O/NE CONSULTANTS' CONFERENCE, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY, 23-24 JANUARY 1958

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06186239
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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: February 3, 1958

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DATE: S I *LIU
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A.OZNCT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
3 February 1958
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 5-58
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SUBJECT: 0/NE Consultants' - tOnference, Princeton, New Jersey,
23.24 January 1958
1.
Participants:
Consultants
CIA Representatives
Hamilton Fish
Armstrong
Allen W. Dulles
Cyril Black Robert Amory, Jr.
Robert R. Bowie Sherman Kent
Harold R. Bull Abbot Smith
Klaus Knorr James Graham
William L. Langer
Willard Matthias
Charles Cremeans
Harold Linder
Max Millikan
Philip Mosely
Joseph Strayer
2.
Agenda:
(OIR, Dept.
of State)
I. Briefing an the Syrian Situation OS January, morn* session
II. NIE 12-58: OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY ti THE EASTERN lONOPEAN
SATMSTES (Board Draft) (23 January morning and afternoon
sessions)
III. NIE 100.58: ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SIT7ATION (Staff Drpet)
(23 January afternoon session and 24 Jemmy)
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I. Syrian Situation (Morning Session, .23 Januaryi
Summary: Mr. Cremeans briefed the consultants en recent develop-
ments in the Syrian situation, highlighting the struggle for power
which is apparently taking place within the ruling group between a
pro-Soviet faction and an Egyptian...Supported neutralist faction. He
discussed the prospects for Syrian-Egyptian union in the light of these
developments. Several of the consultants expressed doubt that Egyptts
apparent opposition to pro-Soviet elements in Syria was really a
development favorable to US interests in the Middle East. It mat;
generally agreed that new manifestations of EgYPtian.Syrian unity
would probably have a significant effect on the course of developments
in Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.
II, NTE 22-58: OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITES
(Morning and Afternoon Sessions, 23 January)
Summary: Discussion of the Satellite paper occupied about half
of the morning session and the beginning of the afternoon session on
23 January. There were few major disagreements with the substance of
the paper, which was discussed in terms centering an Poland, the impact
of Western policies an the Satellites, and Soviet-Satellite-Western
relations. A division concerning the Polish estimate emerged, but
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was resolved by-genera-agreement that the iatuatial it iaand is
precarious but probably net exPlosive. There appeared to be common
agreenent that the attempt tatted with Western policy in an NIE was
a good developnent. Most of the COnAultants were in accord with the
substance of that section and sbme bffered suggestions for improving
its form. The relatively brief discuasionbf Soviet-Satellite rela..
tions included comment on the extent of Yugoslav influence in Eastern
Europe, Bloc economic relations, and East-West trade and cultural
contacts.
Highlights of the Discussion
SMITH opened the discussion by remarking that our Estimates
written prior to the Hungarian and Polish affairs had regarded the
Satellites as "monolithic" and had, as a consequence, seriously erred
in judgment.
MOSELY suggested that the errors were understandable since revolts
are not easy to foresee, and AMORY noted that the Satellite estimate
published in early 1956 had been written prior to Khrushchevls secret
speech on Stalin (February 1956). BOWIE said that the basic failing
in the earlier NIEs was the conviction that, despite unrest in the
Satellites, the Soviets would be able to keep a grip an the situation.
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SMITH, referring specifically to 12-58, posed two questions:
(1) what was the consultants' reaction to the last section dealing
with the impact of Western policiet--a "maiden" effort in NIEs; and
(2) were there any general comment8 on the other portions of 12-58--
anything intolerable or any major pinta omitted?
STRAYER responded, criticizing the Section on Poland. He stated
that the situation in Poland is far more precarious than suggested in
this estimate. He just did not believe that the Poles could success-
fully walk a tightrope for the next five years or so. BOWIE agreed,
and AMORY pointed out that the British mould agree too.
A general discussion of the precarious situation in Poland ensued,
with LANGER making the point that the ',Polish communist party is
stronger than we had thought." BOWIE wondered if that weren't partially
the result of sufference on the part of the Raman Catholic Church in
Poland. MOSEL! said the regime can count on tolerance from groups who
-mould be opposed were it not for the Soviet threat. AMORY added that
the Natolinist had been cleaned out and that the peasants are better
off now than at any time in the last fifty years.
