MALAWI

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05850354
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2018
• Case Number: F-2017-01462
• Publication Date: February 18, 1965

NR Record
Approved for Release: 2018/08/06 C05850354
Approved for Release: 2018/08/06 C05850354
Approved for Release: 2018/08/06 C05850354
NR Record
Approved for Release: 2018/08/06 C05850354
Approved for Release: 2018/08/06 005850354
�-SEERET-
11,
OCI No. 0769/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
18 February 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Malawi
1. Last week's raid on Fort Johnston, a district
headquarters within 100 miles of the Malawi capital,
apparently marks the start of a terrorist campaign by a
group of former cabinet ministers determined to over-
throw Prime Minister Banda. Such a dramatic show of
force enhances their prospects for receiving assistance
from other African nationalists who share their resent-
ment of Banda's collaboration with the Portuguese in
neighboring Mozambique. Although a popular uprising
does not appear imminent, sustained guerrilla opera-
tions, backed from outside Malawi, could in the long
run tip the balance against Banda.
2. Banda is currently in a strong position. He
is, however, laced with the difficulty of trying to ride
two horses at once: because of Malawi's exposed geo-
graphical position vis-a-vis Mozambique and the fact
that Malawi's only transport route to the sea runs
through Portuguese territory, Banda has felt forced to
maintain cordial and friendly relations with the Por-
tuguese, On the other hand, Banda is acutely aware of
African nationalist pressures and on the surface at
least he is trying not to be put in the position of op-
posing the advance of African liberation. He is clearly
aware of the threat to himself represented by armed
"freedom fighters," and if the pressures become too
strong he may well revise his pro-Portuguese position
to save his hide.
3. The Fort Johnston raid arose from a political
stalemate that has prevailed since last September when
the six most capable members of Prime Minister Banda's
cabinet brOke with him--a heavy blow for a talent-
starved government barely two months after it had
achieved nominal independence from ,Britain. Initially
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the breach was essentially a personality clash without
clearcut issues; the dissident ministers challenged
Banda's blatantly autocratic conduct. In September,
they barnstormed around Malawi, stressing Banda's re-
fusal to replace British civil servants with Africans.
More recently all except former education minister
Henry Masauko Chipembere, gathered in Dar es Salaam,
have begun to solicit support from other African
nationalists, focusing their attention on Banda'A
manifest policy of collaboration with the Portuguese
authorities in Mozambique. In September the dissi-
dents professed readiness to compromise with Banda,
but by December Chipembere had a manifesto circulated
in Malawi asserting that he and his former colleagues
were organizing a liberation movement with unspeci-
fied foreign support.
4. The attack on Fort Johnston apparently was
intended as a hit-and-run action; as such it was highly
effective. During the night of 12 February some 200
raiders struck two police stations and a post office,
cut all communications, seized 85 weapons and several
vehicles, and withdrew with no known casualties.
Chipembere, who has a strong popular following in Fort
Johnston, his home constituency, probably led the raid.
This is the first instance of a concerted terrorist
attack against government installations, although op-
position elements have sporadically clashed with members
of Banda's Youth League since September.
5. A widespread popular uprising does not
appear imminent, since Banda retains firm control of
the Malawi Congress Party, the only political party in
the country, while Chipembere and his former colleagues
do not seem to have gained mass support beyond the Fort
Johnston district. The Malawi army of four infantry
companies and the 2,800-man police force are officered
mostly by British expatriates, who estimate that their
African subordinates will obey orders in a political
crisis, despite recent indications of some antipathy
for Banda. These forces probably could suppress any
open resistance in Fort Johnston or the Zomba capital
area, where many civil servants have become disaf-
fected at Banda's increasingly arbitrary rule.
6. However, a drive to capture the raiders has
so far yielded only limited results. A full infantry
company and substantial police reenforcements reached
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Fort Johnston the morning after the raid and began
operations, but apprehended only 20 suspected rebels
in the first 48 hours. The bulk of the raiding force
apparently dispersed into extremely rugged terrain
where individuals and small groups can survive inde-
finitely. It seems likely that a resistance campaign
can continue as long as action is limited to prudent
guerrilla tactics. On the other hand, assassination
appears to be the only presently feasible way for the
insurgents to get rid of Banda any time soon.
7. Apart from eliminating Banda, the dissidents'
ultimate policy objectives remain obscure. Banda's
charges that several of the ex-ministers have accepted
bribes from Communist China are unsubstantiated. Tan-
zania's President Nyerere professes a policy of non-
intervention, including an ostensible ban on political
action by the refugees from Malawi. Oscar Kambona,
the radical Tanzanian foreign minister, has occasional-
ly given favorable publicity to the ex-ministers, but
no solid evidence--other than the Fort Johnston raid
itself--has yet emerged that the Malawi rebels are
receiving concrete support from any foreign source.
8. The most immediate external threat to Banda's
regime is posed by the Tanzania-based Mozambique Lib-
eration Front (FRELIMO). FRELIMO guerrilla fighters
occasionally take refuge in Malawi, and FRELIMO ap-
parently maintains a regular smuggling channel through
Malawi into central Mozambique. In January the Malawi
police arrested ten FRELIMO agents who were smuggling
arms, ammunition, radios, and Portuguese-type uniforms.
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Con- (b)(1)
tinuation of FRELIMO arms smuggling nevertheless leaves (b)(3)
an effective dhannel for arming Banda's enemies within
Malawi, and unless he completely reverses his pro-Portu-
guese policy, the Mozambique freedom fighters and their
Tanzanian supporters still have an overriding motive
for giving covert assistance to the anti-Banda movement.
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MALAWI
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UNC :SFFIED
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