NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 7 APRIL 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05065743
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2017
• Case Number: F-2017-01734
• Publication Date: April 7, 1982

Director of
Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
7 April 1982
op ecre
CPAS NIDC 82-08IC
7 April 1982
Cp.py, 402
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The National Intelligence Daily Cable is prepared in the
Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the other
US foreign intelligence organizations for the purpose of
informing senior US officials.
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Contents
Central America: Stepped-Up Guerrilla Operations .
Special Analysis
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El Salvador: The Military Balance 11
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Stepped-Up Guerrilla Operations
//The insurgents--in an attempt to lift their morale and regain
their credibility following the Salvadoran elections�are increas-
ina nnerations aaainst remnte 7771.7itaru autnnsts and towns
Havana, meanwhile, is show-
ing greater interest in negotiations on El Salvador, but has offered
no credible evidence of a willingness to compromise to achieve peace.
In Nicaragua, the regime is enacting emergency economic measures to
finance defense mobilization and to cope with intensifying economic
problems. Amid growing bilateral tensions, Honduras and Nicaragua
have recalled their Ambassadors.//
//Recent guerrilla attacks on small garrisons in San
Vicente and Chalatenango Departments have resulted in the
deaths of at least 17 military personnel, the capture of
some others, and the seizure of a number of government
arms. In Morazan Department, a similar operation re-
sulted in heavy insurgent casualties. Guerrillas are also
continuing small-scale harassment throughout Usulutan
Department.//
Comment: //The guerrillas appear to be attempting
to accumulate a string of small victories rather than to
conduct major assaults against the larger cities. The
increased activity comes as the armed forces have initi-
ated a three-week rotating standdown of approximately
one-third of their manpower due to Holy Week observ-
ances.//
4
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Castro Favors Negotiations on El Salvador
President Castro, in a major address on Sunday,
unequivocally committed Cuba to "work in the search for
a negotiated political solution to the problems of
El Salvador, Central America, and the area." He said
that Cuba, as well as Nicaragua and the Salvadoran
guerrillas, supported the Mexican peace initiative and
claimed to have moderated his rhetoric in deference to
President Lopez Portillo's suggestion. An unnamed
"senior Cuban official" echoed Castro's message privately
to journalists in Havana, baiting his remarks with the
claim that Cuba does not see a "socialist solution" in
Latin America in the short run, but rather "pluralism."
Comment: Havana's growing interest in negotiations
on El Salvador reflects the Castro regime's chagrin over
the failure of the guerrillas to win a military victory,
and a belief that maintenance of the status quo there is
not to the guerrillas' advantage. Negotiations, on the
other hand, provide time for the guerrillas to regroup
and rebuild, offer the chance of political gains for
insurgents, and--by prolonging the confrontation--buy
time in which public opinion in the US can be exploited
to undercut Washington's resolve on further military
support for El Salvador.
Despite Cuban claims to have halted arms supplies
to the Salvadoran rebels, Havana can be expected to
continue to promote armed struggle in Central America.
In addition, Havana will continue to try to develop
private contacts with political and military leaders in
the region to inflame personal and political rivalries
and sow distrust of the US.
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
EL SALVADOR: The Military Balance
The guerrillas' failure to disrupt the elections and the high
voter turnout have provided a major psychological boost to the
government. The insurgents retain strong military capabilities,
however, and a decisive change is unlikely soon. Meanwhile, the
guerrillas probably will take advantage of the current political
uncertainty over the composition and policies of the new government
to attempt some spectacular action.
//The failure to disrupt the election and the unex-
pectedly high turnout dealt a major political and
psychological blow to the insurgent cause. The insur-
gents expended considerable manpower and material in
their effort to prevent the voting, and new recrimina-
tions among the guerrilla factions are likely to put
heavy strains on insurgent unity.//
//The military balance, however, probably will not
shift quickly and decisively in the government's favor.
