(EST PUB DATE) CIA AND THE HOUSE OF NGO COVERT ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1954-63

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01268718
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 227
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-01452
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963

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Copyright This paper contains material that is subject
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not be copied, in whole or part,
without permission.
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is UNCLASSIFIED.
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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this
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the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US
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Dedication (U)
To the Memory of Gordon Jorgensen,
Friend, Mentor, Patriot, and Transcendently Honest Man
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Acknowledgments (U)
Without Ken McDonald's willingness to take a chance on a beginner, I
would not have been privileged to undertake this project. Without his gently
guided on-the-job tour of historiographical technique, the product would not
have whatever merit may be found in it. It is extraordinarily gratifying to have
the assistance of an editor whose assiduous attention to both form and content
is always aimed at helping the author write, not the editor's book, but his own.
All errors are still mine alone. (U)
All my other History Staff colleagues were also generous with their time,
and I am grateful for their corrections and suggestions. I owe former Editorial
Assistant Diane Marvin particular thanks for having volunteered to retype the
entire draft when it proved impossible to convert the original version to a new
software format, an effort truly above and beyond the call. (U)
Finally, there is the debt to my interview subjects, some of whom, like Paul
Harwood, Joe Redick, and Lou Conein, underwent repeated interrogation with
unfailing equanimity and interest in helping me fill in the blanks. To all of
them, my enduring gratitude. (C)
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Contents (U)
Dedication (U) iii
Acknowledgments (U)
Foreword (U) xi
Chapter 1: Anticolonialism versus Anticommunism (U) 1
Chapter 2: Patrons and Clients (U) 9
Chapter 3: Filling the Void (U) 21
Chapter 4: Bringing the Armies to Heel (U) 37
Chapter 5: Rural Pacification and the Sect Crisis (U) 59
Chapter 6: Leverage in Washington (U) 75
Chapter 7: Democracy or Autocracy? (U) 87
Chapter 8: Making the Best of the Bargain (U) 101
Chapter 9: A More Qualified Commitment (U) 111
Chapter 10: Divided Counsels (U) 129
Chapter 11: "People's War" (U) 145
Chapter 12: "This Coup is Finished" (U) 163
Chapter 13: Passive Engagement (U) 185
Chapter 14: Execution (U) 201
Chapter 15: A Doomed Experiment (U) 217
Comment on Sources (C) 225
Index (U) 227
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Foreword (U)
After the partition of Vietnam with the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the
Eisenhower administration began to directly support the government in the
South headed by Ngo Dinh Diem. President Eisenhower, in a letter to Diem,
promised to help Diem maintain a "strong, viable state capable of resisting
outside aggression." Armed with this support, in July 1954, Diem rejected the
reunification elections provided for in the Geneva Agreements and declared
South Vietnam a republic with himself as president. The CIA, although pessi-
mistic about establishing a stable, civilian regime in South Vietnam, neverthe-
less set about assisting Diem in creating a new state. This is the story of CIA's
efforts and its relationship with Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. (U)
Based on a thorough examination of CIA's records and on in-depth inter-
views of key participants, Thomas Ahern presents an authoritative review and
assessment of CIA's evolving relationship with Diem, first as he struggled to
consolidate his power and then as his increasingly authoritative regime fal-
tered and collapsed when the South Vietnamese military seized power in a
coup favored by the United States. The military generals assassinated Diem
and his brother Nhu. (U)
This ultimately tragic drama is followed in detail by Ahern as he traces CIA
efforts to bring stability and democracy to South Vietnam and to influence
Diem. Although not uncritical of US policy and CIA operations, Ahern's
study reveals a CIA Station�indeed in the early years, two Stations work-
ing diligently and effectively to aid Diem in forming a viable state. That this
effort to build a modern nation state failed greatly frustrated CIA officers.
Nevertheless, the CIA continued its efforts to influence and shape policies and
programs in South Vietnam long after Diem's death. (C)
This thoughtful study is the first volume in Thomas Ahern's larger work of
CIA's role in South Vietnam from 1954 to 1975. The second volume, CIA and
the Generals: Covert Support to Military Government in South Vietnam was
published in 1999, and the third volume, The CIA and Rural Pacification in
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South Vietnam, will also be forthcoming in the year 2000. Together these vol-
umes provide a comprehensive review of CIA programs and reporting from
Vietnam. (C)
Gerald K. Haines
Chief Historian
CIA History Staff
Center for the Study of Intelligence
June 2000
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North and South Vietnam, 1954-1963
Unciassifted
743M4 9,87
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CHAPTER 1
Anticolonialism versus Anticommunism (U)
The Viet Minh destroyed colonial rule in Indochina when they defeated the
French at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954.1 Negotiations beginning in Geneva a
day later led in July to an agreement signed by France, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and the three Associated States of Indoch-
ina, including Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United
States agreed to respect the Geneva Accords, but, unhappy with the provision
for the temporary division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, refused to sign. Bao
Dai, the puppet emperor of the French, remained in Cannes, and his new
prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, had played no role in the war or in the nego-
tiations that ended it.2 (U)
As the Cold War deepened, and especially after the outbreak of the Korean
war in June 1950, the United States had given the French massive material
support in their war against the Viet Minh. Now, with the Geneva Accords
going into effect, Washington faced the painful choice of either accepting the
extension of Ho Chi Minh's authority throughout Vietnam or picking up the
French burden of resistance to the Viet Minh. The decision, hesitant and incre-
mental, was to back Diem and to try to create an independent, anti-Communist
nation south of the 17th parallel. (U)
I The term "Viet Minh" is an abbreviation for Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh�the Vietnam Inde-
pendence League�the national front created by Ho Chi Minh in 1941 to resist the Japanese occu-
pation and the Vichy French colonial regime that collaborated with it. South. Vietnam as a
separate, provisional entity came into existence as a result of the Geneva Accords. The other two
Associated States, which together with Vietnam made up French Indochina, were Cambodia and
Laos. Under the terms of the ceasefire, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was to take
control of all Vietnamese territory north of the 17th parallel, while the French Expeditionary
Corps retired to the south. (U)
This introduction relies on Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books,
1984); George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (Garden
City, NY: Anchor Books, 1987); and George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States
and Vietnam, 1950-1975,2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986). (U)
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There was good reason for American leaders to hesitate, beginning with the
absence of any effective opposition to the Viet Minh, There were few illusions
in Washington, either about Diem's political stature or about the cohesion or
determination of the anti-Communist elements in the South. On the military
side, the humiliation of the French confirmed the perils of a land war on the
Asian mainland for a Western power, perils only recently emphasized by the
stalemate in Korea. From the outset in 1954, some US policymakers warned
that material support to Diem might lead to an inconclusive or even disastrous
commitment of American ground forces. (U)
If there were reasons to hesitate, there were also powerful incentives for the
United States to deny the legitimacy of the Communist regime in the North
and resist its anticipated drive to absorb the South. An apocalyptic but widely
accepted version of the domino theory held that the loss of Indochina would
invite Communist advances along the entire line from Japan to the Suez
Canal.' Domestic political considerations also intensified the pressure to act.
The "who lost China?" debate and its exploitation by Senator Joseph McCar-
thy inhibited consideration of the possibility that the job could not be done, or
at least not at an acceptable cost. The famous Army-McCarthy hearings were
going on as the battle of Dien Bien Phu came to a close. (U)
Administration acceptance of the Geneva Accords would risk political
embarrassment as well as acquiescence in the probable Communization of
Vietnam. At the instigation of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the US
had committed $400 million to the French in late 1953 to persuade them to
stay the course in Indochina. To abandon the anti-Communist South only six
months later would call into question the wisdom of that investment. In the
end, the importance of halting the spread of Communism overshadowed the
risks, and the United States embarked on its 21-year effort to create in South
Vietnam a permanent barrier to Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. (U)
The Origin of US Engagement (U)
The US decision to replace the French as the guarantor of a non-Communist
Vietnam represented the end of a tortuous path that first ran in the opposite
direction. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's generic hostility to European
colonialism and specific antipathy for Charles de Gaulle led him, during early
planning for the postwar period, to suggest a United Nations trusteeship for
Indochina. He later retreated from this, partly to avoid further demoralizing an
already prostrate France, and partly to avoid weakening the basis for retaining
In fact, Indochina was the focus of the first use of the domino image, at a press conference held
by President Eisenhower on 7 April 1954. (U)
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the Pacific islands that the US had taken from Japan. But Roosevelt never
yielded on his insistence that the French accept the principle of eventual inde-
pendence for Indochina. (U)
Although President Harry S Truman was not so personally hostile to French
aims in Indochina as Roosevelt had been, opposition to the restoration of the
colonial regime also fed on the perception of the State Department's Southeast
Asian experts that the French would inevitably come to grief on the rocks of
Vietnamese nationalism. But the force of this argument was blunted by the
fact that, if Ho Chi Minh was a nationalist, he was also a Communist. His his-
tory of connections with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
acquired increasing importance as imminent victory over the Germans and the
Japanese began to reveal the fault lines in the wartime alliance with the Sovi-
ets. (U)
The immediate postwar period saw the consolidation of the Soviet hold
over Eastern Europe. George Kennan's containment theory of 1946 became
the conceptual basis of the US response to this challenge, as the Truman Doc-
trine of 1947 became its policy basis. Discomfort with the exploitative prac-
tices of French colonialism persisted, even while Washington thought it
imperative to prop up a succession of French governments, partly by tacitly
endorsing their aims in Indochina. The result was a schizophrenic policy that
prohibited direct US support of French military operations in Indochina, then
looked the other way while the French diverted to that purpose substantial
quantities of US military and financial aid intended to defend France against
the Soviet threat in Europe. In any case, the gradual intensification of the Cold
War eroded earlier American impressions of Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist
leader who might be encouraged or manipulated into becoming an "Asian
Tito." (U)
The final Communist victory in China in 1949 and Pyongyang's invasion of
South Korea in 1950 reinforced the American view of Communism as an
implacably expansionist monolith. Indochina came to be seen as critical to the
defense of the Asian littoral. In Europe, first priority was the construction of
NATO, and the United States was ready to pay the French a substantial price
for their agreement to the rearming of West Germany. In February 1950, the
French National Assembly ratified the agreement establishing Emperor Bao
Dai as the head of a nominally independent Vietnam. This pro forma gesture
sufficed, in the circumstances, to assuage Washington's anticolonial bias, and
the door opened to a program of direct US support to the French Expedition-
ary Corps. (U)
No amount of material aid could compensate for anachronistic colonial pol-
icies and incompetent leadership, and the French absorbed a series of humili-
ating defeats. By late 1953, the Laniel government was looking for a
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negotiated way out even as it accepted the $400 million offered by Dulles as
an incentive to pursue the struggle. Still anxious to preserve the French posi-
tion in Indochina, the United States joined the multilateral negotiations which
began in Geneva in late April 1954. This hope dissolved with the fall of the
French redoubt at Dien Bien Phu in early May, but the Chinese were eager to
avoid direct US military intervention and intimated to the French that they
would press the Viet Minh to compromise. On 20 July, an agreement between
the French and Vietnamese military commands declared a truce and estab-
lished the 17e1 parallel as the line of demarcation between Communist-con-
trolled North Vietnam and French-administered South Vietnam.4 (U)
As the Viet Minh wore down the French defenders at Dien Bien Phu, both
Washington and Paris had started looking for indigenous candidates to govern
whatever Vietnamese territory might be saved from the Communists. Ameri-
can and French objectives in Indochina were quite different, as they had been
from the beginning. The Eisenhower administration was preoccupied with the
containment of Communism while the French were almost equally single-
minded in trying to preserve their own economic privileges. Both, however,
were looking for an anti-Communist politician receptive to Western guidance
and possessing nationalist credentials strong enough to make him a plausible
competitor to Ho Chi Minh. (U)
The candidates were few. With the advantages of Ho's charisma, the
impending victory against the French, and superior political organization, the
Viet Minh commanded the loyalty not only of convinced Communists but of
many non-Communist nationalists as well. The other nationalists contended
against each other in a welter of tiny, conspiratorial parties. Most of these
lacked any roots in the agrarian base of the society and none had a popular
base in the rice-rich provinces of the Mekong Delta. Vietnamese with techni-
cal or administrative skills were mostly assimilated into the French culture,
and many were French citizens. (U)
Ngo Dinh Diem had established his nationalist credentials in the early
1930s by quitting as the puppet emperor's Interior Minister when the French
obstructed his proposed reforms. In the early 1950s, living in the United
States, he came to be seen by some influential legislators as the best hope for
an anti-Communist leadership in Vietnam. He had many weaknesses, includ-
ing the lack of any organized following, but in the end emerged almost by
default as the joint Franco-American candidate. On 18 June 1954, Emperor
Bao Dai invited Diem to form a government to replace that of the Francophile
courtier Prince Buu Loc. (U)
Dates are given in Harry G. Summers, Vietnam War Almanac (Facts on File Publications, 1985),
p. 24. (U)
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Covert Action as an Instrument of Nation-Building (U)
What Joseph Alsop several years later called the "miracle" of the Agency's
success in Vietnam was the product of CIA's close relationships with Ngo
Dinh Diem and his brother and confidant Ngo Dinh Nhu.5 CIA's energy and
self-confidence in managing these relationships contrasted sharply with State
Department caution and reflected an institutional ethos inherited from the
Office of Strategic Services. This aggressive, enterprising spirit was encour-
aged by the Eisenhower Administration's confidence in covert operations as a
means of containing Soviet expansion. As a result, by mid-1954 there was
ample precedent for the Agency to take a lead role in Vietnam. CIA had
restored the Shah of Iran to his throne in 1953 and in March 1954, just before
the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, had sponsored a successful military coup
against the leftist government in Guatemala. Earlier, CIA's support to the
Christian Democrats in the 1948 Italian elections helped ensure the survival of
democratic government there. In the Philippines, the Agency's close relation-
ship with Ramon Magsaysay beginning in 1950 was perceived as a major fac-
tor in the defeat of the Huk rebellion. (S)
In all these cases the purpose was the same, to establish a viable anti-Com-
munist regime in a country seen as threatened with absorption into the Soviet
Bloc. But although the goal in Indochina was the same, Vietnam presented
CIA, and the US Government as a whole, with a fundamentally different prob-
lem. In the other cases the task was to find and install acceptable leadership in
a functioning, if perhaps undeveloped, nation-state. This might be done by
sponsoring individual leaders, as in Iran and the Philippines, or by supporting
a political party, as in Italy. (U)
Vietnam was different. In the territory south of the 17th parallel, which
Americans at first called Free Vietnam, there existed neither a sense of nation-
hood nor an indigenous administration. Cochin China, comprised of Saigon
and the Mekong Delta, had had only a tenuous connection with the imperial
authority in Hue before becoming a French colony. Annam, in the center, was
now cut in half. And the Geneva Accords did not even in theory create a new
state. The 17th parallel designated a truce line, not an international boundary,
and the entirely provisional entity lying south of it was supposed to disappear
after national elections in 1956. (U)
Alsop's remark was made several years later, in a conversation with Joseph Redick in Laos,
which Alsop visited while Redick was stationed there (Redick interview, 28 September 1989).
Notes of the interviews conducted for this study and the tapes of recorded interviews are on file at
the CIA History Staff. (S)
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Free Vietnam lacked not only an administrative apparatus but also a cadre
of indigenous politicians accustomed to the exercise of power. All of this
meant that with the decision to support Ngo Dinh Diem the United States was
undertaking not only to establish a leader but to create a country. This formi-
dable assignment was complicated from the very start by fundamental dis-
agreements with Diem�mutual incomprehension might be more accurate�
over the kind of leadership required and the kind of polity to be built. And for
the first 10 months of the venture, French officials in Saigon obstructed US
efforts to make Diem head of government in fact as well as title. (U)
The absence of any conceptual common ground with Diem was evident in
the various elements of the American Mission in Saigon and in the US Gov-
ernment in general. The Embassy in Saigon, reflecting the bias of the State
Department's European Bureau, placed greater importance on preserving
Franco-American relations than on constructing a viable regime in Saigon.
The other parts of the US mission�the military and economic aid sections,
the US Information Service, and CIA�were more disposed to let the French
fend for themselves while the United States got on with the work of building
resistance to Communist aggression. But even here, there were conflicts. The
military advisory group was continually at odds with Washington over the
competing requirements of defense against both invasion by the North Viet-
namese Army and domestic Viet Minh insurgency. From the beginning both
military and civilian officials in Washington saw insurgency as the primary
menace, while a succession of senior military advisors in Saigon worried most
about invasion.' (U)
The CIA presence in Saigon also worked at cross purposes, not just with the
Department of State, but with itself. As noted earlier, the Agency maintained
two independent elements during the first two years of Diem's rule. Although
they cooperated to help Diem deal with immediate threats to his survival in
office, they developed conflicting approaches to the long-term issue of con-
structing for him a base of mass political support. The result was that CIA
advisors to Diem and Nhu contradicted each other, usually unwittingly, on this
fundamental issue until unitary command was established in late 1956.7 (S)
6 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (Washington, DC: Center
for Military History, United States Army, 1985), chapters 12-14. (U)
7 Redick interview, 28 September 1989; Orren Magill, interview by author, tape recording,
McLean, VA, 11 October 1989 (hereafter cited as Magill interview, 11 October 1989), at CIA His-
tory Staff. Orren Magill said he served as Lansdale's liaison officer with the regular Station from
odd- to late 1954, then as an operations officer in the regular Station until 1959. Paul Harwood
was chief of the covert action section of the Station from spring 1954 to
spring 1956. Rufus Phillips was an officer in Lansdale's Station, concerned primarily with mili-
tary civic action, from 1954 to 1955. (S)
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The confusion and disagreement were probably inevitable, for the United
States had taken on a gigantic and perhaps impossible task. It had recognized,
but not come to terms with, the dilemma inherent in the widespread belief that
the French presence in Indochina was both part of the problem and indispens-
able to a solution. There was no precedent for what Washington wanted done.
There was no nation-building or counterinsurgency doctrine and, therefore, no
bureaucratic machinery to implement such a doctrine. Any optimism to be
found in mid-1954 stemmed from the hope that the United States might be
able to inspire and mobilize the non-Communist Vietnamese in a way denied
to the French by their unrepentant colonial purposes. It was in this atmosphere
that the CIA began relationships with successive heads of government in
South Vietnam that lasted for 21 years. (U)
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CHAPTER 2
Patrons and Clients (U)
Ngo Dinh Diem's attractiveness to his first American patrons derived from
three qualities: he was a certified anti-Communist nationalist, he was a Roman
Catholic, and he understood English. Diem established his anticolonialist rep-
utation in 1933, the year he was appointed Interior Minister in the imperial
government that served the French as the instrument of indirect rule in Tonkin
and Annam. He resigned after only a few months, protesting French interfer-
ence with his proposed reforms. A flirtation with the Japanese toward the end
of World War II reflected his nationalist values more than it compromised
them, driven as it was by his hostility to the return of the French. After the war
he displayed his anti-Communism by rejecting an invitation from Ho Chi
Minh to join the Viet Minh government. In 1949, courted this time by the
French, Diem spurned an offer to make him their puppet prime minister.' (U)
Diem's religion did not necessarily recommend him to every American
influential in Indochina matters, but it helped win the favor of such prominent
figures as Francis Cardinal Spellman, and Senators Mike Mansfield and John
F. Kennedy. And even non-Catholics could see his religious affiliation as con-
firming his anti-Communism. Diem's access to official Americans was also
the product of his competence in English, rare in Vietnamese of that period,
which he acquired while living with the Maryknoll missionaries in New Jer-
sey and New York between 1951 and 1953. Residence in the US also gave
him a platform for the vigorous lobbying that made him an early frontrunner
when the United States began looking for indigenous leaders for Vietnam.2 (S)
To his early supporters, Diem's anticolonialism and anti-Communism,
buttressed by unquestioned personal integrity, qualified him for national lead-
ership. Others in Washington were more skeptical. A State Department officer
' George WI Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam-(Garden City, NY:
Anchor Books, 1987), 79-80; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books,
1984), 213-217; William Henderson, "South Vietnam Finds Itself," Foreign Affairs, January
1957. (U)
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who met him in late 1950 reported that Diem had no constructive solutions,
only "vague and defamatory" references to the French and an apparent belief
that "only [the] US can solve [the] problem, thru him to be sure."' The work-
ing level at State remained wary throughout Diem's stay in the US, but as
Cold War tensions grew, he found new supporters, among them Congressman
Walter Judd (R-ND), who was influential in East Asian affairs, and Senator
Hubert Humphrey (D-MN).4 (U)
The diversity of American reactions to Diem reflected different expecta-
tions of him. His piety impressed the Catholics, and his patriotism and per-
sonal honesty impressed everyone who was not distracted by his flaws. These
included a narrow and rigid mind, a near-obsession with the evils of French
colonialism, and an inability to engage in genuine dialogue. For a real
exchange of information and ideas, Diem tended to substitute endless mono-
logues that exhausted his listeners without necessarily addressing their inter-
ests. A US military officer attending a meeting with him in 1953 left with the
impression that he had been listening to a "mystic `nut.'"5 Thus, while some
of his American interlocutors saw him as the only hope for the anti-Commu-
nist cause in Vietnam, others saw him as incapacitated by both personal limi-
tations and lengthy absence from the political scene. (S)
Before his brief tenure as Interior Minister in 1933, Diem had served as dis-
trict chief and province chief in Central Vietnam (Annam) With the exception
of this service, he had no prior administrative experience when he took over
the government in 1954. His political assets at that point consisted of his repu-
tation for nationalism and personal probity, a modest following in Central
Vietnam, and the loyalty of those�at the time, perhaps five percent of the
population�who shared his Catholic faith. He seems to have taken for
granted the unquestioning obedience and personal loyalty of anyone commit-
The dates of Diem's residence in the US are given as January 1951 to May 1953 in an untitled
brief Deirirtment of State Division of Biographical Information dated November 1954
Diem's lobbying for US support is described in �Kahin,
Intervention, p. 79. Gene Gregory, an officer of the US Information Service who had worked with
Ngo family supporters in Vietnam took the initiative in introducing Diem to the
State Department in Washington.
US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The US Government and the Vietnam
War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part I, 1945-61 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1984), p. 90. (U)
Kahin, Intervention, p. 80. (U)
9 George W. Allen, The Indochina Wars, 1950-75 (unpublished monograph), p. 97, in CIA His-
tory Staff files. The officer found Diem's English incomprehensible, and said he also "made little
sense in French." (S)
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ted to an independent, non-Communist Vietnam.6 The scarcity of competent
people with this disposition helps explain Diem's reliance from the beginning
on members of his family to run the govemment.7 (U)
The problem was vividly described by Tran Chanh (b)(1)
Thanh, a former Viet Minh who became of Minister of Information in 1955. (b)(3)
� There are just not enough educated Vietnamese.. .half of [them] are
in Hanoi, and half the remainder are in Paris, [the other] half of the
remainder are here, and half of that won't work with us. So,
...whenever we find a man can do a job efficiently, the President
gives him two.8 (S)
Diem was personally modest and uncomfortable with ceremony. Immune to
the ego demands of the charismatic personality, he made himself the servant
of his self-assigned mission. This monomania had its disadvantages, perhaps
the greatest of which was insensitivity to the interests and needs of other peo-
ple, both his followers and the fence-sitters whose loyalty had to be won, not
taken for granted. Tran Trung Dung, Diem's deputy defense minister, is a case
in point.
Assistant Defense Minister Tran Trung Dung (courtesy of Paul Harwood). (U)
Kahin, Intervention, p. 79. (U)
1 The Station's early recognition of tins proclivity is recorded in FVSA 746, 13 August 1954
Paul Harwood, interview, 10 June 1964, Far East Division History Project,
S)
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Dung was a good man but...he had what is sometimes called gallop-
ing consumption and... [was] just not physically capable of
working.. .18 to 20 hours a day. He'd ask for leave, and Diem would
ask, why do you have to take leave, you are still on your feet. This
was the.., distasteful part of working with Diem, he was absolutely
impossible to deal with.' (S)
The absence of personal empathy and communication at the human level
seems to have governed even Diem's family relationships. Ngo Dinh Nhu,
Diem's younger brother and closest advisor, told in
1954 that Diem simply could not be influenced. He "won't listen, he sits there
with his ears closed." The same officer said of Diem that he "lived with God,"
not as a second divinity, but in another world, like a "cloistered monk." So far
as this Station officer could see, not even brother Nhu, as the prime minister's
closest confidant, had a spontaneously human relationship with him.10 (S)
Ngo Dinh Nhu: Alter Ego and Scapegoat (U)
Their experience with Diem in the 1930s might have shown the French
what to expect from Ngo Dinh Diem, but in mid-1954 they seem to have
hoped that he would be hospitable to the preservation of their interests in the
South. But Diem quickly disabused them of any notion that he would be as
malleable as his predecessor, Prince Buu Loc. Diem's prompt display of
intransigence needed an explanation, and the French found it in the person of
Ngo Dinh Nhu. Eleven years younger than Diem, Nhu had been educated in
France as an archivist and paleographer. Unlike his brother, Nhu was in Viet-
nam in the years just preceding the French collapse and was active in the party
politics that Diem ignored. Around 1948, he founded the Parti Travailliste
(Workers Party), which despite its small size�it was hardly more than a semi-
clandestine discussion group�kept the colonial authorities aware of his anti-
French convictions. During the first year of Diem's rule, the French developed
an unreasoning aversion to Nhu that they effectively communicated to the US
Embassy in Saigon." (S)
Nhu reciprocated this French antipathy and actively abetted his brother's
concentration during that first year on expelling the colonial presence. The
French were right about Nhu's importance to Diem, but almost certainly wrong
in seeing Nhu as the source of Diem's intransigence. Nothing in Agency
9 Harwood interviews, 21 June 1990 and 10 June 1964
19 Harwood interviews, 21 June 1990 and 10 June 1964 CIA'.
with Diem and Nhu and described below. (S)
" Harwood interview, 17 October 1989; FVSA 633, 21 May 1954, and FVSA 1542, 5 September
1955
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Ngo Dinh Nhu. (U)
accounts of the period suggests that anyone but Diem set the government's pri-
orities or that Nhu played any role but that of executive agent. IndeedLi
found Nhu diffident at first about making even routine
operational decisions; his impulse was always first to consult Diem.12 (S)
But Nhu's function was no less important for being that of loyal factotum.
If the policy arena belonged to Diem, its implementation became the province
of his younger brother. This division of responsibility, which the passage of
time only reinforced, was a product of three things. First was the administra-
tive vacuum that confronted the new government. The colonial administration
had consciously restricted Vietnamese access to positions of discretionary
power, and the French departure left the government staffed with Vietnamese
who, whatever their nominal rank, were little more than clerks in a system
designed to serve French interests. '3 (S)
Second was Diem's indifference to the mechanics of government. Even the
CIA people in Saigon, generally more sympathetic than the Embassy staff,
saw him as a hopelessly incompetent administrator who always lost the forest
in the trees. Third, Diem proved unable to attract such administrative talent as
was to be found in Saigon and to delegate real authority to the few good peo-
ple serving him. The Workers Party had no vertical structure, and Nhu had no
organizational or administrative experience." (S)
12 Harwood interview, 14 Februa
" FVSA 746, 13 August 1954,
(S)
11 Harwood inlerviews, 10 June 1964
1990. S
; FVSA 1542, 5 September 1955,
and 26 October 1989. (S)
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Nhu did, however, have an intense interest in the theory of political organi-
zation. He was also the only member of the family other than Ngo Dinh Thuc,
a third brother who was the Catholic bishop of a diocese in the Mekong Delta,
to have a circle of political contacts in Saigon. Nhu's style, formed in the days
of his anti-French agitation, was essentially conspiratorial and anti-establish-
ment. He tended to see government institutions as a colonial legacy to be
manipulated or, failing that, obstructed or neutralized. Nhu's contempt for the
urban elite, whose values he saw as "more foreign than Vietnamese," had as a
corollary the need to build an entirely new national leadership, capable of
imbuing the population of the South with Diem's brand of anti-Communist
nationalism." (S)
The story of the failure of Nhu's institution-building efforts is, at the opera-
tional level, the story of the failure of the Diem regime. The CIA programs
supporting these efforts did not prevent that failure, partly because the concep-
tual gulf between the Ngo brothers and their Agency contacts proved to be
unbridgeable. But in 1954, all of that was still to come. During Diem's first
year in office, with his survival very much in doubt, CIA was strikingly suc-
cessful in helping him consolidate his government and in maintaining the US
commitment to him as the instrument for preserving an independent, anti-
Communist South Vietnam. (U)
Two Instruments of Covert Action (U)
By the time of Diem's inauguration in early July 1954, the CIA had been
active in Vietnam for four years, primarily in efforts to strengthen French
unconventional warfare operations against the Viet Minh. When the French
agreed late in 1953 to negotiate the conflict in Indochina, the prospect sud-
denly loomed of their abandoning the struggle. In early 1954, as the Eisen-
hower administration began to anticipate stepping in for the French, the
Agency started trying to identify Vietnamese leaders with whom it might
work directly to resist further Viet Minh expansion. (U)
This exploration took two directions. First was the reestablishment of a
covert action section in the Saigon Station. Unilateral covert action had been
suspended in early 1953 under State Department pressure after the French
exposed a paramilitary operation against the Viet Minh in Hanoi that the
Agency had not cleared with them." French sensitivities were now less
" Harwood interview, 10 June 1964, William Colby with James McCargar, Lost
Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago and
New York: Contemporary Books, 1989), P. 86. (S)
16 Unsigned memorandum,
A marginal note by
states that it could not have been written before late 1962, (S)
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important, and CIA in Saigon was to resume the direct assessment of national-
ist politicians there. To revitalize the program, Headquarters chose Paul Har-
wood, then a newly promoted GS-12, who had a degree in Asian studies and
had just completed a tour of duty He arrived in Saigon in April
1954 and began working out of the m assy on behalf of the Chief of Station
(COS), Emmett McCarthy.17 (S)
The second approach was launched at a January 1954 meeting of the
National Security Council when someone suggested that Colonel Edward
Lansdale, USAF, renowned for his work as "kingmaker" in the Philippines, be
commissioned to find a Vietnamese equivalent of Ramon Magsaysay. The
NSC approved the assignment at about the time that Harwood arrived in
Saigon, and Colonel Lansdale followed him in June, assigned to the Embassy
as Assistant Air Attache.� (S)
Although he had worked briefly for the OSS in San Francisco during World
War II, Lansdale was never a CIA employee. For the Manila assignment, he
had been detailed to the Agency from the Air Force; this arrangement was now
extended for his service in Vietnam. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and
his brother Allen, the Director of Central Intelligence, directly participated in
creating the assignment. Their participation resulted in Lansdale's being sent
out as chief of a second Station, reporting neither to McCarthy in Saigon nor to
the chief of the Far East Division, but directly to Allen Dulles.� (S)
McCarthy's unit, to be called here the regular Station,
Although Lansdale began his tour of duty as
Assistant Air Attache at the Embassy, his staff, all in uniform, worked out of
'7 Harwood interview, 17 October 1989. (S)
18 Evan J. Parker, Jr., Chief, FE/4, Directorate of Plans, Memorandum for the Record, "Indochina
Positioning of CIA PW Officer," 15 March 1954,
(S)
19 Lansdale official personnel file. There was ample precedent for this kind of organizational
anomaly. Before August 1952, when the Office of Special Operations (foreign intelligence) and
the Office of Policy Coordination (covert action) merged into the Plans Directorate, each compo-
nent maintained independent representations overseas.
McCarthy's official title, as the first Chief of Station, was Senior Representative for Indochina
(Clandestine Services Historical Paper 75, The Saigon Liaison Mission, 1952-1954, August 1967,
p. 42, hereafter CSHP). The CIA designation for Lansdale's station was the Saigon Military Mis-
sion (SMM). There arc also occasional references in Directorate of Operations cgiTespondence to
the Saigon Military Station. (S)
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the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Eventually, Lansdale's unit
acquired overt status as the core of the MAAG's National Security Division,
responsible for civic action and rural pacification.20 (S)
In the spring of 1954, as the Viet Minh wore down the French defenses at
Dien Bien Phu, the regular Station was still oriented
primarily toward intelligence cooperation with the French. It also ran a mod-
est intelligence collection effort conducted unilaterally�that is, not acknowl-
edged to the French�plus the covert action section, still immobilized by the
moratorium of April 1953. The regular Station erew slightly as help arriving
for Harwood brought its strength up the same level eventually
reached by Lansdale's team. The two elements led by Lansdale and Harwood
were supposed to work directly with the Vietnamese, inventing and imple-
menting ways to consolidate the authority of the new government. Mean-
while, the Station's liaison element, supervised by McCarthy, gradually
reoriented its efforts away from the French and toward cooperation with
newly formed or newly independent Vietnamese intelligence and security
agencies.2' (S)
Headquarters left both Stations, McCarthy's and Lansdale's, largely to their
own devices in the development of new programs. Beyond occasional resis-
tance to what he saw as intrusions on his turf, McCarthy made no effort to
influence Lansdale's program. Nor did he seek to ensure coordination between
Lansdale and Harwood, even in the sensitive area of their respective relation-
ships with the Palace. Lansdale, although dependent on McCarthy's commu-
nications facilities, seldom coordinated any correspondence with him, and
Harwood seems not to have seen this de facto compartmentation as creating
any risk or inconvenience.22 (S)
McCarthy, by contrast, seemed uncomfortable not only with the Lansdale
relationship but with the management of Harwood's covert action element.
Harwood remembered being asked by Nhu in May 1954 about the terms
under which the US would support Diem's bid to become prime minister. Two
weeks after his request for guidance, having received no response from either
McCarthy or Headquarters, Harwood proceeded to formulate his own terms.
These drew on Harwood's understanding of the kind of agreement that the US
Mission in Saigon hoped to establish with any new government. They
" CSIIP 113, The Saigon Militat-y Mission, June 1954 to December 1956, 2 vols., October 1970,
Vol. I, pp. 4043. (S)
21 CSHP 75, pp. 83-85. (S)
22 Redick interview, 28 September 1989. (S)
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included direct US participation in training the army and uncompromising
resistance by the government to any Viet Minh encroachment on southern
territory.23 (S)
Once Nhu accepted the terms, Harwood was committed to support the
effort to install Diem as prime minister. Perhaps embarrassed by its own non-
feasance, Headquarters accepted without comment Harwood's unauthorized
commitment and proceeded directly into a discussion of operational programs.
According to Harwood, this kind of supervisory lacuna typified the Headquar-
ters style of the period, and he thought the pressure it created helped produce
condition that led to McCarthy's recall in February 1955.24 (S)
Surrogate Links to Washington (U)
The US Ambassador quickly absorbed the French distaste for Diem's
brother and advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and this may account for the fact that by
July 1954, Paul Harwood had become the only American official in regular
contact with him. At this point, Diem was beginning to respond to Lansdale's
calculated effort, endorsed by the Ambassador, to become the Prime Minis-
ter's unofficial advisor. Throughout this early period, the Vietnamese were
accessible to a wide range of other Americans, both official and unofficial, but
the Agency relationships with Diem and Nhu provided both the largest ele-
ment of continuing influence on the new government and the greatest flow of
information on its perceptions and intentions.25 (S)
Diem and Nhu saw Lansdale and Harwood as alternative channels to Wash-
ington when Embassy contacts seemed unresponsive, and eagerly exploited
CIA's readiness to help establish the new government's authority.26 Lansdale
never acknowledged to Diem his Agency affiliation, but this connection had
been widely suspected in the Philippines, and Diem had doubtless heard
rumors about it. In any case, Lansdale made no secret with Diem of his direct
communication with policy-level Washington. This link completed the chain
of relationships that made the Agency's role in Vietnam so crucial. The key
element in this was Lansdale's standing with the Dulles brothers, which gave
him more influence over policymakers in Washington than he exercised over
the Vietnamese Government in Saigon.27 (S)
" FVSA 673, 2 June 1954
24 Harwood interview, 26 October 1989. (S)
" Ibid. (S)
24 FVSA-1542, 5 September 1955 gives the Station's perception of the utility to
Nhu of hi CSHP 113, II, written by Lansdale, contains numerous references to
Diem's requests for meetings with Lansdale. (S)
27 Caswell interview, 27 February 1990. (S)
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At this time, CIA activism and commitment contrasted sharply with
ambassadorial detachment. The first two US ambassadors attached great
importance to the protection of French interests in Vietnam and were openly
skeptical of Diem's qualifications and prospects. The MAAG and the US
Information Service (USIS) were both inclined to favor Diem, even at the
price of difficulties with the French. The MAAG was an important CIA ally in
dealings with the Vietnamese military, both the national army and the sect
forces.28 But the MAAG and USIS saw their charters in narrower terms than
the CIA stations viewed their own; Lansdale and Harwood would discuss and
try to help solve almost any problem that Diem or Nhu might raise. The result
was that, during most of the first year, real communication with the Vietnam-
ese on political issues took place in CIA channels. (S)
Because of the informality of this communication and the mutual confi-
dence that seems to have characterized especially the relationship with Nhu,
the record of the period does more than illuminate the Agency's operative role
in the regime's survival. It also offers a uniquely intimate insight into the
leadership of the Saigon government before disagreement and misunderstand-
ing introduced an adversarial element into its dealings even with the CIA. (U)
There is no doubt that the US Ambassador and his senior staff could, if the
Ambassador chose, have taken on the advisory role so quickly assumed by
Paul Harwood and Edward Lansdale. But the first two Ambassadors to
Diem's government, Donald Heath and General J. Lawton Collins, chose for
different reasons not to do so. (U)
Heath, a career Foreign Service officer, became Chief of Mission in Saigon
in 1950. He was Europe-oriented and sympathized with the French desire to
retain a presence in Indochina. On the personal level, he seems to have been
influenced by the French antipathy toward Diem and Nhu, sharing the particu-
lar distaste for Nhu. During the first months of the new regime, Heath
supported French pressure on Diem to protect local French interests, so there
was little warmth in his relationship with the new government. 29 (S)
Heath left Saigon four months after Diem took office, and was replaced by
retired General J. Lawton Collins. The new ambassador, a distinguished World
War II combat leader who served as the US Army's Chief of Staff during the
Korean war, quickly took Diem's measure and just as quickly found him want-
ing. In December, a month after his arrival, he told Washington that "Diem does
" CSRP 113, II (pages 4-6, 9, 15) details the early help Lansdale obtained from the chiefs of
USIS and the MAAG. (S)
29 Harwood interview, 10 June 1964, (S)
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not have the capacity to unify the divided factions in Vietnam."30 More hopeful
in January, he changed his mind again in March and in April 1955 formally rec-
ommended to John Foster Dulles that Diem be replaced.31 (U)
Collins's perceptions were shrewd, but his argument sometimes was naive.
