CHILE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05492961
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-00792
• Publication Date: February 28, 1978

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237 Us pre.vious editions
�67
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(40)
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2 8 FEB 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
. . .... . . .
� Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
FROM �
SUBJECT � Chile
&ymond A. Warre 2
Chief, Latin America Division
REFERENCE : DCI Memorandum to DDO and IG re Chile,
dated 21 February 1978
1. Action Required: None; for information only.
2. Background: Attached are the following documents
which will put into perspective Agency covert activities in
Chile:
a. Statement to Senate Select CodMittee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities (Church Committee) by former DDOeilliam.E.
Nelsojion 25 October 1973. (Attachment A)
b. Resume of contacts with ITT. (Attachment B)
c. General misconceptions (myths) regarding CIA
activities in the 1970 Chilean elections.
(Attachment C)
c/ s/ George V. Lauder
Raymon A�Warren
3 Attachments ais
15 Xi t
(b)(3)
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SUBJECT: Chile
CONCUR:
H. SteizA 2,.c-X 1 MAR 1978
/qDeputy Director for Operations Date
2_ 5-X7A
DDO/C/L STB/WSturbitt,s7:esm (X9127) (28 Feb 78)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - DC1
1.- DDCI
1 - Ex Reg
1 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1- DDO Reg
1 - OLC
2 - C/LA
1 - C/LA/STB
2
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Statement
by
iUiam F. Nelsor9
Deputy Director for Operations
Executive Session
before
United States Senate
Select Committee to Study GovernMental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
28 October 1975
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SEC
SEN61TIVE
CHILE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
CIA covert action. in Chile over the past decade is an emotion
packed subject. As a result, the debate over the Wisdom and propriety
of this action is often filled more with heat than light. Public understanding
. -
of the facts of this activity and the intentions of the U. S. Government in
pursuing it have been obscured by a heavy cloud of mythology. In the
interests of subsequent clear discussion of the issues involved here. I
hope this morning to sketch- briefly the facts of U. S.. involvement in the
political affairs of Chile in the past ten years and to indicate what the
record reveals regarding the motives and intentions of U. S. policymakers.
.First, the setting: Chile is a long narrow country strung out along
the southwest coast of South America. It has a population of some 11 million
people with a high rate of literacy, a substantial middle class and a considerable
-� industrial base. It has a democratic, tradition and is one of the few countries
in Latin America where the military forces have historicallr been largely
non-involved in the political affairs of the country.
The 1964 Presidential election campaign. Large-scale U. S. �
covert political action in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential elections.
This involvement had its origins in the results of the 1958 elections in which
SENP1VE
CRET
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4.
Salvador Allende as the leader of a communist and socialist coalition polled
a surprisingly strong 28.9% of the total vote and came close to winning the
election. Allende was a self-professed Marxist. whose stated intent was to '
bring about an "irreversible" Marxist revolution in Chile.
By 1962, Fidel Castro had consolidated his position in Cuba and,
as it became apparent that .Allendets Popular Action Front was prepared to
make an all-out bid to win the' 1964 elections,. concern grew in Washington
that the U. S. wpuld be faced with another Marxist government in Latin
,America: Throughout 1959 and 1960, Allende was a frequent visitor to
Cuba. He strongly endorsed Castro and even indulged in some revolutionary
rhetoric regarding the rest of Latin America. He professed to adhere to
the electoral route as his own means to power..
In 1962, funds were authorized to assist the Christian Democratic
Party in order to build it up as a democratic alternative to Allende 's Popular
Action Front. Funds in 1963 were also, authorized to support the leader and
candidate of the then moderate Radical Party.
In March 1964, it became clear as a result of the victory of the
Popular Action Front candidate in a major by-election that the Allende
forces were a serious threat to win the September election.
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ES ONLY
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TIVE
In April 1964, the Special Grou.p, (a predecessor of the 40 Com-
mittee), approved the first installment of what was to develop into a $3
� million dollar program to support the Christian Democratic Party candidate,
Eduardo Frei. Most of the funds provided were through a .co�vert subsidy to
the Party with some lateral support by other groups and parties and support
to the Radical Party candidate to help him maintain his candidacy.
Frei won the election.with 56% of the vote as against 39% for
Allende with 86% of the electorate voting..
