IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET USE OF CHEMICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS FOR US SECURITY INTERESTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05258370
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: September 15, 1983

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
--797,77,12741T-
ORCON
Implications of Soviet Use
of Chemical and Toxin Weapons
for US Security Interests
Special National Intelligence Estimate
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SNIE 11-17-83
15 September 1983
Copy 469
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SNIE 11-17-83
IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET USE
OF CHEMICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS
FOR US SECURITY INTERESTS
Information available as of 15 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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TrigraRTIVeteeNT-RACI,LQ,
SCOPE NOTE
Soviet development and transfer of lethal chemical and toxin agents
and their use against combatants in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
have breached a widely accepted barrier against employment of these
weapons which, with few exceptions, has held fast since World War I.
The determination that the Soviet actions constitute a violation of the
1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was made at the
highest levels of the US Government. The violation has profound
implications for US security interests.
This Estimate examines these implications in four areas:
� International reactions affecting arms control.
� The spread of chemical weapons.
� Western defenses against such weapons.
� Intelligence collection and analysis.
SER.ET
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CONTENTS
Page
Page
SCOPE NOTE iii
KEY JUDGMENTS 1
DISCUSSION 5
Soviet Actions and Policies 5
Soviet Chemical Weapons (CW) and Toxin Use 5
The Obligations 5
The Violation 6
Rationale 6
International Reactions Affecting Arms Control 7
The European Response 7
Implications 8
A Decision To Discontinue? 10
The Spread of Chemical Weapons 10
The Proliferation Record 10
The Soviet Role 12
Implications 12
Significance for Western Defense 13
Vulnerability to Chemical Warfare 13
Toxins: The Added Threat 14
Implications 15
Implications for Intelligence 15
ANNEX A: Evidence on Chemical Weapons Use in Southeast Asia
and Afghanistan A-1
ANNEX B: Soviet Development of Toxins B-1
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Soviet Actions
The Soviet chemical and toxin warfare actions were almost
certainly the result of a conscious leadership decision. That decision was
probably influenced by the following considerations:
� That the agents used would be militarily effective for the
purposes intended.
� That no threat of retaliation existed.
� That the situations offered opportunities for operational testing.
� That the probability of detection was low and any evidence
acquired would be ambiguous.
� That the political risks of a response were negligible, and any
adverse international reaction could be contained.
If these were the considerations that guided the Soviet decision, we
believe they have been largely borne out by events.
� International Reactions Affecting Arms Control
The intelligence evidence 1 that formed the basis of the Presiden-
tial determination of Soviet violation of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention has been steadily strengthened by confirmatory
reporting and analysis. Nevertheless, West European and other govern-
ments and publics have widely resisted fully accepting the published
evidence. Faced with the classic compliance issue of what to do about a
detected violation, those governments have exhibited great reluctance to
react in a concerted and politically significant way. This reluctance
poses a continuing obstacle to a forthright Western response to the
violation.
There are a number of reasons for the lack of a concerted
international response:
� Initial European suspicions that US charges were motivated by
anti-Soviet propaganda objectives.
' See annex A for a summary of the intelligence evidence.
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� Scientific controversy that erupted over portions of the US case,
and was exploited by the media in a manner adding to public
confusion and skepticism.
The fear, harbored by some, that charging a Soviet violation
would jeopardize future accords.
Rationalization that the violation is not of sufficient military
significance to warrant exacerbating the already strained US-
Soviet relationship.
The decision by some West European governments to withhold
their own confirmatory intelligence findings from their publics
in order to avoid domestic political controversy.
The skepticism about the credibility of the evidence survives in
part because of the inherent limitations of sensitive intelligence,
including the need to protect sources and methods, Which fundamental-
ly inhibit its persuasive public use.
In our judgment, the impact on the Soviet leaders of the lack of a
concerted and sustained response to their violations may be more
significant than the violation itself, as it could lead the Soviets to
conclude that violating arms agreements carries no lasting penalty. It
may reinforce the Soviet propensity to disregard arms limitation
agreements that they believe cannot be effectively monitored or
enforced. One lesson that emerges from this analysis is that if an
agreement banning chemical warfare (CW) is to be effective there must
be not only adoption of stringent verification arrangements but also a
Soviet conviction that the West has the resolve to act decisively in the
face of discovery of a violation.
The Proliferation Issue
The evidence of Third World acquisitions of chemical warfare
capabilities (summarized in this Estimate) shows a proliferation momen-
tum greater than heretofore appreciated.
Soviet military assistance has been a common source and major
stimulus to this momentum. Since CW capabilities are integral to the
Soviet force structure, the fact that they were transferred through the
military assistance program is not surprising. Soviet assistance is likely to
continue, hence the momentum will probably be sustained.
Much of the action has been centered in the Middle East, but other
areas�parts of Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa�are increasingly
at risk. The attractions of chemical weapons for Third World forces,
2
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combined with a multiplicity of open market sources of chemical
materiel, provide further nourishment for this growth. As more nations
join the chemical club, a heightened sense of vulnerability is bound to
manifest itself. We therefore expect a continued upsurge in chemical
warfare activities.
The appearance of chemical agents in local conflicts and the
introduction of chemical weapons to regions of strategic importance
confront US and allied forces with an increased likelihood that they will
become deliberate or unintended targets of attack with such weapons,
even quite independently of any direct Soviet role. The risk is as yet
small, but is almost certain to grow.
The Western Defense Issue
The appearance and use of novel combinations of chemical and
toxin agents, superimposed on the recognition that Soviet and Warsaw
Pact forces incorporate chemical weapons as an integral part of their
force structure, has intensified existing concerns over the chemical
warfare threat. The disparity between Soviet and Western capabilities
for such warfare and the deficiencies that NATO forces exhibit in both
offensive and protective chemical postures call into question the
sustainability of NATO force effectiveness in a chemical- or toxin-
contaminated environment
If present trends continue, NATO will have to recognize the need
to reassess its chemical posture, in spite of the political resistance such a
reassessment will be likely to encounter
The Intelligence Issue
The implications of these findings for intelligence are clear: the low
priority historically accorded to chemical, biological, and toxin warfare
issues�both collection and analysis�must be reversed more radically
than has so far been the case. Serious and sustained effort to upgrade
collection and to enhance the talent dedicated to analysis can reduce the
areas of uncertainty that still plague our knowledge. The substantial
improvements recently achieved in CW use collection and analysis
should be extended to the entire chemical warfare area. But even
allowing for such improvements, there are inherent limitations to
intelligence monitoring systems. The Community's ability to monitor a
chemical or biological weapons ban will fall short of achieving the high
confidence that is widely desired.
