NORTH KOREAN CIB ARTICLE 17 APRIL 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06759864
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00295
• Publication Date: April 17, 1969

Approved for Release: 2018/09/27 C06759864
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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Central Intelligence ulletin
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17 April 1969
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Background Use Only/Controlled Dissem
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
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When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
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TCS No. 516/69
17 April 1969
Central Intelligence ulletin
CONTENTS
Korea: South Korean spokesmen have called for strong
US retaliation for the shootdown; North Korean mili-
tary activity is cautious and defensive. (Page 2)
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NR Record
NR Record
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Korea: The South Korean Government has thus
far not taken an official position on the shootdown
of a US reconnaissance aircraft by North Korea.
Spokesmen for the government and opposition parties
in South Korea, however, have called for the US to
take strong retaliatory action to prevent more such
incidents.
The incident is cited by some South Korean
commentators as further evidence of South Korea's
need for additional US military assistance. Under-
lying the South Korean reaction is concern over the
US resolve to deal firmly with North Korean attacks.
Japanese Government spokesmen, citing lack of
detailed information, have refrained from denouncing
North Korea. Yesterday, Foreign Minister Aichi was
put on the defensive in the Diet by the opposition
with a heavy barrage of questions regarding the im-
plications of the incident for Japan. The Social-
ists and Communists, stressing that the plane was
from a US base in Japan, are exploiting popular
fears that Japan might become embroiled in a Korean
conflict. This line promotes the leftist campaign
to scrap the US-Japan security treaty.
The Japanese press has developed the theme that
an increase in tension in the area might dim pros-
pects for an early return of Okinawa to Japanese
administration.
The Soviet Union, whose ships and aircraft have
joined in the search for survivors, has used both
US and North Korean press agency reports of the
incident, but Soviet press commentary has supported
the North Koreans.
Because Soviet ships were closest to the crash
site, Moscow probably believed it had to help as
long as there was the possibility of survivors. The
Soviets may also believe their cooperation may help'
deter US retaliation, and relations with the US
17 Apr 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
-TerP-SEG1?4,-12
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will thus not be endangered. Moscow may not mind
if Pyongyang sees the cooperative search operations,
in which the Soviets have recovered debris, as a
tacit rebuke for its action against the US aircraft.
North Korean military activity since the shoot-
down has been cautious and defensive.
UN Command forces along the Demilitarized Zone
have been placed on full alert. A North Korean
claim that US forces fired into the Demilitarized
Zone on 15 April is unsubstantiated.
17 Apr 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/09/27 C06759864