STRAYER restated his objection, noting that popular enthusiasm
for the regime is waning, the economy is sagging, etc., and acing
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whether the Soviets would tolerate such a deterioration. LANGER asked
What the Alternatives to the present Situation are,
SMI1H called attention tO paragraph lOrdealing in part with the
possible affects on Poland of a withdrawal or foreign economic aid.
Did the consultants think that, ih the -attest of a loss of such aid, the
Polish regime could revise its investment program and thereby avoid
trouble with the people?
KNORR said that this was conceivable in economic terms but it might
not be done because of the regime's ideological convictions. Further,
such an investment shift would perforce involve a big transfer of the
labor force. MOSELY felt that if Soviet aid were withdrawn, the people
would rally behind the regime and support an investment shift, and
BLACK said that the US wtuld probably step up its aid in such an event.
STRAYER said that withdrawal of Soviet aid is highly unlikely.
SMITH then asked if all were agreed that, if a revolt occurs, it
is most likely to be caused by economic distress.
KNORR thought so, given the other factors considered in the esti-
mate. ARMSTRONG said that a revolt would be caused by economic die.
tress and the mgoscovite presence.� STRAYER believed that the cause
would be political. LANGER commented on the unlikelihood of any revolt,
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citing the effect of the Hungarian example and noting that the Poles
had endured oppression in the 19th century for long periods. AMORY
added that he had been told that many young polish intellectuals.-
feeling that things were too tough nationally�mere focusing all their
energies on material improvementr in the spirit of 19th century Polish
neo-positivism.
SMITH observed that there now seemed to be general agreement that
the situation in Poland is precarious but that it would probably stay
that way without an explosion-..which, he noted, is more or less the
way the estimate puts it. He then changed the subject to Soviet..
Satellite economic relations and asked if the Satellites could now be
considered an economic liability to the USSR.
There appeared to be general agreement with LINDERts remark that
this is a matter of very complicated figuring and that the question
probably cannot be answered, All also agreed, however, that the change
in economic relations had been in the Satellites' favor. LINDER traced
the evolution of Soviet economic practice in the area, describing the
first period (post war) as "straight robbery," the second as "trade on
terms very advantageous to the USSR," and the third as involving
"investment and long-term paper, with the Soviets dominant in the
current account."
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slam observed that the Soviet empire bad ereiNetkkessret 'meal
afininistrationsa not permanent4 expleitive.. This has lees asecaPanied
by political changes--the day 4 unlimited 'twist *antra is at an end.
STRAYER demurred, stating that if(the doViete eootAmme ter receive fewer
and fewer hard goods from the Satellited% they will revert to tougher
management.
A brief discussion of the Strategic value of the Satellites to the
USSR included BMWs remark that the Soviets would not risk removing
their troops from the area under virtually any circumstances. LANGER
concurred, but BLACK noted that the need for large standing armies has
diminished. BUCK criticized the estimate for omitting consideration of
the strategic factors.
SMITH then shifted the conversation to the estimate's section on
the impact of Western policies and asked for comments. There was gen-
eral agreement that this section was a worthwhile and "encouraging"
innovation in an NIE.
LANGER stated that he agreed with the estimate that there is not
much the West can do in the Satellites. In his opinion the West
ushouldn't push too hare; if the situation is going to disintegrate,_
it will do so by itself. Outside actions to hasten the process might
actually slow it up.
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SEURIFI
The discussion then centered on paragraph 54, &sling with the
possible impact of Soviet trocpwithdrawals or East...West negotiations
discussing such an eventuality.- After some disagreement over specifics
had emerged, ARMSTRONG expreesed the Opinion that the subject of nego-
tiations warranted more thought, pessibly in a special study. ARMSTRONG
and LANGER agreed that a clearer differentiation between the Satellites
should be made in any such study.