He unsparingly described Diem's rigidity and suspicion, his unwillingness to
share power outside the family, and his "apparent incapacity for creative
thinking and planning." But the analysis of alternatives was marred by his eth-
nocentrism: "We are not dealing here with fully rational, educated, unbiased
Westerners."32 Diem, for his part, had no more gift for crosscultural communi-
cation than Collins, and he also entirely lacked a capacity for personal empa-
thy. The prospects for mutual comprehension were therefore nil. (U)
During one encounter in early 1955, Diem turned down Collins's nominee
for command of the Vietnamese Army. Collins wanted competence, and Diem
wanted loyalty. At his next meeting with the Station, a frustrated Nhu declared
that his relationship with Harwood now constituted the official government-
to-government communications channel. The Palace did not enforce this
impulsive edict, but the incident reflected both the absence of rapport between
government and Embassy, and Diem's confidence in his Agency contacts to
get his point of view to Washington." (S)
3� Collins to Defense Department, 16 December 1954,751G.00/12-1654, Records of Department
of State, quoted in Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-
1960 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1985), p. 247. (U)
3, J. Lawton Collins, Telegram to Department of State, 7 April 1955, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-57, Vol. 1, Vietnam (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp.
218� 220 (hereafter cited as FRUS). (U)
32 Ibid., p. 232. (U)
33 Harwood interview, 18 October 1989. (S)
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CHAPTER 3
Filling the Void (U)
The Ngo family's relationship with CIA had its beginning long before
Diem's accession to office. Ngo Dinh Nhu met Edward
Korn, in 1951.
,INhu was the Agency's main political action contact in Saigon until
the January 1953 flap in Hanoi that produced the operational standdown. (S)
Nhu as Catholic social activist. (U)
From late 1953 until Harwood's arrival, a contract employee named Vir-
ginia Spence maintained the relationship on a social basis
with Nhu's wife. Spence had been hired for her proficiency in
French and was sent to Saigon, apparently without operations training, to
serve in what seems to have been a clerical capacity. But she was socially
adept and developed a genuine friendship with the Nhus. She also recognized
L,ater, Korn-Patterson. (S)
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the importance to Nhu of her CIA affiliation, and how material support helped
save the relationship after a gaffe she still vividly recalled 10 years later.
Nhu's Agency contacts
soon saw that he looked at the relationship in terms of their ability and will-
ingness to help him advance his own agenda. But he was open about his asso-
ciates, and Spence later remembered how quickly he responded to her requests
to meet such people as his brother, Bishop Thuc, and labor leader Tran Quoc
Bun. Noting the secretiveness and deception that marked his later behavior,
Spence recalled that, at the time, "he needed us far more than we needed him."
She was equally perceptive about the anti-Viet Minh nationalist politicians,
observing shortly before Diem's appointment that:
These men who have schemed and fought and gone without to get
political power don't have any idea what to do with it now that it's
within their grasp. All the shouts of "Throw out the French,"
"Throw out Bao Dai," "Up democracy," "Down communism" don't
do a thing for the day-to-day running of a government. They are like
the bride who couldn't see beyond the end of the church aisle. Now
someone is going to.. .ask them to collect taxes and do something
for the working man and I think they're scared. They need support,
all right, but they don't realize how much.' (S)
Harwood quickly came to much the same conclusicrn. For the first several
weeks after his arrival, he left the Nhu contact in Spence's capable hands
while he sounded out other non-Communist nationalists, looking at first for
people to launch resistance operations in the North. Nguyen Ton Hoan, leader
of a nationalist splinter group known as the Southern Dai Viet Party, had a
"nasty habit of leaving his hardware all over the place�.45 caliber automatics
dropping out of his pockets." But Harwood gave him a chance to demonstrate
the existence of an anti-Viet Minh apparatus in Hanoi. Hoan failed to produce,
' Virginia Spence interview by Thomas L. Ahern, 31 July 1964,
files (hereafter cited as Spence interview). (1
Spence interview; FVSA 673, 4 June 1954
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and so did the other local politicians Harwood tested. Nhu quickly emerged as
the most promising of an unimpressive lot, having at least some access to a
potential mass base through organized labor and the Cao Dai sect.4 (S)
The Station had no illusions about either Nhu's personal qualifications or
his influence on the local political scene. Spence described Nhu and his Work-
ers' Party cadres as "seven busy little politicians." She saw him as a "born
schemer" whose potential looked greater for covert action than for intelligence
collection:
Anything a friend tells him he swallows whole. He does have a cer-
tain political stature and a great flair for making nothing look like
something..
But Nhu was intelligent, energetic, and passionately nationalistic. At the
time, he displayed what Harwood saw as liberal impulses that offered the
prospect of a compatible joint approach to questions of political organization.
In any case, there was nobody else.' (S)
Accordingly, Harwood set out in May to help Nhu build a covert political
action organization. Again, the shortage of qualified people inhibited
progress. An example was Tran Van Do, an uncle of Nhu's wife. Nhu thought
him deficient in energy and courage and could think of no more active role for
him than that of safehouse keeper, exploiting the immunity conferred by his
social position from unannounced visits by French security. But the scarcity of
loyal talent was such that a few months later he became Diem's foreign minis-
ter.' (S)
Another problem was the absence of any solid political organization.
Spence said that what Nhu had was "six good men and true, and a potential
mass of well-wishers, and nothing in between."8 While Harwood explored
operational possibilities with Nhu, trying to remedy or work around this orga-
nizational vacuum, the State Department .began discussing with the French a
new government for non-Communist Vietnam. At Headquarters' request, Har-
wood told Nhu at a meeting in May that there were "plans which might
involve Diem." He said the Agency understood the brothers to be in contact
and asked if Diem would accept a position other than that of prime minister.
Nhu's answer was a categorical "no."' (S)
Harwood interview, 10 June 1964
(S)
FVSA 629, 21 May 1954,
' Harwood interview, 10 June 1964, (S) In April 193b, Ambassador Collins even sug-
gested that Do would make a better prime minister than Diem (FRUS, 1955-57, 1, Vietnam, p.
220). (S)
'NSA 688, 23 June 1954,
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CIA and Emperor Dai (U)
What generated this query from Headquarters about Diem is not known, but
some historians believe that Bao Dai appointed Diem at the instigation of
CIA. Agency records do not entirely resolve the question but suggest, at most,
a peripheral CIA role. John Anderton, McCarthy's successor as Chief of Sta-
tion, thought that the French had promoted Diem's candidacy "with US con-
currence and support" and that the French only turned hostile to Diem when
they discovered that he would be less malleable than his predecessor. Two of
Anderton's subordinates thought it was the other way around, that the French
had only grudgingly acceded to American insistence. But neither specified
any Agency role in this arm-twisting of the French. When Virginia Spence
told Headquarters in April 1954 that Nhu thought French Prime Minister
Laniel favored Diem, the tone of the report did not suggest any understanding
on her part that the Agency was trying to influence the outcome. '� (S)
One Agency history says that CIA-supported assets may have encouraged
Bao Dai to make the appointment; if true, this was obviously unknown to the
Saigon Station." The only records mentioning an Agency relationship with
Bao Dai are a November 1954 proposal appar- (b)(1)
ently to persuade him to keep Diem in office, and a memorandum to the Dep- (h)(q)
uty Director for Plans that refers to a 'one of (b)(1)
whose tasks is "influencing Bao Dai to support Diem."2 (S) (b)(3)
In fact, John Foster Dulles and the French seem to have concluded, more or
less simultaneously, that there was no alternative to Diem. On 24 May, the US
Embassy in Paris moved to "reestablish contact" with Diem to discuss his
negotiations with Bao Dai.13 (U)
9 FVSA 633, 21 May 1954
10 Interviews with John A.nderton, 20 November 1963, Phillip Potter, 23 October 1963,
and 18 April 1964 FVSA 629, 21 May 1954, filed
"Roberta S. Knapp, The Central Intelligence Agency�The First Thirty Years, 1947� 1977
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency History Staff, 1990), P. 116. (S)
12 Frank G. Wisner, Memorandum for L. Randolph Higgs, Deputy Operations Coordinator,
Department of State, "Proposal to Bao Dai," 17 November 1954
George Aurell, Chief, FE Division, untitled memo-
randum for the Deputy Director for Plans, 26 January 1955, ibid., 'S)
13 Douglas Dillon, Telegram to Department of State, 24 May 1954, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1952-54, Indochina (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 13:2, p.
1608. Also, see S. M. Bao Dai, Le Dragon d'Annam (Plon, 1980), p. 328, cited in Kahin, Inter-
vention, p. 78; Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1970), p.
128; and John Foster Dulles, Telegram to Department of State, 8 May 1955, US Department of
State, FRUS, 1955-57, I, Vietnam, p. 374. (U)
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As Diem's appointment came to look more probable, the CIA role grew
more active. Harwood, as noted earlier, asked his superiors for the terms on
which he could commit covert assistance through Nhu. At the end of May,
getting no response, Harwood made up his own terms and delegated Spence to
take them to Nhu. These conditions, to which Nhu agreed, called for prosecut-
ing the war against the Viet Minh and opposition to "coalition and partition."
The US would train the Army even over French objections, and the Vietnam-
ese would take particular care in selecting commanders for the internal secu-
rity organs and the military. The terms also included a requirement for CIA
access to Bao Dai in order to prevent him from dismissing a Diem government
"on a whim," and for the continued secrecy of the liaison with CIA." (S)
Harwood's unilateral action in this episode not only dispensed with Head-
quarters guidance, as already noted, but took CIA quite outside its charter into
the area of policy. Whether Headquarters eventually sought State Department
endorsement of his program is not recorded; any departure from what became
US policy after Diem's nomination was apparently minor enough to attract no
attention. (S)
In May, CIA wanted to know not only Diem's intentions but what ambi-
tions Nhu might be harboring for himself. Nhu insisted that he would accept
no position in his brother's Cabinet, and Spence believed he had "worked so
long covertly he couldn't bear to do otherwise."15 But he anticipated working
closely with Diem and declared his willingness to serve as intermediary. Hop-
ing to use the connection for covert action as well as collection purposes, the
Station pressed Nhu to describe his influence over Diem. Nhu replied, proba-
bly with tongue in cheek, that he could "direct" his brother.'6 (S)
CIA Advisors to Diem and Nhu (U)
Even before Diem emerged as a candidate to head the government, Nhu's
talents and willingness to work with the Agency had helped make him the
focus of CIA covert action planning. Unburdened either by his brother's with-
drawn personality or by the endemic Vietnamese xenophobia, Nhu readily
agreed to work with Paul Harwood. Like Virginia Spence, Harwood found
Nhu open and honest about his compatriots, including his brother Diem; since
Nhu was reporting here on matters in which he was directly involved,
Spence's reservations about his reliability did not apply. He was receptive to
INSA 673, 2 June 1954,
FVSA 673, 4 June 1954,
16 FVSA 688, 23 June 1954
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advice techniques and authorized direct CIA contact with (b)(1)
key collaborators including Tran Chanh Thanh, later the information minister; (b)(3)
and labor leader Tran Quoc Buu.17 (S)
On the personal level, Harwood found Nhu sociable and witty. He could
display a puckish sense of humor, as on one occasion when he kissed Mrs.
Harwood's hand in a gesture both genuinely affectionate and mocking of colo-
nial etiquette. He was indifferent to any perquisites, and for more than a year
after Diem's accession Nhu continued to live in a small house near the Central
Market. The cordiality of his early relationship with CIA survived chronic
mutual disappointments on policy matters, and the Harwoods became confir-
mation sponsors to the Nhus' eldest daughter.18 (S)
Confirmation ceremony for the Nhus' daughter Le Thuy. From left: Ngo Dinh Nhu,
Mrs. Harwood, Lee Thuy, Bishop Ngo Dinh Thuc with Nhus' son Quynh, son Trac,
Paul Harwood, Madame Nhu (photo courtesy of Paul Harwood). (C)
Family jokes that the Nhus shared with the Harwoods reflect the spontane-
ity of the relationship. Some were at the expense of Diem's archaic personal
and political style, others at the expense of Nhu's wife. As a relatively recent
convert, Madame Nhu was less intimidated by the clergy than most Vietnam-
ese Catholics, and Nhu would teasingly call her a "pagan." She was also free
'7 Harwood interview, 10 June 1964
o FVSA 1542, 5 September 1955,
and 26 October 1989. (S)
(S)
Harwood interviews, 10 June 1964,
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of undue reverence for Diem and seemed to enjoy an anecdote she shared with
Mrs. Harwood that involved her four-year-old son, nicknamed Quang-Quang.
The child once wandered into a Cabinet meeting looking for his uncle. Some-
one pointed to a bathroom door at the end of the conference room, and Quang-
Quang opened it, revealing the seated Prime Minister. Mimicking official pro-
tocol, Quang-Quang executed a hand salute and began singing the national
anthem.19 (S)
"Quang-Quang" saluting
(photo courtesy of Paul Harwood). (U)
The anecdote illustrates the intimacy of the Harwoods'relationship with the
Nhu family. This contact might well have sufficed as the sole basis for the
Agency's role as unofficial advisor to the Palace, but the presence of Edward
Lansdale resulted in direct CIA access to both the principal figures in the new
government. (S)
Edward Lansdale had come to Saigon in June and was waiting for Diem
when he returned from France. Lansdale later described in his memoirs hav-
ing walked in on him unannounced the day after Diem took office on 7 July
1954. Lansdale had enlisted George Hellyer, the Mission's public information
officer, to make the introduction, and Hellyer also interpreted as Lansdale
spoke no French. Although Diem had studied English while living in the US,
19 Paul Harwood, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, McLean, VA, 16 May 1990; Harwood inter-
view, 21 June 1990. (S)
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he apparently never volunteered to use it with Lansdale; for two and half years
of continuous association they communicated through an interpreter. Lucien
Conein, one of Lansdale's men, said later that, "I think Lansdale surprised the
hell out of him. ...I don't believe Diem thought he was going to last very long.
What could he lose by talking to this man?"20 (U)
Lansdale's success in the Philippines encouraged him to believe that he had
discovered the key to defeating Communist-led insurgencies. Exuding confi-
dence when Harwood and others saw imminent defeat, Lansdale quickly came
up with a formula for Vietnam. On 11 July, he announced to DCI Dulles that
his goal was nothing less than to build a "political base" in Indochina which, if
successful, would "give CIA control [of the] government and change [the]
whole atmosphere." Diem was an "unworldly dreamer but seeking help," and
Lansdale had just written a three-year plan which, he told Dulles, Ambassador
Heath was going to help him sell to the Prime Minister. If all went well, CIA
would have advisors in all key areas, and Lucien Conein would conduct liai-
son with the Armed Forces if General Nguyen Van Vy, a friend since Conein's
OSS service in Vietnam, became chief of staff.2' (S)
Heath and Lansdale visited Diem on the 12th, and the Ambassador encour-
aged Diem to accept Lansdale as a personal advisor. Having made this
endorsement, Heath spent most of the meeting describing for Diem the US
view of the implications of partition between North and South. It was not until
that evening that Lansdale got the opportunity to explain his program, which
included "emergency adoption" of the Philippine Consitution, electing an
"interim advisory congress," attracting the sect armies into the national forces,
and launching a variety of organizational reforms.22 (S)
Never greatly concerned about protocol or bureaucratic discipline, Lansdale
had presented his agenda to Diem before vetting it in Washington. But he cor-
rectly anticipated Agency agreement as Headquarters immediately set to work
to win State Department concurrence. State objected only to the proposal to
use Filipino advisors, and only because the Philippines had not yet recognized
" Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 157-159;
Interview with Lucien Conein on 24 June 1985, quoted in Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale:
Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), p. 152. Conein's perception may well have
been accurate, although it ignores Diem's perennial habit of cultivating unofficial American con-
nections. Three others, during this period, were Joseph Buttinger of the International Rescue
Committee, land reform expert Wolf Ladejinski, and Wesley Fishel, head of the Michigan State
University public administration team in Saigon. (U)
SI SAIG 3321, 11 July 1954
22 SAIG 3336, 12 July 1954, ibid. (S)
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South Vietnam. By early August, State had reversed itself even on this,
approving 20 Filipino "trainers in support of paramilitary and psychological
warfare operations in Indochina."23 (S)
Diem was, at least initially, greatly taken by Lansdale's freewheeling ideas,
and added proposals of his own. He asked for plans to reorganize the Army
and the Ministry of Defense, and, foreshadowing of his permanent preoccupa-
tion with foreign military support, suggested a Vietnam Foreign Legion. Diem
noted that the Chinese Communists had never accused Germany of interven-
tion in Indochina merely because of Germans serving in the French Foreign
Legion, and he thought that anti-Communist governments in Asia should be
similarly immune.24 (S)
Hope for a Challenge to Ho Chi Minh (U)
Heath's concern with the effects of partition was fully shared by the two
CIA Stations. Indeed, in mid-summer 1954, CIA in Vietnam was by no means
reconciled to the permanence of Communist rule in Hanoi. On 12 July, Lans-
dale's representative in Hanoi joined McCarthy's man there in a passionate
appeal to Saigon and Washington to support a nationalist resistance movement
in the North. Acknowledging the political naivet�f its Vietnamese contacts,
CIA in Hanoi argued that this could be overcome by pragmatic US counsel.
These nationalists, they insisted, were at least preferable to past Vietnamese
governments, which had enjoyed "warm US support" despite "corruption and
complete lack [of] public support." The case rested on CIA Hanoi's percep-
tion that Vietnamese nationalism had always been strongest in the North and
that active engagement in the anti-Communist cause was not to be expected
from the nationalists in the Center and South "after the US has walked out on
their Northern brothers." As the CIA people in Hanoi saw it, the loss of
Tonkin would lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia. 25 (S)
Lansdale followed the Hanoi message with a cable asserting that the Viet-
namese Army would shortly ask for material help. He said he would then
"require [a] decision soonest on CIA policy re [a] guerrilla movement in
North Vietnam." Adding that he feared destructive rivalry among guerrilla
bands, he proposed to urge on Diem a unified resistance command. On
26 July, Lansdale predicted that many thousands would refuse to leave the
North; they asked only for rice and ammunition, which he wanted CIA to
" George Aurell, Chief, FE Division, Memorandum for Robert C. Strong, Operations Coordina-
tor, Office of the Undersecretary of State, "Proposed Advisor to Ngo Dinh Diem," 13 July 1954,
and memorandums for George Aurell, Chief, FE Division, 21 July and 3 August 1954, ibid.
(S)
24 SAIG 3352 15 July 1954 ibid.
ibid. (S)
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provide forthwith, along with exfiltration of leaders for training. But Harwood
had reported four days earlier that the Ngo brothers. had abandoned any notion
of a "suicidal defense [of] Hanoi." They now intended to leave behind only
small stay-behind units with specific missions against the Viet Minh, who
were scheduled to take over Hanoi on 10 October.26 (S)
But if Diem was resigned to a Communist assumption of power in Hanoi,
Lansdale was not. Complaining to Dulles about Diem's indifference to unified
command for stay-behind units in the North, he scornfully dismissed any need
to accede to loss of the North. Saying that he suspected the French of trying to
manipulate the South into accommodation with the North, he demanded,
"Will the US Government stop playing [the] French parlor game in IC
[Indochina]?" If so, he asserted, he could quickly form an effective resistance
movement. Apparently believing that a change of government in France
would somehow obviate the need for such a resistance program, he suggested
as an alternative a "military coup in Paris to make [a] lady out of [a] slut." It
would require, he thought, no more than a "handful [of] strongminded US
officials to change [the] entire complexion [of the] world picture."27 (S)
Meanwhile, more mundane problems in Saigon were absorbing US officials
there. The Geneva Accords had established two deadlines, which during
Diem's first weeks in office were already focusing attention on the need to
increase popular support for his government. The first deadline allowed
300 days to relocate people who found themselves, after the Geneva Accords,
on politically inhospitable ground. The second called for national elections to
produce a unified Vietnamese government in July 1956. For Diem, the reloca-
tion deadline created two requirements. One was to resettle the refugees,
mostly Catholics, coming down from the North. The other was to establish
governmental authority in the countryside, especially in those portions of the
South being vacated by the Viet Minh. The prospect of elections also required
the construction of an organized base of popular support and the creation of a
claim for Diem's authority above as well as below the 17th parallel. (U)
The regular Station's contribution to this effort focused at first on the com-
petition for legitimacy between Diem and Ho Chi Mink As of late July 1954,
Harwood was urging Nhu to follow up on the "National Revolution" themes
of two Diem proclamations issued earlier that month. The Station wanted to
put the onus on the Viet Minh, as stooges of the Communist Chinese, for the
partition of Vietnam. This was fine with Diem, who had explicitly repudiated
" SAM 3336; SAIG 3403, 22 July 1954, and SAIG 3419, 26 July 1954, ibid. (S)
" SAM 3352. No reaction from Dulles to the suggestion for a coup in Paris has been found. (S)
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the partition. The irredentist theme also afforded a momentary reprieve from
the need to deal with the narrow base of Diem's political support in the
South.28 (S)
From the beginning of its association with Diem, the regular Station recog-
nized his limitations as a competitor to Ho Chi Minh. In August, Harwood
noted that Diem's reliance on a few loyalists who regarded him as the salva-
tion of the country was leading to government by coterie, which exempted
Diem from political compromise. Harwood reported that the sects, Dai Viet
politicians, some Catholic groups, and even the Binh Xuyen gang, "would like
to offer their loyalty to the government for something in return, but Diem has
shown little desire to.. .bargain." This attitude was not, as Harwood dryly
noted, "a political asset which will attract mass support."29 (S)
But as the Station saw it, it was not an unqualified liability either, at least in
the short term. Reliance on family precluded Diem's being unseated by
"ambitious underlings or a party trading on his name." In any case, he had no
serious non-Communist challenger. The national elections mandated at
Geneva were still almost two years away. Reports of resistance to the new
regime in the North encouraged Harwood to think, for a short time, that it
might be possible to make Diem a competitive candidate for nationwide lead-
ership. He noted that Diem had support from the Catholic trade unions and the
Trinh Minh. The faction of the Cao Dai, and in the coastal villages of Central
Vietnam. If Diem could dispose of the French and Bao Dai and consolidate
the military's support by adding 100,000 men to the Army, elections might
become something "to be sought rather than a nightmare to be avoided."30 (S)
But Diem's indifference to popularity and his hostility to compromise con-
stantly hindered the development of a broad political constituency. Harwood
found him "fixated" with the French, "obsessed" with their obstructionism,
but totally unconcerned about establishing a base of voter support. His partici-
pation in later efforts to improve his public image was therefore more acquies-
cent than active. Even Nhu's relatively progressive views had the
authoritarian, elitist cast of the early 20th century Vietnamese anticolonialists.
Nevertheless, Nhu's request for Agency help in organizing a political party
along democratic lines was no mere "window dressing." He seemed to Har-
wood genuinely to be groping for some way to bring the government into con-
tact with the people." (S)
" FVSA 741, 30 July 1954 FVSA 74, 13 August 1954
" FVSA 746, 13 August 19:)4,
" FA/SA 746; Paul Harwood, interview by Thomas Ahern, McLean, VA, 11 September 1990. (S)
31 Harwood interviews, 14 February and 11 September 1990; and 10 June 1964 (S)
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Covert Support in a Political and Administrative Vacuum (U)
Nhu's agreement to the conditions for CIA support specified by Harwood in
May had left open the content and the nature of the Agency's participation.
Nhu wrote to Harwood, apparently during these chaotic early weeks of
Diem's administration, asking for support without Agency "controls." The
Station acceded�
-and planning began for a variety of projects aimed at
consolidating the government's control and building for it a base of popular
support. These included the Can Lao (Labor) Party, to be developed out of
Nhu's semicovert Parti Travailliste cadre, and like its predecessor, intended to
be a cadre party, not a mass organization. It would act for the new government
where the bureaucratic legacy of the colonial regime was found inadequate,
and would control the mass front organization, the National Revolutionary
Movement, aimed at building a popular constituency for the Diem provern-
ment
The painfully slow progress of these efforts resulted, in the Station's view,
from several causes. One of these was Nhu's propensity to take an idea for
reality, or at least for something realizable. He was "always talking about
things that didn't exist as if they did." Second, there was the perennial short-
age of competent people. Throughout the Harwood-Nhu association, what
seemed like sound ideas lay dormant for lack of effective leaders and func-
tionaries to carry them out. (S)
Another problem was the administrative vacuum in the countryside. Har-
wood heard it poignantly described by the capable but consumptive Tran
Trung Dung, at the time Acting Defense Minister and also former mayor of
Hanoi and husband of Nhu's niece. Harwood had traveled with members of
the Nhu family by military convoy to Vinh Long, in the Mekong Delta. During
the course of the visit, in a conversation with Dung, he inquired about the
extent of the government's control. Harwood later paraphrased Dung's
response: "As long as we're here it's this far, but when we go back to Saigon it
" SAIG 3670, 23 August 1954. and_FVSA 1549 5 geommi,,, iocc
" Harwood interview, 11 September 1990. (S)
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goes back with us." Harwood asked if there were "provincial officials, district
administrators, people who take care of the roads, or anything else?" He
recalled Dung's reply:
No, the French didn't leave us anything. ...Our problem right now is
not trying to keep the Viet Minh from taking over our area, but to
take it over before they do. ...[Of course,] we can't go about this
thing in the same way [as the French] because this is our country, we
can't operate as an army of occupation. But...trying to develop
political and social programs with any impact.. .in an unadminis-
tered territory where you have a hostile population which is armed
and ready to go against you�how do you do itV4 (S)
Harwood had no answer to Dung's question. The issue was further compli-
cated by the absence of a coherent, attractive political program designed to
win mass support. As the "National Revolution" theme faded, Harwood and
Nhu struggled to replace it with something vital enough to win over uncom-
mitted nationalists and compete with the Viet Minh. But the discussion seems
not to have transcended the level of organizational mechanics, and Station
reporting concentrates on such things as the construction of a "Cold War polit-
ical apparatus" and material support to Tran Quoc Buu." (S)
The activism of CIA's officers in Saigon did not imply disagreement with
the Embassy's pessimism. The regular Station took note of Diem's heavy reli-
ance on family members, saying that he could not win "if nationwide elections
were held tomorrow."" Diem had been Prime Minister just two weeks when a
"despondent and fatigued" Nhu insisted to Harwood and Spence on 21 July
that, despite the obstacles, his brother would remain in office and try to con-
solidate his government. Apparently speaking for both Nhu and himself, Har-
wood wrote that the "task is hopeless, but [the] effort must be made."37 (S)
That effort included direct Station intervention in the formation of the Cab-
inet. Later in July, Harwo6d found himself back with the pistol-packing
74 Harwood interview, 19 June 1964. The "armed" and "hostile population" presumably
refers to the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects as well as to the Viet Minh. (S)
FVSA 746, 13 August 1954,
FVSA 746, 13 August 1954, ibid. (S)
37 SAIG 3407, 26 July 1954, Harwood inter-
view, 10 June 1964, Both Harwood and Lansdale seemed more confident, in late July, of
the prospects for a resistance movement in the North, about to be taken over by the Communists,
than they were of Diem's prospects in Western-supported South Vietnam. Both of them bom-
barded Headquarters with demands for material support and training for stay-behind units to be
organized by the old line nationalist parties, the Dai Viet and the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang. On
this issue, in sharp contrast to their Saigon programs, the two Stationsseem to have kept each
other fully informed.
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Nguyen Ton Hoan and "belabored [him] mercilessly into seeking an appoint-
ment with Ngo Dinh Nhu to negotiate Dai Viet support to the Diem govern-
ment." Harwood then "turned around and sat down and beat Nhu just as hard
to accept Dai Viet support." The two eventually met, but reached no agree-
ment; Diem and Nhu never did enlist the support of the non-Communist
nationalist factions.38 (S)
Lansdale found Diem dispirited by the chaos that followed the close of the
Geneva Conference on 21 July. He responded by trying to help Diem deal
with the immediate threats to the government while laying the groundwork for
the construction of permanent institutions.39 Like Diem and Lansdale, Nhu
and Harwood saw the sects and the French as posing the greatest danger. Har-
wood wrote on 13 July that prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh was
impossible "when all tools needed to do this job [are] locked up by French
high command." Having acknowledged the underlying Communist threat, he
got down to the immediate problem: if the French continued to obstruct
Diem's use of the Army to deal with the sects and the Binh Xuyen, they would
provoke increasing Vietnamese hostility, not only to France, but eventually
also to the US.4� (S)
Ngo Dinh Diem vs. the French (U)
As the North prepared for Communist rule, Ngo Dinh Diem exercised
undisputed control over the grounds of his combined office and residence and
little else. The French High Commissioner still occupied Gia Long Palace. As
we have seen, the French still ran the Army and controlled the country's
finances. Their capacity to frustrate Diem's full exercise of the powers of his
office rested not only on these residual controls but on collusion with various
non-Communist organizations whose interests would suffer under an effective
indigenous regime. (U)
Absentee Emperor Bao Dai, for example, had given the Saigon police and
Surete (the latter, the internal security branch) on a concessionary basis to an
underworld gang called the Binh Xuyen. In the countryside the French were
linked with two religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, whose armies
controlled substantial areas west of Saigon and in the lower Mekong Delta. Of
potential adversaries only the Viet Minh were quiescent; in Diem's view the
immediate threat to his political survival was not the Communists but the
French and their collaborators. Lansdale, as we have seen, emphatically
" SAIG 3407, 26 July 1954,
view, 10 June 1964,
" Clandestine Service Historical Paper (CSHP) 113, The Saigon Military Mission, June 1954 to
December 1956, 2 vols., October 1970, II, pp. 5-8. (S)
40 SAIG 3332, 13 July 1954,
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shared this perception, and Harwood held essentially the same view. Indeed he
joined in a 20 July Lansdale appeal for covert support to Diem, which should
continue whatever the final terms of the impending Geneva agreement, and
even if the US gave such an agreement its formal endorsement.41 (S)
Headquarters apparently did not directly address the Harwood�Lansdale
appeal for covert support to Diem, but did show itself more willing than the
Department of State to challenge French control of key Vietnamese institu-
tions. In late July, Richard Bissell, then a special assistant to the DCI, asked
the State Department for confirmation of CIA authority to operate in Indoch-
ina independently of the French. Bissell later advised FE Division that State
had confirmed its intention to support Diem. State's position was "emphati-
cally not that [of allowing] the French to frustrate the development of inde-
pendent national governments in the Associated States and to hold a veto
power over US actions." But the Department had noted continuing French
control of the "only instruments of power" in the South, and it concluded that
"activities opposed by the French would probably fail."42 (S)
Bissell suggested that FE Division convey this view to the field and instruct
the Stations to tell the French "something of what they are doing" when this
could be done "without immediately prejudicing the success of an undertak-
ing."'" Whether this advice ever reached the field is not known. In practice,
Lansdale's subsequent work with refugee transportation and his civic action
project with the military were coordinated with the French; his other activity
and Harwood's liaison with the Palace were not. But Lansdale's style reflected
more his civilian experience in advertising than it did clandestine technique.
His high profile contacts with Diem and various Vietnamese Army officers
and sect leaders generated several French efforts, in both Saigon and Paris, to
have him withdrawn.'" (S)
The Dulles brothers were firmly committed to the Lansdale mission, and
these efforts failed. The two Stations persevered, but in these early weeks
encountered little except frustration. The combination of French and indige-
nous opposition, Diem's contempt for constituency-building, and the shortage
of competent subordinates prevented the new government from creating visi-
ble political momentum. An impatient CIA Headquarters began to question
whether Diem was, after all, the man for the job. Emmet McCarthy responded
" Harwood interviews, 10 June 1964, and 25 October 1989; Lansdale, In the Midst of
Wars, pp. 150, 171-172; SAIG 3366, 20 July 1954
Memorandum for C/FE, "Policy re Indochina," 30 July 1954, quoted in CSI-{P
113,1, pp. 30-32. (S)
" Ibid., p. 32. (S)
" Ibid., pp. 112-118. (S)
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on 21 August, speaking for both his Station and Lansdale's. Rejecting the idea
that Diem might be no more than a vacillating politician, McCarthy insisted
that his "uncompromising stand on complete independence for Vietnam"
underlay all his earlier dealings with the French and the Japanese as well as
various Vietnamese factions. As for US criticism of Diem's failure to "demon-
strate an administrative capacity such as no previous government has demon-
strated," the COS noted that the French still ran Diem's "finances, military,
customs, immigration, diplomatic representation, judiciary and police matters
and security forces."45 (S)
McCarthy went on to acknowledge the limited competence of the Cabinet,
and the politicians and sect leaders not yet won over, but maintained that the
largest obstacle to Diem's consolidation of power remained French efforts to
undercut him. Sounding a note about Vietnamese leadership that would reso-
nate through the rest of the Agency�and US�experience in Vietnam,
McCarthy argued that there was no one else. As a "nationalist symbol and sin-
gle-minded and courageous leader," Diem remained the best choice for US
support.46 (S)
It seems likely that McCarthy was right: if any non-Communist leader mer-
ited US support, it was Ngo Dinh Diem. At this point, as in the months leading
up to Diem's selection by the US and France, this preference reflected the
absence of an alternative as much as it did any display by Diem of either polit-
ical charisma or administrative skill. But continuing French sabotage of
Diem's efforts distracted US officials from the more basic question of his
capacity, under any circumstances, to create a nation-state capable of resisting
absorption by the Communist regime in Hanoi. In any case, as we have seen,
the US decision to engage itself in Vietnam had from the beginning grown
more out of the perceived cost of failure than out of confidence in victory. (U)
SA1G 3650, 21 August 1954
46 Ibid. (S)
S)
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CHAPTER 4
Bringing the Armies to Heel (U)
Agency defenders of Ngo Dinh Diem might see no alternative to him, but
this did not mean that they failed to recognize his weaknesses. In a cable of
25 August, even Lansdale shed his customary optimism. Without explicitly
repudiating his endorsement of McCarthy's 21 August defense of Diem, Lans-
dale suggested that the Prime Minister had waited too long to exhibit "real
leadership." Unnamed nationalists outside the government were becoming
restive at Diem's fumbling, and Diem would now have to act boldly in order
to avoid a coup. Always confident of the power of the American political
example, and of his own ability to impart that example to the foreign mind,
Lansdale said he intended to work with these nationalists "and teach them
some [of] our political principles." But he feared that this might not suffice to
prevent a coup, and he was at the moment spreading the word that the US
Government would spurn any new government "established by bloody coup."
The question remained: If such a government were "anti-Communist and will-
ing [to] accept guidance then what would US Government policy be?"1 (S)
The feared coup did not take place, and Lansdale's question did not have to
be answered. Instead, he and the regular Station continued the struggle to gen-
erate political support for the regime. Harwood and Nhu now came up with
two devices aimed at compensating for the government's lack of control over
the army and police. First, they proposed a combined mobile police force and
presidential guard, intended as a kind of all-purpose security and investigative
force to protect the regime from "commie [and] confessional [sect] agitators,"
and to strengthen Diem's hand in his dealings with other political groups.'
Harwood made arrangements through the and Nhu provided
about 30 men for paramilitary training by the but the
' SAIG 3706, 25 August 1954,
2 SAIG 3332 13 July 1954 and SAIG 3670,23 August 1954,
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project never matured. Harwood later called it a "fantasy," citing the lack of
competent personnel and the unrealistically varied functions the organization
was to perfonn.3 (S)
The other project was better focused and seemed to produce better results. It
involved the support of a hamlet militia, originally created by the French to
resist the Viet Minh, that Diem and Nhu wanted to use to establish Saigon's
authority in the countryside. Harwood supplemented Nhu's support of the pro-
gram by allowing him to use for it part of the Station subsidy that seems to have
begun about August 1954. By the end of the year, the force had by Nhu's
account some 15,000 men under arms. The government used it to stake out a
rural claim not only�perhaps not primarily�against the Viet Minh, but also
against the sects. Although the Station had no independent way to monitor
results, Nhu's evident satisfaction indicated that it was serving its purpose.4 (S)
If Nhu was happy, COS McCarthy was not. On 17 September, he sent an
angry cable asking Headquarters to instruct Lansdale to cease his meddling
with the program. Seeking to head off any charge of poor coordination,
McCarthy said Lansdale had been "generally" advised of the activity in
August; the COS had informed him of it indirectly, via Lansdale's executive
officer and interpreter, Joe Redick. The Headquarters response, if any, has not
survived; there may already have been a disposition to let the two Stations
work out their differences by themselves.' (S)
Preparing for an Exodus from the North (U)
In any case, the plethora of challenges to Diem's fledgling government pre-
cluded either Station from dwelling on jurisdictional questions. One of these
challenges followed from the Geneva Accord provision allowing relocation
on political grounds. Both Vietnamese and US officials in Saigon expected a
mass exodus of Catholics from the North, and within weeks of taking office
Diem had set up an interministerial committee on refugees.6 (S)
But this group did nothing, and Lansdale, not yet firmly established in
Diem's confidence, fumed in frustration until he persuaded Ambassador
Heath to intercede with the Prime Minister. In mid-August, Diem replaced the
first committee with a new one empowered, as Lansdale wanted, to negotiate
transportation and other logistics with the Americans and the French.
