NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02282
• Publication Date: October 27, 1976

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
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Wednesday October 27, 1976 CI NIDC 76-251C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, October 27, 1976.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Situation Report
USSR: Central Committee Elections
ITALY: Communist Party Changes
MALTA: Mintoff Tightening Control
POLAND: Student Dissidents Active
JAPAN: Fishing Negotiations
BRAZIL-CHILE-PERU: Better Relations Ahead
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LEBANON: Situation Report
The Arab summit conference in Cairo ended last night
after affirming support for the Lebanese cease-fire arranged
at the six-party meeting in Saudi Arabia last week.
Arab League Secretary General Riyad later announced
that the conservative Arab oil states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar--would underwrite most of
the financial costs of the peace-keeping force and that Lebanese
President Sarkis would have the final say on the force's compo-
sition.
The willingness of most of the other Arab states to
go along with these arrangements represents another victory for
Syria over the Palestine Liberation Organization, as it will
allow the Syrians to dominate the Arab force. The PLO had joined
with the radical Arab states in attempting to limit Syria's
participation, which could include as many as 25,000 of the
planned 30,000-man force.
To placate the Palestinians, the conference did re-
affirm past declarations that the PLO is the "sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people," promise to support
the Palestinian struggle "with all means," and condemn Israeli
"acts of aggression" in southern Lebanon.
Fighting in the south diminished yesterday with all
sides holding their positions. Right-wing forces continued to
shell the Muslim town of Bint Jubayl but claimed to have estab-
lished effective control of the area between Rumaysh and the
Arqub.
Palestinian leaders
are said to recognize that their torces are too weak to chal-
lenge right-wing forces in the border area or quickly to resume
significant terrorist operations against Israel.//
//The Christian militia leaders at present
appear primarily interested in securing the withdrawal of the
fedayeen from contested areas of central Lebanon. Leaders of
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Camille Shamun's National Liberal Party militia reportedly are
still hoping to renew their offensive in the Alayh area. with
Syrian backing if no withdrawals follow the summit conference.//
The Riyadh accord called for significant pullbacks
by all armed groups from major highways and central and south-
ern Lebanon by yesterday and for withdrawals from Beirut and
its suburbs by tomorrow. So far we have seen no evidence that
any party is attempting to meet these deadlines.
USSR: Central Committee Elections
The Soviet Central Committee yesterday elected a new
member of the Secretariat and promoted three candidate members
of the Central Committee to full membership. It also approved
the five-year economic plan and next year's plan and budget,
which are to be reviewed by the Supreme Soviet today.
The new party secretary is Yakov P. Ryabov, the party
first secretary of the Sverdlovsk region in the Urals. Party
secretary Kirilenko has career ties to this area and is prob-
ably Ryabov's patron. Ryabov, 48, has worked in industry and
in a series of party posts in Sverdlovsk, a major center of
heavy industry, but we are not aware of his new duties.
The plenum did not remove Defense Minister Ustinov
from the Secretariat, which may mean that he will continue to
oversee the defense industry for the party. Under Brezhnev,
Soviet leaders previously have not held full-time party and
government posts simultaneously.
mier
that
last
full
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N. A. Tikhonov, who was promoted to first deputy pre- (b)(3)
in early September, was not awarded the Politburo status
usually goes with the post. A picture of the leadership
month in the press, which showed Tikhonov standing with
members of the Politburo, indicated an effort to advance
his candidacy.
seem to
leaders
The lack of action on moves for which preparations
have been made may reflect some disagreement among the
as well as their long-evident reluctance to make changes
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in the senior leadership. The plenum's outcome does not pre-
clude the Supreme Soviet from announcing some changes on the
government side, and fuller treatment of the plenum's impli-
cations awaits the results of the session today.
ITALY: Communist Party Changes
Leadership changes in the Italian Communist Party
made at last week's Central Committee meeting indicate that
party chief Berlinguer is working to strengthen his grip in
the face of increasing dissent over his policy of cooperation
with the Andreotti government.
The changes are consistent with Berlinguer's effort
since his election as secretary general in 1972 to consolidate
his personal control of the party. At the party congress last
year, for example, Berlinguer managed to eliminate the Polit-
buro--a preserve of the party's old guard which had hindered
his freedom to maneuver. He also added more of his allies to
the party secretariat.
In the personnel shuffle last week, Berlinguer re-
duced the Secretariat from nine to eight members and replaced
two men appointed in 1975 with two newcomers who are reportedly
even closer to him.
//In addition, Berlinguer put one of his confi-
dants, Giovanni Cervetti, in charge of the party's key organi-
zation section. There are signs that Cervetti--who appears to
be a rising star in the party--may be open to some liberaliza-
tion of internal party procedures.
Another secretariat member who appears close to Ber-
linguer was given responsibility for the press and propaganda
section.
Despite the dissenting views expressed during the
Central Committee meeting, the session ended with an endorse-
ment of Berlinguer's policies. In his concluding statement,
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Berlinguer assured the committee that he would insist on pledges
from the government of social and economic reform and a larger
policymaking role in return for his cooperation.
MALTA: Mintoff Tightening Control
Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff is creating uneasi-
ness among his opponents by strengthening his political control
following his narrow but decisive victory in last month's na-
tional election.
On October 11--after Malta's constitutional court
agreed to hear an opposition Nationalist Party suit charging
vote fraud--Mintoff summarily transferred two of the court's
three judges and replaced them with justices more favorably
disposed toward his own Labor Party. The Nationalists immedi-
ately dropped their suit, claiming that the "independence and
freedom" of the courts had been infringed.