During the afternoon session, SMITH raised the question of Titots
influence on the other Satellites. MOSELY pointed out the unique
origin of Titols regime and said that Yugoslavia does not offer the
other Satellites much inspiration. He agreed with ARMSTRONG that
there had been little change in Yugoslavia's international position
over the past two years, but added that since the rapprochement with
the USSR, Belgrade has looked ahead 10-15 years--it used to look ahead
in terms of months. The Yogoslays are now very much impressed with the
inevitability of Communism in the underdeveloped areas of the world.
SMITH wondered if the only significant thing to look for in the
Satellites was disaffection in the leaderships, not in the peoples.
BLACK thought most disaffected leaders had been purged.
asked
how a drift toward greater freedom from Moscow could be recognized by
the intelligence community if the Satellite leaders involved were not
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anxious to call such a trend to Moscow's atteatien. He cited Ramania
as a possible example. LANIER didn't think it could be recognised;
STRAYER thought that economic-indicators would be the most revealing
in this event.
MOS= pointed to cultural relations alai an indicator and mentioned
Rumania's recent moves in this field._ This led to a general discussion
of East-West cultural and economic contacts, with AMORY commenting an
the Soviet willingness to expand such contacts. BOWIE remarked that
this willingness was in large part the resat of the heavy Soviet
propaganda pitch and ARMSTRONG agreed, pointing to the relatively
greater contacts between the USSR and the underdeveloped areas. Amor
observed that there had been few Soviet defections in the lest and
added that such defections would not be in the West's interests anyhow�
the US wants Bloc visitors to go back home to spread their impressions
of the West.
Following the DIRECTOR's arrival, SMITH recapitulated the morning
session on Poland and on the impact of Western policies. The DIRECTOR
expressed interest in the estimate vie a via the situation in Poland
after Gomulka's death and spoke generally of the Satellites. He called
attention to a report he had read on Czechoslovakia which said that the
situation was slowly liberalizing, despite the absence of revolts. He
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then asked if anyone doUbted that it was in the DS interest to expand
trade contacts with the East. There was general agreement that this
was in the US interest. This Wad followed hy further discussion of
Soviet motives.
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III. NIE 100.58: ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION
Summary
Discussion of the World Situation paper filled three separate
sittings of the meeting and ranged over a number of arbitrarily
selected controversial high points. There was considerable division
over the paper's full impact between those who found its tone of
pessimism suited to the moment and those who felt it tended to
underestimate the long range difficulties which the Soviet bloc
would increasingly face. Although no firm agreements were reached
in debate, the force of discussion indicated a few major developments
of common concern: (1) that the Soviets were experiencing great
success with non-military methods of implementing their national
interests, and that these methods were attuned to the general nature
of political and economic evolution in the underdeveloped areas of
the world, (2) that both in the Jest and elsewhere new opportunities
for independence, if not for neutralism, were stirring the thoughtful,
and provided significant portents of the pattern of future alignments,
and (3) that conditions of mutual deterrence in the cold war were
shaping basic strategic thinking and policy motivations of the principal
antagonists, but that imponderables remained which emphasized the risks
and raised the stakes of the game.
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Highlights of the Discussion
(Afternoon Session, 23 January)
SMITH summarized the discussion on the World Situation paper
which had taken place at the last meeting of the consultants. He
pointed out that the draft which the consultants were now considering
had not yet been approved by the Board and would be affected by the
present meetings. He remarked that the single most important event
of the past year was the alteration of the structure of power and
prestige in the world wherein the USSR had gained considerably. He
asked for comment on (a) the general import of the whole paper, and
(b) whether any significant factors had been omitted.
All of the consultants expressed general approval of the paper.
LANGER, MILLIKAN, STRAYER, and BULL felt that the tone was a little
too gloomy. BLACK, KNORR, ARMSTRONG, LINDER, and MOSELY did not
share this feeling.
STRAYER suggested that the und,:rdeveloped countries were making
cold-blooded decisions in the light of their own interests rather
than succumbing to Communist blandishments or achievements. BULL
poihted out that the underdeveloped countries in many cases have
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very poor alternatives to their present positions and that this will
act as a check on their adopting a pro-Soviet policy. He added that
the full impact of Soviet technical achievements will probably be felt --
especinlly in Western Europe -- only when Soviet missiles are operational
and site emplacements completed.
BLACK said that many of the pessimistic factors in the paper ha&
existed for some time but had not previously been recognized sufficiently.
