PRINCETON CONSULTANTS MEETINGS OF 13-14 OCTOBER 1955

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03436541
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: November 3, 1955

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CINTIAL INTNLLISJINCII &GMT
CST= CII NATIGIAL 2911111118
3 Nerecker 1955
NATE NINCIANDUN NO. 7843
SWIM Prineetes Constatants Ilietinss et 13.14 October 3355
PANTICIPANIS
Board ef Nattemal Zatisates
Abbot N. Smith lases Ala. Roscoe it, Schuisaann
Jams Cooley
Coasultikute JIG
Capt. Nal* ilitcalts USN
Staff Nesbess
Thilip 1. lamely
Jose* IL Strayer
3. Scorer
Col. Gems* Lincoln
William I. Donbas
*Oar Tomei
I. men MB AIN) SCO/N Cr
Racy
� 1. The discussion proceeded five a ccesideratica of the present
nein Uses of Soviet ipolity. to a sere detailed essagnatien of Soviet
policy is particular areas. 'The *Missals opus& the wasting by saUciting
opinions as paragraph 24, MIN 1143..55, 'Soviet Pn1in7 in the
1.14#6 of the Smelt iteatinsow The paresseph Inger discussion described
02toller only
g- October only
U4.-,CUME
DATE IrO Mow
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the notivatiees of current &Mat pOlicy. In brief these meet
(a) Stalin's death and the Soviet leadership's 'restless ter greater
flandbilite; (b) recteseition by the new leaders that the old policy
had. lad into a bliad ellen (e) newt nualeer dereelopsestse (4)
econentc stamina within the Mal and (e) a maculation that softer
policies would bring pester dividends.
2. The consultants agreed that all the.. fasters we operating
to infloance present Soviet pollen but there was less agrecanat
conaerming the relative might skis* the various fie:tees carried
in Soviet decisions. argued that nuclear surfers danger and
economic pressures ver�t teeters sad ware therefore lass
important than the other teeters noted In the estimate. over
agreed that certain factors had been present for years. he
underlined the importance of 5ta1ie6s death end the probability
that the present leaders are aces aware of the implications of
nuclear developments and etecanceds difficulties, liesely tea the
view that the USSR had becalm more concerned abeerE the &angers
of nuclear var during the pest two years. Se felt that*. Soviet
leadership niedit reasonable have concluded, on the lassie or state,
sent* by US leaders* that the US was seriously wishing an alternative
policy of var. Thus the USSR night well have ecessidered it necessary
to pacify the US tied the Warts sal cause a retraction of US payer in
Europe* If anything* vasid be inclined to increase the
Importence of the nuclear as a determinant of the eessent
lie* of Soviet policy. Lincoln felt that the wet important factor
is the Soviet calculation that %lantern strength and usity nista
be inpaired by a softer Soviet policy.
30 The consultants explored the problem of reconcilteg the
present cceellistory trend of Soviet policy In !rope with the evidences
of less entemble Soviet policy elsewhere* Nereer end Rts_a_gy discounted
the possibility that other time the loessidium nesters--Wal any
effective voice in policy makdas. Mee disagreed with the statement
in EDI 1.1-13-55 that the Scarlet 2aIirs night have to take into account
abeam dasestle reactions if they reverted to a tough policy after
means a relaxation policy far sew tine.
la. Hese believed that the present ea/mattes in Rum* VOA
dictated by so.t anticipation of energles crises in the Per Rest
ant by the intention to beep the US isolated free its Xeropess allies
in such circumstances. Re felt that the Vita amid expect* and
perhos agitate* little crises which it woad pis* to manipulate
g
SSEMNIP
r�ritineeeper.e.ill A
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r.
to the disadvautage of the Va. in partteular be former an inevitable
-erisis la Iadochime whore the 1/8316 opseatlas through Its Viet limb
ally, eat profit *just by letting the hall roll down
doubted Vert the MISR would wish a Far Ibietera crisis ef soffit
proportion; to catalyse unified Wester* oppositica. Men expressed
the opinion that the ten probably dose not must crises as such but
fawns that they will ewe about. expected Vest the Seriet
leaders woad seek to *Ind& wee Maar crises if it appeared that the
US night resolve then wivestapeously.