3 Harwood interview, 16 May 1990. (S)
Harwood interview, 16 May 1990. Harwood could not remember the amount of the subsidy, and
it is not specified in surviving files. (S)
SAIG 3956, 17 September 1954,
6 Clandestine Service Historical Paper (CSHP) 113, The Saigon Military Mission, June 1954 to
December 1956, 2 vols., October 1970, II, pp. 6-7. (S)
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Lansdale was delighted with Diem's appointment of Dr. Emmanuel Phuoc to
run the office, but Phuoc proved to be no exception to the general run of early
Diem subordinates. Within a month Lansdale had branded Phuoc a posturing
self-seeker. But the mere formal existence of a Vietnamese executive authority
enabled the Americans and the French to get on with transportation and recep-
tion arrangements.7 (S)
SMM's friend Ho Quan "Manny" Pruoc is an effervescent psyvvarrior At this briefing in Long-
My, President Diem, Defense Minister Minh, and Delegue to the South Lam watch some of his
mood (caption by Ed Lansdale). (U)
Before the migration ended in May 1955, over 900,000 people moved to
South Vietnam. Helping to stimulate this was the Northern element of Lans-
dale's team, which remained in Hanoi until 9 October 1954. Its primary mis-
sion was the conduct of stay-behind operations in the North, but Lansdale
used it also for propaganda designed to encourage emigration. The team
7 SAIG 3607, 17 August 1954, and SAIG 3687,24 August 1954, both
Regarding the new refugee relocation agency, see SAIG 3607, 17 August
1954, ibid. (S)
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propagated slogans, aimed at Catholic villages, such as "the Virgin Mary is
going south," and put out leaflets, ostensibly of Viet Minh origin. Lansdale
believed that one of these produced a threefold increase in refugee registration
by provoking fear that the Viet Minh would confiscate private property.8 (U)
Lansdale later claimed to have alerted Diem to the electoral potential of a
transplanted Catholic community and thus to have been instrumental in pro-
moting the migration. But he also conceded that most of the Catholics needed
no urging to leave the North. His major contribution had therefore less to do
with psychological warfare than with his forceful advocacy of a transportation
and resettlement program.9 (U)
Dividing the Sect Leadership (U)
As August gave way to September 1954, the refugee program was just get-
ting under way. The local French remained hostile to Diem, for whom the only
real bright spot at this point was the susceptibility of the sect forces to accom-
modation with the new government. In an episode crucial to his survival in
office, Diem moved with uncharacteristic decisiveness, exploiting both CIA
Stations to win the formal allegiance of one sect leader and achieve at least a
modus vivendi with two others. In this context, the sects themselves deserve a
closer look. (U)
The Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai arose as 20th century products of the social
dislocations that accompanied colonial rule in the South. The Hoa Hao, with
up to a million and a half adherents in the western part of the Mekong Delta,
developed out of Buddhism. The somewhat larger Cao Dai borrowed from a
number of the world's major religions; Victor Hugo and Abraham Lincoln
were among its secular saints. Before World War II, both sects contested
French authority in their respective enclaves, the Cao Dai northwest of Saigon
and the Hoa Hao in the western Mekong Delta. During their occupation of
Indochina in World War II, the Japanese supported the Cao Dai, competing for
influence with the Vichy regime they left in nominal control until early
1945.i0 (U)
Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), p.
158. (U)
9 Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 166-167;
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 222; CSHP 113, II, pp. 6-7. Lansdale told his biographer
that he then pressed Heath into service as interpreter with Diem when the time came to persuade
the Prime Minister to approve the new relocation scheme (Currey, Lansdale, pp. 156-157). (S)
,0 Currey, Lansdale, pp. 145-146. (U)
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The two sects were militantly anti-Communist. After the war the French
chose to overlook any wartime inconstancy in order to enlist their support
against the Viet Minh. In this context, they undertook the financial and logisti-
cal maintenance of sect forces�an estimated 15,000 Hoa Hao and perhaps
20,000 Cao Dai�as auxiliaries to the French Expeditionary Corps.11 After
Dien Bien Phu, with Saigon's treasury still under their control, local French
authorities continued courting the two sects, hoping to salvage some influence
at the expense of the francophobe Diem. But they could make no enduring
commitments and failed, if they were seriously trying, to drive the sects onto
the offensive against the new government. It is nevertheless clear that most of
the sect forces and many Vietnamese Army officers were hostile to Diem. Any
sect forces that he could co-opt would weaken opposition from that quarter
and help deter dissidents in the Army.12 (S)
Hoa Hao and Cao Dai leaders, for their part, faced the loss of their French
subsidies and were looking for some other means of support. This provided
the basis for some mutual accommodation, if Diem could replace the French
as benefactor of the sects. But he had no money. Nhu had already complained
to Harwood that his brother's predecessor, Prince Buu Loc, had absconded
with the Prime Minister's confidential fund when he left office. Accordingly,
sometime in the first weeks of the Diem government, Harwood sent
'asters to the Palace for use at Diem's discretion. How much of
t Is first subsidy Diem spent on the sects is unknown, but it was presumably
exhausted when he approached Lansdale in September 1954 with a request for
more." (S)
The commander of an independent Cao Dai force, Trinh Minh The, was a
longtime contact of Ngo Dinh Nhu. More anti-French than pro-Diem (the
French believed he had assassinated their commanding general in the South in
1950), General The was nevertheless a potential ally against pro-French ele-
ments in the regular army. After negotiations between The and Nhu, Diem
asked Lansdale for funds with which to buy The's support. Lansdale delivered
n greenbacks to Diem, who passed the money on to Nhu for delivery
to The. Two days later, on 15 September, Lansdale was invited to The's head-
quarters on the Cao Dai's sacred mountain in Tay Ninh Province. There,
11 Ibid. Estimates of sect membership are from Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965), p. 116. (U)
'2 CSHP 113, II, p. 10. (S)
" Harwood interview, 21 June 1990. The money Was written off on the basis of a hand receipt
from a Palace functionary,
Harwood could not recall the exact amount, but thought it might have
been the equivalent
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Cao Dai temple at Tay Ninh (photo courtesy of Paul Harwood). (U)
General The confirmed his support for the government, agreed not to take any
uncoordinated military initiative against the French, and released his French
prisoners." (S)
First meeting with Trinh Minh The in his Nui Ba Den hideout. Lansdale at left, Trinh Minh The is
facing camera (caption by Ed Lansdale). (C)
The account of this incident in Lansdale's official report omits his own role
in securing The's commitment to Diem. Reflecting his perennial reluctance to
acknowledge using material inducements, Lansdale says only that "at Ambas-
sador Heath's request, the US secretly furnished Diem with funds for The,
through the SMM" (Saigon Military Mission). Inasmuch as The's adherence
" CSHP 113, I, p. 69; CSHP 113, II, p. 10; Harwood interview, 21 June 1990;
Memorandum for the Record, "Transfer of CIA Funds to Colonel Trinh Minh The by Lansdale,"
11.(1
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was already assured with the passage of funds, the invitation to Lansdale
seems likely to have represented Diem's way of securing a display of overt US
recognition of The, whom the French regarded as a common criminal.'5 (S)
This episode provoked the first recorded instance of what developed into
chronic antagonism between Lansdale and Nhu. At a subsequent meeting with
Harwood, Nhu blamed Lansdale for provoking Trinh Minh The's accusation
that payment in dollars showed Diem to be in the pocket of the Americans.
Probably embarrassed at having been an accessory to this, Nhu threatened to
have Lansdale declared persona non grata. And Lansdale returned the senti-
ment. Once, after Ambassador Heath's departure in November, he instructed
Joe Redick to see the new Ambassador, General Collins, and suggest having
Nhu removed. Redick reminded him that Nhu was the regular Station's princi-
pal contact in the government, and Lansdale dropped the matter.'6 (S)
A Test of CIA Leverage (U)
Agency support for Diem's efforts with the sects did not prevent a US con-
frontation with him the week after General The rallied. Diem's Cabinet was
composed entirely of Ngo family loyalists, and the French had just persuaded
Secretary of State Dulles that it should be broadened to include representa-
tives of the still-uncommitted sects. Diem resisted the combined French and
American diplomatic efforts, and Headquarters finally instructed the Station
to try to break the impasse, in order to avoid confronting him with the possible
withdrawal of American support. Harwood doubted both the wisdom of the
goal and the existence of a workable alternative to Diem but set out to do what
he was told.17 (S)
It appears that Nhu undertook first to try his own hand at talking Diem into
making the desired changes. But on 20 September he acknowledged his fail-
ure with a message urgently requesting Harwood to come to the Palace that
evening to argue the case himself. The three met in Diem's bedroom. As Har-
wood later recalled it, "I really had the heat on, and argued, pressured," but
Diem was obdurate, despite a Harwood threat to withdraw from the relation-
ship in the face of Diem's "passivity." Harwood was equally obdurate, and at
one point they sat in silence for something like an hour and a half. As the night
wore on, they also walked out onto the balcony at the front of Gia Long Pal-
ace, and Harwood noticed two tanks outside the fence with their guns trained
'5 CSHP 113, II, is. 10. (S)
Harwood interviews, 17 October 1989 and 14 August 1990; Redick interview, 28 September
1989. Harwood had no recollection of telling Lansdale of The's negotiations with Nhu, and
thought Lansdale might well have seen his own role as operative in rallying The to the govern-
ment. (S)
17 Harwood interviews, 10 June 1964, and 16 May and 11 September 1990. (S)
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on the Palace. Well aware of the doubtful loyalty of the Army's Chief of Staff,
he suggested that Diem's presence on the balcony might tempt General Hinh's
gunners, and they went back inside. Finally, Diem grunted something which
Nhu interpreted for Harwood as meaning that he was giving in, the Cabinet
would be broadened." (S)
And Diem did broaden it, although in Harwood's view, the results vindi-
cated the Prime Minister's reluctance: the new Hoa Hao and Cao Dai minis-
ters were corrupt and disloyal. Lansdale was frantic, persuaded that the
Cabinet moves reflected nothing but a treacherous French move to promote
anarchy. He implored DCI Dulles to stiffen Emperor Bao Dai's resistance to
French maneuvering, and to get him to rescind his reported decision to ask for
Diem's resignation." (S)
However unsatisfactory the outcome, the incident does suggest the predom-
inant Agency influence in American dealings with Diem and Nhu in the early
months of the regime. Ten years later, Harwood recalled the episode as repre-
senting perhaps "the first and last time that anybody ever got Diem to do
something... that he didn't want to do to start with."2� Harwood may have
overstated his conclusion, but it illustrates how little, even during the period of
Diem's greatest dependence, US support could be translated into influence.
The question of leverage, so vigorously argued in later years, had been essen-
tially answered before the end of 1954. (S)
Warding Off an Army Mutiny (U)
In the tangled aftermath of the Cabinet reshuffle, the loyalty of the French-
dominated military remained in doubt. The government's writ did not extend,
for example, to the psychological warfare branch of its own army. Fed by a
French journalist, the Army's radio had in September "undertaken a character
assassination" of Diem, which Lansdale believed attracted a large audience.
To combat this, he arranged the loan of a US Navy officer from the task force
then transporting refugees and placed him at the radio station, whose Vietnam-
ese commander had been his classmate and friend at the US Army's Psycho-
logical Warfare School at Fort Bragg. The idea was gradually to modify the
editorial slant from anti-Diem to anti-Viet Minh without attracting the atten-
tion of the French. The young American lieutenant worked hard, "with partial
success."2' (S)
18 FVSA 810,27 September 1954, interviews with Paul Harwood on 10 June 1964,
17 and 26 October 1989 and 16 May 1990. (S)
19 Harwood interview, 10 June 1964 SATG 4021 and SAIG 4039, 23 September 1954,
(S)
" Harwood interview, 10 June 1964 (S)
21 CSHP 113, II, pp. 13-14; SAIG 4293, 18 October 1954,
;ST
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The regular CIA Station came up with a radio of its own, loaning Nhu a
transmitter borrowed from the MAAG. Nhu used it for the next several weeks
to proselytize army officers and to announce new adherents�some authentic,
some notional�to Diem's cause. 22 (S)
French influence over the Vietnamese military was abetted by the Army's
commander, General Nguyen Van Hinh. A French citizen and officer in the
French Air Force, Hinh did not conceal his distaste for his nominal superior,
the Prime Minister, and seems to have made thinly veiled threats to help
unseat him. But Hinh recognized the intensity of the US commitment to Diem,
and in early October made a conciliatory overture to Lansdale, who admon-
ished him through Filipino and Vietnamese intermediaries to get on the gov-
ernment bandwagon and start preparing to fight the Communists.23 (S)
Still fearful that Hinh intended to depose Diem, Lansdale urged Heath and
Major General John O'Daniel, USA, chief of the MAAG, to deploy the
Saigon Military Mission (SMM) where it could exercise continuous influence
on the Army. Diem had already endorsed Lansdale's liaison with the civilian
agencies responsible for rural affairs, and Lansdale brought them together
with their US counterparts at his house on 7 October. Heath now agreed to
assign Lansdale's men to General Hinh to coordinate the military aspects of
this rural civic action, and simultaneously to help prevent a rupture between
Diem and the Army.24 (S)
On 11 October, Lansdale reported that Diem wanted him assigned as Hinh's
personal advisor. Ambassador Heath backed away from this idea, but Lans-
dale persisted in his self-assigned role as mediator and on the 18th trium-
phantly announced to CIA Headquarters that Diem and Hinh had accepted
him as peacemaker between them. Three days later, Lansdale got word that
Hinh had provisionally renounced his opposition to the government. But
before declaring loyalty, Hinh would require that Diem demonstrate the good
faith of which Lansdale had assured him. Meanwhile, Lansdale had just
" Harwood interview 10 June 1964. (S)
" SAIG 4197,8 October 1954, (S)
" Ibid. Lansdale ended his report ot this episode in the grandiloquent fashion characteristic of his
early correspondence from Saigon: "If present plans mature the SMM [will] be in position [to]
change ithe] Indochina picture rapidly." He begged for more and better people�only two of the
existing complement could be trusted to "work without constant supervision"�to enable him to
seize this "big chance [for] CIA [to] play heroic role save SEAsia right where situation most des-
Penn e." (5)
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"scolded" Hinh's chief of psychological warfare for his dealings with the anti-
Diem leader of a Hoa Hao force. The colonel, who Lansdale believed was also
a French agent, "grinned and promised [to be a] good boy" in the future. 25 (S)
Watching First Paywar Company ceremonies in the rain are Generals Hinh and Ty with SMM
members Lansdale, Sharpi, and Redick. In the background are our USIS friend Jack Andrew (died
of hepatitis), Swiss journalist Peter Schmidt, and Capt Giai (reportedly murdered by Ba Cut)
(caption by Ed Lansdale). (C)
Whether Diem condescended to prove his good faith to General Hinh is not
recorded. But an Army mutiny was now at least temporarily defused, and
General Trinh Minh The picked the same moment to confirm his adherence to
the Diem cause. He told Lansdale he was trying to get another Cao Dai gen-
eral to reject a Hinh offer of 6,000 rifles in return for Cao Dai repudiation of
the Diem government. Diem now invited Lansdale to call on him, and Lans-
dale, in this heady atmosphere, told Headquarters he proposed to get Diem
finally to "act like [a] leader and ask people [to] unite against [the] Commu-
nists while building [a] free strong nation." In an effusion of compressed
telegraphese, Lansdale acknowledged that his Station might be embarked on a
quixotic mission. But:
Vietnamese use grenades instead windmills. Part job is make them
stop trying kill each other particularly when we guests their houses.
Some local US Government officials feel we too naive but our love
" SAIG 4293; SAIG 4337, 22 October 1954,
(S)
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campaign started work despite long odds against. If win then US
Government has friendly united govt army people in fight against
communists.26 (S)
Prime Minister Diem vs. Ambassador Heath (U)
But Lansdale's activist optimism collided that night (21 October) with
Diem's fatalistic passivity. To Lansdale's every urging that he rally his popula-
tion and start building the institutions of government, Diem pleaded weak-
ness: the French were supporting his enemies and planning to bomb Trinh
Minh The's forces; even the Americans insisted on Cabinet representation for
the treacherous sects. Lansdale reported that he offered detailed suggestions
for solving Diem's litany of problems, but the Prime Minister thought himself
too weak to tackle any of them except by "devious methods." Lansdale then
tried explaining the notions of executive efficiency and delegation of author-
ity, but Diem looked unconvinced. Lansdale concluded his crestfallen account
of this session with a resigned if somewhat patronizing sigh: "Well[, I] am
also unsuccessful getting my sons [to] wash behind [the] ears."27 (S)
A week before the disappointing 21 October meeting, a "bitterly discour-
aged" Diem had already displayed to Lansdale his sense of dependence on
foreign sympathy and support. He gave Lansdale a long message for President
Eisenhower in which he complained that Ambassador Heath's complicity in
French maneuvering utterly vitiated his own efforts to energize the struggle
against the Communists. He wanted American material support delivered
directly, not through the French, and American advisors to modernize the gov-
ernment and the Army. And were Heath to be replaced, his successor should
be an American of "great courage and irresistible conviction" of his country's
ideals. Heath seemed, unfortunately, "to see our problems from the French
perspective."28 (S)
Relying this message to Washington, Lansdale assured Dulles of his per-
sonal regard for Heath, and suggested that the DCI delete Diem's unflattering
description of the Ambassador before sharing the message with the State
Department. But Lansdale thought the DCI should take up the matter privately
with the Secretary of State, because it would be "constructive [to] replace
Heath soonest," so long as his replacement was "out of top drawer. Urgently
need man caliber Clay or Van Fleet even if could have only for year."29 (S)
" SAIG 4337, ibid. (S)
" SAIG 4345, 24 October 1954, ibid. (S)
" SAIG 4291, 18 October 1954, ibid. (S)
" Ibid. (S)
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Two days later, on 20 October, Dulles assured Lansdale he had done as
requested: he had discussed the message informally at the "top policy level at
the Department of State," presumably with his brother. But he noted the "most
unfortunate consequences" for CIA relations with State both in the field and in
Washington if the Agency became the channel for such communications. The
US Government could not, in any case, act on such an informal request as
Diem's through Lansdale, and Diem should be advised that Eisenhower would
not see it. Dulles added that he understood Lansdale's actions as an intelli-
gence officer in "acquainting" him with Diem's message. Nevertheless, he
fully agreed with State's procedural objections. Lansdale "should make it
clear to Diem that this is a procedural matter and in no way signifies any dim-
inution of US Government support of him."" (S)
The irrepressible Lansdale shot back: "Roger wilco." He had, he said, stipu-
lated his respect for protocol in his first message and now felt that the DCI
might "wish to point out informally [to the] State Department some time that
CIA was not willfully interjecting itself into State Department business." This
had come about only because Diem could not use the State channel, distrusted
his own Ambassador to Washington, and had no other reliable emissary for
what he considered an emergency message. Lansdale implied that these cir-
cumstances left him no choice, as "US Government policy was [and] is that
Diem is a friend we help."" (S)
A Conflict of Operating Philosophies (U)
With the question of Vietnamese Army loyalty still simmering, and Diem
still fixated on his problems, Lansdale lost another skirmish in October 1954.
This one, waged against the regular Station ostensibly over an officer's assign-
ment, revealed the gulf that separated the Lansdale operational approach to
operational security from that of the CIA's Directorate of Plans. (S)
The object of the battle was the same Ed Korn who had served as
case officer a couple of years earlier. Lansdale wanted him for his psy-
chological warfare program, but the regular Station objected. Korn had served
with the regular Station at the Embassy during that tour and had been known
as CIA. His return now with SMM, the Station argued, would destroy
the credibility of repeated claims by both stations that Lansdale represented
not CIA but the US military. After 10 days of sometimes bitter coffespon-
20 October 1954, ibid. (S)
3' SAIG 4375, 25 October 1954, ibid. (S)
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dence, Lansdale essentially conceded, accepting that Korn would have to work
at the Embassy with Lansdale's role limited to "remote guidance and protec-
tion." 32 (S)
Lansdale took the occasion of this quarrel to call on Allen Dulles to rede-
fine the term "covert." Attributing to the Communists a capacity for assuming
"open ideological leadership while quietly building covert ops," he criticized
the US failure to adopt a similarly open stance. The insistence on secrecy, he
thought, put the US Government in the "false position [of] being afraid or
ashamed of its beliefs. ...We require natives [to] risk [their] lives while we
seemingly hide." Lansdale said he wanted at least to have open liaison
between the SMM and the regular Station: the "need for meticulous [clandes-
tine] methods.. .has been [a] dead issue since [the] Geneva Conference." The
different values they attached to concealing US sponsorship of "covert" action
programs remained a bone of contention between Lansdale and the Agency
for the duration of Lansdale's tour.33 (S)
Exit General Hinh, Enter the Filipinos (U)
The conclusion of these episodes brought no general relaxation, as they
were followed by renewed tension between General Hinh and Prime Minister
Diem. Lansdale later reported, without identifying his source, of learning that
Hinh planned to attack the Palace on 26 October. He thought to divert Hirai by
luring him and his two most trusted staff officers to a holiday in Manila. Hinh
declined, but three of his staff, including the alleged French agent command-
ing the psychological warfare unit, accepted. Lansdale sent them off in an air-
craft loaned him by General O'Daniel. On the effect of this ploy, Lansdale
reported that "26 October was spent in the Philippines. The attack on the Pal-
ace didn't come off."" (S)
In retrospect, General Hinh's anti-Diem posturing looks like a French ploy
to intimidate Diem into either cooperating or resigning, and Hinh's departure
for exile in Paris in November suggests French acknowledgement of failure.
Both Hinh and his French sponsors were surely aware that Senator Mansfield
had threatened on 15 October to push for a suspension of aid to Vietnam and
French forces there if Diem should be overthrown. And President Eisenhower
released a letter to President Diem on 24 October promising that beginning on
1 January 1955 all US aid would flow directly to Diem's government. In this
context, the seduction of Hinh's staff officers acquires an almost farcical
" SAIG 4292, 18 October 1954, ibid. The assignment never materialized. (S)
33 Ibid. (S)
34 eSHP 113,11, pp. 9-10, 15. (S)
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Drama during Diem-Hinh struggles. Diem and power-seekers Binh Xuyen's Bay Vien, ex-Presi-
dent General Xuan, Chief of Staff General Hinh (caption by Ed Lansdale). (U)
aspect. Nevertheless, the atmosphere of crisis that provoked it illustrated the
preoccupation of the US Mission with the regime's fragility." (U)
The Hinh episode did not shake Lansdale's faith in his own ability to inspire
and control a unified Southern resistance to Communist expansion. His sta-
tion, he told Headquarters on 1 November, intended to "influence millions
rather than hundreds or thousands." It could do so, he implied in his character-
istic telegraphese, because "overwhelming majority Vietnamese feel much
same towards Vietminh and personal freedom as US Government does and
voluntarily join us fight against enemy." To Lansdale, most of the sect leaders
were true nationalists and militant anti-Communists; only the French stood in
the way of a "national effort...coordinated under a national leader who [is]
influenced or controlled by CIA."" (S)
Again, Lansdale's pursuit of grand objectives had to give way to the
demands of unfolding events. This time, the challenge arose from the need to
assert government control in areas being vacated by the Viet Minh. While
nearly a million refugees were flowing into South Vietnam, an estimated
1, Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 2 vols. (New York: Praeger, 1967), II,
p. 864. (U)
SAIG 4444, 1 November 1954, and Mitt
Lansdale never saw any contradiction in the notion of an authenti-
cally nationalist leader being controlled by the CIA. This derived, it seems, from an implicit
assumption that true, i.e., anti-Communist, nationalists could have no interests that did not coin-
cide with those of the United States. (S)
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General Hinh makes Hon Hao rebel Ba Cut a National Army colonel during the Diem-Hinh
struggle (caption by Ed Lansdale). (U)
80,000 to 90,000 Viet Minh were headed north. An unknown number of cad-
res was left behind, but the Viet Minh administrative apparatus that had con-
trolled substantial areas in the South was largely if provisionally dissolved.
Prime Minister Diem now had to replace that apparatus with his own. Things
were not much different even where the Viet Minh had not set up a formal
administration of their own, as only about 20 percent of the colonial bureau-
cracy resided outside Saigon, with nearly all of that in the provincial
capitals." (S)
" Edward G. Lansdale, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, Memoran-
dum for the Record, "Pacification' in Vietnam," 16 July 1958, cited in CSI-IP 113,1, P. 146. The
estimate of 10,000 cadres left in the South used by many authorities is apparently derived from
French sources. If this refers only to Communist Party members, it may well be too large. If it
includes non-Communists who joined the Viet Minh to fight the French, it is probably far too
small. The figures later released by Diem's Information Ministry, however inflated, suggest that
Saigon shared the perception of a larger Viet Minh presence after regroupment. (S)
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Upon his arrival in Saigon, Lansdale had immediately recognized the polit-
ical no-man's land in the countryside. He had brought with him a belief,
formed in the Philippines, in the efficacy of humanitarian programs as a
means of strengthening the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the
rural population. Accordingly, even before Diem's installation in office, he
discussed with one of his Filipino contacts, Oscar Arellano, the formation of a
volunteer medical team from the Philippines. As early as July, when the offic-
ers assigned to his Station were just beginning to trickle into Saigon, Lansdale
began working with the Ministry of Social Action, helping to develop village-
level self-help projects and a system of symbols that would allow illiterate
voters to cast ballots in local elections." (S)
The imminent arrival of refugees from the North and the corresponding
evacuation of Viet Minh areas in the South demanded a response from Saigon.
Having already secured encouragement from Arellano and the promise of
financial support from CIA Headquarters, Lansdale was ready when Diem
recognized the need for refugee medical assistance. He got Diem to issue a
formal request for help, and Arellano, as Vice-President for Southeast Asia of
the Junior Chamber of Commerce International, arranged sponsorship by the
Philippine chapter. The result was Operation Brotherhood, whose first medi-
cal team arrived in Saigon in October 1954. By May 1955 it had over
100 doctors and nurses at 10 medical centers in South Vietnam, treating refu-
gees and training Vietnamese medical personne1.39 (5)
Lansdale believed that the Filipinos had much to offer Vietnam. He saw
their contribution not solely or even primarily in terms of technical assistance,
as in Operation Brotherhood or the later creation of a veterans' organization,
but in the force of their example as citizens of a working democracy. Diem,
however, accepted the technical help without ever adopting the Philippines as
a political model for Vietnam. This produced some tension with Lansdale,
who noted that once, "with a grimace on his face, Diem told me that the Viet-
namese didn't need the help of a bunch of orators and nightclub musicians."4�
The subject came up with the regular Station, as well. Paul Harwood recalled
a meeting with Diem and Nhu at which Diem made an incomprehensible but
clearly derogatory remark about "chemises flottantes" (floating shirts). Nhu
explained it as a reference to the loose-fitting barong worn by Lansdale's
Filipinos.41 (S)
38 CSHP 113,11, p. 13. (S)
3, Ibid., I, pp. 138-146. (S)
40 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, p.214. (U)
4, Harwood interview, 17 October 1989. (S)
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President Diem at Operation Brotherhood Clinic, c. 1955. (U)
Town of Long Kuyan, center of pro government Hoa Hao Army, turing out to welcome Operation
Brotherhood. Note sign "Phi Luat Tuan," which means "Philippines" in Vietnamese (captions by
Ed Lansdale). (U)
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Operation Brotherhood open its Camau clinic on packing crates in front of the schoolhouse it
later occupied, as national security troops rolled in for "Operation Liberty." These Filipinos kept
the clinic open 24 hours a day (caption by Ed Lansdale). (U)
The Continuing Controversy Over Ngo Dinh Nhu (U)
Ngo Dinh Nhu's service as intermediary with Diem and his cooperation in
various operational activities had established his value to the regular Station
well before Diem accepted Ed Lansdale as an informal advisor. The Embassy,
taking its cue from the French, regarded Nhu much as Lansdale did, seeing
him as a malign influence on the Prime Minister, Thinking Diem would be
more tractable in his brother's absence, Ambassador Heath tasked the Station
in the fall of 1954 to get Nhu out of the country. The Station objected to this
Harwood went further, with
McCarthy's approval, and "laid down the law to Nhu that he was not going to
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leave the country." Diem had already yielded to Heath, promising to send Nhu
to a UNESCO conference in Montevideo, but Nhu stayed. 42 (S)
Although not privy to this defiance, the Embassy was fully aware of the Sta-
tion's increasing operational intimacy with Nhu, and this served, according to.
Paul Harwood, as "grounds for charges of a CIA cabal against official policy."
The tension persisted through the tenures of both Ambassador Heath and Gen-
eral J. Lawton Collins, who replaced Heath in November 1954, and abated
only with the arrival of Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt in May 1955.43
(S)
Diem and Nhu, for their part, valued their Agency contacts (even when, as
in Lansdale's case, the CIA connection was not acknowledged) as a way
around the Embassy's reserve. Harwood wrote that he thought it "highly
likely" that Nhu believed their liaison produced a Washington climate more
favorable to Diem than would otherwise have been the case. Further cement-
ing the connection, as we have already seen, was the Agency's bankrolling of
Diem's maneuvers to divide and suborn his adversaries in the sects." (S)
As a military man, Collins took a personal interest in the Vietnamese mili-
tary establishment. He had little sympathy for irregular units, and not long
after his arrival he instructed Harwood to tell Diem to terminate the hamlet
militia project funded through Ngo Dinh Nhu. Reminded that the US could
not force its will on the Prime Minister, Collins modified his order: it was Sta-
tion support that would cease. Harwood later recalled that Collins, though
always prepared to hear opposing views, was at the time preoccupied with the
development of triangular divisions to defend against invasion across the 17th
parallel. He was unimpressed by Harwood's argument that Viet Minh subver-
sion already threatened the South from within.45 (S)
42 Harwood interview, Another Nhu critic was the columnist Joseph
Alsop, who told Lansdale in late November that he thought Nhu a "wretched little man:" Lansdale
responded with praises of Diem, which Alsop "seemed [to] buy." Lansdale reported this exchange
in the same cable which asked Headquarters to approve Alsop's request for an "L [lethal] tablet"
(apparently then on hand in Saigon) to take with him to Camau, a Communist redoubt where he
was to see Viet Minh returnees being regrouped for movement north. Alsop apparently thought
himself a candidate for abduction by the Communists, but Headquarters instructed Lansdale to
deny the request as contrary to CIA regulations. SAIG 4802, 3 December 1954, and
5 December 1954,
1" Harwood intervieN\ 10 June 1964; FVSA 1542, 9 September 1955,
It appears that Ambassadors Heath and Collins, with their tepid support of Ngo Dinh Diem, were
farther out of step with policy than the Saigon CIA representation. The atmosphere changed with
Ambassador Reinhardt, who was concerned both to establish a personal working relationship with
Diem and to support grassroots political organizing in South Vietnam. He seems to have valued
the Agency as a participant in these endeavors. (S)
FVSA 1542, 5 September 1955,
Harwood interview, 17 October 1989; Paul Harwood, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, tape
recording, McLean, VA, 14 August 1990, copy in CIA History Staff. (S)
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Despite this setback, CIA became involved in other military questions. In
late 1954, for example, Headquarters suggested that Diem proceed to integrate
sect forces into a national guard subordinated to the Interior Ministry and
grant the sects administrative authority in their own strongholds. A handwrit-
ten addendum instructed the field to obtain policy approval from the Embassy,
and the cable was released by the Acting Chief of FE Division. McCarthy
replied from Saigon that General Collins was opposed to the national guard
idea, preferring to make the Army responsible for internal security. The debate
continued, and Collins was eventually won over to a program that included an
internal security role for the Interior Ministry and a training and advisory role
for CIA." (S)
A Dual Role for CIA (U)
By the end of 1954, a pattern had emerged in CIA's dealing with Diem and
Nhu that would prevail until the US decision to abandon them in 1963. The
first strand in this pattern resulted from the fragility of the regime. For CIA, as
well as for Diem and Nhu, defense against the regime's enemies claimed first
priority. It is indeed likely that without CIA intervention on his behalf Diem
would not have survived six months in office. Only the Agency had the means
and displayed the will to bolster his resistance to the opposition, both active
and passive, led or tolerated by the French. It is clear that Diem still saw him-
self as dependent for his survival on American backing, which in the context
of immediate threats to his tenure came almost exclusively from CIA. (S)
The second strand arose from the recognition by both Harwood and Lans-
dale�Nhu seems to have shared their view, at least in the beginning�that the
government required a positive political program if it were ever to evolve into
a durable alternative to the Viet Minh. Firefighting was thus interspersed with
efforts to construct such a program and the apparatus with which to carry it
out. (S)
Behind these two strands, the background to the pattern was formed by
Diem's indifference, even hostility, to political accommodation and the con-
struction of a base of popular electoral support. Within weeks of his inaugura-
tion, CIA in Saigon had discovered that Diem was nearly as intractable as his
problems. Although the Agency was determined to help him seize the political
offensive, opportunities to do so were limited by his authoritarian mindset and
by the continuing series of challenges to his political survival. (S)
" SAIG 4246, 13 October 1954; 20 October 1954; 16 November 1954;
SAIG 4662, 20 November 1954, all No evi-
dence has been found that the Station resumed an active role in the funding of either sect forces or
local self-defense units. (S)
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The ability of CIA to exploit any such opportunities was restricted, further-
more, by a certain naivet�especially on the part of Ed Lansdale. Lansdale had
an abiding faith in anti-Communist fervor and American political institutions
as a formula for political development in former colonies such as the Philip-
pines and Vietnam. He ignored or denied the influence of cultural differences
and social and economic structures; it is typical of his style that he never
learned a foreign language. In his dealings with ex-colonials, he exuded a
somewhat paternalistic benevolence that appealed to those who either shared
his perception of American entitlement to leadership, or found it expedient to
profess such views in return for promises of support against their local
adversaries.47 (U)
But the regular Station, also, found itself embroiled in efforts at institution-
building which were driven more by reluctance to admit defeat than by rigor-
ous calculation of the means appropriate to predictably achievable ends. At
the end of 1954, both Stations had accomplished far more at defending Diem
from his enemies than they had at influencing his governing style or policy
decisions. (S)
^7 ,ansdale's In the Midst of Wars is replete with examples of his approach to his clients, and there
are others in Currey, Lansdale. (U)
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CHAPTER 5
Rural Pacification and the Sect Crisis (U)
At the beginning of 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu had
exploited the help of their respective CIA advisors to defeat the first chal-
lenges to the new Prime Minister's authority. But new challenges were already
clearing the horizon, notably a threatened insurrection by the religious sects
and the urgent need to establish a government presence in the countryside. US
officials doubtful of Diem's abilities continued to see little reason for an all-
out effort on his behalf; the new Ambassador, J. Lawton Collins, was the most
prominent among many such skeptics. In these circumstances, the informal
CIA liaison with the two major figures in Diem's government had already
evolved into the principal channel of communication between the Vietnamese
regime and official Washington. (S)
It seems clear that for Diem the value of his CIA liaison lay in its support-
ing him against local opposition and its service as a channel to get the
regime's point of view to official Washington. For Washington, the intelli-
gence product of the contacts with Diem and Nhu constituted the most author-
itative and comprehensive coverage of the government's activities and
intentions that it could get. With Harwood and Lansdale in privileged posi-
tions, conventional collection activity, whether unilateral or through liaison,
took a back seat. But Diem and Nhu had�or at least were sharing�very little
credible information on the DRY. In the interval between crises, COS McCar-
thy moved to get the Vietnamese to set up a foreign collection service targeted
at the North. (S)
Early Efforts to Build an Intelligence Liaison (U)
McCarthy apparently felt obliged to approach the Vietnamese through the
Ambassador rather than use the Harwood channel to Nhu. Heath was charac-
teristically detached, telling the Station in early November 1954 that "it
remained unclear how far 'we' were prepared to go... in supporting the Diem
government and that we might discuss it later." Paul Harwood tried to help,
encouraging Diem to request help from the Ambassador. But when Diem told
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Heath he wanted to send someone to the Embassy to discuss intelligence mat-
ters, the Ambassador understood him merely to be offering another source for
debriefing.'
The misunderstanding was finally resolved, but Diem was still undecided
where to locate a new service; as late as March 1955, he was wondering aloud
in Lansdale's company whether a new intelligence service should reside in the
Defense Ministry or the Army. With his characteristic concern for personal
control, he chose neither. Instead, the intelligence section of Nhu's Can Lao
Party, the Political and Social Studies Service known by its French acronym
SEPES, became the locus of the collection effort aimed at North Vietnam.
