is
far behind that of the West and is not expected
to catch up for many years.
23. The research and developmental activities in
basic electronics, including communications, indi-
cate that China now is concerned with a Wide
range of techniques. During the next 5 years, it
will continue to give serious attention to engineer-
ing research to known and proven goals, but it is
unlikely to progress significantly in any one aspect.
Heavy reliance will continue to be placed on the
use of foreign devices, equipment and systems with
the short supply of electronics research manpower
and resources being allocated only to the most
critical items. Efforts in other industries, notably
precision instruments, metallurgy, and chemicals,
are dynamic factors that will affect the level of
Chinese electronics technology. Any lack of prog-
ress in those fields would act as a considerable
brake. Solid-state devices and masers are ham-
pered by a scarcity of apparatus and test equip-
ment. Work on lasers is handicapped by lack of
suitable high-quality crystals. Although more than
70 types of germanium transistors are being pro-
duced and at least 20 types of diodes are being
manufactured in good supply, China lags consider-
ably in industrial-scale techniques for refining
germanium and silicon. Nevertheless, suitable ma-
terials for almost all military applications are ex-
pected by 1970.
24. The geophysical sciences in China collec-
tively are slowly improving but will remain below
the level of the scientifically advanced countries
in 1970. Meteorology is probably the most active
of these sciences, with work programmed on better
weather forecasting and equipment. Geodesy ca-
pabilities are adequate for supplying all geodetic
parameters of an IRBM test range but not for an
over-water ICBM range. Work in the other geo-
physical sciences is also relatively limited despite
some active work in such areas as exploring nat-
ural resources, setting up a network of seismologi-
cal stations, oceanographic support to the fishing
and shipping industries, and cosmic ray obser-
vation.
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25. A severe shortage of qualified investigators
and technological materials hinders research and
development in the medical sciences. Reforms in
education will not rectify the situation by 1970, but
by the mid-1970's, the quality of graduate physi-
cians may compare favorably with that of Western
graduates. Chinese medical research is directed
toward infectious and neoplastic diseases with in-
creasing emphasis on basic disciplines. A broad
nutritional research program is underway, but it is
hampered by a slow data build-up and a shortage
of personnel and will not provide meaningful re-
sults during this period.
26. China has directed its research on biology
toward the practical problems that occur in agri-
culture, industry, and public health. The quality
of the small amount of published research generally
is very good. The number of research institutes
is adequate to support the limited basic research
program. China's capabilities in biological science
will increase gradually during the next 5 years,
but no outstanding accomplishments are to be ex-
pected.
27. China has accorded high priority to the agri-
culture sciences, and the quantity of the work will
increase during the next 5 years. The most im-
portant advancement in agricultural research has
been in crop breeding. New native strains of rice,
wheat, and corn have been successfully introduced
and have significantly increased yields on experi-
mental plots. Chinese plant breeders are Western-
trained. Entomologists have successfully adapted
and implemented foreign control methods, virtually
eliminating destructive migratory locust attacks.
Research on the utilization of agricultural chemi-
cals is critically inadequate, though these chemi-
cals offer the most important means for increasing
China's food resources. Plant pathological research
is not impressive by Western standards. Although
the small quantity of research in the animal sciences
has successfully improved the health and the breed-
ing stock of swine, sheep, and poultry, the develop-
ment of the livestock industry will be very slow.
With support from other segments, the fishing in-
dustry can be expected to grow moderately through
1970. Research on unusual foodstuffs�wild and
aquatic plants�during the next 5 years will con-
tribute to the supplementary nutritional reserves
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in times times of food scarcity. The microbial conver-
sion of agricultural wastes and by-products into
foodstuffs has been successful, but the processes
are not yet economical.
28. Military technology in China is characterized
by considerable emphasis on the manufacture of
duplicates, modifications, and adaptations of for-
eign equipment of proven capability, especially
Soviet guided missiles, aircraft, ground weapons,
naval weapons, and electronics systems. The dif-
ferent sectors of production vary widely in strength.
29. The nuclear weapons program in China ap-
parently has received the support of a number of
old and new research facilities. A major complex
now under construction near Koko Nor in North-
Central China may become a new main center for
nuclear weapons research and development. The
first test of a Chinese nuclear device of 19 KT yield
was conducted on 16 October 1964 at the test site
located at Lon Nor in Western China.
/ If they so choose, the Chinese probably
could stockpile bombs based on these initial de-
vices for their medium bombers as soon as fission-
able materials are available.
30. Energetic efforts have been underway for
some time to provide nuclear materials for the
weapons program. A complex near Lanchou for
producing U-235 could have begun operation be-
tween August 1962 and March 1963. This com-
plex probably includes a gaseous diffusion plant
that was supplied by the Soviets during 1957-60.
On present evidence, we believe that the U-235
used in present devices was probably produced by
a combination of gaseous diffusion and electro-
magnetic processes.
31. Two complexes appear to be producing
plutonium in China. One, near Pao-fou could pro-
duce an estimated 10 kilograms of plutonium a
year.
Another and larger
reactor is under construction at Yumen, but it will
not become operational for two or more years.
32. China has displayed an active interest in a
guided missile program for some 10 years. With
Soviet assistance, the Chinese constructed a missile
test center at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu and a research and
development center at Ch'ang-hsin-tien, a south-
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west suburb of Peiping. The latter center is be-
lieved to have achieved full operational status in
1963. The Soviets and Chinese also established a
small test range and development center for the
coastal defense variant of the Kennel ASM at Lien-
shan in the Gulf of Liao-tung.
33. The Chinese probably are stressing the de-
velopment of a land-based strategic MRBM capable
of delivering a nuclear warhead at a range of 1000
nautical miles or more. The first MRBM prototype
flight test is believed to have taken place in early
fall 1963 at Shuang-ch'eng-tzu. The missile is very
likely based on the Soviet SS-4, or possibly the
SS-3. The system could enter production in 1966
or 1967 and be ready for deployment in 1967 or
1968. There is no evidence that may be exclu-
sively associated with an ICBM. If development
is already initiated, it would be 1970-75 before an
ICBM could be operational.
34. As to other programs, the Chinese are un-
doubtedly interested in land-based tactical missile (b)(1)
systems similar to the Soviet 150-mile range SSM
which was supplied to China. A shipyard at
Dairen has fabricated one submarine of the Soviet
G-class, and an intent to obtain or produce the
SS-N-4 type of missile for which this submarine is
designed must be assumed. SS-N-2 missiles may
have been -supplied by the Soviets for use in the
several Osal Komar guided missile patrol boats
sighted in China. Coastal defense missiles of the
AS-1 type could be produced at Chinese aircraft
plants.
35.
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research and development program of some sort
undoubtedly exists and probably carries a high
priority, 2 or 3 years will be required before pro-
duction on a large scale is within China's capa-
bility. An unknown number of Soviet Guideline
SA-2 missiles were made available to China. Al-
though 23, possibly 25, SAM sites have been noted,
no more than 6 have been observed with equip-
ment at any one time. Some sites apparently were
never equipped, and at least 6 have been aban-
doned completely. I
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target areas to defend against reConnaissance over-
flights by high-altitude aircraft.
36. Space activities in China appear to be limited
at this time. Success with the MRBM program
could eventually provide a capability to orbit a
small satellite using relatively simple upper stages.
Also, if the Chinese efforts to purchase foreign
missile equipment and technology are successful, a
program to demonstrate a space capability could
get underway any time before 1970.
37. Aeronautical research, development, and pro-
duction are quite limited generally. An abrupt
cessation of programs, based on Soviet applied
designs and blueprints, was noted in mid-1960, and
only recently have we seen signs of a resumption
of activity. Although the Chinese probably can
produce copies of Soviet MiG-21 aircraft by
1965-66, and the Badger and Camel by 1968, they
probably cannot design and build a significant
military aircraft of their own until the 1970's.
Materials research has met with some success, but
high Western standards are still well beyond the
reach of the Chinese.
Spare engines are purchased abroad
for I1-18's and Viscounts. Increases in factory
floorspace indicate a Chinese intention to produce
aircraft and engines on a much larger scale. Soviet
aid was withdrawn in 1960, and no appreciable
numbers of combat aircraft have been produced
since the MiG-17 and -19 programs folded after
the rift. The Badger and/or Camel programs have
not yet gotten underway. China has an urgent
need for military aircraft, but the USSR at least
has curtailed the supply of spare parts and has
withheld essential elements of support for both
the Badger and MiG-21 production programs.
38. Chinese ground weapons developments cur-
rently stress a rapid build-up of improved weapons
based on foreign designs. They are either modi-
fied slightly or copied exactly and are produced
in large volume. Emphasis is placed on the repro-
duction of infantry weapons, antiaircraft artillery,
field artillery weapons, and combat vehicles. In-
digenous conventional armaments research and de-
velopment probably will not have developed suffi-
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ciently to change this situation much by 1970, al-
though experience will eventually allow much more
independence.
39. At present, the Chinese possess a small but
improving capability in the design and develop-
ment of minor warships and their associated pro-
pulsion plants. The capability in ship design
should be improved considerably by the construc-
tion of a model basin Wuhsi,
about 75 miles northwest of Shanghai. This in-
stallation should become operational in the period
1965 to 1967. The Chinese probably will not at-
tain a capability in the design and development of
major warships and submarines until beyond the
period of this estimate.
40. Antisubmarine warfare research and devel-
opment efforts appear to be in their infancy.
41. Defensive, rather than offensive, chemical
warfare doctrine is emphasized in China. Much
of the CW material is made from Soviet designs
or has been furnished by the USSR
Chemical personnel receive highly spe-
cialized training in all aspects of chemical warfare.
China's offensive CW capability is impaired by
limited production of agents and stockpiling capa-
bilities. Available ground weapons and Soviet-
designed aircraft are capable of disseminating
massive quantities of CW agents in a large-scale
offensive tactical operation. On the other hand,
China within the next 5 years will not produce
adequate amounts of either offensive or defensive
CW material to rise above training requirements
plus a small amount for stockpiling. The Chinese
Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) has an excellent
screening-smoke capability and a small but grow-
ing flame warfare capability./
fensive CW equipment apparently is
pletely lacking.
42. The Chinese are not known to be actively
engaged in the research and development of bio-
logical warfare agents at this time,
Civilian de-
almost corn-
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By 1970, with the ex-
pected assets of competent- scientists and facilities,
China could produce limited quantities of BW-
agent material and also develop a munition with a
suitable delivery system.
43. China has engaged in limited research and
development on original military electronics, though
much developmental work is involved where for-
eign designs are adapted to domestic production.
Through 1970, only a few components and systems
will be of native Chinese design. Almost all of
the more complicated and sophisticated military
electronics equipment will be copies, modifications,
or adaptations of foreign products namel We t-
em, Soviet Bloc and a a
By 1970, new
mese designs of EW/GCI, fire control, ship-
board, and airborne radars may be expected to
appear. In its military communications, China re-
lies heavily on importations, j
/I Wholly Chinese
work on such advanced equipment as burst trans-
mission or scatter will not be realized by 1970.
China depends largely on passive electronic coun-
termeasures, such as chaff. Although the Chinese
will continue to use chaff, little or no information
is available on which to base a confident assess-
ment of other modes.
44. Although there are sharp differences among
sectors, the general level of industrial technology
in China can be characterized as being far behind
that of the United States, the USSR, Western
Europe, and Japan. China has mastered the tech-
nology of some basic industries, such as steel, coal,
electric power, and aluminum, but even in these
industries technical assistance from abroad is re-
quired to keep up with advances in products,
equipment, and production techniques. In more
complex fields�for example, the priority fields of
8
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precision instrumentation, petro-chemicals, chemi-
cal fibers, and chemical fertilizers�China is heav-
ily dependent on imported knowledge and equip-
ment for development. The general backwardnes:(b)(1)
of technology is not a great hindrance in some
sectors, such as construction and transportation,
because simple techniques can fill most needs.
45. Technological progress in most industrial
fields has been extremely slow since 1960. Ma-
chinery and equipment have been imported at only
a small fraction of the peak levels in 1959-60, for
example, about $125 million worth in 1963 com-
pared to $845 million in 1960. Equally important
has been the small number of foreign industrial
technicians in China compared with the formerly
large number of Soviet and Satellite technical per-
sonnel helping China's industry.*
46. China is well endowed with most of the raw
materials required for industrial development.
Raw materials for iron and steel, power, nonferrous
metals, chemicals, and construction materials gen-
erally are abundant. The major resource deficiency
is the lack of arable land in relation to population;
thus, major technical improvements in farming are
required to increase agricultural production. China
has only small forest resources, but these resources
will be adequate through 1970. Some of the steel
alloying metals, such as nickel, are available only
in very small quantities and must be imported.
47. Automation in the Western sense is very
limited in China's industry, and no major Chinese
advances in automation are expected by 1970. A
few industrial processes employ highly automated
equipment. For example, such equipment is used
in the production of electronic tubes and other
electronic components that are of standard design
and are required in volume. In most industries,
however, automation does not exist.
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48. During the period through 1970, techno-
logical progress in industry is not likely to speed
up from the slow pace of the past few years un-
less China receives technical assistance on a scale
at least as large as that of the first decade of
Communist rule on the mainland. Technological
TCS 4425/65
advance probably will be at a slow rate and will
be centered on a small group of industries. In a
few fields, especially those related to the advanced
weapons program, a high priority in the allocation
of scarce resources probably will yield notable im-
provements in technological capabilities.
DISCUSSION
I. Introduction
ATTITUDE OF THE REGIME TOWARD
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
49. China's leaders have consistently emphasized
the key role played by science and technology in
helping to build China into a powerful state. Mod-
ern science and technology get equal billing as
prime national objectives along with modern agri-
culture, modern industry, and modern national de-
fense. Premier Chou En-lai restated this position
at the December 1964 National People's Congress
and said further that "we cannot take the beaten
track traversed by other countries in the develop-
ment of technology and travel behind them at a
snail's pace" but "must break away from conven-
tions and do our utmost to adopt advanced tech-
niques." Such exhortations for the promotion of
science and technology are directed not only at
planners, managers, and research scientists dealing
with advanced techniques but toward all personnel
who in any way are connected with scientific and
technical matters, including farmers and industrial
workers. The application of scientific experimental
methods is urged on all. The objectives being the
improvement of working methods, tools, and prod-
ucts at the production level, and the advancement
of scientific and technological capabilities all along
the line up to the more complex technological de-
velopments and advanced fundamental research.
The latter being acknowledged by the Chinese as
necessary for success in putting China abreast of
the rest of the world in scientific and technological
capabilities. In China, scientific experimentation,
technical innovation, and technical revolution are
Communist watchwords.
--TAP�Cr-C.2g
FOREIGN RELATIONS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
50. The Chinese view science and technology
as an important factor in their foreign relations.
First, they need the scientific and technological
information and materials to be found in other
countries, particularly the more advanced countries.
Second, they can use science and technology to
improve access to less developed countries and
thus promote friendly relations.
51. Until mid-1960, China had the kind of rela-
tion with the Soviet Union whereby China's needs
could be satisfied to a large degree. Two basic
agreements were involved: the Scientific and Tech-
nical Agreement which was signed in October 1954
and the Scientific Cooperation Agreement in Janu-
ary 1958. The latter agreement provided particu-
larly for close relations between the academies of
sciences of the two countries. During 1960, the
agreements were abrogated but for the sake of ap-
pearances were revised and reinstituted in 1961.
Formalities have been followed, but little of sub-
stantive value to China has resulted. Recently, the
lack of normal activity connected with the agree-
ments indicates that they have both become mori-
bund. China has not discontinued all relationships
with the USSR, however, but has continued such
contacts as participation in scientific conferences in
the Soviet Union, affiliation with the Joint Institute
for Nuclear Research at Dubna, USSR, and mem-
bership in the Fisheries Research Commission for
the Western Pacific, made up of Communist coun-
tries. Some contacts in the technological field
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probably continue in connection with certain trade
items that call for technical services, but the nature
of them, if any, is not known.
52. Relations with Eastern European countries
have been similar to those with the Soviet Union
but on a considerably smaller scale. Formal rela-
tionships covered by scientific and technical agree-
ments are being maintained, although the substan-
tive content is believed to have diminished mark-
edly in the last few years.
53. China is now taking steps to establish rela-
tions with advanced countries of the non-Commu-
nist world as a substitute for the valuable relations
formerly enjoyed with the Soviet Bloc. The inter-
national political environment combined with
China's own hesitancy to open her doors to for-
eigners has retarded the growth of these relations.
