SOVIET PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OG NEW BCW AGENTS
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Director t Approved for Release: 2015/01/05 005495022
ii
1Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT .�
OR MARK ON
Soviet Program for
Development of
New BCW AgentOsk
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
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NI IIM 85-10009
SOVIET PROGRAM FOR
DEVELOPMENT OF
NEW BCW AGENTS
Information available as of 9 September 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
To ret
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE 1
KEY JUDGMENTS 3
7
DISCUSSION
ANNEX A: Genetic Engineering Tutorial 21
ANNEX B: Biotechnology Development in the USSR 23
ANNEX F: Agent Potential 43
OlTheer.eL
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PREFACE
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum addresses a Soviet
program that uses advanced biotechnologies to derive biological and
chemical warfare (BCW) agents,
Traditional
BW and CW development programs are not within the scope of this
paper. (s NF)
This publication was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer at Large.
The paper was coordinated within CIA and with the
Foreign Science and Technology Center, the Foreign Technology
Division, the National Security Agency, the Naval Intelligence Support
Center, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center. (s)
1
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Over the past decade the Soviet Union has expanded its traditional
R&D program for developing new biological and chemical warfare
(BCW) agents to include a program that applies advances in biotech-
nologies such as genetic engineering. This means that the Soviets may in
the future be able to develop a much broader range of agents than was
heretofore possible. Because of the program's organization, it would be
possible to limit the scope to research and such development and testing
as might be considered acceptable for defensive purposes, and yet
produce sufficient quantities of agents for weaponization within months
of production initiation.
This has implications for assessing compliance with the Biological
Weapons Convention. We do not know what impact the development of
such BCW agents may have on Soviet BCW employment doctrine"
The duration of the research program and assessment of openly
published Soviet biotechnology research suggest that limited testing of
prototype agents may have occurred as early as 1981. More extensive
test range evaluation may have begun at any time subsequently.
Although testing activities have been documented in the Soviet Union,
existing data do not incontrovertibly tie agents produced within this
program with those activities. If our timetable assessments are accurate,
however, prototype agents could now be available for limited use,
clandestinely or by surrogates in remote locations. We do not believe
the agents are currently available in large quantities.
There is a potential for unrecognized use of these agents because
they could mimic naturally occurring epidemics. Similarly, unknown
agents might be used for wide-scale destruction of crops or livestock.
3
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The range of agents that could result from this program includes:
� Infectious agents that are naturally occurring but have been
modified to enhance weaponization potential.
Compounds that normally are present in the body in minute
quantities. These compounds can produce a wide range of
deleterious effects if introduced in higher-than-normal concen-
trations or if genetic or chemical manipulation has been used to
alter their structure or activity.
� Toxins not normally found in humans but derived from other
organisms, such as bacteria, fungi, plants, and some animals,
could also be altered or synthesized for use as agents
The effects caused by these potential agents could range from
emotional and behavioral changes to physical effects such as extreme
pain, rapid induction of sleep, hemorrhage, and death. Properties could
conceivably be tailored to specific field requirements for stability,
persistence, dissemination, and rapidity of effect. In a field setting,
there would surely be an unquantifiable psychological impact on
combat units subjected to such agents, and the psychological stress could
severely degrade morale and impair combat effectiveness.
the Soviets can
develop vaccines or other medical protection specific for the agents to
be deployed. This would allow them to operate without restrictive
physical protection in a contaminated area
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The organization of major aspects of this program differs from our
perception of the traditional BCW program in that R&D activities are
reportedly to be carried out in classified research establishments
scattered across the USSR, and the resultant organisms�agents them-
selves or agent-producing�held there in small quantities until required
for use. At that time these -seed- cultures would be shipped to a
number of predesignated and specially equipped Microbiological Indus-
try production plants otherwise normally engaged in producing materi-
als for civilian use. Conversion of these plants to agent production could
probably be accomplished in days to weeks. There is thus no need for
large-scale agent storage over a long term. In addition, several different
agents could be produced rapidly at these plants with little need for
large amounts of precursor compounds and no need for additional
conversion
The support that has been given to Soviet molecular genetics and
biochemical research has allowed the scientists to achieve quickly a high
level of competence in using sophisticated techniques. Whereas the
Soviets' research has generally lagged Western (especially US) state of
the art, their capabilities when targeted in this fashion are sufficient to
carry out the R&D required for development of these agents.