3
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DISCUSSION
Soviet Actions and Policies
Soviet Chemical Weapons (CW) and Toxin Use
1. The fact that the Soviet Union has transferred
lethal chemical and toxin weapons to Southeast Asia
and has used them in Afghanistan 2 has caused the US
national security community to focus on an aspect of
Soviet military posture and policy that has heretofore
received little attention�namely that chemical weap-
ons are treated as an integral and effective part of the
overall weapons array available for use by Soviet
forces in conjunction with either conventional or
nuclear weapons
2. The spectrum of modern chemical agents and
delivery systems available to Soviet and other Warsaw
Pact forces provides a capability to attack protected
and unprotected personnel in almost any tactical or
weather condition and to produce residual contamina-
tion on equipment, ships, and terrain. In addition, the
Pact has vigorous and extensive programs to prepare
its forces for operations in a chemical or biological
environment.
3. The use of a variety of lethal chemical agents,
including some that remain unidentified, has been
largely overshadowed by the discovery of a new class
of agents�trichothecene mycotoxins�a component of
"yellow rain.'
4. From the available evidence it seems clear that
toxin weapons are considered by the Soviets to be a
specific class of chemical weapon whose use would be
determined by the tactical requirements. While no
separate policy regarding their employment has been
identified, there are situations where their use would
appear to offer advantages over classical known
agents.
The evidence on these developments is presented in an earlier
estimate SNIE 11/50/37-82 (2 February 1982) and a subsequent
update, Memorandum to Holders (2 March 1983) both entitled Use
of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan
5
5. What is particularly disturbing about the appear-
ance of toxins as warfare agents is the fact that we know
very little about the combinations of toxins and other
agents that the Soviet Union may have under develop-
ment. (For a discussion of Soviet toxin development, see
annex B). The significance of this is that there may be
new agents in Warsaw Pact arsenals far more toxic than
the trichothecenes. Moreover, some of them could have
chemical and physical properties well suited to combat
use that would be difficult to detect and could defeat
US and NATO protective measures.
6. There is no doubt that Soviet forces have a
substantial capability to conduct chemical warfare op-
erations, both offensive and defensive. Their CW doc-
trine is well integrated with overall military doctrine,
and they have more chemical units, training, equip-
ment, weapons, and delivery systems than any other
nation. They are subject, however, along with many
other nations, to the international obligations they have
accepted constraining this form of warfare.
The Obligations
7. On 5 April 1928, the Soviet Union ratified the
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacte-
riological Methods of Warfare, also known as the
Geneva Protocol. As one of the first signatories to the
Geneva Protocol, the Soviet Union (as did many other
nations) retained two reservations: that the Protocol is
binding only as regards relations with other Parties
and that it ceases to be binding in regard to any enemy
states whose armed forces or allies do not observe
provisions. Vietnam acceded to the Protocol on 23
September 1980; Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea
are not Parties.
8. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Devel-
opment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruc-
tion (BWC) was ratified by the Soviet Union on 26
March 1975. This Convention obligates Parties "never
in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or
otherwise acquire or retain (1) microbial or other
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biological agents, agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that
have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or
other peaceful purposes; or (2) weapons, equipment, or
means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict" (Article I).
The BWC further obligates parties: -not to transfer to
any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and
not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any
State, group of states, or international organizations to
manufacture or otherwise acquire" any of the agents,
toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery
specified above (Article III). Afghanistan, Laos, Kam-
puchea, and Vietnam are all Parties to the BWC as
well. The BWC does not include a specific prohibition
on use, as Parties agree that that is covered under the
Geneva Protocor.1.<
9. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the
great majority of the international community have
taken the position that the prohibition on use stated in
the Geneva Protocol has become part of customary
international law of armed conflict as a result of
general adherence to the Protocol, the practice of
states in refraining from chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) use in subsequent major wars, and the
declarations of international organizations. As such,
the prohibition would apply to all states and to all
conflicts. The Soviet Union has never, to our knowl-
edge, argued to the contrary.
The Violation
10. According to the provisions of the BWC, devel-
opment, transfer, and weaponization of toxins consti-
tute a violation of the Convention. While Warsaw Pact
and US military literature suggests some artificial
distinctions among toxins,3 it is clear from the BWC
' The 1977 classified East German Manual of Military Chemistry
states that toxins selected for military purposes in the 1960s were
principally bacterial toxins and thus considered as biological warfare
agents. It further argues that since it is now possible to synthesize
small molecular-weight toxins, that is, pure chemicals, the situation
has changed. Since these nonliving substances differ fundamentally
from biological organisms, they should be designated simply "toxin
warfare agents" which would be "used in combat according to the
same principles and with the same methods used for chemical
warfare agents." Other Soviet sources suggest that toxins with a
molecular weight of less than 600 daltons be classified as chemical
agents and those above 600 as biological. Trichothecenes toxins
weigh between 300 to 400 daltons and would, by this criterion, fall
into the chemical class.
6
negotiating record that all toxins, regardless of origin,
method of production, or molecular weight, were
intended to be covered under the prohibition.
11. The production or possession of toxins for use as
weapons in armed conflict is not permissible under the
BWC, regardless of the quantities of toxins involved.
Therefore, the Soviet involvement in -yellow rain"
would be considered a violation of the BWC if any of
the following elements is established: (1) that Soviet
forces possessed toxin weapons in Afghanistan; and (2)
that the Soviets supplied toxin weapons, or quantities
of toxins for weapon purposes, to any of the forces in
Afghanistan or Southeast Asia; or (3) that the Soviets
assisted any of the forces in Afghanistan or Southeast
Asia in producing, acquiring, or using toxin weapons
or quantities of toxins for hostile purposes. Similarly,
Afghanistan, Vietnam, Kampuchea, or Laos would be
in violation if possession or transfer of toxin weapons
by their forces is established. Intelligence clearly sup-
ports a positive finding on all three of these elements,
most conclusively on the latter two. It was on the
strength of these findings that the US Government, at
the highest levels, declared the Soviet Union in viola-
tion of the BWC.
Rationale
12. Why would the Soviet leadership risk incurring
international opprobrium for an arms agreement vio-
lation?