The opposition is also concerned about the expected
naming of a long-time Labor Party stalwart to the Presidency,
a post the ,Nationalists insist ought to be above narrow parti-
san considerations. In addition, the opposition is troubled by
a Mintoff directive requiring government officials to obtain
prior approval to attend parties at foreign missions and to re-
port back to Mintoff's office any discussion involving Maltese
official business.
The Prime Minister's actions are a bit more extreme
than some strictly partisan measures he has adopted in the
past, but they are entirely in character. Although technically
his interference in the traditionally independent judiciary is
constitutional, it does appear to add substance to opposition
charges that he is growing increasingly autocratic.
Mintoff already runs the executive with an iron hand
and, although the Labor Party enjoys only a three-vote majority
in Parliament, party discipline ensures passage of virtually
any legislation he wants.
These latest moves appear to serve notice that Mintoff
will tolerate little interference in his plans to sever Malta's
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military ties with the UK and the West, steer a neutral foreign
policy course, and pursue his program of "democratic socialism"
at home.
POLAND: Student Dissidents Active
The Polish leadership is worried about a possible
outbreak of violence at Warsaw University, the US embassy re-
ports.
The embassy notes that over the past several months
there has been a proliferation of dissident manifestoes and
increasingly open protests against regime policies.
the Workers Defense League, which was established
to protest the regime's retaliation against those who demon-
strated in June, was organized at the University.
Although both workers and intellectuals have caused
problems tor the government in the past, it is unusual for
dissidence to develop among the two groups at the same time.
The student effort to identify with the workers may be partic-
ularly worrisome for the regime, which probably views such an
alliance as a new impediment in dealing with either group with
serious economic problems.
The government so far has avoided using repressive
measures against the students, and security organizations have
kept a low profile at the University in order not to increase
tensions. The students have demanded that the party and govern-
ment send representatives to hear their grievances. Several
prominent Polish journalists recently have met with the stu-
dents in an attempt to satisfy their demands.
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JAPAN: Fishing Negotiations
Japan will probably maintain posi-
tions taken in previous negotiations as long as possible,
stalling, perhaps, until the coming round of US-Soviet talks
scheduled November 15 are completed.//
//Japan has publicly argued that the 200-mile
zone that the US plans to impose in March is illegal under in-
ternational law, but it almost certainly would acquiesce to US
authority within the 200-mile region even if agreement is not
reached during the talks in Tokyo.//
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//The two sides will also discuss
new system for calculating fishing quotas. Japan
larly concerned over the quota-setting power given the eight
US regional councils under the 1976 US Fishing Conservation
and Management Act. Each council will determine the surplus
fish harvest available to foreign fleets. Japan would prefer
to deal directly with Washington, where negotiators could put
fishing in the context of overall bilateral
relations.//
//Japan will ask for special consideration
at the
role as the
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negotiations on the quota question citing its
world's leading fishing nation, the importance of fish in the
Japanese diet, and its close political ties with the US. Japan
relies more heavily on fish for animal protein than any other
developed country. In 1974, consumption of fish products ac-
counted for 56 percent of animal protein in Japan, compared
with 2 percent
in the US.//
Japanese domestic consumption of fish has increased
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faster than
fish caught. Since 1970, Japan has shifted from a
net exporter
been buying
to a large net importer, in part because it has
more expensive products.
Although only a small factor in Japanese gross na-
the fishing industry carries considerable po-
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tional product,
litical clout. The industry employs nearly half a million peo-
ple, mainly in the northern island of Hokkaido--a stronghold
of the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party.
The Japanese industry is particularly vulnerable to
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pressures
from coastal countries because it harvests 45 percent
of its catch within 200 miles of foreign shores. Thirteen per-
cent of Japan's catch comes from within 200 miles of US shores.
In 1974, the Japanese fleet harvested 1.4 million tons in US
waters, mostly Alaskan pollock, accounting for 60 percent of
the total foreign take in the US 200-mile zone.
//Minor reductions in the informal
quota for Ja-
percent--would
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pan's catch in US waters--of perhaps 10 to 15
not hurt the fishing industry. Sharper reductions, however,
would adversely affect fishing activity and would almost cer-
tainly cause political problems for the Miki government. A 40-
percent cut in the US quota, for example, would result in the
layoff of 20,000 workers if yields were not increased in other
fishing areas.//
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pollock harvested
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almost all the Alaskan
//Since
is consumed in Japan,
a reduction in the Japanese catch in US
waters would
result in higher imports from the US.//
Both
the Japanese government and the fishing industry (b)(3)
are already
adapting. Many large firms have sharply cut back
new investments in ships and fish processing equipment and are
shifting to nonfishing activities. Others are increasing direct
investment
in foreign fishing fleets and plants.
For
its part, the government has launched a $700-
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million, seven-year
program to increase fishing yields ir Jap-
anese coastal waters.
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BRAZIL-CHILE
-PERU:
Better Relations Ahead
Brazil
is attempting to strengthen ties with Peru
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and Chile without
becoming involved in the long-standing Peru-
Chile border tensions. Preparations are under way for a meeting
November 5 between Brazilian President Geisel and Peruvian
President Morales Bermudez. Last month the Brazilian army min-
ister made an official
visit to Chile.
The agenda
for the presidential meeting reflects
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Brazil's essentially
economic interest in Peru. According to
reliable press reports, several bilateral agreements will be
signed, including a long-term trade exchange--Peruvian non-
ferrous metals for
Brazilian agricultural products--estimated
to be worth over $100
million annually.
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Foreign Minister Silveira has placed
Brazilian
new emphasis on developing
firmer relationships throughout
Latin America,
advantage.
and the tactic seems to be working to Brazi3�s
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it is clear that
the six military governments of the Southern Cone feel somewhat
abandoned by the US, particularly because of recent developments
in the human rights area. The result has been closer coopera-
tion among Southern Cone governments in a variety of areas.
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