PLEASE FIND ATTACHED UPDATED VERSIONS OF OUR SPREADSHEETS ON THE POSITIONS ON THE SUMMIT COUNTRIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05218353
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2017
• Case Number: F-2017-00837
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987

Approved for Release: 2017/03/09 C05218353
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Mernotrandurrt Von
1 June 1987
Please find attached updated versions of our spreadsheets
on the positions on the Summit countries on Summit
economic and political issues. The date of the update
was 5/20/87.
Chief, Western Europe Divison
Office of European Analysis
ELPRA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of intelligence
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Approved for Release: 2017/03/09 C05218353
Venice Summit Economic Positions
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
European Community
Macroeconomic policy coordination
International monetary reform
Finance Ministry opposes macroeconomic
policy coordination to stabilize exchange
rates. Accepts the use of indicators�ex-
cept interest rates�to monitor economic
policy and performance but not to dictate
policy changes. Other Japanese officials
believe more expansionary policies are
needed to halt yen's rise.
Not inclined to alter its domestic policies
for the sake of international cooperation.
Has agreed to strengthen the indicator
process, but rejects efforts tying changes
in indicators to policy changes.
Skeptical of any monetary reform that
would commit Bonn to policy changes.
Acknowledges the usefulness of coordinat-
ed intervention to stabilize exchange rates.
Reportedly has agreed, at least temporar-
ily, to informal target zones.
Leading proponent of greater policy coor-
dination. Strongly supports use of indica-
tors to trigger consultations among the G-
5, but not policy changes. Agrees that
Tokyo and Bonn should stimulate their
economies.
Argues for flexible system based on the
creation of reference zones among the
world's principal currencies. Mitterrand
may stress dangers of unilateral efforts to
influence currency markets and to argue
the importance of multilateral
cooperation.
Believes more policy coordination is neces-
sary, but reluctant to use indicators to
mandate policy changes. Believes Japan
has primary responsibility for correcting
world trade imbalances; reticent about
pushing Bonn to reflate.
Chancellor Lawson believes more reliance
should be put on interest rates, rather than
intervention, to control exchange markets.
Not in favor of target zones.
Concerned about imbalances but will let
other summit countries take the initiative.
Wants West Germany and Japan to pur-
sue more expansionary measures, but will
be restrained to avoid criticism about their
own economic imbalances.
Will press for a more stable monetary
system. Advocates creation of exchange
rate target zones based on a dollar-yen-
ECU alignment. Is likely to resist any
measure limiting its monetary sovereignty.
Not a major issue for Ottawa. Has not yet
clarified views on use of indicators, but has
publically stressed the need to coordinate
policies.
Supports exchange rate stability, but non-
committal about target zones. Finance
Minister has avoided making any public
commitment to joint official intervention.
Is likely to call for greater economic policy
coordination and expansionary policies in
Japan and West Germany. May argue for
increase in government spending on infra-
structure and private investment in Europe
and for labor to slow growth of real wages.
Top priority is to prevent a further decline
in the dollar, ensure EMS stability. Will
advocate close cooperation to stabilize ex-
change rates. May call on the United
States to do more by cutting budget deficit
and adopting more restrictive monetary
policy.
Agriculture�reform and trade
Recognizes disparity between high domes-
tic and low world prices, but faces major
political impediments to action. Increased
rice imports out of the question, but may
be willing to gradually phase out some
existing quotas and offer the United States
a larger beef import quota.
Under the gun from farm bloc, Bonn
emerging as main impediment to EC agri-
cultural reform. May agree more rational
policies necessary, but unlikely to offer
concessions.
Deeply suspicious of US motives in agri-
cultural trade. Willing to admit system
needs reform, but fearful EC policies will
be singled out for attack. Will resist rapid
progress in GATT talks because of next
year's presidential election.
Favors more realistic agricultural policies,
curbing spending. Supports OECD work
on agriculture. Will try to focus disus
o m of domestic policie
Third World debt
Tokyo using debt issue to improve image
as responsible economic power. Encourag-
ing Japanese banks to lend more money to
troubled LDCs. Banks have already set up
offshore company to buy discounted loans.
Views Baker Plan as a failure but has no Debt emerging as a major concern. Chirac
new solutions to offer. Opposes debt relief worried that economic turmoil in Third
alone but favors new loans to LDCs under- ---warld_will_nlav_intods. Finance
taking structural reforms. May urge sum-
mit leaders to give banks more generous
tax writeoffs for bad loans.
Supports Baker Plan but favors more flex-
ibility in its implementation. Lawson has
proposed relieving poorest African debtors
by converting some loans into grants, of
stetching out maturities of others, and
introducing concessional interest rates.