13. First, while we believe that an explicit policy
calculus was involved, it is not entirely certain that the
initial use and transfer of chemical weapons was in
fact the result of a high-level Soviet Government
decision. There is a remote possibility that the integra-
tion of such weapons in the Soviet force structure and
their standard inclusion in Soviet training and doctrine
caused such weapons to find their way into local
conflict use without highest level deliberation. Soviet
persistence, however, in supplying and using these
weapons in the face of US demarches beginning in
1979, implies at least awareness and condonement at
highest government levels.
14. The decision that resulted was probably im-
pelled by the following considerations:
� Military effectiveness. The weapons are, in fact,
well suited to the circumstances in which they
have been used, that is, in operations against
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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unprotected, stubborn, highly elusive, irregular
forces in mountainous and jungle areas. In some
situations, for example, that of the H'Mong tribes
in Laos, the terrorizing impact of the toxin
weapons has succeeded in driving them out of
their highland redoubts.
� No threat of retaliation. Soviet and client forces
could employ these weapons without fear of
reprisals in kind.
� Operational testing. The local situations offer
favorable opportunities to evaluate the effective-
ness of weapons under field conditions. A wide
range of chemical weapons were in fact opera-
tionally employed and after-action field exami-
nations of victims were conducted.
� Negligible risk of detection. Effective Soviet and
client state control over access to the regions and
the rapid degradation of the agents after dissemi-
nation must have argued strongly against the
likelihood that outsiders would acquire persua-
sive evidence of the violation.
� Unlikelihood of strong international reaction.
The standards of evidence demanded by most
governments to enable them to surmount their
political and psychological resistance to acknowl-
edging the fact of violation are such as to be in
practice unobtainable. Hence, even in the event
of such a reaction, the leadership could count on
its highly developed propaganda instruments to
turn back or defuse any accusation
15. We have considered and rejected two other
hypotheses that could explain Soviet toxin use. One is
that toxins were regarded, or perhaps represented by
the Soviet military, as a class of herbicides which
subsequently manifested unexpected lethal antiper-
sonnel effects. We do not view this hypothesis as
persuasive, given the secrecy, tight control, and medi-
cal caution often applied to these weapons in the field
and the unambiguous antipersonnel manner in which
they have of ten been employed. The other derives
from interpretations of international agreements. First,
a strict technical interpretation of the Geneva Protocol
proscription against use would not imply a violation in
Afghanistan, Laos, or Kampuchea, as those countries
are not parties. Second, the customary international
law extension or interpretation, which the Soviets have
7
at times endorsed, does not appear to act as an
effective constraint on Soviet behavior. As with other
arms control agreements, the Soviets have demonstrat-
ed that they feel bound only to explicitly stated
obligations.
16. The Soviet response to accusations of toxin use
has never relied on the above interpretations. Their
tactic has been one of absolute denial, counter allega-
tions, and evasive contentions. Among their most vocal
retorts to US charges of use is the accusation of US
conduct of chemical warfare in Vietnam.b.
International Reactions Affecting Arms Control
The European Response
17. We recognize that, while the intelligence find-
ings of Soviet CW and toxin use have been strength-
ened and reinforced by a steady flow of confirmatory
reporting and analysis, acceptance of these findings by
governments and publics has encountered strong
resistance. Indeed, in spite of a unique US Govern-
ment effort to make the intelligence evidence widely
available, there remains a level of skepticism, particu-
larly among a few vocal scientists, about the validity of
the findings. The media treatment of this skepticism
and of the CW and toxin use issue generally has
tended to accentuate the sense of doubt and uncertain-
ty that is widely shared throughout the West. This
uncertainty represents a major obstacle to a forthright
Western response to the violation
18. Western Europe initially responded to the un-
veiling of Soviet involvement in chemical and toxin
warfare with profound skepticism. Political reactions
were hesitant and defensive. They were played out in
three forums: the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in
Geneva, the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and the
NATO Secretariat.
19. In the CD, where the CW negotiating effort is
centered, the most significant Western response to the
revelation of CW use was to press for the conclusion of
a comprehensive and verifiable CW ban. While most
Western governments exhibit great reluctance to level
The United States has adopted the interpretation that the
Protocol does not apply to nontoxic riot-control agents and chemical
herbicides.
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charges of CW use, they now recognize the necessity
to tackle the difficult verification issue in any CW
ban.
20. At the UNGA, unlike the CD, diplomatic activi-
ties have sought to draw attention to the CW use issue.
The UNGA adopted a resolution in December 1980 to
undertake an investigation of the allegations of use of
chemical weapons and subsequently extended its man-
date for an additional year. As long as the investigation
continued, most governments felt relieved of any
obligation to speak out on the issue. Since the release
of the final report in December 1982, with the
cautious finding that it "could not ignore that there
was evidence that such weapons might have been used
in some cases," we have seen more willingness among
the Western nations, notably the French and British,
to make public statements condemning chemical use.
Other UNGA efforts are under way to develop proce-
dures to investigate future allegations of use and to
attempt to improve verification provisions in existing
treaties.
21. In the NATO Secretariat, particularly in the
Military Committee, the principal response has been
one of heightened awareness of Soviet capabilities to
use toxins in the European theater and concern about
the resulting implications for NATO forces. But con-
straints at the political level of NATO governments
have sharply inhibited serious action on these con-
cerns.
22. How can we explain the subdued Western
reaction to the CW revelations? In addition to the
basic skepticism already noted, the following factors
were at work:
� Initial European attitudes were colored by their
suspicion that the United States was pursuing the
CW use issue for its anti-Soviet propaganda value
and to support its CW modernization program.
That suspicion has only partly dissipated, and has
reinforced a European determination to distance
themselves from what they view as a confronta-
tional US style in East-West relations.
� The initial European reluctance to support the
US charges was also due to the paucity of
scientific evidence the United States was able to
adduce, their own inability to collect and analyze
contaminated samples, and their unfamiliarity
with the new analytic techniques that were
required to detect and quantify the toxins.
� Failure to take a public stance on the CW use (b)(3)
issue is part of a larger European preference for
pursuing an independent, more accommodating
policy toward the USSR. This preference is root-
ed in a number of special European economic
and political interests vis-a-vis the Eastern Bloc.
This orientation and the value they attach to
demonstrating progress in the arms control arena,
leads them to avoid making public charges of
Soviet violations.
