THE CUBAN CRISIS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06516304
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02757
• Publication Date: October 26, 1962

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
THE OMAN CRISIS
The Soviet leaders, faced
with the dangerous consequences
of a major miscalculation of US
intentions regarding strategic
missiles in Cuba, have taken a
variety of measures to minimize
the damage to the USSR's pres-
tige and interests and to deter
direct US military intervention
in Cuba. Moscow's cautious
reaction to President Kennedy's
22 October speech was contrived
to avoid commitments to specific
countermeasures without giving
an appearance of acquiescing to
the measures announced by the
President. Khrushchev's pres-
ent intention, as reflected
in the diversion of Soviet ships
away from the US quarantine zone
and in his call for a summit
meeting, apparently is to avoid
incidents which might make the
crisis more difficult to control
and to rely primarily on polit-
ical pressures to forestall
further US actions in Cuba
There are no indications that
the USSR is planning retaliatory
actions in other areas, such as
Berlin or Southeast Asia.
Moscow's initial reaction
to President Kennedy's speech
was intended to underscore the
USSR's military preparedness
to meet any eventualities. The
commander in chief of the War-
saw Pact forces, Marshal Grechko
ordered pact representatives in
Moscow to increase the military
readiness of member nations.
Defense Minister Malinovsky re-
ported to the Soviet Government
on measures to raise the "battle
readiness" of Soviet armed
forces. Two days later, Mali-
novsky repeated earlier Soviet
claims of a "mighty and in-
vulnerable" global rocket and
of the capability to destroy
enemy rockets in flight. Mos-
cow also announced that all
military leaves had been can-
celed and that release from
active duty for members of the
strategic rocket forces, anti-
26 Oct 62
aircraft defense forces, and
the submarine fleet had been
postponed until further notice.
The Soviet Government state-
ment of 23 October, warning that
the US is "recklessly playing
with fire," was aimed primarily
at gaining time and placing
the US on the defensive while
Moscow attempts to generate
growing pressures on the US
which, the Soviets hope, will
deter further US military action
and oblige the US to ease the
quarantine on shipping. The
statement carefully refrained
from specifying the USSR's
reaction to the quarantine and
to possible US military action
to remove the strategic missiles
in Cub. It evaded the central
issue of the missiles and re-
affirmed the claim in Moscow's
statements in September that
the military equipment being
sent to Cuba is "designed ex-
clusively for defensive pur-
poses." It sought to play
down the USSR's role in the
crisis by portraying the con-
flict as one between *MWM and
the US.
Moscow's statement replied
only indirectly to President
Kennedy's warning of US nuclear
retaliation against the USSR
if any nuclear missiles should
be launched from Cubal against
any nation in the Western
emisphere. It stated that So-
viet nuclear weapons will never
be used for aggressive purposes
but added a vague and ambiguous
warning that the "Soviet Union
will strike a very powerful re-
taliatory blow" if the "ag-
gressors touch off a war."
Although the statement
denounced the US quarantine
and denied Washington's right
to halt and inspect foreign
vessels on the open seas, it
avoided any hints of Soviet
reaction beyond stating th t
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the USSR "resolutely rejects
such claims." The statement
also implied that the USSR will
seek to circumvent the US de-
mand for the prompt dismantling
and withdrawal of all offensive
weapons by contending that all
military equipment in *17711 is
defensive and owned by NW%
Moscow termed the US demand as
one which "naturally no state
which values its independence
can meet."
Although the Soviet state-
ment did not unequivocally deny
President Kennedy's statement
about the presence of strategic
missiles in ABM!, Soviet spokes-
men and propaganda have attempted
to cast doubt on the authenticity
of US information. The state-
ment dealt only indirectly with
this question by noting that the
US accuses Cuba' of "allegedly
creating a threat to US security"
and termed this allegation
"hypocrisy." Soviet UN delegate
Zorin, however, charged that US
"fabrications" were designed to
persuade the UN Security Council
to "approve retroactively" US
aggressive acts against u
He claimed that the US had failed
to present proof of its charges.
Moscow radio on 24 October as-
serted that the US Defense
Department had produced "some
kind of faked photographs taken
from spy planes" to justify its
"aggressive acts." It said the
"big lie" spread by Washington
is aimed at justifying "far-
reaching aggressive actions."