5. Mare was a pease/ disposition aeons the eassultante to
believe that the prose* Soviet policy would last far an extealed
period of Um, use theight for yahoos as law as five ce ten yews.
believed the pavan& phase eight last for ten years. In hie
the Soviet leaders would jeopardise their gins it they
turned leek in the near fulawe and they vadat be unable to maks
use at the soft police, again far a ember of years ones they lad
abandon& it. It-mL weed but added that develegesata in the
Male ar JbeNetight force a change in soviet pulley after about
five years. ,Strayer, suggested that the present policy is dealgrad
to dimes and weaken the West. At saes point the Soviet leaders
may ecnolede that they have achieved optima results. At suoh
a juncture* is it net coacediveble that the USSR would be xtrawly
tempted to seise the auoicious aumat for a drive on the Weft?
6. There was little smart for the pavoposition UM the
Soviet leaders had become sore concerned with the USSR as a great
pear then with the agansicu of Comunisa as a revolutiaary
neveseat. Lincoln slanted the possibility or scat such evolution
but believei that the Soviet leaders wild not close off opportunities
for furtheriag Conseniss. azis and Donlan observed that the
West is simply dealing With a Mire satirriMet diplomacy which
by no some escludet the ccatienzed opezutica of the euimenist
underarm*. line insisted that it would, be imaceerate and ma-
fusing to attf distinguish between Soviet power wale and ideological
goals. /be Soviet leaders believe in the paw at the states, but they
also have a simplified* ideologically colored view of their ultimate
objectives.
7. Lincoln believed that at the Oshoter seeting of the foreign
ministers the Soviet loaders would seek to demetrate to thkeermana
that progeses toward unification could net be accomplished at the
fourvemer level. Bs also registered disagreement with In 23-55,
�West Oessany sad the Reunification Issue.* Be reparded the estimate
luanDENT44
WOW
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as too cgotialstie regrxdine the future orleastatiom of Vest (Ilerlan
policy. lihreower, be floated that a center�ridirt coalition would
probably Sallow Adenauer. _ABoover and _ltitealf thought
that they detected a swing tW.lDeraocaTh In Vest
Oranan polities. lbs_ek disagreed, saying that be thought It
none likely that a .an Danseratic goverment, in accordance
with the developing logic of West Seresses interratineal positiol,
night adopt a sore neutral foreig* volley similar to that now advocated
by the Social Democrats. and -_flt that the USSR would
have no altersative to its grease* Germs galley Idrich mead reaeonably
be expecebed to enjoy ivy manna of 11620111411�
a, With respect to the tliddla bet, described the
situation tam the Soviet point of view aa OUi. Sore is a
stalemate in Europe, and possibly also in the Ter last. 2be reminder
of the world is largely made t ot backward coastries Where subvernion
has not been strikingly successful in the past. The Soviet lead,ers �
probably feel cow that there ere opportunities for profitable
diplomatic mureuveringe in those amen. Ocasegrently, it is now the
soviet lfte that ansistamee Circa the UM will be *mailable to the
Arab countries which indicate villingress to abjure Vestals camait.
nests. Mow added that the Soviet leaders mat rectogaine the
posid,billVar an Avab4sreall war and tint consequently they sleet , �
have decided to run the risk of such an eventuality. T believed
that the aim or the UM is to establish a claim to p�IILsts in
big parer regulation of the ISdille *wt. le thought that the Soviet
leaders calculate that a little war in the Middle last weld
help to achieve this end. Liman deserved that if car occurs in
the 1W1* Mast popular opIM.M the Arab.Asien world. would be
sympathetic to the Soviet position. agreed, noting that the
US marl be forced into a pro4sammeLS-WIT..Areb role.