China, however, has moved gingerly along the
usual avenues of access to foreign scientific knowl-
edge, materials, and assistance.
as tor tile tiinng ot non-bloc scientists to do re-
search, consult, or teach for extended periods in
China, none are known to have been hired, al-
though official overtures to do so have been voiced
in some Japanese scientific circles. There are nu-
merous instances, however, of Western scientists
being invited to China for consultation and lecture
tours of a few weeks duration. Attendance at
international scientific meetings commenced to be
an important type of contact with non-Bloc science
during 1963, but the "two-Chinas problem" keeps
Communist China out of any organization in which
the Republic of China is a member. Communist
10
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China adheres to none of the bodies under the
International Council of Scientific Unions except
the History of Science Section of the Union of the
History and Philosophy of Science. Contacts have
been established between the Chinese Academy of
Sciences and the British Royal Society and the
Australian Academy of Science. Expansion of
such relations is expected.
55. In the less-developed countries, China uses
science and technology to promote her interests.
The example of China's scientific progress is used
as a foundation for influential relations. Under
cover of scientific and technical assistance, Chinese
geologists, civil engineers, and others are able to
explore and map foreign countries. China's biggest
effort in the use of science to influence foreign
countries was the convocation of the Peiping Sci-
ence Symposium in August 1964. It was attended
by individuals from 41 countries of Asia, Africa,
South America, and Oceania (New Zealand and
Australia). The main purpose was clearly politi-
cal. By mans of the Symposium and the perma-(b)(1)
nent liaison office established by the Chinese in
connection with it, China intends to develop Pei-
ping as a science center and to use science as one
of the bonds in welding together an Afro-Asian
Bloc under China's domination.
56. Other efforts have included a few Chinese
touring delegations, attendance at science confer-
ences in Asia and Africa, and special training of
foreigners in China. Scientific and technical coop-
eration agreements, similar to those signed during
the 1950's with Soviet Bloc countries, are appear-
ing. Cooperation documents have been signed by
China during 1965 with Indonesia, Cambodia, and
the United Arab Republic, during 1964 with Al-
geria, and in 1960 with Cuba. China's use of sci-
ence and technology as a vehicle for penetration
and influence in Afro-Asian countries is expected
to expand steadily in the next few years.
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II. National Objectives, Organization and Control
NATIONAL GOALS AND PLANS
57. The ultimate Chinese goal is to overtake and
to move ahead of the world's scientific and tech-
nological leaders at a rapid pace. Central to all
planning and programming is the aspiration for an
ever increasing capacity for self-sufficiency, while
at the same time making use of all available for-
eign technology judged useful in speeding up the
process.
58. In 1956, China set forth a 12-year Plan for
Scientific Development. It's aim was to reach
world levels in the common disciplines of science
and to concentrate on advancement in the follow-
ing 11 technological subjects:
i. Nuclear energy
ii. Electronics
iii. Jet propulsion
iv. Automation and precision instrumentation
v. Exploration and exploitation of petroleum and
other scarce mineral resources
vi. Metallurgical process and alloys
vii. Heavy organic synthesis and use of fuels
viii. New power equipment and heavy machinery
ix. Important problems in harnessing the Yellow and
Yangtse Rivers
x. Agriculture mechanization, electrification and
chemicals
xi. Countermeasures against major endemic diseases.
A 12th subject (not listed here) cited important
theoretical problems in natural science, presum-
ably areas of research intimately related to some
of the 11 technological subjects.
59. The Chinese, in 1956, explicitly stated that
success in carrying out the plan by 1967 would de-
pend heavily on assistance from the Soviet Union.
When the keystone of Soviet aid dropped out of
the plan during 1960, the target date of 1967 was
no longer tenable. Even before 1960, the schedule
had been upset by gross mismanagement of re-
search and training during the "great leap forward"
which started in 1958, only a few months after the
plan had finally been made firm and a yearly plan
prepared in accordance with it. Although the
great leap forward" and the withdrawal of almost
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all Soviet assistance upset the schedule
12-Year Plan and called for some shifting
orities, the overall aims continued to be
with national goals.
of
of
in
the
pri-
line
ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
61. Under the supervision of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, the National government plans and
supervises scientific and technological affairs pre-
sumably through the State Scientific and Techno-
logical Commission, a senior level body in the
State Council. The actual execution of research
and development is carried out principally by the
Chinese Academy of Sciences and by the research
organs of the various technical ministries. The
ministries operate central research academies with
subordinate research institutes and have additional
research facilities attached to industrial plants.
The capabilities of ministry research facilities have
increased markedly in the last 5 years and now
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constitute important research and development
strength. Some contributions to research needs of
the State also are made by the universities and
colleges. A fairly large volume of work is done
under the research and development label by pro-
vincial and lower political bodies and local produc-
tion units, but the scientific and engineering level
is usually low. The organization for research and
development is shown in figure 1.
62. The role of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) is dominant. Reliable Party members are
present in each unit, with top authority resting with
a Party man, who, in many cases, is not the formal
head of the unit. The only organ of the Central
Committee of the CCP known to have regular con-
tinuing duties relating to science and technology
is the Science Section of the Propaganda Depart-
ment. This section works through the Chinese
Scientific and Technical Association as its control
organ and has the responsibility for the mass con-
trol of scientists and engineers. Presumably, there
is close coordination within the Party of military
and scientific affairs. The Chairman of the State
Scientific and Technological Commission is an army
marshal who is concurrently Vice-Chairman of the
Party's Military Affairs Committee.
63. The State Scientific and Technological Com-
mission is the government's top planning, control,
and supervisory body in the scientific and techno-
logical field. Its work bears on all organizations
having duties of a scientific and technical nature.
Since its formation in November 1958 by amalga-
mating the Scientific Planning Commission and
the State Technological Commission, it apparently
has had broad responsibilities for determining the
direction that China should go in science and tech-
nology and for seeing that the resulting programs
are carried out. Responsibilities known for the
Scientific Planning Commission follow. They are
assumed to apply to the new organization as well.
i. Determination of the kind and level of technology
to be fostered, both for the short- and long-range terms.
ii. Incorporation of the yearly and long-range scien-
tific and technical plans into the overall economic plans
by working in conjunction with the State Economic
Commission and the State Planning Commission.
Et Implementation of the scientific and technical
plans, especially key projects.
iv. Coordination of work done by the various organs
having responsibility for research and development.
_-T-012�SEC�fte1
12
v. Administration of scientific and technical Person-
nel. (A new State Council Bureau for Scientific and
Technological Personnel was set up in June 1964. It
presumably relieved the Commission of detailed opera-
tional duties in this field.)
vi. Management of research and development funds.
vii. Operation of the scientific and technical docu-
mentation and information services.
viii. Provision of research equipment and materials.
( A Ministry for the Allocation of Materials was estab-
lished in October -1964 and may have taken over re-
sponsibility for the details of this operation.)
ix. Establishment and management of weights and
measures and industrial standards.
x. Conduct of international relations in science and
technology.
64. Within the Commission's organization are
possibly 40 or more divisions which handle the
affairs of particular substantive fields of science
and engineering and perform or manage support-
ing services. To carry out its work, the Com-
mission has a number of advisory committees of
one or two dozen experts each. They meet as
needed to provide the expertise needed for the
conduct of the Commission's business. Each sub-
stantive division of the Commission is believed
to have such a committee of experts. The degree
of supervision exercised by the Commission varies
from one of very general policy direction to one
of close detailed supervision for some key projects.
The Commission is believed to have a Defense
Technology Division for incorporating military
problems into the national planning and program-
ming of research and development.
65. The Academy of Sciences is China's leading
research and development institution. Most of
China's leading scientists are on the rolls of its
80 or more relatively well-equipped research insti-
tutes. China's scientific strength and continuity
of effort in the various basic scientific disciplines
is found in the Academy. It is also a service
organization supplying research and development
support to both civil and military programs of the
country. Direct military control of parts of the
Academy or part of individual research laboratories
is probable. Another important role of the Acad-
emy is the training of new scientists, a role sup-
plementing that of the regular universities and col-
leges. The Academy's China Universities of Sci-
ence and Technology founded in 1958, in Peiping
and Shanghai, offer a 5-year undergraduate cur-
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riculum heavily biased toward those scientific and
engineering subjects especially significant in ad-
vanced industrial and military technology. A
4-year graduate training program has been operat-
ing since 1956. Facilities of the Academy are lo-
cated in many parts of China, but the largest con-
centration is in Peiping, with Shanghai ranking
next.
66. One pattern of organization found among
some of the technical ministries consists of a sci-
entific committee and a research academy (yen-
chiu-yuan ) with subordinate research institutes
(yen-chiu-so). The scientific committee is a gen-
eral planning and overseeing body, probably com-
posed of representatives from both those agencies
needing the research and those doing it. It would
probably be the body in direct contact with the
State Scientific and Technological Commission.
The research academy and its subordinate research
institutes carry out research on key problems or
problems common to the field of responsibility of
the ministry. Major industrial plants usually have
plant laboratories attached to handle local prob-
lems. In the cases of both the Ministry of Agri-
culture and the Ministry of Public Health, the
status of the central research body may be higher
than in the cases of other ministries, the central
bodies being called the Chinese Academy of Agri-
cultural Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Med-
ical Sciences. ( The term used in the name is
k'o-hsueh yuan.) Both have extensive research fa-
cilities extending throughout China and operate
the major higher educational institutions in their
respective fields in China.
67. A definitive description of the organization
for planning, controlling, and supervising defense
research and development at all levels cannot be
made. Nevertheless, a few facts are available.
At the top is the Party's Military Affairs Commit-
tee in whose hands rests basic policy direction.
Within the government, the highest level body is
the National Defense Council, but its role in re-
search and development is not known.
68. The Ministry of National Defense is the
logical locus of responsibilities in military research
and development, but the degree to which it is
responsible for planning and managing the vast
it
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military research and development effort that ex-
tends into many other ministries and the Academy
of Sciences is not clear. Within the Ministry of
National Defense, the same pattern of organization
for research that is seen in other ministries is indi-
cated by the organizational names�a Ministry of
National Defense Science Committee and an Acad-
emy of Military Sciences. Also under the ministry
is the People's Liberation Army Academy of Medi-
cal Sciences. Some research and development fa-
cilities are operated by the Ministry of National
Defense, and they may be subordinate to the Acad-
emy of Military Sciences. Research organs also
are known to be subordinate to the Defense Science
Committee.
2nd Ministry of Machine Building�nuclear energy
ELEMENTS OF CONTROL
70. The control of research for defense in these
various organs may center in the Ministry of Na-
tional Defense or possibly in the State Scientific
and Technological Commission. Within the Com-
mission there is believed to be a Division for De-
fense Technology; whether this division has a co-
ordinating and supervising function or is limited
to collating for planning is not known. Some key
projects, however, are believed to be supervised
directly by the Commission; some of these could
be military projects.
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71. Little is known about the financing of re-
search and development programs, but in general
the programs are well supported. In 1960, the
science budget was $441,224,000 (2.45 yuan=$1)
or 1.54 percent of the national budget which was
up from $99,590,000 or 0.8 percent of national
budget in 1956, the year that China commenced
(b)(3).
the "march on science" with a huge budgetary
increase over previous years. Research and de-
velopment have continued to expand since 1960,
especially in the expensive advanced weapons field,
and we now estimate that China's appropriation
for research and development is roughly in the
range of one-half to one billion dollars.
III. Resources
GENERAL
72. In the 1950's, the USSR began to aid China
with experienced manpower, technology, and some
equipment for a nuclear energy program. The
Soviets also participated with the Chinese in geo-
logical exploration, mining, and the design and
perhaps the construction of a uranium-metal plant.
In addition, they probably supplied plans and part
of the equipment for a gaseous diffusion plant at
Lanchou and possibly for a reactor facility at
Pao-tou. The withdrawal of Soviet aid in mid-1960
undoubtedly impeded the Chinese program, forcing
China to reorient its efforts to develop and to pro-
duce, with little or no foreign assistance, the various
critical materials and equipment required. Thus,
virtually every field of science and technology in
China is seriously hampered by acute shortages of
well-trained, experienced personnel at the higher
levels. To overcome the critical problems in
science and technology, China will need the advice
and assistance of foreign experts for a number of
years to come.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL MANPOWER
73. Although a useful degree of competence
exists within nearly every scientific and engineering
field, the number of well-trained and experienced
researchers available cannot cope with a vast num-
ber of demands for MD support. The regime has
the resources to assemble a team of research scien-
tists and technologists who would be competent to
make progress toward almost any objective, but
only at the expense of other projects. Very slow
progress has been made in overcoming the very
critical shortage of scientists capable of doing ad-
14
vanced-level work, but programs under way indi-
cate that the rate of increase in the numbers of
well-trained research workers will begin to go up
markedly in the next year or two. By 1970, China's
research staff will be considerably strengthened at
the upper levels of competence.
74. For the lower level of technical services for
which China is in great need, a good supply of
technicians and narrowly trained engineers is
available.
75. China now has an estimated 1,539,000 living
graduates of higher educational institutions. Of
these, 846,000 are specialists in scientific and techni-
cal fields, including 476,000 in engineering special-
ties. ( See table 1.) Since the Communist take-
over in 1949, 1,355,000 students have been gradu-
ated from Chinese universities and colleges. By
1970, the estimated total number of graduates will
be more than two million. Of the 1,355,000 stu-
dents graduated since 1949, 780,000 specialized
in scientific and technical subjects. Tables 2 and
3 give the numbers graduating each year and the
cumulative totals through 1964.
76. The large numbers of scientific and technical
graduates cannot be taken as a direct indicator of
China's capabilities in research and engineering,
because much of the training given since the Com-
munist takeover has not been of high standard,
and many have had only a few years of experience.
Youth characterizes the scientific and technical
graduates, 90 percent having been produced since
1949. In contrast to the low age level of most
graduates, the average age of those capable of
competent research and engineering leadership is
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Table 1
Number of Living Graduates of Higher Educational Institutions
Total
1,539,000
Engineering
476,000
Medicine
144,000
Agriculture
130,000
Natural Sciences
96,000
Teacher Training
388,000
Other
305,000
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15
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UNCLASSIFIED
Table 2
Yearly College Graduations by Specialty, 1950-64
( In Thousands)
ACADEMIC
YEAR
TOTAL
ENGR.
MED.
AGRIC.b
NATURAL TEACHER
SCIENCE TRAINING
OTHER '
1949/50
18
4.7
1.4
1.5
1.5
.6
8.3
1950/51
19
4.4
2.4
1.5
15
1.2
8.0
1951/52
32
10.2
2.6
2.4
2.2
3.1
11.5
1952/53
48
14.6
2.9
2.6
1.8
9.6
16.5
1953/54
47
15.6
4.5
3.5
.8
10.6
12.0
1954/55
55
18.6
6.8
2.6
2.0
12.1
12.9
1955/56
63
22.0
5.4
3.5
4.0
17.2
10.9
1956/57
56
17.2
6.2
3.1
3.5
15.9
10.1
1957/58
72
17.5
5.4
3.5
4.6
31.6
9.4
1958/59
701
55.0
11.4
28.8
17.1
72.1
20.4
1959/60
135 f
1960/61
162
54.0
19.0
10.0
10.0
49.0
20.0
1961/62
178
59.0
17.0
20.0
11.0
56.0
15.0
1962/63
200
77.0
25.0
17.0
10.0
46.0
25.0
1963/64"
200
77.0
75.0
17.0
10.0
46.0
25.0
� Includes health sciences and pharmacy
� Includes forestry
'Includes economics, political science, law, history, foreign languages, physical education, arts
d Apportioned as in 1962/63
Table 3
Cumulative College Graduates 1950-64
( Data Derived from Table 2)
(In Thousands)
YEAR
TOTAL
�
ENGR.
Mn.
AGRIC.
