MEMORANDUM FROM THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR OPERATION MONGOOSE (HARVEY) TO THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS MONGOOSE (LANSDALE)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01317534
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-02554
• Publication Date: July 24, 1962

Approved for Release: 2018/04/23 C01317534
Memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer
for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)/7
Washington, July 24, 1962.
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum dated 11 July 1962, Subject
as Above
1. Pursuant to reference memorandum and in accordance with
our previous discussions, set out below are comments for inclusion
in your overall report to the Special Group (Augmented) at the con-
clusion of the first phase of Operation Mongoose, 31 July 1962. In
preparing these comments it was found necessary to defer finalizing
them until we had an opportunity to review and check them against
the 23 July 1962 draft of NIE 85-2-624 a copy of which is avai a e to
you.
2. BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS -Phase I:
a. On 16 March 1962, the Special Group (Augmented)
approved Phase I of Operation Mongoose authorizing and
directing that between that date and 31 July 1962, CIA mount
a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence
concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandes-
tine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan authorized
intelligence - political, economic, and covert actions, short
of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the
target area or otherwise require U.S. armed intervention.
The plan required that actions taken during Phase I should be
consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro in the Western
Hemisphere and be undertaken in such a way as to permit U.S.
disengagement with minimum losses of assets and prestige.
Major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence
have required approval in advance by the Special Group
(Augmented).
b. Phase I of Operation Mongoose did not provide for
a maximum operational program against Cuba and did not
authorize any extensive use of U.S. military personnel,
Source; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings
and Memoranda Series Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose,
7/62. Top Secret; Noforn; Sensitive.
4? Not found.
---/The draft of NIE 85-2-62 cited here has not been found.
For the text of NIE 85-2-62, as approved by the USIB and circulated
on August 1, see Document
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bases, and facilities. No decision was made to undertake a
phased operation to provoke a revolt with the commitment
that such revolt would be supported by U.S. military forces.
c. Within the policy limitations of Phase I, it was hoped
that the following would be accomplished:
(1) The development of an effective functioning
operational unit for the conduct of intelligence, psycho-
logical warfare and covert actions against Cuba.
(2) The development in depth of hard intelligence
coverage of Cuba.
(3) h establishment of limited resistance cadres
inside Cu nd an adequate assessment of the resistance
potential, as well as operational conditions affecting the
possibilities of organizing and inciting a major revolt.
(4) Keep alive, insofar as possible, the spirit of
resistance inside Cuba and exploit any possibilities that
appeared for the development of future Cuban leadership
and revolutionary doctrine.
(5) etermine the possibilities of and, if possij le,
take action toward splitting the top Cuban leadership.
�d. During Phase I the following has been accomplished:
(1) An effective operational unit for the conduct of
multi-purpose operations against Cuba has been establish
and is functioning well. Wekof 23 July, 477 CIA staff per-
sonnel are devoting full time to this effort. In addition, a
very large number of additional personnel are devoting
part-time efforts to Operation Mongoose.
(2) Point c(2) above has been accomplished. Hard
intelligence coverage of Cuba at the present time exists
in depth and has increased substantially since the inception
of Phase I. Through this coverage we now have an excellent
understanding of military, political, economic and resistance
conditions and activities inside Cuba as reflected o y y
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numerous individual intelligence disseminations, but
by the intelligence refle ted in summation in the forth-
coming NIE 85-2-62.
Mongoose contemplate
he plan for Phase I of Operation
that we would have established
inside Cuba by 31 July 1962, controlled reporting
intelligence agents, including legal travelers. In fact;
we have at the present time inside Cubancontrolled
Cuban agents and third country controlled agents,
a total of agents inside the target area. /
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'third country controlled agents, reporting sub-
stantially on Cuba, are located outside Cuba. A sub-
stantial number of these will in the near future be
dispatched on missions inside Cuba. In addition,
independent support agents are producing intermittent
intelligezne reports with some frequency concerning
Cuba. The above figures do not include the extensive
reporting from the Opa -Locke Intelligence Center,
.....
which is now totaling approximately 800 reports a mon1th.