ARMSTRONG indicoted his deep concern over the unfavorable reaction in
Western Europe, particularly in England, to recent Soviet achievements.
He read excerpts from an editorial in the New Statesman to demonstrate
the intensity of this reaction.
MILLIKAN felt that the paper placed too great emphasis on the
psychological aspect and paid too little attention to actual developments
which may occur in the near future. Citing the example of Indonesia,
he stressed the importance of internal developments in various countries
which develop independently of their leaders' attitudes toward the UC.JSSR
competiticn but are frequently a vital setting for that ccmpetition.
He also suggested that the paper should give more attention to the
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relationship of the strategic military situation tCpotentiataq 1 '
crises -- e.g. the Soviet leaders may feel that their enhailce-eglobal
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military strength M.Ak make the US lets willing to ..ploy military
force against them and thus increase the chances Of'obrushfiren
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conflicts.
BOWIE agreed that more attention should be paid to the real alter-
natives that various countries face and less to the frame of mind of
their leaders. He said that the paper in general could be looked upon
as a companion piece to an annual strategic policy review; as such,
the long term view is important, and more attention could well be
given to the underlying prospects in, the less-developed countries.
KNORR expressed the feeling that the psychological approach in
parts of the paper was a great virtue. He pointed out this does not
appear elsewhere and suggested that specific developments in the under-
developed countries have been and can better be treated in area papers.
SMITH suggested that the paper's emphasis on attitudes could be
justified in part by the fact that a major facet of sputnik was that
it revealed to the world the potential of Soviet technological develop-
ment which had previously been known only to relatively small informed.
groups. ARMSTRONG agreed that this made it desirable to focus the
paper on attitudes.
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Commenting on possible omissions from the papers UNDER suggested
the desirability of eonsiderntion of the population problem and its
impact in the uncommitted countried and recommended more emphasis on
the raw material resources of these countries. ARMSTRONG thought
that recent changes in Western Europe deserved more attention and
recommended particularly that more detailed treatment be given to
individual countries rather than focusing analysis on the area as a
whole. NOSY also felt that differentiation should be made as to
haw various countries are coping with their problems and suggested
that sometimes they can usefully be judged on that basis. LANGER pointed
but that the paper pays relatively little attention to Soviet weaknesses
and problems which are still very real in certain areas.
At SYJTH's request,
summed up the State Department's
reading of world reaction to recent Soviet technological advances.
He indicated that in woiad opinion an in-balance does now exist to
some degree between the US and the USSR, and that as long as it does,
some of the uncommitted groups, which doubt the US ability to catch
up, may gravitate toward the USSR.
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Turning to the strategic aspects of the present and probable future
world situation, STRAYER commented that the major fast is that the USSR
can now -- or will be able soon to hurt the U$ badly and quickly.
MOSELY suggested thst the Soviet leaders have probably for some time
been weighing the possibility of preventive mar, but now they cnn feel
that it is a real option which they have. He opined that it is at
least possible under these circumstances that they might at some
state decide to use a decisive technical advantage to attempt to
end the ccmpetition with the US. MILLIKAN asked if the appraisal of
danger to the US had shifted sharply over the past few months.
THE DIRECTOR replied that there was nothing qualitatively new
in recent developments, althaugh there was a new time element involved.
The main change resulting from hard intelligence was to bring closer
by a year or a year-and-a-half our estimate of the time at which they
would have certain capabilities. In response to a question from
MOSELY as to whether the Russians had tills demonstrated their ability
to speed up their programs, THE DIRECTOR said that from their point
of view, no sneel-up may have taken place; we merely gained additional
information on what was going on.
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MILLIKAN felt that the time element in the balance of US-USSR
strategic capabilities WAS of vital importance and that the facts of
the strategic competition should be diScussed in realer terms than
murely world reaction to it.
In response to SMITH'S request for comment on the subject of
negotiations with the USSR, STRAYER and BLACK indicated their un-
certainty as to the meaning and implications of paras. 33 and 35
of the paper. In explaining the pn.ra7raphs� MATTHIAS emphasized the
seriousness with which the British are studying the problem of
negotiations with the Russians and
suggested that West German
Chancellor Adenauer may feel that the increased degree of US dependence
on IRBM bases gives him cmsiderable leverae in determining Germany's
relatins with the Western alliance.