St. George saw some promise in the enterprise. Although the chief of
SEPES, Nhu loyalist Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, had no intelligence or security
experience, his deputy, whose name St. George recalled as Diep, was a capa-
ble and energetic ex-Viet Minh who seemed prepared to accept a collegial
relationship with his CIA counterparts. With Agency help, he began working
to identify potential stay-behind agents already in the North and people in the
South who might return to Hanoi as ostensible defectors.3 (S)
Vigorous CIA support for Ngo Dinh Diem had in St. George's view over-
come much of the initial Vietnamese reserve, and he anticipated fruitful coop-
eration from Diep and his other SEPES contacts.
Nevertheless, Diem continued to depend on CIA for intelligence support,
and the Agency continued trying to build and exploit a GVN collection capa-
bility. Under the French regime, the intelligence aspect of internal security had
been located in the branch of the police called the Surete. Renamed the Police
I FVSA 894, 3 December 1954,
Clandestine Service Historical Paper (CSHP) 62, "The Defeat of the Binh Xuyen Sect by the
Diem Government, 10 March-3 April 1955," 15 April 1955, p. 5, copy in CIA History Staff; Lau-
rent St. George, telephone interview by Thomas L. Ahern, Camden, SC, 25 August 1995. St.
George served in Saigon from mid-1953 to mid-1955. (S)
St. George interview, 25 August 1995. (S)
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Special Branch (PSB), it maintained the files on Communist as well as other
subversives and the Agency chose it as the locus
of an effort at joint coverage of the Viet Cong.' (S)
In intelligence liaison as in everything else, the sense of urgency generated
by the weakness of the early Diem government demanded creative solutions
when normal procedures could not promise immediate results. The regular Sta-
tion lacked personnel to exploit apparent PSB receptivity to a collaborative
effort, but COS McCarthy could find no place
officers. So Headquarters approacha1
to cover new
Agency
officers were dispatched under this arrangement, and arrived in Saigon in mid-
1955. Such expedients did not, unfortunately, guarantee results, and when St.
George left in late summer there had been no visible progress.7 (S)
Military Civic Action in the Viet Minh Zones (U)
However important for the long term, the question of creating a South Viet-
namese intelligence capability paled before the continuous crisis of govern-
mental authority. In late 1954, therefore, Ed Lansdale and Paul Harwood were
devoting most of their attention to the threats to Diem's survival. The Prime
Minister's distaste for political coalition-building had eroded the regular Sta-
tion's early hopes that he might emerge as political competition for Ho Chi
Minh, and the "National Revolution" theme gradually faded from Harwood's
reporting after September 1954. Although there are later references to the
elections scheduled for July 1956, both Harwood and Lansdale began to focus
their efforts on the creation of popular support for Diem south of the 17th par-
allel. Harwood's organizational program with Nhu quickly collided, as we
5 Ibid. (S)
Ibid. (S)
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have seen, with the desperate shortage of competent people. The absence of an
attractive ideology or positive program seems also to have stood in the way of
creating a credible alternative to Ho Chi Minh. (S)
Lansdale had at least the Army to work with. At the end of 1954, having
observed the near-absence of a civilian governmental apparatus in the coun-
tryside, he persuaded Diem and the new ambassador, General Collins, to use
the Army as the government's main tool for rural pacification. In early
November, Lansdale's men had seen the promising civic action work initiated
by a Vietnamese Army commander in the Mekong Delta near Soc Trang, and
Lansdale induced Diem to visit the area.8 Diem was impressed and subse-
quently accepted Lansdale's proposal to give the Army both military and civil
powers in the Viet Minh zones scheduled for reoccupation under the terms of
the Geneva Accords.9 (S)
Lansdale wanted an executive role in the program. General O'Daniel
needed a plan for MAAG support to the government's occupation of areas
being vacated by the Viet Minh, and Lansdale volunteered to write it. When
O'Daniel approved the document, Lansdale took it to Diem, who issued it
with only minor changes in late December as the government's National Secu-
rity Action (Pacification) Directive. Then, although he was technically not
even a MAAG officer but an assistant air attach�Lansdale persuaded
O'Daniel to put him in command of the new MAAG division charged with
pacification support. From this position, in early January 1955, he persuaded
Ambassador Collins to make him the coordinator of all US Mission activity,
civilian and military, supporting pacification. The entire gambit had taken him
less than six weeks.� (S)
A month later, on 8 February 1955, the government began the reoccupation
of the Camau Peninsula, the southern tip of the country and the first of two
zones designated for the assembly of Viet Minh cadres being regrouped to the
North. In both areas, Camau and the coastal provinces of Annam from south-
ern Quang Nam to Phu Yen, Viet Minh control had gone uncontested since the
end of World War II. Lansdale saw their reoccupation by the Vietnamese
Army as an opportunity to display the merits of military civic action. But the
Camau operation began before Lansdale's people could impart the Philippine
example to all the participating Vietnamese military, and results were mixed.
Where the troops were prepared and an Operation Brotherhood medical team
CSHP 113, The Saigon Military Mission, June 1954 to December 1956, 2 vols., October 1970,
II, p. 16. (S)
CSHP 113, I, p. 149(S)
m Ibid., p. 149-153. (S)
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Operation "Gia-Phong:" President Diem follows the troops into the former Viet Minh stronghold
of Qui Nhon. (U)
Operation "Gia Phong:" troops of the National Army's 31st Division entering a Binh Dinh vil-
lage. One result of this "national security action:" young people returned from the hills (captions
by Ed Lansdale). (U)
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was on hand, the new Saigon government presence seemed to be well
received by a civilian population accustomed to Viet Minh rule. Elsewhere,
Lansdale implied, the welcome was more tepid." (S)
There was time for more thorough preparation of the second pacification
operation which was launched in late April 1955 in the southern Binh Dinh-
northern Phu Yen portion of Central Vietnam. Lansdale claimed to have per-
suaded Diem to name as its commander a capable officer, Colonel Le Van Kim,
whom Diem distrusted for his French associations. Lieutenant Rufus Phillips,
ater the supervisor of Amen- (b)(1)
can support to Nhu's Strategic Hamlet program, represented Lansdale in this (b)(3)
operation. In both Camau and Central Vietnam, the Vietnamese wanted to min-
imize direct US participation in order to prevent the appearance of foreign con-
trol. Phillips, in both operations the only American observer, judged the second
to be highly successful. As the Army demonstrated its discipline and good will,
he witnessed an increasingly warm welcome by the civilian population.
Among the signs of this welcome was the help volunteered by the local citi-
zenry in locating a number of Viet Minh arms caches.12 (S)
Phillips also witnessed the clearly spontaneous enthusiasm that greeted Ngo
Dinh Diem when the Prime Minister acceded to Lansdale's urging to visit Qui
Nhon, the recently reoccupied capital of Binh Dinh Province. At the airstrip
there, as the crowd grew, a Filipino with Operation Brotherhood led several
Vietnamese in lifting Diem up onto their shoulders. Diem was both terrified
by the manhandling�he loathed being touched�and delighted by the
crowd's response. On another occasion, dressed in the customary white shark-
skin suit, he even waded into a flooded paddy field to greet some astonished
rice farmers." (S)
The successes of the two pacification operations led Phillips, among others,
to believe that the combined deployment of civilian and military resources
under the civic action rubric constituted a valid approach to the assimilation of
previously Viet Minh-controlled areas. There were, however, two obstacles to
such a program. One was the short-term participation of the Vietnamese Army
" CSHP 113,1, p. 153-157; CSHP 113, II, p. 24-2.5;
McLean, VA, 20 January 1964 (hereafter cited as interview, 20 January 1964);
(S)
IS CSHP 113,1, pp. 153-166. (S)
" Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, pp. 242-243; Rufus Phillips, interview by Thomas Ahern,
McLean, VA, 11 October 1989 (hereafter cited as Phillips interview, 11 October 1989); Harwood
interview, 25 October 1989. (S)
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First lessons at Long-My: Lt-Col Duc explains brotherhood between soldiers and civilians. SMM
psywarrior Phillips and friend Banzon listen in rear (caption by Ed Lansdale). (C)
in any given operation and the inability of the regular civilian administration
to replace it. Phillips and the Vietnamese commander, Colonel Le Van Kim,
saw the same administrative vacuum in Binh Dinh that had earlier been
pointed out to Paul Harwood in Vinh Long. They tried to get the military com-
mitment in Central Vietnam extended, but to no avail. Since there was no
functioning civilian apparatus to take over from the army, the success of the
pacification campaign proved transitory. Phillips never got an explanation for
the government's failure to exploit the opening created by the Army's appar-
ent success in Central Vietnam. If Lansdale intervened with Diem on the mat-
ter, no report of their discussion survives." (S)
The second obstacle was the uneven participation of the various agencies,
all working more or less autonomously, that comprised the US Mission.
MAAG and the US Information Service gave unqualified support. The eco-
nomic aid section hesitated, however, fearing that to channel resources to civic
action through the Defense Ministry would undermine its regular programs of
support to embryonic civilian ministries. Lansdale, as coordinator, controlled
the deployment only of such resources as individual agencies were willing to
commit. Only after persistent Lansdale jawboning did the economic aid peo-
ple agree to help. It then took until 1957 for their first contribution to arrive in
14 Phillips interview, 11 October 1989. The record contains no information on the reasons for
withdrawing the Army, or by whom the decision was made. (S)
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Vietnam-25,000 pairs of sewing scissors), Yet Diem seems to have been
genuinely enthusiastic about the potential of civic action. In May 1955, with
Lansdale's encouragement, he appointed a Commissioner General for Civic
Action, responsible directly to the Palace. In this as in other efforts aimed at
the countryside, the principal concern of both Lansdale and the Prime Minis-
ter was to find a surrogate agent to undertake the rural administration that
seemed beyond the capacity of the regular bureaucracy to handle.16 (S)
More Trouble with the Sects (U)
Whatever its long-term importance, the establishment of an effective gov-
ernmental presence in the countryside could get only passing attention while
Ngo Dinh Diem's opponents still challenged his authority in Saigon. In the
early months of 1955, the prospect of an Army mutiny had receded, and the
main threat now came from sect leaders trying to preserve the armed forces
that guaranteed their local autonomy. (U)
Hon Hao General Ngo, whom President Diem desired be taught the precepts of love by us. After
knowing us, the beard was trimmed (caption by Ed Lansdale). (U)
19 Phillips interview, 11 October 1989. (S)
'6 CSHP 1.13, I, p. 168. (S)
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As noted, Ed Lansdale had met several of the sect leaders in September
1954. Undertaken at Diem's request, these contacts included not only the
maverick Cao Dai leader, Trinh Minh The, but also General Nguyen Thanh
Phuong, commander of the regular Cao Dai forces, and two Hoa Hao gener-
als. Now, apparently abetted by local French interests, all but General The
challenged Diem's authority. The immediate issue was the fate of the sect
forces. If Diem were to become more than a neo-colonial figurehead, he
would have to find the moral and material leverage needed either to integrate
sect forces into the regular Army or to dissolve them." (S)
Diem's response was, as usual, to solicit American support. He cannily
exploited both Lansdale's idealism and what he must have recognized as the
uncoordinated activities of the Lansdale and regular Stations. Perhaps mindful
of the fallout from Lansdale's delivery of funds to General The in September
1954, Diem now relied on the Harwood-Nhu channel for cash inducements.
For Lansdale, he had another mission, that of demonstrating to the skeptical
sect leaders Diem's command of American support by serving as a Palace
intermediary. He did not acknowledge this purpose to Lansdale, who appar-
ently took at face value Diem's request to approach Hoa Hao General Ngo and
teach him "how to earn the love and affection of his people."18(S)
Diem took a similar approach to ensuring the cooperation of Nhu's Cao Dai
confederate, Trinh Minh The. In late January and early February, as Lansdale
negotiated with The on Diem's behalf, he was apparently unaware of simulta-
neous bargaining between Nhu and the Cao Dai, although Nhu kept Harwood
continuously informed. As a result, Lansdale viewed his role as more opera-
tive than was actually the case. For his part, Harwood knew nothing of Lans-
dale's participation. In any case, the parallel negotiations had the desired
effect, and one regiment of General The's forces was integrated on
13 February 1955.19 Meanwhile, Lansdale continued to represent Diem in
talks with other sect leaders less receptive to government authority than Gen-
eral The. (S)
With French support of the sect armies coming to an end, General O'Daniel
and French High Commissioner Paul Ely named Lansdale to head a joint
Franco-American military team to work out arrangements for their demobili-
zation or integration into the regular Army. Consistently more fearful of a
17 CSHP 113, I, p. 10-11. (S)
IS Ibid. (S)
19 CSHP 113,1, p. 73. Lansdale reported the troops of this regiment as "pledged... to SMM who in
turn had insisted that they be loyal to Vietnam" (CSHP 113, II, p. 26). Also see Harwood inter-
view, 21 June 1990, and Memorandum from the Special Assistant [Anderton] to the Ambassador
[Collins], "Confidential Funds Project," 25 March 1955, AN 68A 5159, Box 124, Records Group
84, National Archives and Records Administration, Suitland, MD (hereafter cited as NARA). (S)
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sectarian rebellion than other Americans on the scene, Lansdale persuaded
O'Daniel and Ely to reassure the sect leaders with a mid-March series of brief-
ings on Franco-American plans.2� Still unpersuaded that Diem would respect
their interests, sect leaders including the presumptive Diem loyalist Trinh
Minh The formed a United Sects National Front. On 21 March, they issued a
manifesto giving Diem five days in which, as Lansdale put it, to "clean out his
entire government." Otherwise, they "would go to the people."" (S)
As the crisis intensified on the evening of 20 March, Lansdale found him-
self beginning a four-hour session with the Prime Minister. Diem complained
not only about the sects, but about his own Defense Minister's presumption in
wanting authority to dismiss "undesirable" Army officers. During the next
two days, Lansdale shuttled frantically between Diem and the Cao Dai, assur-
ing Diem that The, at least, was still loyal to the government, despite having
signed the manifesto. Ambassador Collins, whom Lansdale had kept
informed, wanted to be helpful. He thought he might be able to reassure Cao
Dai Generals Phuong and The. But at the ensuing meeting on 22 March, Col-
lins waxed censorious, criticizing the manifesto and questioning its authors'
patriotism. It went so badly that Lansdale felt constrained to ask Collins, at the
end of the session, to explain to his visitors that three note-taking American
participants were Embassy officials, not journalists." (S)
Lansdale saw Diem the evening of 22 March. Diem was still worried about
control of the military and about Collins having told him that Defense Minis-
ter Minh was responsible for the Army.
I explained that Collins was actually defining the chain-of-com-
mand, [and that this had been] prompted by Diem ordering troop
movements without notifying Minh. Diem asked for an American
'job description' of his responsibilities as President; so I outlined
those of the US President. 23 (S)
As the crisis mounted, Lansdale noticed a strange passivity in Diem's
reaction:
Diem does very little constructive planning in such times of stress;
or, at least he has not told me his plans; he pays scant attention to
such planning, seems eager to continue reporting the events of the
day, what Ambassador Collins has termed "crying on my
shoulder."24 (S)
20 CSHP 113,1, pp. 66-68, 73-79. (8)
21 CSHP 62, p. 6. (S)
" Ibid., p. 8. (S)
23 Ibid. (S)
" CSHP 62, p. 6. (S)
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Lansdale tried to fill the gap, suggesting various political and public relations
maneuvers that Diem might use to regain the political initiative against the
sects. He also tried to mediate the enduring dispute between Diem and General
Phuong over pay and subsistence to Cao Dai troops. Of his method in resolving
a dispute over the amount already paid, Lansdale later said that, "As usual, I had
checked the matter] out with both parties, telling them that I preferred taking
such matters up openly rather than going behind their backs."25 (S)
Headquarters and Harwood, meanwhile, were dealing with sect demands
for more money. The total amount of this support is not known, but in one
action, the DCI approved n March 1955 for use in both covert
action and intelligence collection in Saigon. With Ambassador Collins's con-
currence, Harwood promised Nhu on the 22nd that he would shortly get
riasters (about for distribution to sect leaders; another
iasters might become available later.26 (S)
The Binh Xuyen Insurrection (U)
On 29 March, after a week of inconclusive maneuvering, Cao Dai leaders
Phuong and The came to Lansdale claiming that the Hoa Hao were colluding
with the Binh Xuyen gang in plans to stage a coup de force. They expected an
immediate move and implored Lansdale to get Phuong's troops integrated into
the national army to prevent their being suborned by the anti-Diem Cao Dai
pope, Phain Ngoc Tac. Lansdale undertook to discuss the matter with Collins.
At the same time, Diem was telling the French that he was about to use the
Army to take over the National Police headquarters. General Ely pressured
him into postponing an attack, but the Binh Xuyen preempted the issue, open-
ing fire on Army posts in Saigon. Mortar rounds landed on the Palace
grounds, and Lansdale wanted to go to Diem for firsthand reporting of devel-
opments. General O'Daniel, apparently concerned for Lansdale's safety,
refused to let him go.27 (S)
Harwood visited the Palace that evening, and recalled ducking for cover
when an explosion rocked the room. He and found himself staring at Diem,
Nhu, and the President's military aide underneath the map table at which they
had been standing. Sent to find out what was going on, the President's aide
25 Ibid., pp. 6, 9. (S)
" Undated blind memorandum, apparently prepared by ARC staff, I Memoran-
dum, Special Assistant [McCarthy] to the Ambassador [Collins], "Confidential Funds Project,"
25 March 1955, filed in CIA History Staff. There is no basis for the figure of used,
according to Frances FitzGerald, by "most historians of the period" (Frances FitzGerald, Fire in
the Lake [New York: Vintage Books, 1973], p. 106)
27 11)1(1., pp. 12-15. (S)
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returned to say that snipers in a house next to the Palace had fired on a passing
Army convoy. Its commander thereupon brought up a 105mm howitzer and
fired it point blank through the offending house. Harwood had been at the Pal-
ace almost daily during the crisis debriefing Nhu and, on Collins's behalf, urg-
ing Diem to refrain from deploying the Army against the Binh Xuyen. On this
visit, he was there to check out a French report of a Vietnamese Army advance
toward Binh Xuyen territory in ChoIon. Diem gave assurances that he had
made no such move and did not intend to do so.28 (S)
Lansdale was horrified to find out the next morning that Ely had used the
threat of French armed intervention to impose a ceasefire, and that Collins
supported him. Lansdale protested that "the French Army in effect was assum-
ing a role which made Saigon a protectorate." Collins disagreed, insisting that
the French role was only that of mediator. Diem saw it as Lansdale did and
complained that Ely had proclaimed himself "commander-in-chief." But Ely
and Collins prevailed, at least for the moment. In one development that grati-
fied Lansdale, Diem and General Phuong agreed that day, 30 March, to inte-
grate 8,000 more Cao Dai troops into the national Army, thus denying them to
the sects' dissident United Front.29 (S)
Meanwhile, Nhu kept Harwood informed of his own efforts to defuse the
crisis. While Diem was again using Lansdale as his emissary to Trinh Minh
The, Nhu continued his personal negotiations with The and Phuong. A Station
report of 29 March, apparently from Nhu, described a meeting at which The
agreed to withdraw from the sects' United Front and Phuong undertook to
leave the Cabinet. The two Can Dai generals performed as promised, and
Nhu's authority as both negotiator and reporting source was accordingly
enhanced.3� While the Embassy was reporting that the rest of the Cabinet was
about to quit, Harwood told Washington that it wouldn't: Nhu had said that
none of its members had the fortitude to confront Diem with a resignation.
None did, and they all stayed, at least for the time being.31 (S)
On 31 March, probably at French instigation, Bao Dai sent Diem a
reproachful telegram from his retreat in Cannes. It deplored the bloodshed�
there had been a hundred or so casualties and obliquely suggested that Diem
resign. (The Emperor sent it twice, once in the clear to ensure that Diem's ene-
mies were kept informed.) Ely and Collins maintained their pressure on Diem
not to act against the Binh Xuyen, and the Prime Minister was reduced to
asking Lansdale whether this meant that the French and the Americans were
28 Note from Paul Harwood, November 1995; Harwood interview, 21 June 1990. (S)
" CSHP 62, pp. 14-15, 17. (S)
3� Intelligence report CS PD 454, 29 March 1955
3' Harwood interview, 17 October 1989. (S)
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planning to depose him. Lansdale assured him to the contrary, but could offer
no help when Diem complained of the corrosive effect on his authority of the
enforced standoff. But Lansdale could at least ensure that the Vietnamese per-
ception of events was conveyed to Washington. The day after the French pre-
vented a showdown with the Binh Xuyen, he spent three and a half hours in
the prime ministerial bedroom, debriefing people sent in to him by Diem. 32 (S)
During this phase of the crisis, Defense Minister Ho Thong Minh resigned
over Diem's refusal to guarantee prior consultation with the Cabinet before
moving against the Binh Xuyen. Collins thought this an example of Diem's
inability to manage people of independent views and reacted by threatening
Diem with the withdrawal of US support if Minh were not retained. Minh left
the Cabinet anyway, and on 31 March Collins intimated to Washington that he
had given up. Diem, he said, had had a "fair chance" to set up a working gov-
ernment, but had "produced little if anything of a constructive nature."33 Lans-
dale, meanwhile, complained to Headquarters that he thought Collins
destructively inconsistent in criticizing Diem for passivity while preventing
him from curbing the Binh Xuyen, now the single most immediate threat to
the government's authority.34 (S)
Lansdale's major points of disagreement with Collins were the morale of
the Army and the sincerity of Cao Dai Generals Phuong and The, who simul-
taneously professed loyalty to Diem and trafficked with the anti-Diem leader-
ship of the sects' United Front. Lansdale and the regular Station, supported by
the MAAG and the Military Attach�thought the Army could whip the Binh
Xuyen, and Lansdale was certain of the good faith of his Cao Dai interlocu-
tors. Collins was doubtful on both counts. Despite being discouraged by the
State Department from exploring alternatives to Diem, he wrote John Foster
Dulles on 7 April that "my judgment is that Diem does not have the capac-
ity. ...to prevent this country from falling under Communist control." (U)
General Collins vs. Ngo Dinh Diem (U)
36 Fearing that
Collins would object to the proposal, Lansdale asked Headquarters to approve
CSHP 62, pp. 18, 22-27. (S)
" j Lawton Collins, Telegrams to Department of State, 29 and 31 March 1955, Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1955-57, I, Vietnam, pp. 158, 169 (hereafter cited as FRUS). (U)
3.1 SAID 651.7, 20 April 1955, cited in CSHP 113,1, p. 101. (S)
" J. Lawton Collins, Telegram to Department of State, 7 April 1955, FRUS 1955-57, Vietnam, I,
p. 219. (U)
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it without ambassadorial coordination. Washington sympathized with his
dilemma, but insisted that Collins be consulted. As it turned out, Collins
readily approved the idea. At that point, however, John Foster Dulles had
already endorsed a suggestion from the DDP, Frank Wisner, to postpone final
word to the Station until Washington could discuss the plan directly with the
Ambassador, who was to be recalled for consultations on Diem's political
future. Lansdale, meanwhile, was to temporize if Diem pressed him on the
matter." (S)
Apprehensive about the line that Collins would take in Washington, Lans-
dale cabled the DCI asking for permission to accompany the Ambassador to
Washington. The reply, from Wisner, turned him down, but urged him to try to
prevent a damaging rejection by Diem of Collins's latest recommendations for
government appointments. Lansdale spent the two days before Collins's
20 April departure shuttling between the Palace and the Embassy, but was
unable to prevent what he saw as a fundamental misunderstanding between
Diem and Collins. The result was that Collins left for Washington persuaded
that Diem would take only sycophantic yes-men into the Cabinet, whereas
Lansdale thought Diem was insisting merely that they be "anticolonialist hon-
est courageous men."38 Lansdale seems to have been taking Diem at his word,
while Collins, who never questioned Diem's sincerity, had the better apprecia-
tion for what this formula would mean in practice. (S)
Harwood was experiencing the same problems with Nhu that Lansdale con-
fronted with Diem. On 21 April 1955, just after Collins's departure, Harwood
predicted to Headquarters that, at an impending discussion of the police prob-
lem, Nhu would ask why Diem was being prevented from asserting control of
his own government. Harwood had already received Nhu's letter protesting
Collins's latest effort at Cabinet-broadening. The letter noted that Collins had
acknowledged consulting other Vietnamese on a reorganized government,
Nhu insisted that compliance by Diem would mean "the negation of the whole
revolutionary ideal...and the realization of a regime like that of Chiang Kai-
shek, ending in a Viet Minh victory, they alone being capable of sweeping
away all this rot." (S)
36 One subsequent cable from Lansdale gives the amount as piasters. SAIG 6925,
16 May 1955, Later the Station advanced
piasters, which was ultimately returned. SAIG 8226, 29 August 1955, ibid.; Redick inter-
view, 28 September 1989. (S)
" CSHP 113, I, pp. 95-97. The whole thing came to naught when Diem concluded that the
authors of the idea could not produce. He returned the money in late August, but used Lansdale as
intermediary in unproductive negotiations until shortly before B a Cut was captured in April 1956.
(S)
38 CSHP 113, I, pp. 97-98; SAIG 6517,20 April 1955 quoted in CSHP 113,1, p. 100. (S)
" SAM 6523, 21 April 1955
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This apocalyptic vision of the results of a non-Communist coalition illus-
trates the perceptual gap, in the matter of defining a legitimate authority for
South Vietnam, that already separated the Ngo brothers from their American
sponsors. Diem had once written that "a sacred respect is due to the person of
the sovereign. ...He is the mediator between the people and Heaven as he cel-
ebrates the national eult."40 In the midst of the struggle with the sects, Diem
and Nhu seem to have seen their mission in terms both mystical and propri-
etary. The Americans, on the other hand, might be divided as to tactics, but all
saw the task as one of trying to reconcile the various anti-Communist interests
and beginning the construction of a popularly based government while hold-
ing off the Viet Minh. (U)
The divergence of American opinion over tactics, which persisted until the
eve of the coup in 1963, resulted in a relationship with Diem that was adver-
sarial at two levels. First was the opposition of the US officials who thought
Diem incapable of succeeding and wanted him replaced. The second level
arose from the tension between Diem and those Americans who saw him as
the only candidate for leadership of an anti-Communist South Vietnam, but
who wanted him to accept their views of the institutional form it should take.
Both the CIA Stations saw the weaknesses in Diem's leadership, and Har-
wood in particular had already experienced one confrontation. But neither he
nor Lansdale saw any alternative. As Ambassador Collins left for Washington,
both Stations remained committed to their mandate from Headquarters to help
Diem survive. (S)
40 Nguyen Thai, The Government of Men in the Republic of Vietnam (Thesis, Michigan State Uni-
versity, East Lansing, MI, 1962), quoted in FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake, p. 109. (U)
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CHAPTER 6
Leverage in Washington (U)
Collins's departure for Washington on 20 April launched the most fateful
episode in CIA's relationship with the Diem government. It also illustrated
both Collins's tangled relations with CIA and the Agency's capacity at that
time to exploit the US media for support of political action. In Hong Kong,
enroute, the Ambassador picked up a copy of Life magazine with a cover
photo of a triumphal Diem reception in Central Vietnam. The photograph and
accompanying story had resulted from a Lansdale initiative that Wisner took
to Time/Life in January. He gave the editors a background paper, and they
undertook to publish a feature on Diem's growing political stature in Free
Vietnam.' (S)
Collins arrived in Washington outraged by this publicity for what he
regarded as a lost cause. He told an interdepartmental meeting that Diem had
no popular following. The photo was faked, he insisted, probably by Paul Har-
wood, and CIA was "slanting its reports." Wisner responded that he under-
stood Diem to have scored a genuine public relations triumph, and Collins
"practically called [him] a liar."2 (S)
Wisner promptly asked the Station for its side of the story. The thrust of its
reply was that money could not buy the popular feeling so evident in the pho-
tograph. Wisner later told Harwood that he had read the cable to a subsequent
session of the same interdepartmental committee, with some consequent dam-
age to Collin's credibility in Washington. It seemed that Collins had forgotten
his own approval of the Time/Life project, given to Wisner in Washington in
early February and confirmed in Honolulu on his way back to Saigon.'
' Deputy Director for Plans, Memorandum foi , Support Assistant to the DDP, "Pro-
posed Time Magazine Cover Story on Diem," 2 February 1955
Harwood interview, 17 October 1989; John Caswell, interview, 13 December 1 63, (S)
22 April 1955; Harwood inter-
view, 17 October 1989; unsigned memorandum, "Significant Travel by Premier Diem Outside
Saigon Area," 24 April 19.55,
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Harwood thought Collins's apparent forgetfulness may have represented a
fundamental lack of interest in the covert action program. The Ambassador
never, throughout his tenure in Saigon, asked for a briefing on it, (S)
With or without a formal briefing, Collins had already decided that CIA
officers in Saigon enjoyed too much freedom of action. State Department
records hold a memorandum by Deputy Chief of Mission Randolph Kidder
noting that the Ambassador had "directed that [CIA] will periodically review"
its current activities with him and Kidder. According to Kidder, Allen Dulles
sent George Aurell to Saigon in February 1955 to "discuss the above decision
with Ambassador Collins. No change in the Ambassador's directive was
made."' (S)
Why CIA Headquarters felt the need to make such a demarche is not clear.
The record leaves no doubt that the Agency consistently sought Ambassado-
rial approval for its action programs in South Vietnam. In the most potentially
sensitive case
Headquarters summarily rejected Lansdale's request to forego ambassadorial
coordination. (U)
It is also not clear why Collins, who as Paul Harwood noted had never
asked for a briefing on the action program, concluded that CIA in Saigon had
too much freedom of action. The most likely explanation is the Ambassador's
disapproval of the hamlet militia program, which Harwood had begun sup-
porting during the tenure of Ambassador Heath. Collins may have feared that
the Agency was running other programs which, however well coordinated in
Washington, might not meet his own approval. (U)
Collins had no reciprocal obligation to keep the CIA Stations informed of
his intentions, and he did not share with them his 7 April
1955 recommendation to State that Diem be replaced. CIA Headquarters, pre-
sumably aware of it at least after the mid-April meeting that discussed Col-
lins's recall, was also silent. As Collins prepared to leave, Lansdale wanted to
know how he should respond to the anticipated probing by Diem as to Ameri-
can intentions. Collins told him to assure the Prime Minister of continued US
support. The Ambassador's well-known differences with Diem rendered this
guarantee somewhat suspect, and Lansdale was uneasy. But for the first week
of Collins's absence he had no choice but to feign optimism in his dealings
with Diem.' (S)
Harwood interview, 16 May 1990. (S)
Randolph Kidder, Memorandum for the Record, untitled, 11 March 1955, AN 68A 5159, Box
124, RG 84, NARA. (U)
6 Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 276-277. (U)
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Showdown with the Binh Xuyen (U)
In the last week of April, tension with the Binh Xuyen mounted once more.
In an almost exact reprise of the events of late March, Diem told Lansdale of
his intention to remove Lai Van Sang, the chief of the National Police; the
same information came from Nhu via Harwood. This time Collins was not
around to object, and Diem acted on 26 April without informing the French.
He appointed a new security chief and set up a headquarters for him outside
the sector controlled by the French Army. The rumor mill continued to predict
French and American defection from Diem's cause, and Lansdale begged
Headquarters for the authority to assure Diem and other Vietnamese officials
of Washington's continuing commitment. (S)
This elicited a reply from Allen Dulles urging restraint regarding Diem and
pointing out that any assurances of the kind Lansdale wanted would be sent
through the charg�'affairs, Randolph Kidder. In any case, Dulles said, no
assurances of any sort could be given until the conclusion of deliberations
then being conducted "at the highest level," and "you should be prepared for
[the] possibility that this might involve some changes in relations to Diem."7
(S)
This cautionary word reflected General Collins's formidable presence in
Washington. The contretemps over the Life cover story may have tarnished
Collins's credibility, but the Ambassador had two advantages in the debate
over what to do about Diem. One was the strength of his conviction of Diem's
incapacity. The other was his status as personal representative of the Presi-
dent. The title was designed to meet the peculiarity of his accreditation to both
the Diem government and the residual French command in Vietnam, but it
accurately reflected his relationship with President Eisenhower. Within a few
days of his arrival in Washington, he had prevailed on the President and a
reluctant Secretary of State to start working with the French and Bao Dai to
find a replacement for Diem. On 27 April, at the close of the working day,
three cables went to the Embassy in Paris with instructions on the way to
broach the subject with the French.' (U)
As State was telling Paris how to begin preparing Diem's removal, an unin-
formed but suspicious Lansdale was looking for a way to forestall just such a
move. By 27 April, he had sounded out the members of the country team and
confirmed that all, including Charg�'Affaires Kidder, thought Diem could
beat the Binh Xuyen.9 Early on the 28th (near the close of business on the 27th
Special Assistant lAndertoni, Memorandum for the Ambassador [Collins], untitled, 25 March
1955 AN 68A 5159, Box 124, RG 84, NARA; CSHP 113, I, pp. 101-102. The quotation is from
26 April 1955, p. 104. (S)
8 FRUS, 1955-57, I, Vietnam, pp. 294-299. (U)
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in Washington), he asked Kidder to authorize the country team members to let
their respective headquarters have their views, but Kidder declined, saying
that Collins already knew them. Lansdale then turned to the regular Station,
and by 0900 hours they had sent a joint cable, telling Headquarters that it was
the "considered opinion" of CIA in Saigon that Diem had a better chance to
succeed than any prospective replacement; failure to support him would doom
any successor government and benefit only the Viet Minh. The message added
that information just received and being passed to Kidder warranted a coun-
try-team estimate and suggested that the DCI get the Department of State to
request one from Saigon.10 (S)
Part of what the State Department later called "a flood of reports and rec-
ommendations" from Lansdale, this cable arrived at Headquarters on the
evening of 27 April local time. Along with the other reports, it provoked a
series of telephone calls from... [George] Aurell to [Archibald] Roosevelt
(acting for Wisner), to Allen Dulles, to [Undersecretary] Hoover, to the Secre-
tary, to [Director of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs] Ken Young. The
result was a stay order on Paris not to embark on the course of action agreed to
late yesterday afternoon." (U)
While the State Department was putting a hold on preparations to replace
Diem, Headquarters asked Saigon for more detail on events there. By the time
the request arrived, the replay of the late March crisis was resuming. Shortly
after noon on the 28th, mortar rounds again exploded on the Palace grounds.
Diem called General Ely to protest�the fire seemed to be coming from the
Binh Xuyen in an area protected by the French�while his secretary was on
another line giving Lansdale a running account of the firing and of the argu-
ment with Ely. As another round landed nearby, Diem told Ely he was order-
ing the Army to return fire and hung up. His secretary relayed this to Lansdale
and also hung up. i2 (S)
Some students of early US involvement in Vietnam have believed that
Lansdale, anxious to block any move in Washington to abandon Diem,
encouraged the Prime Minister to challenge the Binh Xuyen, and that it was
9 Clandestine Service Historical Paper (CSHP) 113, The Saigon Military Mission, June 1954 to
December /956, 2 vols., October 1970, I, p. 38; Randolph Kidder, interview by Thomas L. Ahem,
Washington, DC, 22 January 1990 (hereafter cited as Kidder interview, 22 January 1990). (S)
CSHP 113, I, p. 40; SAIG 6625, 28 April 1955, of which a retyped copy is filed i
S)
" Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, Untitled Memorandum,
28 April 1955, P1/US, 1955-57, Vietnam 1, pp. 305-306. The "stay" order is reprinted on page
301. (U)
'2 CSHP 113, I, pp. 105-106. (S)
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the Army that fired first. Lansdale clearly did not urge Diem to avoid a show-
down, but so far as his interpreter, Joe Redick, could later recall, he said
nothing to incite one either. '3 (S)
Lansdale's team and the regular Station spent the next two days keeping
Washington abreast of Diem's progress against the insurrection. Lansdale con-
centrated on Diem, other contacts at the Palace, and Trinh Minh The. Har-
wood, meanwhile, debriefed Ngo Dinh Nhu, getting from him copies of
reports prepared for Diem by the chief of the Army's intelligence service.
Since the fighting in late March the regular Station had been in almost nightly
contact with an agent in the Binh Xuyen; he was (b)(1)
in a position to provide authoritative tactical information. Harwood passed (b)(3)
much of this to Nhu for use by the Army.14 (S)
Reversing Course (U)
On 29 April, the State Department asked for the Country Team estimate
suggested by CIA in Saigon; Kidder's reply confirmed the optimistic assess-
ment of Diem's chances sent the day before by the two CIA Stations.'s Mean-
while, the Vietnamese Army, supported by Trinh Minh The's Cao Dai troops,
seized the initiative in the battle for Saigon. The Hoa Hao hung back, watch-
ing as their Binh Xuyen allies went onto the defensive.16 The confidence in
Diem and the Army voiced by Lansdale and the Country Team seemed about
to be vindicated. (S)
At this point Diem showed Lansdale a second telegram from Ban Dai. No
longer content with the veiled threat of late March, Bao Dai now ordered
Diem and his Army chief of staff to Paris. Diem was to turn over the Army to
General Nguyen Van Vy, a French citizen and supporter of the former chief of
staff and would-be mutineer, General Hinh. Diem told Lansdale that the Army
and the loyal Cao Dai refused to accept Vy's authority and that they wanted
Diem to endorse their intended repudiation of the emperor. Diem wanted to
know if the US would accept this.17 (S)
Lansdale's description of the incident does not refer to any consultation with
Headquarters or the charg�'affaires. It says he responded that Washington
'" Joseph Redick, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, Staunton, VA, 22 January 1991 (hereafter cited
as Redick interview, 22 January 1991). (S)
CSIIP 113, II, p. 41; ARC; Magill interview, 24 October 1989.