NATURAL
SCIENCES
TEACHER
TRAINING
0
1950
18
4.7
1.4
1.5
1.5
.6
8.3
1951
37
9.1
3.8
3.0
3.0
1.8
16.3
1652
69
19.3
6.4
5.4
5.2
4.9
27.8
1953
117
33.9
9.3
8.0
7.0
14.5
44.3
1954
164
49.5
13.8
11.5
7.8
25.1
56.3
1955
219
68.1
20.6
14.1
9.8
37.2
69.2
1956
282
90.1
26.0
17.6
13.8
54.4
80.1
1957
338
107.0
32.2
20.7
17.3
70.3
90.2
1958
410
125.0
37.6
24.2
21.9
101.9
99.6
1959
4801
180.0
49.0
53.0
39.0
174.0
120.0
1960
615f
1961
777
233.8
68.0
63.0
49.0
223.0
140.0
1962
955
292.8
85.0
83.0
60.0
279.0
155.0
1963
1,155
370.0
110.0
100.0
70.0
325.0
180.0
1964
1,355
447.0
135.0
117.0
80.0
371.0
205.0
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UNCLAZIFIED
Table 4
Estimates of Surviving Graduates of Higher Education in China by Age and
Field of Specialization-through 1964
A. NUMBER OF GRADUATES
AGE GROUP
ALL FIELDS
ENGINEER
MEDICAL
SCIENCE
AGRICULTURAL
NATURAL
SCIENCE
EDUCATION
OTHER
All Ages
1,539,056
476,204
143,651
130,069
95,590
388,470
305,072
20-24
563,929
206,480
65,555
50,935
30,661
145,238
65,060
25-29
497,776
148,176
42,303
47,449
34,688
166,060
59,100
30-34
227,917
73,575
21,296
13,681
10,208
50,681
58,476
35-39
102,531
23,840
7,145
8,205
7,375
9,938
46,028
40-44
60,247
11,502
3,327
5,295
4,317
7,734
28,072
45-49
27,996
5,806
1,908
2,129
3,383
2,395
12,375
50-54
31,730
4,056
1,322
1,507
3,031
3,461
18,353
55-59
15,430
1,664
474
558
1,084
1,618
10,032
60-64
6,637
637
186
178
488
777
4,371
65-69
3,018
290
84
82
221
352
1,989
70-74
1,762
170
49
48
128
206
1,161
75+
83
8
2
2
6
10
55
Percent by Cate-
gory*
100.0
31.0
9.3
8.5
6.2
25.2
19.8
B. PERCENTAGE OF DISTRIBUTION*
MEDICAL
NATURAL
AGE GROUP
ALL FIELDS
ENGINEER
SCIENCE
AGRICULTURAL
SCIENCE
EDUCATION
OTHER
All Ages
100.0
100.0..
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
20-24
36.6
43.4
45.7
39.2
32.1
37.4
21.3
25-29
32.4
31.1
29.5
36.5
36.3
42.7
19.4
30-34
14.8
15.5
14.8
10.5
10.7
13.0
19.2
35-39
6.7
5.0
5.0
6.3
7.7
2.6
15.1
40-44
3.9
2.4
2.3
4.1
4.5
2.0
9.2
45-49
1.8
1.2
1.3
1.6
3.6
0.6
4.1
50-54
2.1
0.9
0.9
1.2
3.2
0.9
6.0
55-59
1.0
0.3
0.3
0.4
1.1
0.4
3.3
60-64
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.2
1.4
65-69
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.6
70-74
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.4
75+
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
* Percentage figures forced to add to an even 100.0 percent. ( Prepared by John Aird, FDAD, U.S. Bur. of
Census-Dec. 1964.)
UNCLASSIIIED
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higher than than might be expected because of continu-
ing dependence on many of those older scientists
and engineers trained in America and Europe.
Table 4 gives the numbers in each field by group.
77. The quality of students graduating since 1949
varies greatly, depending on when or where the
training was received. In the early 1950's, many
students were graduated after only 2 or 3 years of
study, so urgent was the need for technical per-
sonnel in industry and for teaching. By 1955, the
4-year course was common and 5-year courses
started to be adopted. The quality of training
slipped appreciably during the "great leap forward,"
when radical training schemes were adopted and
much student time was spent in labor on farms and
in factories. By 1961, quality in education once
again was stressed. More time was made available
for study and for laboratory work by cutting down
time spent in labor and political meetings; but,
beginning in late 1964 under the "social rectifica-
tion" program, students and graduates alike were
once again being ordered to "go to the country-side"
to perform menial labor. On the other hand, sev-
eral reforms have brought improvements. The
open book" method of examination is being intro-
duced to promote independent thinking in place of
the traditional emphasis on rote. The very high
degree of specialization has been reduced; students
are given more training in fundamental principles
in broader fields so that they can be used more
efficiently as needs for personnel change.
78. The quality of training also has varied be-
tween institutions. Graduates of such general
universities as Peiping, Fu-tan, and Nan-k'ai and
technical universities, such as Tsinghua, Chiao-t'ung
and the China University of Science and Tech-
nology are better trained than those from some
other universities and from most of the specialized
engineering colleges.
79. With total enrollments in universities and
colleges running between 700,000 and 800,000,
shortages of well-trained teachers and laboratory
facilities still remain, but a considerable improve-
ment on both counts is expected by 1970. Despite
shortcomings in China's educational standards, the
country has made remarkable progress in educating
large numbers of the population to a level never
before attained. Scientific and technical graduates
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of the better universities and engineering colleges
are well qualified to participate in significant re-
search and development activities and their num-
bers are increasing. Though many of the college
graduates do not meet Western standards, they can
make a useful contribution to programs for modern-
izing industry, agriculture, and the military forces.
80. The number of scientists, engineers and tech-
nicians engaged in research and development rose
from a few thousand in 1952 to 32,500 in 1958, not
counting some 10,000 to 20,000 more in universities
and colleges who may have been engaged in some
level of research work. Since 1958, the research
force has continued to expand and is believed to be
approaching 100,000. A force of this size could be
made up only of large numbers of inexperienced or
poorly trained research scientists and support tech-
nicians working with a minimum of competent
leadership. Much of the work done would be rela-
tively low-level research or engineering develop-
ment. According to the Chinese themselves, "only
several thousand . . . are the higher scientific and
technical personnel." It is these few who are ca-
pable of planning and directing research projects
of significance.
81. A rising rate of increase of well-trained scien-
tists is expected during the next year or two.
For some of these, greater leadership ability will
come with the knowledge and sophistication gained
from being part of China's expanding research pro-
gram over the last 10 years. Other new leaders
will come from more formal programs for advanced
training. China has had 4-year graduate training
programs under way in the Academy of Sciences
and in the universities and colleges. The rate of
training has been severely limited by the small
number of scientists capable of training them.
Progress has also been slowed by the malpractices
during the "great-leap-forward" period. The
Chinese claim that 12,000 persons have completed
postgraduate training since 1949, but most of them
completed only short-term (1- or 2-year) programs
designed to expand the substandard training of the
early 1950's and to give better preparation partic-
ularly for teaching. In the fall of 1964, 1,200 new
postgraduate students were accepted in universities
and research institutes, which is an increase over
the 800 of 1963. The proportion destined for 4-
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year PhD equivalent training is not known, but the
total currently in such advanced training programs
is estimated to be not more than 2,500. The Acad-
emy of Sciences had over 400 students enrolled in
its 4-year program during the 1962-63 year.
Through 1970, the formal training program should
add more than 3,000 new research workers trained
to the PhD-equivalent level.
82. Since 1950, some 7,200 Chinese students have
been sent to the Soviet Union as regular under-
graduates or graduate students at Soviet universi-
ties, colleges, and research institutes. About 4,600
completed their work and returned to China.
Others were recalled before completing their formal
courses. In early 1965, probably fewer than 50
were enrolled in Soviet higher educational institu-
tions. Those completing graduate studies leading
to the Soviet kandidat degree total about 1,800.
The kandidat degree is roughly equivalent to
the US doctorate. These Soviet-trained returnees
should be a source of some new leadership in re-
search unless held back on the grounds that they
may be pro-Soviet as a consequence of their ex-
perience.
83. The Chinese in the next few years may com-
mence the training of appreciable numbers in Euro-
pean countries and in Japan, but this is by no
means certain. At present, there are very few
science and engineering students from China study-
ing in Western countries.
84. In the field of nuclear physics, a special
training program is provided at the Joint Institute
for Nuclear Research at Dubna, USSR, near Mos-
cow. China is the second largest supporter in this
international ( Communist) research center, the So-
viet Union being the largest and providing about
half the support. The number of Chinese doing
research or in training there is not known but is
probably about 50.
FACILITIES FOR RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
85. Facilities and equipment of widely ranging
quality and quantity can be found in the various
Chinese research and development establishments.
Very large complexes employing thousands of per-
sons are in operation in fields, such as nuclear
22
�Trylp�Aftc*FT
energy and missiles, and in broad-ranging fields,
such as that of the chemical industry. Sophisti-
cated apparatus of the kind expected to be used
in the research laboratories of advanced countries
can be found in China and probably is available
in adequate quantities where very high priority
programs are under way. In general, however,
Chinese research scientists are commonly handi-
capped by not having access to the equipment and
materials they need because of nonexistence or poor
distribution. They must work with considerably
less equipment than they need, and they spend an
inordinate amount of time making equipment and
materials that in advanced countries would be
available commercially. Chinese industry is not
yet prepared to fill such needs adequately, and
foreign purchases are restricted by foreign exchange
shortage or export prohibitions.
86. Expansion of research and development fa-
cilities has gone forward, even during the post-1960
period of general economic retrenchment. This is
especially notable in connection with nuclear en-
ergy and missile development, but expansion has
not been restricted to those fields. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(D)(J)
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2,000,000
Figure 2
Cumulative Scientific and Technological Graduates by Field
of Specialization for Selected Years in Communist
48050
1$000
1950
Other than Scientific & Technological
Natural Sciences
Agriculture
Health
Engineering
615,000
39,000_
53,000
1960
1,355,000
1964
220,000
1970
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1111
TCS 4425/65 (b)(3)I
IV. Status and Trends in Research and Development
87. China has achieved certain successes in some
areas of its research and development programs in
spite of critical shortages of senior scientists and
engineers, lack of modern techniques and methods,
and deficiencies in the amounts of advanced mate-
rials, equipment, and facilities. Nevertheless,
China's immediate research and development capa-
bilities and rate of progress in the disciplines and
technologies will feel the effects of these far
reaching shortages for several years to come. The
assessments that are presented in this study are
based on the assumption that there will be no re-
sumption of foreign assistance to Chinese research
and development as had been provided by the
Soviet Union before 1960.
A. SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES
1. Physics
88. China has recognized the importance of basic
physics research and has a program of study in
that discipline. Although the country has not
achieved notable results, a good foundation exists
for growth and for general support of economic
and military needs.
89. An increasing amount of basic solid-state
research is being conducted. A major research
effort in solid-state physics has been designed to
support the Chinese electronics industry, which
obviously can make immediate contributions to
advanced weapons systems and to the civilian
economy.
modest achievements in
91. China has made
low-energy nuclear physics, and gradual progress
in this field can be expected. Accelerators avail-
able for research are relativel few
variety.
92. In high-energy physics, much of the research
is done at the Institute of Atomic Energy* in Pei-
ping. This work must be largely theoretical be-
cause experimental facilities are limited; many
problems in this area are referred to Chinese scien-
tists working at the Joint Institute for Nuclear
Research in Dubna, USSR. /
r The limitations
im-
posed by inadequate equipment will almost cer-
tainly prevent any major advances for the imme-
diate future.
23
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2. Mathematics and Computer Technology
94. China's research in theoretical and applied
mathematics is fairly active and competent, espe-
cially when compared with the situation before
1949. Most of the research follows the lead of simi-
lar work abroad and is directed toward applica-
tion in such areas as computers, automatic control,
statistics, operations research, and linear program-
ming.
95. A dozen or so senior mathematicians are
conducting high-level research on such subjects as
number theory, differential equations, analysis,
topology, differential geometry, and real and com-
plex variables. These men are devoting a con-
siderable portion of their time to training students.
As the younger mathematicians gain experience,
China should be capable of original research on
theoretical and applied mathematics - on a fairly
large scale.
96. China's computer technology has been highly
dependent on foreign assistance, but native com-
petence is growing rapidly. The Chinese are fully
aware of modem developments and are exerting
considerable efforts to improve their technology
which is still considerably inferior to that in the
West. The most advanced high-speed digital com-
puter in China, the 16-K, is somewhat inferior to
the U.S. IBM 7090, which was commercially avail-
able in 1959;
97. The availability of computers is marginal in
meeting many of China's needs, and strict alloca-
tion of computer time is needed to solve even pri-
ority economic and military projects. Neverthe-
less, a dozen or so factories are now producing
numerous special-purpose analog computers and
lesser numbers of fairly high-speed electronic
digital computers, which are adequate for the tasks
24
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(b)(3)
of numerical weather forecasting, operations r((b)( 1)
search, business data processing and various types
of scientific and technical computations. China's
capabilities probably also are adequate to provide
some specialized computing devices that may be
required as elements of military systems. More
sophisticated research in the space sciences and
military technology will require advanced types of
computers which the Chinese are now building.
(See "Computers," para. 338.)
3. Chemistry and Chemical Engineering
98. Most of China's current research projects in
chemistry are aimed at mastering the known chemi-
cal processes and adapting them to China's condi-
tions. Research results are not outstanding nor are
the projects very original, but they do provide sup-
port for China's military and economic programs.
99. Emphasis in chemical research is on: the
separation and preparation of pure materials for
electronic and nuclear applications; the develop-
ment of chemical fertilizers and production of in-
secticides to support agriculture; and the produc-
tion of polymeric materials, petroleum products,
and pharmaceuticals.
100. Chinese research in inorganic chemistry sup-
ports the light and heavy industries by developing
methods for analysis and for the separation of
economically important metals from indigenous ores
containing iron, tungsten, manganese, tin, the rare-
earth elements, and the radio-active elements
thorium and uranium. The preparation of pure
materials, such as silicon, rare earth oxides, and
borides, that are useful in the electronics industry
has been achieved, at least to the pilot-plant stage.
101. The major topic in physical chemistry re-
search is catalysis related to petroleum processing.
Here the effort is imitative of Western research(b)( 1)
with a study on cobalt catalysts, among other(b)( 1
Although the effort has not achieved significant
results, it will continue to stress the improvement
of yields using well-tried processes.
102. Electrochemical research is aimed at the
separation and purification of rare metals from
molten salts. Research on batteries for use in all
types of military vehicles and aircraft is aimed at
lengthening the lifetime of the standard lead-acid
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48053
a. Pa-I model electronic digital computer (Soviet model M-3)
b. Pa-I model digital computers under construction in Communist China
(b)(3)
Figure 5
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battery. Investigation Investigation of newer battery systems,
such as the nickel-cadium system is also carried
out. There is evidence of some fuel-cell research,
but this will not have military significance for many
years.
103. Basic research on organic chemistry in China
is far behind that in the West, with only a few
significant contributions having been made. The
Chinese are conducting a small amount of high-
quality basic research on the chemistry of high
polymers and have a major development program
in this field. The application of results produced
in the research institutes has been inhibited, how-
ever, by a shortage of engineering know-how and
inept management.
104. In the field of pharmaceutical chemistry,
there has been some success in producing drugs
for export. While some of the work was merely
copying known methods, some very good original
research has been done. For example, the Chi-
nese successfully developed diosgenin and in 1962
began to sell it abroad. (Diosgenin is an ex-
tremely important substance used in the prepara-
tion of cortisone, hydrocortisone, and progesterone.)
Now they are able to export finished cortisone in
various forms as well as other steriod hormones.
105. -In support of their agricultural program, the
Chinese have conducted a sizable amount of re-
search in insecticides, including synthesis of or-
ganophosphorous compounds
106. Research has been carried out to exploit
waste materials. Agricultural wastes have yielded
furfural, and research is being carried out to pro-
duce a series of organic chemicals analogous to
those derived from coal-tar. There is no evidence,
however, that commercial-scale processes have been
developed. Attention has also been paid to by-
products from petroleum and shale processing,
107. Basic research in chemical engineering is
rather limited in China and is concentrated at
educational institutions,
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109. Resources in chemical engineering research
and development have been devoted primarily to
agricultural and military needs. Great emphasis
is being given to the development of processes and
equipment for synthetic ammonia, urea and other
fertilizers, as well as other chemicals for use in
agriculture.
4. Metallurgy
110. Specialty alloy steels are receiving the high-
est priority in Chinese metallurgical research. Be-
cause of the scarceness of nickel in China, a large
effort has been devoted to substitute steel composi-
tions that require a minimum of this element for
alloying oses.
111. The high-priority materials requirements of
agricultural, industrial, and military programs are
reflected in Chinese metallurgical research activity
on corrosion- and heat-resistant steels used for the
construction of chemical process equipment and on
processes for extracting certain of the less common
metals. It is questionable whether China now has
the capability to produce and fabricate high-tem-
perature alloys required for aircraft jet engines;
however, a very limited capability may be de-
veloping.
112. The Chinese are producing a modest variety
of alloy steels, including some stainless steels,
ordinary grades of precision steels, high-speed tool
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steels, and spring steels. They now have corrosion-
resistant stainless steels needed for fertilizer plants,
and are acquiring applied research experience use-
ful in specialty steel manufacturing. By 1970,
China should be able to produce most varieties of
specialty steels. The major problem which the
Chinese have in specialty steel technology is the
poor control of chemical composition and homo-
geneity. Little is known of the Chinese ability to
produce such metals as titanium, beryllium, and
molybdenum. China's problems with steel proc-
essing suggest, however, that at present it would
have difficulty in producing and fabricating these
metals on an industrial scale since a more complex
technology is required.
