THE "PENTAGON PAPERS"

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01482296
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: July 8, 1971

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8 July 191
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The "Pentagon Papers"
Ba.ckgrotra
1. The set of--documents that has become informally termed the
� "Pen.'-gon Papers" is in fact a study entitled "United States-Wc.--.:marn _
� Relations 1945-1967" produced by a group labelled "Vie.tr-arri Task Force"
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The study_ consists of 46�
volum..es of text plus a four-page "47th volurrH.elf that includes the two-
page transmittal memorandum. by which Leslie H. Gelb (Chairman of the
Task Force) formally forwarded the whole study to the Secretary of
Defense plus a two-page "outline" (1. e., table of contents). A copy.
this 'volume 47" is appended to this memorandum.
Z. As a quick examination of the outline *ill illustrate, the stUdy
LS an amalgam of narrative text by members of the Task Force that wrote
it plus compendia of official documents grouped by period or subject or
both. In virtually every volume,. tne narrative text quotes extensively...
(and usually quite selectively) fr.onzr. a variety of official documents.Not
all of these are reproduced 'separately in the documentary annexes but
_
.in many cases the quotations are collectively so extensive that most of
the document in question is reproduced at some point or'other in the study.
In addition, every volume (and, usually, every section) of narrative text -
has a _fairly elaborate set of footnotes which cite by fu' title, identifying
number (e. g.-, SNIF, 10-4-54) and issue date virtually every document
discussed, allud.ed to or quoted from in the text itself...-. The d.ocurnents
cited, quoted from or discussed spanthe entire classification gamut from
overt published material (e. g.,. books and articles) to Top Secret doc-uments
carrying a variety of additional restrictive indicators.
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3. The study was commissioned in June 1967 by- then Secretary
McNamara who levied the requirement on the Office of International
Security Affairs, at that time headed by John McNaughton. Morton H.
Halperin, 1VIcNaughton.'s Deputy for Policy Planning and Arms Control,
was apparently given command oversight of the project and the Task Force
which did the actual work was chaired by one of Halperin's subordinates,
Leslie H. Gelb. (Both Gelb and Halperin are now with the Brookings
Institute.) Some 30-40 people -- officers from the military services,
Defense Department civilian employees (including Daniel Ellsberg) and
a variety of outside consultants, many but not all from the RAND
Corporation -- seemed to have worked on various parts of the study at
various times. Despite the dates given in its title (19457-1967), frona the
standpoint of substance the study effectively cuts off with President
Johnson's 18 March 1968 speech. When the various parts of the study
were actually written cannot be determined with certainty, though its
various portions were clearly written by different people at different
times and the end result is much more a collection of separate mono-
g-raphs than a unified whole. It would appear that all portions of the
study were completed by the summer or early fall of 1968. As a glance
at Gelb's transmittal memorandum will demonstrate, however, the stud.y
was not formally dispatched through channels to the Secretary of Defense
(Mr. Clifford) until 15 January 1969 -- a Wednesday. President Nixon's
inauguration was, of course, on Monday, 20 January 1969. Thus the study
was in fact dispatched with only two working days left before the change
of administration in the Defense Department.
Parochial Damage Assessment
4. There are repeated references to the Agency, its activities,
its officers (some identified by name) and its alleged positions throughout
most of the narrative portion of the study. Also the narrative is replete
with allusions to, discussions of and quotations from (augmented by specific
footnote citations) a wide range of Agency documents: operational cables,
raw field reports, Headquarters disseminations, NIErs a.nd Si\TIE's; ;formal
memoranda and studies (from ONE, OER., OCI, the DDI and special task
groups), informal and in some cases internal memoranda, and memoranda
from the D'CI (Mr. McCone) to the President. In a.ssessii,.;g the damage
done in having the study pass in its entirety into the public domain and/or
unfriendly hands (e. g., the Soviet Government), it must of course be
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gni-en that allof th material in the Pentagon st�z.:-.r.caf.t..7.-s now at least
three years old and some of it is over twenty years o1d:7 Nonetheless,
we are �concerned about the following areas of actual or potential
Certain proprietary relationships --
- are identified in the study (and in
material therefrom already published in the New Yo-..71::
Times). So too are the mission and functions of our
our former control of/use of CAT. (Reference is made to
CAT's logistical and tactical air support of anti-Sukarno
forces in Indonesia and there is an allegation, stated as
a fact, that CAT "completed more than, 200 overflights
of Mainland China and Tibet.") These identifications
� could cause various kinds of problems or embarrassment
in the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia and elsewhere.
b. Several of our officers are identified-by name,
position a.r.d/o7.- activity including present or former -
Clandestine Service officers such as Messrs. Richardson,
deSilva, David Smith, Spera and Conein. The damage
done in the case of officers who were or now are Chiefs .
of Station is probably slight, but officers still serving
abroad under genuine cover are another matter..