(S)
CSHP 113, I, pp. 106-107. (S)
CSHP 113 , II, p. 41. (S)
CSI-III 113, I, p. 108. As was often the case, Nhu was simultaneously giving Harwood what
Diem was telling Lansdale. The same information, attributed to a sourc d in terms that
fit Nl,si, is contained in SALO 6659, 29 April 1955,
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April 1955: Decision in Saigon-Cholon. (Caption by Ed Lansdale). (U)
"would accept a legal action, but that dethronement by voice vote... such as
that described by Diem was hardly a legal proceeding."" At the same time, as
recounted later in his book, Lansdale encouraged Diem to defy the Emperor's
order to report to him in France. He pictures Diem in an agony of indecision
over the conflict between imperial authority and the national interest, a conflict
that Lansdale implies he helped him resolve. "Slowly, painfully," they came to
the conclusion that if Diem left, "there would be no moral basis upon which
the government could govern.. .freedom would founder." In fact, Nhu had
already told Harwood that Diem would ignore the order. Diem did so, though
he also resisted sect pressure formally to repudiate the Emperor. Charg�
d'Affaires Randolph Kidder, to whom Diem also described his dilemma,
adopted a more neutral stance, saying that the Prime Minister would have to
bear full responsibility for any defiance of imperial command. 19 (S)
'8 CSI-IP 113, II, pp. 44-45. (S)
19 SAIG 6678,29 April 1955
Midst of Wars, p. 299; FRUS, 1955-57, Vietnam, I, p. 318. (S)
Lansdale, In the
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Diem's decision to stand fast deprived General Vy of any resources except
that portion of the Imperial Guard still loyal to Bao Dai. These modest forces
were enough to provoke near-chaos in Diem's high command, even as the
Army battled with the Binh Xuyen for control of Saigon. While the pro-Diem
Cao Dai were trying to arrest General Vy, Vy's Imperial Guard arrested and
then released Diem loyalists, including the Army Chief of Staff. According to
Lansdale's account, Colonel Tran Van Don then somehow persuaded Vy to
trick the French into delivering armored vehicles they had been withholding
from the Vietnamese. Vy turned them over to the Army, which promptly
deployed them against the Binh Xuyen.2� (S)
Perhaps helped by Vy's armored vehicles, Diem's army made short work of
the Binh Xuyen. By noon on 30 April, the rebels had been driven from Saigon
and all but a few isolated strong points in Cholon.21 The Binh Xuyen and the
Hoa Hao retained some nuisance value for another year, but as French support
faded away they no longer presented a real threat. (S)
An Agency officer then in Washinton later recalled that on a weekend after-
noon, presumably either Saturday, 30 April, or Sunday, 1 May, Allen Dulles
and Frank Wisner took the latest reporting on the battle for Saigon to John
Foster Dulles's house. Diem was holding his own against the Binh Xuyen, the
reports said, and people were rallying to him. The DCI and Wisner argued that
this was the wrong moment to fulfill President Eisenhower's commitment to
Collins to look for a Diem replacement. The Secretary of State agreed and,
with his visitors still present, telephoned the President. He summarized the
Agency reporting and recommended postponing the intended withdrawal of
US support. In Collins's absence�he was already on the way back to
Saigon Eisenhower concurred. 22 (S)
As the meeting ended, an aide announced the arrival of Couve de Murville,
the French Ambassador, and the Secretary of State assured his departing
visitors that "he would take care of the French." On the afternoon of 1 May,
with Collins still en route to Saigon, a State Department telegram to the
Embassy reaffirmed the US commitment to Ngo Dinh Diem.23 (U)
" CSIIP 113 ,II, pp. 42-43; Memorandum, S/S [Fisher Howe] to The Secretary [John Foster
Dulles], "French Aid to Anti-Government Elements in South Vietnam," 6 May 1955, citing
ARMA [Army Attache] Report 982, 2 May 1955, Decimal File 751 G00/5-255, RG 59, NARA.
(S)
CSIIF 113, 11,1). 43. (S)
22 Caswell interview, 27 February 1990. Caswell described his presence at the meeting as that of
"someone, who can pronounce the names." (5)
" Ibid.; John Foster Dulles, Telegram to Embassy Saigon, 1 May 1955, US Department of State,
FRUS, 1955-57, Vietnam, 1, p. 344. (U)
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The battle for Saigon, April 1955. (U) (CIA photos)
Information from Lansdale's sources represented only part of the reporting
that persuaded President Eisenhower to reverse his decision to abandon Ngo
Dinh Diem. Much of it was acquired by the officers of the regular Station,
especially Paul Harwood in his frequent meetings with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Allen
Dulles, however, treated it all as emanating from Lansdale, whom he had per-
sonally selected for the Saigon assignment, and whom he regarded as the
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The battle for Saigon, April 1955. (U) (CIA photos)
Agency's preeminent authority on Vietnam. Wittingly or otherwise, Lansdale
lent that authority not only to his own reporting but to that of the regular Sta-
tion. In so doing he became the largest single influence on deliberations in
Washington at the most critical point of Diem's tenure before 1963.24 (S)
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Cesar Climaco, director of Operation Brotherhood in Saigon, organizing a boys brigade to clean
up part of the city destroyed during the Binh Xuyen fighting. Note presence of Ngo Dinh Diem in
upper tier (caption by Ed Lansdale). (U)
More generally, the episode illustrates one of the salient features of the
Agency's relationship with Ngo Dinh Diem, namely, that CIA exercised its
influence much more effectively on Diem's behalf than on Diem himself. He
seems never to have acted in the spirit of quid pro quo, but rather as one enti-
tled to the satisfaction of his demands by the justice of his cause and by the US
interest in seeing him succeed. Diem undoubtedly never learned the details of
the Agency's operative role in arranging the suspension of State's instructions
to Paris, and then persuading the Secretary of State and the President to
rescind their commitment to Collins to abandon him. But he would certainly
have regarded this service as no more than his due. (S)
It is not certain, of course, that without CIA support Diem would have been
forced from office. For one thing, he still had committed backers on Capitol
Hill. Senator Mike Mansfield had threatened to cut off aid to Vietnam if Diem
were replaced, and Congresswoman Edna Kelly of New York spoke for many
on the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) in opposing withdrawal of
US support for him. And two influential State Department players�Walter
Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and Kenneth Young,
Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs�were unper-
suaded by Collins's arguments; they saw no viable alternative to Diem. John
Foster Dulles, less committed to Diem than any of these, had always ques-
" Caswell interview, 27 February 1990. (S)
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tioned whether anyone better was to be found. And Diem's success against the
Binh Xuyen would have strengthened his supporters' hand even without help
from CIA.25 (U)
But negotiations with Paris, once under way, might have acquired momen-
tum of their own. With a foot in the door, the French would have fought hard
to bring Diem down, and Ambassador Collins would probably have supported
them even after the defeat of the Binh Xuyen. The certainty is that DCI
Dulles, exploiting Lansdale's advocacy in Saigon and his own ready access to
the Secretary of State, ensured that the issue would not be joined. Doubts
about Diem persisted, but the die was cast. (U)
The same combination of goal-oriented action and intellectual objectivity
that most CIA officers brought to bear on their dealings with Diem and Nhu
also produced pioneering work on the operational concepts and the methods
of inter-agency coordination that later defined the American counterinsur-
gency effort in Vietnam. All of this taken into account, the Agency's role in
consolidating Diem's hold on the government of South Vietnam remains its
most substantial achievement of the Second Indochina War. (U)
25 Kenneth Young, Memorandum to the Assistant Secretry of State for Far Eastern Affairs,
30 April 1955, FR(1,5,1955-57, Vietnam, I, pp. 337-339. (U)
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CHAPTER 7
Democracy or Autocracy? (U)
The climactic Agency contribution to the consolidation of the Ngo Dinh
Diem regime came with its intervention on Diem's behalf at the end of April
1955. Thereafter, although still an active and influential player, the Agency no
longer dominated US efforts to ensure his survival. Ed Lansdale, to be sure,
remained in contact with Diem until the end of his tour in December 1956,
and a succession of Agency officers continued Paul Harwood's association
with Ngo Dinh Nhu. But the end of the continuous crisis that began with
Diem's accession was accompanied by events that reduced his dependence on
CIA for support against the sects and for a voice in Washington. (U)
The first of these came with the death of Lansdale's principal Cao Dai con-
tact, General Trinh Minh The, and the consequent decline in Lansdale's influ-
ence with the religious sects. Second was the arrival of a new ambassador.
With the reaffirmation of US support for Diem, General Collins's distaste for
the Prime Minister made him odd man out, and he left Saigon only a few
weeks after returning from his late April visit to Washington. G. Frederick
Reinhardt arrived with instructions to take a conciliatory approach with the
thin-skinned Diem, and he set out to improve the tone of the relationship with
the Palace. In so doing, he reduced the government's dependence on its CIA
contacts to get a sympathetic hearing.' (U)
By this time, John Foster Dulles had already confronted the French on the
question of Diem's tenure. Meeting French Prime Minister Edgar Faure just
after Diem's defeat of the Binh Xuyen, Dulles intimidated him into abandon-
ing French opposition to the Ngo brothers. Faure argued that Diem was "not
Karnow, Vietnam: A History (Penguin Books, 1984), p. 223. (U)
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only incapable but mad." But threatened with the withdrawal of US support to
Free Vietnam and thus to the remaining French military forces there, he reluc-
tantly gave in.' (U)
As the last of the Binh Xuyen forces were fleeing Saigon on 2 May, Ed
Lansdale's closest sect ally, General Trinh Minh The of the Cao Dai, died in a
final skirmish. Lansdale continued mediating with the sects on Diem's behalf
and tried to use The's successor to help rally them to the government. But
The's influence as commander of an autonomous Cao Dai army was now lost,
and Lansdale's role as honest broker did not prevent the Cao Dai pope and the
Hoa Hao leadership from trying to hold on to their respective enclaves.3 (S)
Reunification Elections Repudiated (U)
Lansdale continued nevertheless to remind the sect leaders that Diem
enjoyed US favor. He and the regular Station also continued to serve Diem as
an information channel to Washington. In July 1955, only two months after
the battle for Saigon, Diem exploited this access again to register his opposi-
tion to reunification elections. Mandated by the signatories to the Geneva
Accords, these elections were scheduled for 1956, with preparatory consulta-
tions to begin in 1955. The State Department was giving qualified support to
British and French pressure on Diem to participate. In this context, on 5 July,
Ambassador Reinhardt urged Diem to retreat from the standard Saigon denial
that, as a non-signatory, South Vietnam had any obligation to respect the
Accords.4 (U)
The session ended with no commitment from Diem, who called the next
day for separate meetings with the acting chief of Lansdale's Station, Gordon
Jorgensen, and John Anderton, since April 1955 the chief of the regular Sta-
tion. In an open appeal for CIA intervention in Washington, Diem told Ander-
ton that he wanted CIA to intercede with the "highest councils in Washington"
to avoid the "defeatism" and neutralism" that cooperating in election prepara-
tions would produce. Apparently without consulting the Ambassador, the Sta-
tions relayed Diem's plea. Their intervention may well have had some effect
Herring, America's Longest War, pp. 54-55; US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1955-57, I, Vietnam (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), 372-
378, 393-399. The term "Free Vietnam" for Vietnamese territory below the 17th parallel was
used in American official correspondence for about a year after the Geneva Accords. It seems not
to have had any formal basis and was gradually replaced by the term South Vietnam. At this same
time, from mid-1955 into early 1956, the Diem government and the US began to popularize the
term Viet Cong�meaning Vietnamese Communists and pejorative in tone�as a replacement for
the respectable Viet Minh. (U)
CSHP 113,1, pp. 128-132. (S)
4 FRUS, 1955-57, 1, Vietnam, pp. 475-476. (U)
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as there was already working-level reluctance in the State Department to pres-
sure Diem into unequal electoral competition with the more populous and
tightly controlled North.5 (S)
Whatever the Agency's influence on the decision, Washington did, in
effect, give Diem license to sabotage the preliminary talks. CIA in Saigon
then set out to help find a pretext for this that would be acceptable to the pro-
unification and generally neutralist Asians such as Burma's U Nu, whom
Diem was then trying to cultivate.6 (S)
The Frustrations of a Kingmaker (U)
As usual, to act on Diem's behalf was easier than to get him to act, and
Lansdale, who had hoped personally to instruct Diem in the ways of demo-
cratic leadership, grew increasingly frustrated. Although regarded by some
colleagues as consciously engaged in creating his own legend, Lansdale never
claimed substantial influence over Diem; he once told Paul Harwood that
Diem took perhaps 10 percent of his advice. Within weeks of the early May
success against the Binh Xuyen, Lansdale seems to have despaired of acquir-
ing enough influence to make the effort worth continuing. He wrote to Gen-
eral Leland Hobbes, who had furnished for his work in the
Philippines, asking for help in arranging a transfer back to Manila. Hobbes
brought the matter to John Foster Dulles, who wrote to President Eisenhower
in early June that Magsaysay badly needed his erstwhile advisor to help fend
off the political opposition. Eisenhower agreed, and Dulles authorized Lans-
dale to fly to Manila in July to "test Filipino reactions."' (S)
As it turned out, the visit generated intense opposition from the American
Ambassador as well as from Filipino politicians and
newspapers sensitive to the return of a reputed kingmaker. There is no evi-
dence that Magsaysay expressed interest in Lansdale's return, or indeed that
they even met. In late July Dulles told Eisenhower that the trip had been
"counterproductive," and Lansdale stayed in Saigon.' (U)
5 SAIG 7528, 7 July 1955, no reply has been
found); G. Frederick Reinhardt, Telegram to Department of State, 5 July 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, 1,
Vietnam, p. 475; Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Letter to Ambassador Reinhardt, 10 June 1955, FRUS,
1955-57, I, Vietnam, p. 444. (S)
Paul Harwood, interview by Thomas Ahern, McLean, VA, 27 March 1991. (S)
' Harwood interview 17 October 1989; Currey, Lansdale, p. 179. (S)
Currey, Lansdale, p. 179. Currey cites two memorandums on the subject from Dulles to Eisen-
hower, dated 7 June and 26 July 1955. He does not explain how the purpose of Lansdale's visit
becathe known to Philippine press and political circles, nor why Lansdale did not approach the
Dulles brothers or Magsaysay directly. (U)
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Like many Americans, Lansdale tended to blame Diem's intractability on
Ngo Dinh Nhu. As Lansdale's biographer put it, "always there was Nhu to
whisper behind his back and to counter the suggestions he made [to Diem]."
Lansdale acknowledged Diem's innate rigidity, but vented his frustrations on
Nhu, describing him as a "Mussolini type character who had set up a network
of local district controls styled after the Japanese system [during Japan's
World War II occupation of Indochina]." He thought "Nhu reveled in this
secret type of government control of the people, and slowly attempted to
evolve a Fascist type state."9 (S)
But Diem made the decisions, and Diem was not to be budged. If reassign-
ment to Manila was also not in the cards, Lansdale concluded, there might still
be an opportunity to improve the performance of the American bureaucracy in
Vietnam. He thought the activities of its autonomous agencies should be inte-
grated in order to compensate for the Saigon government's weaknesses.
Accordingly, on returning from his failed mission to Manila, he proposed a
new coordinating role for himself in the US Mission. Attributing the idea to
General John O'Daniel, chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG), he cabled a suggestion that he be made the new ambassador's
"assistant for action [on] overall political-economic-military affairs." The
reply, drafted by Frank Wisner and released by Dulles on 8 August, did not
deny the need for better coordination, but said that the proposed role would
"probably be an unwise arrangement." Noting that Lansdale had failed to
mention Reinhardt's reaction to the idea, Wisner pointed out that the Ambas-
sador would probably regard the coordination function as his own. '�) (S)
Whatever his disappointment at these setbacks, Lansdale persevered with
his efforts to help Diem build a functioning government. Even during his
absence in Manila, his deputy, Gordon Jorgensen, was fighting for Embassy
approval of a Civil Guard designed to protect the rural population from antici-
pated Viet Cong incursions. Working with General O'Daniel, Lansdale also
negotiated an agreement with Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders to assimilate
more of their armed forces into the national Army. Diem accepted the Ameri-
can proposal and integrated them in July." (S)
His optimism apparently restored, Lansdale pursued not only the sect nego-
tiations but further efforts to bind the government to its rural constituency. He
wanted to convert the ad hoc program of military civic action into something
more comprehensive, and later in the year he got Diem to create a civilian
9 lbid, p 179. Edward Lansdale interview, 6 January 1964,
2.5.55, Lansdale's cable has
not been found. Its content is summarized in Dulles's reply. (S)
" CSHP 113,11, pp. 50, 54. (S)
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agency reporting directly to the Palace. Lansdale also hoped to use demobi-
lized veterans to help link the government to the countryside
to help form the Vietnam Veterans League.
Lansdale wanted this organization to be independent of the government, but
Diem, always jealous of his authority, did not. At least partly for this reason�
the perennial shortage of indigenous leadership talent hindered any organiza-
tional effort in South Vietnam�it never prospered. The Philippine medical
project, Operation Brotherhood, ingratiated itself with its patients, but its
efforts were not followed by an effective indigenous medical program, and
any contribution it made to the Saigon government's public image proved to
be transitory. 12 (5)
It is not clear whether Lansdale recognized the limited ability of Philippine-
based programs to popularize the Vietnamese Government and blunt the effect
of Communist propaganda. The record suggests that, by mid-1955, he had
largely delegated these programs to subordinates and was concentrating on
trying to influence Diem to shape the institutions of the new central govern-
ment. The regular Station, working with Ngo Dinh Nhu, then became the prin-
cipal source of direct CIA support to political action in the countryside. The
main instrument of these efforts was the National Revolutionary Movement,
which Nhu had created in late 1954 to meet the need for an
ostensibly nongovernmental sponsor for pro-Diem propaganda. (S)
The Uphill Road to Political Reform (U)
In June 1955, Harwood still saw the NRM as merely a device to elect
approved candidates to the national constituent assembly then being planned.
But Headquarters had more ambitious goals, writing to the field in July that
the NRM should help bridge "the present enormous gap between the Govern-
ment and the people." It should do this by representing a program of "politi-
cal, social, and economic reform which [has] a direct bearing on the particular
livelihoods of individual Vietnamese."" (S)
Headquarters recognized that this was easier said than done, adding that the
NRM's problems were "directly related to those plaguing local governmental
administration throughout Vietnam." The proposal left unspecified the content
of the desired reforms and concentrated instead on matters of organization and
control. Speaking of a proposed NRM convention, Headquarters assumed that
its proceedings would have to be controlled from the top in order to ensure
approval of the desired statutes and officers. But these officers would have to
12 CSIIP 113,1, pp. 138-146, 150-153, 177-195; Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New
York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 207-213. (S)
13 I7VSW 1106, 21 July 1955, :S)
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be "outstanding nationalists who are well respected and who have superior
leadership ability." 14 The proposal offered no advice on how to find such peo-
ple, for whom both stations had been searching ever since the spring of 1954.
Headquarters did, however, wrestle with the question whether outstanding
nationalists would consent to be manipulated in the way it proposed. It argued
that, far from being a tool for repressing divergent viewpoints, "the build-in
control mechanisms are designed to encourage NRM members to use autho-
rized channels of communication." This, Headquarters thought, would "dis-
courage the development of needless and crippling factionalism." 15 (S)
Although painfully aware of the shortage of local talent, Harwood did not
argue the point. Instead, he tried to make good the lack of content in the Head-
quarters proposal. In late summer, he sent home a list of objectives that
included specific agrarian and labor reforms including land redistribution, cre-
ation of democratic institutions, and expanded public services.16 (S)
But it was one thing to set goals, another to get Diem to adopt them. Neither
the Americans nor even Nhu could move Diem on the vital issues of land
reform and administrative overhaul. In June, for example, Diem's US advisor
on agrarian matters, Wolf Ladejinsky, had to report the failure of his latest
effort to interest the prime minister in either land reform or in correcting the
"lassitude" of local administration. According to Ladejinsky, Diem agreed in
principle, but insisted that solutions could be attempted only in the context of
"pacification and stabilization." To Ladejinsky's appeal that Diem play a
direct role in persuading farmers of their stake in the new regime, the Presi-
dent "pleaded extreme preoccupation with urgent matters."17 (U)
In his talks with Harwood, Nhu claimed to share American convictions
about administrative and land tenure reform in the provinces. But he had no
more luck with Diem than did Ladejinsky. In early September, Harwood
reported that one of Nhu's basic criticisms of Diem's rule was the failure to
advance these two reforms." (S)
A Legitimizing Referendum (U)
While Nhu and Harwood talked about domestic reforms, Diem was begin-
ning to deal with the implications of his stonewalling on preparations for all-
Vietnam elections. The prospect of claiming for South Vietnam the status of
'4 Ibid. (S)
is Ibid. (S)
'6 FVSA 1542, 5 September 1955 (S)
'7 Memorandum, Wolf Ladejinsky to Ambassador Reinhardt, 7 June 1955, FR US, 1955-57, I,
Vietnam, pp. 456-458. (U)
'8 FVSA 1542, 5 September 1955, (S)
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nation-state focused Diem on the need to strengthen his legitimacy, which at
that point still derived from the mandate of the French puppet emperor, Bao
Dai. In June 1955, Diem's foreign minister told Ambassador Reinhardt that
the govertunent might depose Bao Dai through a national referendum. Rein-
hardt and the Department thought this procedure lacked legal standing, and
they urged Diem to shelve the matter until it could be properly dealt with by
the national constituent assembly then being prepared. A little later, in July or
August, Diem gave Lansdale to understand that he might stage demonstra-
tions against Bao Dai and respond to this ostensible popular demand with a
decree deposing the Emperor.19 (U)
Lansdale was evidently unaware of the official US position. With a sense of
high accomplishment, he later described his success in persuading Diem to
abandon the contrived street protest in favor of the very referendum idea that
State deplored. The regular Station supported the Embassy, but could not urge
its position on Nhu, who was out of Saigon in late September and early Octo-
ber. As preparations advanced, there was nothing to be done but withhold sup-
port for the government's referendum propaganda. Meanwhile, Headquarters
at least tacitly acquiesced in Lansdale's more aggressive approach, noting the
"instrumental" work on the referendum being done by a Filipino constitu-
tional expert Lansdale had brought to Saigon.2� (S)
Lansdale set out to help ensure a decisive Diem victory. Hoping to see the
government burnish its image with free and fair elections, he urged Diem not
to allow any irregularities at the polls.
According to the official
results of the 23 October referendum, over 98 percent of those voting pre-
ferred Diem to Bao Dai as chief of state. Three days later, Diem proclaimed
himself President of the Republic of Vietnam. In so doing, he achieved the last
two of what the regular Station saw as his three basic aims. First, with Ameri-
can support, he had successfully defied the French. Now, he had removed Bao
Dai and assumed absolute authority below the 17th paralle1.21 (S)
The regular Station (though apparently not Lansdale) saw substantial gov-
ernment manipulation in the scale of Diem's majority; the votes cast in
Saigon, for example, exceeded the number of voters by over 150,000 votes.
1� G. Frederick Reinhardt, Telegram to Department of State, 29 June 1955, FR US, 1955-57,1,
Vietnam, p. 474; Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, p. 331. (U)
" Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, p. 332-333; CSHP 113, I, pp. 133-134; SAIG 8604,
23 September 1955; SAIG 8750, 6 October 1955; and SAIG 8810, 12 October 1955, al
(S)
2, Currey, Lansdale, p. 180; Harwood interview, 27 March 1991. (S)
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But Harwood thought the result also reflected the government's inability to
handle the mechanics of the project. There was at the time hardly any govern-
ment presence at the village level, and therefore no machinery with which to
distribute and count ballots. Nhu would come to meetings with Harwood
"sputtering with frustration" over problems of the simplest logistics. In Har-
wood's view, even had the government wanted only to determine the popular
will, it would have been reduced to guessing.22 (S)
A Strategy of Repression (U)
With the 23 October 1955 referendum and the proclamation of his presi-
dency three days later, Diem created the formal basis for his assumption of
power south of the 17th parallel. This left open the questions how he would
exercise that authority, and, in the political realm, how his CIA advisors could
help him extend and consolidate it. Both Stations saw the consent of the gov-
erned as indispensable to the new government's success. As we have seen,
they consistently urged Diem and Nhu to move toward democratic institutions
while reforming administrative practices. (S)
But early signs emerged of what Lansdale and Harwood both saw as a
potentially destructive authoritarian style. As early as June 1955, the regular
Station deplored the continued arrests of opposition leaders, which it feared
would alienate those who, while not participating in the government, were
also not resisting it. And little more than two months after the referendum,
with the arrest of non-Communist opposition leader Dr. Phan Quang Dan,
Lansdale complained that "the government is using force as a substitute for
good leadership." He also seems to have given some credence to the claim of
a Cao Dai contact that by February 1956 there were already 7,000 political
prisoners in Saigon's Chi Hoa prison." (S)
During this period, middle to late 1955, Diem launched his "denunciation
of Communists" campaign. The Viet Minh cadres whom Hanoi had left in the
South had as yet offered no overt resistance. But they were gradually replacing
the French at the top of Diem's list of enemies. Consciously adopting Com-
munist techniques, Diem set out, as one CIA officer later put it, to "get them
before they get us." One way to do this was to stage mass meetings at which
Diem's officials exhorted the villagers (the practice does not seem to have
been common in the cities) to denounce Viet Minh cadres and sympathizers.
Another was the widespread detention of known or suspected dissidents in a
22 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, p. 334; Harwood interview, 27 March 1991; Intervention,
p. 95. (S)
2, SAIG 7125, 2 June 1955 7; SAIG 0275,
19 February 1956, ibid. (S)
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program run by the Surete, later called the Special Branch, of the National
Police. Here also, the bulk of the arrests, and especially the more indiscrimi-
nate among them, seem to have taken place in the countryside. But the arrests
of urban politicians that dismayed both Lansdale and Harwood presumably
reflected the same policy. 24 (S)
The principal author of the propaganda aspect of the denunciation cam-
paign was Diem's third Information Minister, Tran Chanh Thanh, a lawyer
and former Viet Minh member. As Nhu's executive agent in the NRM, he was
well known to the Station, with which he conducted the working-level liaison
on NRM matters. The Station deplored Thanh's "Leninist" tendencies and
held itself aloof from his denunciation campaign. Nor did the Station's intelli-
gence liaison section support the Special Branch program of detaining sus-
pected Communists.
The regular Station seems to have been of two minds about regime activity
against its actual and potential opponents. In late 1955, Harwood pointed out
to Nhu the "apparent discrepancy between [the] democratic spirit" of Diem's
proclamation announcing his ascension to the presidency and the "totalitarian
spirit" of the denunciation campaign and other activity being run by ex-Viet
Minh using Viet Minh methods. Harwood said he would like to believe that all
this was a "temporary phenomenon" and that some thought was being given to
the development of "political leaders with more democratic ideas."26 (S)
Divergent Views and Divided Counsels (U)
Their common goal�the creation of a popular, representative govern-
ment�did not prevent the Ngo brothers' CIA advisors from giving at least the
appearance of divided counsels. As we have seen, Harwood and Headquarters
24 Reporting from Hanoi on 24 November, the pro-Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett said
that, on the 10th, Diem had convened a "Congress to Denounce Communists," and that the cam-
paign was already in its "third phase" (see FBIS report, 29 November 1955,
Caswell interview, 27 March 1991. For more information on the
origins of the denunciation campaign, see Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1977), pp. 19, 26, 49; J.J. Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency in
South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The Role of the Southern Vietminh Cadres (RAND Corporation, May
1968), pp. 9-13. (S)
25 Harwood interview, 16 May 19911
(S)
26 Harwood interview, 27 March 991; SAIG 9153,9 November 1955
(S)
roject Amendment, 10 February 1956,
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agreed with Nhu on Diem's need for an organized base of electoral support.
Lansdale, by contrast, continued to promote his vision of Diem as a Vietnam-
ese George Washington, above any consideration of party or faction. (S)
There is some evidence that Lansdale's chronic frustration with Diem was
reciprocated. The differences in their political philosophies and personal
styles probably affected Diem in much the same way they did Lansdale. Gen-
eral Tran Van Don, at one time chief of staff of the Vietnamese Army,
observed that Diem had at first relied heavily on Lansdale, giving orders to
put him through to Diem "night or day, whatever Diem was doing." Lansdale
was of great assistance, Don thought, but he "went a little far when he tried to
have Diem copy Magsaysay. ...this really hurt Diem's feelings." Late in 1955,
not having seen Lansdale at the Palace in some time, Don asked about his
absence. Diem answered, "Lansdale is too CIA and is an encumbrance. In pol-
itics there is no room for sentiment." Nevertheless, whether they had a genu-
ine friendship, as Lansdale thought, or whether Diem saw their relationship in
instrumental terms, as Vietnam desk officer John Caswell believed, Lansdale
continued to enjoy regular if perhaps reduced access to the Palace. He was
well aware, of course, that many of his prescriptions looked to Diem like
unpleasant medicine.27 (S)
Lansdale's convictions about the way to shape the new Vietnamese polity
also led to a collision with the regular Station. In September 1955, having
heard reports of political activity in the military, he cabled Headquarters that
the Army was "deeply torn" by favoritism shown to NRM members in the
officer corps. He had apparently not coordinated the message with the regular
Station, and Headquarters instructed him to consult COS John Anderton.28 (S)
Anderton did not acknowledge explicitly endorsing NRM organizational
work in the Army, but took issue with Lansdale's claim that the NRM was
corrupting the military. In any case, Ambassador Reinhardt had already asked
him in June for a "priority effort" to build Diem a base of electoral support.
Despite his argument with the regular Station on this subject, Lansdale did not
learn about Reinhardt's instructions until late 1955 or early 1956. He protested
to the Ambassador, who reacted "with a strange look" and told him that US
27 Tran Van Don, Our Endless War, p. 60; Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 159; Redick interview,
28 September 1989; Caswell interview, 27 February 1990. (S)
25 SAIG 8428, 10 September 1955, and
13 September 1955, ibid. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, pp. 341-344. In his
hook, Lansdale consistently refers to the Can Lao in describing this controversy. Some of the reg-
ular Station's correspondence uses the cryptonym for the NRM when the context indicates the
Can Lao is meant, and Douglas Blaufarb has said that there was confusion over the cryptonyms
during his tenure as DCOS from 1956 to 1958 (see Blaufarb interview, 11 April 1991). Overlap-
ping leadership and activities probably account for the perennial confusion on this point. (S)
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policy advocated building a "strong nationalist party" supporting Diem. Lans-
dale was outraged at not having been consulted and flew to Washington to
argue his case there. He saw officials at all levels, including the Dulles broth-
ers, who gave him the impression they regarded his views as "too visionary
and idealistic." Concluding that his prospects of doing "constructive work [in
Vietnam] seemed to be ending," Lansdale repeated his request of the previous
summer for a transfer. This time, the Secretary of State refused even to con-
sider it.29 (S)
Neither station favored a politicized Vietnamese Army, but Lansdale and
Anderton argued for months over the actual extent of NRM organizing among
the military. In early March 1956, Harwood tacitly acknowledged undesirable
political activity in the army, reporting that "at station demand," the NRM had
suspended the training of political instructors for the army. Nhu and Diem had
also responded to Harwood and Lansdale pressure by drafting a decree pro-
hibiting political activity in the army. But Nhu continued to deny any NRM
wrongdoing. He made it clear, furthermore, that while the army would ideally
be free of partisan politics, the main thing had been to get Diem's candidates
elected to the Constituent Assembly. Thus, it was only after the elections on
4 March 1956 that the Vietnamese acted on CIA's demands.3� (S)
The NRM and a Strategic Dilemma (U)
Despite their disagreements about repression in the countryside and politics
in the military, Harwood believed that Nhu harbored a genuine concern for the
welfare of the peasantry and an equally real desire to create an efficient, equita-
ble administration. Nhu might look on the people as "children," and he cer-
tainly doubted that Western political institutions could be reproduced in
Vietnam, but Harwood thought he was looking to the US for "basic political
philosophy and inspiration." Accordingly, the Station asked Headquarters in
November 1955 to find people who could furnish "heavy and realistic indoctri-
nation in Western political theory and practice" to NRM functionaries. As Har-
wood later recalled it, Headquarters never did adequately meet this ambitious
requirement
2" Memorandum, Chief FE Division [Aurell] to DCI [Dulles], "Clarification of CIA Assistance to
Political Program in Support of Diem," 9 November 1955,
Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, pp. 342-345. (S)
SAIG 0456, 4 March 1956
8 March 1956,
(s)
FVSA 1542; SAIG 9153, 9 November 1955,
SAIG 0516,
FVSA 2682, 17 April 1956,
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At the same time, Harwood had to deal with the question of NRM participa-
tion in the denunciation campaign. In the fall of 1955, he explicitly opposed
using the NRM for coercive purposes, telling Nhu that he would not support
an expanded front controlled by totalitarian-minded leaders. Nhu insisted that
both he and Diem shared Harwood's concerns and that the major obstacle to
democratic development was the absence of a "living political doctrine" to
guide the work of pro-Diem political forces, especially the NRM. Telling
Headquarters about this session with Nhu, Harwood said he recognized that
this was not the moment to press the Vietnamese for adherence to the tenets of
Jeffersonian democracy. But he wanted to keep Nhu and Diem from abandon-
ing "positive democratic goals," even at a time when other, more pressing,
problems required "negative or repressive treatment." Apparently fearful that
democratic values would continue to be overshadowed, Headquarters com-
mented apprehensively, in early 1956, on signs of an "autocratic tendency" in
the developing NRM." (S)
A little later, in March, Harwood came to see some merit in NRM participa-
tion in security matters. Defending the NRM against charges, apparently
reported by Lansdale, of having usurped government authority in rural secu-
rity programs, Harwood decribed efforts to identify VC and other dissidents as
part of the "civic duty" of any loyal Vietnamese. But apparently still uncom-
fortable with this NRM role in countersubversion, he added that he saw its
program moving from anti-VC investigation and denunciation to encouraging
village leaders to participate in social and economic projects." (S)
This uneasy ambivalence over the strategic purpose of the NRM persisted.
Both Stations were persuaded of the need for Diem to establish truly represen-
tative government. But they also, especially the regular Station, seemed to
accept that a certain amount of more or less arbitrary repression in the coun-
tryside was needed, at least in the beginning, to keep sect dissidents and the
Communist underground under control. Harwood's remarks are typical. The
implicit assumption appears to have been that a judicious level of repression
would not compromise the nation-building program and might even be a pre-
requisite to its success. No one, Vietnamese or American, seems to have
feared that denunciations and non-judicial police action could produce disaf-
fection that outweighed the damage done to the Viet Cong underground.34 (S)
32 SAIG 9153;
(S)
SA1G 0456, 4 March 1956
" {-NSA 1542
16 January 1956,
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Probably because there was nothing else to work with, the regular Station
strengthened its endorsement of Headquarters' ambitions for the NRM in
early 1956. A January dispatch from Headquarters speaks of the long-range
objective of filling the political vacuum at the village level. But the Station
was closer to the problem and better understood the obstacles. Harwood
reported that the Station's ideas were ' "foreign... sometimes incomprehensi-
ble" to his contacts in the NRM, and it would be essential to insert a cadre of
indoctrinated Vietnamese if the organization were to develop (b)(1)
along the lines that CIA desired." (S) (b)(3)
Later in January, the NRM adopted a progressive platform for the elections
to the constituent assembly. It included a bow to agrarian reform ("each peas-
ant family should have land"), as well as provisions for "social insurance
laws," public works, cooperatives, expanded education, and, probably at the
instigation of Nhu's wife, equality of the sexes." The problem was the dispar-
ity between promise and performance. Headquarters worried about the diver-
sion of NRM members into paramilitary work and about coercive recruitment.
If the situation could not be "clarified and improved," Headquarters warned, it
might be necessary to withdraw Agency support. 37 (S)
As Ngo Dinh Diem approached the first anniversary of his victory in the
battle for Saigon, the structure and style of his government had largely
matured. Having boycotted the Geneva-mandated election preparations and
dethroned Bao Dai, he had launched his bid to create a nation out of the terri-
tory below the 17th parallel. But as of early 1956, Diem showed as little inter-
est in conciliating the non-Communist opposition as he did in making his rule
attractive to the mass of the population. CIA, and apparently Ngo Dinh Nhu as
well, agonized over the authoritarian bias of Diem's style. Even when the Sta-
tion and Nhu agreed on policy goals, however, they were frustrated by the lack
of competent, motivated people to organize and staff their political programs.
Their dilemma reflected in part nothing more than the severe shortage of such
people. But it resulted also from the adoption by the anti-colonialist, francoph-
obe Diem of both the personnel and the style of governance of the departed
French colonial administration. Most of the "anti-colonialist courageous hon-
est men" whom Lansdale believed Diem to be seeking either stood aside or
joined the Viet Cong. (U)
" SAM 9761, 10 January 1956 and SAIG 0042, 31 January 1956, both
S)
3' During his tour of duty, Harwood thought that Nhu's wife exercised little influence on policy.
But she did nag Diem and Nhu with genuinely progressive ideas about the status of women, and
occasionally wore down their resistance (see Harwood interview, 16 May 1990.) (S)
Sai on Embassy Telegram 2963, 23 January 1956. 23 January 1956; and
13 February it all
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CHAPTER 8
Making the Best of the Bargain (U)
Personal charisma might have compensated to some extent for anachronis-
tic policy and reliance on the colonial bureaucracy, but Ngo Dinh Diem's style
did nothing to alleviate the problems that preoccupied the Station and Ngo
Dinh Nhu. Although the Prime Minister's forays into Central Vietnam in early
1955 had appeared to generate some real popular enthusiasm, his withdrawn
nature soon reasserted itself. As the referendum approached in September,
Headquarters opined that failure to establish "essential rapport" with the peo-
ple "was probably the most serious shortcoming of the Diem government."