113. Powder metallurgy techniques are not yet
well developed in China, and apparently little re-
search is being undertaken in this field. Other
modern metallurgical techniques, such as vacuum
metallurgy, zone-refining, and explosive forming
are being studied, though most metallurgical re-
search efforts are devoted to improving more con-
ventional techniques.
114. China probably has been engaged in re-
search on the metallurgical application of radio-
isotopes.
115. Technological problems concerning the
beneficiation of ores for the production of the com-
mon nonferrous metals, such as copper, aluminum,
tin, lead, and zinc, are still of concern to the Chi-
nese. In addition, Chinese metallurgists are con-
tinuing their efforts to develop processes for the
extraction of other nonferrous metals, such as zir-
conium, hafnium, uranium, and tantalum from their
ores. A degree of success in these efforts is indi-
cated, but they are still years behind the West and
are not expected to catch up until well beyond
1970.
116. The application of research findings to full-
scale industrial fabrication of metals is still a prob-
lem in China. Chinese difficulties in heat treat-
ment primarily concern the control of furnace
atmospheres, furnace automation and mechanization
techniques, and quality control procedures. The
welding of steel continues to be a problem and is a
subject of much applied research throughout China.
26
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117. A limited amount of basic physical metal-
lurgy research is under way in China. Studies of
internal friction in metals, being conducted at the
Institute of Physics, Academy of Sciences, are out-
standing. Other routine studies are being made of
metal whiskers, dislocations, creep, and magnetic
properties.
118. The most important research institutes in
the field of metallurgy are the Institute of Chemi-
cal Engineering and Metallurgy, Institute of Metal-
lurgy and Ceramics, Institute of Metals, all under
the Academy of Sciences, and the Research Institute
of Nonferrous Metals, under the Ministry of Metal-
lurgical Industry. The Shih-ching-shan Steel Plant
in Peiping is devoted to investigations of newer
steel making processes and to the improvement of
the conventional processes in use in China.
5. Basic Electronics
119. While trying to achieve a capability in
theoretical research, the Chinese are emphasizing
practical research and development for their im-
mediate production needs. In particular, they are
concerned with the development of their manu-
facturing facilities so that they can produce their
own telecommunications equipments and adapt
foreign equipment to their manufacturing capabili-
ties. In spite of Sino-Soviet ideological differences,
China continues to cooperate, at least to an extent,
with other Communist countries in research on
equipment tropicalization. China almost certainly
will have a very formidable research capability
within a few years after the period of this estimate.
120. In noncommunications electronic equip-
ment production and deployment for military use,
the Chinese already have demonstrated an increas-
ing ability to develop their own equipment and to
adapt foreign equipment to their manufacturing
capabilities. Their aim undoubtedly is to develop
a completely self-sufficient ,industry for the produc-
tion of this equipment, though at present they will
take whatever help becomes available.
121. To date, Chinese leaders have emhasized
the engineering development aspects of electronics
research, concerning themselves with adapting
Soviet Bloc, Western, and Japanese devices, equip-
ment, and systems in order to meet requirements
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which they consider essential. Generally speak-
ing, the requirements considered essential are ex-
tremely meager by Western standards.
122. There is no clear-cut division of responsibil-
ity for fundamental and applied research among
the various categories of Chinese institutions, lab-
oratories, and plants that are concerned with elec-
tronics. The responsibilities of institutions and
laboratories often overlap those of manufacturing
installations, which do a considerable amount of
development work. The Fourth Ministry of Ma-
chine Building (formerly the Tenth Bureau, Third
Ministry of Machine Building), and the Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications are associated
with electronics work. Some studies on electrical
meters is conducted by the First Ministry of Ma-
chine Building.
123. The task of obtaining foreign prototypes
to modify or adapt is rapidly becoming easier.
Western (except U.S.) and Japanese electronics
material, sometimes of the very latest type, is now
readily available to the Chinese; the only limitation
on purchases being China's ability to pay or to
establish credit and, to some extent, on export re-
strictions. In addition to their use of foreign-made
components, equipment, and systems, the Chinese
place great emphasis on the publication of transla-
tions and abstracts of foreign scientific and techni-
cal books, journals, and the like. This includes a
large body of material from the Soviet Bloc, prob-
ably some "classified" technical data. Much of
this material reaches Chinese electronics personnel
within a year after its original publication. In their
own papers and books, the Chinese generally cite
far more Western publications as references than
they do Soviet Bloc.
124. From the standpoint of engineering devel-
opment, as well as more fundamental research and
development, no special emphasis appears to be
placed on any particular segment of the general
field of electronics. However, in the case of high-
grade published research (in contradistinction to
technical articles describing some unit, such as an
electron tube), emphasis is placed on a very few
items�semiconductor devices, lasers, masers, para-
metric amplifiers and wave guides. These papers
are an enigma, for the number of Chinese papers is
very small in comparison with the number of papers
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published in scientific journals in Japan and the
West. Yet many are of excellent quality, and such
excellence is not normally associated with a small-
scale technical capability.
125. Engineering development of semiconductor
devices based on Western, Soviet Bloc, and Japa-
nese transistors is conducted at a number of plants
scattered throughout the whole of China. Exam-
ples of such plants are the Peiping Electron Tube
Plant and the Nanking Electron Tube Plant. The
Institute of Semiconductor Physics ( also known as
the Institute of Semiconductors) of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences is the largest center for more
fundamental research on semiconductor devices.
The Institute of Semiconductor Physics is an out-
growth of the Institute of Physics, Chinese Academy
of Sciences, where a small amount of work on semi-
conductor devices is still done. A large number of
higher educational institutions, such as Peiping
University, Fu-tan University in Canton, and Nan-
k'ai University at Tientsin are also centers of semi-
conductor research.
126. During the last 10 years, approximately 100
papers concerned with semiconductor devices were
published by some 70 authors. The theoretical
work is almost always of high quality and certainly
comparable to that which is found in such U.S.
journals as Physical Review and Reviews of Modern
Physics.
127. The Chinese probably profited more from
Soviet assistance in electronics than in any other
field of science. Moreover, electronics seems to
have suffered the least when such aid was with-
drawn. Chinese scientists of this discipline seem
to be far less interested in investigating problems
of basic research that would lead to original de-
signs than they are in copy-manufacturing and
design-modifying foreign equipment, such as tele-
vision cameras, transistorized radio receivers, and
communications components of reasonably good
quality.
128. At the present time at least 70 types of
germanium transistors are manufactured in China
and are in good supply, not only for essential civil-
ian and military purposes but also for use by radio
amateurs, students, and the like. The transistors
include low-power, high-frequency types (100
milliwatt, 100 mc/s), audio-frequency power units,
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and low-frequency control elements. The majority
of these transistors are intended for applications
in radio sets, audio amplifiers, power-frequency
controls, and similar devices. Some of these tran-
sistors can be used for relatively high-speed ( on the
order of 1 microsecond) logic and computer cir-
cuitry. Although the number of transistor types
manufactured in China is much less than in the
West, the types that are produced probably are
quite adequate for the manufacture of most civilian
telecommunications and control units which require
transistors, and for certain military equipment,
such as HF communication sets. However, the
apparent lack of Chinese-manufactured silicon-type
transistor will prevent the development of mobile-
type military telecommunications equipment that
must operate at extended temperature ranges.
129. More than 20 types of diodes are manufac-
tured in China and are in good supply. Many of
these are silicon diodes.
130. Chinese interest in laser and maser research
began in 1961 with one known scientist. The num-
ber grew to five in 1962 and subsequently increased
to a total of 54 by late 1964. Laser/maser re-
search is known to be conducted under the De-
pal trnent of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. -
131. Ruby and gas lasers (helium-neon) are be-
lieved to have been constructed, and good basic
work on doped calcium fluoride laser materials is
under way. Crude laser crystals can probably be
grown in China, but crystals suitable for meaningful
research with lasers are most likely obtained abroad.
Western and Russian literature is followed closely,
but the time lag is probably as much as 1 year.
The full range of possible laser applications is cer-
tainly appreciated, but little more than the basic
laser experiments have been duplicated. The Chi-
nese indicate an interest in and probably are de-
veloping materials for ruby masers and lasers. Al
though the emphasis has been on the optical prop-
erties of these devices, the Chinese probably are
aware of the use of masers in the production and
amplification of radio frequency oscillations at
millimeter and submillimeter wavelengths. How-
ever, masers for military applications are not ex-
pected to become available until after 1970. If
the present rate of growth in this discipline is
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continued, within 3 to 5 years China's research
could represent a major, full-scale program capable
of making significant contributions to the state of
the art.
132. Altogether, at least .16 facilities are engaged
in some aspect of electron tube research, develop-
ment, and production. Approximately 200 different
conventional-type vacuum tubes of good quality
are known to be produced in quantity. These un-
doubtedly are available as needed for essential
civilian and military purposes. Although the Chi-
nese claim to be developing and manufacturing
special purpose tubes, such as magnetrons, no in-
formation is available on the quantity or quality of
these tubes. Magnetrons, however, are definitely
known to be manufactured at one of the two elec-
tron tube plants in Ch'eng-tu, Szechwan Province.
133. Other electronic passive components are
produced by the Chinese in quantity and are only
considered marginally satisfactory in comparison
to Western prototypes.
134. Native-produced electrical measuring equip-
ment for use at frequencies below 300 megacycles
per second appear to be readily available in China.
This type of equipment is somewhat inferior to the
best produced by the West, but it is adequate for
its assigned purpose.
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6. Geophysical Sciences
135. China's geophysical sciences, with certain
exceptions, are just beginning to mature as full-
fledged research disciplines. Hence, inasmuch as
these regimes are characterized by the same prob-
lems of trained-personnel shortages, research-equip-
ment scarcities, and deficiencies in facilities that
prevail in other areas, China for some time will con-
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Figure 6
Nanking electronic tube plant
a. Workshop
b. Stem assembly
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tinue to remain far behind the leading nations of
the world in geophysical science and technology.
136. a. ASTRONOMY�China has only a few
modest programs in areas of astronomy such as
asteroids, latitude and time, celestial mechanics,
stellar evolution and solar astronomy. There is
also an interest in radio astronomy and in the de-
sign of astronomical instruments. China main-
tains an optical satellite observation program which
is directed by the country's largest observatory at
Purple Mountain, near Nanking.
137. The largest telescope in China, a 60-centi-
meter reflector, is located at Purple Mountain.
China's lack of larger telescopes greatly restricts
activities in observational astronomy. The observa-
tory also has a horizontal spectrograph and a Lyot
chromospheric telescope for solar research, as well
as several transit instruments and astronomical
clocks.
138. Although the Peiping Observatory has as
large a staff as that at Purple Mountain, little
observation work is conducted, the emphasis being
on basic astrophysics and teaching. A radio tele-
scope is planned for the next solar cycle peak
( 1968-69) and will consist of 32 6-meter dishes.
Observatories at Shanghai and Tientsin are active
in time service and latitude determination respec-
tively.
139. b. UPPER ATMOSPHERE AND SPACE�Re-
search is conducted in several sub-fields of upper
atmosphere and space geophysics. Greatest em-
phasis has been on ionospheric studies, with most
of the work that is published being on correlation
studies of ionospheric irregularities.
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density determinations can be made. The Chinese
have stated their intention to develop rockets and
satellites for upper atmospheric and space research.
140. The development of sounding rockets is the
responsibility of the Academy's Institute of Geo-
physics, which is responsible for developing an
upper atmosphere rocket research program and
possibly for designing scientific payloads for earth
satellites.
141. A few cosmic ray observatories exist in
China, including a new one established near Can-
ton in 1964. This new station was associated with
the IQSY in publicity although China is not an
official participant. In the next 5 years, China's
research will probably be expanded to other sub-
fields, such as aurora, airglow, and meteor investi-
gations.
142. c. METEOROLOGY�In China, meteorology is
probably one of the most active and productive of
the earth sciences programs. Nevertheless, the
status of meteorological research is low compared
with the status of similar research in more ad-
vanced countries. As with most other sciences,
meteorology is expanding in China, and attention
appears to be concentrated on establishing a data
collecting net and on developing forecasting ca-
pabilities to support the military, agriculture, avia-
tion, and industry.
143. Although China has progressed rapidly in
meteorology since 1949, the average quality and
limited quantity of personnel, instrumentation, and
weather communications keeps capabilities lower
than in advanced countries. Minimum operational
requirements of the armed forces, industry, and
agriculture can be met. Better forecasting capabili-
ties and some additional improvement in the ob-
servational network will be accomplished in pro-
grams during the next 5 years. The Chinese have
had research on the theory of numerical weather
prediction under way for several years and are now
using electronic computers for weather forecasting.
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144. Since Typhoons constitute a major threat
to the edonomy of China, considerable research is
conducted in attempting to describe and under-
stand them. The monsoons also are studied ex-
tensively.
145. The Chinese recently (1960 and 1961) pre-
pared comprehensive climatological atlases which
indicate clearly that much of the effort in this area
has been directed toward basic, descriptive pro-
grams providing agricultural and economic support.
146. Some native meteorological instruments are
produced, although most of this kind of equipment
is believed to be adopted from foreign equipment.
147. Little significant research in physical me-
teorology has been conducted, though interest in
weather modification has been indicated and a
small effort in cloud physics has been started. By
1970, China will be only slightly nearer the level of
advanced countries in meteorology.
148. d. GEODESY AND GruvimErRy�Another ac-
tive area in Chinese earth science is geodesy,
though little original research toward describing
the geophysical features of the country, so that
surveys for cartographic and mineralogic applica-
tions constitute a large part of the geophysical
effort. Only well-known methods and equipments
appear to be in use.
149. A gravimetric base-station network has been
established, and the Chinese are capable of estab-
lishing geodetic parameters for an IRBM test
range. The establishment of an ICBM range in
the Pacific will be difficult with current Chinese
capabilities in marine geodetic measurements.
Routine gravimetry is used in mineral exploration,
but instrumentation is in short supply.
150. e. GEOMAGNETISM AND GEOELECTRICITY�
Basic research on magnetic storms and routine geo-
magnetic observations have been conducted by the
Chinese. Both fields have been applied routinely
in the exploration of natural resources. There are
no indications of geomagnetic investigations that
may be associated with a nuclear detection system.
151. f. GEOLOGY�The Chinese have conducted
concentrated programs in all subfields of geology,
mainly in support of natural resource exploration
programs but predominantly on a reconnaissance
basis. New deposits of petroleum, various min-
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erals, sub-surface water, and other natural resources
have been located. In addition, emphasis is placed
on research supporting civil engineering and agri-
culture. This trend is expected to continue, espe-
cially in the exploration for minerals, petroleum,
and subsurface water to support an increasing
economic demand. In addition, research on rock
classification, correlation, and age dating, as well
as detailed mapping of economically potential
areas, will continue, but no significant contribu-
tions are expected by 1970.
152. g. SEISMOLOGY�The Chinese have been
active for several years in earthquake recording
and zoning, with considerable effort being directed
toward antiearthquake construction. Seismology is
used extensively in mineral and subsurface water
exploration.
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\ Little basic research is indicated by pub-
lished literature; and, as yet there is no evidence
of programs directed towards marine seismic ex-
ploration. A network of seismic stations in China
is capable of underground nuclear detection on a
limited scale. Most of this network was set up
with aid from the Soviets. There are no indica-
tions that this network will be improved exten-
sively by 1970.
153. h. OCEANOGRAPHY�A major portion of
oceanographic research in China continues to be
directed toward the support of marine biology and
the fishing and shipping industries. A stronger
program may be indicated by the recent establish-
ment of a State Council Bureau of Oceanography.
Several extensive and systematic annual surveys
have been carried out in the ocean areas adjacent
to the China coast but with emphasis on routine
data collection. China's participation in the Com-
munist countries' Fisheries Research Commission
for the West Pacific is an asset to the country.
Such programs as tidal and ocean wave study,
harbor erosion and silting problems, beach and
coastline studies, near-shore bottom topography
investigations, and extensive marine biological
programs are expected to continue. Other for-
merly neglected areas, such as marine physics,
chemistry, geology, and research instrumentation
are slowly being developed.
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Figure 7
Purple Mountain Astronomical Observatory at Nanking
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b. The 60-centimeter reflector
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research in addition to purely practical aspects.
Work is in progress on the use of purine an-
tagonists as antiviral agents, on the nature of drug
resistance, on the structure and function of viral
nucleic acids, and on the mechanism of anti-
genicity.
157. Main lines of research on biochemical and
biophysical areas of the medical sciences include:
(1) the crystallization of proteins, (2) the discovery
of active sites on enzymes and their mechanism of
action, (3) the structure, properties, and genetic
role of nucleic acids, (4) the general study of
metabolism, using tracer techniques, and (5) bio-
logical effects of radiation. The best of this work
is conducted at the Institute of Biochemistry of
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), Shanghai.