The Soviet ambassador to Mexico
;publicly denied that there is
an "arsenal of Soviet aims" in
,and a Soviet diplomat in
Britain said Soviet weapons
supplied to Cuba are not equipped
with nuclear warheads.
Cuba
The Soviet statemrsnt of 23
October again sought to justify
Moscow's military presence in
by pointing to the deploy-
ment of US forces and armaments
throughout the world and to US
rejection of Soviet proposals
Mi
26 Oct 62
for withdrawal of all foreign
forces from alien territories.
Future Tactics
Khrushchev's call for a
"meeting at the highest level"
suggests that the Soviet leaders
believe that time will work to
their advantage and provide grow-
ing opportunities to press the
US to agree to enter negotiations
with Cuba and the USSR and pos-
sibly to suspend implementation
of the quarantine and other
measures. In his reply to a mes-
sage from Bertrand Russell, Khru-
shchev sought to contrast Soviet
and US positions by pledging
that the USSR will do everything
in its power to avert war. He
said Moscow will avoid "reckless
decisions" and will not allow
itself to be "provoked" by US
actions. He also tried to en-
hance the urgency of a summit
meeting by warning that if the
US carries out its announced
"program of pirate action," the
USSR would have no alternative
but to "make use �of the means
of defense against the aggressor."
He added that US "aggression"
against WTIRM would render a sum-
mit meeting "impossible and use-
less."
The Soviet leaders are
seeking to convey an impression
of composure and discipline in
dealing with the Cuban crisis.
Khrushchev and other top Soviet
leaders went backstage to greet
an American opera singer after
a performance on 24 October. The
performances of other US cultural
groups in the USSR received an
unusually cordial reception on
23 October. The demonstrations
in front of the US Embassy in
Moscow on 24 October were per-
functory by comparison with other
demonstrations.
Gromyko made a demonstrative
stop in East Berlin on his trip
back to Moscow from New York.
His public remarks there on 24
October, however, contained no
s 1r
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
hint of Soviet retaliatory
action against the Western
position in Berlin. He re-
stated the Soviet position
that an agreement with the
West is possible but only on
the condition that Western
"occupation troops" are with-
drawn and East German sovereignty
is respected. He avoided any
mention of a deadline but
declared that the West should
realize that the East German
i*,00140Y.
-MAN
SoiNk
GUANAJAY
�
IRBM COMPLEX
frontiers are "firmly and
reliably secured." Soviet
propaganda continued to play
down the possibility of a "new
Berlin crisis" in the near
future and professed to see a
"more realistic approach" to
the German problem at the UN
General Assembly.
Missiles in Cuba
It now is apparent that
the deployment to Cuba of So-
viet offensive missiles and
associated construction equip-
ment and prefabricated materials
began last spring. Necessary
surveying, road construction,
and initial building con-
struction were mostly concen-
trated in August, September,
and October.
26 Oct 62
There are nine Soviet of-
fensive miaailla sites in LubA.
Five sites--all for 1,100-mile
.medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs)--appear to be fully
operational. One additional
MRBM site is expected to be-
come fully operational on 28
October. One 2,200-mile inter-
mediate-range ballistic mtasilel
(IRBM) site may become operational
by 1 December, the other two
by 15 December.
LOCATIONS OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IN CUBA
too
.1.(fricAL,MIL ES
3236
" ."�
,
EMEDIOS IRBM
Four MRBM sites are grouped
in the San Cristobal area of
western Cuba, and two are near
Sagua la Grande. Each has or
will have four launchers with
at least two missiles for each
launcher.
Two fixed sites for IRBM
missiles are in the Guanajay
area near Havana. One IRBM
site is near Remedios, and .there
probably is a second, companion
site there. Each of the IRBM
sites has four launch pads.
There is no positive evi-
dence that nuclear warheads for
these missiles are present in
. However, certain buildings
under construction at the sites
appear to be for storage of
nuclear weapons.
Cuba
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CURRENT It WEEKLY SUMMARY
Site. Of unidentified activity, ,
possibly missile related
�
o 'Confirmed surface-to-air nrissifq (SAM) site
� Possible SAM site, exact, location unknown
Support facility for processing equipment
Airfield with trlfG aircraft
,
0 Coastal defense cruise-missile site
..;.--�Effective air defense perimeter
(estimated radius: 20-25 nautical miles)
The 24 Soviet surface-to-
air (SAM) sites in CY115-4 now are
in operational status and give
air defense cover to most of
Cuba
Other Weapons
In addition to the MRBM and
IRBM deployment and. the SAM de-
fensive system, there are three
known short-range cruise-missile
sites in Cuba and 12 short-range
missile-equipped KOMAR motor
torpedo boats.
