NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05333835
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2017-00186
• Publication Date: October 3, 1984

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Director of
Central
0 CP AS /C IG
C YI S 41.7-!148
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
3 October 1984
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2JX
Copy 486
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Warning Notice
This Document NotTo Be Reproduced
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WN)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PR)
ORCON (0C)
Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
Caution�proprietary information involved
Dissemination and extraction of Information
controlled by originator
REL... This information has been authorized for release to...
FGI Foreign government Information
WN WNINTEL�Intelligence sources or methods involved
The National Intelligence Daily Is prepared in the
Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the other
US foreign intelligence organizations.
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Contents
� El Salvador: Military Situation
Central America: Contadora Negotiations 2
Egypt-North Yemen: Renewing Relations 3
Notes
USSR-Morocco: Warming Relations
Jordan: King's Gesture Toward Arabs 4
Japan: Pressures To Raise Defense Spending 5
Yuaoslavia: Measures Anainst Fthnir Alhanians
USSR-Angola: Possible Soviet Disinformation
Western Europe: Delays in Satellite Launches
USSR: Meat Production Up
In Brief
10
Special Analyses
Nicaragua: Mixed Prospects for the Insurgents 11
Turkey: Resurgent Terrorism 13
Zimbabwe: Mugabe Consolidating Control 15
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EL SALVADOR: Military Situation
Army operations in the north suggest that tactical coordination
between ground and air units is impro e the guerrillas
reportedly continue to have problems.
Military attache reporting indicates that 2,000 to 2 500 troops
currently are sweeping eastern Chalatenango
biir and artillery strikes against guerrilla concentrations
are providing support to infantry units
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Insurgents in the west reportedly are concerned about the possible
delay of a crucial arms shipment expected to cross Guatemala later
this month the . (b)(1)
guerril ac believe the shintnent will include munitions, medicine, and (b)(3(b)(3)
money
Meanwhile, lack of funds in the Guazapa area, in central El Salvador,
reportedly forced one insuraent faction to suspend operations durina
Auaust and September (b)(1)
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Comment: Much of the Army's success in recent months reflects
closer coordination between infantry, artillery, and air units and better
and more timely use of tactical intelligence. Recent command
changes and a realignment of brigade boundaries also have resulted
in more capable and aggressieeJis1�cpmmanders taking charge of
the key 4th and 5th Brigades.
The Chalatenango campaign is the Army's first major operation in the
area for many months. Previous reporting indicated that large
numbers of insurgents were evacuating their strongholds in the
region, probably to escape Army ground and air attacks, but also to
begin operations farther to the west. Current government operations
in the north, however, will complicate r to train, resupply,
and concentrate for large-scale attacks
Nevertheless, insurgent resupply continues. The guerrillas, despite
their many problems, remain fully capable of strikina hard at lucrative
military and economic targets. (b)(3
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CENTRAL
AMERICA:
Contadora Negotiations
The Core Four countries�Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, and
El Salvador�have agreed that the proposed peace treaty needs
further negotiation, but ton tadora mediators are seeking
support for it at the UN.
The Core Four Foreign Ministers have agreed that a new phase of
negotiations should begin after 15 October, the deadline for their
replies to the Contadora group. According to a US Embassy report,
each government will send its comments separately. Costa Rica and
Guatemala will address political issues, while Honduras and
El Salvador will concentrate on security concerns.
The Costa Ricans believe that focusing on the unique concerns of
each state will reinforce the political impact of the presentations. The
Honduran and Salvadoran ministers have told US officials, however,
that they are unhappy because t to share equally the
burden of objecting to the draft.