While none of this work is entirely original, it is
well conceived, controlled, and executed. Work
in physiology, neurophysiology, and pharmacology,
especially the mechanism of drug action, is ex-
cellent.
158. Cancer research has included clinical studies
on cervical carcinoma, choriocarcinoma, chorio-
adenoma destruens, esophageal carcinoma, and
nasopharyngeal carcinoma; these included histo-
pathologic studies associated with the clinical in-
vestigations, principally conducted by the Institute
of Experimental Medicine, CAMS, in Peiping.
159. Although individual basic studies on cancer,
protein synthesis, and medical virology have at-
tracted international attention, China will be un-
able to exploit in depth or adequately to broaden
its indigenous medical research capabilities before
1970. China is expected to seek Western scien-
tific and technological aid in the next decade in
order to overcome domestic research and develop-
ment deficiencies. Initial contacts and rapport are
being sought in part through the biomedical
sciences.
160. China is attempting to assure an adequate
food supply for its expanding population by in-
creased nutritional research and by birth control.
It is supporting a broad program of applied nu-
tritional research designed to identify the food
requirements of farmers and workers, to increase
the nutritive value of foods, to standardize and
simplify techniques for determining nutritional
levels, to apply nutritional science in the treatment
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154. Although published material indicates a
strong interest in marine seismology, gravimetry,
and geomagnetism, no important research programs
have been noted. The -Chinese possibly have as
many as three small oceanographic investigation
ships, but they rely mainly on small naval ships
for support. Instrumentation is undoubtedly in-
ferior to that of the leading nations. /
\ No major ad-
vance in the Chinese oceanographic program is
expected by 1970.
7. Medical Sciences
155. China has a severe shortage of trained
medical personnel. Many Chinese medical doctors
in comparison with Western-trained physicians are
weak in basic sciences, generally demonstrate
superficiality in clinical practice, and are strongly
influenced by political dictums. The reforms of
medical education that have been introduced will
not rectify the situation during the period of this
estimate, but by 1973-75 they should advance the
quality of graduate physicians to a level that will
compare favorably with Western standards.
156. Medical research in China is directed to-
ward infectious and neoplastic diseases and along
the lines of basic disciplines. Major attention has
been given by the Chinese Academy of Medical
Sciences (CAMS) to research on the prevention
and control of infectious diseases which exact the
greatest toll on the working forces�schistosomi-
asis, tuberculosis, malaria, Japanese B. encephalitis,
typhus, bacillary and amebic dysentery, and hook-
worm. Significant contributions include the isola-
tion of a strain of trachoma virus by Tang and
Chang et al at the rung-jen Hospital at Peiping,
and the development by the Ch'ang-Ch'un Vaccine
and Serum Institute and the CAMS, of a less toxic
vaccine against Japanese B. encephalitis. China
has a capability for the production of vaccines and
serums for most of her human and veterinary dis-
eases, as well as the production of standard phar-
maceuticals and antibiotics in limited quantities.
With the exception of this work, little in the way
of original research in this area seems to have been
accomplished in recent years. Use is now being
made of the few highly qualified Chinese micro-
biologists by giving more emphasis to fundamental
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of disease, and to promote food hygiene. The
research build-up is slow, and manpower training
will not yield fruit before 1970. Its efforts in popu-
lation control have been limited to the support
of late marriage, use of contraceptives, and liberal-
ization of abortions and sterilization. No evidence
is available of any related drop in the birth rate
which is about 2.2 percent of the total population.
161. Traditional Chinese medicine is of two
basic types: herbal medicine, which, in many cases,
has a pharmacological basis; and the more obscure
practice of acupuncture, or needling, and moxi-
bustion, or cautery, which have not been ade-
quately evaluated scientifically. The mixing of
Western and traditional medicine serves to in-
crease the number of medical practitioners in the
eyes of people, to bring ideas of modern hygiene
and public health to the traditional doctor without
causing "loss of face," and to extract from a large
body of traditional remedies those that are truly
efficacious. This practice probably will continue
at least until enough Western-style physicians are
available.
8. Biological Sciences
162. In general, the quality of Chinese biological
research is fairly good. However, the quantity of
research is low; so is the number of PhD-level
scientists. The number of research institutes is
adequate for China's limited basic research pro-
gram, but, if China extends its biological research,
an expansion of these facilities will be necessary.
Except in certain areas of molecular biology, where
the Chinese are making significant advances, Chi-
nese biological research is not expected to produce
any outstanding scientific accomplishments within
the next 5 years. However, there probably will
be a gradual increase in biological science capabili-
ties during that period. Official emphasis will con-
tinue to be centered on the applied rather than
the basic aspects of biological research. The main
research effort in Chinese biology is directed to-
ward practical problems concerned with agricul-
ture, industry, and health.
163. The taxonomy and ecology of the flora of
China continue to dominate the field of botany.
Other fields receiving increased attention are plant
physiology, genetics, and biochemistry. Investi-
gations are being conducted on photosynthesis,
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mineral nutrition of plants, tolerance of plants to
adverse conditions, induced mutations, and molecu-
lar biology. Although China's total genetic re-
search capabilities are limited, some outstanding
basic research in molecular biology has been con-
ducted. The Chinese may attempt to make a
spectacular contribution to molecular biology, as
this is an area in which they might surpass rival
Communist countries. Some excellent biochemical
research on the resynthesis and regeneration of
insulin has been conducted by scientists at the
Institute of Biochemistry, Shanghai. Chinese bio-
chemists also have attained high-quality research
in enzymology and protein biosynthesis.
164. In Chinese zoological research, the morpho-
logical, taxonomical, and ecological fields are most
prominent. Investigation in these fields on many
insects, fishes, and animal parasites has resulted
in the successful development of a number of
biological control measures. Though limited, much
of this research is on the level of Western work
in the zoological sciences.
165. The scope of Chinese microbiological re-
search is fairly broad, and the overall quality of
most microbiological research is good. Research
in microbial physiology and biochemistry empha-
sizes the industrially useful microorganisms. Chi-
nese research on microbiological methods of pros-
pecting for gas and oil also has been conducted
during the last few years. Considerable advances
have been made by the Chinese in the field of
antibiotic research, but they have not yet attained
a quality of research as high as that attained by
Western scientists. The Chinese are currently in-
vestigating the possibility of utilizing microbes to
convert by-products and agricultural wastes into
foodstuffs. Scientists have had some success in
this field, although production costs of such proc-
esses must be lowered substantially before research
findings can be applied practically.
166. Major research progress in hydrobiology in
China has occurred in fish rearing and catching,
the development of marine shellfish culture, the
extensive propagation and utilization oC seaweeds
for human food and industrial material, and the
investigation of the plankton distribution in the
China seas. Research on the sea kelps Laminaria
and Porphyra has resulted in more successful
propagation of these species, and research on the
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Figure 9
Sika fawns. The velvet antlers of Sika deer are highly valued by the
Chinese for traditional medicine.
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Figure 10
Lecture on the sea animal Amphioxus at Shantung Univers!
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Students of the Oceanographic Department of Shantung
University measuring the transparency of sea water
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Figure 12
Aquarium, part of the Marine and Limnological Museum,
Tsingtao, Shantung
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Figure 13
Edible seaweed grown by the youth brigade
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Figure 14
Cultured kelp
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edible green alga, Chlorella, is good. There has
been a significant growth in the scientific research
force in this area and a comparable increase in
the number of aquatic products institutes and re-
search facilities in China. This research, how-
ever, has not yet reached the advanced scientific
stage of that in many Western countries. Based
on increased support from its scientific and tech-
nological sector, the Chinese fishing industry can
be expected to develop at an accelerated rate dur-
ing the next 5 years.
9. Agricultural Sciences
167. Chinese agricultural research has increased
significantly, but as yet has contributed little to
increases in the food resources of China. Increased
emphasis given to the development of agricultural
productivity has been evident since September
1962 when the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party gave first priority between agriculture and
industry to the development of agriculture. The
quality and quantity of Chinese agricultural re-
search will probably improve as a result of this
priority, but a lack of trained scientists and, to a
lesser extent, facilities, and scientific equipment
will limit the potential contribution of such re-
search toward meeting China's needs for increasing
its food resources within the period of the estimate.
168. The most significant Chinese agricultural
research has been in crop breeding. Chinese plant
breeders and geneticists .have successfully bred
improved rice, wheat, corn and other food crops
that have significantly increased yields on experi-
mental plots. The Chinese claim the successful
selection of more than 400 superior varieties dur-
ing the last 10 years. The majority of these varie-
ties probably have been obtained through identi-
fication and selection of indigenous local varieties,
which were increased and distributed with little or
no breeding work. A lesser portion was derived
through the application of advanced crop breed-
ing methods, primarily using imported genetic
material. Many of the Chinese plant breeders are
Western-trained and have kept abreast of modern
plant breeding techniques.
169. Chinese research on the effective utilization
of agricultural chemicals (chemical fertilizers, in-
secticides, fungicides, and herbicides) is critically
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inadequate, even though agricultural chemicals,
especially fertilizers, offer the greatest opportunity
to increase China's food resources. Improperly
designed and controlled experiments, combined
with the generally poor quality of indigenously
produced agricultural chemicals, have hindered the
exploitation of the full potential of chemicals in
food production. Although Chinese scientists have
conducted good research in the soil sciences, their
research on chemical fertilizer utilization is very
limited, and fertilizer recommendations are based
mainly on mass trial and error experiments. The
Chinese will place increasing importance on chemi-
cal fertilizer and pesticides, and their utilization
should have a noticeable effect within 5 years.
However, most of their agricultural chemical re-
search will be directed toward the adaptation of
foreign practices and recommendations.
170. Chinese entomologists have been engaged
chiefly in adapting and implementing foreign con-
trol practices to varied conditions of food crop
production. Through ecological and life cycle
studies on the migratory locust, the Chinese have
brought locust attacks under control, and no dis-
astrous outbreaks have occurred in recent years.
Other important accomplishments include the iden-
tification and control of insect vectors of plant
diseases. Although insects are _controlled mainly
with insecticides, the Chinese have successfully de-
veloped biological control methods, using both
insect predators and microorganisms. Most of the
microorganisms utilized have been imported from
abroad. The dangers of upsetting present ecology
by the introduction of control insects are not in-
vestigated. Research on preventive methods rather
than control methods frequently is emphasized.
These include cultural methods, reporting and
forecasting systems, insect-free and insect-resistant
seeds, and chemical destruction of hibernating in-
sect pests. Entomological research has been geared
to solving current problems, but Chinese researchers
are fully aware of the importance of basic entomo-
logical research.
171. Chinese plant pathology research directed
toward the control and prevention of food crop
diseases has not been impressive by Western
standards. The strengthening of traditional prac-
tices, however, by the use of modern technology
and the adaptation of foreign control methods for
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serious fungal and viral crop diseases have accom-
plished practical results, which have significantly
reduced crop losses.
172. China has very little good research in the
animal sciences, but its very few co sa animal
scientists have co o the improvement of
s eep, and poultry breeding stock.
Nevertheless, in China, the weak scientific founda-
tion and the feed and breeding stock will make
the development of the livestock industry extremely
slow. Significantly, China has adapted foreign
livestock practices to reduce disease incidence,
which has nearly eliminated some of the more
serious diseases.
10. Nuclear Energy Research
173. DrrnonucrioN�The Chinese atomic energy
program began in the mid-1950s with Soviet aid
that continued until mid-1960. The aid involved
technical manpower, technology and some equip-
ment. Western unclassified literature also provided
valuable information. The Soviets participated
with the Chinese in geological exploration, min-
ing, and the design and perhaps the construction
of a uranium-metal plant. In addition, they prob-
ably provided plans and possibly some equipment
for the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchou and for
the reactor facility at Pao-tou. The withdrawal
Of Soviet aid in mid-1960 undoubtedly impeded
China's atomic energy program, forcing the Chi-
nese to reorient their efforts to develop and pro-
duce, with little or no assistance, the varioous criti-
cal materials and equipment required.
174. Although research in nuclear physics was
being conducted as early as 1955 or 1956 by a
group of scientists within the Institute of Physics
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, China did not
officially announce the establishment of the Insti-
tute of Atomic Energy (IAE) until 28 June 1958.
The Institute was made subordinate to the De-
partment of Physics, Mathematics, and Chemistry
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Although
the administrative headquarters and some facilities
are located in the Chung-kuan-ts'un section of Pei-
ping, the major equipment and laboratories are
located near the suburb of T'o-li, approximately 19
nautical miles southwest of Peiping. The IAE
also has established branches throughout China in
such places as Lan-chou, Hsi-an, Wu-han, Ch'eng-tu,
34
Canton, Shanghai, and possibly at Urumchi and
other locations. However, the current status,
amounts, and types of equipment at these branches
are not known.
(b)(
176. Other than the Institute of Atomic Energy,
many of the colleges and universities offer training
in nuclear energy subjects and undoubtedly would
support any Chinese efforts in this field by con-
ducting basic research in nuclear energy or associ-
ated fields. (See Nuclear Weapons Program, para
304)
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179. The only known U-235 production facility
in China is the complex located on the Yellow
River near Lan-chou. This facility probably in-
cludes a gaseous diffusion plant supplied by the
USSR during the 1957 to mid-1960 period. This
site layout suggests that original plans included
an additional building that would have permitted
production by normal gaseous diffusion tech-
niques of highly enriched uranium. However, a
second large building has not been constructed.
The evidence suggests that the first building could
have started operation sometime between August
1962 and March 1963. The Chinese apparently
were forced to adopt other methods to achieve
highly enriched U-235. Thus, it seems improbable
that a completely gaseous diffusion process was
used by the Chinese, since they are likely to have
used the first nuclear materials available for their
first device.
180. We believe that the likeliest source of the
Chinese enriched uranium was a combination of
processes, where partially enriched uranium pro-
duced by the Lan-chou gaseous diffusion plant was
further enriched by an unidentified electromagnetic
separation facility.
181. A small electromagnetic facility could be
located within the Lan-chou complex.
�T15?-5-FC�RLF-
184. Pao-eou Plutonium Production Facilities�
A highly secure installation, located about 4 nau-
tical miles to the northwest of the old city of
Pao-t'ou, was identified in March 1963 as probably
being a plutonium production facility. On the
basis of all available evidence, however, we are
not able to establish a firm estimate of the opera-
tional status of the reactor.
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190. Based on all of the above considerations,
we believe that the initial start-up of this reactor
occurred in late 1963 or early 1964, although the
apparent availability of excess electric power in
March 1963 suggests that it might have started-up
around that date.
191. We estimate that the Pao-t'ou reactor has
a thermal power rating of about 30 megawatts.
Assuming that the facility is operated so as to
minimize the time necessary to obtain sufficient
material for a test device, and that no serious
difficulties are encountered that would delay pro-
duction, we estimate that the earliest the Chinese
could produce sufficient plutonium from this re-
actor to fabricate an all-plutonium test device is
by early 1965.
192. Sufficient plutonium for a composite device
could have been available in late 1964. The Pao-
tou facility, at a power level of 30 megawatts, is
estimated to be able to produce about 10 kilograms
of plutonium a year.
193. Yumen�A large industrial complex has
been under construction near Yurnen in a remote
area of Kansu Province since 1959 or before.
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195. In addition, within the Yumen complex is a
facility that possibly could be a water-cooled re-
actor, operatin in the ran :e of erha s 50 to 150
megawatts. (b)(1)
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B. INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY
1. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
197. Agriculture in China is characterized by
labor-intensive methods of cultivation. The level
of mechanization is low, with handtools predomi-
nating but supplemented by small numbers of trac-
tors, mechanical pumps, and other types of farming
equipment. Chemical fertilizer has been utilized
in only small amounts compared to the amounts
used in Japan and Taiwan.
198. Cultivation is already so intensive that the
possibilities of expanding agricultural acreage are
small. The Chinese thus are dependent primarily
on the use of capital-intensive measures to increase
production. Chemical fertilizer is the most promis-
ing method for increasing yields, but substantial
amounts would be required. For example, in order
to produce the grain needed to feed the population
in 1970 at the 1957 rate, the Chinese would prob-
ably need an additional 25 million tons* of chemi-
cal fertilizer. However, domestic production of
chemical fertilizer is not expected to exceed 8 mil-
lion tons in 1970. Other measures that might be
used to increase yields include improved grain
varieties; improved methods to control insects,
diseases, and weeds; and irrigation. Improved
seed varieties, however, are of minor significance
unless accompanied by improved agricultural *prac-
tices. Furthermore, China's supply of chemical
pesticides and herbicides is small. In addition,
China's prospects are not favorable for the expan-
sion of its irrigation systems. Small and medium
irrigation projects have probably already been used
to the maximum; and the construction of large
projects in the south is precluded by topography
and in the north is limited by excessive silting,
alkalinity, inadequate water resources, and scarcity
of technical skills. The operation of irrigation
systems could be enhanced considerably, however,
by the increased use of mechanical pumps. Other
types of mechanization would have only a small
effect on improving yields because of the intensity
of present land use.
