EXPLOITING THE "SADDAM IN EXILE" GAMBIT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06746042
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01399
• Publication Date: March 13, 2003

Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042
o
-Sten=
DCI Red Cell
mectoreacemmuftivaace A Red Cell Report
Number 107 13 March 2003
In response to the events of
11 September, the Director
of Central Intelligence
commissioned CIA's Deputy
Director for Intelligence to
create a "red cell" that
would think unconventionally
about the full range of
relevant analytic issues. The
DCI Red Cell is thus charged
with taking a pronounced
"out-of-the-box" approach
and will periodically produce
memoranda and reports
intended to provoke thought
rather than to provide �
faathoritative assessment.
lease direct questions or
mimed= tib Wei Ki1 WI
CAM
(b)(3)
( b)(1 )
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Exploiting the "Saddam in Exile" Gambit
(b)(3)
Actively is othg a WI hour departure"type-exile for Saddam enIght
,undercut parreptions that the US Is pluming only mtlita" ry options�and may
also discourage Se:Manes early use of HIV In a war. If Saddam rejected a 1*--
( bl ( 1 1
blessed exile offer, the onus of war would be on Ithn. Whether or not an exA ,,_;),(
offer flew, US backing for exile initiatives might bet,' Arab lo )lo
regimes mollify Amex& el ZCS. Engaging ARM on such an Initiative might
giVe the approach greater credibility and the Russian leader an orpiment
opals.? those inging him to oppose the &h? the MSC Although an exile
negaation offers. both &Warn lustanblvar diplomacy additional chances to
staIL such pitoblems might be rrnowezibylin24riga ,11X5e exile guarantee to
immediate implementaBon of &comment MettilitienS. Even so, Iraqi
resentment that Saddens's ClinW might go unpunished would be a longer.tenn
problem, as woo*, the need Srit 7Sa a post-ddam mime would
be Indy tieftwent from the okl order. (b)(
Discussion of possible exile for Saddam continues and may reach a crescendo on the eve
of war. 11� �--LCell_ctifers a speculative assessment on the pros and cons ()Me 'Nude
optian1(b)(3) (b)(3)
ATI Otter He Can't Refuse?
( b)(1 )
(b)(3)
President arrements last Thursday�that exile mtht be an
eferlAlibIe proviided the suemedirig regime Wily Me UNK 0:Ns:Imminent
resolutions�may inspAre a new burst of ititerest,t*,,;', exile option as Gulf states and
otheis seek a Dast-ditth attune** to wat. (u)k�-')
Ouir mamma of Aratb mkt tornaientary suggests that follawing up the President%
twinertes with a tonal eiridersammt of the at*C would army signftant weight
tirtitecnationally and moor summit YAM Arab dohrelments amid butAcs.
( b)(1 )
(b)(3)
e teaqt In the aftemeth of victory of delta of the US-UK resoludon, attapfing the eivilie
apaci. K40 Wirer uS as (two ao a mil atenooke 1;617--40 Zha Ow
ghriiit Saddam a form of UNSC pidection *Nes dike peatehilly and ( b) (3)
iirnmedizkely,, and the re* 4egiroe meds disarmament obligations.
Pat remains axiom to aroold Owning bridges to the US by ',I., a veto at the UNSC.
he might grab at the opportunity to play a central rofe en trying to avert war�perhaps
-s-eeRis
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042
-Strefica
through a joint US-Russian "presidential initiative" offering Saddam a UNSC-guaranteed
exile
� Moscow's involvement might also make an offer more credible to Saddam, a man who
trusts no one but has as much confidence in Putin as he does in any foreign leader.
Saddam might see a guarantee backed by Russia and the Arab world as reliable�and
even if not, such an offer would seem believable elsewhere
(b)(3)
Would He Buy it?r
(b)(3)
The odds are slender, but real, that Saddam would actually take up the offer. If he were to
realize his regime is finished, he may grasp survival for himself and his clan with whatever
loot they can drag out with them. Saddam might see exile as allowing him to survive to
fight another day, just as Napoleon did�after his first exile, at least.