LINGER doubted that the West European powers will seriously undertake
negotiation with the USSR in the face of US opposition but expressed
the opinion that if they did, it would severely damage the Western
alliance. BOWIE pointed out that if the Western European desire for
negotiations was this intense, we would probably not oppose it.
THE DIRECTOR expressed doubt th-,t the USSR has any interest in
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negotiaticns with any single European power, except on terms of that
power adopting neutralism. He agreed with ARMSTRONG that the German
question is probably an excention to thia. It was generally agreed
that a redraft of the final sentences of para. 33 would be desirable.
SMITH inquired what the West European countries other than Germany
have to negotiPte with the USSR about? BLACK sufgested the possibility
of their asking the USSR what would you give us if we expelled the
NATO bases. THE DIRECTOR pointed out that the USSR would gain little
from negctiatims with one country to expel the bases as long as other
countries maintained them. MILLIKAN suggested, however, that the
precedent' would be valuable.
Prelimin-ry to a discussi,n of para. 351 MATTUAS summarized
recent developments in the direction of an independent Western European
military policy. MILLIKIN felt that these should be a source of worry
to the USSR. TPE DIRECTOR said the Russians are worrying about them.
He added thnt some of the European powen4looking back to 1914 and
1939, may feel thnt development of their own nuclear capability is
the one way to ensure US involvement in any future conflict in which
they may become engaged. They may feel, he suggested, that as long
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as the US is the only Western power to have a nuclear otapabilitv,
the US might draw back and leave them in the event of a non.muclear
conflict.
MILLIKAN and BOWIE said thiS:Should strengthen NATO considerably.
THE DIRECTOR agreed -- but felt it would do so only if the US can be
sure that the European capability will be used if the US alone were
attacked. SMITH added that the European Powers might not be desirous
cf getting involved in a conflict, perhaps vital to US interests,
which began in a distant area, such as Iran.
STRAYER said that whet the Western European countries really
want is to maintain their independence. Until they develop their own
capability, they will remain dependent on the support of American
retaliatory power. When they have developed an independent capability,
they may feel that they can stay out of conflicts in which Europe is
not directly involved. BOWIE indicated that he would not be surprised
to see the Western European position made explicit when an independent
nuclear capability is attained: "We have our own capability now.
Americans go home from West and Russians from East Europe."
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SITRY2
THE DIRECTOR 7eeommenied rewording of para. 35 in the light of
the discusbion especially the third sentence. He suggested that
it be made clenr thnt the Western European military capability being
discussed was a !nuclear one and that a substitute be found for the
phrabb"minor awression." SMITH added that the development of an
independent capability and its implications may occur somewhat more
quickly than we have indicated and that perhaps "neutral" might be
a better word than "independent" to ascribe it. He also thought
it micht be worthwhile to consider the implications of a war arising
outside Europe which involved US but not European interests.
January 1958.
(Morning Session, 24 January)
SMITH reopened consideration of the World Situation paper by
proposing to focus the first part of the morning's discussion on two
questions concerning the power conflict between the US and the USSR.
Referrirr to pnra. 62, he asked the consultants to ponder: (1) the
probable Soviet view of the nature of future armed conflicts, both
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limited and general wars; and (2) the probable estimate of the US
views on these matters as held by Soviet policymakers. Recalling
Toynbee's precept that the establishment of democratic systems and
industrialization made general wars possible, he queried whether
the Soviets conduct their policy planning on the basis of an assumption
that limited war is possible -- and whether they feel we are capable
of limiting a conflict in which we might become engaged. He proposed
the use of geographical rather than weapons limitaticns in considering
these questions.
KNORR interjected that curbing the SAC of both sides was a
primary condition of limitation. Analyzing probable Soviet reasoning
a or000s limiting hostilities, he observed that since each side
knew the other could destroy it, incentives to impose limits were
strong. However, he felt the Soviets would regard the US capacity
to limit war as lower than the Soviet's because our military force
was less flexible. Hence, he thoucht that the Soviets might be
inhibited from aggravating dangerous situations, or even from under-
taking limited hostilities for fear that the only riposte open to
us would be all out nuclear rexisal. ARMSTRONG refused to accept this
thesis entirely, pointing out that the Soviet 21anners were also aware
that the factor of cautious restraint would stay the US hand.