Western technology acquisition has been central to the rapid
progress of biotechnology development in the USSR. The United States,
however, is no longer the principal direct supplier of biotechnology
research expertise to the USSR and in the last decade increasingly has
been supplanted by other Western nations as suppliers of research
equipment and materials. Curtailment of technology transfer from the
United States might temporarily slow research progress but would not
prove a permanent impediment.
5
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� As already demonstrated by the -yellow rain- usage in South-
east Asia, both detecting and documenting deliberate use of
unidentified BCW agents are difficult.
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ANNEX A
Genetic Engineering Tutorial
I. The term -genetic engineering- often is used
interchangeably with the term -recombinant DNA,-
but they are not synonymous. Genetic engineering
refers to the capability to modify the genetic charac-
teristics of cells or organisms at the molecular level. It
depends upon a broad spectrum of advanced basic and
applied research techniques that have evolved from
molecular biology and related research in biochemical
genetics and cell physiology. Through genetic engi-
neering, production of microorganisms and biochemi-
cals from them can be enhanced
2. Recombinant genetics encompasses only that spe-
cialized area of genetic engineering in which new
genetic material is placed into (chemically recombined
into) a host organism in order to alter that organism's
properties. The transferred genetic material may be
taken from another organism or synthesized in the
laboratory. The altered�recombinant�organisms
may themselves be the product, or they may be
cultured in a fermentation system to produce other-
wise unobtainable quantities of a desired biochemical.
3. Only over the past decade have researchers
achieved the major scientific and technical break-
21
throughs that allow purposeful manipulation of the
genetic properties of living organisms, particularly
small organisms like bacteria and viruses. The United
States, followed by Western Europe and Japan, has
been at the forefront of these biotechnology develop-
ments and has consistently maintained a molecular
genetics research program that is broader in scope and
more advanced overall than anywhere else in the
world. In recent years, private industry in the West
(but, again, to the greatest extent in the United States)
has begun attempting to exploit these new molecular
genetics techniques to produce and market commer-
cially important compounds".***(1
4. Industrial applications have focused largely on
production of pharmaceuticals and other chemicals
that now can be produced more cheaply and in
greater quantities than was previously possible. Other
commercial applications include such things as bacte-
rially enhanced mining, oil recovery, and agricultural
production, as well as pest control and the production
of fibers and plastics. Scientific studies have included
exploration of the mechanisms of brain and central
nervous system function, and other physiologic re-
search.
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ANNEX B
Biotechnology Development in the USSR
1. The development of modern biotechnology is a
major objective of Soviet science. From official Soviet
publications we know that biotechnology has captured
the attention of the party Central Committee and the
Council of Ministers as providing potential solutions to
longstanding internal problems in such areas as agri-
culture and medicine. In 1981 the Soviets established
an Interagency Scientific and Technical Council to
coordinate the civilian biotechnology research and
development spread among four ministries, the Acade-
my of Sciences, the Academy of Medical Sciences, and
the Microbiological Industry. The emphasis in the
civilian program is on research directed toward utili-
tarian and commercially marketable products such as
pharmaceuticals, synthetic fuels, food and food addi-
tives, and toward biodegradation of substances that
resist natural decomposition.
2. A publication describing research of the Institute
of Bioorganic Chemistry, Moscow, whose chief is
Yuriy Ovchinnikov, states that the S&T Council�also
headed by Ovchinnikov�plans and coordinates the
research and technological developments in physico-
chemical biology and biotechnology of more than 200
scientific institutions within the USSR Academy of
Sciences, Academies of Sciences in the Soviet repub-
lics, the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural
Sciences, the Academy of Medical Sciences of the
USSR, the Public Health Ministry, the Ministry of
Agriculture, the Ministry of Higher Education, the
Central Board of the Microbiological Industry of the
USSR ((;lavmikrobioprom), and others.