(3) With regard to Point c(3), we have been less
successful.
I conteplat that we would have infiltrated into Cuba
g ie original maximal planning under Phase
m
by 31 July 1962 at least 23 illegal intelligence reporting
and resistance cadre teams. By the conclusion of this
phase, we will have actually infiltrated no more than
s. In additi. ,agja.saalzia,operations
and .nel 500 � . nd re-suppl operation will have been
completed. During August 19.2, barring presently
unforeseen operational failures or aborts, t4 more
teams should have been infiltrated into Cuba,c. as well
as twc7Ina, lirirThi-la cac operations and oneh, 000)P9Und
frP"11111020Peration. Our failure to meet the original
schedule of team infiltrations primarily was due to two
factors: (a) lack of policy approval by higher authority
to make any extensive utilization of Department of
Defense personnel and support, and (b) a series of
operational failures and aborts due to weather, enemy
action, failure of inside agents to keep rendezvous and,
in a few instances, missions aborted by the Cuban agents
involved for various reasons, including their dissatisfaction
with U.S. lack of aggressiveness against Cuba. Since
1 April 1962, in addition to the operations involved abovdej
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maritime operations have aborted or failed due to one or 1361) (4)
ore of the factors listed immediately above. Had we been
permitted to mount a more intensive and aggressive effort,
the original infiltration schedule probably would have been
met, possibly exceeded. You will recall that it was pointed
out to the Special Group in March 1962 that the full imple-
mentation of the operational plan for infiltration would
require use of Defense facilities which were not subsequently,
as a matter of policy, forthcoming. The speed with which
and the extent to which we can in the future infiltrate black
teams for resistance purposes into Cuba will of course depend
upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of
support we can count on thereunder. Although we have had
losses in connection with the teams infiltrated, Phase I has
demonstrated that we can successfully infiltrate such teams
and that, given proper policy approval and sufficient support,
we can greatly, increase the resistance cadres and activities
inside Cuba
(4) With regard to Point c(4) above, our activities,
we believe, have had a substantial effect in supporting a
spirit of resistance inside Cuba. This effect has not of
course been as great as it would have been ha.d we been
able to mount a maximum covert action, paramilitary and
psychological warfare operation. We have not been success-
ful in developing an effective revolutionary movement or
leadership around which a Cuban revolt inside Cuba could
be rallied at the present time.
(5) ith regard to Point c(5) above, we have developed 060 tte)
a numbe1bf promising leads to thettap Cuban leadershl, but
no immediate current possibility of splitting
3. OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE:
a. The operational estimate of conditions and possibilities inside
Cuba is well reflected in the forthcoming NIE 85-2-62. In summation,
based on the intelligence collected and our operational experience
during Phase I, it is our conclusion that there is a sufficiently sub-
stantial resistance potential inside Cuba which, , given a maximum
operational effort, could be organized and incited into open revolt
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provided the Cubans could be assured that if they themselves
revolted their revolt would be supported by U.S. intervention
and that the U.S. would not permit it to be crushed by Castro's
military and police counteraction. It is our opinion that there
is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incited by late
1963 if we embark on a maximum operational program now.
Possible dissatisfaction with the Cuban regime inside Cuba has
.materially increased over the past several months and is likely
to continue to increase for some time. It is not likely to result
in spontaneous revolt or in major widespread resistance
without organized assistance and support from the U.S. The
Military/Security/Police apparatus of the Castro regime is
effective and its effectiveness can be expected to increase.
It is and will remain, in our opinion, for the foreseeable future,
capable of containing and eventually destroying the bulk of any
unorganized, unsupported resistance or revolt which may arise
in Cuba. If a revolt in Cuba is organized and incited, it will
be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not
supported by substantial military force.
b. With regard to the influence of Castro and Cuba else-
where in the Western Hemisphere, the appeal of Castroism as
. such has dimmed appreciably in other Latin American states
during the past several months, although there are many indica-
tions that Castro's Cuba is still active in subversive activities
� that
elsewhere in the Hemisphere, including firm evidence at Cuba
.provided $10,000 to the 13th of ovember Guatemalan revolutionary
group in Mexico Cl.tn It cannot be overstressed, however, that
.the Cuban regime has proven that violent social revolution and
a break with the U.S. is possible in Latin America and will be
supported by the Soviet Bloc without the USSR necessarily insist-
ing on complete traditional communist control. The appeal of
the Cuban example will increase in other Latin American states
if reform lags and if hopes and promises remain unfulfilled.