199. Historically, China drastically over-cut her
forests, so that today the people are woefully de-
ficient in wood and wood products. Artificial and
* Tonnages are given in metric tons.
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natural regeneration of forests have not kept pace
with the cutting rate, and in the long run China
must either curtail the consumption of wood or
increase reforestation sharply. Nevertheless, China
is believed to have sufficient national reserves to
continue the current low cutting rate of about 30
million cubic meters annually through 1970.
200. China is not exploiting her fishing potential
to the fullest. Further development depends on
the introduction of equipment needed for deep-sea
fishing and the improvement of transportation serv-
ices and processing facilities. There appears to
be no technological limitation to further substantial
expansion of the industry.
2. Basic Industries
201. China's basic industries were expanded dur-
ing 1949-60 with large-scale assistance from the
USSR and the European Satellites and were ori-
ented heavily toward serving a large construction
program and the production of military and civilian
machinery and equipment. Major emphasis was
placed on the rapid expansion of plant capacity
and production of a few important commodities,
such as steel, coal, electric power, and cement.
Since 1960, however, priorities in the basic indus-
tries have centered on the expansion of facilities to
produce more complex commodities such as petro-
leum products, agricultural chemicals, plastics, and
special steels. Plant capacity in the steel, electric
power, and cement industries has been only par-
tially used and probably will not return to full
operation for several years. In the case of the
current priority basic commodities, however, ex-
pansion of production will be limited by a scarcity
of domestic technical skills and by the Chinese
ability and willingness to import equipment, techni-
cal data, and technical personnel from abroad.
202. a. METALLURGY�With the exception of
chrome, nickel, and cobalt, China's metallurgical
industry probably has sufficient capacity for pro-
ducing most of the present requirements for com-
monly used metals and alloys. In the early years,
requirements for alloy and special steels and many
nonferrous metals and alloys were limited by the
simple nature of the economy, and required metals
were produced domestically in accordance with So-
viet specifications or they were imported. With in-
creasing demands for high-strength and corrosion-
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resistant materials imposed by advanced military
and civilian requirements, the Chinese increased
substantially the electric furnace capacity and the
training of metallurgists in the late 1950's. How-
ever, the Chinese still do not have the capability to
produce high-quality grain-oriented steels or to
fabricate refractory metals, such as molybdenum,
tungsten, columbium, and tantalum. The Chinese
also do not have sufficient rolling equipment to
produce in adequate quantities the variety of shapes
needed for a wide range of modern industrial and
military construction. The metallurgical equip-
ment industry is unable to produce the large pre-
cision finishing mills needed to complete the rolling
mill program that was started but only partly com-
pleted with Soviet aid.
203. Raw materials for the production of most
metals are available in China, although the quality
of some ores is inferior. However, China has only
small known reserves of chrome, nickel, and co-
balt�three important steel alloying materials. Ex-
pansion of the modern mining sector is an essential
prerequisite for any sustained large-scale increase
in production by the metallurgical industry.
204. The main problems in increasing the sup-
ply, variety, and quality of metallurgical products
in the near future are: ( a) putting into operation
modern finishing mills (b) training additional
metallurgists and skilled production workers, and
( c) securing the additional equipment and tech-
nology needed for the production of the more
sophisticated metals and alloys. China probably
has available sufficient metallurgical competence
and the necessary equipment, including vacuum
melting equipment, to produce small quantities of
superalloys, electrical steels, and stainless steels.
However, substantial increases in high-grade alloy
steel production will depend on expansion of ca-
pacity, primarily electric furnace capacity; there is
no evidence that an expansion program is currently
taking place even though production of alloy steels
is believed to be roughly equal to the former peak
year of 1960. Most of the equipment is available
in the Free World; but, to the extent that such
expansion would involve the acquisition of vacuum-
type electric furnaces, COCOM restrictions would
be an inhibiting factor. Expansion will also be
required in rolling mill capacity, if China is to
meet a large part of its requirements for certain
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types of finished steel�particularly sheet and
strip�from domestic production. The expansion
in rolling capacity will require imports of equip-
ment and/or complete plants. Several years will
be required before rolling capacity can be in-
creased, because 2 to 4 years of leadtime is required
to design, manufacture, and install a modern large-
capacity rolling mill.
205. b. cHEmicALs�The technological develop-
ment of China's chemical industry lagged behind
that of other heavy industries up to 1960. In gen-
eral, China is 10 to 15 years behind the West in
chemical engineering. Although considerable prog-
ress was made in the production of basic chemi-
cals, the Chinese neglected some key sectors, such
as chemical fertilizers, plastics, and chemical fibers.
Since 1960, the Chinese have emphasized the im-
portance of chemicals in increasing agricultural
yields and as substitutes for natural products.
They have established programs to convert ma-
chinery plants to the production of fertilizer equip-
ment and to import chemical plants from the Free
World.
206. Production of chemical fertilizers was only
about 2.9 million tons in 1963. Most of the in-
crease in production achieved since 1960 has been
obtained through fuller use of existing plants; at-
tempts to enlarge productive capacity through
domestic resources have ielded onl small results
to the resent.
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208. output of chemical
fertilizer in I.V/U probably will reach no more than
8 million tons.
/ In addition, new technological prob-
lems will confront the Chinese in developing fer-
tilizers which do not consume large amounts of
sulfuric acid in their manufacture.
209. The plastics industry of China is relatively
new and undeveloped. Prodirtion has increased
from about 10,000 tons in 1957 to perhaps 50,000
tons in 1964. Chinese chemists have succeeded in
producing some of the more common types of
polymers but are lacking in the ability to mass-
produce specialized types that are useful in mili-
tary weapons. Current output consists primarily of
three basic types of products: phenolics, polyvinyl
chloride, and urea-formaldehyde. Other plastics,
produced only in small amounts, include poly-
styrene, methyl methacrylate ("organic glass"), ion-
exchange resins, aminoplasts, chlorinated polyvinyl
chloride, organic-silicone, epoxy resins, and various
plastic intermediates including formaldehyde, ace-
taldehyde, and synthetic phenol. Most of these
plastics were produced as a result of considerable
technical aid and some equipment provided by the
USSR. Although China claims to produce Teflon,
polyethylene, and polyester, the production of each
is limited to the output of batch operations.
210. No substantial development of the plastics
industry during the period through 1970 is fore-
seen, without significant concomitant improvements
in the domestic supply of materials and skilled labor
and additional technical assistance from abroad
211. The small chemical fiber industry has in-
creased production from 200 tons in 1957 to 30,000
to 40,000 tons in 1964. This gain was largely at-
tributable to plants built and equipped by Soviet
Bloc countries. Viscose rayon and "Chin-lun"
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(nylon-6) are produced in sizeable quantities while
small quantities of vinyl perchloride and poly-
acrylonitrile are also produced. Expanded produc-
tion of artificial fibers ( for example, viscose rayon)
is hindered by shortages of woodpulp and sulfuric
acid. Production may be 100,000 tons by 1970,
an insignificant amount compared to China's need
for textile fibers. Even this level of production
will depend on the purchase of several more plants
from the Free World.
212. Present production of rubber is insignificant.
China is still lacking in processes capable of mass-
producing silicone rubbers, oil-resistant synthetic
rubbers, and light-weight, highly chemical resistant
materials. Natural rubber can only be grown in a
small area; therefore China is forced to import
natural rubber or to develop a synthetic rubber
industry. In the 1950's, a 50,000-ton synthetic
rubber plant was built by the USSR at Lan-chou,
but production from this plant remains far below
capacity.
213. China is unlikely to make significant gains
in the synthetic rubber industry by 1970. Im-
ported plant and technology would be required for
expansion. Moreover, a major reorientation would
be necessary in the rubber fabricating industry if
synthetic rubber were to be used in volume be-
cause the present technology in rubber fabricating
is based on riatural rubber.
214. c. FUELS AND PovvEn�The fuels and power
industries of China have a low level of technology
by Western standards. Except for petroleum prod-
ucts, however, these industries can meet present
requirements for their products. Coal supplies 90
to 95 percent of the energy that is obtained from
primary fuels. Natural gas and petroleum are
minor sources of power by contrast with their
prominence in modern industrial nations. Reserves
of coal and hydroelectric power are abundant and
reserves of petroleum and natural gas are sufficient
for needs in the foreseeable future.
215. The level of technical skills in mining coal
is low and the Chinese lack experience in the man-
ufacture of such crucial items as electric and
hydraulic control and switch gear, bearings, and
similar components for mining machinery and
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equipment. The Chinese are attempting to mod-
ernize the coal industry. As a result, the supply
of machinery and equipment from domestic sources
may become larger, of better quality, and more
diversified in the future.
216. While the Chinese are technically able to
develop and exploit oilfields and are believed to be
able to build and operate refining facilities capable
of providing most of the country's needs for petro-
leum products, China does not have sufficient sec-
ondary processing units to produce the desired
quality and mix of petroleum products. For ex-
ample, without such secondary processes as
alkylation, reforming, and/or catalytic cracking,
China does not have the capability to produce high-
grade aviation gasoline. The production of jet
fuel, however, does not require the use of these
types of equipment or material, therefore China
is believed to have the capability to produce jet
fuel. However, any production of jet fuel would
be at the expense of other products such as motor
gasoline and lamp kerosene.
217. The Chinese probably will remain depend-
ent on outside sources for secondary refining equip-
ment through 1970. Purchases of such equipment
from the Free World will provide China with the
capability to produce important raw materials for
the petro-chemical industry and will serve to im-
prove the over-all technological level of China's
refining facilities. Acquisition of such equipment,
moreover, will enable the Chinese to gain experi-
ence in the operation of more sophisticated proc-
esses and could provide prototypes for eventual
domestic manufacture of similar equipment. The
selected purchases of complicated equipment
through 1970 are expected to include arrangements
for technical training.
218. By 1960, the electric power industry of
China had reached a level of technology com-
parable to the US power industry during the late
1920's and the 1930's. The industry is comprised
of a mixture of the small, old, inefficient power-
plants that the Communists inherited in 1949 and
of the relatively modern thermal electric and hydro-
electric powerplants which have been constructed
since 1949 with extensive equipment and technical
assistance from the USSR and the European Satel-
lites. Technological developments within the in-
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dusty have remained static during the last 4 years.
Present capacity is probably sufficient to meet re-
quirements for electric power through 1970, but
some installation of new capacity will take place
to meet specific local requirements for electric
power as they arise. The Chinese electro-techni-
cal industry can produce most of the generating and
transmission equipment needed. The only appar-
ent technical obstacle that the Chinese will en-
counter in the completion of plants now under con-
struction is in the manufacture of large generating
equipment for such projects as the San-men Hsia
Hydroelectric Powerplant. Such equipment prob-
ably will be imported.
219. The construction materials industry in
China is extremely backward and will remain so
through 1970. However, the Chinese construction
materials industry can provide the basic materials
needed to build most types of projects. The Chi-
nese have built small-scale plants, which produce
a low-grade product for local construction and have
built large plants to produce materials for con-
struction in the more modern sectors of the econ-
omy. The average quality of Chinese construction
materials is below Western standards, but it is ade-
quate to build projects that are structurally safe
and functional in nature. Moreover, the Chinese
are selective in the use of these materials, reserving
- the high quality construction materials for export
or for military projects.
3. Machine Building
220. a. GENERAL�China is able to produce a
fairly wide variety of basic types of machinery and
equipment for industry, transportation, and conven-
tional military use. Specific items include general
purpose machine tools, trucks, tractors, locomotives,
power generating equipment, simple petroleum
equipment, radio equipment, piston aircraft, textile
machinery for both natural and manmade fibers,
and less complicated types of farm machinery.
221. Although progress since 1950 in acquiring
industrial echnology has been impressive, the
present volu e and variety of production is small
in relation to industrial needs and military aspira-
tions. The most basic problem is the small size
of the present machine building sector in terms
of plant capacity and of skilled labor. There are
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only a few important plants in each major machine
building category, and these plants do not have the
advantage of the support of a complex of smaller
subcontracting plants. Special problems include
a shortage of facilities for making and processing
large castings and forgings and for making precision
machinery and precision hydraulic equipment, the
poor quality of Chinese ball bearings, a deficiency
in designing capability, a low degree of specializa-
tion, and inferior plant practices.
222. The Chinese will not achieve by 1970 the
technological capability to produce machine tools
for either a substantial variety and volume of ad-
vanced weapons or a wide range of civilian items.
Rapid progress and useful results may be attained
in a few special fields, with possibly a few spectacu-
lar achievements. The breadth of progress in ma-
chine building depends most importantly on the
extent that construction of new plant capacity can
be resumed and maintained. This in turn depends
on availability of resources, including imported
machinery and equipment and foreign technical
advice, as well as domestic technical skills.
223. b. MACHINE TOOLS�Most of the machine
tools produced in China are general purpose tools
of simple design and of the type that has been
manufactured abroad for the past 20 years. The
Chinese claim to be able to produce native-designed
machine tools, but there is no evidence of the ex-
istence of such tools. I
j Only very small numbers of
precision machine tools are produced. The Chi-
nese do not make transfer lines, numerically con-
trolled, or other specialized mass-production ma-
chine tools. Bevel gear cutting machines and in-
terior grinders for antifriction bearing races par-
ticularly are in short supply.
224. The Chinese have been attempting to make
..up for deficiencies in machine tool production by
importing precise, automatic, and specialized types
of equipment, which will be required in increased
quantities during the next 5 years, and by collecting
technical information from abroad. Through these
means, some improvement in the production of pre-
cision machine tools may take place by 1970.
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225. C. CIVILIAN MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT�
The Chinese are able to produce most of the simple
types of machinery required for industrial con-
struction. They have produced several hydro-
electric generators of 72,500 kilowatts, and recently
reported production of a 100,000 kilowatt hydro-
electric unit. They also have produced thermal
electric generators of 50,000 kilowatts, some nitro-
gen fertilizer equipment, coal mining equipment,
simple steel and petroleum production equipment,
and nearly all of the equipment needed for light
industry. The chief fabrication problems are in
the production of machines requiring large castings
and forgings or fine balances and close tolerances,
equipment requiring high pressure, and devices for
precision measuring and testing. Importations of
equipment to produce alloy metals, metallurgical
rolling equipment, complex petroleum refining
equipment, and specialized chemical equipment
will be necessary in order to achieve increases in
the production of such priority commodities as
chemical fertilizer, special steels, and petroleum
products. Equipment of this type already is being
sought and purchased in the Free World.
226. Although the production of most transpor-
tation equipment is well below peak levels at-
tained in 1958-60, the Chinese have built small
quantities of steam locomotives, freight cars, trucks,
piston aircraft (the Colt An-2), and ships of over
10,000 tons. The Chinese have not yet produced
satisfactory diesel or electric locomotives; because
of low priority, inadequate production facilities,
and shortages of some materials, diesel locomotives
are unlikely to be produced in significant numbers
by 1970. In the past year or so, truck production
has been resumed and is showing steady gains.
The Chinese still cannot produce the modern air-
craft required for long-distance commercial flights
and have imported Viscounts from the UK and
IL-18s from the USSR. Further imports will prob-
ably be required by 1970, especially for interna-
tional flight operations. Merchant ship produc-
tion also has been resumed recently, though the
Chinese probably still import some of the more
complicated components for these ships.
227. The Chinese, with Soviet Bloc assistance,
have established a well-equipped production base
for electronic components and end-items. The in-
dustry, comprising more than 70 plants and capa-
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hie of employing about some 200,000 persons,
' features the production of military equipment.
Civilian production is limited to priority require-
ments of industry and government, such as com-
munications equipment needed to spread propa-
ganda to the populace and overseas.
228. d. MILITARY MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT-
General�The level of technology in Chinese plants
producing military hardware has been raised only
slightly since 1960. Progress has been confined
largely to development and production facilities
in the nuclear and missile fields. The present
state of military production technology is as follows:
i. Continuation of a basic orientation toward the
production of ground armaments.
A lack of mass-production-type technology and
little use of automation.
An incompleted aircraft industry lacking some
key units of production equipment and possessing only
a small production and technical capability for ad-
vanced aircraft.
iv. A very small capability for the production of
high-precision components for the control and instru-
mentation of advanced military systems.
v. A shortage of designers and production engineers
competent to set up serial production of components
for new weapons systems.
vi. A naval shipbuilding industry with a capability
for a small annual output of attack submarines, de-
stroyers, and patrol craft but lacking adequate capa-
bility for serial production of some key components
and lacking ability to design indigenous production
models.