9. aDoVer Emphasised the eamenie limitations on the =Ws
ability to 7-11114Wrer through an offers of sit to the 1114d3a Nast aud
South Asia. Weever, he meted that the Upset of the offers cannot
be disormarted. Lincoln was more impressed with the ecroaceds capabilities
of the USSR, arguing that it Is wee able than the US to neve quickly
on targets of opporturd.ty.
....1118"102161
10. Mere was general concurrence, with ems dissent fres Soever
and Lincoln, with the thesis of SUS 1141.55, wOone Taglicatioes"asar"i
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liffeinge�
ewe'
alrstest of Internatienal Arstaments Inspection." The eatieate aroma
that en inspection agreement weld offer the UM considerable but
not insormountable difficulties in terms of intersal political centra3..
loom and lincoln believcd. that laatereom :amigo laspectors in the
Wie"*rn vuteettUmg politieal offset. ZOOM* pointed eats,
hoesver theft tbe Soviet leaders could easily emetWrceept au inspete
ties: phsate ane then throw roadblocks in the way of its effective
. Lincoln emintained that tin estimate oeforoefibasisod
Soviet ability to cope with the Unmet posed by foreign, inspectors. At
tbe wawa tine, he believed tint the Soviets mai, probably overestimate
the threat to their political menbrol posed by the inspectors.
U0 Kase � argued ectremear that the WSW mead acaomodate lorge
numbers of we inspeetcre trithauto internal political
centrals* Ile noted that the nes leadersbip has been nadifying its
security controls and ray he achieving greater efficiency* lgareavero
twenty years of conditioning in On:street of 411311VUUMISO against
foreigners cm the part of the eittaenz7 offere a subtotantial security
cushion ter the regime. lb also argued" in reflecting on factors
revering Soviet acceptance of as inspection plane that the USSR
rewrite a surprise attack by the IX aa smelt sore conceivable than
woad awns Who enderatood the US political system. All the
consunants agreed that the phrasing of the estimative emblem was
unrest's:ate and. that it is misleading to indicate that Soviet
of inspection amould lead to anything nave
substantial than etemmisb pestle:124U= in such other sepeevisory
as these in Urea or Isiochina*
1,,P4
III, 111410:114TIA
12e The consultants etre is general agreement with the judgments
in ICE 3.10.2-55, "regoslaviats Intereational Position." remarked
that the eat to should have dwelt sore on the internal
inglicatiess of Tito*s between. the Sloes. cantended
that Tit* is somewhat acre deeendent upon Vectors aid estimate
implies* Nose_ ly end Lincoln stressed that the 4 peastica of Soviet-
lesonlaveitetellite relations is of extreme importance ant will require
further study in future estinates*
130 lte_en1y believed tie* the itrushehavenulene a leen to
meade rites doematic position* Sinaheltevga
airport spolosy vinei tee wito flees-vie Yugoslav eaminforsests and Titoists
alike*. lb also noted that Soviet woul4 wakes nonellessomiest
opposition in Yogoslavia alma smeh opposition has probably matted an
Mel s on the Wrest to weaken his Conseniss. Mose=scehounted.
the 2/103.1heed of effective Soviet penetration of legeslavis
closer ties since he believed. Tito to be Aromas, than ever. We thought
Tito vas interested in probing to discover hew tar the Soviets are
willies to go in zeleming teeniesso The Soviets in tore weerwish to
vas nto as a bridge for aigneaching the Socialist parties in the West.
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-MR-MAL
IV. DEVELOPMTNTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
14. Hoover believed that the Israeli will pursue a policy
designed titarMi it easy for the Egyptians to attack. Lincoln
observed that it will take time for the Egyptians to learn g
effective use of the weapons they expect to receive frdm the Bloc.
Therefore, it is unlikely that within the next two to three years
the Egyptians could react to goading by the Israeli. In I.smis
opinion Egyptian public opinion may nevertheless force thi-=
to act against its better judgment. If there develops,a straggle
between Egypt and Israel, the pressures in Iraq at the lower
levels of the population will be so intense that it mill be
extremely difficult to keep Iraq off Israel's back. The elite
Iraqi may not agree with the masses but probably will be forced to
.go along with the anti-Israeli war.