Cuba also represents and will continue to represent a danger
because its subversive activities might at any time provide
the spark that would set off explosions in unsettled countries,
for example, Venezuela and Guatemala. In addition, Cuba
represents of course the dangerous example of a communist
regime within the Western Hemisphere in defiance of the United
States and breaching hemispheric solidarity.
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4. FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION:
Set out below are comments on the four possible future courses of
action outlined in Paragraph 5 of reference memorandum:
IIa. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation;
protect hemisphere from it:" If this course of action is adopted
by higher authority, it will not result in the overthrow or probably
in any material change in the Castro regime in the foreseeable
future. If this course of action is adopted, the extent of effort
currently being devoted by CIA and other agencies to Operation
Mongoose should be reviewed and reconsidered and probably
seriously curtailed. If this course of action is adopted, the U.S.
Government will of course receive increased pressure from the
multitudinous Cuban exile groups and will be faced with an
siincreasing level of irresponsible unilateral Cuban actions based
in and from the U.S.
"b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic ,psychological
and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime
without overt U.S. military commitment:" This course of
action, which is very close to that undertaken in Phase I of
Operation Mongoose, is not likely to result in the overthrow of
the Castro regime in the foreseeable future and unless it is
intensified to the point of substantially raising the "noise level"
inside and outside the U.S. , its effectiveness is likely to be �
limited to the collection of intelligence and to the containing of
Cuba at about the present level. If this course of action is
adopted, certain portions of the present CIA effort probably
should be terminated, particularly the infiltration of black
j resistance teams, sin e without some phased plan f r action
these teams are being jeopardized to little purpose.
..
11c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Com-
munist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success,
including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end. :"
This is, in effect, the original operational proposal presented to
the Special Group (Augmented) and disapproved in favor of Phase
I on 16 March 1962. If this course of action is adopted, and if we
are permitted thereunder in the immediate future to mount an all-
out maximum operational effort to establish and support resistance
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inside Cuba with full covert use of military facilities and personnel,
there is an excellent chance of inciting a revolt inside Cuba by late
1963. This would require maximal effort keyed to a phased plan
and would require decision now to commit U.S. Forces to support
such a revolt since, even if incited, such a revolt cannot be kept
alive, more than a few days in the face of Cuban military and
security counteraction unless the revolt is supported by substantial
military forces. This phasing is necessary too since, unless we
can assure the Cubans that if they are able to revolt they will be
supported, our chances of inducing them to engage in resistance
and revolt to a sufficient extent to constitute more than an irritant
to the Castro regime are remote. Details and specifics of the
necessary actions to implement this course of action have been
discussed with you on a number of occasions. Basic to success-
ful implementation of such a course of action, and particularly
the clandestine operational phases thereof, are a series of policy
decisions by higher authority at the inception which would permit
the operational units sufficient flexibility and freedom of action
and decision within clearly understood policy parameters to
effectively implement the operations involved on a phased basis.
"d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist
regime by U.S. military force:" This course of action involves
a policy decision by higher authority beyond the purview of CIA.
If higher authority decides on this course of action, CIA is of
course prepared to assist in developing the necessary provocation
to justify such intervention and to assist in implementing this
course of action with full intelligence and covert assets.
5. It is hoped that the above comments will be of some assistance
to you in preparing your overall report on Phase I of Operation Mongoose
to the Special Group (Augmented). It would be most appreciated if you
would make available to us copies of your report to the Special Group in
order that we may comment as appropriate. If any further details or
comments from us would be helpful, please let me know.
(signed)
WILLIAM K. HARVEY
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