Inordinate political sensitivity to public discus-
sion of CW issues among almost all West Europe- ( u)( I )
an governments acts as a further inhibitor. The (b)(3)
West Germans, the only European allies to have
US CW stockpiles on their territory, have a real
fear of the public outcry that would greet a
decision to permit further deployment of chemi-
cal weapons on German soil
Implications
24. An important observation about this experience
with a detected violation is the fact that the US effort
to resolve an arms control compliance issue in the
public arena has failed to win vigorous West European
support. Despite an unprecedented release of US
intelligence findings, Western reluctance continues to
inhibit a concerted response. A corollary of this obser-
vation is that similar difficulties are likely to be
encountered in other arms control compliance areas
where technical intelligence findings are relied upon
to validate a violation. The special nature and secrecy
requirements of sensitive intelligence are such as to
impose severe limitations on the ability of govern-
ments to present intelligence findings in a publicly
compelling way. (s)
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25. In addition to these inherent intelligence limita-
tions, several rationalizations are also at work support-
ing the acquiescence of Western governments in the
violation. One is the contention, mostly privately
stated, that challenging the Soviets on their violation
would have a deleterious effect on the progress of
ongoing arms control negotiations and endanger the
possibility for reaching new accords. Those making
such statements seem to be unconcerned with the
consequences for Western security interests of holding
enforcement of existing treaties hostage to the negotia-
tion process. First, if failure to respond allows the
Soviets to arm themselves in prohibited ways while the
West exhibits restraint, instability rather than en-
hanced security could result. Moreover, it would signal
the Soviets that the West is, in fact, unable or unwill-
ing to enforce compliance.
26. Another Western rationalization for acquiescing
to noncompliance is the assertion, sometimes publicly
made, that because there is strategic parity between
the two superpowers, US efforts to enforce compliance
are provocative and dangerou. Thus, some would be
willing to interpret Soviet violations as not militarily
significant and not worth pursuing, since that would
hamper US-Soviet relations in other arenas. This is
particularly true for the chemical, biological, and toxin.
weapons which many view as being of no strategic
importance and some even consider as having no
tactical utility.
27. Many in Europe and elsewhere regard chemi-
cal, toxin, or biological weapons as almost as frightful
and indiscriminate as nuclear weapons and, therefore,
prefer to deny their existence in the hope that they
will disappear or be negotiated away. Furthermore,
for them, admitting blatant Soviet violation of an
existing arms agreement would destroy the argument
that treaties are self-enforcing even in the absence of
effective verification, because of the high political cost
associated with being publicly branded before the
world as a violator.X
28. The impact on the Soviet leaders of what they
may perceive as an inability of the West to deal
effectively with the violations probably has greater
implications for the West than the fact of the violation
itself. The lack of cohesion in the Western reaction
could be read by the Soviet leaders as an indicator that
they can violate at least some agreements�those most
9
difficult to monitor�without major costs. The mes-
sage they have received so far gives them no compel-
ling reason to adhere strictly to their obligations.
29. We do not expect that sufficient public pressure
can be brought to bear to arrest what appears to be a
sustained Soviet toxin and biological weapons pro-
gram�a program most clearly prohibited by the
BWC. Soviet literature reflects the firm conviction
that other major powers possess these weapons and will
employ them a inst Soviet forces in any major future
conflict.
30. The implications for the viability of a new
chemical weapons convention now being negotiated in
Geneva seem clear. Two factors will figure prominent-
ly in the Soviet calculus of the risks they would run in
the future by violating provisions of the projected
treaty: (1) the ability of the Parties to monitor the
provisions and detect violations, and (2) the forceful-
ness of the international response to such violations. If
they perceive both of these as being weak, as present
evidence might lead them to conclude, there would be
little incentive for them to adopt a rigorous policy of
compliance. To provide that incentive would require
more than the adoption of effective and acceptable
verification provisions�in itself a complex task; it
would also require, that the West muster the resolve to
react decisively in the face of evidence of violation.
The latter requirement may be even more of a
stumblin block in the arms control regime than the
former
31. We should note that Soviet behavior in the CW
arena is fully consonant with the Soviet approach to
arms control generally, as described in earlier intelli-
gence and historic studies. According to these studies,
the Soviet Union considers the principal purposes of
arms control limitations to be those of enhancing its
strategic position vis-a-vis that of the United States and
reducing the risk of war. The pursuit of strategic
advantage outweighs considerations of cost, of control-
ling the arms race, or of the possible destabilizing
effect of particular weapons. They have sought to
preserve the military advantages they already possess
and to protect the military programs and options they
intend to pursue.
32. The earlier studies also affirm that arms control
negotiations are used to support other Soviet objec-
tives, which include dividing the Western Alliance and
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blocking their specific weapons or modernization pro-
grams. An effective propaganda effort directed from
the highest levels of government supports these objec-
tives. Much of the propaganda is focused on encourag-
ing complacency among the Western democracies and
on exploiting the tendency in some parts of the
European political spectrum to equate the mere fact
of visible diplomatic activity (for example, arms con-
trol negotiations) with progress toward peace and thus,
by implication, with a reduced need for a vigorous
defense. These attitudes persist despite the mounting
evidence of questionable Soviet practices regarding
compliance with treaty obligations. While Soviet prop-
aganda ,does not create the vociferous opposition by
peace groups in the West to such issues as INF
deployment, MX development, and CW binary pro-
duction, it at least helps sustain it.
A Decision To Discontinue?
33. Recent indications raise the possibility that the
Soviets may have decided to constrain use of lethal
CW agents. A review of all available recent intelli-
gence on the use of chemical weapons in Southeast
Asia and Afghanistan, including a firsthand survey in
the field, reveals a striking reduction in the incidence
of lethal attacks since the beginning of 1983 in spite of
a relatively high level of combat activity in Laos,
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. Reports of chemical
attacks�including lethal events�continue to be re-
ceived and corroborated by other data, but, for the
most part, these relate to events of an earlier period,
principally mid-to-late 1982. Moreover, the chemical
attacks reportedly occurring in 1983 appear largely to
have involved the use of riot-control agents and
sublethal concentrations of other agents, mixtures of
agents, or mixtures of agents and toxins.
34. While a span of eight months is insufficient time
to provide an explanation as to why lethal attacks have
decreased markedly, the current decline is unprece-
dented. We cannot rule out the possibility that a
Soviet policy decision to limit the use of lethal chemi-
cal and toxin agents may have been taken.