The US Mission to the UN reports that Mexico and Nicaragua are
urging the Security Council to meet this week to endorse the latest
Contadora draft. The Panamanian Foreign Minister in his speech to
the General Assembly urged other countries to promote the draft,
while the Colombian Foreign Minister called on the Security Council
to back the Contadora process
Colombian President Betancur told the US Embassy that he
disagrees with US objections to the draft but would consult his
Contadora colleagues. He fears � will withdraw from the
talks if more changes are made
Comment: Managua's early acceptance of the draft treaty has given
Nicaragua a propaganda victory and has put the onus on the Core
Four. Although the Core Four will not be stampeded into signing the
draft, continuing pressure by the mediators for a quick settlement will
make it more difficult to revise the proposal. Moreover, their decision
to submit tieirnhs�ations independently probably indicates some
dissension
An endorsement of the draft by a majority of the Security Council
would be a substantial diplomatic victory for Managua. The
Contadora mediators, however, probably will pursue a
noncontroversial resolution that merely harks the nonfat-1nm qrocess
in order to avoid a possible US veto
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EGYPT- Renewing Relations
NORTH YEMEN:
Cairo has acted to clarify its relations with the Arab
Egyptian People's Assembly voted yesterday to withdraw
from the federation agreement of 1971 with Libya and Syria although
it emphasized that this action does not imply any lessening of Cairo's
commitment to Arab unity. President Mubarak said publicly that
Cairo wamereIvcknowledging that the union doe's not exist except
on paper
Mubarak warned "tenfold retaliation" against LibyO if Tripoli carries
out its rumored attack against the Aswan High Dam. He made clear
that the Assembly action was not directed against Syria and
expressed confidence that Egypt soon will have normal relations with
all Arab states. He emphasized that restoration of relations with Cairo
would not mean an endorsement of the CamD Davidaccords nor '
would it mean that Cairo is canceling therr
Comment: The North Yemenis probably see renewed ties with Egypt
as a way to counterbalance relations with Saudi Arabia and to obtain
help in maintaining their Soviet-supplied military equipment. North
Yemen, the last Arab state to break relations with Egypt, upgraded
relations last May by appointing a senior diplomat to head its
Interests Section in Cairo
Mubarak had been planning for months to break the tripartite
federation agreement of April 1971, which was signed but never
enacted. He fully expects that other Arab states eventually will follow
the precedent of Jordan and restore relations. Mubarak hopes to
encourage them by mal�a clear that annentanne of Camp David is
not part of the package
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USSR-MOROCCO: Warming Relations
The US Embassy in Rabat says a visiting Soviet trade delegation is
receiving unusually prominent press coverage and attention from
high-level Moroccan officials. The two sides reportedly signed
protocols to revive both a previous trade agreement and a joint
venture to develop Moroccan phosphate. Meanwhile, discussions are
continuing on a broader oil supply arrangement and an agreement to
increase trade. The USSR accounts for 4 t of Rabat's foreign
trade but supplies 20 percent of its oil
Comment: Soviet trade delegations have made annual visits to
Morocco for many years. King Hassan probably arranged the
increased press attention this year to demonstrate his eagerness to
address deteriorating social and economic conditions. He also wants
to improve trade with Moscow, particularly the sale of phosphates�
Morocco's primary export�because of the growing trade deficit with
fulnernui nrl th a,anI, international market for phosphates
JORDAN: King's Gesture Toward Arabs
King Hussein used his address at the opening of the Jordanian
parliament on Monday as a response to Arab criticism of his decision
to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt. He emphasized that Arab
disarray was a major factor in Israel's ability to act with impunity and
that a strong Arab front was needed to counter Tel Aviv. He cast
doubt on Israeli willingness to negotiate, insisted that an exchange of
land for peace be the basis of any talks, and repeated his charge that
the US p ward Israel undercuts Washington's credibility as a
mediator
Comment: Hussein probably expects little help from Israel or the US
in restoring momentum to the peace process. He may, however, hope
to develop a united Arab front that could take the lead in peace
diplomacy. Hussein also is worried Jordan's military weakness and
( what he sees as a lack of US edinnc rt leave him vulnerable to Syrian
intimidation. .
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JAPAN: Pressures To Raise Defense Spending
Pressures from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the
Japanese Defense Agency, and Japanese industry, combined with
encouragement from the US, are pushing the Liberal Democratic
leaders to raise defense spending by redefining the present limit.
