FURTHER VIEWS OF A RANKING YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL ON TITO'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES AND THE YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM QUARREL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03161643
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-01374
• Publication Date: March 31, 1949

CLASSIFICATION TOP, 30TZET/C07TROL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RNFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY Yugoslavia/South America
SUBJECT Further Views of a Ranking Yugoslav Official
on Titoea Foreign and Domestic Policies and
the YugoslavI.Caminform Quarrel
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF INFO. March 1949
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The Quarrel between Tito and the Cominform
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1. Tito 's quarrel with the Cominform had its origin in the year 1944 following
the liberation of Belgrade. Even at that time Tito was too independent and
much too prominent to satisfy the Russians, but they could take no action
against him during the war. Tito required Soviet assistance against General
Draga /Lihailovio and their aid at the F ice Conference. As early as 1944,
however, Sreten Zujovic, who is now in prison, supported the Soviets more
ardently than he supported Tito. When the open break with the Cepinform
came in 1948, the Yugoelav Communist Party and the Yugoslav Arm, accepted it
with regret since Soviet wartime propaganda had deeply influenced the Yugo-
slav mind. Non-Cormunist segments of the popule.tion, however, had been dis-
illusioned and even alienated by the behavior of the Red Army and the repro-
sentatives of the USSR in Yugoslavia. Finally the economic recovery of the
country had been retarded by ruthless exploitation of all Yugoslav resources
for the benefit of the Soviet Union and the other satellites. As a result,
the Army and a majority of the Yugoslav Corraramiat Party were compelled to
support the break with the Cond.nform, albeit with regret and with the hope
that Tito could discover a favorable solution of the dispute.
2 0 NOW however, Tito cannot "go to Canossa". Neither can he proclaim a de-
finitive anti-Soviet policy. Although there is no possibility that he can
find an amicable solution to Yugoslavia's difficulties with the Cominform,
Tito must continue to deceive the Party and Army into believing that he is
basically pro-Soviet and will sooner or later settle the dispute. After
years of propaganda favoring the USSR and attacking the Pest, Tito cannot
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execute a volte4ace0 For this reason Yugoslavia's approach to the
Western democracies, although economically her salvation,is difficult
and full of political risks. Tito does not enjoy this situation, but
there is nothing he can do about it,
Loading functionaries of the Party and the Army, on the other hand, know
that their fate depends upon Titols ability-to extricate them from their
difficulties� Tito must constantly remember the pro-Russian turn of mind
of many of his collaborators, of whom he cannot rid himself. Ale7ander
Rankovic, for example, is a dengerous individual; the UDB is his personal
creation and its officials obey him rather than Tito. Individuals such
as Rankovic, Kardelj, Kidric, Bebler and Djilas can never be persuaded
to turn their backs completely on the USSR, Since, however, they are
doomed to fall if Tito falls, they support him; at all times, nevertheless,
they match to see that Tito does not approach the West too closely, since
this uould mean their fall without any avenue of escape to the Russians.
0
Such an illogical situation cannot last forever.
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4. The present Soviet attitude in the Yugoslav-Austrian dispute over Carinthia,
is designed to show the people of Yugoslavia that the USSR is not an enemy
of their ocsantry but only opposes the dictator. Tito, and his supporters.
At the present time the Russians hope to overthrew Tito and his gang, re-
gaining control of Yugoslavia for themselves. When they see that this can-
not be done, they will drop the Pan-Slav mask and attempt to destroy Yugoslavia
itself, making use of the plan of 1934 for the destruction of the Yugoslav
state.
The Role of Yugoslavia in a Future War
0348.0...���
5. Yugoslavia cannot remain neutral in a future conflict. Should Tito still
be in power at the outbreak of war, he will endeavor to preserve Yugoslav
neutrality at least for a time. The USSR, however, mould not respect Yugo-
slav neutrality; the Russians would atr once invade Yugoslavia in order to
dispose of Tito and his supporters, establish a regime oriented toward the
Soviets, and put the nation at the disposal of the Soviet war machine. If,
on the other hand, Tito should disappear before the outbreak of war, there
is no doubt that Yugoslavia will again become a Soviet satellite and will
find herself in the vanguard of the Soviet Army.