35. There are other possible explanations for the
sharp decline in CW and toxin attacks including the
fact that the H'mong, who are the principal targets in
Laos, are greatly diminished in numbers and are
dispersed to the point where they no longer pose a
serious threat. In Afghanistan, where chemical agent
use has always appeared to be more selective and
limited in scope, a decline in use may be dictated by
the changing character of Soviet and Afghan combat
operations there or by a finding of Soviet operational
testing that the agents are less effective than originally
thought. Kampuchea is a more difficult situation to
evaluate. We have evidence of continued use of
chemical agents and some indications of toxin use in
1983. This continued use could, of course, be ex-
plained by the possibility that the Soviets may not be
able fully to control Vietnamese use against the Demo-
cratic Kampucheans and Khmer. The Vietnamese
may by now have acquired a limited indigenous
capability to produce and weaponize some agents as a
result of technology and training acquired from the
Soviet Union. If that is the case, some use of both
lethal and incapacitating agents may continue despite
a Soviet decision to place tighter constraints on chemi-
cal use.
The Spread of Chemical Weapons
The Proliferation Record
36. The past decade has seen an ominous prolifera-
tion of chemical weapons acquired by Third World
states, especially in the fertile crescent of the Middle
East. The increasing public awareness that such weap-
ons are being used effectively under the aegis of one of
the superpowers and without evoking much public
censure may provide further stimulus to this trend. A
brief historic perspective of developments in key
countries will provide some sense of the dimensions of
the problem.....
37. Egypt was the first country in the Middle East
region to obtain chemical weapons training, indoctri-
nation, and materiel as part of the sizable security
assistance it received from the Soviet Union through-
out the 1960s. High-ranking Egyptian officers were
sent to Moscow for training at the Soviet Red Banner
Academy of Chemical Defense, and chemical warfare
capabilities were integrated into the Egyptian force
structure under Soviet tutelage. This capability was
subsequently employed against the Yemenis in the
1963 and 1967 campaigns.
38. Iraq became a beneficiary of Soviet CW indoc-
trination and training in the mid-1960s, but their CW
� 10
-40ECRF-1_
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activities remained low key until Iraq's ill-fated inva-
sion of Iran in September 1980. With the adverse turn
of events in that war, the Iraqis began a process of
direct purchase of chemical agent precursors, muni-
tions for fill, and production facilities from Western
Europe and Egypt.'
We
have identified three possible CW production facilities
and two possible storage sites.
39. The effective use by the Iraqis of tear gas (CS)
to turn back an Iranian offensive in 1982 has been
documented, and there has been reporting of the use
of a chemical agent with lethal effects in 1983. If the
contracts with West European firms Concluded in
1982 and 1983 for acquisition of laboratories, factories,
and munitions are fulfilled, Iraq could have a strong
chemical agent production capability by the end of
the year. CW tactics are not as yet well integrated into
the Iraqi military structure, and troop training is weak.
These deficiencies, however, can be overcome if the
Iraqis recognize them as critical to their security.
40. Syria, also a major recipient of Soviet CW
assistance, probably has the most advanced chemical
warfare capability in the Arab world, with the possible
exception of Egypt. Both Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union provided the chemical agents, delivery
systems, and training that flowed to Syria. As long as
this support is forthcoming, there is no need for Syria
to develop an indigenous capability to produce CW
agents or materiel, and none has been identified!
41. Libya, the largest purchaser of Soviet military
assistance (at least in financial terms), must be assumed
to have also benefited from Soviet CW indoctrination
and training. Its attempts, however, to develop a CW
capability since the mid-1970s through the acquisition
of facilities and materiel from East and West Europe-
an sources have met with little success. The Libyans
reportedly received some CW agents from Poland in
1980. They probably have a modest supply of protec-
tive equipment and riot-control agents for offensive
use. We do not believe they possess lethal chemical
agents, however, except perhaps for test or experimen-
tal purposes. Libya has made efforts to contract with
West German and Swiss firms for construction of CW
production and storage facilities. Because Qadhafi is
widely viewed as unstable and belligerent, however,
Libya has encountered difficulties in concluding these
contracts. As long as Qadhafi remains in power, we
expect this pattern to continue.
42. Israel, finding itself surrounded by frontline
Arab states with budding CW capabilities, became
increasingly conscious of its vulnerability to chemical
attack'
11
44. Beyond the Middle East, a number of other
countries, principally in the Horn of Africa and in East
Asia, have moved toward chemical capabilities
45. Ethiopia's involvement with CW is also heavily
Soviet based. It has acquired chemical agents, muni-
tions, and decontamination equipment as well as CW
training from the Soviet Union, but has not developed
an indigenous capability to produce CW agents or
materiel. There are numerous allegations of Soviet
participation in the planning and supervision of chem-
ical operations, but confirmatory evidence is fragmen-
tary. There are also unconfirmed reports of lethal
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chemical attacks by Ethiopian forces against selected
targets in the areas controlled by the Eritrean People's
Liberation Front. Incapacitating and irritating agents
have been used during combat over the past several
years. Cuban personnel have also assisted the Ethiopi-
ans through CW training and provision of protective
materiel.
46. Thailand, in response to the Vietnamese CW
threat, is upgrading its capabilities through acquisition
of protective equipment from the West and through
improvement of its CW research.
48. Burma has maintained a staunchly nonaligned
foreign policy and avoided entanglements with its
neighbors. Nonetheless, Burma surely has been sensi-
tized by its neighbors' possession of chemical weapons.
However, the most likely target for use of such
weapons would be against the significant internal
insurgency Burma faces, some of it externally support-
ed.
49. Other countries in East Asia also possess CW
capabilities, although less dramatic changes in their
programs have been noted in recent years. China has a
small, though not militarily significant, offensive CW
capability.
North Korea also reportedly
stores and produces first-generation CW-type agents,
but such reports are unsubstantiated.
The Soviet Role
50. While there does not appear to be a common
pattern of acquisition of chemical warfare capabilities,
a common initial stimulus was imparted by Soviet
military assistance. Under the influence of that assist-
ance, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Libya all developed their
initial appetites and capabilities for chemical warfare.
These acquisition efforts have had an accelerating
effect on proliferation in the region as a whole and
possibly beyond
12
While the evidence is not yet
sufficient to allow us to conclude that we are witness-
ing the onset of a serious chemical arms race, forces
and ambitions have been set in motion that will be
difficult to arrest
51. The active Soviet role in stimulating prolifera-
tion of chemical weapons seems, on the face of it,
inconsistent with their characterization of such weap-
ons as "weapons of mass destruction," a term that is
taken by some as signifying special constraints on their
use. In the case of nuclear weapons, for example,
which are similarly characterized, Soviet policy has
been one of strict adherence to the nonproliferation
regime, including undeviating insistence on imposition
of international safeguards. The seeming contradiction
can be explained in three ways: first, the term "weap-
ons of mass destruction" does not, in Soviet usage,
carry such restrictive connotation�the term is applied
to a wide spectrum of weapons having broad area
effects; second, nuclear weapons, unlike chemical
weapons, pose a unique threat to vital Soviet security
interests, and their potential spread is an anathema in
their eyes; and third, chemical warfare capabilities are
so completely integral to the Soviet force structure that
we should not be surprised to see training, doctrine,
and materiel transferred almost routinely as part of
their military assistance programs.
