LETTER TO ROY L. ASH FROM W. E. COLBY RE SIX COPIES OF A DRAFT BILL, " TO AMEND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED"
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
01482080
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date:
August 7, 2017
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2007-00094
Publication Date:
January 14, 1974
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
letter to roy l. ash from[15132279].pdf | 153.66 KB |
Body:
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CENTRAL. Nrce.T.LI..:GENCL' AGENCY
V1i,SHING70N, D.C. 20.5Ci5
1 t JA 1974
Honorable Roy L. Ash, �Director
Offiee of Management and Budget �
Washington, D. C. 20503
Dear Mr. Ash:
This submits proposed legislation in accordance with Office of
Management and Budget Circular No. A-19, revised. Enclosed are
six copies of a draft bill, "To amend the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended." Also enclosed are copies of a sectional analysis, a
comparison with existing law, cost analysis, and drafts of the letters
of transmittal to the President of.the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
The proposed legislation amends Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 by adding a new subsection (g) defining "information
relating to intelligence sources and methods" as a separate category of
classified information to be accorded statutory recognition and protection
similar to that provided "Restricted Data" under the Atomic Energy Act.
The proposed law grants the Director of Central Intelligence the authority
to issue rules and regulations limiting the dissemination of information
related to intelligence sources and methods of collection and provides
for a criminal penalty for the disclosure of such information to
unauthorized persons and for injunctive relief.
The continued effectiveness of the United States foreign intelligence
:collection effort is dependent upon the adequate protection of the intelli-
gence sources and methods involved. In recognition of this, Congress,
Under Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, made the
Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the protection of intelli-
gence .sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure... Unfortunately,
there is' no statutory authority to implement this responsibility. In
recent times, serious damage to our foreign intelligence effort has
resulted from unauthorized disclosures of information related to inteltigence
sources and method. The circumsta.nees of these dis(tlooures precluded
punitive criminal action.
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In most cases, existing law is ineffective in preventing disclosures
of information relating to intelligence sources and methods. Except in
cases involving communications intelligence, no criminal action lies
against persons disclosing classified information without authorization
unless it is furnished to a representative of a foreign power or the
disclosure is made with intent to harm the United States or aid. a foreig,n.
power. It also requires the revelation in open court of confirming
or additional information of such a nature that the potential damage to
the national security precludes prosecution. Furthermore, prevention
of disclosure in order to avoid serious damage to the intelligence
collection effort better serves the national interest than punishment
after disclosure; however, there is no existing statutory authority for
injunctive relief.
The greatest risks of disclosure come from persons who are
entrusted with information relating to intelligence sources and methods
through a privity of relationship with the U.S. Government. When such
persons, without authorization, disclose information to representatives
of the public media, it receives wide publication, and, of course, is
. revealed to the foreign nations which may be the subject of or otherwise
involved in the intelligence activities, leading to their termination as
well as political or diplomatic difficulties.
fully effective security program might require legislation to
encompass the willful disclosures of classified information by all persons
knowing or having reason to know of its sensitivity. However, in order
to limit the free circulation of information in our American society only
to the degree essential to the conduct of a national foreign intelligence
effort, this legislation proposes that prosecution be provided only for
persons who have authorized possession of such information or acquire
it through a privity of relationship to the Government. Other persons
collaterally involved in any offense would not be subject to prosecution.
Further, disclosures to Congress upon lawful demand would be expressly
excluded from the provisions of the proposed law.
In order to provide adequate safeguards to an accused, while at
the same time preventing damaging disclosures during the course of
prosecution, subsection (g)(5) provides; or an in camera determinatioi
by the court of the reasonableness of the d'eSignation for limited
distribution of the information upon which prosecution is brought.
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Finally, in order to prevent disclosures, subsection (g)(6)
provides statutory authority for the enjoinder of threatened acts in
violation ol the subsection upon a showing by the Director of Central
Intelligence that any person is about to commit a violation of.the
subsection or any rule and regulation issued thereunder.
Your advice is requested as to whether there is any objection
to the submission of the proposed legislation .to the Congress from,
the standpoint of the Administration' 5 program.
� �
Sincerely,
(-4
w. E. Colby
Director
Enclosures
cc; Chairman and Members of PFI.AB
Chairman and Members of NSC..IC
� Members of USIB
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