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BOWIE reminded the group that the Soviets were likely to. select
areas and issues of combat which would divide the Western allies
rather than confront them with clear cut choices. In such cases he
felt the Soviets would have the advantage of anticipating US reluctance
to resort to all-out war. BOWIE then tabled what he felt was the
most dangerous possibility for the future -- namely that the US and
the Soviets having subverted two competing lesser states would confront
one another suddenly as champions of their respective nroteges. LANG
dcinted out thAt there had been very little actual infiltrtion of
Soviet soldiers or citizens in Korea and Indo China, Probably because
the USSR was unwilling to provide motivations for US attack on its
homeland. KNORR responded that he felt that if Soviet pilots had
engaged US squadrons, this too would have been an indication that
limits were acceptable. LANGER felt the Soviet Union would not allow
hostilities between the two principal adversaries to become so direct
before pulling off its gloves.
SMITH then sketched out a hypothetical situation in which US
backed Turkey invaded Soviet supported Syria. MOSEY stated that
the USSR would very promptly move into Turkey. MILLIKAN felt they
would more likely hestitate briefly, first giving full warning to
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manor European European cities and brooding the aggressor before the UN.
LANGER observed that the Soviet decision would be based ultimately
on whether Syria was worth more to them than Turkey was to the West.
THE DIRECTOR said it would not be Syria that was in the scales, but
Soviet national prestige. KNORR rebponded to this remark that a
decision by the Soviets to withdraws or not to marchwould in today's
situation result in their winning enormous prestige as the preservers
of world peace. THE DIRECTOR remarked that our restraint during the
Hungarian uprising had won the US no prestige.
MOSELY, pointing out that the discussion seemed to emphasize the
delicacy of making accurate assumption about the other fellow's motives
in times of passionate crisis, returned to his earlier stated hypothesis
that preventive war was now at least a possible option for Soviet
decision makers. This course might, he felt/ offer attractions when
the imponderables in any given situation became so difficult to
estimate that they risked the chance of serious miscalculation. THE
DIRECTOR, reinforced by BULL, stated that he felt this choice would
not 1-e available to the Soviet Union until 1959-60.
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A rather raMbling dismission of different foreign policies that
the Soviets might pursue in the next few years ensued. The various
options mentioned in paras. 18 and 62 of the draft, economic penetration,
war by proxy, infiltration, etc., were touched on by several consultants.
The general opinion seemed to cluster around two points: (1) that
non-military tactics were serving the Soviets well, and hence would
be employed extensively, and (2) that restraints on the use of force
operated differently on the US and USSR.
In response to MOSELY's reiteration of the possibility ofireventive
war, THE DIRECTOR remarked that he felt the Soviet leaders did not
want tJ provoke such a calamity, and further that the Soviet people
were not willfully destructive and had little interest in world conquest.
He insisted that the decision to launch preventive war would not simply
be a function of the degree of superiority in destructive power which
the Soviets might some day feel they had achieved over the US. On the
other hand, THE DIRECTOR questioned where at least in Europe -- a
war-by-proxy might take place. He also underlined his earlier position
by observing that a nation cannot win confidence in the world's chancellories
by backing out of situations threatening danger. LINDER differed with
THE DIRECTOR to the extent that he felt the Soviets would be less
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inhibited from risking war than the US, and hence might push crisis
situations belligerently. He suuested that the Soviet leaders were
at least subconsciously persUaded by their own personal doctrinal
equipment that in any catastrophic war between East and West, the
West could not recover because of the internal contradictions of
capitalism.
MILLIKAN referred to p. 45 of the estimate and said that he was
disturbed by the implication here that US-Soviet troop confrontation
will lead to general war ecause, in effect, we (the US) would not
let such a confrontation remain limited. He stated that, in his
opinion, the Soviets mir,ht well try to keep a conflict limited.