� Saddam would only seriously consider exile when convinced he has exhausted every
last option�most likely as US forces are on their way to Baghdad. Making a last offer
of exile contingent on no7,70-1` WMD might convince him to defer use simply to
keep his options opened. ku)k`-')
The UAE proposal offered at the Arab League
summit even called for the UN and the Arab League to supervise creation of a successor
regime.
� Such arrangements would make a post-Saddam Iraq a UN and not a US problem�and
might relieve the US of some expense and responsibility.
� Although Washington would have less direct control over Iraq's future, sharing
responsibilities with Iraq's neighbors would moderate anti-US sentiments now whipped
up over Iraq, deflate charges of US "hegemonism," and start the process of
refurbishing the US image in the Muslim world (b)(3)
(b)(3)
Potential Pitfallsr
Should Saddam decide he loves life more than martyrdom and accept exile, a new set of
challenges would immediately surface.
� Delay. Saddam would try to use an exile offer to start a new round of negotiations
while remaining in control of Iraq. States trying to prevent a war would play along. To
prevent such a dynamic, any offer of exile would need to be non-negotiable and
offered to Saddam on a take it or leave it basis with the clock still ticking.
� Disarmament. For many governments, the case for disarming Iraq is based on
getting WMD out of the hands of a dangerous megalomaniac. With Saddam gone,
many states would be willing to give a new regime a pass on WMD. Any UNSC-
endorsed exile would still require a short deadline for implementation of disarmament
resolutions.
� Power vacuum. Saddam's exit before Iraq is occupied by US and UK forces might
result in a dangerous power vacuum or a splintering of the country into Kurdish,
Sunni, and Shi'a regions. If Iraq devolved into chaos, authorities might lose control of
secret WMD stocks to faction leaders, rebels, or even terrorists. Outside powers�Iran
-SEeREZ
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042
 Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042
(b)(3)
� 41(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
�
�
and Turkey�would be tempted to intervene. An exile deal would need to be
accompanied by rapid occupation of key � an international force that included
US and UK troops already in the Gulf. (b)(3)
Saddam's other Arab neighbors would be more than willing to settle for a
Sunni military clique to continue in Saddam's place. The international community would
probably split again over the issue of a successor regime, with Russia, France, and the
Arabs arguing a Sunni successor was acceptable, and the US, Britain, and others
demanding more far-reaching changes.
.The Iraqi people and the exile community would feel betrayed and abandoned if
Saddam went into a comfortable exile, leaving a Sunni military leader in control.
Exempting Saddam and his henchmen�arguably the prime perpetrators of massive
crimes against humanity during the past two decades�from accountability would be a
dangerous model.
� Kurdish and Shi'a Iraqis might see Saddam's departure as an opportunity to overthrow
a confused and weakened successor regime. The US could be faced with a situation
similar to the aftermath of the war in 1991 if Kurdish and Shi'a rebels were to seize
control of their local areas and then demand US support.
� Even Iraqi Sunnis might be discomfited. With Saddam and his senior henchman gone,
lines of authority and loyalty would be unclear, especially in the security forces,
opening the way for ambitious cliques of lower-ranking officers to bid for power.
Saddam's departure might open the door for a series of destabilizing coups (b)(3?us
factions within Iraq struggled for control of the new regime
Without a large occupying force, the greatest long-term danger would be that Saddam
would be replaced by a successor who would say all the right things but who, once
attention focused elsewhere, would become a new Saddam and resurrect Iraq's WMD
program. Even if all the weapons are destroyed, the expertise to build new ones, including
nuclear weapons, will remain. Without a basic change in the nature of the Iraqi state, few �
ways exist of guaranteeing that a successor regime would eschew WMD.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
-SteRETI
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746042