229. Advanced Weapons�Growing access to
Free World production equipment and technology,
as well as domestic programs in scientific and
engineering education, may permit by 1970 the
improvement of military production technology
on a broader base; but energies still will be strongly
oriented toward the development of advanced
weaponry and toward the production of advanced
weapons on a small serial basis. By 1970, China
will have only a small capability to produce rela-
tively advanced weapons, assuming that it has
access to foreign equipment and technology with-
out any marked improvement. Imports of pre-
cision machine tools from such countries as Czecho-
slovakia and Switzerland have increased since 1960,
and Japan is likely to become a more important
supplier than in the past.
46
230. Present Chinese production technology is
capable of providing missile components in the
small quantities required to support present re-
search and developmen� programs for ballistic mis-
siles of medium range. However, there are esti-
mated deficiencies in the capability to support
production of certain elements of missile systems.
The Chinese probably will attain a limited pro-
duction capability for an MRBM system by 1967
or 1968. The Chinese may be producing some
kind of SAM, either replacements for the SA-2 or
prototypes of a native Chinese version, or both.
The evidence is not sufficient to permit a firm
judgment, but it is considered highly unlikely
that either version is being produced on a sub-
stantial scale. It may be 2 or 3 years before
larger scale production is within their capability.
Foreign technical assistance may be a primary
factor in future development of the Chinese missile
programs, depending on the types of missiles
selected for production and the scale of the planned
deployment efforts. The availability of Free World
scientific and technical literaturei
have aided China's SAM development.
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/ An added indicator is the recent
identification of a new, large, experimental, ship
model testing basin near Wu-hsi, which is nearing
completion.
233. The Chinese have been faced with two
major problems in shipbuilding: (i) the need to
establish production facilities capable of supplying
the full range of marine components, and (ii) the
design and manufacture of complex modern com-
ponents that require advanced theoretical concepts
and/or manufacturing techniques, particularly for
naval ship construction. The Chinese now are de-
pendent on foreign sources for some advanced
equipment and for designs and will continue to be
so through 1970. However, we anticipate that in-
creasing numbers of ships will be completed an-
nually, probably having increased complexity.
The Chinese have produced destroyer escorts, tor-
pedo boats, minesweepers, submarines, submarine
chasers, and various types of small craft. The
recent appearance of a Komar-class and an Osa-
class guided missile patrol boat suggests the possi-
bility of their serial production before 1970. Pro-
duction of these boats, however, is dependent on
the Chinese development of their missile systems.
It is unlikely that the Chinese will produce their
own native version of either a modern major war-
ship or modern submarine in the period of the
estimate.
234. Aircraft-!
The Chinese had produced the
Fresco (MiG-17) jet fighter, the Colt (AN-2) piston
transport, and the Hound (Mi-4) helicopter and
were preparing for production of the Badger
( Tu-16) medium bomber and the-Farmer ( MiG-19)
twin-jet fighter. Since 1960, the only production has
been a small number of Colts (the small number
of Fishbeds (MiG-21) are not considered to have
been of Chinese fabrication). The specific causes
of the collapse of the Chinese aircraft industry in
1960 have never been identified but probably in-
ICS 4425/65
elude inability to produce certain components,
dependence on Soviet technical advice or blue-
prints that were removed in 1960, and inability to
maintain standards and tolerances in manufacture.
235. Activity at aircraft plants in late 1964 and
early 1965 suggests that the production of some of
the advanced craft may soon start, including prob-
ably the Farmer and possibly the Fishbed. Short-
ages of special metals and of technological skills
may continue to limit the production of aircraft,
although some gaps can be filled by imports from
the Free World. The production of native models
is not likely to reach significant proportions by
1970 because of backwardness in design, research,
and production.
236. Land Armaments�China has more than 60
arsenals for the production of land armaments.
This includes plants of pre-1949 vintage, some of
which have been expanded and re-equipped, and
newer ones built with Soviet aid. About seven
plants appear to be related to armored vehicle
production, including a Soviet-aid plant at Pao-tou
that has produced the T-54 tank. Activity at the
arsenals was at a modest level during 1960-63,
because of general shortages of raw materials, the
general economic dislocation, and the lack of
skilled personnel to replace the Soviet advisors and
technicians withdrawn in mid-1960. Some of the
plants that were built in the late 1950's may not
have been fully equipped with production ma-
chinery and ancillary equipment before the Soviet
withdrawal.
237. China probably can supply small arms and
small-caliber crew weapons in sufficient quantities
to meet the requirements of the ground forces
through the 1970 period. Present facilities prob-
ably could not meet all requirements for large-
caliber weapons, tanks, armored cars, and other
vehicles by 1970, but modernization and re-equip-
ping of the ground forces is not urgently required
barring full-scale war.
4. Light Industry
238. Most light industrial plants in China are
characterized by techniques that are within Chinese
capabilities. China's textile, food processing, and
paper plants are operating below capacity at pres-
ent, largely because of insufficient raw materials.
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Little, if any, plant expansion will be required by
1970. No serious technological problems should
be encountered in the use of manmade fibers in
the textile industry because the Chinese can pro-
duce most of the needed textile equipment them-
selves and can use the under-utilized cotton tex-
tile mills to process cotton mixtures. Through
1970 some food processing, paper, and woolen
plants may be imported in order to modernize
production techniques.
5. Services
239. a. coNsmucrioN�Measured by Western
standards, the technical level of the construction
industry of China is extremely backward and will
remain so through 1970. However, advanced tech-
nology is not needed to get most of the jobs done.
The Chinese construction effort relies heavily on
labor-power instead of machine-power and on con-
ventional construction materials instead of the
newer types developed in the West. As a result,
Chinese projects usually require long periods to
complete and are often crude in appearance, but
the functional nature of Chinese projects is not
greatly impaired by these drawbacks. Despite the
labor-intensive methods followed by the Chinese,
they do use some construction machinery. Before
1961, much of the heavier construction machinery
.was obtained from the USSR and the European
Satellites. Although the Chinese claim to produce
most of their construction machinery themselves,
they still must import selective lines of heavy con-
struction machinery, such as bulldozers, motorized
graders, and scrapers.
240. b. TRANSPORTATION�The technical level of
transportation in China is very backward by West-
ern standards. The Chinese still depend almost
entirely on steam locomotion for railroads. Sig-
naling, communications, and automation of railroad
operations lag far behind similar activities in the
United States and even the USSR. The freight
car inventory of about 129,000 units at the begin-
ning of 1964 is fairly modern, though some of the
more common improvements found in the West,
such as shock control devices, are rare in China.
The Chinese themselves state that, of the 300,000
miles of roads in China, 44 percent are in poor
or bad condition, and that no noticeable reduction
48
has been made in the number of dangerous bridges
in the country. Motor vehicle repair and service
facilities appear generally adequate to meet the
needs of China. The civilian air transport fleet is
made up largely of imported planes, and standards
of maintenance are sufficient to keep most of the
fleet in operation. Ground facilities and aircraft
communications and control equipment appear
adequate, but not much flying is done at night or
in poor weather. The general level of technology
in water transport of China is far below that of
the United States, though loading and unloading
facilities at many of the main ports have been
mechanized.
241. Significant technological developments are
unlikely to take place before 1970 in transport
operations, though some minor improvements un-
doubtedly will be made. Although transport fa-
cilities are not modern by Western standards, and
operations are inefficient, the transport system is
generally adequate for the needs of the economy,
especially when the availability of large quantities
of muscle-power is taken into account.
242. c. TELECOMMUNICATIONS�IR the field of
telecommunications, China's objective is to join all
major cities with high-capacity common-carrier
systems. Immediate plans call for multiplexing the
existing landlines and for supplementing them with
microwave radio-relay and scatter facilities. To
fulfill these plans, the Chinese will continue tc
import more multichannel carrier and radio-relay
equipment, particularly from Western countries
Domestic production of this equipment will alsc
be stepped up.
243. An increase in the use of the radioprinter,
with some new uses of radiofacsimile and radio.
telephone have been observed on civil links since
1959. The domestic manufacture of these equip
ments, which has frequently been mentioned in thf
Chinese press, has been confirmed.
244. High-frequency communications will con-
tinue to be used. By the end of 1970, China i!
expected to have a more modern, nationwide com-
mon-carrier network by using integrated multiple"
wire and cable circuits, line-of-sight circuits, and
possibly scatter circuits.
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C. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
1. Guided Missiles
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246. Although interest in space projects has been
noted in the Chinese press
no evidence is available tnar may maicate that
China has a major space program under way.
The Chinese could have a capability to orbit a
small satellite eventually, using its MRBM when
it is finally developed along with relatively simple
upper stages. Also, if the Chinese efforts to pur-
chase foreign missile equipment and technology are
successful, a program to demonstrate a space capa-
bility could get under way any time before 1970.
247. b. missn.,Es�The size and type of the re-
search and development facilities point to the pos-
sibility of Chinese-manufactured operational sur-
face-to-surface and surface-to-air systems in the
not too distant future. In addition, China is be-
lieved to be engaged in a development program
that includes air-to-surface, air-to-air, as well as
cruise missiles for naval use. The largest and
possibly the most important missile complex is the
Shuang-ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Center. The ex-
tensive research and development complex, situated
in an isolated area about 40 miles northeast of
Shuang-ch'eng-tzu (41�02'N � 100�17'E), has sub-
stantial rangehead instrumentation for support of
both SSM and SAM launch complexes.
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249. The Ch'ang-hsin-tien Missile Test Center,
a research and development complex located ap-
proximately 12 miles southwest of Peiping, is de-
signed in part to static testfire large liquid engines
of indeterminable size. Three vertical test stands
are available. Also, a horizontal test stand is
being used at the present.
251. The center apparently was designed to con-
duct research and to develop and fabricate missiles
and missile ground support prototype equipment
for surface-to-surface missiles. The stands at this
facility are credited with the capability of testing
missiles of at least MRBM size, and the industrial
buildings are believed capable of fabricating R&D
missiles and of limited series production.
252. The cruise launch sites at the Lien-shan
(40�42'N � 120�52'E) complex are close to a naval
airfield, naval air school, and a shipyard. This
proximity and type of sites point to the complex
as being a candidate for a naval missile training
facility, as well as a naval research and develop-
ment facility for cruise-type shore defense SSM's.
253. The facilities at Tai-yiian ( 37�59'N �
112�33'E ) are believed to consist of an SA-2 type of
solid-propellant booster test stand and a missile
solid-propellant production plant.
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the missile could be an adaptation ot
the Soviet SS-3 or Soviet SS-4. The payloads and
ranges for those systems are:
SS-3 2,800.�300 lbs 603 nm
SS-4 3,200�-500 lbs .... . 1,020 nm
However, because of the length of the test range,
the collaterally reported MRBM range of the Chi-
nese missile, Chinese military requirements in the
Far East, and the size of the Chinese launch pad
at SCTMTC, we believe that the Chinese missile
being developed is probably an adaptation of the
SS-4.
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260. 2. Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems (Tac-
tical, Land-Based)�China is believed to have
received some Soviet 150-mile range missile systems
prior to mid-1960. Vehicular mounted missiles
possibly were fired to compatible ranges at
SCTMTC durin the first half of 1960.
(b)(1)
261. 3. Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems (Na-
val)�The submarine detected on 7 November
1964 at Dairen is similar in outward appearance
to the Soviet G-class submarines capable of launch-
ing the SS-N-4 missile when surfaced. Initial con-
struction more than likely began about mid-1962
in the Dairen shipyard, and the vessel probably
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262. The fact the Chinese have launched this
submarine indicates that they probably have a
program to place a missile system on board; how-
ever, there is no intelligence information regard-
ing the missile system. Since the Soviet G-class
submarines were designed specifically for launch-
ing the SS-N-4 missile, we estimate that the SS-N-
4-type missile will be the immediate goal of the
Chinese, though we cannot predict the time frame
for this accomplishment. The Soviets may have
provided SS-N-4 missile hardware and components
and/or plans for the G-class submarine.
263. In the area of guided missile patrol boats,
the presence of at least one Osa-class PTFG and
one Komar-class FTC in China has been detected.
The Chinese have the capability of modifying the
P-6 motor torpedo boat, of which they have a
significant number, to the missile-firing Komar con-
figuration. They also are considered capable of
constructing the Osa-type, which is built from the
keel up as a guided missile craft. The Soviet
SS-N-2 is an aerodynamic vehicle fired from launch
tubes or ramps fitted on the Komar' Osa-class mis-
sile patrol boats. The SS-N-2's may have been
delivered with the Komar/ Osa's by the Soviets, as
in the case of Indonesia, the UAR, and other na-
tions which have received these systems from the
USSR. If the P-6 motor torpedo boats are being
converted by the Chinese, initiation of SS-N-2
production by Chinese aircraft plants is a distinct
possibility.
264. In regard to coastal defense missiles, China
was apparently supplied by the USSR with limited
numbers of the coastal defense variant of Kennel
at least as early as 1959. The Chinese established
a test range and/or training center for this missile
at Lien-shan in the Gulf at Liaotung, and this com-
plex is believed to be still active.
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site near Dairen has been in existence since at least
1962, no vehicles or missile-related equipment have
been observed in the are
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267. 4. Surface-to-Air Missiles�The Chinese
were apparently supplied by the Soviets with a
small number of complete
SA-2 sets of six launchers each. SA-2 sites were
identified as early as 1959, and
SAM sites have been observed to date. Some of
these sites were never equipped, and in several
cases equipment has been moved from one site to
another. The Chinese appear to be purposely mov-
ing the few sites of SAM equipment in their posses-
sion from one place to another in an effort to
surprise and destroy U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.
In this manner they hope to maintain a deterrent
a ainst these fli� hts
Although the
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276. The Chinese initial efforts may be to pro-
duce modest-sized engines capable of operating
in the subsonic regime. With some outside aid
or further experience in providing and fabricating
high-temperature materials, the Chinese could de-
velop supersonic engines.
277. Although the Chinese have a very low capa-
bility in the field of reciprocating aero-engine
design, they are able to build Soviet-designed
engines from Chinese-manufactured components.
(b)(1)
278. The Chinese have a capability for produc-
ing light and medium types of aircraft from de-
signs, piston engines, and other components sup-
plied by foreign manufacturers, in many instances
by the Soviets, but the withdrawal of much of the
Soviet support has greatly reduced this production.
As yet, China has not
roduced as-turbine
gines.
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279. The Chinese, however, are continuing to in-
crease aircraft and engine factory floorspace.
280. The Chinese have demonstrated a very lim-
ited aircraft design capability. In 1958, they intro-
duced 13 "Chinese copies" of the Soviet Colt and
copies of foreign designs of light utility and trans-
port aircraft. This capability is also supported
by the Chinese ability to set up production lines
to assemble Soviet aircraft, an ability which entails
the development of at least a partial design capa-
bility, even if complete bluenrints arp
281. China probably can continue to acquire
necessary air transports from the USSR. With suf-
ficient priority and some foreign help on the
engines, it could possibly produce a prototype
Within 2 or 3 years. However, there is a more
urgent need to build a capability in the military
combat field. Western military aircraft are not
available to the Chinese, and the Soviets, although
supporting some production and supplying of air-
craft, have discontinued or at least have reduced
spare-part support for aircraft in service and have
withheld support essential to the success of the
Chinese Badger program.
282. China is believed to be capable of repro-
ducing the Fishbed by 1965-66 and the Badger by
1968. However, the Chinese probably do not have
the native capability to design and build a mili-
tarily significant aircraft until the 1970's. This is
based on the normal time scale for developing aero-
TCS 4425/65
dynamic systems and the problems of developing
materials for use in modern military aircraft.
3. Ground Weapons and Equipment
283. a. cENERAL�China has conducted practi-
cally no research and development work on conven-
tional ground force combat materiel and has been
content to import and to adapt types and models
of proven capability. Developmental work has
been restricted to modifying existing designs ( gen-
erally of Soviet origin) to meet local requirements.
A desire has been indicated by the Chinese to insti-
tute a long-range conventional armaments research
and development program. As yet, however, no
concrete evidence is available of the program's
implementation nor of any details on its exact
scope. It is believed, therefore, that the techno-
logical level of China's research and development
of conventional ground force combat materiel will
not have advanced significantly by 1970.
284. b. INFANTRY WEAPONS�During the time
frame of this assessment, China will continue to
manufacture Soviet-type infantry weapons on
which data and tooling were provided by the USSR
prior to the 1960 break between the two countries.
China will increase her technical intelligence col-
lection efforts against the USSR and other pro-
ducers of modern infantry weapons as a start to-
ward the development of an in-house capability to
design her own infantry weapons. The develop-
ment of such a capability, however, is not expected
to receive a high priority, and China will not gain
a worthwhile native capability to design and de-
velop modern infantry weapons by 1970.