Aircraft counts at the
various fields show a total
of 22 IL-28 (Beagle) medium
jet bombers at San Julian in
extreme western C-i15Th None
have been observed else-
where.
Jet fighters are concen-
trated in areas near surface-to
-surface mtswilei installations.
All 39 known MIG-21s (Fishbeds)
are at Santa Clara airfield in
central Cuba', about midway be-
26 Oct 62
CAVGWE
tween the Sagua Grande MRBM site
and the IRBM site near Guanajay.
As many as 26 MIG-15s
(Fagots) and 9 MIG-19s (Farmers)
recently have been located at
the Cuban Air Force Headquarters
base at San Antonio de los Banos,
south of Havana and near both
the IRBM installation at Guana-
jay and the MRBM sites at San
Cristobal.
Thirteen IL-14 (Crate) trans-
port aircraft have been noted at
nearby Playa Baracoa. Two other
unidentified transports are
located here also, and there is
one apiece at San Antonio de los
Banos and at Camaguey. As many
as AO helicopters have been re-
ported at Playa Baracoa air-
field, cubes major heliport.
Cuban Reaction to President's
Speech
Cuba
reaction to the US
moves of 22 October has been.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
cautious. The high level of mili-
tary alert continues, but Castro's
public response to the crisis has
been relatively restrained. His
speech on 23 October--unusual in
that it was not the occasion for
a mass public demonstration--was
comparatively mild, full of stereo-
typed references to "the inevitable
triumph?! of the Cuban revolution
over "Yankee imperialism." The
speech explicitly rejected any in-
spection of Cuban territory by
foreign nationals. The subdued
tone of the Castro speech and the
lack of significant comment by
other Cuban leaders since may be
a result of close consultation
with Soviet authorities.
Non-Cuban press represent-
atives in Cuba l report the city to
be calm and relatively normal,
with none of the confusion and
disorganization that accompanied
the mobilization prior to the in-
vasion of 1961.
Nonbloc Reaction
Official and unofficial ex-
pressions of support, sympathy,
or understanding for the US
position on Cuba--either overtly
or privately expressed by govern-
ment leaders--have reached an
impressive volume from all parts
of the world. Nations from which
such expressions have recently
been received are Italy, Portugal,
Luxembourg, Belgium, Switzerland,
Iran, India, Thailand, Congo
(Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica,
and Panama. Among the very few
nations or groups expressing open
opposition to the US stand was
the Algerian National Liberation
Front, which terms the quarantine
of Cad an intolerable .inter-
ference in the internal affairs
of that country." An official
Iraqi statement also says the US
quarantine is a "flagrant vio-
lation of the principle of freedom
of the international seas" and
a "regression for the organiza-
tion of international society."
26 Oct 62
An Air Cubana plane com-
ing from Prague made a technical
stop at Goose Bay, Labrador, on
23 October and was searched by
Canadian authorities before being
allowed to continue to Havana.
Two East German Kt-is:a-tie technicians
and five Czech technicians were
on board.
In Latin America, military
support for the quarantine action
has been offered by Argentina,
Guatemala, Peru, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, and
Honduras. Enthusiastic backing
for the US position is reported
among the Chilean armed forces,
particularly on the part of air
force officers. The Argentine
Government has offered two
destroyers on three days' notice,
with a submarine, a marine bat-
talion with transport, and other
units if required later. The
Argentine Air Force commander
has sent messages to General
LeMay and other hemisphere air
force commanders pledging read-
iness to participate in any
joint measures required by the
Cuban crisis.
The Peruvian offer is
qualified by a requirement of
unanimous approval of the OAS
resolution. The Uruguayan Gov-
ernment, according to press re-
ports, has now decided to sup-
port the OAS resolution, but
with certain reservations on
the use of armed force.
President Duvalier of aiti
and Preeident Rivera of El
Salvador have announced support
for the quarantine policy. Presi-
dent Goulart of Bfffl, however,
apparently seeks a mediatory role.
Demonstrations of opposition
in Latin America remain scattered
and ineffective. The Communists
appear reluctant to commit them-
selves to a major effort in the
face of widespread official and
public acceptance of the US
position
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