Implicitly recognizing the odds against getting Diem to make basic changes of
either style or substance, Headquarters confined its suggestions to the minu-
tiae of his rare public appearances. Accordingly, it urged Harwood to get Nhu
to persuade Diem to eschew his customary white sharkskin suit in favor of
Vietnamese dress. Trying another angle, Headquarters reacted to a United
States Information Service (USIS) account of the the indifferent public
response to an October trip by the new president through the Mekong Delta.
Noting Diem's reported lack of rapport with the crowds, Headquarters lamely
suggested that the Station arrange for him to get elocution lessons.' (S)
There was, of course, little prospect of improved rapport with the masses
unless Diem attached some importance to it. But so far as Nhu was concerned,
Diem was not merely indifferent to the techniques of crowd-pleasing, but
lacked any understanding of "politics, politicians, or parties." Diem "felt that
to rule it was enough to have an army and an administrative apparatus." Nhu
insisted to the Station that he himself knew this was not enough.2 (S) �
The continuing fragility of the government and the intransigence of its
numerous opponents meant that if Diem was to have any chance of success,
Agency and other American support had to continue even in the face of
' INSW 1264, 30 September 1955; Foreign Service Dispatch 49, 14 October 1955; FVSW 1438,
29 November 1955; . The Station's replies, if any, have not been found. (S)
2 Contact Report Blaufarb and Nhu 11 July 1956, attachment to FVSA 3460, n.d.
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disagreement with him on issues of both style and substance. Thus, while
admonishing Nhu about the dangers of authoritarianism in late 1955,
He began a training program for NRM officials
and, trying to counter the current of neutralism in Southeast Asia, worked with
Nhu and the local USIS office to install Information Ministry positions in var-
ious South Vietnamese embassies. He also secured the cooperation of the
Embassy's labor officer in a program of support to Tran Quoc Buu's Vietnam-
ese Confederation of Christian Workers.3 (S)
Lansdale, meanwhile, used his access to Diem to urge the creation of repre-
sentative institutions�especially a constitution guaranteeing an independent
legislature and judiciary�that he thought essential to ensuring the govern-
ment's success. Diem's usual reply to these entreaties claimed sympathy for
the idea, while emphasizing the need for unfettered executive authority for a
government with so many enemies.4 (S)
To his concern for the health of Vietnamese institutions Lansdale added a
lively interest in the Saigon government's international reputation. Discover-
ing in early 1956 that Joseph Manciewicz was planning a film version of Gra-
ham Greene's The Quiet American, he contrived an introduction when the
producer visited Saigon. Lansdale proposed transforming Greene's essentially
anti-American treatment into a success story
Lansdale's Station then got Diem to authorize the govern-
ment's cooperation in the filming.5 (S)
During this period, Lansdale's advocacy continued to aim at opinion in offi-
cial Washington. As he had fought for endorsement of the Diem government
almost a year earlier, he now undertook to win support for Diem's opposition
to all-Vietnam elections. As we have seen, both stations had supported Diem's
reluctance to participate in election preparations. Now, the President wanted
to repudiate the process entirely. Lansdale proposed a propaganda line
designed to get South Vietnam and the US off the hook: if the North really
wanted a political solution, he wrote, it should first demobilize its Army.
Headquarters liked this uncompromising approach and found a sympathetic
FVSA 2964, 25 May 1956,
4 Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, chapter 18; Clandestine Service Historical Paper (CSHP) 113,
The Saigon Military Mission June 1954 to December 1956 October 1970 Vol I c lap 10 (S)
FVSA 3280,
2 July 1956
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audience for it at the State Department, where Kenneth Young, Director for
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, volunteered to take it up with the
interagency Special Coordinating Committee on covert activity.' (S)
The result was guidance for the country team drafted by State, USIS, and
CIA. The outcome would probably have been the same without Lansdale's
intervention, but his forcing the issue produced an earlier and perhaps more
unequivocal policy decision than might otherwise have emerged. Although
Lansdale was always reticent about what he told Diem of his own role in the
policymaking process, one may infer that the outcome also helped reinforce
his role as confidant and informal channel to Washington.' (S)
Popular Government vs. Executive Authority (U)
Of the issues that preoccupied CIA in Saigon in early 1956, only that of
reunification elections found the Agency and Diem in full agreement. Other
issues brought into sharp focus the differences between the Vietnamese and
American approaches to the kind of government that should rule the South.
One of these was the formation of a national assembly, the other, the process
of drafting and promulgating a new constitution. (U)
Although all four parties�the Ngo brothers and the separate CIA sta-
tions regarded an elected assembly as essential, the Americans placed a con-
siderably higher value on the integrity of the voting process. As early as
January 1956, the regular Station was reporting its concern that Diem would
rig the elections scheduled for March. Harwood urged Nhu to keep them "fair
and free." Nhu explicitly agreed not to censor campaign materials and guaran-
teed the integrity of the secret ballot. But he complained about the self-
aggrandizing opposition and told Harwood about organizing "formerly anti-
government thugs.. .on behalf of [the] NRM in case of VC or sect electoral
violence." Apparently accepting the rationale for this, Harwood added that
Nhu was "handling this himself since it [is] highly sensitive and must be done
properly."' (S)
SAIG 9281, 14 January 1956 19 January 1956; both
(S)
1 February 1956, ibid. Lansdale's book says he argued the matter personally with
the Dulles brothers in early 1956, when the Secretary of State seemed to take for granted that the
elections would be held; Mr. Dulles's response is not described. (See In the Midst of Wars,
P. 345.) (S)
SARI 9717, 6 January 1956, and SAIG 9839, 16 January 1956. Con-
tact Report, Harwood and Nhu, 7 February 1956, attachment to FVSA 2391, 9 March 1956
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The elections were in fact manipulated, but not to Nhu's satisfaction,
despite the election of NRM candidates to a majority of assembly seats. He
deplored the irregularities, in Harwood's view, less out of respect for the sanc-
tity of the ballot than because of their results: rigging by local officials had
defeated several candidates whom Nhu wanted as part of a new national lead-
ership cadre. But these were mostly people from the North, running in Saigon
and the Delta, where local officials had seen to it that at least some of the car-
petbaggers were defeated
Incipient differences over the structure of the new government that lurked in
discussions of the elections became clear in the drafting of a constitution. The
main actor on the CIA side was Ed Lansdale. In August 1955, apparently act-
ing on his own authority, he had brought to Saigon a Filipino journalist and
constitutional scholar named Juan Orendain who he thought might influence
Diem to adopt the system of divided powers that the Philippines had borrowed
from the United States. Hoping to attract Diem's non-Communist competitors
into participation in government, Lansdale saw an independent legislature and
judiciary as indispensable to relieving their doubts about Diem's good faith.
Diem, whom Harwood saw as preoccupied with establishing unconditional
personal authority, wanted no part of either.10 (S)
Orendain persisted, and some of his prescriptions seem to have found their
way into the draft submitted by Diem's constitutional commission. But Diem
scrapped the draft in April 1956 and invited Orendain to consult with him
directly on the "basic principles" he had decided to present to the assembly in
lieu of a draft text. As Orendain reported it, Diem's main concern was to be
assured of "all executive powers" he needed at the "present time." Lansdale
later credited Orendain with "almost singlehandedly drawing up a constitu-
tion," but Joe Redick, his interpreter and executive officer, thought Agency
influence to have been slight, given the divergence between Orendain's rec-
ommendations and the final product." (S)
The regular Station's detachment cannot have helped to advance Lansdale's
case with Diem. During June and July, while Orendain tried unsuccessfully to
talk Diem into agreeing to an effective separation of powers, with an autono-
mous National Assembly, Deputy Chief of Station (DCOS) Douglas Blaufarb
9 Interview with Paul Harwood, 27 March 1991;
1956, attachment to FVSA 2682, 17 April 1956
6 March
CSHP 113, I, pp. 133-134; Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, chap. 18; Harwood interview,
27 March 1991. (S)
" Project Status Report August 1955 SAIG
0955, 19 April 1956, Lansdale interview,
6 January 1964, Redick interview, 4 December 1963,
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stood aside. He had no Headquarters mandate to get involved and believed
that Lansdale did. In fact, no one had encouraged either Station to concern
itself with this. PE Division's covert action chief worried both (b)(1 )
about the authority for the advice Lansdale was giving Orendain and about its (b)(3)
competence: CIA had no charter to shape the Vietnamese constitution, and
Headquarters lacked detailed information on the Lansdale/Orendain recom-
mendations. A member of Lansdale's Station, being debriefed around mid-
1956, assured Headquarters that Lansdale kept in touch with Ambassador
Reinhardt, who was providing what guidance he could despite inadequate
instructions from the Department. This may have served to resolve Headquar-
ters' doubts; at any rate, seems not to have followed up with any (b)(1 )
questions or guidance to Lansdale.12 (S) E (b)(3)
The Saigon Government as Intelligence Target (U)
As Diem's rigidity and his government's weaknesses became more evident,
the regular Station�Lansdale did not believe in formal, controlled agent rela-
tionships began to supplement its liaison programs with unilateral efforts
designed to circumvent Palace obstructionism.� One of Harwood's men,
took out the first insurance policy in April 1956 by recruiting
"as the
Diem family dictatorship developed, came more and more d fre-
quently into conflict with the family c etermin f f t, it
itself." r
DespiteLi quarrels with Nhu and Diem, managed to retain their
confidence and became an important if sometimes self-interested source on
the inner workings of the family and the government." (S)
12 Undated, unsigned transcript of the debriefing of
FVSA 3280, 2 July 1956,
SAIG 1591,23 June 1956
farb interview, 11 April 1991. (S)
13 Lansdale saw source motivation in terms of shared ideals: "The strongest control is one that
is self-imposed; it is based upon mutual trust and the awakening of unselfish patriotism on
ideals or principles we ourselves cherish.., the foreign person or groups serve our own best
national interests by serving their own highest national interests, which coincide with ours."
CS111) 113 11 26 (Si
Blau-
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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eporting included one of the most obscure aspects of the Diem
administration, the role of Diem's youngest brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as de
facto governor of Central Vietnam. Almost a year earlier, one of Diem's clos-
est American contacts, Wesley Fishel of the US public administration team,
had listened to Diem's almost surreal denial that Can had sponsored assassina-
tion teams. Now came reporting in mid-1956 on efforts by Can to
displace both Nhu and Information Minister Tran Chanh Thanh as the princi-
pal power behind the throne. It became increasingly evident that Saigon's con-
trol of allegedly nationwide programs, including some supported by CIA,
extended only to the edge of Can's territory. This applied as much to civic
action and intelligence operations against the Viet Cong as it did to political
organizing by the NRM and the Can Lao.15 (S)
Nhu recognized the problem and often discussed it with Harwood. He
claimed that Diem understood both the advantages and the disadvantages of
Can's suzerainty in Central Vietnam but refused to curb him. The Embassy
would importune Harwood to get the Palace to do something about Can, but
Nhu, informed of the complaint, would only throw up his hands. Harwood
later thought of the perennial tension over Can's role as symptomatic of the
shortage of political and managerial talent willing to serve the regime. Diem
used what he could find and simply ignored what must have looked to him
like mere caviling from the Americans.16 (S)
The Appearance of Progress (U)
When Paul Harwood left Vietnam in April 1956, he was pessimistic about
the government's long-term prospects. Efforts at institution-building were
foundering for lack of qualified, motivated people: "We got nowhere." In
June, Diem took a step that Lansdale, whom he did not consult, later saw as
catastrophic. In an effort to strengthen central government control, Diem abol-
ished the traditional system of locally-constituted village councils, replacing
them with committees appointed by his district and province chiefs. In doing
15 Diem's tortured defense of Can against rumored sponsorship of assassination squads sheds
some light on the president's mental processes. According to Diem, General Hinh (exiled in late
1954 for conspiring with the French against him) spread the assassination rumor "not because
Can had organized such squads, but because Hinh was afraid that if someone asked Can whether
he should organize an assassination squad, Can might say yes, and since if he did say yes, my
brother would give explicit advice as to how to go about it, General Hinh was afraid. But you may
be sure that Can has never done anything of the sort." Memorandum, Wesley Fishel to Ambassa-
dor Reinhardt, "Gouvernement en Famille," n.d., attached to FVSW 1133, 5 August 1955,
debriefin of 7 June 1956,
debriefing of 23 October 1956,
FVSA 3748, 28 September 1956,
16 Harwood interview, 27 March 1991. (S)
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this, he went counter to Lansdale's repeated urging to increase the representa-
tive character of local elections. Lansdale found Diem's secretiveness a "mys-
tery," but in retrospect it seems obvious that Diem, familiar with Lansdale's
views, decided simply to avoid argument by keeping his own counsel." (S)
Harwood's replacement, Douglas Blaufarb, also had to face the perennial
question of the dearth of competent people. In September, Nhu told him in an
excess of candor that the NRM would collapse in short order were it not sup-
ported by the government. Nhu pointed to the central committee, saying that
the nonentities comprising it included "some undoubted crooks." He was per-
haps less candid in trying to account for this phenomenon. When Diem
founded the NRM in the fall of 1954, he said, "all the sound nationalist ele-
ments were already involved in other parties; no talent was left over for NRM
cadres." Left unacknowledged and unexplored was the Ngo brothers' failure
to attract that talent into the service of the new government.18 (S)
Blaufarb turned out to be even more skeptical than Harwood about the pros-
pects that covert action might succeed in drawing the population into support
of the government. He saw Diem and Nhu as convinced that the regime was
"hanging by a thread," threatened not only by the Viet Cong but even by the
"ejected French and the beaten and dispersed sects." Blaufarb thought Diem
and Nhu knew better, even while they allowed "these feelings of insecurity
and suspicion" to lead them into harassing the press, politicizing the Army,
and turning the legislature into a Palace dependency. Like Harwood, he saw
Diem and Nhu as paternalistic and condescending toward their compatriots.
Nhu, the more politically liberal of the two, probably believed that "demo-
cratic' requirements are met if the masses can be manipulated legally, without
force.. .by the central committee of puppeteers ."19 (S)
Despite his skepticism, Blaufarb continued working with Nhu on a formula
for political organization. In early October, he and Nhu agreed that a reorgani-
zation of the NRM and intensified training of its officials might compensate
for the prevalence of "low-caliber dregs, many with shady pasts which they
were trying to live down by joining a Diem group." At the same time Blaufarb
was exploring the potential of the Can Lao, Nhu's semi-secret cadre party�
which Headquarters thought had at least the advantages of better people and
"a fairly inspiring doctrine."20 In late October, Headquarters concluded that
the NRM could not fill "the political vacuum at the village level." In Decem-
ber, rivalry between the Central Vietnam and Cochin China factions forced the
'7 Harwood interview, 11 September 1990; Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, p. 356. (S)
Report of Blaufarb meeting with Nhu 28 September 1956, attached to FVSA 3918, 5 October
1956, (S)
'917V,A 3647, 7 September 1956 (S)
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postponement of a planned NRM convention, leaving the organization in a
"floundering and feuding condition." The Station reacted by suspending its
support.21 (S)
C/FE Al Ulmer, President Diem. (C)
Suspension was made easier by a simultaneous change of climate at Head-
quarters with respect to covert political action. Late in 1956, FE Division chief
Al Ulmer visited Saigon. The burden of his message, as Joe Redick later
recalled it, was that the era of free-wheeling improvisation was over, and that
CIA in Saigon would begin operating like a normal station, with more empha-
sis on intelligence collection. This mandate was followed in December
1956 by the departure of Ed Lansdale and the dissolution of his Station. Some
of his activities were absorbed by the Station, some were entrusted to the
Embassy's foreign aid section and USIS, and some were terminated.22 (S)
20 Nhu had borrowed from the teachings of Emmanuel Mounier, a French Catholic philosopher of
the early 20th century, to formulate a theory he called "personalism." He then proclaimed this the
theoretical basis of the Can Lao Party. Not coherent enought to be readily summarized, personal-
ism seems to have represented an effort by Nhu to reconcile the idea of individual freedom with
the perceived need, in a developing country, for willing submission to an authoritarian state (IT)
2' FVSA 3919, 8 October 1956,
attachment to FVSA 4085 n d
1-,VNA 4n6, 8 January 195/.
22 Redick interview, 28 September 1989; CSHP 113,! and II, passim. (S)
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� Lansdale had enjoyed little success in persuading Ngo Dinh Diem to treat
the consent of the governed as a fundamental goal of his administration. His
efforts to unify the organization and management of the US Mission's rural
programs also bore little fruit, partly because of his difficulty�one that he
himself acknowledged�in persuading his superiors that he was keeping them
fully informed. But he had made two crucial contributions, first when he inter-
vened in the debate with Washington that produced its commitment to Diem in
May 1955, and second when he served as honest broker in the suspicion-
ridden negotiations between Diem and the religious sects. And his ground-
breaking work on unified rural programs anticipated by ten years the assimila-
tion of such activity under the aegis of the US Military Assistance Command/
Vietnam." (S)
As 1956 drew to a close, CIA officers trying to help the government attract
the active loyalty of its citizens saw little reason for optimism. But Diem had at
this point made substantial progress in establishing his authority. With vigorous
and effective help from the US, and especially from the CIA, he had eliminated
the immediate threats to his survival. With the French gone and the sects under
control, he had begun expanding the area under his authority. He had created a
national assembly and promulgated a constitution, and the date set for reunifi-
cation elections had passed without a reaction from the North. (U)
Amid all this, there was still no significant armed resistance from the Viet
Cong. Indeed, despite the frustration of its hopes for reunification, Hanoi
decided in late 1956 to continue the "political straggle" in the South, concen-
trating on building its party organization while trying to prepare the ground for
revolution. The Diem government thus entered 1957 with no serious competi-
tion for control in the South. In these circumstances, there seemed to be time
for the US to try to moderate the regime's drift toward arbitrary rule. There
was, in any case, no candidate to replace Diem; in that respect, nothing had
changed since his accession to office. But the problems had changed, and
these changes were reflected in the approach to the Palace taken by the newly
unified CIA Station. 24 (S)
" Interview with Evan Parker, 8 March 1991 State Department interview with Lansdale,
6 September 1984. (U)
" Race, War Comes to Long An, pp. 73-81. Race describes the controversial decision to persist
with "political struggle" as it was promulgated in a document, apparently written by Lao Doug
Party Central Committee member Le Duan, called "The Path of the Revolution in the South." For
the Station's attitude, see Blaufarb interview, 11 April 1991. (S)
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CHAPTER 9
A More Qualified Commitment (U)
Nicholas Natsios, who became Chief of Station (COS) when John Anderton
departed in early spring 1957, took a more active interest in intelligence col-
lection than in covert action. This predilection was encouraged by FE Divi-
sion Chief Al Ulmer's desire to have the newly unified Station concentrate on
genuinely covert operations. In any case, the atmosphere of crisis that drove
the freewheeling programs of Edward Lansdale and Paul Harwood had
receded. Having met the initial challenges to his survival in office, Diem now
confronted the more intractable long-range problems of what soon came to be
called nation-building. In this new atmosphere Natsios could adopt a rela-
tively detached stance, concentrating more on illuminating the workings of
the regime than on helping it against its adversaries.1 (S)
As COS, Natsios inherited not only the contact with Nhu, but also direct
access to the President. Anderton had given him to understand that this rela-
tionship remained unknown to the Embassy, although Headquarters had
revealed it to the State Department by August 1956. Unaware of this, and
dubious about the propriety of a concealed channel to Diem, Natsios declared
it to Elbridge Durbrow when he arrived as Ambassador in March 1957. He
offered to advise the Ambassador of prospective meetings, and to bow out of
anything that Durbrow wanted to handle himself.2 (S)
The record reflects no concrete results from the Anderton relationship with
Diem. Natsios' move thus achieved real gains in his relationship with the
Ambassador at no visible cost in influence on Diem. Natsios continued to see
Diem on ad hoc issues; one that arose in July 1957 was that of an open limou-
sine that the President wanted the Station to buy for him. Headquarters
objected CIA had already furnished him one limousine�but Durbrow
Evan J. Parker, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, Potomac, MD, 8 March 1991, tape recording
(hereafter cited as Parker interview, 8 March 1991); Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. Parker was
Chief of FE Division's Southeast Asia Branch from 1953 to 1958. (S)
Natsios interview, 6 March 1991; Vernet L. Gresham, Memorandum, "Colonel Edward Lans-
dale," 27 August 1956, Lansdale personnel file. (S)
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COS Nick Natsios, President Diem. (C)
From left, DDCI Charles Cabell, Nick Natsios, Ambassador Durbrow, DDP official
Tracy Barnes, GVN interpreter (photos courtesy of Nick Natsios). (C)
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pushed the idea, and a suitably appointed Cadillac was eventually delivered.
Blaufarb accompanied the President on a test drive around the Palace grounds,
and Diem, seated in the rear, nearly joined him in the front when the driver
stepped too briskly on the unfamiliar power brakes.' (S)
Natsios also introduced what Blaufarb later described as an "absolutist"
approach to clandestine sources: if they hadn't signed on the dotted line, they
couldn't be trusted, and the Station wasn't going to use them. Natsios agreed
that he had seen the Station as too dependent on casual informants; to correct
this he began a search for potential agents that began with contacts
(S)
Ceremonial Visits to Washington (U)
Despite Natsios'detachment, the Station continued trying to help Ngo Dinh
Nhu find a political formula that would bind the peasants to their government.
It also went on serving as his channel to the US Government. In this role, it
organized his visit to Washington in March 1957, paying around-the-world air
fare for him and his wife. Although Nhu held no official position, Headquar-
ters succeeded in arranging a short meeting with President Eisenhower in
addition to sessions with the Secretaries of State and Defense and DCI Allen
Dulles, plus calls on influential Senators.5 (S)
Nhu had no requests to make of CIA. DDP Frank Wisner, hosting a lunch,
urged him to intensify South Vietnamese collection on the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam (DRV) and suggested that he run such operations through Laos
and Cambodia. Wisner also urged a larger effort to debrief refugees and inter-
rogate prisoners.' (S)
Wisner had described to the DCI Nhu's use of the semicovert Can Lao party
to control the government and said he hoped the visit might give Nhu a clearer
understanding of the US political system. Wisner does not, however, appear to
have expressed any concern to Nhu about the Saigon government's authoritar-
ian style; the record says only that he told Nhu how greatly he admired the
leadership displayed by President Ngo "during this difficult time."7 (5)
Natsios interview, 6 March 1991; Blaufarb interview, 11 April 1991; Memorandum
for the Record, "Gift of Open Limousine to President Diem," 30 July 1957
Fiche 18, passim. (S)
l3lautarb interview, 11 April 1991; Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. (S)
Chief FE Division, Memo ancli)r for De nit irector for Plans, "Visit to Washington of Ngo
Dinh Nhu" 12 March 1957 , 5 April 1957
10 April 1957, ibid. (S)
Chief, Far East Division, Memorandum for the DCI, "Visit to Washington of Ngo Dinh Nhu,"
22 March 1957, filed ibid.; Philip Potter, Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting Between DDP
and Ngo Dinh NMI, 4 April 1957," 18 April 1957; filed ibid. (S)
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Nhu made an excellent personal impression. Headquarters later told the
field that people who had known him earlier thought he had "increased
immeasurably in poise and self-confidence." The only sour note was struck by
Madame Nhu, who created difficulties that Headquarters said it intended to
address in a separate dispatch. With that exception, Headquarters thought the
trip highly successful. Years later, the Nhus' escort officer, Paul Harwood,
could recall only that Madame Nhu had reveled in the attention paid her by
Allen Dulles and various notables from the State and Defense Departments at
a dinner the DCI hosted at the Alibi Club on H Street in Washington. She
exploited her good looks, vivacity, and command of English to become the
star of the evening. Nhu was unhappy with her performance, although in Har-
wood's view she was "not a problem, but a sensation."8 (5)
Madame Nhu (photo courtesy of Nick Natsios). (U)
Upon Nhu's departure, preparations began for a visit by President Diem.
Edward Lansdale, now at the Pentagon, contacted CIA's Vietnam desk to sug-
gest that Diem be invited to address a joint session of Congress. Lansdale had
a friend, Nick Arundel of the United Press, whom he could ask to approach
8 FVSW 3462, 9 May 195 Paul Harwood, inter-
view by Thomas L. Ahern, McLean, VA, 9 October 1991 (hereafter cited as Harwood interview,
9 October 1991). Headquarters' list of complaints about Madame Nhu has not been found. (S)
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Diem backers such as Senators Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and John F. Kennedy
(D-MA). Diem was in fact invited to Capitol Hill, shortly after his 8 May
arrival.9 (S)
DCI Allen Dulles visited Diem at Blair House. An FE Division briefing
paper for the DCI noted that, for more than a year, CIA had been pushing for a
reorganized South Vietnamese intelligence effort. But Diem, while agreeing in
principle, seemed "afraid to place too much responsibility in the hands of one
man," and progress had been slight. Al Ulmer noted for DDP Frank Wisner
that Diem displayed "little personal inclination" toward democratic practice,
and that the Can Lao, headed by Nhu, effectively dominated the government. '0
(S)
Although they had few illusions about the popularity of Diem's rule, senior
Agency officials spared the President any direct criticism during his visit. Still
admiring his success in overcoming the anarchic conditions of 1954, they
greeted Diem as the hero of a story to which no one had expected a happy end-
ing. The Station and the Vietnam desk at Headquarters might fret about the
Saigon government's apparent indifference to the consent of the governed, but
there was general agreement in Washington, shared by CIA, that Diem had
succeeded in stabilizing the South, and that the war had been won. In any case,
the Eisenhower administration was preoccupied with the aftermath of the Suez
crisis and the Hungarian uprising of late 1956, and in a mood to look on the
bright side of developments in Vietnam." (S)
Working Both Sides of the Street (U)
The Station had only Vietnam to worry about, and both Natsios and Blau-
farb were less optimistic than Washington about the Ngo brothers' ability to
solidify their political base. Neither was predicting disaster. Both, however,
were concerned about Diem's style. This prevented him from co-opting oppo-
sition politicians�themselves "conspiratorial to a fault," in Blaufarb's view�
and from inspiring the loyalty of the rural population. Diem's lack of charisma
was by now notorious in the US Mission, where it was common to joke about
Vietnam's need for a "Mag Van Say."12 (S)
9 The subject is discussed in a series of informal notes between officers in the Southeast Asia
Branch, beginning 8 April 1957. (S)
1� Chief, Far East Division, Memorandum for the DCI, "Visit to Washington of Ngo Dinh Diem,"
22 March 1957
" Caswell interview, 4 Januaty 1991; 1 arker interview, 8 March 1991. Caswell later came to
believe that the extent of Saigon's apparent control, judged as it usually was by the low rate
of Communist-inspired incidents, was largely an illusion created by Hanoi's self-imposed
restraint. (S)
12 Blaufarb interview, 11 April 1991. (S) Ramon Magsaysay had defeated the Huk insurgency
while serving as Secretry of National Defense and was President of the Philippines from
1953 until his death in 1957. (U)
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In this atmosphere, the Station worked not just to penetrate the government
and its VC adversaries but to build bridges to the anti-Communist opposition.
signed an agreement formalizing his
recruitment of a year earlier. In May, durin Diem's welcome to Washington,
the Station was telling a disaffected fficial that the Americans
wanted to prevent the emergence of a dictator like Korea's Syngman Rhee.
Support to the Vietnamese opposition would have to be clandestine, however,
to avoid "endangering South Vietnam's position as an anti-Commie bulwark
in Southeast Asia." Penetration of the proceeded when Blaufarb
recruited disenchanted with Ngo Dinh Nhu.13 (S)
In July, Headquarters described importance in terms of his
potential as opposition to the government. Although the Station
was not explicitly searching for a replacement for Diem�perhaps only
because there seemed to be no candidates�a Station officer returning to
Headquarters at that time appealed for an additional officer to help make con-
tacts in the opposition. The idea was to spot "clean people.. .pull them
together, select the best potential leaders, and then build them up�all behind
Nhu's back."" (S)
The search for a genuine anti-Communist opposition accompanied a new
surge of the recurring CIA impulse to popularize the regime. The long-post-
poned NRM convention took place in May 1957, but its proceedings "evoked
little interest or discussion." Ngo Dinh Can increased his influence when one
of his lieutenants was elected President and other people from the North and
the Center were named to the Central Committee. Nevertheless, the Station
saw some hope in the very fact that the convention took place
The Station and Headquarters had always seemed somewhat polarized on
the subject of the NRM. Only a little more than a year earlier, Headquarters had
been the main proponent of a major role for the NRM, while Paul Harwood
emphasized its limited potential. Now, however, it reacted skeptically to the
Station's new optimism, writing in mid-summer that the NRM leadership
seemed to feel no responsibility to the masses, and that it used the organization
'3 FVSA-5280, 24 April 1957,
1957.
'4 Unsigned memorandum, '
unsigned memorandum of debriefing of
(S)
15 FVSA 5658, 25 June 1957,
; FVSA 5509, n.d., 9 May
Blaufarb interview, 11 April 1991. (S)
Blaufarb interview, 11 April 1991;
10 July 1957,
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simply as an instrument of control. The NRM's ills therefore looked impervi-
ous to an approach that addressed only the state of training. More basically, in
Headquarters' view, Diem's standing with his people would henceforth
"depend more on the success of his programs than upon propaganda."16 (S)
The Station did not reply to this until December, at which time Blaufarb
displayed uneasy ambivalence about the prospects of working with Nhu to
improve the regime's image. He seemed to accept Nhu's claim that the focus
of NRM activity had already shifted from propaganda to rural organization
and community development. Although Nhu thought immediate political lib-
eralization would lead to disaster, the Station saw the NRM as "pointed in a
democratic direction" and seemed to entertain some hope that it might help
create the politically mature, responsible peasantry that Nhu saw as a prereq-
uisite for democracy.
On the other hand, the Station noted the movement's rivalries and general
incompetence. Like his predecessors Lansdale and Harwood, Blaufarb was
faced with the absence of alternatives. He concluded, rather tentatively, that
resumed CIA support to the NRM would be a "constructive element," adding
that his help was intended mainly to create access to otherwise inaccessible
information and to people susceptible to recruitment. '7 (S)
Blaufarb's skepticism about political action resources included the Can Lao
as well as the NRM and the ruling family. At one time hopeful that it could
exploit the Can Lao's superior discipline for covert political action, the Station
now believed that the party functioned only to "secure and broaden the
regime's hold on the elements of power." Blaufarb suspected that its misdeeds
included murder and was sure it directed "trickery and deceit" at the US Gov-
ernment. He accepted as sincere Nhu's protestations of desire for political
freedom, but he added that "if anyone is deluded, it is Nhu himself, in his con-
ception of... the family's magisterially guiding the faltering steps of the Viet-
namese people" until they were ready for freedom. Blaufarb wondered if Nhu
realized how much he enjoyed his own power and speculated that both Nhu
and Diem might persuade themselves that "Ngo family paternalism is still
what the people really need and want," with democracy reserved for an ever-
receding tomorrow.18 (S)
Problems of Cooperation in Collection Against the Communists (U)
The Station had no alternative to Nhu as a partner in internal political action
but continually tried to find a substitute for him as a partner in intelligence
16 FVSW 3883,11.d., ibid. (S)
" FVSA 6915,31 December 1957
18 Ibid. (S)
"S)
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work against the Communists. As of late 1957, the main instrument of this
liaison, which as we have seen got off to an abortive beginning in November
1954, was still SEPES, the intelligence arm of Nhu's Can Lao Party. Its early
staff included some of the people Paul Harwood sent for training (b)(1)
in 1954, but results had always been disappointing. This was mainly because (b)(3)
Diem and Nhu devoted more of SEPES's resources to the non-Communist
opposition than they did to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam.19 (S)
That had not been the understanding when the Agency agreed in the sum-
mer of 1955 to support operations against North Vietnam: SEPES was sup-
posed to be targeted against "anti-government groups in Vietnam" only when
the "sensitive nature of the activity precludes handling through the normal
security services." On this somewhat amorphous basis, CIA budgeted
SEPES for the year ending 31 August 1956. But it became clear (b)(1)
e organization was "not primarily an espionage service." It did indeed (b)(3)
have as one responsibility counterespionage against "Viet Cong elements,"
but this was only one mandate on a list that included the vetting of new Can
Lao members, political action, "suppression of anti-party activity, [and] covert
collection of party funds."2� (S)
The diversion of resources to party interests was aggravated by the Viet-
namese reluctance to permit working level CIA participation in such opera-
tions against the North as SEPES found time to run. Darwin Curtis, in charge
of the Station's SEPES liaison, noted both the lack of cooperation by the Viet-
namese and the evidence that they were "incapable of mounting successful
medium or high-level operations against targets in the DRV." Only 29 of
219 SEPES staffers worked in the External Operations Bureau targeted on the
DRV, and just two of these had persuaded Curtis of their professional compe-
tence. But he did not want the liaison abolished as "over 50 percent of the
[intelligence] we collect on the DRY comes from SEPES sources," most of
this from the refugee debriefing center in Quang Tri.21 (S)
Saigon Station officer Harry Petersen,
Darwin O'R. Curtis, "senior
member of of the Saigon Station team handling liaison with the Vietnamese Intelligence Service,"
Memorandum for the Record, "Evaluation of the CIA liaison with the Service des Etudes Poli-
tiques et Sociales (SEPES), a Foreign Intelligence Service of the Government of Vietnam. for the
period March 1956 through May 1958," n.d.,
(S)
20 SEPES Project Outline, 26 September 1955,
(5)
2, Darwin OR. Curtis, Memorandum for the Record, "Evaluation of the CIA liaison with the Ser-
vice des Etudes Politiques et Sociales (SEPES), a Foreign Intelligence Service of the Government
of Vietnam (GVN) for the period March 1956 through May 1958." (S)
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In December 1957, Natsios seized on a remark by Tran Trung Dung,
Diem's deputy in the Defense Ministry, to try to end the Station's dependence
on SEPES for joint penetration operations against the Communists. CIA had
begun supporting a modest program of harassing attacks on coastal facilities
in the North. According to Dung, Diem expected the second phase of this
activity to emphasize intelligence collection. Declining to take the security
risk inherent in employing the same agents in both guerrilla operations and
collection activity, Natsios suggested a separate program employing new
agent personnel. To his dismay, Diem approved the idea only after sending
Dung to discuss it with Nhu. But Natsios decided he could accept Nhu's
potential for interference. Diem's cooperative chief of unconventional war-
fare, Colonel Le Quang Tung, would be running the program, and Natsios
thought that Nhu would stay away from operations and be "satisfied with just
determining policy."22 (S)
There is no record that this initiative ever led to significant results; Colonel
Tung was first and foremost a Diem loyalist and displayed no inclination to
stretch his charter to gratify the Americans. The pattern of a grudging commit-
ment from Diem or Nhu followed by working-level evasion or outright non-
feasance repeated itself in CIA's dealings with all the potential Vietnamese
partners in intelligence operations against the Communists. (S)
The most promising of these arrangements involved the Surete, later called
the Special Branch of the National Police. Holding the principal charter for
both intelligence and police action against the indigenous Viet Cong, the
Surete was the domestic counterpart to the foreign intelligence service nomi-
nally renresented by SEPES
But this seems to have produced no leads to pene-
trations of the Communist organization-
-nor did it set the stage tor Joint operations. (s)
Meanwhile, Diem's security apparatus, presumably led by the police, pur-
sued the suppression of suspected Viet Minh cadres and sympathizers under
the "Anti-Communist Denunciation" rubric. Intelligence was neither a pur-
pose nor a product of this exercise, or if it was, the Vietnamese concealed this
from the Station. The result was that in late 1959, when the insurgency began
to threaten Diem's hold on the countryside, most of such information as the
Surete provided to its Agency advisors was coming from casual, low-level
informants. (S)
" INSA 6642,31 December 1957,
(S)
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Another potential partner was the Military Security Service (MSS) headed
by General Mai Hun Xuan, a police functionary under the French whom Diem
retained, apparently with some hesitation, for his experience in security work.