Protective of EC policies but as a major
agricultural importer more willing to dis-
cuss issue than Paris or Bonn. Is likely to
argue that problem is surpluses not export
subsidies, and that the EC has moved to
get these under control.
Agricultural trade liberalization a major
concern. May present a proposal on behalf
of Cairns Group for cutting grain export
subsidies. Would have political difficulty,
however, implementing more than token
reforms in domestic programs.
Delors generally supports agricultural re-
forms but hamstrung by divisions among
member states. Has endorsed OECD calls
for gradual and balanced subsidy reduc-
tions. Is likely to join in appeal for pro-
gress in GATT Round, but worried that
CAP will bear the brunt of criticism.
Softer view of Third World debtors. Will
push for capital flows from developed
country trade surpluses to LDCs. Supports
growth-oriented measures, more flexible
debt management policies, debt-equity
swaps, and relief measures not tied to
tough conditionality.
Continues to support Baker Plan. Favors
expanding IMF lending, large IDA replen-
ishment.
No real competence on issue but favors
maintaining enlarged LDC access to IMF
resources, increased IBRD lending, and
macroeconomic policies aimed at expand-
ing developing country growth.
New round and international trade
Goal will be to deflect criticism. Supports
Uruguay Round, especially interested in-
tellectual property and services. Still clari-
fying position on investment.
Concerned other Summit countries�espe-
cially the United States�backing away
from free trade and alarmed by possibility
of US-Japan trade war. Annoyed by US
machine tool decision. Will again endorse
Uruguay Round and urge others to refrain
from new restrictions in the interim.
Aside from misgivings about agriculture,
enthusiastic about GATT Round, particu-
larly discussions on services. Fearful of
mounting protectionism in the United
States. Is likely to take especially tough
line on Japan.
Pleased with progress in Uruguay Round.
Hoping to focus on fundamental problems
in trading system rather than on bilateral
spats.
Interested in summit statement condemn-
ing protectionism. May push for GATT
mechanism to monitor standstill. Is likely
to give lukewarm support to Uruguay
Round discussions on services.
Committed to Uruguay Round, while pre-
occupied with free trade negotiations with
the United States. Primary concern, be-
sides agriculture, is liberalizing trade in
natural resources and commodities. Shares
some concerns of LDCs about protection-
ism in industrialized countries.
Delors will focus on Community's trade
deficit with Japan, urge Tokyo to promote
imports, and restrain exports. Is likely to
support statement calling for early pro-
gress in Uruguay Round as long as agri-
culture not singled out for fast-track
treatment.
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Venice Summit Political Positions
Japan
West Germany
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
European Community
East-West relations
Sees no substantive change in Soviet poli-
cy toward Japan. Believes strongly in coor-
dinated Western initiatives toward
Moscow.
Relations with Moscow improving. Urging
positive Western response to Gorbachev's
domestic and arms control initiatives.
Concerned about implications of Gorba-
chev's initiatives for Eastern Europe and
will want to discuss. Favors expansion of
East-West trade.
Skeptical of Gorbachev's internal reforms;
suspects effort to delude Western public
opinion. Tensions with Moscow height-
ened because of Soviet espionage in
France.
Taking wait-and-see attitude toward Gor-
bachev's domestic reforms. Wants to ex-
pand trade with Moscow. Thatcher consid-
ers herself the Summit leader most
informed on Soviet developments.
Impressed by Gorbachev's reforms but
believes he is seeking efficiency, not open-
ness. Sees opportunity to improve negative
trade balance with Soviet Union.
Has praised Soviet domestic reforms and
resumed cultural and scientific contacts
broken off after Afghanistan invasion.
Wants to expand East-West trade. Still
calling forcefully for human rights im-
provements in Eastern Bloc.
Cautious in assessing Gorbachev's domes-
tic reforms. Negotiating with CEMA on
mutual diplomatic recognition.
Arms control
Supports European zero option on INF
and SRINF as step toward elimination of
Soviet missiles in Far East. May seek
explicit acknowledgement of Asian securi-
ty interests in Summit documents. Fears a
broader interpretation of ABM Treaty
could provoke domestic objections to par-
ticipation in SDI.
Favors zero option on INF
Favors SDI research but op-
poses broas interpretation of ABM Trea-
ty. Willing to support French desire to link
new conventional talks to CSCE to ensure
French participation.
Fears INF accord will decouple the Unit-
ed States from West European security;
wants linkage to Soviet concessions on
conventional forces. Chirac strongly op-
poses Soviet zero option on SRINF as step
toward denuclearized Europe. Ambivalent
about SDI and opposes broad interpreta-
tion of ABM Treaty. Wants new conven-
tional talks to be tied to CSCE. Opposes
MBFR in principle and does not
participate.