The Policy of the Soviet Union
.11.40ff.S�W
The Western democracies do not even yet understand the essence of Conrranism
and the aims and tactics of the USSR. Neither the Western democracies nor
the various emigres have been able to organize a sound, logical, and effi-
cient propaganda against the real forces of Communism, exploiting at the
same time its weak points and the weaknesses of the Communist satellite
regimes. The Soviets dream constantly of world revolution and the dictator-
ship of the proletariat. Khowing perfectly wall that Communism cannot be
imposed on other nations by peaceful neans, the leaders of Communism have
no other choice than the use of fraud, lies, deceit, terror, corruption,
and ultimately brute ferce. Moscow has therefore developed an unparalled
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military organization and an unprecendented policy of imperialism, the.
purpose of -which is the subjugation of neighboring nations, one by one;
the next targets mill be other nations in Europe and Asia. Africa and
South America will follow in their turn, Strong Connunist lifth columns
are to be ,found everywhere and non-Communist personalities in high posi-
tions have been corrupted by Soviet agents. North, America has been deeply
penetrated by the Communists* Henry -Wallace, for example, represents the
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greatest American shame and the lowest level of polities,
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could not understand why the democracies did not use of-
fIcient methods against the Comnunists.
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7. In the war between the Western democracies and the USSR, Europe mould
shortly-be completely occupied by Soviet and satellite forces. When this
occurs the Soviet Union mould have at its disposal in Europe and Asia un-
limited territories with great resources and a tremendous manpowor with
high industrial efficiency. From such a base, organized by terror and
typical Communiot methods, the Soviets will be able to resist any outeike
attacks organizing and launching air and subnarine offensives.
Recent Shifts of Personnel in the Soviet Government
80 The substitution of Vishinsky for Molotov represented a change of voices
rather than policies, There is no possibility that Vishinsky will introduce
any shift of policy via-a-via Yugoslavia. Whether it be Vishinsky or Molotov
who shouts and commands, firrictiyity, attitude, and even his behavior will
be prescribed by the Politburo. The character or mentality of the man oc-
cupying any given position is of no importance; he is only a gramphone record,
This fact constitutes the principal differonce between Soviet officials and
diplomats and those of the Vest, who still retain a certain liberty of action
and attitude,
Yugoslav Policy toward South America
9,
10,
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the policy of Yuge.(b)(3)
sleela haa been, the reestablishrent of, and even increase in, prewar trade
with that continent, Some successes along this line have been achieved.
Yugoslavia now has a trade turnover with Argentina of some thirty million
dollars annually, At the present time Yugoslavia buys leather, fats and
rant in - Lreentina and sells tirber, lumber, cement and caustic soda to that
country. Under the present trade agreement, Yugoslavia pays thirty'- three
percent of her indebtedness in dollars, settling the renainder on a barter
basis. The balance of trade with Argentina is presently unfavorable to
Yugoslavia,
a prime point (W(1)
in Yugoslavia policy vis-a-vis South America had been the repatriation of (b)(3)
Yugoslav emigrants. In general only Communists, Conrattn.ist sympathizerso in-
dividuals with a, left:st orientation in politics, and those who had not been
able to establish themselves in tether lands had shown a vrillingness to return.
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Approximately 2,000 Yugoslays had gone hove from Argentina alone; with
a few exceptions the character of those individuals who had returned to
their homeland was such that the Argentine Goverment should have been
happy to get rid of theme The cparrel with the Cominform has produced
so much confusion among Yugoslav citizens in Argentina that the final
result will be to turn them against Communism altogether. In any events
however, the UDB keeps the Yugoslav Government informed as to the activi-
V.es and attitudes of Yugoslav emigrants.
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11. The official illustrated the character of Yugoslav diplomatic policies
and activities in South America by the example of Argentina. Tito had
never intended that the Yugoslav Legation in Argentina should be merely
an extension of the Soviet diplomatic representation. The Minister to
Argentina, Franc Piro, had been instructed by Tito to consider himself
the representative of the Yugoslav nationk, not of any particular Yugoslav
regime.' Piro had been further instructed to pursue only normal diplomatic
activities and to maintain friendly relations with all other diplomatic
establishments. With the approval of the Yugoslav Government, Piro attempted
to preserve such friendly relations with all diplomatic representations of
Soviet satellites after the break with the Camitlform. The Cominforms however,
attacked Piro as Tito's servant. Relations with the Yugoslav Legation were
severed by the diplomatic establishments of the USSR and its satellites
PiroIs removal, furthermore, had been suggested bo Tito by the Russians in
an indirect fashion. It is conceivable that Tito might retreat in this
matter, in order better to resist the Cominform elsewhere.
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