Despite Palace doubts about Xuan's loyalty, Ed Lansdale vigorously courted
him in 1955 and 1956. Upon Lansdale's departure the regular Station took
over the effort to negotiate a working relationship with the MSS, whose char-
ter called for counterintelligence support to the Vietnamese Army. Xuan
agreed to an unspecified program of cooperation in September 1956, but in
December disclaimed having the authority to share intelligence. COS John
Anderton appealed to Diem, and in early January 1956 Xuan acknowledged
having received the green light. The Station then waited another year and a
half to get Diem's agreement in principle to joint operations. Even then the
MSS disappointed its Station contacts as the locus of a common endeavor to
penetrate the Communist apparatus." (S)
During most of this period, from mid-1955 to late 1956, the two Stations
pursued sporadic consultations with Diem and Nhu over the structure of a
revised military intelligence organization. The brothers' expressed interest in
such advice and their periodic approvals of joint collection activity renewed
CIA hopes of fruitful cooperation even as working level efforts led to little or
no results. The Agency had, indeed, little choice but to try working with the
Vietnamese in the search for agent candidates. But in retrospect, it seems that
the Ngo brothers' compulsively secretive cast of mind always prevailed over
any impulse to exploit to mutual advantage the advice and support pressed on
them by CIA.24 (S)
The regular Station had already identified the syndrome that doomed to
frustration all efforts at productive cooperation in the areas of intelligence and
internal security. In mid-1955, Paul Harwood reported conversations with Ngo
Dinh Nhu and Information Minister and ex-Viet Minh Tran Chanh Thanh. Cit-
ing Thanh's preoccupation with protecting the NRM, the Can Lao's front
organization, from "saboteurs" and "provocateurs [from] other political par-
ties" as well as from the Viet Cong, Harwood acknowledged that Nhu agreed
23 FVSA 2391, 9 March 1956,
15 October 1956, FVSA 4666, 22 January 1957, and FVSA 5844, 22 July 1957,
In his book, Lansdale recounts the bizarre episode in which, persuaded of imminent dan-
ger to the person and fami y of General Xuan, he arranged for the latter to be given safehaven
The exercise turned into an administrative nightmare which further
strained Lansdale's always-tense relationship with CIA's Far East Division. See Lansdale, In the
Midst of Wars, pp. 148-49. (S)
2-4 SA1G 7017, 24 April 1955, filet
FVSA 2391 9 March 1956
FVSW 1959, 28 March 1956,
FVSA 2989, 26 May 1956,
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on the need to entrust the security function to something other than the NRM
"secret service." But in Harwood's view,
Their past experience and political education, having taken place as
� it did in a climate of [colonial] repression, division of loyalties, sus-
picion and corruption, and opposition for opposition's sake, has
resulted in ingrained habits of thought which can only be slowly
overcome. Working clandestinely, albeit amateurishly, has become
second nature; concern over the possibilities of penetration by oppo-
sition groups is distorted to the point where they think of tying up
their best cadres in internal "intelligence" units; decentralization of
direction and operation, necessary for survival under the old restric-
tions, have left their inheritances of weaknesses in executive and
administrative ability.25 (S)
A Wasted Year (U)
The habits of mind that shaped the Ngo brothers's approach to intelligence
and security matters affected every aspect of their governing. Station appre-
hensions about their style were shared by Ambassador Durbrow and by all
elements of the US Mission except the MAAG, now under Army Lieutenant
General Samuel T. Williams. The degree of Station influence on the Ambassa-
dor's views is not certain but was probably substantial, as CIA's contacts�
unilateral agents as well as the nearly exclusive relationship with Nhu�pro-
vided unique access to the workings of the government. The Ambassador saw
COS Natsios as often as two or three times a day; things got so cozy that Nat-
sios began to worry about the way it looked to the rest of the Embassy and
mentioned to Durbrow his concern about being seen as a sinister influence on
the Ambassador. 2' (S)
,
Granting that a recent increase in Viet Cong terrorism had created an
unavoidable distraction, Durbrow concluded in December 1957 that Diem had
largely wasted the opportunity of the past year to begin urgent economic
development programs. The Ambassador called for pressure on Diem for
decisions on economic and social issues and warned that continued inaction
"might lead to a deteriorating situation in Viet Nam within a few years."27 (U)
" FVSA 1545,5 September 1955
26 Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. (S)
" Embassy Saigon Dispatch 191,5 December 1957, FRUS, 1955-57, I, Vietnam, 869-884. The
increase in terrorism represented what the Viet Cong called the "extermination of traitors" cam-
paign, designed to help the VC survive the government's anti-Communist repression program in
the countryside. (See Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An, pp. 82-84.) (U)
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Lieutenant General Samuel Williams.
On his left is Nick Natsios. (C)
General Williams was the only Country Team member to dissent. He
argued that the threat from the North fully justified Diem's preoccupation with
security matters and denied that this weakened the regime politically. Natsios
saw Williams as uncritically supportive of Diem, and as having adopted a dan-
gerously proprietary attitude toward the Vietnamese Army. In any case, as
1957 drew to a close, not even the pessimistic majority on the Country Team
saw the situation as irretrievable.28 (S)
The mutual reserve that now characterized the relationship between the Pal-
ace and the Station did not prevent Nhu from indulging in one of his moments
of candor. Talking to DCOS Douglas Blaufarb in January 1958, he said that
Tran Chanh Thanh would stay as Information Minister despite the decay of his
Anti-Communist Denunciation League into a refuge for "opium smokers and
prostitutes." Although Nhu wanted to revitalize this propaganda arm of the
anti-Communist campaign, he does not seem to have solicited Station help.
Indeed, except for sporadic Station support of NRM training, the era of joint
domestic political action had been over since the end of 1956.29 (S)
" Embassy Saigon Dispatch 191; Natsios interview, 6 March 1991; Blaufarb interview, 11 April
1991. (S)
29 Memorandum of Meeting, Douglas Blaufarb and Ngo Dinh Nhu on 13 January 1958, dated
14 January attachment to FVSA 8445, 22 August 1958,
S)
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As the sense of partnership dissipated, Nhu focused increasingly on third-
country matters in his dealings with the Station. After declaring his Diem con-
tact to the Ambassador in the spring of 1957, Natsios began to represent the
Station at some of these meetings, listening to Nhu expound on the politics of
India, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, SEATO, and on French plotting
against Diem from Phnom Penh and from the French military base at Seno in
Laos. At a meeting with Blaufarb in January, having just returned from being
wined and dined by U Nu in Rangoon, Nhu "seemed more than usually
relaxed and pleased with himself."
�(S)
Until well into 1958, Nhu's personal style had been modest, and the policy
issues he discussed with the Station represented the practical concerns of a
fragile government. In late March, during a visit to Saigon by DDP Frank
Wisner, this began to change. In the course of two long meetings, Nhu waxed
grandiloquent about South Vietnam's new stature in the region. According to
Nhu, the Indians claimed they had told Ho Chi Minh that "the Ngo family is
South Vietnam." Ho was said to have responded that he was "anxious to meet
Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife, and will go anywhere at any time in order to do
so." Nhu also told Wisner that the Burmese were following his advice in their
reaction to a Hanoi proposal on Vietnamese reunification. And he thought he
had a channel into the Masjumi Party that could be used to influence the Indo-
nesian situation." (S)
Neither Wisner nor Nhu appears to have mentioned the Vietnamese insur-
gency. But a flow of reporting had begun, at this time, on the deterioration of
government control in the countryside, especially in the provinces of the
southwest. Despite Nhu's reticence on the subject, he and Diem had appar-
ently already decided how to deal with it. In February, just six weeks after
Blaufarb reported Nhu's assurances of NRM commitment to community
development, NRM chief Nguyen Thieu told that Diem's goal (b)(1)
for the organization was "the elimination of subversive communist elements (b)(3)
in every village, however remote�a task beyond the Army and other security
forces, even with massive US aid." Thieu added, without specifying the means
3' INSA 7785, 30 April 1958, ibid.
j(s)
S)
FVSA 8445, 22 August 1958,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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to be employed, that a second NRM task was to ensure a large government
majority in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 1959.32 (S)
Thieu assured the Station that only one more year of subsidies would be
needed to put the NRM on its feet and "wipe out all possibility of a relapse of
Free Vietnam away from democratic forms." The question whether the Diem
government was even then res ectin democratic forms was presumably in the
mind of IJase officer, when he acknowledged Headquar-
ters' earlier concerns about the NRM. Although reserving judgment about its
prospects, he noted the absence of alternative instruments: the NRM "looms
as the only significant fully overt political grouping remaining in Free Viet-
nam, for better or worse."" (S)
At Cross Purposes (U)
Even had the Ngo family been working together, the VC could have consti-
tuted a mortal threat. Unfortunately for the anti-Communist cause, the spring
of 1958 saw intensified conflict between Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can. In
a series of meetings in late March and early April, Can convoked the National
Assembly deputies from Central Vietnam to air his grievances about Nhu, and
to urge them to give first priority to the interests of the Center. On one funda-
mental issue, however, the two brothers seem. to have been of one mind.
Whenever the conciliatory approach necessary to attract popular loyalty con-
flicted with their campaign to destroy the Communists, repression would take
precedence." (S)
Meeting Blaufarb in early June, Nhu made this choice of priorities explicit.
He said he had recently addressed all the district chiefs in the country, telling
them that they were on the wrong track if they assumed they needed popular
support in order to fight the VC. Nhu said he had pointed out their responsibil-
ities to "tax and discipline the population which in turn would not respond to
them with affection." He went on to prescribe what he said he had already
urged on local officials in the south and west, that is, a covert organization
equal to that of the Communists. According to Nhu, his audience reacted with
surprise and interest, apparently never having "given such matters much
thought." To Blaufarb, Nhu seemed to have adopted this hard line approach as
the core of his strategy against the insurgents." (S)
FVSA 7166, 11 February 1958 Nguyen
Thieu is not to be confused with Oeneral Nguyen Van Thieu later President of Sr uth Vietnam. (S)
FVSA 7166; FVSW 3883, \
No Blaufarb response is mentioned. (S)
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A month later, Ngo Dinh Can expressed essentially the same view to a Sta-
tion source, saying that the government's main task was to maintain the coun-
try's respect for it. VC could not be reformed and must be killed: "VC
methods are necessary to combat the VC." Can endorsed the existence of
opposition parties, but only if they were controlled by the Can Lao to prevent
their falling under the control of VC agents." (S)
Evidence now emerged that Nhu perceived an increasingly adversarial qual-
ity in his relationship with official Americans, including his CIA contacts. In
April, Tran Quoc Buu told Blaufarb that Nhu was aware the Americans
detested him and his wife but that he insisted his commitment to the govern-
ment's "political line" would continue whether the Americans sympathized or
not. That this distrust extended to the CIA became clear when Blaufarb dis-
covered that the driver he had hired on the recommendation of Tran Kim
Tuyen, chief of the Can Lao's intelligence service, was not deaf, as Tuyen had
claimed. He also was fluent in both French and English. Blaufarb and Natsios
noted in the spring of 1958 Nhu had become less accessible and less receptive
to advice.
but they also saw it as the
product of Nhu's habituation to power and, perhaps, "a latent anti-West
bias."" (S)
In July, the Station obtained unequivocal evidence of the regime's willing-
ness surreptitiously to defy the US mission, including its CIA contacts. The
episode began when Nhu urged Blaufarb to recommend using the Vietnamese
as a channel to the Khmer Serei, the principal organized opposition to Cambo-
dia's neutralist Prince Sihanouk. Blaufarb reacted coolly, but Nhu persisted.
Eventually, the Station and Ambassador Durbrow combined to get Nhu and
Diem to agree to suspend Vietnamese efforts to overthrow Sihanouk. Nhu told
Blaufarb he recognized that American collusion against Sihanouk was
unlikely and that working at cross purposes was undesirable. But the apparent
concession was empty, as
he Palace continued its plotting against Sihanouk.38 (S)
(S)
April 1958, enclosure 1 to FVSA 7899, 6 June 1958,
Natsios interview, 6 March 1991; Blaufarb interview, 11 April 1991; blind memoran-
dum, "Ngo Dinh NMI: Current Status as of May 1958," n.d.,
SAIG 6997, 21 July 1958, and SAIG 7000, 22 July 1958,
Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. (S)
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As for management, "xenophobia [had] no greater exponent in the GVN
than SEPES Director Tran Kim Tuyen." The Station had earlier described
Tuyen's deputy Hoang Ngoc Diep, as overbearing, deceitful, and ineffective,
but in view of the shortage of qualified personnel saw nothing to be gained by
trying to get him replaced. Instead, the Station would give up trying to develop
SEPES as an institution and concentrate instead on cultivating individual
officers.4� (S)
These frustrations and disagreements were accompanied by another burst of
Station energy on behalf of the NRM. In August, the Station judged that the
three-month pilot program in the Delta was succeeding, and it devoted eight
single-spaced pages to justifying its continuation. But except for a reference to
"community works" and "peasant cooperatives," the dispatch said nothing
about specific objectives or the means of achieving them or the results already
observed. This may have caused some hesitation at Headquarters, as the Sta-
tion complained in September that the desk was still pondering the NRM's
February request for renewed financial support. In October, the
recommended replacing ad hoc support of individual
projects with a return to the monthly subsidy that the Station had begun in
1955. Headquarters must have acceded, because reported in Novem-
ber having committed the Station to a monthly payment until June 1959. In the
progress report for December, he judged that the NRM had "developed in fine
fashion."'" (S)
Whatever had encouraged the Station about the NRM�again, it supplied
no details�pessimism grew during this period both about the Agency's rela-
tionship with Nhu and about the larger question of the regime's prospects of
success. Blaufarb noted in November that Nhu had become progressively less
informative on internal affairs, and that he and Natsios were finding candid
discussion replaced by "a flow of talk which is almost impossible to
interrupt." Nhu's reticence on internal politics and the differences of opinion
40 Ibid.; FVSA 4356, 11 December 1956 If the Sta-
tion is referring here to the same Diep whose collegial attitude impressed Larry St.George, it
clearly reversed its opinion after St George's denarture (S)
4
(S)
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that caused it essentially precluded any new joint activity in the domestic
political arena.42 (S)
The Station judged that Nhu's standing with Diem was increasing even as
the government's popularity was declining. It saw intellectual arrogance as the
essence of his personal style and covert manipulation as the heart of his
method. In the Station's view, these traits prevented Nhu from recognizing the
regime's greatest failure, the substitution of paternalism for positive leadership
and real communication with the masses. The Station remained uncertain how
much of Nhu's activity was unknown to Diem, but was confident that the
brothers shared the same assumptions about the proper relationship between
government and people. 43 (S)
The result, as the Station saw it, was a neutral attitude among the masses,
but increasing discontent in the Army, business, professions, and the National
Assembly, as well as growing numbers of disaffected Catholics, regional
blocs, and ethnic minorities. An assessment sent to Headquarters in October
1958 implied that subversion was a relatively unimportant factor in the gov-
ernment's decline, saying that Cornmunists, the sects, and dissident non-Com-
munist politicians constituted an opposition element of no great size. The
Station acknowledged that growing popular alienation augured poorly for Ngo
Dinh Diem. But like its predecessors over the previous four years it saw him
continuing in office if only for lack of a competitor. Even a military coup
seemed ruled out, for the time being, by the absence of a leader commanding
the respect of the entire Army.44 (S)
12 FVSA 8780,
." Ibid. (S)
(S)
10 October 1958,
(S)
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CHAPTER 10
Divided Counsels (U)
William Colby arrived in Saigon as Deputy COS in February 1959, and
COS Natsios shortly began sharing with him his regular meetings with Ngo
Dinh Nhu. Together they watched Nhu and Diem grope for a political formula
potent enough to resist subversion and strengthen the government's hold on a
disaffected but still quiescent population. The 1956 recruitment of
and Natsios' subsequent emphasis
on acquiring controlled agents had substantially improved the Station's access
to the regime's inner workings. This reporting grew in importance as policy
differences between the Vietnamese and the US made Nhu increasingly wary
even of the Agency contacts who had succeeded his friends Paul Harwood and
Virginia Spence.' (S)
Station reports of early 1959 describe Diem as preoccupied, even obsessed,
with security issues. At the beginning of January, he cautioned an audience of
government officials about the risk of subversion even by "those friends who
aid us" and enjoined them not to reveal state secrets or confidential plans. A
week later, addressing the government bloc of the National Assembly, he
praised Ne Win of Burma for having compelled holders of safe deposit boxes
to open them for government inspection. Not only illegal riches, but "many
plans and plots were discovered by this move." Diem proposed to have the
Treasury "provide safe deposit boxes to the public, which would then be
opened to expose similar activities in Vietnam." More ominous, in the view of
Diem's audience, was his stated concern about the vulnerability to VC blan-
dishments of former Viet Minh now serving the government. Although struck
by Diem's "humble and rather quiet delivery," the deputies thought his
remarks about subversion would make it even harder to draw the line between
dissidence and constructive criticism.2 (S)
Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. (S)
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The Ngo brothers worried not only about Communist subversion but about
continuing French hostility. In February, Nhu told the Station that "renegade"
Frenchmen, including two high officials at the Quai d'Orsay, had resumed plot-
ting against Diem. Four French citizens had been arrested, along with a "1000-
man agent net involved in this activity many of whom talked to save their skins
and have implicated many others." There was, apparently, some substance to
Nhu's charges. Over a year later, the Station reported that four Frenchmen and
some 20 of their Vietnamese agents had been arrested in December 1959; the
Frenchmen were not released until June 1960 after negotiations between Diem
and visiting French Finance Minister Antoine Pinay.3 (S)
Political Prelude to "Armed Struggle" (U)
Tran Quoc Buu insisted at this time that all major policy decisions were
being made by Ngo Dinh Nhu. If he posed an issue to Diem, Buu said, the
President would temporize, saying he needed some time for reflection. The
same question posed to Nhu would draw an immediate response, and "a few
days later the identical solution may be obtained from Diem." This report
drew an anxious request from Headquarters for an interpretation of the gov-
ernment's functioning, and an estimate of Nhu's prospects as a replacement
for Diem.4 (S)
The response has not been found, but the Station had in April begun report-
ing in considerable detail the monologues by Nhu that Natsios had earlier
described as nearly impossible to interrupt. Filled with the empty theorizing
and condescending moral judgments of a Left Bank intellectual, they sug-
gested some of the isolation from reality which had been remarked in Diem
several years earlier. An eleven-page account of Nhu's thoughts on econom-
ics, provided by began with
the pronouncement tnat "all economic policy is basically nothing but a projec-
tion on a material plane of a philosophical doctrine, of a certain conception of
life and the universe." Other such dicta, issued directly to the Station, dealt
with Vietnam's neighbors: "Indonesia is in a serious situation, indeed," and
Thailand is "another country without a moral basis."' (S)
But the central issue of the government's relationship with its people kept
intruding. Nhu's perpetually conflicted views on this problem goaded him into
repeated contradictions. In mid-1958, as already noted, he had told Douglas
Blaufarb of his advice to South Vietnamese district chiefs to abandon any
VJA. hill, 20 July 1960,
FVSW- 5173,
21 May 1959.
INSA 9497, 21 April 1959
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effort to ingratiate themselves with the peasantry. He professed to hold the
same view in early 1959 when he rejected Tran Quoc Buu's argument that the
government needed the support of the masses. This time, Nhu justified his
position with apocalyptic talk about a third world war determining the final
political alignment of small countries like Vietnam; meanwhile, he said, there
was nothing to be done.6 (S)
The pendulum swung again, and in April 1959 Nhu told Natsios and Colby
of the need to "develop a series of political, economic and social organizations
in Vietnam in order to attract the loyalty of its citizens to the GVN." He
thought the average Vietnamese too diffident to aspire to any direct relation-
ship with the state, and in need of "intermediaries to which he can attach his
loyalties and which can represent his interests." Diem expressed the same sen-
timents two months later in a talk with Ambassador Durbrow about the secu-
rity situation when he emphasized the need to attract the loyalty of the
population.7 (S)
Although certainly welcomed by the Station and the Embassy, these state-
ments did not lead either side to propose new programs, nor did they reduce
the adversarial climate that defined especially the CIA and Embassy relation-
ships with Nhu. In March, the Embassy produced a comprehensive dispatch
on the Can Lao that Natsios had suggested the previous August, and for which
he provided intelligence and editorial support. The report described illegal
Can Lao business practices, which included under-invoicing in the cinnamon
bark trade and the sale of export licenses.' (S)
Such practices had drawn Congressional attention to the conduct of the
American aid program, and Ambassador Durbrow hoped to persuade the Ngo
family to bring them to a halt. He sent economic aid director John Gardiner to
discuss the matter with Diem. In July he raised it himself with Nhu, who
replied with a disquisition on economic development in a backward country.
Durbrow backed off, and the Embassy reported that it found Nhu's explana-
tion plausible. It reasoned that Can Lao "opportunism" might be all for the
best if "practiced mainly for the benefit of the country" and concluded that
Americans should avoid being "distracted" by their own moral judgments.
The Station also began to doubt the wisdom of pressing the issue, apparently
because it feared for the safety ol who had fur-
nished the information on the Party's commercial activity.' (S)
6 bid. (S)
7 EVS 3283, 13 May 1959; SAID 9166,28 June 1959;
Saigon Embassy Dispatch 279, 2 March 1959, FRUS, 1958-60 I, Vietnam, 156-158; FVSA
9499, 14 April 1959 (S)
9 Saigon Embassy Dispatch 40, 30 July 1959, FRUS, 1958-60, I, Vietnam, 220-225; FVSA
10119,4 August 1959, (S)
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While the US and the Ngo brothers held each other at arm's length, the
Saigon regime and the Communists both moved toward greater reliance on
force in their struggle for control in the countryside. In January, after Central
Committee member Le Duan reported on the parlous condition of the Com-
munist Party in the South, the Hanoi leadership modified its 1956 decision to
rely on political means of opposition to Diem. It now permitted military
action, although political struggle was to remain the principal instrument of
resistance to Diem. In May, Hanoi formed the 559th Transportation Group to
handle infiltration of personnel and materiel into South Vietnam. On the other
side, also in May, Diem published Ordinance 10-59, which prescribed the
death penalty, without the right of appeal, for vaguely defined crimes against
the state. Beginning in the summer of 1959, the number of guerrilla attacks
rose sharply, and so did Saigon's anti-Communist repression. '� (U)
During the months preceding the rise in guerrilla activity, Station sources
followed the struggle between Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can for influence
on Diem and for control of the governmental apparatus in Cochin China. In
February 1959, Can was said to be moving in on the Can Lao organization in
several Mekong Delta provinces; he had told Diem he would participate in the
Party's reorganization, but only if he were given full control. Nhu had earlier
told Blaufarb about Can's ambition to run the Can Lao and had described his
brother as a "nervous cardiac, given to impulsive decisions and too narrow and
subjective in outlook." In July, one of Can's operatives
reported on harassment and even arrests of Can's organizers in the South by
SEPES chief Tran Kim Tuyen." (S)
In this predatory political climate the Station had to decide if and how to
use the National Assembly elections of August 1959 to promote the evolution
of a moderate, representative government, was concerned
mainly to "moderate the GVN's almost fanatical aim to elect its slate
100 percent" and thus to reduce its vulnerability to charges of rigging the elec-
tion.
Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An, pp. 19n, 99-106; William E. Colby, Lost Victoty, pp. 57-
58. (U)
passim; FVSA 7899, 6 June 1958 and FVSA
10054, 28 July 1959, iblif (S)
,2 FVSA 10065, 28 July 1959 and FVSA 10217, 8 September 1959,
FVSA 10118,4 August 1959, ibid
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Clandestine reporting supported the Station's view that "while the popula-
tion is apathetic toward the elections, the GVN [Government of Vietnam] is
not." Agents told of forced withdrawals of unacceptable candidates, pressure
on province and district officials to rig the results, and trucking soldiers in to
vote in crucial districts in Saigon.
During all of this, the Agency's attach-
ment to an outworn propaganda theme was demonstrated by the Station's
effort, through the NRM, to provide for a North Vietnamese representation in
the new, putatively all-Vietnam, Assembly." (S)
William Colby took over the NRM project from just before
the 1959 elections. The emptiness of the NRM program struck Colby as it had
his predecessors; like them, he proposed to give it substance through a cadre
training program. In the third reversal of Station practice on NRM funding,
Colby abandoned the institutional subsidy and restricted Station support to
cadre training. He hoped thereby to "build reality into this facade" with a
"corps of informed and energetic workers." Again like his predecessors,
Colby seems to have left it to the Vietnamese to devise the program's substan-
tive and motivational content. After watching their efforts for four months, he
reported without elaboration that he saw "progress on this peculiarly CIA job
of political development."14 (S)
Mobile Warfare (U)
On 26 January 1960, the Second Indochina War began when some 200 Viet
Cong troops overran a Vietnamese Army (ARVN) regimental headquarters at
Trang Sup, in Tay Ninh Province. There were other attacks during the Tet hol-
idays of 1960, and together they represented the beginning of the Communist
recovery from the Party's near-extinction by government repression. (U)
Aware of the attrition suffered by the VC organization, observers on the
government side had developed a "last gasp" theory to explain the rise in guer-
rilla activity in the last half of 1959. Like the southern Communists them-
selves, Diem and MAAG Chief Williams, and apparently the rest of the
Country Team, saw the Viet Cong on the ropes, reacting in desperation to
increasingly succcessful government programs. The Station seems not to have
dissented from this view, at the time, but had already begun trying to antici-
pate new Communist attacks.15 (S)
1" FVSA 10118. FVS 3706 22 August 1959, -VSA 10065
(S)
9 FVSA 10693, 20 January 1960, ibid. The dispatch does not describe the progress that Colby
observed. (S)
Ronald Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960 (Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1985), pp. 334-338; Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. (S)
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Part of Natsios's attention to this subject was provoked by General Will-
iams's propensity to deny having seen Station reporting on it. Natsios had
begun hand-delivering it to the general, requiring him to initial it after reading.
The wisdom of this practice was demonstrated when Williams complained, at
a Country Team meeting after the Trang Sup attack, that CIA had provided no
advance warning. Anticipating the complaint, Natsios had with him the folder
containing reports predicting a major attack in Tay Ninh during the period of
the Trang Sup disaster. He read from this coverage and displayed the cover
sheet with Williams's initials on it to the Country Team.16 (S)
Influenced in part by the continuing high level of Communist military
activity, Natsios and the Embassy (though not Williams) came to believe that
the regime's authority was fading, and that obstruction by Nhu nullified
American efforts to get Diem to correct a potentially disastrous trend. This led
to some agonizing in correspondence with Headquarters over ways and means
to get Nhu out of the way, perhaps as Ambassador to Washington. Natsios
pointed out the improbability of Diem's acceding to Nhu's departure, but
Headquarters persisted." (S)
tsy April, Natsios had come to regard Nhu 's
removal as an "excellent but impractical" idea." (S)
Nhu stayed, and no one can say whether his departure would have pre-
vented the intensified non-Communist opposition to the Diem government
that followed the VC inauguration of guerrilla warfare. In April, eighteen of
the old-line nationalist politicians assembled at the Caravelle Hotel in Saigon
and issued a manifesto calling for political reforms including recognition of
the parties they represented. Diem and Nhu rebuffed them, and the incident
came to look to William Colby like "another milestone in the gradual centrifu-
gal separation of the Vietnamese body politic."19 (U)
At this point, apparently responding to pressure from Headquarters, the Sta-
tion had already begun working on its contacts in and near the government to
talk Diem into reforms which clandestine reporting showed to be increasingly
Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. (S)
11 Ibid. (S)
18 Ibid.; FVSA 11040, 21 April 1960
18 Colby, Lost Victory, p. 73. (U)
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urgent. The Station also approached Nhu directly, and gave Ambassador Dur-
brow a briefing paper that he used with Diem. The Station approached various
other contacts, encouraging them also to use their access to the Palace, and
told Headquarters that the government had already acted, perhaps for reasons
of its own, on several of its suggesfions.2� (S)
Another Try at Nation-Building (U)
In June 1960, Colby replaced Natsios as Chief of Station. Natsios had rec-
ommended him when FE Division Chief Al Ulmer asked for a nomination; it
turned out that Colby was Ulmer's preference as well. Almost immediately he
launched an effort, similar to that of the 1954-1956 period, to work with the
government to bolster its authority and popular appeal. Headquarters wel-
comed Colby's proposal to restore a cooperative relationship with the Palace,
though it now saw Nhu as a questionable instrument of Station political
action. It recommended a series of briefings for Diem designed to deal with
the likelihood that his own people had not told him, or that he had simply
refused to accept, how bad things were in the countryside. Headquarters sug-
gested Lansdale-style psychological operations, including ombudsman and
civic action programs on the Philippine model, and wanted the Station to seek
by all available means to revitalize the land reform program, get press censor-
ship relaxed, and stimulate better government use of intelligence.2' (S)
Colby's departure from his predecessor's approach to the Palace was drastic
enough to prompt Natsios later to say that Colby had "jumped into bed with
Nhu." During his 16 months as DCOS, Colby had unstintingly supported Nat-
sios's handling of the Station's senior government contacts, giving no hint that
he favored a different approach.22 (S)
Evan Parker, Indochina Branch Chief at Headquarters, also noticed the
change under the new management, thinking of Colby as "more optimistic"
than Natsios, as something of a "do-gooder." But the difference, to Parker,
was mainly one of style: Colby simply did not scrutinize the Ngo brothers and
their government with Natsios's pessimistic detachment.23 (S)
20 FVSA 11040, 21 April 1960. (S)
21 ibid.; Natsios interview, 6 March 1991. Headquarters' expression of
distrust for Nhu and its confidence in the Philippines as a psywar model may have owed some-
thing to the fact that its author, David Smith, had been a member of Lansdale's Station. (S)
22 Colby later wrote that "the surprising aspect of the Station's posture when I arrived was the
complete absence of any kind of political or paramilitary action program�something that would
use the CIA's techniques and talents to advance American policies and interests." (See Colby,
Lost Victory, p. 84.) Colby here leaves out of account Station support to the NRM and to the para-
military operations against the North being conducted with Colonel Le Quang Tung. (S)
" Natsios interview, 6 March 1991; Parker interview, 8 March 1991. (S)
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Colby had, in fact, begun cultivating Nhu while still serving as DCOS. In
February 1960, he reported a meeting at which Nhu repeated his belief in the
necessity of a political base for the counterinsurgency effort. Nhu "mentioned
his many efforts to convince the President of this" and, in his first known
request for conceptual guidance from CIA, asked for any relevant literature
the Station could provide. Colby's relay of this request to Headquarters speci-
fied works by Liddell-Hart on T.E. Lawrence, and by Lenin and Mao.24 (S)
If an April exchange between Diem and MAAG chief General Williams is
any indicator, the President was unmoved by Nhu's claimed efforts to per-
suade him of the need for a political mass base. Williams, uncharacteristically
concerned about Diem's political support, opined that "the problem was not
entirely military and that it would be necessary to win over the entire popula-
tion" while strengthening civilian administration. Diem refused to be engaged
on the subject and, contradicting his statement of the year before to Ambassa-
dor Durbrow, replied simply that "he thought the problem could be solved by
military means." Meanwhile, the Embassy disagreed with Colby's view that
Nhu represented an instrument of reform: Durbrow, echoing the French in
1954 and 1955, cabled the Department in May that all the regime's current
derelictions in both foreign and domestic policy were "basically due to [the]
machinations of Diem's brother Nhu and his henchmen." By mid-September,
Durbrow was telling the Department that if Diem continued to resist essential
reforms, it might become necessary to look for an alternative Vietnamese
leadership." (S)
As Durbrow's attitude toward the regime hardened, Colby tried to enlighten
the Palace on the potential rewards of a reform program. In an August meeting
with Diem, he urged the President to encourage political organizing "indepen-
dent of the government." He also called for a larger effort to publicize the gov-
ernment's achievements and reminded Diem of the need to begin preparing
for the presidential election scheduled for April 1961. Diem took the opportu-
nity to complain about his "corrupt and tradition-bound bureaucracy," but
Colby did not seize this opportunity to note the corrosive effect of nepotism
on the energy, integrity, and competence of a government at war. Instead, the
COS settled for a promise to give Diem a copy of the US "Code of Ethics for
Government Service."26 (S)
24 FVSA 10819, 17 February 1960. (S)
2' Elbridge Durbrow, Telegrams to Department of State, 3 May and 16 September 1960, FR US,
1958-60, Volume I, Vietnatn, pp. 434, 579. (U)
26 FVSA 11236, 25 August 1960. (S)
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Diem also complained about US footdragging on the expansion of the
Army. Colby tried to show him "an easier path through the American bureau-
cracy by strengthening the Civil Guard" rather than adding regular units, and
Diem subsequently raised the idea with Durbrow.27 (S)
Intelligence Reorganization and More Pressure for Political Reforms (U)
It may have been signs of motion toward the centralization of Vietnamese
intelligence collection that encouraged Colby to press his suggestions for
these more comprehensive reforms. After six years of inaction on repeated
CIA proposals, the Palace asked the Station on 2 August to suggest how to
organize a "central intelligence agency" in South Vietnam. Nguyen Dinh
Thuan, Diem's Secretary of State at the Presidency, also asked Colby to rec-
ommend on a "personal and confidential basis" potential candidates to head
the agency. This triggered an urgent exchange with Headquarters, which gen-
erally welcomed the opening, although one staff officer warned that such
efforts elsewhere in the Third World had failed: these governments would
accept CIA help, then use the new organizational superstructure to prevent
direct CIA contact with operating elements.28 (S)
Colby recommended a coordinating agency, in order to centralize the work
of the Vietnamese without adding one more to the existing Proliferation of col-
lection organs. But he also thought it should have the authority to run its own
collection operations, if necessary, and to "protect sources from other agencies
and departments." He thought it should be restricted to intelligence work, but
Headquarters, agreeing that SEPES had "conducted covert action malodor-
ously," maintained that the new agency should not be prohibited from exploit-
ing its own intelligence product. On the question of leadership, Headquarters
agreed with Colby that no one currently heading an intelligence organ should
be named. It suggested another of the Ngo brothers, Ngo Dinh Luyen, despite
Luyen's lack of any experience in the field. In any case, competence was not
Headquarters' main concern. Acknowledging that such an appointment would
look like more nepotism, it argued that the family connection would prevent
SEPES chief Tran Kim Tuyen from sabotaging the new setup." (S)
" Ibid. In fact, expanding the Civil Guard as a way around the cap on the size of the Army had
been discussed for several years in the US Mission. (See especially FRUS, 1958-60, Volume I,
Vietnam, passim.) (U)
28 SAIG 1061, 2 August 1960: Deputy Chief, Fl/Ups, Memorandum for Chief FENCL, Attention
Mr. Whitehurst, "Comments on Proposed Central Intelligence Agency for Viet Nam," 23 August
1960; boil (S)
" SAID 10611; 3 August 1960; (S)
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With Nguyen Dinh Thuan as the action officer, the Palace began a tortuous
process of evaluating the Station's proposals. Meanwhile, Colby pursued the
covert action theme with Nhu, encouraging the search for a comprehensive
political strategy. In early September, Nhu came up with an idea similar to�
perhaps borrowed from�the doctrine developed by French General Lyautey
in Morocco early in the century. He proposed creating circles of secure vil-
lages, emphasizing political programs and armed protection in the villages at
the periphery. Nhu acknowledged that the idea might sound abstruse but
thought it preferable to what he saw as current reliance on "keeping main
routes open and striking out in hit-or-miss fashion from central points."30 (S)
Colby responsed a week or so later with a 66-point list of suggestions for
improving the government's standing with its people and for more effectively
prosecuting the war against the Viet Cong. Presented to Nhu as Colby's "per-
sonal thoughts," the proposals had been approved by Ambassador Durbrow as
a ploy in his campaign to nudge the Palace into reform measures. The list that
Colby gave Nhu carefully avoided direct criticism of the Saigon government
but covered the entire range of social, economic, and security issues facing
it.' (S)
Colby repeated for Nhu's benefit his August recommendations to Diem. He
then went far beyond these by calling for National Assembly investigations of
the behavior of civil servants, the military, the police, and the judiciary. Colby
acknowledged that the country had entered a "critical period" and suggested
that the President administer a "psychological shock" to the public by reshuf-
fling the Cabinet, convening a national conference of politicians across the
non-Communist spectrum, declaring martial law in the Mekong Delta, and
threatening not to run for reelection in April 1961.32 (S)
With the possible exception of martial law for the Delta, Colby's proposals
were so predictably distasteful to a man of Diem's convictions and governing
style as to suggest that they were driven less by sober analysis than by a sense
of desperation. There was, as Colby must have expected, no response. A
month later, Durbrow made a direct approach to Diem, repeating many of the
same ideas and urging that Nhu be sent abroad. Neither his initiative nor
Colby's produced major changes in the government's way of doing business.
Diem, however, publicly acknowledged governmental failings in his so-called
State of the Union message of 3 October and brought some new blood into the
" FVS 5010, 6 September 1960;
31 FVSA 11536, 22 September 1960,
" Ibid. (S)
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Cabinet. But these gestures did not persuade Durbrow, who had already sug-
gested that Diem might have to be replaced, to expect reforms drastic enough
to win popular confidence." (U)
If William Colby still entertained hope for the regime, Durbrow's skepti-
cism was shared by the Station officers in touch with the non-Communist
opposition. George Carver, later the influential Special Assistant to the DCI
for Vietnam Affairs, recalled that, as one of Colby's younger case officers, he
had already come to see Diem as unsalvageable. Only fundamental reforms
would save the regime from the insurgency, he thought, but Diem would never
change, and the reforms would never come. Station management, on the other
hand, and officers conducting liaison with Diem's intelligence and security
organs, tended to see the Ngo family, whatever its deficiencies, as indispens-
able. But even the most pessimistic saw no immediate threat to Diem's sur-
vival, and the debate produced no tension or polarization in the Station. 34 (S)
In Colby's view, Carver and like-minded officers were simply reflecting the
anti-Diem bias they had absorbed from their contacts. But the COS felt obli-
gated to disseminate reporting from the regime's critics. He then tried
unsuccessfully, by his own later account�to restore what he considered a
more balanced perspective by means of his own monthly assessment for
Headquarters." (S)
" Elbridge Durbrow, Telegrams to Department of State, 15 October and 24 December 1960;
Saigon Embassy Dispatch 157, 15 October 1960; Saigon Embassy Airgram, 3 November 1960;
FRUS, 1958-60, I, Vietnam, pp. 595-596, 598-604, 622-625, 744; Kahin, Intervention, P. 123.