3. Soviet expansion in biotechnology generally has
mirrored that which has taken place in the West with
a lag time of two to four years. Although fewer in
number than their Western counterparts, some Soviet
molecular biologists, concentrating on basic and ap-
plied sciences, have proved to be just as technically
competent. Currently there are more than 75 institutes
and universities in the Soviet Union with basic and
applied genetic-engineering and related research pro-
grams.
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4. Despite significant expansion within the last five
years, the Soviet research effort is still technically
inferior to that of the United States. Nonetheless,
innovative research and state-of-the-art technological
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6. It is our judgment that Western technology ac-
quisition has been central to the rapid progress of
biotechnology development in the USSR. The United
States is no longer the principal direct supplier of
biotechnology research equipment and expertise to the
USSR, having been in the last decade increasingly
supplanted by other Western nations.
7. Since the late 1970s, the Soviets have expanded
their genetic-engineering methodology base by coordi-
nating and planning programs and training scientists at
home and abroad, In addition, they have utilized a
wide range of open and clandestine methods for
collecting information. By utilizing open literature,
scientist-to-scientist exchanges, and acquisition of
Western data bases and research products, the Soviet
Union has reduced its need to develop the broad
scientific base required by Western countries for
progress. By capitalizing on acquisition of Western
technology, the Soviets have been able to begin at the
midpoint in the learning curve and avoid taking costly
risks. We expect that the Soviets will excel in specific
targeted areas of genetic engineering/biotechnology.
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ANNEX F
Agent Potential
1. Biotechnology-derived warfare agents compose
two distinct classes or groups of agents:
� Naturally occurring infectious agents and those
genetically enhanced to increase their potential
for weaponization, or organisms into which the
biological machinery to produce a foreign sub-
stance has been introduced.
� Bioregulators, " toxins, venoms, and their biolog-
ically active subfractions, produced through ge-
netic engineering/biotechnical means
Depending on the type of agent and route of adminis-
tration, the effects can range from incapacitation to
rapid death. (c)
Infectious Agents
2. Infectious agents can be altered by laboratory
modification of the genetic material so the organism is
more virulent (the ability to overcome body defenses)
and/or is drug resistant:
One example of such an effort�production of a
pathogenic tularemia strain resistant to the anti-
biotic spectinomycin�was published by re-
searchers at the Scientific Research Institute of
Epidemiology and Microbiology imeni N. F.
Gamaleya in Moscow. These researchers used
classical genetic techniques to derive the antibi-
otic-resistant strain, rather than the new genetic-
engineering methodologies. (See annex A.)
" Bioregulators are compounds that are essential for the normal
psychological and physiological functions of a living organism. Many
are found in the human body in minute concentrations. Alternate
forms may be synthesized to mimic or enhance their effects. These
low-molecular-weight compounds are usually peptides (components
of proteins made up of amino acids). They include neuroregulators
and neurotransmitters of the central nervous system, protein hor-
mones, and enzymes produced in other parts of the body. These
compounds can cause a wide range of harmful effects if introduced
at higher-than-normal concentrations or following genetic or chemi-
cal manipulations that would, for example, change specificity or
duration of action.
43
4. A third method of changing an infective organ-
ism is to incorporate genetic coding to make the
organism more stable to aerosolization and exposure to
environmental factors. Several environmental factors
such as ultraviolet light (sunlight), varying atmospheric
humidity, extreme temperatures, and dehydration
cause microorganisms to lose infectivity and viability:
genetically engineered E. coli that will survive
the environmental hazards encountered by an
aerosolized warfare agent.
� This hardy organism�or some other potential
vector�could carry a gene coding for the pro-
duction of a toxin, venom fraction, or other
bioregulator.1
Bioregulators
5. The bioregulators that might be used in warfare
would incapacitate by causing psychological effects
such as the inability to act or make decisions; inappro-
priate response to specific danger; a heightened aware-
ness of pain; and analgesia (no sense of pain). Howev-
er, depending on factors such as dose and route of
administration, they could be lethal.$),
" E. coli is normally present in the body and is necessary for the
proper functioning of human digestion. Since the inception of
recombinant DNA methodology, more than a decade ago, E. coli
has been the standard vehicle used for genetic engineering ,
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