285. c. ANnArRcnArr ARTILLERY�Antiaircraft ar-
tillery units of the Chinese armed forces employ
Soviet-designed 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm
guns to support the Air Defense Organization.
All of these weapons have proven effective against
slow flying aircraft within the limits of their range
capabilities. The 37mm gun, M1939, is a towed
weapon which has no radar or remote control
equipment. The gun, capable of firing 80 rounds
per minute, utilizes optical sights and has a maxi-
mum effective AA range up to 4,500 feet. The
towed 57mm AA gun, S-60, utilizes both on-
carriage (optical) and off-carriage (radar/director)
fire control equipment. This gun, which is the
most recently developed Soviet AA gun, has a sus-
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tamed rate of fire of 60 rounds per minute and has
a maximum effective AA range of about 13,120
feet. The 85mm weapon, of World War II vintage,
and the 100mm AA gun, designed in 1949, utilize
off-carriage fire control equipment. The maximum
effective AA range of these weapons is 27,500 feet
and 39,000 feet respectively. Although research,
development, and deployment of surface-to-air mis-
siles is increasing, conventional tube artillery is ex-
pected to continue to be used in an AA role by the
Chinese during the period of this forecast. No
newly designed antiaircraft guns are expected to
appear in China's inventory for the next 5 years.
286. d. FIELD ARTILLERY wEAPoNs�The Chinese
People's Liberation Army is equipped with proven
weapons which are characterized by simplicity of
design, operation, ruggedness, and field maintain-
ability. The loss of Soviet technical support is
expected to have long-range effects on a weapons
modernization program. In the past, the Chinese
have relied almost entirely on foreign designs while
neglecting to develop a research and development
capability necessary for continued progress. The
Chinese are believed to have recognized this prob-
lem; though there is little indication that a vigorous
research and development program for improved
artillery weapons exists at the present time.
287. During this forecast period, Chinese artil-
lery units probably will continue to be equipped
with the foreign-designed weapons currently in
their inventory. The artillery rocket launchers of
132mm and 140min probably will be supplemented
by a Chinese version of the Soviet-designed 240mm
launcher. Current indications of the extensive re-
search and development effort in the field of rockets
should aid the Chinese to establish a design capac-
ity applicable to field artillery-type launchers. A
single-round, truck-mounted rocket launcher of the
FROG (free flight rocket over ground) type may
appear as a prototype, or in limited quantities,
thus providing the Chinese with a 10- to 30-mile
range weapon having a CW, HE, or eventually
a nuclear delivery capability.
288. e. COMBAT vnuruYs�Past efforts on the
part of China to develop and produce tanks, ar-
mored personnel carriers, and assault guns have
been practically negligible. This is evidenced by
the current Chinese inventory of armored combat
54
vehicles of Soviet origin, the majority of which
are of World War II vintage. China possesses a
capability for manufacturing in limited quantities
the Soviet T-54 medium tank and also an artillery
prime mover based on an old Soviet design. During
the forecast period, the Chinese are not expected
to develop any significant combat vehicle of native
design. Moreover, during the period, the Chinese
are not expected to develop any mobility devices
or methods which would significantly improve the
mobility capabilities of current tanks, armored sup-
port weapons, armored personnel carriers and
transporters or special purpose armored vehicles.
4. Naval Weapons Systems
289. PRESENT R & D CAPABILITIES AND 'TRE,NDS---At
present, the Chinese possess a minor capability
in the design and development of warships and
their associated propulsion plants. This capability
is based on experience gained as a result of Soviet
technical assistance which began about 1954 under
an agreement with the USSR to furnish technical
help and prefabricated components of naval ves-
sels. The Soviets furnished the Chinese with de-
tailed information, such as the working drawings
of ships under construction, with technical advisors
from the Soviet shipbuilding industry who aided
the Chinese in solving design and construction
problems, and with material aid in the form of
prefabricated sections for warships under construc-
tion. This Soviet aid was furnished to the Chinese
in the construction of several classes of warships,
namely the W-class submarine, the Riga-class
destroyer escort, the Kronstadt-cl ass submarine
chaser, and possibly to some degree the recently
constructed G-class ballistic missile submarine.
290. Concurrently with the start of the Soviet
aid program, a department of shipbuilding was
instituted at Chia-tung University, Shanghai, and
a serious effort was initiated to build research
facilities and to train technical personnel. This
organization and is expected (b)(1
to strengthen teChese research and develop-
ment capability as it begins to turn out technically
educated and qualified personnel. As a result of
past Soviet technical assistance, the ship design
personnel have acquired a limited native design
capability.
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291. The two organizations that are associated
with all aspects of Chinese ship research, design,
and construction are the Scientific Research Insti-
tute for Shipbuilding, which operates a relatively
small model basin at Shanghai, and the Central
Design and Construction Office for Shipbuilding,
Shanghai, both under the control of the Sixth Min-
istry for Machine Building.
292. In addition, the Chinese have constructed
a probable model basin, 1,600 feet long at Wu-hsi,
about 60 miles northwest of Shanghai. This instal-
lation should become operational sometime in the
period 1965 to 1967. It should enhance China's
ship designing capabilities considerably by permit-
ting the Chinese to test fast merchant ship and
warship models.
293. HULL DESIGN AND an.r. commucrioN�The
Chinese, with Soviet material and technical aid,
were able to build a number of Whiskey- and Riga-
class destroyer escorts of Soviet design. More
recently they completed construction of a Golf-
class ballistic missile submarine and a Romeo-class
submarine, apparently without the aid of Soviet
personnel and quite possibly without Soviet ma-
terials.
294. Although the Chinese lack of sufficient num-
ber of qualified personnel for the production of
significant new naval ship designs embodying origi-
nal contributions, they are designing coastal and
river ships of their own by the application of Soviet
technical information. In all marine design work,
they are making every effort to incorporate the
most modern materials.
295. The Chinese have a native design capability
in small naval craft and have already designed
and constructed a number of fast patrol boats of the
Shanghai-class, which do not represent any radical
advances in design. The Shanghai-class patrol boat
probably is propelled by Soviet-designed engines,
but the basic hull probably was designed and
developed by the Chinese.
296. gin, PRoPurstox�China's design and devel-
opment of main propulsion engines for commercial
ships is difficult to distinguish from that devoted
to naval ships. The Chinese have depended heavily
on Soviet technical assistance in this area. Main
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propulsion units for Whiskey-class submarines and
Riga-class destroyer escorts probably were obtained
from the Soviet Union. However, it is believed
that the production of commercial diesel propulsion
units for small ships speeded up in 1962.
297. Capabilities in submarine design and con-
struction exist in the ability to copy or modify exist-
ing Soviet submarine designs of the Whiskey-,
Romeo-, and Golf-class. Capability in original sub-
marine design is unlikely by 1970. Original design
and construction of midget submarines may be em-
phasized; a capability may already exist in this area.
298. If existing trends continue in diesel and gas
turbine research and development, China likely will
be able to produce medium-size diesel engines for
marine use and marine gas turbines of 5,000- to
8,000-horsepower output. These engines would
provide the Chinese with the hardware necessary
for developing a CODAG unit to be employed in
MTB- or PCE-type surface craft.
299. By 1970, China should be able to design or
copy and construct any of the more sophisticated
steam turbine propulsion plants presently in exist-
ence.
300. There presently are no known indications
of Chinese research in unconventional forms of pro-
pulsion, such as fuel cells. Marine applications of
this mode of propulsion by the Chinese are not
likely to occur by 1970.
301. Although China is not known to be vigor-
ously pursuing the development of hydrofoils for
military applications,
Capabilities to design
and construct this type of craft for inland waters
and near shore operations should be adequate by
1970.
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5. Antisubmarine Warfare
302. Research and development in antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) and naval weapons, if they exist at
all, appear to be token efforts. The Chinese Navy
cannot expect any large-scale improvements in its
ASW weapons systems until such time as the coun-
try receives massive aid from an outside source.
303. Little evidence exists to show China's cur-
rent activity in the design, development, or pro-
duction of sonar equipment for naval use. For
the most part, the Chinese probably have relied on
Soviet sonars, such as the Tamir, Feniks, and Phi-
toniy, which are believed to have been installed
aboard Chinese naval ships during the 1955 to 1960
period of Sino-Soviet collaboration.
At that time, the Chinese were not attempting to
perform original research but were trying to modify
the Soviet equipment to meet their own nroduction
requirements.
China is producing
sfibIfinders and has produced a fathometer that is
comparable to the Soviet NEL-4 fathometer. It
may also have developed an omnidirectional sono-
buoy.
6.
56
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313. The Koko Nor complex is believed to be
associated with the Chinese atomic energy program.
(b)(1)
312. KOKO NOR COMPLEX-A major complex with
some facilities that bear a resemblance to certain
facilities at Soviet nuclear weapons research and
development sites and at weapon production sites
is under construction in north-central China near
Koko Nor.
SECRET
314. LOP NOR TEST srrE�The first Chinese nuclear
test was conducted on 16 October 1964 at the test
site located at Lop Nor ( 40�50'N � 89�40T ) in
western China.
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7. BW/CW Activities
318. a. GENERAL�In 1956, a separate branch was
created as the Antichemical Warfare Corps within
the Chinese People's Liberation Army. This Corps
was given the mission of training and equipping
CPLA units for defense against chemical, biological,
and radiological (CBR) warfare agents. The
Corps was placed under the command of Major
General Chang Nai-keng and subordinated to the
General Rear Services Department of the Ministry
of National Defense. The Ministry reserved for
itself the authority to initiate the develo ment of
CBR materials.
319. b. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
JChina has a sufficient number of competent
scientists and facilities to conduct offensive BW
research and development, L
\ China
possibly could produce limited quantities of BW-
agent material and could develop a BW munition
58
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with suitable means of delivery by 1970. If the
Chinese had taken over and continued the Japanese
BW research effort in Manchuria, they now could
have such a system, but we have no evidence of
this.
_3*
I, the mili(b)( )
and civilian BW defense posture is weak. Ade-
quate respiratory protection equipment is available
to first line Chinese troops but not to militia or
civilians. Sufficient vaccines and antibiotics are
probably available for normal military needs in
China but even by 1970 probably will not be ade-
quate for national defense against large-scale attack.
Military training in BW defense follows the pattern
established by the USSR; such training is given to
limited numbers of officers and NCO's. BW de-
fense is expected to remain at a generally low level
through 1970.
321. Civil defense training in China is mainly
devoted to educating the public in carrying out
sanitary measures as defense against BW attack.
Improvement of the BW civil defense could occur
by 1970, probably by support from an improved
public health system, but civilian protective and
decontamination equipment probably still would
not be available in sufficient quantity.
322.)
The veterinary sciences in Ch(b)(1)
include programs designed to prevent, control, and
eradicate animal diseases affecting livestock. Por-
tions of such research and development concerning
serums and vaccines for prophylaxis and theraj(b)(1)
rigid quarantine procedures, and effective decon-
tamination measures, could be applicable to a
livestock defensive BW program.
(1)
Chinese plant-crop research and development pi (b)
u-
gram is applicable to defense against BW and ttvi
directed toward the protection of plant life fraL
disease and insects for the ultimate prevention of
crop losses.
323. c. CHEMICAL WARFARE�The Chinese, though
lacking a strong offensive CW capability, recogni(b)(1 )
that toxic chemical weapons are highly effectii:c
for tactical employment and have trained the indi-
vidual soldier to protect himself against their
effects. The CW doctrine of China is sound and
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Students at the CPLA Chemical Warfare School training with
electronic equipment
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Smoke-generating demonstration at the CPLA
Chemical Warfare School
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Figure 23
CPLA Smoke-generating equipment, possibly of Chinese
manufacture, being operated by students of the CPLA
Chemical Warfare School
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follows closely that of the USSR in regard to the
role of persistent and nonpersistent agents, muni-
tions employed for agent dissemination, and the
role of all types of CW materiel in tactical opera-
tions. Defensive rather than offensive doctrine
is emphasized. Much of China's CW materiel is
made from Soviet designs or has been furnished
by the USSR.
325. China's offensive CW capability is impaired
by a limited production and stockpile capability
in both World War I-type CW agents and the
nerve agents, which could, nevertheless, pose a
significant threat to poorly prepared neighboring
countries. However, if Soviet logistical support
were again available, the Chinese do have ground
weapons and aircraft (of Soviet design) capable
of disseminating massive quantities of CW agents
in a large-scale offensive tactical operation. The
CPLA has large stocks of smoke munitions and a
well-developed tactical doctrine, which give it an
excellent screening-smoke capability. Expanding
stocks of flame weapons and additional emphasis
on training in flame warfare techniques have given
the armed forces a small but growing flame warfare
capability.
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328. The lack of adequate research facilities and
an adequate number of personnel experienced in
CW research appears to have caused CW research
and development in China to remain as a minor
effort. (
(b)(1)
China, however, is producing
a number of organophosphorus insecticides for
agricultuial use and is known to be carrying for-
ward an active research program in this area at
several agricultural institutions. Research and pro-
duction facilities working on organophosphorus in-
secticides can be converted to work on CW nerve
agents. The shortage of CW-experienced scien-
tists is expected to continue at least until 1969.
329. Civil defense in China is under the Min-
istry of Public Security. There is little evidence
of an effective civil defense program.
8. Military Electronics Technology
330. The increasing importance of China as a
military power will necessitate the development of
tactical communications equipments comparable to
those of other countries. These equipments, how-
ever, probably will not be as sophisticated as those
of the more advanced countries. Nevertheless,
1970, the Chinese should be able to meet most of
their essential electronics requirements.
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331. At present, China's military electronics in-
dustry produces components for and assembles
complex electronic systems similar to those em-
ployed in the Soviet air defense systems during the
late 1950's. (
With the decline in 1960 of the sizable- amounts
of electronic materials being shipped from the So-
viet Union, new military needs began to be met
chiefly by China's own adaptations of foreign-
designed equipment.
332. Almost all of the Chinese effort that is de-
voted to military electronics today is concerned
with adapting Western, Japanese, and Soviet Bloc
devices, systems, and equipment to the manufac-
turing conditions of China. Work on military
electronics is so intermixed with work on civilian
electronics that progress in one sector is tanta-
mount to progress in the other.
333. RADAR�Basic radar research and develop-
ment are probably conducted at various institutes
and � lants throu hout the Chinese econom
60
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(b)(1)
(b)(1)
334. commuNicATIoNs�China places heavy reli-
ance on imports from the more advanced countries
for its military communication equipment, espe-
cially for the more sophisticated equipment operat-
ing above the HF band. Some of this equipment,
however, is probably adapted by the Chinese.
335. The Chinese continue to express consider-
able interest in the use of microwave links. How-
ever, their attempts to duplicate and/or design
microwave equipment have apparently not been
completely successful
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b)(1)
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Figure 24
CPLA Assault Troops training with Soviet-type LPO
flame thrower
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Figure 25
CPLA Engineer Troops using Soviet-type ROKS flame thrower
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336. The present Chinese research and develop-
ment emphasis apparently is on creating simple
radio equipments of original native design while
copying either wholly or in part the more compli-
cated sets of foreign design. This trend is ex-
pected to continue through 1970. Possibly between
1965 and 1970, transistorized radio equipment will
be introduced into ground forces materiel. Basic
designs, however, will remain the same. Chinese
research and development capabilities to design
wholly native equipments, which have more ad-
vanced features, such as burst transmission or scat-
ter, will not be realized by 1970, unless China re-
ceives substantial outside assistance.
337. ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES�The Chinese
rely heavily on ressive detection in sumort of
military needs.
They have frequently used
chaff and are expected to continue using it. They
may develop it for use against S-, X-, and L-bai(b)(1 )
radar.
(b)(1)
338. COMPUTERSH
Some i(b)(1)
the recent Chinese analog units are technically
comparable to early versions of Soviet and Western
missile control computers, and it is believed that
a continued research and development effort
through 1970 will enable the Chinese to re-design
and manufacture Soviet models of fire control and
missile guidance computers. (See section on Math-
ematics and Computer Technology, page 24.)
339. INFRARED DEvicEs�The Chinese have dis-
played an awareness (in published articles) of the
potential applications of infrared radiation to
ground weapons. In 1957, they exhibited a naval
type of infrared direction finder that may have been
obtained from the Soviet Bloc. While (based on
the above) they show some present capability to
develop infrared devices, they do not show any
apparent trend to apply infrared principles to
ground forces weapons. The Chinese have ob-
tained a Sidewinder in good condition for duplbvi
eating purposes. They may have developed An'
infrared seeker of the type used in the Sidewinder
or AA-2 (Atoll) air-to-air missile and may be pro-
ducing such a weapon system in limited quantity.
�1`t910�Frr-r-4W-T-
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0
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