Covert action during the Frei regime -- 1965 to 1970. In this
period money was authorized as follows:
1964
- $160,
000
support to
(b)(1)
grass roots organizations among slum
dwellers and peasants.
(b)(3)
1965
- $175,
000
was spent in assistance to democratic
candidates in the March 1965 Congres-
sional elections. This program was
designed to assist 35 moderate candidates
representing all anti-Allende parties who
� were considered to be involved in tight races
.against leftist candidates. Moderate,
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(b)(1) �
(b)(3)
candidates, scored impressive victories in
many close races.
1967
- $30,
000
was spent to strengthen the moderate factions
in the Party.
(b)(1)
(b)(3).
1968
- A program of $350, 000 was authorized to assist
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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SENSIT
particularly
moderate candidates. in the March 1969
Congressional elections. The results show thai
this limited program was relatively effective
in that 10 of the 12 candidates elected won their
races. This program was run against a back-
ground of internal diss erJA ion within the
Party and a major push by th
to unite as many leftists and left of center
groups as possible in preparation for the 1970 .
Presidential elections.
The 1970 Presidential election race. In the political maneuvering
orior to the September 1970 Presidential election, .Allende again emerged as the
candidate for what was now called the Popular Unity Forces. He was opposed by
4
SENSI VE
SE ET �
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SENZITIYE
Jorge Alessandri, as the candidate of the center right, and Radorniro Tornio
for the Christian Democrats In March 1970, the 40 Committee decided that
the U. S. should not support either of the candidates opposing Allende but
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
)70
should attempt spoiling operations against the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Committee approved $125,000 to support a propaganda mechanism and some funds
selected individuals in the
votes the
Party to*reduce
Party could deliver in support of the
�
The
summer campaign wore on Alessandri lost popularity, Tomic's campaign
the number of (b)(1)
(b)(3)
As the�
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
stalled and Allende's group continued to gain strength. Based on:Ambassador
Korry's recommendation the 40 Committee approved an authorization for an
additional $300,000 for anti-Allende propaganda.
Allende was a narrow winner in the three-way Presidential election(b)(1)
� of 4 September 1970, gaining 36.6% of the vote as compared to 35.3% for (b)(3)
Alessandri and 28.1% for Tomic.
The election law provided that, when no President receives a
popular majority, the Chilean Congress must choose between the two top .
candidates. This produced a period of intense activity in which efforts were
made by the U. S. Government to prevent Allende's confirmation by the Congress.
Covert action during the period between the Presidential election of
4 September 1970 and the 24 October 1970 vote by the Congress. On 14 September
SENJ.1E
CPFT
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SENJ IVE
1970, the 40 Committee approved $250, 000 for use at Ambassador Korry's
'discretion in an attempt to swing Congressional votes to Aless.an.dri. These
funds were not spent. At the same time, on 15 September 1970. President Nixon
I
called in in the DCI and instructed him to attempt an effort to prevent Allende
. -
from taking power when and if it appeared the Constitutional route would �
not succeed. The-Agency was instructed to carry out this activity without
�
reference to any other department of government. By early. October it
became clear that action to swing Christian Democratic votes to Alessandri .
would not be decisive and therefore contacts were established by CIA with the '
Chilean military to determine the possibility of thei4:�intervention to prevent
kAllende from taking power.
There were a number of different groups in the Chilean military
involved in coup plotting. The Agency developed contact with one group.
headed by retired General Viaux and with another headed by an active duty
/
imilitary General Valenzuela. The object of both of these groups was to attempt
to remove from office General Rene Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief
who was a major stumbling block to their plans for a military coup, Both
.s
�
hoped to remove Schneider fromithe scene by kidnapping him.
Discussions with the Viaux group progressed rapidly but by 15 October
the decision in Washington was that Viaux had virtually no chance of launching
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a successful coup. Accordingly, a message was conveyed to the Vieux group
�
.warning it against precipitous action. Contact with that group was terminated
on 18 October with no support given them.
Discussions with the Valenzuela group took longer to develop. This
group requested tear gas grenades and three sub-machine guns and'planned to
stage an and-uction. of General Schneider on 19 October. This operation did not
come off howe.Ver, although weapons were passed to the group on 22 October. .
�
On 22 October the Vieux group, acting independently, carried out an abduction
attempt against General Schneider, who resisted and was shot. Schneider's
death.terminated any further attempts by the military to take action, and
Allende was confirmed by the Congress on 24 October 1970.