BOWIE stated that the Soviets may feel that they can make aggressive
moves and not run a serious risk of meaningful US reaction. They may
be inclined to reas,:n that the situation since Hungary inhibits the
West. This, plus the sputniks, is perhaps alarming.
ARMSTRONG remarked that the discussion was dealing with present
dangers and was assuming a lessening of this danger when the US
had ICBM capabilities. But suppose, he said, the Soviets can counter
the ICBM by the time we have it - wouldn't this change our prognosis?
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MOSELY answered, asserting that Moscow youtd feel in that event
that they had us neutralized.. BOWIE wasn't so sure and said that
the key in such a situation would be the degree of Soviet certainty --
how could they ever feel certain that they had us neutralized? KNORR
agreed and stated that it is very unlikely that either side will ever
possess clear-cut superiority*.
STRAYER, referring to pa, e 45 in the draft, suggested that the
last two sentences be rewritten in order to clarify and amplify the
thought. Obviously, he said, it will be easier to prevent a general
war if limited wars involve the US and USSR only by proxy, in remote
areas, where prestige would not be a vital factor. The closer a
limited war is to major areas of interest to the big powers, the harder
it will be to keep it limited.
BULL raised a specific examle of a lossible limited war: Suppose
the Soviets went into Iran, and then the US entered, with both sides
intending to limit the conflict. What would the US reaction be if
it were realized that, if the war remained limited, the US was going
to lose? He asked if American leaders could then go to the public
and say "we five up?" Would American willingness to enter such
limited wars -- and to keep them limited -- eventually result in our
being "nibbled to death?"
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MILLIKAN stated that theta mrcmAt be able to limit war unless
it accepts the "nibbling proposition P Jose the US might lose one
such war tut would counter by its entry in another. KNORR agreed,
saying that even if you lose one you have a chance of winning the
next. The real comparison here should be between the losses involved
in losing limited wars and losses involved
lin "raising the ante" -- there should be no interest in raising the
ante if in the process you destroy everybody.
A general Tascussion, involving the definition of "limited"
and "brush-fire" wars followed. AMORY said Iran was not a good
example since it was too "blue chip" an area to be brush-fire.
LANGE, disagreed. SMITH pointed to Korea as a limited war and traced
it in terms of US objectives -- first, a very limited US objective,
which then was expanded after successes, and then amended again
after defeats. The end result was a compromise.
SMITH then shifted the discussion to a consideration of the
first six paragraphs of the draft, which serve as a generalized
introduction. Did the consultants have any particular reactions
to these paragraphs?
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BOWIE expressed his view that the introduction vs too short-term
a "cataclysmic framework;" it shouid refleet a lenger,range view.
AMORY commented that it dealt with tO0 things -- the shift in US
prestiLe and the general long-range view; paragraph]. did not really
distinguish between the two and failed in its objectives. SMITH remarked
that perhaps the paper made too much of the short-term, obscuring the
distinction between short and long.term.
THE DIRECTOR said the paper over-emphasized US loss of influence
and observed that, in his oclinion, the Soviets are losing influence
in many parts of the world. MILLMAN questioned the phrase "shining
example" as applied to the USSR, and LANGER wondered if the US really
had suffered a loss in moral influence.
THE DIRECTOR called attention to paragraph 4, line 4 and
questioned the stPtement about the "world's respect" for Soviet
"intellectual and economic accomplishments." He would not mind the
use of "scientific" but objected to the use of "intellectual". In
the intellectual field, he said, the Soviet accomplishment is the most
"barren since the Dark AFes."
:iiiMSTRONG added that the USSR has
substituted scientific progress for cultural progress and has "exploited"
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more than it has ',created.* SMITH Said that perhaps Pintellectual"
is too broad but that "scientific" is too narrow after LINDER had
noted that the Soviets were getting a lot _of people well-educated.
MILLIKAN stated that the real point is that the Soviets have
undermined the anti-Communist belief that the Soviet system is
"intellectually stifling in all directions."
Referring to pnragraph 6, LINDER said that to assume that the
peoples of the world are really ccncerned with world affairs is goihg
too far. The estimate should talk of attitudes in terms of governmental
attitudes.