Press reports, apparently leaked by senior party officials, indicate the
ceiling may be changed from "below 1 percent" to "about 1 percent"
of GNP, possibly as early as late October.) (b)(1
c Japanese companies want the chanae in War IV 11161bclbe bctleb IV
the Defense Agency (b)(3
Comment: Tokyo�facing political, business, and bureaucratic
pressure�probably will revise the defense spending limit by early
next spring. The Defense Agency needs more funding to meet
procurement objectives. The Liberal Democrats already are trying to
P
minimize the political repercussions of a repricinn by intimatinn tat
the limit will nnt xreed 1 c percent of GN
YUGOSLAVIA: Measures Against Ethnic Albanians
A proposed toughening of laws on ethnic intolerance will increase
resistance among Albanian nationalists in Kosovo Province. Several
changes would make national, religious, or racial intolerance a federal
crime and would void property sales concluded under the threat of
ethnic violence. Other new laws would overturn Kosovo's bilingual
employment policy and limit the public use of the Albanian flag
Comment: The new measures, now being considered by the
legislature, are aimed at pacifying the Serbian and Montenegrin
minorities in Kosovo, who increasingly are motivated to emigrate
because of violence and discrimination. The draft measures reaffirm
Belgrade's harsh stand against Albanian nationalists and will make
tensions in Kosovo Province worse. Limits on the use of the Albanian
flag, if pressed, could cause a n w rniinri nf Inral ritafianre and new
strains with neighboring Albania
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USSR-ANGOLA: Possible Soviet Disinformation
Recent stories appearing in the West European press allege that
Angolan Politburo member Kito Rodrigues and another senior
Angolan official associated with negotiations with the West on
Namibia are involved in a petroleum scandal. One story also claims
CIA involvement. The Angolan Government has denounced the
stories as false and says they were "launched by imperialism" and
aimed at government figures negotiating with the West
Comment: The Angolan treatment of the story suggests that
Luanda's criticism is directed at the Soviets. There is no information
to confirm Soviet involvement, but the story may have been planted
to discredit Rodrigues, whom the Soviets and Cubans regard as
of the architpnts nf A gola's policy of compromise over Namibia.
ri
rron:snrrat_nr
October 4
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WESTERN EUROPE: Delays in Satellite Launches
Arianespace, the commercial operator of the Ariane space launch
vehicle, has released a revised launch schedule listing only
one more launch this year and a maximum of six next year. Two
geosynchronous communications satellites are to be launched by an
Ariane-3 on 9 November. The new Ariane schedule shows that one
launch has b an dolnugri frn 1984 to 1985 and three launches from
1985 to 198er
Comment: Refurbishment of the launch pad between missions is
taking longer than expected and is the primary reason for these
slippages. The entire program probably will be delayed by at least six
months unless Arianespace develops new launch procedures to
reduce launch pad damage. If launch pad refurbishment continues to
take three months or more rather than the planned two months,
however, Arianespace could be at least a year behind schedule by the
end of the decade. These delays would benefit the.US commercial
space-launch industry if US launch vehicles such as the Delta and
Atlas-Centaur remain on schedule. Customers for satellite launches,
facing reveni e Ins frnm thp rininve wo Id switch from Ariane to
US launches
USSR: Meat Production Up
Published production figures for the first eight months of this year
indicate that Soviet meat production increased 7.6 percent over the
comparable period in 1983. The growth in meat output this year is due
largely to a record harvest of forage crops last fall, a second
consecutive mild winter which reduced the demand for fe
record livestock inventories, and near-peak grain imports
Comment: Meat production is almost certain to reach or slightly
exceed government goals for the second consecutive year. Nearly
three months remain in the year, and feedstuff availability and Soviet
livestock management policies can still affect the final outcome.
The Soviets could achieve a slight increase in consumer meat
consumption if meat imports remain high, but they may choose
instead to rebuild low meat inventories. The impact on meat
production of this year's poor grain crop�now estimated at
180 million tons, 15 million tons below last year's estimated output�
will be largely felt next year.
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Middle East
In Rrinf
� Soviet television yesterday reported meeting.betWeen Chernenko
and visiting South Yemeni President ... suggest i talks went
smoothly... as expected Moscow criticized US policy in Middle
rternati
East, called fo " al peace conference and Indian Ocean
zone of peace.