Covert action activities from 1970 to September II. 1973. Allende's
first two years in power, 1971 and 1972, were marked by his use of all
. Constitutional and legal means �his disposal to move Chile in the direction
of a socialist state. He began to nationalize Chilean major industrial and -
�� commercial enterprises and brought others under severe government harassmen�
The economic control.was designed to weaken the political opposition .by elirninat
the private sector which provided the financial support for the opposition's elect�
political and media ictivities. The government also tried to silence the oppositic
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by action against the independent press. It first tried unsuccessfully to obtain
'control over the distribution of newsprint, Then an extension on loans we're
not granted by government janks, taxes on news media were raised and
government advertising and the revenue it produced was no longer available
to nongovernment aligned outlets. Revolutionary organizations of special
communal commands were established to control the distribution of essential
articles, mainly food. The Soviet and Cuban presence grew and by March 1972.
Soviet Bloc credits of some $200 million had been extended to Chile and the
Soviets were dangling an offer of $300 million to the Chilean military so that
they might purchase Soviet military equipment.
i
During this early period, with 40 Committee approval, the Agency
was tasked with a broad spectrum of activities which were designed in the
main to keep alive the political opposition to Allende and the sustenance of
private sector organizations and news media which were under heavy financial
pressure. A total of $6 million was expended in this effort.
Of the $6 million expended over half was in 'support-of political parties.
particularly the Christian Democrats:. Another $1.5 million was expended to
� keep in publication, El Mercurio, a major independent daily in the country.
The remaining m.onerwas spent to support elements in the private sector and fo)
other media and propaganda support operations.
Popular disillusionment with Allende continued to grow during the
S ECR EJEflSITIYE
FS ()NI Y
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latter half Of 1971 and in 1972 and by 1.973 the Popular Unity Front was able
to muster only 43% of the vote in the national Congressional elections. The
economy was rapidly deteriorating. Strilses by shopkeepers and truckers (which
were not supported by CIA) and boycotts by students were serving ta bring
together widely divergent segments of Chilean society in common opposition td
Allende. By 1973, the government was declared to have placed itself outside the
law and the Constitution in.iepara.te declarations by the Congress, ti-e�SlIareme.Cou
and the Comptroller General of the Republic.
�These confrontations between the Allende administration and the
other branches of the government caused growing:concern within the Armed
Forces which until the fall of 1973, had sarupulously adhered to their historical
tradition of non-intervention into politics.
By September 1973. the country was faced with social and econ. omic�
chaos. Civil war was a growing pos.sibility.. Allende had depleted a national �
economy with reserves amounting to nearly $400 million despite considerable
' delivered and promised aid from the Soviet Union and East Europeans. The
accumulation of concerns finally moved the military to seriously consider a coup
This resolve was strengthened by the discovery that the Popular Unity Front was
attempting to penetrate, subvert and foment divisions within their commands.
During this period CIA had been in touch with members of the Armed
Forces for purposes of intelligence collection. The Station Santiago was specific
�
-.SE.11 IIVE
. ECRET
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Fr
(
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
SECRET/SENS
EYES
prohibited from involving itself in any coup plotting on the part of the Chilean
military. It can be categorically stated that the Agency did not encourage or
support the 1973 military coup which brought down the Allende Government and
resulted in his death.
This is a brief record of the Agency's activity in Chile during the
period 1964 to the present. Sothe of the basic facts are worth repeating:
Agency activity as regards Chile was conducted with
specific approval by the 40 Committee and Presidents involved. �The
desperation move in September of 1970 to prevent Allende's coming
to power by a military coup was the exception to broad interdepart-
mental coordination on the subject of Chile.
....U. S. Government policy prior to 1970 was to prevent
a devout Marxist from taking power and U. S. policy after 1970 was to
' .10
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1
not true:
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SITIVE
attempt to support and sustain until. the 1976 elections a democratic-
...
opposition to a government which grew increasingly intolerant of
that opposition and by 1973 was clearly operating outside the
Constitution.
....During this period there were 31 separate briefings
of Congressional Committees of CLA.'s covert action program in
Chile.
The following statements or myth 4 about the Chile program are
There was never an effort to-irdestabilize" the.
Chilean Government during the period 1970 to 1973. As indicated
above the effort was .to keep a free press and a_democratic
\ opposition alive. Democracy in Chile was done in not by .