BOWIE observed that too much was made of actual changes. It's
not so much that, he said, as the fact that we have been "jolted"
by sputnik into greater realism; the paper almost has a "Jeremiah
quality."
Prior to his departure, THE DIRECTOR commented generally that
the piper was a rood one, but that, as the head of an agency which
has dealt with Soviet capabilities, he thought it a "little too alarmist."
He thought thit the discussions with the consultants had been extremely
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useful, and surgested that a new section be added to the paper to deal
with Soviet problems, from the point of view of the Soviet planner.
He also referred to the desirability of another estimate to discuss
US initiative in non-military fields.
THE DIRECTOR concluded by streSSing his interest in discussions
of the limited war concept and in the difficulties the US may face
in attempting to counter Communist take-overs. In this respect,
"Black Africa may be the sputnik of the next five years."
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After a short halt in the prose-Mingo, 4vemissie4 ot the World
Situation paper was resumed. The consultants covered a broad range
of points, but there was little effort to Synthesize the various views
expressed, because no concensus emerged. The first phase of the talks
centered on Soviet accomplishments in nonAmilitary affairs. AMORY
kicked off the discussion by observing that there was a danger of
underestimating the degree to which the Soviet people consider their
society a successful welfare State. This led to perusal of other
satisfactions in Soviet life and to consideration of achievements that
contributed to domestic tranquillity. There was no agreement as to
whether Soviet advances in science could be interpolated to suggest
significant overall intellectual accomplishment, but at the insistence
of LINDER, formidable "educational" gains were noted BLACK and
ARMSTRONG disagreed as to whether Soviet higher education was available
to large enough numbers.
SMITH shifted the discussion to the economics content of the paper
(specifically pares. 59 and 60). He suggested that the world might be
conveniently divided into those countries Which would be harshly
affected by US recession and those that would not be. LINDER (with
KNORR concurring) stated that he felt there might be a-toudh of over-
emphasis in the paper as to the effect of US recession on Europe.
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After some detailed discussions of the paragraphs in question, AMORY
summarized the relatively more optimistic views of the consultant
economists by saggesting that European Sensitivity to fluctuations in
the US economy was diminishing as their long range investment plans
began to bear fruit in the form of inCreased and more varied prodUctive
capacities. STRAYER observed that economic pressures on &rope were
likely to spring from other causes, citing the closing of the Suez
Canal as an example. The general view was the Earopean economies were
on the whole reasonably sound, and that slowing up in the rate of
growth could be attributed to gear-shifting and salutory efforts by
the French and British to check inflation.
The concluding time was spent on a general discussion of the sig-
nificance of mutual deterrence in effecting basic policy decisions.
Three general positions emerged: (1) LANGER argued that the Soviets'
fear of the US would probably equal our fear of them; MILLIKAN Saw
little comfort in this, expressing the misgiving that doctrinaire com-
munists might conclude the leaders of a decaying capitalism would strike
out blindly in desperation against them, and hence mould be less
reasonable themselves. MATTHIAS pointed out that fear of large wars
also now created hesitations about starting small ones which might
develop uncontrollably. (2) MOSELY and BOWIE were less optimistic about
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the equilibrium achieved in a condition diantnal deterpence; the latter
noted that deterrents needed eonstant keying np to renain effective,
they were not autcmatic. (3) A third position was advanced in which
the danger of war was seen eh at ieatst in part attributable to technical
factors. AMORY arid KENT spoke to the proposition that under conditions
of mutual deterrence, marked by bluffing And counter bluffing of both
sides, the technical commitment to attack at some moment might become
progressively firmer until a point was reached where the act became
irrevocable. KENT observed that the indications systems of both sides
were so delicate that alerts might be conceivably signalled although
no actual hostile step had been taken.
The discussions ended with the expression of several views as to
Soviet motives in calling for summit negotiations. LANGER felt it was
a time-gaining device while ICBMs were being perfected. KNORR disagreed
strongly. He felt that the Soviets were making a calculated effort to
reduce nuclear armaments so that they would be unchallengeable in a
world *here power was measured in conventional military terms. SMITH
concluded by suggesting that the USSR was seriously interested in
reducing the tensions of cold war competition, estimating it could best
develop its potentialities in a more relaxed world atmosphere.
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