, c. There are repeated references to Agency engage-. .
�.ment in covert paramilitary operations (including sabotage
and harassment).;. There is also considerable discussion
of Agency officers' contacts with the generals who were
mounting the coup against Diem. There is also clear
reference to the fact of our endeavors to develop unilateral
penetrations of our. nominal hosts _and allies (i.e., the GVN)�:
couched in ways that .could possibly corn-otornise still-- �
reporting (and valuable) agents.... Much. Of. this type of.
compromise may not be new or startlingly revelatory, but
the study does provide what hostile or friendly 0-overnments
could construe or ei.-ploit as "official proof" of the Agencys in such activities.
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d. The extensive cuotation from and dis-c-f,Zsio,--. o-=.
wide range of Agency pu'olica.tions sPanning mor.e. than -
two d,ec.ades raises its own problems. The�positions
(or a highly selective distillate of the positions) the
Agency has taken over time on a variety of sensitive and'
politically charged topics are carefully charted. By .
selection, the Agency record as reflected in the Pentagon
� study is already distorted.- But once it is in. hostile hands
or the general public domain, this record -- detailed though
partial -- is PriMa facie vulnerable to further distortion
and misuse as 7-=-,iun.ition" by axe-grinding or disingenuous
parties of all stripes to attack the U.S. Government,
particular U.S. administrations or senior officials therein,
the Agency, or the United States in general.
e. As a -special case of the above, certain individual
reports (e. g., the ROLLING THUNDER assessments or -
the Will to Persist study) or special memoranda
(e- g- �
the
DOT' s Special Assistant's �15 October 1966 private memo- �
randum for the DC1- commenting frankly and fully on Secretary..
1\fic-Nai-riz-ira's trip report) raise their own problems.- Though -
in fact these documents were prepared in response to -
explicit requests. from senior non-Agency officials, this
essential piece .of background information is not stated in .
the Pentagon. study. Thus its authors' process of selection
�makes it appear- -- or could be used as presumptive 'proof''
that the Agency, on its own initiative, plunged headlong into -
the midst of debates over policy issues.
f. The numerous references to Agency docurnents;
especially the explicit footnote citations of them (and of
Agency documents to-which the. study's text makes only
passing allusion), raise another issue which heretofore
the Agency has never had to cope with on an-y- large .scale.
These citations-provide explicit information now available
for use or- abuse by persons operating from any of a variety
of motives to demand (in court if necessary) the full texts
of specific Agency documents under the provisions of
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rocent i-eedorn of information legislation. Whre com-
pliance is clearly contra-indicated, most such c-.-cuests
could probably be fended off; but potential .recuestors of
all strines now have detailed data never before in wide
circulation and the steps necessary to cope with such
reouests could therriselve.s raise their own problems,
g.� .Finally; more than specific potential damage
attributable to single passages in the study,. the collective.
totality of Agency material in the Pentagon study would.
tell- any sophisticated or professional 'outsider a very.
great deal indeed.about.how:the Agency goes about doing it
,business (e.g. its procedures, ..the. numbering systems,
�
format, and prose style ernployed..fo2.- different types. of
documents or communications, etc.,. etc.). This would
constitute a major windfall for any hostile intelligence
service and greatly facilitate...future denigration operations,
including the preparation of fabricated documents, forgeries
or other types of tailored disinformation.
TIT_ Broader Damage Consideration.s
5. The Pentagon study involves intelligence compromises that go
well beyond immediate or parochial CIA concerns. Many if not most of the
original documents incorporated one way or another in the study involved
communications intelligence of some form or to some extent. A sophisticated
review of the study would tell professional intelligence'officers of many -
foreign countries (certainly the Soviet Union and Communist China) a
great deal about the overall level of U.S. COMINT capabilities and much..
about certain specific U.S. communications intelligence activities-,One
particular volume of the study, by itself, would clearly compromise an
e7.-ztrernely sensitive and politically delicate collection activity.
6. Anart from the intelligence field -oar'se, the stucy also cornpro_ises
sc-f