CIA but by the ruinous economic policies of a Marxist tdeologue
who finally brought about a *situation in which the non-political -
military felt they had no alternative but to act.
....The Agency did not bring on or encourage the �
military coup of September 11th 1973 and did not play any role
in Allende's death.
�.As you know from your exhaustive investigations
the Agency had broken off and provided no support to the group
11
SEN SjBVE
- S- RET
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El.
SITIVE
pt'
that shot General Schneider.
Mr. Chairman, U. S. policy from -1962 to 1970 was consistent in
attempting to prevent the takeover of the Government of Chile by Allende and
his communist and socialist compatriots. The course of events in Chile since
Allende's takeover prove the wisdom of that policy: The present Government
of Chile has a considerable way to go but military governments in Latin America
have been followed by more democratic alternatives.
There are honest differences of opinion about the wisdom and efficacy
of all of the policy decisions on Chile over the past decade. It is worth noting tha
the Cubans and the Soviets considered the course of events in Chile aa a disaster
to their interetts. The Soviets in their comments on Chile emphasize that Chile
proves the thesis that "socialist revolution" should never be attempted without
political control of the military forces -- a lesson they have been working hard. �
in Portugal to put into practice.
Was our role in Chile bad and anti-democratic?� I think not. The U. S.
was acting within the broad mainstream�of traditional U. S. policy in Latin Ameri
That policy has been to resist the establishment governments in Latin America
with close ties to European powers -- in this case the Soviet Union. That policy,
around the world, has also been to oppose the attempt by minority communist
and radical Marxist parties to takeover governments in the knowledge that once
in power these forces ultimately destroy the elements of democracy and diversity
that enabled them to gain power. What has been preserved in Chile is the chance
begin again.
12
SEN .
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Agency-ITT Relationships
.,,T
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(b
(b
6. In the pre-election period CIA actively pursued an
advisory role with ITT on where and how to use their funds
in support of Alessandri against Marxist candidate Allende.
In the interlude between election and inauguration of Allende,
'.CIA, along with other USG agencies, implemented a 29 September
1970 decision by the 40 Committee to undertake economic
pressure against*Chile utilizing U.S. business firms with �
Chilean interests.
7. In the post inaugural period CIA maintained contact
with various ITT officials on an irregular basis, but did not
pursue any action program with ITT, although there was, on
these occasions, an exchange of information.
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Myths and Facts
. 1. Myth: CIA unilaterally, without authority, undertook
covert action in the 1970 presidential election
in Chile.
FACT: All actions undertaken by the CIA in the 1970
presidential election were directed by the
40 Committee (Track I) or by President Nixon
(Track II).
2. Myth: CIA was responsible for the attempted kidnapping
and death of General Schneider.
FACT: The CIA did not participate in the bungled kid-
napping and death of Chilean Army Commander-in-
Chief General Rehe Schneider. CIA had been in
touch with the group that was responsible for
Schneider's death but CIA had broken off contact
with the group several days prior to that event.
and had warned the group against taking any
precipitous action since it was .clear that they
did not have a chance of pullirik off a successful
coup;
3. Myth: The CIA continued to try to effect a coup but did
not keep the White House.informed of such efforts
after 15 October 1970.
FACT: There was conflicting testimony before the Church
Committee that the White House (Henry Kissinger/
General Haig) stood down on efforts to promote a
military coup after 15 October 1970. CIA
officials testified that CIA activities in Chile
were known to and thus authorized by the White
House, There is no documentary proof that CIA
was instructed to stand down after 15 October
1970. CIA activities in Chile after that date.
were made known to the White House which did not
object to such activities, thus, in effect,
authorizing the continuance of these activities.
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4.
I Myth: CIA .sought the assistance of ITT to provide funds
for Chilean Presidential candidate Alessandri and
the major Chilean newspaper El Mercurio.
FACT: ITT, not CIA, initiated the dialogue on ITT assis-
tance to candidate Alessandri and the newspaper
El Mercurio as the result of a telephone call
TTom .ITT
CIA did not accept any ITT funds nor serve as a
(WO)
funding channel to Alessandri and his National
,0\
Party. was specifical,oxV�)
___ )
told that CIA could ITT funds nor (bv3p
not. absorb any
could CIA serve as a conduit to infuse ITT funds ' '
into Chile.
2
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