Implications
� 52. Three forces are at work that sustain the prolif-
eration momentum:
� Soviet military assistance, acting as both a source
and a stimulus. If this military assistance contin-
ues�as we have every reason to expect�it is
bound to add further fuel to the anxieties that
drive the chemical warfare momentum. As more
nations join the chemical club, a heightened
sense of vulnerability is likely to manifest itself.
� An open market source of supply. Numerous
non-Communist and Warsaw Pact firms are ca-
pable of selling CW protective equipment, train-
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17-CforoiNt 7170a7114/111refteRC-ON-
ing, chemical munitions, and the necessary com-
ponents to manufacture them. Moreover, the
wide diffusion of chemical production capabili-
ties and the large profits to be made make
effective control over the transfer of the relevant
technologies virtually impossible. In many cases,
the acquiring military force deals directly with
firms in the West,
often without the knowledge of the
supplier's government. We see only continued
growth in this industry.
� Motivations. Third World military establish-
ments appear to consider chemical weapons as
offering important tactical benefits. Harboring,
as they often do, a particular fascination for
technological solutions to military problems, they
may look to nerve gas and toxin weapons with
more than routine interest. They are also unlikely
to be inhibited from resort to such weapons by
the kind of public revulsion these weapons evoke
in the West, or by the fear of possible escalation
to a nuclear response that applies to the NATO�
Warsaw Pact environment.
53. The readiness to use such weapons is probably
tempered somewhat by two factors. One is the unde-
termined effectiveness of both traditional and novel
agents in the special climatic and terrain conditions of
these regions. Another is the lack of experience of local
forces with the employment of such weapons. Neither
of these factors would be likely, however, to prevent
the use of such weapons if the country contemplating
their use felt its security significantly threatened.
Moreover, the lack of public outcry against the use of
such weapons cannot have gone unnoticed by Third
World governments. The Vietnamese and Lao, for
example, have suffered little international sanction for
their role in CW use.
54. These considerations lead us to conclude that
the upsurge in chemical warfare activities will contin-
ue.
55. Finally, such an upsurge could also influence
the attitudes of terrorists toward use of chemical and
biological weapons. Such weapons have, on occasion,
been used successfully against selected individuals
and, less successfully, in attempts at economic terror-
13
ism.6 Clandestine production of chemical or biological
weapons for a multiple (one or two dozen) casualty
attack generally raises no greater technical obstacles
than does the clandestine production of chemical
narcotics or heroin. The problems of inflicting mass
casualties, however, are much more formidable. Safety
requirements for volume production of agent, the cost
of such an operation, and the risk of discovery all
increase significantly.
56. But it is the motivational and practical consider-
ations, rather than the technical obstacles, that account
for the low degree of terrorist acceptance of these
weapons so far. These weapons are less accessible,
flexible, and controllable than conventional small arms
and explosives; widespread indiscriminate killing by
these means may cause more public alienation than
support for a terrorist cause. On the other hand,
increased publicity regarding the effective use of
chemical and toxin agents in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan, coupled with the acknowledged difficul-
ties of detection and identification, might increase the
attractions of such weapons for use or threats of use
against indiscriminate targets. One successful incident
involving such agents would significantly lower the
threshold of restraint on their application by other
terrorists. The ready availability of these agents and
associated protective gear in regions of potential con-
flict makes them possible targets for theft. While we
do not see significant indicators of proliferation of
these weapons to terrorist application, the potential is
there.
Significance for Western Defense
Vulnerability to Chemical Warfare
57. The disparity that exists between Soviet and
Western capabilities for chemical warfare is widely
recognized in the Western defense community. NATO
forces exhibit glaring deficiencies in all aspects of
offensive and protective chemical postures. The threat
these forces face is that of massive Soviet use of
chemical weapons coupled with surprise. This could
facilitate penetration of NATO defenses and permit
'The only attempt that achieved even limited, short-term effects
was the highly publicized cyanide poisoning of Israeli oranges by the
Arab Revolutionary Army�Palestinian Command in 1978(41�
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the high rates of advance which the Soviets believe
necessary for victory in a short war. Prime targets
would be airfields, nuclear and logistic depots, com-
mand and control facilities, and large enemy troop
concentrations. Other important targets might include
air defenses, amphibious forces, convoys, and port
facilities
58. From what we know of Soviet doctrine, nonper-
sistent agents would be used to attack targets on a Pact
axis of advance and on installations they wished to
occupy. Persistent agents would be used to attack
airfields and logistic facilities as well as to protect the
flanks of Pact forces. Chemical attacks could also be
combined with either high-explosive (HE) or nuclear
attacks. When combined with nuclear attacks, chemi-
cal weapons would be used against targets for which
nuclear strikes were not planned. Chemicals used
simultaneously with HE munitions would not only
cause additional casualties but would also hinder
recovery from the effects of the HE strikes by requir-
ing personnel to work in hot and cumbersome protec-
tive clothing
59. NATO's deficiencies against conventional
chemical agents encompass the whole gamut of chemi-
cal capabilities: detection, identification, protection,
antidotes, prophylaxis, and decontamination. While
some efforts are under way to ameliorate these defi-
ciencies, the efforts have encountered resistance at the
political level by governments suffering budgetary
strictures and lacking a sense of urgency.
Toxins: The Added Threat
60. The problem of NATO CW deficiencies is now
greatly aggravated by the discovery that the USSR has
been developing and using toxins in novel combina-
tions with chemical agents, the precise nature and
military effectiveness of which remain unknown.
Warsaw Pact military manuals contain large sections
on toxins and describe in detail their use not only as
sabotage agents, but also as "combat" toxic warfare
agents. Like traditional chemical weapons, toxins have
a number of potential tactical uses depending in large
part on terrain and meteorological conditions. In
urban settings and in mountainous or jungle terrain,
their use may be more cost effective than equipment-
and manpower-intensive conventional sweeps. Like
persistent chemical agents, some toxins are effective
territorial denial weapons and are especially useful to
14
deny food, water, and materiel resupply to forces.