The insurgent's preparations to disrupt the election
left them with better arms, more trained cadre, and new
supply routes. The flow of the Cuban and Nicaraguan
arms is likely to continue, although perhaps at a re-
duced volume. Despite the successful election, the
insurgents still enjoy some degree of international
political and propaganda support.//
Military Improvements
//The Salvadoran military has strengthened its capa-
bilities over the past year and appears to have gained
ground on the insurgents. One of its greatest weaknesses
had been insufficient manpower to conduct offensive
operations while defending population centers and eco-
nomic targets. Since last year, however, the Army has
nearly doubled, and the combined strength of the mili-
tary and security forces is now over 28,000.//
--continued
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//To improve command and control of this larger force,
the Army has formed two additional brigade headquarters,
bringing the current total to six. A quick-reaction
battalion activated last year has been conducting in-
creasingly effective sweep operations.//
//Two additional quick-reaction units are in training,
and regular infantry battalions throughout the country
are being strengthened and reequipped with US M-16 rifles,
machineguns, mortars, and recoilless rifles. In addi-
tion, the US is training 500 officer candidates in an
effort to reduce a shortage of junior commanders.//
//The acquisition of 14 UH-1H helicopters over the
past year has made the Army much more mobile, allowing
small units to be deployed by air and wounded personnel
to be evacuated quickly. Although some helicopters were
destroyed in an insurgent raid in late January, they
were soon replaced, and the inventory is being expanded
to 20.//
//The Army, however, still has significant weaknesses.
Soldiers often have to be rushed into combat before com-
pleting basic training. Coordination among large units
is weak, generally allowing insurgents to escape sweep
operations.//
//Inadequate logistic support often forces the Army
to end offensive operations prematurely. The government
cannot interdict guerrilla supplies delivered by sea
and air.//
Insurgent Forces
//The guerrillas also have made considerable improve-
ments over the past year. They still appear to have a
regular force of between 4,000 and 5,000, and have a
part-time militia of between 5,000 and 10,000.//
//The insurgents have divided the country into five
fronts, each with a commander and general staff. Guer-
rilla units are mostly concentrated in about eight base
areas from which operations are launched. Within these
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eight base areas more than 40 well-defended guerrilla
camps have been identified, and there may be many more.//
//Most insurgent training apparently takes place
within the base areas, but many commanders and special-
ists have taken courses in Nicaragua, Cuba, East Euro-
pean countries, or the Middle East. As a result, the
guerrillas have become more adept at ambushes and
sabotage.//
//The insurgent supply network has expanded consid-
erably, with most of the arms and ammunition coming from
external sources through Nicaragua. Overland delivery
from Nicaragua through Honduras has decreased as a re-
sult of more effective Honduran interdiction efforts,
but sea and Derhaus air de]ivPrips havp nirkpa un
slack.
//Despite these improvements, the insurgent problems
continue. The largest faction believes in a protracted
guerrilla war and is opposed to negotiations, while
other factions still hope for a quick victory through a
popular insurrection, and barring that, a negotiated
settlement giving them access to power. The differences
have resulted in lack of unity and coordination at the
tactical level, occasionally leading to open fighting.//
//The insurgents have failed to build a substantial
base of popular support, particularly in urban areas.
The guerrillas have won the support of
refugees in their base areas, but this
in administrative and economic burdens
insurgent military operations.//
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peasants and
has resulted
that have hindered
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Current Situation
//The guerrillas need some spectacular successes to
preserve their credibility and restore morale. They had
hoped to seize the eastern cities of Usulutan and San
Francisco before the elections, but the failure of
diversionary attacks elsewhere and the arrival of govern-
ment reinforcements forced them to retreat. They never-
theless remain strong in these areas, and it will take a
major government effort to dislodge them.//
//The insurgents may increase
particularly against major bridges
dams in the country.
they have targeted one of the few remaining bridges
across the Lempa River. Such important targets are
generally well defended, however, and the guerrillas
may be forced to strike elsewhere.//
sabotage operations,
and hydroelectric
//They also hope to turn the success of the extreme
right in the election to their propaganda advantage.
They would be aided in this effort by the exclusion of
the moderate Christian Democratic Party from the ruling
coalition.//
//In addition, the insurgents may try to take advan-
tage of the initial political uncertainty surrounding
the new constituent assembly. Nevertheless, guerrillas
probably will remain on the defensive for some time.//
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