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Special Analysis
NICARAGUA: Mixed Prospects for the Insurgents
Anti-Sandinista guerrilla groups are becoming more unified both
politically and militarily, but growing logistic problems cloud
their future. Guerrillas based in the north have kept the regime
on the defensive, but groups in the south currently are incapable
of mounting a serious challenge. Meanwhile, the insurgents'
increasing ties to the political opposition have improved the
guerrillas' political legitimacy 1
_
The Nicaraguan Democratic Force and the Democratic-Revolutionary
Alliance brought the Miskito Indians of the Misura into their
partnership in late August to form the Nicaraguan Democratic Unity.
Several leaders traveled together to Europe last week, and the
Democratic Force reoortedlv is i set ding food and military supplies to
its smaller alliez
All of the insurgent groups supported the civil opposition's demands
for a free election in an appeal to the meeting in San Jose last week of
EC and Central American foreign ministers. Edan Pastora, who split
from the Revolutionary Alliance in June in oppositi
insuraents' unity accord also sianed the documen
Democratic Force Bearing the Burden
The Democratic Force, which claims to have over 10,000 men, has
engaged in heavy fighting in the northwest and appears to be inflicting
many more casualties than it is losing. After a lull of several months,
the insurgents renewed air attacks with a raid on Santa Clara on
s
1 September.mall number,
u urdlteewLutltutlue to aeseri to
the insurgents.
The guerrillas reportedly are suffering severe shortages of
ammunition for support weapons which are causina them to avoid
head-on clashes
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ctober 1984
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Reduced Operations on Caribbean Coast
The Misura, which reportedly carried out numerous successful
attacks in late August and September, still appears to dominate the
countryside in the northeast. The Misura reportedly depends on the
Democratic Force for supplies, however, and some
Indian bases have had no food for days. The troop strength of Misura
reportedly has dropped from over 2,000 to some 1,100 since the
beginning of the year, probably because some groups have be
or lack of supplies as well as fromsome desertions
. . . .
Robelo's Democratic Revolutionary Alliance reportedly had only some
300 men along the Costa Rican border in early August and has not
conducted many operations. Several of Pastora's dissatisfied
commanders reportedly have expressed interest in joining Robelo,"
�i who hopes the Alliance m ght grow as .a result of defections from
Pastora , 7
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Pastora $ forces, nonethe ess, probably number more than 2,000 and
� have conducted sporadic raids in the south. Their Miskito allies� ,
estimated at leis than 1 000�have been artive alonn the coast near
Rinefiairis
According to the US Embassy,
the Sandinistas recently sent an emissary to Pastcra in an annarant
attempt to exploit the deterioration of his position
�
Prospects
The Democratic Force and the Misura probably can continue their
current pace for several months and are likely to retain the initiative.
Some Sandinista tactics, such as indiscriminate sheilinos probably
.will continue to cause Nicaraguans to join the guerrillas
The insurgents' increasing contacts with the political opposition are
reflected-in the San Jose declaration and in their offer of a cease-fire
if the regime would conduct free elections. A demand by the civil
opposition that the insurgents be included in a national dialogue
increased the insurgents' hopes for political recognition, even though
the demand subsequently was dropped to offset Sandinist
concessions It probably will be renewed after the election
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TuPlusntrovinces unaer martial Law or State ot Emergency
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KIRKLARE
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ANAKKALE
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KAYSERI
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Lebanon
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ARTYIN
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Provinces
E3 Martial law
1-1 State of emergency
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Special Analysis
, TURKEY: Resurgent Terrorism
AV
115
an,
A new outbreak of terrorist activity throughout Turkey is the
latest evidence that the military and civilian governments in
power since the coup of 1980 have not eradicated extremist
violence. Despite nearly six years of martial law, the longest and
toughest state of siege in the Republic's history, many of the
militant groups responsible for the chaos of the late 1970s
remain intact. Security forces probably can avert a major threat
to public order, but violence is likely to be a continuing feature of
Turkish life until th conomic factors contributing to
terrorism are eased (b)(3
The transition to civil'an rule, following the election last November Of
the government headed by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, has taken
place under fairly calm conditions. Recent attacks by Turkish leftists
and Kurdish separatists, however, mark the strongest challenge to
public order si ey indicate that terrorist groups still pose a
serious threat.