15. Hoover wondered if the traditional inter-Arab rivalries
would not be submerged during a time of Egyptian-Israeli conflict.
Strayer doubted that even an Egyptian war against Israel could
overshadow the antagonisms within the Arab world. He admitted that
in the event of such a mar the Arab states would be likely to
participate, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. However, Arab
rivalriee would become most evident if the ear went badly for Egypt.
In these circumstances the Iraqi might argue that their best contri-
button to stabilising the situation would be to form a greater Syria.
16. The consultants were pessimistic About a peaceful resolution
of the Egyptian-Israeli difficulties. It was agreed that the Soviet
leaders have succeeded in opening a new area of conflict between the
US and the USSR, and that recent Soviet policy poses an extraordinarily
delicate and intricate problem for the US. Lincoln said that if the
Israeli attack Egypt the USSR might achieve Fear& gains by appealing
to the UN for an international force to put down the aggression.,
Strayer, noted that min or lose the Arabs will remember that they
received armaments from the Soviet Bloc and that the US armed Israel.
The consultants speculated that possibly an international "honest
broker" meld be found to influence Israel against a belligerent
course of action. Mosel suggested that the USSR might indicate its
willingness to withh�I1 arms from the Arabs in return for the
dismantling of US bases abroad.
6
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0946R2V
V. NIE100445: WORLD SITUATION AND LONGER TERM TRENDS (Staff Draft)
17. The consultants commented favorably on the Staff Draft as
a thole. However* there were numerous criticisms regarding scope
and detail. In particular the consultants believed that the paper
tried to project too far into the future. All agreed that more
attention should be paid to China and Indochina. awer believed
that the draft over-estimated Bloc flexibility in fairly stable
areas such as Western Europe. He advocated toning down the paper's
concentration on Bloc policies in stable areas of the world. The
Bloc is unlikely to engage us in areas where the US is strong, but
around the periphery where we are weak. What, for example, is
going to be Soviet policy toward an aspiring world power like India?
11111 not the leaders of India and Yugoslavia seek to take advantage
of the Soviet soft policy to go along on their own? Ye...2mi agreed
that the draft should place much more emphasis on the relatively
backward world areas and on countries with neutralist ambitions.
Lincoln also believed that the role of the neutral and backward states
should be further explored. The crisis is not yet upon us in Africa.
Should not the eatimate tell us more about this area so that we can be
prepared? He would also like to see concentration on the probable
role of our Allies andivhat it will take to keep NATO a going concern.
Name added that an omission was the possible 0feet of the erosion
Memirs on the Satellites. Vesely doubted this since the new Soviet
policy is for export only. Redid not anticipate internal diffie.
culties in the USSR if the Soviet leadership eventually decided to
reverse its conciliatory policy. The change could be blamed on US
intransigence. Hoover thought that increased Soviet efforts to
"use" the UN mierrIrdeveloped someahat.
18, !ely, Strayer, and Hoover protested that the draft gives
the impression that this is a agla-Without,uncertalety and change.
Mosely felt that there should be more on the Soviet tactic of manip-
iiating little crises, especially in the Far ,East� so as to maximise
gains while inhibiting US action and contributing to a deterioration
of NATO or a dissipation of NATO resources. Re added that in Europe
the USSR has little more that it can afford to give away, but grave
problems remain unresolved. The people of Europe are likely to
become very mach mare that on really big problems Soviet policy
continues to be inflexible.
EN
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19. Mosely and Hoover regarded Indochina as an irresistible
opportunity for Communist dhina and were very pessimistic regarding
the survival of South Vietnam. Both were agreed that the draft
should indicate that there is much greater Chinese interest in
Vietnam (and a higher degree of danger there) than in the offshore
islands. Metcalf believed that the growing magnitude of the China
problem requires more attention in the draft on Communist intentions
toward Southeast Asia.
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