Toxins may be effective in contaminating potential
amphibious landing sites, supply ships, shore facilities,
and land routes.
(b)(3)
61. Soviet employment of trichothecene mycotoxins
in Southeast Asia and strong indications that other
toxins have long been under development in the USSR
makes it likely that a variety of novel agent combina-
tions is already incorporated in the Soviet arsenal.
Some of these undoubtedly have unique properties not
heretofore encountered...1'1"),
62. We know of specific compounds under investi-
gation which appear to have considerable potential as
agents (for example, biologically active silicon-contain-
ing and organofluorine compounds), and we are aware
of some stated Soviet goals regarding agent properties.
These enhanced properties include persistence and
stability, mask breaking (that is, canister penetration)
through microencapsulation, dissemination in submi-
cron-sized particles, and use of special carrier solu-
tions. Penetration of personal protective garb is sug-
gested by coated flechettes and by the
hypothesis of silica gel slivers as a component of yellow
rain. Extremely rapid-acting incapacitants are also of
growing concern. Reports from Afghanistan indicate
that such compounds have been used. Open-source
literature and intelligence reports describe Soviet re-
search on a sleep-inducing peptide, raising the possi-
bility that other peptides are being developed as CW
agents, that is, small, easily synthesized molecules with
specific toxic properties and/or with the capability of
extremely rapid transfer across the blood-brain barri-
er.
63. Such novel threat agents raise an additional set
of problems, such as the following:
� Detection. Detectors presently fielded by the
United States and Warsaw Pact countries can
detect and identify only standard agent classes:
choking, blister, and nerve agents. US detectors
cannot detect toxin molecules; we are uncertain
about the toxin-detection capability of fielded
Warsaw Pact equipment. Improved detection
systems may emerge from ongoing analytic work
on air pollution detectors.
� Identification of agents. This is essential for
determining proper treatment, both prophylactic
and therapeutic. For most toxins and traditional
(b)(3)
(b)(1 ))(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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agents other than nerve gases, treatment so far is
solely supportive and palliative. Considerable
research is under way on immunization and
antidotes, but in the absence of identification of
agents, little progress can be expected.
� Protection. In personal protective ensembles,
clothing, masks, and so forth, the respirator
cannister has the greatest potential for compro-
mise. Multiple-access routes to target organs en-
hance the likelihood of defeating protective
measures. Mixtures of agents could provide an
especially effective means of target access, with
one serving primarily to defeat protective gear
and the other providing a lethal concentration of
agent. At present, continuously operating collec-
tive protection systems for command posts, vehi-
cles, ships, and aircraft offer one solution for
protection against toxic agents.
� Decontamination. Decontamination from toxin
exposure is probably more readily accomplished
than from the more persistent standard agents.
For example, VX and thickened mustard are
gummy and hard to remove, whereas some toxins
when exposed to sunlight and oxygen, are inacti-
vated and others can be washed away with
water. Nonetheless, because of their potency,
persistence, and low detectability, toxins could
pose a significant hazard.
Implications
64. The use of unknown combinations of chemical
and toxin weapons in local conflicts and the prolifera-
tion of such weapons to a growing number of countries
raise two serious concerns.
65. One is the increased likelihood that US and
allied forces deployed to Third World regions either as
combatants or in a peacekeeping or advisory role may
become deliberate or unintended targets of chemical
or toxin attacks. Such attacks could be visited upon
Western forces quite independently of any direct
Soviet role. Western forces will have to be prepared to
protect themselves against such an eventuality.
66. A second and far more serious concern is the
disparity that is now apparent between Soviet and
Western capabilities for and attitudes toward chemical
and toxin warfare. The glaring deficiencies NATO
15
forces display in their offensive and protective chemi-
cal posture add up to an inability to detect agents and
to disseminate warning; inability to perform combat
roles in protective ensembles; critical limitations in
nighttime reconnaissance, and so forth. All these call
into question the survivability and combat effective-
ness of NATO forces in a chemical- or toxin-contami-
nated environment�an environment that can only be
characterized as chaotic, one in which mass casualties
and reduced medical and materiel support would
heighten psychological stress and severely degrade
individual and unit effectiveness.
67. These deficiencies are particularly troubling in
view of what we now believe to be the capacity of
Warsaw Pact forces to employ novel combinations of
agents that can be neither identified nor effectively
protected against. It also opens up worrisome possibili-
ties for deceptive tactics designed to degrade the
NATO force posture, such as, by combining an irritant
with battlefield smokes to cause a unit needlessly to
don its protective masks or ensembles, significantly
degrading its effectiveness. The use or threatened use
of these weapons thus could yield psychological as well
as tactical benefits.
68. Given the disparities in capabilities, the mili-
tarily significant possibilities these weapons offer, and
the increased likelihood that they will be used, the
need for a determined reassessment of the NATO
chemical posture seems inescapable, even in the face
of the political resistance such a reassessment would
encounter.
Implications for Intelligence
69. Historically, both collection and analysis of
intelligence on chemical and biological warfare have
suffered from persistently low priority. Not until after
the 1973 Yom Kippur war did the issue receive some
recognition, but because priorities are assigned by
country, the chemical warfare function still remains
underemphasized worldwide.'
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71. As is true for other weapon systems, our greatest
difficulty is in obtaining early indications of newly
emerging weapons while they are still in the research
and exploratory development stages. But unlike most
other systems, chemical and toxin munitions can be
deployed and perhaps even employed without our
being able to assess their characteristics (a tank, after
all, has a turret, guns, and other features that can be
seen and measured�a gas is usually invisible and
usually leaves no discernible trace).
16
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ANNEX A
EVIDENCE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND AFGHANISTAN
The Findings
1, A Special National Intelligence Estimate of Feb-
ruary 1982, subsequently updated and reaffirmed in a
Memorandum to Holders in March 1983, found that:
� Lao and Vietnamese forces, assisted by Soviet
logistics and supervision, have used lethal chemi-
cal agents against H'Mong resistance forces and
villages since at least 1976, and trichothecene
mycotoxins have been positively identified as
ingredients in one of the classes of agents used.
Other types of chemical agents have been used
also.
� Vietnamese forces have used trichothecene toxins
and a variety of chemical agents against Kampu-
chean troops and Khmer villages since at least
1978.
� The only hypothesis consistent with all the evi-
dence is that the trichothecene toxins were devel-
oped in the Soviet Union, provided to the Lao
and Vietnamese, either directly or through trans-
mission of technical know-how, and made into
weapons with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam,
and Kampuchea. It is highly probable that the
USSR also provided other chemical warfare
agents.
� Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used lethal and
casualty-producing agents on Mujahedin resist-
ance forces and Afghan villages since the Soviet
invasion in December 1979. Evidence of the use
of mycotoxins has been obtained through sample
analysis.
The Evidence
HUMINT
Special Intelligence Including Photography
(b)(1)
(b)(3)_
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
A-1
-tSCS.Q.
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Medical Data
5. Medical reporting including histories and physi-
cal examinations obtained by qualified specialists in
tropical medicine, chemical agent effects, internal
medicine and dermatology, and forensic medicine
have led to the conclusion that lethal agents, including
small molecular-weight mycotoxins, have been used.
Limited autopsy data available from all three coun-
tries support the conclusion that chemicals exogenous-
ly supplied by weapons rather than through natural
disease explain the preponderance of the findings. Not
one qualified physician who has examined victims
alleging to have experienced chemical attacks has
accepted any alternative explanation as plausible. Sim-
ilarly, interv!ews we accepted for analysis were con-
ducted by qualified individuals with training in sociol-
ogy and anthropology. Possibilities of systematic bias
due to cross-cultural misunderstanding, language bar-
riers, folkways peculiarities, and magical thinking are
essentially ruled out.
Scientific-Sample Evidence
6. The United States has processed approximately
750 discreet physical and biological specimens from
attack sites and victims. Scientists)
Ihave found in these samples or
analyses evidence of toxins and other lethal chemicals.
Physical and biological control samples have been
acquired in many cases. In none of these controls has
the presence of any lethal chemical agent been noted.
Furthermore, the particular chemicals and, in general
terms, their concentrations found in many samples
(when information is available) have been internally
consistent with the stories of human observers present
at the site of the specific alleged attacks from which
they were taken. These consistencies have included
method of delivery, symptoms in animals and
humans, and aftereffects. In several cases physical
and biological samples have been independently ac-
quired from the same sites by different groups. And
in a number of cases, controls have also been obtained
from the periphery of these attack sites and from age
and sex matched control cohorts. A growing list of
additional countries are finding independent confir-
mation of their own,/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Note on Methodology
7. Attack data from the above classes were re-
viewed, recorded, tabulated, and screened for dupli-
cation and inconsistency. Attack tables which have
been generated in previous assessments were primari-
ly compiled to include only those events that could be
confirmed by more than one class of data. All sample
evidence of either physical or biological nature was
double blinded and submitted with controls. No false
positives have been discovered throughout these pro-
cedures. All community analyses have been scruti-
nized by an outside panel of fully cleared nongovern-
ment specialists in medicine, chemistry, and the
social sciences. Experts from other countries were also
consulted. No alternative scientific or technical expla-
nation has been proffered that diverges from the
conclusions expressed in the Special National Intelli- (b)(3)
gence Estimates. Alternative hypotheses ranging from
serious to fanciful have been considered and, after
investigation, rejected on grounds of scientific inde-
fensibility.><
A-2
--SE6RE.L_
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ANNEX B
SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF TOXINS
1. The use of a variety of lethal chemical agents in
Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has been largely
overshadowed by the discovery of a single new
agent�trichothecene mycotoxins�a component of
-yellow rain.*-_.
2. Much remains unknown about the overall Soviet
chemical warfare (CW) program. We have a fairly
good understanding of its historical development,
some sense of its research direction, but only sketchy
knowledge of current doctrine. Some delivery systems
for classical CW agents are known, dispersion patterns
and concentrations for such agents have been project-
ed, and fatality estimates formulated. No such pletho-
ra of data exists for new chemical agents and toxins
that have been employed in these regional conflicts.
Recent intelligence attention to Soviet toxin research
has brought to light some additional information that
raises our concern about the threat we face
3. Until recently, US intelligence on toxic agents of
interest to the Warsaw Pact has emphasized those
agents known to exist during and shortly after World
War H, such as the mustards and nerve agents.
Evidence exists, however, that the use of toxins as
combat weapons is not a newly developed or experi-
mental Warsaw Pact concept, but that the trichothe-
cenes may have been part of the Soviet arsenal for
decades
4. A 1951 intelligence report written by a captured
German chemical warfare expert, Dr. Walter Hirsch,
contained detailed information on Soviet chemical
R&D programs from 1939 to 1945, resulting from his
Soviet POW interrogations. Among the new war gases
under development in the Soviet Union during that
period was a "powdery, yellow-brown" agent called
lebeda. The word lebeda in Russian refers to a millet-
like feed extender, an indirect reference, no doubt, to
the trichothecene-contaminated millet that caused the
devastating disease outbreaks in Orenburg in the
B-1
Soviet Union during and after World War II. Begin-
ning in 1941 and continuing until Hirsch's capture, the
new agent lebeda was mentioned repeatedly by Soviet
prisoners of war who had technical training or connec-
tions with Soviet CW schools. Hirsch was not able to
identify the agent on the basis of its described proper-
ties, but noted an array of symptoms that bear striking
similarity to those observed in yellow rain victims.
Interestingly, the agent was also described as being
disseminated in munitions or as an aircraft spray.
5. A prominent scientist who left the Soviet Union
in 1958 has provided additional insight into Soviet
trichothecene R&D. As an investigator of the Oren-
burg outbreak, he traced the origin of the epidemic to
natural contamination of grain sources by toxin-pro-
ducing Fusaria. Having identified optimal conditions
for toxin production by the fungi, he was ordered to
supply large amounts of toxic culture extracts to other
Soviet scientists for classified research projects. Subse-
quent Soviet toxicity studies in humans involved addi-
tion of various doses of the toxic material to ground
meat which was then fed to political prisoners, and the
course of development of toxic effects was monitored.
Inhalation experiments were also conducted using
monkeys. Techniques for enhancement of toxic effects
by combining toxins of different types were also
investigated. Extensive debriefings of this source have
led us to conclude that his technical bona fides are
impeccable and that the striking claims he continues to
recall and support are highly credible.
6. The Soviet Union has maintained active research
projects in all aspects of natural toxin research on a
scale many times more extensive than one would
expect solely on the basis of agrotechnological or
epidemiological R&D. The research is well supported,
involves both military and civilian investigators, and in
many cases has been linked with facilities associated
with CBW research and development.
no change in the level of these
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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"St-GREJ:
TICTOR1171,40C-ONT-RAC-T4QACahl
activities occurred after ratification of the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention.
B-2
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1
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Approved for Release: 2015/07/08 005258370
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