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Kurds in southeastern Turkey launched simultaneous raids on
several government outposts in mi The attar:kg were
unprecedented in timing and scop (b)(1)
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In mid-September, a Marxist group called Dev-Sol claimed
responsibility for several bombing incidents in Istanbul.
Ankara's Ability To Cope
Ozal agrees with President Evren and senior military officers on the
need for stronger measures to counter terrorism. Ozal and Evren
apparently intend to move slowly in reducing mania! law, which still
exists in 41 of Turkey's 67 provinces. The government has at its
disposal several laws passed by the former military government,
including "state of emergency" powers for provincial governo
use in an intermediate stage between military and civilian rule
The resilience of Turkey's 25 or so active militant groups derives in
part from their fragmentation. Terrorist groups are prone to
factionalism and shifting leadership. They are often small and
dedicated to violent action rather than development of a broad base
of support.
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These characteristics multiply the problems of the security forces.
Senior police officials reportedly are pessimistic about their ability to
eradicate clandestine g�nsr1spite having more funds for
equipment and training.
Turkey's extremists appear to have little difficulty recruiting followers
because of the country's acute social and economic problems. These
include endemic unemployment, one of the highest rates of
population growth and urban migration in the world,' land distribution
and income inequities, an outdated educational system, and festering
ethnic and sectarian tensions (b)(3
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In addition, a majority of the country's convicted terrorists will be
released within the next few year&Mnstrobably remain strongly
committed to radical causes.
Even though terrorism is mainly indigenous, the government also
must deal with some foreign subversion. Officials reportedly are
increasingly concerned about foreign support for Turkish and Kurdish
militants, particularly by Syria. Another phenomenon, too, is the use
of Turkish soil by Middle Eastern neighbors to attack each other and
Western enemie:
Outlook
A gradual increase of terrorism is likely during the next year or so, but
short of levels that would threaten political stability. The authorities
may adopt more stringent policies that risk slowing Turkey's
democratic development. Tougher police or military action alone will
not solve the problem because the social and economic conditions
that caused violence in the first place still exist. Ozal's economic
reforms�if they take hold�will help ameliorate these conditions, but
he will need to go further in order to solve the problem of extremism
over the long term.
Extremists almost certainly view the US as the key supporter of the
coup of 1980 and of the military regime. Even a modest revival of
terrorism will lead to new threats to US servicemen and facilities in
Turkey. According to the US Embassy, the Turkish poli
have information that militants may be planning attacks
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Special Analysis
ZIMBABWE: Mugabe Consolidating Control
Prime Minister Mugabe's strong criticism of US policy on
southern Africa and charges of US collusion with Pretoria reflect
increase - idence but do not presage basic policy
changes (b)(3
Mugabe consolidated his control over the party at the second
congress of the Zimbabwe African National Union in August. He
appointed all of the members of a new Politburo that essentially runs
the party and the government. Half the members are from Mugabe's
subtribe of the coun peaking majority, which has long
dominated the party I (b)(3
The biggest loser was the largest Shona-speaking subtrib=
held a third of the positions in the old Central Committee (b)(3
If Mugabe emerges as the consensus candidate for the OAU
chairmanship in November, which now appears increasingly I Itt
may become a bolder and more independent critic of the US (b)(3
He will remain committed to socialist goals. He most likely wi I
continue, however, to let the realities of the Zimbabwean economy
constrain radical ideologues (b)(3
Prospects
The Prime Minister is likely to press for a one-party state and an
executive presidency, probably after elections early next year. He is
unlikely to get the necessary unanimous approval of Parliament,
however, because 20 seats are reserved for whites until at least 1987.
Mugabe's commitment to a one-party state and to a "socialist
transformation" could cause instability in Zimbabwe by aggravating
relations with the country's Ndebele and white minorities and with
South Africa. Nevertheless, some whites profess a new confidence
because they believe that a c hasive nartv ran (IP I with unrest and
that realists remain in control
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