Vlore willing than other Euro-
pean lealiers to accept broader interpreta-
tion of ABM Treaty but wary of SDI
deployment. Wants to maintain MBFR
until clear that new talks will address the
conventional inbalances in Central
Europe.
Leaning in favor of zero option proposals
for INF and SRINF despite concern
about Soviet conventional and tactical nu-
clear superiority. Might reconsider partici-
pation in SDI research if the United
States adopts broad interpretation of
ABM Treaty.
Supports zero option on INF but worried
about split within Alliance over short-
range INF. Favors SDI as long as research
conducted within limits of strict interpre-
tation of ABM Treaty.
EC leaders have discussed and generally
support zero option on INF, but formal
"EC" position unlikely.
Terrorism
Is likely to balk at tough counterterrorist
initiatives and would probably oppose
naming specific sponsors, such as Syria or
Libya.
South Africa
A low-priority issue for Tokyo
Generally favors strong counter terrorist
policies and would support strong Summit
declaration on the issue.
Often conciliatory toward state sponsors of
terrorism. Would probably accept Summit
statement against terrorism if it did not
accuse specific governments.
Will support strong Summit statement
condemning terrorism and its sponsors.
Dubious that further sanctions are needed
against state sponsors of terrorism. Con-
siders itself only "virgin" among major
nations in dealings with terrorists.
Would support Summit statement calling
for more technical cooperation on counter-
terrorism. Would balk at naming specific
state sponsors of terrorism.
Has supported US and UK sanctions
against Libya and Syria. Would endorse
strong Summit statement on terrorism.
Favors increased multilateral cooperation,
exchange of information, and stricter bor-
der controls.
Yrepareo to support
against apartheid at Summit.
Condemns apartheid but rejects stronger
sanctions. Favors aid and training to
South African nonwhites.
Opposes stronger sanctions. Strengthening
ties to Frontline States. Would support
Summit declaration against apartheid.
Strongly opposes tougher sanctions. May
suggest "positive sanctions" in form of aid
to South African blacks and neighboring
countries. Dubious that Summit statement
against apartheid would have intended
impact.
Has gone along with limited EC sanctions
but fears tougher actions would threaten
strategic materials supply. Would support
Summit statement against apartheid.
Has strongly condemned apartheid and
adopted limited economic sanctions. May
try to toughen any Summit statement on
South Africa, suggest creating a high-level
Summit-Seven body to monitor South Af-
rican developments.
Further economic sanctions unlikely. Urg-
ing closer ties to Frontline States. Budget-
ary constraints preclude large-scale aid to
Frontline States.
Middle East
r a ors
international recognition of FLU. up-
ports international peace conference on
Arab-Israeli dispute.
Favors international peace conference on
Arab-Israeli conflict, but is skeptical of its
chances for success. Considering increas-
ing arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Supports international peace conference
including representatives of PLO. Has cul-
tivated relations with Syria and Iran to
help win release of hostages in Lebanon.
Favors international peace conference but
wants to keep Syrian role small for time
being. Stresses Jordan's role in possible
West Bank federation.
Favors international peace conference but
unlikely to press more controversial initia-
tives at Summit. Political leadership divid-
ed over desired role for PLO.
Not a major actior in Middle East. Has
close relations with Israel and Egypt.
Would support international peace confer-
ence if acceptable to Israel.
Probably will urge other Summit partici-
pants to support international peace con-
ference on Arab-Israeli conflict.
Iran-Iraq
Leans toward Iran, although ostensibly
neutral in Gulf war. Exports only dual-use
material to the warring states and favors
negotiated settlement.
Supports EC's calls for immediate cease-
fire and negotiated settlement. Govern-
ment prohibits arms sales to belligerents,
although smuggled West German arms
may have reached both Iran and Iraq.
Fundamentally pro-Iraq. Sells arms to
Iraq. Also trying to normalize relations
with Iran, so far without success, in hopes
of speeding hostages' release.
Claims to be "scrupulously neutral" in
war. Will nonetheless resist attempts to
halt nonlethal arms sales to Iran. May
suggest Summit statement on need to pro-
tect Gulf shipping.
Publicly neutral but leans toward Iraq.
Fears Iranian victory would encourage
terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists.
Trying to block private Italian arms ship-
ments to both sides.
Neutral in Gulf war. Has attempted strict
prohibition on export of war materiel to
either side.
Officially neutral in war. Anxious about
escalation, awaiting UN peace initiative.
OD)j1),
(h)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(D)(1)
(b)(3)
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