In Lost Victory, Colby criticizes Durbrow for "irrelevant" and "transparently hostile" proposals
that were in fact almost identical to those Colby presented to Ngo Dinh Nhu. Station reporting at
the time cited correspondence between the Station and CIA Headquarters, not ambassadorial
instructions, as the genesis of Colby's approach to Nhu, and gave no hint of reluctance to urge
these reforms. Queried in 1991 about his role in this episode, Colby said he "may well have" con-
veyed the list to Nhu; if so "probably for the Ambassador." He did not recall ever having tried to
talk the Ambassador into a more cooperative approach to the Palace and thought it unlikely he
would have done so, because in his stated view the Ambassador, not CIA, was responsible for
policy matters. (See Colby, Lost Victory, pp. 74-75; William Colby, interview by the author,
Washington, DC, 16 October 1991 (hereafter cited as Colby interview, 16 October 1991); FVSA
11536; SAID 1400 (S)
George A. Carver, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, Washington, DC, 23 October 1991. (S)
" Colby interview, 16 October 1991. Colby attributes this failure to the fact that the pessimistic
intelligence reports were widely distributed by cable, while his own summaries, "not highly clas-
sified," went to the Headquarters desk by pouch. He does not explain why he did not address his
views to a wider audience. (See Colby, Lost Victory, p. 106.) (U)
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The November 1960 Mutiny (U)
The Station was unanimous about one thing, namely, that dissidence among
non-Communists in Saigon was on the rise. In July, it reported having acceler-
ated its coverage of the non-Communist opposition. In September, it began
assembling its holdings on military officers. By October, it was debriefing
General Tran Van Minh,
using him and other contacts to try to identify potential coup partici-
pants. Meanwhile, as part of a routine effor o broaden
its access, George Carver recontacted Hoang Co Thuy, a prominent Dai Viet
oppositionist politician and acquaintance of earlier Station officers." (S)
For all its efforts to chart the rise of disaffection with Ngo family rule, CIA
obtained no advance warning of the paratroopers' coup of 11 November. Like
everyone but the rebels themselves, Station officers got their first inkling from
the pre-dawn movement of armored vehicles, followed by gunfire directed at
the Palace. But the Station's coverage of the opposition to Diem had prepared
it to take the lead among US Mission elements in identifying the coup leader-
ship and clarifying its intentions.37 (S)
Early in the morning Station officers were already canvassing their contacts
or taking to the streets for direct observation of rebel activity. George Carver
hit pay dirt immediately when, on calling Hoang Co Thuy, he was invited to
meet a group of civilian politicians who hoped the military would install them
as the new government. With COS Colby's permission, Carver drove to Thuy's
home. Reporting to the Station by phone, he also served as the channel for US
pressure on the rebels not to storm the Palace, as they threatened to do, but to
negotiate with Diem. As Carver recalled it years later, he suffered a genuine
crisis of professional conscience over these instructions, for he believed that
Diem would have to go, sooner or later, and that manipulating the coup group
to Diem's advantage was profoundly mistaken. Carver also recalled his suspi-
cion of Diem's good faith, and how this had intensified his antipathy for his
assigned role. But he did what he was told, however reluctantly, and worked to
persuade Thuy's group to negotiate with Diem on terms that would preserve
the President's role "as the leader in the...anti-Communist battle." (S)
" FVST 2059, 13 September 1960; FVST 2239, 19 October 1960;
Carver interview, 23 October 1991.
(S)
37 Colby interview, 16 October 1991
(S)
38 Carver interview, 23 October 1991; FVST 2359, 30 November 1960,
S)
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Meanwhile, Russ Miller, a Station officer assigned to operations against
North Vietnam, drove to the Palace with Dick Bender, the Station's Vietnam-
ese linguist. The firing had given way to a standoff, and the two mingled with
the foreign journalists there, who were equally in the dark about the rebels'
sponsorship and purposes. Miller found no one who could enlighten him; the
only spokesman for the coup was perennial oppositionist Dr. Phan Quang
Dan, a former CIA contact, who was clearly just trying to board the band-
wagon. Dan announced that he would give a press conference at the headquar-
ters of the Joint General Staff (JGS), near the airport, so Miller and Bender got
into their jeep. Once underway, they were startled by a burst of fire so close
that Bender dove for cover under the dashboard. A rather stout man, he got
stuck. Finally freed, with Miller's help, he volunteered to return to the
Embassy to observe developments from there." (S)
Miller and another colleague, then set out for JGS Headquarters.
Dan and the journalists left after the press conference, and Miller and
simply wandered around no one had taken any security precautions�until
they found the cou leadership. Miller did not recognize anyone and intro-
duced himself an as Embassy officers. Some time later, airborne com-
mander Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi showed up. He knew Miller, gave him the
use of a phone, and assigned one of his officers to keep the Americans contin-
uously informed. The two Agency officers stayed the night, slee in on tables
when not listening to the grievances of the airborne officers as left
with the impression that they were simply fed up with too many deployments
in unsuccessful operations against an enemy their government seemed not to
know how to fight.40 (S)
Miller's first instructions from the Chief of Station were to avoid any
"counseling role" and to limit himself to getting the facts. Carver was already
covering Thuy's group of civilians. Discovering that the Station had on-the-
spot coverage of both sides of the coup, Ambassador Durbrow appropriated
Bill Colby's desk and began listening on an extension to Carver's and Miller's
reports. Durbrow was also on the phone with the Palace. Reflecting the State
Department's ambivalence about the desirability of prolonging Diem's tenure,
he did not offer unequivocal US support, but urged the President to negotiate
the paratroopers' demands.41 (U)
39 Miller interview, 5 and 12 November 1991. (S)
4� Miller interview, 5 November 1991; F�lnterview, 20 January 1964. (S)
11 Carver interview; MIS, 1958-60, 5 Vietnam, pp. 633-637. (U)
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Like Carver, Miller was now also instructed to pressure the rebels to negoti-
ate rather than storm the Palace.42 The military element of the coup leadership
seems to have been divided about the relative merits of negotiating with Diem
and overthrowing him and was thus susceptible to American pressure. Attack-
ing the Palace remained a rebel option until Army units loyal to Diem arrived
on 12 November, and Durbrow's use of the Station to restrain the rebels may
therefore have been crucial to Diem's survival in office.43 (S)
Negotiations continued through 11 November and into the early hours of
the 12th. There seemed to be progress, with substantial concessions from
Diem, until the arrival of loyalist units vindicated Carver's misgivings. Diem
had used the talks with the rebels simply to gain time while Colonel Tran
Thien Khiem, a Catholic and close associate of Bishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, one of
Diem's brothers, organized the rescue operation. 44 (U)
Russ Miller later recalled that it was he, informed by the Station, who told
Thi that reinforcements were coming to Diem's aid. Thi recognized that this
meant the end of the coup. But he still had a battalion of 105mm howitzers and
told Miller he would use his artillery to punish the duplicitous Diem. Miller
pointed out the certainty of civilian casualties (many Americans, as well as
Vietnamese, lived in the vicinity of the Palace) and the futility of trying to
reach Diem in his Palace bunker. Thi relented and shortly left with the rest of
the rebel military leadership for the airport and on to refuge in Cambodia.45
(S)
The defeated military rebels did not take Hoang Co Thuy with them. Instead,
he showed up at George Carver's house, looking for asylum. After some scur-
rying around in search of a safe place, the Station moved Thuy tc
apartment, where he spent the night of the 12th before being hidden in a safe
house 46 Eventually,
42 Unlike Carver, Miller suffered no anxiety about the wisdom of this mandate, being content to
serve as an information channel and leave policy considerations to others. But he did not regard
himself as a mere mechanic, concerned only with the conduct of operations and not with their
effects. His detachment on this issue arose from the conviction that neither he nor any other
American had the answer to Vietnam's problems, nor could we impose it on the Vietnamese even
if we found it. He recalled that Colby had often commented on his "noncommittal" attitude
toward the Diem regime. (See Miller interview, 5 November 1991.) (S)
" Miller interview, 5 November 1991; Colby interview, 16 October 1991; Carver interview,
23 October 1991. (S)
" Carver interview, 23 October 1991. (U)
4' Miller interview, 5 November 1991; William Rust, draft chapter entitled "Prelude to War: John
Kennedy and Vietnam," pp. 10-11. Written for US News and World Report Books in 1982, this
draws on interviews with Vietnamese and American witnesses, including Colby, Miller, and
Carver, and looks like an unedited rendition of its contributors' recollections. Available in CIA
History Staff files. (S)
4, Carver recalled Thuy appearing at his doorstep some 48 hours after the coup ended, i.e., circa
14 November. (S)
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(Headquarters had also quite gratuitously ordered that he be dis-
guised), and flown to Clark Air
Force Base in the Philippines, then to safehaven in Okinawa.47 (S)
Although more a mutiny than a serious coup d'etat, the paratroopers' revolt
seriously threatened Ngo Dinh Diem's rule. In the early aftermath, he and Nhu
were grateful for the American role in keeping the paratroopers from staging
an all-out assault on the Palace. But unconcealed CIA dealings with the rebels
and Durbrow's failure to offer unqualified support for the regime fed a sense
of betrayal. There were no reprisals against Miller or but the chief of
Diem's personal security service, Tran Kim Tuyen, told Colby that Carver
would have to leave the country. He claimed to have tricked Carver, by means
of a staged phone call, into admitting the contact with Thuy. Colby denied that
Carver was a CIA officer, or that there were any grounds for his removal." (S)
Ngo Dinh Nhu also protested Carver's role, telling Colby that espionage
was to be expected but that Carver's encouragement of the rebels was unac-
ceptable. Colby, sure that there had been no such encouragement, insisted both
on Carver's neutralit But when
threatening letters began arriving in Carver's mail box, the Station accepted
that he could no longer work in Saigon and evacuated him and his family to
49(S)
The security of another important operation, the contact with General Tran
Van Minh, was threatened during the coup when, as the Station later put it,
"orthodox operational practices suffered in many ways." Anxious to debrief
Minh, who as the new Permanent Secretary of Defense should have been well
informed, the Station sent to Minh's home on
11 November. Upon being admitted to the house, found the general
surrounded by subordinates. Although this exposure led to no overt conse-
quences, and the relationship continued, the risks in the approach were not
offset by any intelligence gain: Minh was firmly astride the fence, acknowl-
edged no contact with either the rebels or Diem, and contributed nothing to the
Station's coverage of the mutiny.50 (S)
The behavior of all the participants in the episode exemplified the dilemma
that had first confronted the US Mission in 1955. Ambassador Durbrow, like
General Collins, despaired of succeeding with Diem. But he had no one to
17 Carver interview, 23 October 1991; interview, 20 January 1964. (S)
48 typed (according to penciled notation) 18 July 1961,
20 January 1964; Carver interview, 23 October 1991; FVST 2359
(S)
4, Colby, Lost Victory, pp. 78-80. (U)
" FVSA 11867,19 January 1961,
Interview,
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suggest as a replacement, and could only try to use the mutinous ARVN offic-
ers to force on Diem some of the long-resisted reforms. William Colby, like his
predecessors in 1955, agreed on the absence of an alternative, but continued to
hope, against all experience, that Diem would come to see the wisdom of
American advice. The rebel officers themselves, like their earlier Francophile
counterparts, had only their grievances in common, and lacking any kind of
political program or even serious interest in power, were easily outmaneuvered.
The civilian politicians, dependent as they were on military support, counted
for even less. The affair did little more than intensify mutual distrust. (U)
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CHAPTER 11
"People's War" (U)
The display of ARVN's dissatisfaction with Ngo Dinh Diem did nothing to
resolve the disagreement between Ambassador Durbrow and Colby about the
prospects of the regime's reforming itself. Nevertheless, both the Embassy
and the Station pursued their efforts to help the government contain a sharply
intensified VC challenge. Unfortunately for the effectiveness of US support,
its military component was governed by a flawed strategic concept, while the
civilian component had no organizing principle at all that transcended the doc-
trine and practices of the participating agencies. (U)
Since his arrival in October 1955, MAAG chief General Williams had vig-
orously supported Diem's view that the Army's mission was to deter or repel
invasion across the 17th parallel. He bitterly opposed any effort to involve
ARVN in counterinsurgency programs, and when he left, six months after the
onset of guerrilla warfare at Tet 1960, ARVN was still organized and trained
along entirely conventional lines.' (U)
The civilian side lacked the guidance of even a flawed concept. Lansdale's
earlier vision of a unified effort aimed at countering a Maoist "people's war"
had never taken root in the US Mission, each of whose members pursued its
own program while clinging to its institutional autonomy. In this climate, the
Ambassador functioned more as coordinator than as commander. But the
emergency created by Diem's fading authority and by the VC resort to force
required a response. The result was the Mission-wide counterinsurgency plan
of December 1960. In Colby's retrospective opinion, the result was
disappointing in its failure to confront the political struggle in the countryside
or to unify the efforts of the various US agencies. Colby had not yet launched
the village defense programs that became the hallmark of his tenure, and his
only contribution to the plan called for creating a centralized Vietnamese
intelligence organization.2 (U)
' Spector, Advice and Support, pp. 320, 326, 339-340. (U)
Colby, Lost Victory, p. 83. The text of the plan is in FRUS, 1961-63, 1, Vietnam, pp. 1-12. (U)
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At precisely the same time that the US Mission in Saigon was groping its
way toward the articulation of a counterinsurgency strategy, the Vietnamese
Communists were laying the policy and organizational foundations of an
intensified campaign to "liberate the South." Policy came in the form of a res-
olution at the Third Congress of the Lao Dong Party, held in Hanoi in Septem-
ber 1960, that called for overthrowing the Diem government and establishing
a "national democratic coalition government in South Viet Nam." The organi-
zational framework appeared on 20 December 1960 when southern Commu-
nists announced the formation of the National Liberation Front for South
Vietnam (NLFSVN).3 (U)
An Electoral Distraction (U)
The search for a counterinsurgency strategy competed for attention in early
1961 with the tactical issue of the April presidential election. The Station
wanted to help Diem use it to build popular support. Taking it for granted that
Diem would win, if necessary by rigging the elections, COS Colby found his
options severely limited. There being no prospect of an authentic contest, he
decided to promote the appearance of real alternatives by focusing on the
selection of a running mate. Accordingly, he urged Nhu to get Diem to run on
two tickets, each with a different, but truly competitive, vice-presidential can-
didate. Having explored this, Nhu responded that it would contravene the
electoral law, and the Station then turned to its Vietnamese political contacts
in an effort to generate public discussion of potential candidates. Colby
thought this might persuade Diem to select a strong running mate "in place of
several non-entities he was reported to favor," meanwhile establishing a
degree of openness in the selection process.4 (S)
This initiative enjoyed some success. A public debate began, in the press
and elsewhere. The Station later thought its efforts might have helped spoil the
prospects of an alleged opium smoker who had seemed to be Diem's first
choice. But the Station withheld any material support to Diem's candidacy,
reasoning that he would win anyway, and that nothing the CIA could do
would make him more popular. As of early April, the Station was urging
opposition candidates to emphasize their own programs, rather than concen-
trate on the regime's failures, but found its advice largely ignored. Diem won,
as expected, but the Station did not see the election as having served to build
public confidence in the govex-nment.5 (S)
3 Kahin, Intervention, pp. 114-115. (U)
4 INSA 12044, 16 March 1961,
9 February 1961
FVST-2503; FV S1 2621,6 April 1961, ibid. (S)
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The palpable decay of the government's position in the countryside would
probably have nullifed any effort, no matter how energetic, to improve Diem's
image during the campaign. An organizer in the joint stay-behind program
reported in February, for example, that in Tay Ninh, just northwest of Saigon,
the government no longer controlled anything but the capital and areas physi-
cally occupied by its troops. Even Tran Quoc Buu, Ngo Dinh Nhu's longtime
ally in organized labor, anticipated either defeat by the Viet Cong or another
Army mutiny.6 (S)
Meanwhile, more fallout from the failed military coup in November bur-
dened the Station's relationship with Nhu. Colby's deputy went to
Nhu in May to acknowledge what he assumed the Palace already knew, that
CIA in Phnom Penh had been in touch with the exiled mutineers in refuge
there. assured Nhu that the initiative had come from the Vietnamese,
and that CIA had consented to talk to them only to try to prevent their being
exploited by the NLF in Phnom Penh. offered to serve as a channel to
the rebels, if Nhu desired, and later, perhaps optimistically, reported that Nhu
appeared to accept the Station's story at face value.' (S)
A Reprise of 1957 (U)
In certain respects the US response to developments in South Vietnam in
early 1961 mirrored that of 1957, when Diem's triumphal reception in Wash-
ington was followed by the Ambassador's gloomy judgment that the Saigon
government had wasted a year of opportunities. In May 1961, exactly four
years after Diem's trip to the US, Vice President Lyndon Johnson visited
Saigon, where he hailed the President as "the Winston Churchill of Southeast
Asia." Washington now acknowledged the urgency of Diem's problems, but
as in 1957 chose unconditional support for Diem as the linchpin of the US
program in Vietnam.' Like their counterparts of four years earlier, CIA and
other officials in Saigon might admire Diem's patriotism and personal integ-
rity but were frustrated by his loss of the initiative to the Communists. The
general decline of the government's position in the countryside directly
affected Station equities when insurgent gains forced the termination of NRM
training in the Delta.' (S)
Facing an active insurgency in Vietnam, the Kennedy Administration did
not turn its attention elsewhere as Eisenhower had. On the contrary, it made
counterinsurgency and nation-building the heart of its Cold War strategy, with
6 INST-2572, 10 March 1961 ibicl � FVS 4434, 11 April 1961
SA1G 3006, 10 May 1961,
Kz-thin, Intervention, pp. 129-130. (U)
Kahin Intervention, p 133;
(S)
7 June 1962,
S)
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Vietnam at center stage. This new emphasis�most visible, at first, in the
expansion of the US Army Special Forces�encouraged CIA to look for ways
to help reverse Communist advances in the South. (U)
John F. Kennedy's first Ambassador to Saigon, career diplomat Frederick
Nolting, arrived with instructions to achieve a collegial relationship with
Diem. Just as Ambassador Reinhardt had earlier substituted cooperation and
forbearance for General Collins's skepticism and impatience, Nolting now
replaced Durbrow's pessimism with a renewed quest for solutions. (U)
In this atmosphere, COS Colby's first proposal called for more of the Sta-
tion's traditional approach in the form of a "pilot program" of political organi-
zation in the Delta province of Phong Dinh. This was actually the third such
experiment in Phong Dinh, the NRM's president's home province. Colby's
correspondence on the project, like that of his predecessors on earlier such
efforts, talks about creating political mechanisms but says nothing about the
political substance they were intended to propagate. In any case, whether
despite or because of lessons learned from the earlier experiments, the first
training cycle in the new "agit-prop" program did not get under way until a
year later, in May 1962. By that time, this whole approach to nation-building
had been eclipsed by the village defense programs that dominated US pacifi-
cation strategy for the remainder of the Diem regime; indeed, until the GVN
collapsed in 1975. The first of these programs emerged in mid-1961 when
proposed to a Station contact that Alia& tribesmen in the highlands province
of Darlac be armed for local self-defense.1� (S)
A Strategy of Pre-Emptive Territorial Defense (U)
It was not that the Rhade were clamoring to fight on the government side.
Resettlement projects that Diem had launched in the Central Highlands in
1955 had severely disrupted the Montagnard way of life�the government had
outlawed, among other things, the use of the traditional crossbow and aggra-
vated the perennial ethnic antagonism between the highland tribes and the
lowland Vietnamese. Nor was the government eager to arm an antipathetic
minority. But the Viet Cong were increasingly active in the High Plateau,
where security was a perennial obsession with Diem, and at least some of the
Rhac1�lso resented their intrusions." (S)
1� FVST 2732 9 June 1961
Colby, Lost Victory, p. 89. (S)
11 Unsigned "Report�Buon Enao Project," dated 8 May 1962.
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Colby presented the opportunity to Nhu, who approved an experiment to be
conducted jointly by CIA and the Vietnamese Special Forces. This cleared the
way for to persuade the elders at the village of Buon Enao to cast their (b)(1)
lot with Saigon. With a promise of Rhade participation, CIA arranged for US (b)(3)
Special Forces personnel to be detached to CIA to begin training the first of a
series of self-defense units that a year later comprised some 35,000 men.12 (S)
DCOS David Smith later gave Colonel Gilbert Layton credit for the pro-
gram's success. As chief of the Station's paramilitary branch, Layton worked
out the procedures and set the tone, putting heavy emphasis on helping the vil-
lagers preserve as much as possible of their traditional way of life. This could
be taken to extremes, as in the case of a village inhabited by Black Thai,
which needed a white buffalo for an important religious ceremony. None
could be found in the area, so Layton's men immersed a conventionally-pig-
mented animal in a chlorine bleach solution for several days until its hide
turned acceptably pale.13 (S)
The gratifying progress of village self-defense among the Montagnards, due
in large part to this kind of respect for local usage, only cast in more promi-
nent relief the absence of a similar program among lowland Vietnamese. At
their weekly meetings in late 1961, Nhu and COS Colby continued trying to
thrash out a more comprehensive pacification strategy. According to Colby's
published account, Nhu was "stimulated by the fact that our discussions were
of political strategies." But it was only after a number of these sessions that
"the germ of the 'Strategic Hamlets' program had been born." Colby's subse-
quent descriptions of the Buon Enao and similar experiments provoked Nhu
into looking at them as the potential basis for a "new Vietnamese social and
political community...." By the end of 1961, Nhu had articulated the concept
to the point of being "able to convince Diem to make a major national pro-
gram" of it. Formal approval came with the creation of the Interministerial
Commit" tee for Strategic Hamlets on 3 February 1962.14 (U)
Colby had competition for influence over Vietnamese thinking on pacifica-
tion. While he and Nhu were theorizing about political community, Diem had
invited Sir Robert Thompson, one of the architects of the counterinsurgency
program in Malaya, to furnish a British perspective. By October 1961,
Thompson had completed an assessment of the insurgency and on
13 November gave Diem a plan for the pacification of the Mekong Delta.
October also saw the arrival in Saigon of the General Maxwell Taylor mission,
'2 Ibid.; Colby, Lost Victou, pp. 90-91. (S)
'' David Smith, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, Silver Spring, MD, tape recording, 6 October
1992 (hereafter cited as Smith interview). (S)
14 Colby, Lost Victory, pp. 85-101, passim; Senator Mike Gravel, The Pentagon Papers (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971), III, p. 144. (U)
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which President Kennedy had dispatched to explore the deployment of US
combat forces to Vietnam and to press for more aggressive pursuit of the war
by the South Vietnamese. Thompson talked to Taylor, who subsequently
asked for copies of the British concept papers. These had met a chilly recep-
tion from the US military in Saigon but were much better received in Wash-
ington, where Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs, sent Kennedy a strategic plan consisting of "an unabashed restatement
of most of Thompson's major points.", (U)
As one Pentagon Papers historian saw it, Washington and much of the US
Mission in Saigon liked the Strategic Hamlet concept because it responded to
their perception of the insurgency as being political as well as military. Diem
favored it because it promised additional US aid in a format that largely
evaded the erosion of sovereignty implicit in Maxwell Taylor's new idea of
"limited partnership" between US and Vietnamese authorities. It also appealed
to him, the Pentagon Papers author speculated, because "it put achieving secu-
rity before winning loyalty�in an operational context in which it was difficult
to differentiate between security for the rural populace and control of that pop-
ulace." 16 (U)
With respect to substance, Colby saw not only Diem but Thompson as con-
cerned primarily with centralized control of the rural population. Nhu agreed,
at least about Thompson, whom he distrusted as having the outlook of a colo-
nial administrator. Nhu and Colby, on the other hand, wanted the Strategic
Hamlet to become the nucleus of an undefined new political system defending
itself against what they saw as Viet Cong terrorism. Indeed, Nhu saw the Stra-
tegic Hamlet as the vehicle of a "social revolution." He used Communist ter-
minology to tell a conference of province chiefs in December 1961 that upper
class "lackeys of the imperialists and colonialists" should be overthrown in
favor of "outstanding combattants" [sic] and poor farmers. 17 (S)
But this conceptual difference had little effect on implementation. Because
both perspectives assumed a peasantry looking for protection from the Commu-
nists, they both called for quarantine measures as the first phase of implementa-
tion. Once the guerrillas had been physically isolated from the population, the
development aspects of the program could begin. In any case, whether Nhu
talked Diem into launching the Strategic Hamlet program, as Colby claimed, or
(5 Ibid., II, pp. 80,139-142. (U)
16 Ibid., pp. 146-147. (U)
17
c 1; Colby, Lost Victory, pp. 99-100;
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whether Nhu was following the Diem�Thompson lead, he was free to imple-
ment his own version of it when Diem appointed him Chairman of the Inter-
ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets in March 1962.18 (U)
While the Strategic Hamlet concept was evolving into a joint US�Vietnam-
ese counterinsurgency program, Colby supervised the expansion of the Citi-
zens' Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) in the High Plateau and experimented
with political action in ethnic Vietnamese communities in the lowlands. In
October 1961, Headquarters approved arming an additional 1,200 "Montag-
nard auxiliaries" in Kontum Province and granted for civic action
teams designed to provide local self-defense and improved village administra-
tion in lowland communities. In December, the first US Special Forces team
detailed to the CIDG program arrived in Buon Enao.19 (S)
More Uncertainty About Diem's Prospects (U)
The gradual expansion of the CIA commitment to rural counterinsur-
gency�reflecting that of the US Government as a whole took place with a
watchful, perhaps hopeful, eye toward the emergence of new Vietnamese
leadership. In October, for example, during the Taylor Mission, Station officer
Harry Petersen pursued his contact with a group of "young Turks" in the gov-
ernment who were frustrated by its "archaic and unrealistic.. bureaucratic
procedures." FE Division Chief Desmond FitzGerald, in Saigon with the Tay-
lor Group, authorized "more aggressive probing" for possible replacements
should "Diem and his government disappear." The Station had a list of agents
and other contacts on whom it might call in the event of a crisis, but worried
that they might interpret its soundings as implying endorsement or the prom-
ise of support. FitzGerald, "while recognizing the problem, found no immedi-
ate solution." The soundings continued, apparently, but had to rely on an
essentially passive style of elicitation.20 (S)
's In 1978, Colby attributed to Thompson and Diem an operative role in creating the program:
"[The Saigon government was willing to move in the general direction that Thompson recom-
mended and I was supporting. With Diem's approval, Nhu began to develop his plan." Later, in
Lost Victory, Colby minimized the British role, claiming that, while Thompson "certainly influ-
enced the process," he and Nhu had developed the concept that Nhu then sold to Diem. (See Hon-
orable Men: My Life in the CIA [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978], p.177; Colby, Lost
Victory, pp. 99-100.
(S)
"9 FVST 3037, 7 November 1961, John A
McCone, DCI, Memorandum for Gordon Gray, Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, Memorandum, "History and Development of the Buon Enao Project,"
28 August 1962, ibid., Folder 3. When MACV took over management of CIDG in late 1963, it
renamed the program, changing "Citizens" to "Civilian" Irregular Defense Groups. (S)
20 INST 3037. (S)
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Station correspondence in the last months of Colby's tenure grew increas-
ingly ambivalent about the outcome of the contest between Diem's govern-
ment and the Viet Cong. In early December 1961, Colby attributed to Nhu a
"petulant outburst" in the government-controlled press, reacting to the Taylor
Mission's pressure for reforms. Colby said Nhu had provoked "a vast amount
of speculation about the need for fundamental changes in the regime,"
changes that might very well be violent. The Station had been reporting on
disarray in the Palace and had already undertaken to try to identify new lead-
ership capable of replacing Diem. But when Senator Stuart Symington (D-
MO) visited Saigon at this time, Colby took issue with his impression that
Diem's loss of popular support had made a VC victory almost inevitable.
Colby reported that he offered Symington "some other considerations" but did
not say what these had been. Whatever their content, they seemed to reflect an
essential optimism about the prospects of success. When FitzGerald told him
in early 1962 that it was time to come home, Colby reacted by saying that he
would have preferred another year in Saigon to finish what he had started. But
FitzGerald insisted, and Colby became his deputy in FE Division until
FitzGerald became DDP and Colby took over the Division.21 (S)
There were, in fact, at least transitory grounds for optimism. The introduc-
tion of attack by helicopter-borne infantry in early 1962 gained, if only briefly,
the military initiative for the government. But Colby's optimism seems to have
stetnmed more from renewed faith in the vision and the leadership qualities of
Diem and Nhu than from success on the battlefield. In January, he sent Head-
quarters a copy of notes taken by a visitor who (b)(1)
had spent several hours with Diem just after the November 1960 coup attempt. (b)(3)
Forty pages of a single-spaced typed manuscript summarize Diem's disquisi-
tion on topics ranging from a defense of compulsory labor to the illegitimate
birth of various people in the political opposition. The authoritarianism is never
concealed: if he doesn't "make the peasants work, they will revolt." Diem
acknowledges no weaknesses, boasting of the moral superiority of his govern-
ment while condemning Viet Cong cynicism, French perfidy, and US obtuse-
ness and parsimony. The press gets particular attention, its coverage of the
1960 military coup attempt decried as a "criminal aberration."22 (S)
Colby worried that the notes might make Diem look guilty of "bad faith or
irrationality," saying he had held them hoping to find time to write an interpre-
tative piece to send with them. He urged Headquarters to judge Diem not by
selected phrases but by "the whole picture that he is trying to present in these
conversations." Implicitly endorsing this picture, Colby ended by suggesting
2 7 December 1961; FVST 3126, 9 December 1961
16 October 1991. (S)
27
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that Diem might be furnished a tape recorder to begin a memoir like the one
recently done by Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter; this, he thought,
might well be supplemented by finding Diem an "intelligent biographer."
Colby did not explain how a Diem memoir or biography might make the
regime more competitive with the Viet Cong, and neither project ever came to
fruition.23 (S)
Diem and Nhu on Strategy and Tactics (U)
Colby continued his meetings with Diem and Nhu during the early months
of 1962, and the record of these contacts provides unique insights into the
brothers' perceptions of the nature of the struggle and of the way to pursue it.
Essentially, the sessions with Diem confirmed the unrelieved authoritarianism
of his governing style, while those with Nhu revealed his growing recognition
of the government's strategic dilemma. Talking to Colby in late February
about security in the Highlands, Diem dismissed any notion of a political
problem with the tribes there, calling them "unstable and childlike." So far as
the President was concerned, they needed to be "treated as a stern father
would, giving them very precise directions and rewards and punishment."
That this condescension extended beyond the mountain tribes to include cer-
tain ethnic Vietnamese emerged in Diem's stated preference for Central Viet-
namese refugees in resettlement projects because of the "usual weaknesses of
S outherners ." 24 (S)
In addtion to paternalism Diem's ignorance of the way things actually work
led him to ignore the practical difficulties of implementing his proposed rural
security arrangements. With his sense of mission apparently intact after two
disaffected Vietnamese Air Force pilots bombed the Palace in late February,
he lectured Colby on resettlement of ethnic Vietnamese villagers onto the
High Plateau. His formula assumed that the VC could only enter hamlet
enjoying a government presence by force. The village's Civil Guard detach-
ment would resist any small incursion but would melt away with the civilians
if a larger VC unit attacked. Even then, it would still be able to "estimate" the
route by which the VC unit would withdraw, and to set up an ambush.25 (S)
Nhu was equally offhand in taking for granted the Vietnamese villager's
antipathy to Communism, and in assuming that his policy prescriptions would
actually work. In March, he assured Colby and the visiting Desmond FitzGer-
ald that over 10,000 Strategic Hamlets would be completed in 1962, and he
echoed Diem's confidence that the inhabitants of villages attacked by the VC
2" Ibid. (S)
24 FVS 7130, 7 March 1962
25 Ibid. (S)
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could simply "disappear into the countryside." They would first "secrete their
valuables" in a place which out of respect for the farmer's "personalist right"
would be unknown to government officials. And if the VC burned a man's
house, the government would build him a new one. 26 (S)
Nhu seems to have assumed in this that South Vietnamese civil servants
possessed precisely the dedication and competence he had continually
claimed they lacked in meetings with his CIA interlocutors. But Nhu had
never displayed much understanding of organizational mechanics; as Colby
put it, he had "no sense of the reality" of problems at the implementation
level. Nevertheless, if he greatly overestimated the capacity of his bureau-
cracy to respond to continually changing policy, Nhu occasionally penetrated
to the heart of the problem in a way never achieved by President Diem. In a
discussion of the Strategic Hamlet program with Colby, Nhu recognized that
the government had to confront the material issues that concerned the rural
population, and he acknowledged that the application of the government's
land tenure laws, which favored the owners of large holdings, drove many
peasants into the arms of the VC.27 (S)
Apparently referring to the influence of landowners in the National Assem-
bly, Nhu said that the prospects of new legislation were poor. Looking for a
way around this obstacle, he outlined for Colby an idea suggesting some
understanding of the Viet Cong technique of winning peasant loyalty with a
calculated blend of positive and negative incentives. Recognizing the damage
done to Saigon's image when the government annulled VC land redistribu-
tion, Nhu suggested a scheme whereby peasants holding land under the VC
dispensation might hold it provisionally, perhaps for 90 days, while they
induced relatives in the VC to bring in their weapons and change sides. But
Nhu did not address the legal problem of making this tentire permanent, and in
practice the government continued to labor under the burden of a regressive
land tenure policy.28 (S)
At this same meeting, Nhu stressed one of his favorite themes, the need for
self-sufficiency at the hamlet and village level. Weapons for self-defense, for
example, should be loaned to the village for six months, at which point the
local militia should have captured its own from the Viet Cong. Colby thought
this approach abdicated an opportunity for the government to use American
" The record contains no acknowledgment by Nhu or the Station of the forcible relocation of vil-
lagers that accompanied the construction that month of the first Strategic Hamlet built with US
participation. Gravel, Pentagon Papers, II, p. 149; FVS 7159, 14 March 1962;
(5)
27 Colby interview, 16 October 1991; FVS 6938, 16 January 1962,
28 FVS 6938; Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1977), passim. (S)
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material support to sell the program to the villagers. But Nhu insisted on a
minimum of US aid and won Diem's support for his position. Years later,
Colby recalled this as the one example in his own experience with Nhu of the
malign influence that many observers claimed Nhu had always exerted on the
President." (S)
The House of Ngo Divided (U)
While Nhu instructed Colby in pacification strategy, the Station proceeded
in spring 1962 to refine and expand the paramilitary programs that had pre-
ceded and now complemented the larger Strategic Hamlet program. At the
same time, it was looking over its shoulder at the South Vietnamese military,
much of which the Station suspected of being still disaffected if not positively
mutinous. Thus, on the action side, the Station was supporting training
courses for civic action teams and Nhu's Republican Youth, in effect a
replacement for the NRM, and refining the CIDG program. For information
on the Army's mood, Colby supplemented conventional agent operations by
assigning Russ Miller to take soundings among his many contacts in the mili-
tary. Miller later recalled that, owing perhaps to the need to avoid looking as if
he were encouraging sedition, he got nothing more serious than routine bar-
racks griping." (5)
If the threat of a military coup had receded, there was no lack of tension
within the Ngo family itself. By April, it had reached the point that Nhu no
longer felt the need to give his brother unquestioning obedience. He told one
Station source about several non-attributable propaganda operations he had
just approved, cautioning him not to tell Diem, who would have objected. He
mentioned other areas of disagreement with the President and said that Diem,
often critical of other people, had now started complaining about him.3'
Another report said that Nhu and Can had a bitter argument over Strategic
Hamlets in early June, the outcome of which was Can's withdrawal of local
military support for the program in Central Vietnam." (S)
29 FVS 6938; Colby interview, 16 October 1991. (S)
FVST 3565, 15 May 62, diller interview,
5 November 1991. (S)
'" The mutual backbiting of Diem's subordinates exploited this tendency. A few months earlier,
"Big" Minh had complained that Nguyen Khanh was vilifying him at the Palace. As a result,
Diem reprimanded Minh for "laziness," and Minh complained to a colleague hat
Khanh was "like a child" in his misrepresentation to Diem of Minh's problems. FVS 7036,
8 February 1962, (S)
"7- FVS 7325, 25 April 1962,
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In this climate, DCI John McCone and DDP Richard Helms visited Saigon
in early June. No record survives of any meeting with the President, but Ngo
Dinh Nhu treated the visitors to a discourse on the "paralysis of fear" that the
"mammoth population" of Communist China inspired in all its Southeast
Asian neighbors except the Vietnamese and the Meo tribesmen of Laos. He
professed optimism about the Strategic Hamlet program and praised the intro-
duction of heliborne operations into the war against the Viet Cong. He
described the rallying of the mountain tribes to the government as "our great-
est success of the last two years" without crediting the initiative to the CIA.
Nhu called for more defoliation in the Central Highlands, partly to starve out
the VC and partly to force more Montagnards into accepting government pro-
tection." (S)
John Richardson, who replaced William Colby in June 1962, soon followed
up on the McCone�Helms visit by soliciting his first private meeting with
Nhu. The new COS was pleasantly surprised at the degree of give-and-take,
although Nhu "dominated the discussion throughout and carried, by far and
away, the most of the conversation [sic}." At this session, Nhu waxed critical
of Diem's approach to the insurgency and expressed less confidence than he
had with the DCI that the peasants longed for physical protection from the
VC. Nhu worried that they had no particular reason to prefer the "oligarchic,
corrupt, bourgeois" Saigon government, which deserved to be swept away if it
could not develop a "more 'revolutionary' quality." He blamed Diem for
emphasizing large-scale projects�massive resettlement, dams, highways�
that made little immediate contribution to solving local problems or counter-
ing the appeal of the Viet Cong. 34 (S)
It seems that Nhu's attitude toward the government's obligations to its rural
constituency had in fact undergone a second transformation. From the rela-
tively liberal approach of 1954 and 1955, while launching the NRM with Paul
Harwood's help, he came in 1958 to dismiss the very possibility of the govern-
ment's ingratiating itself with the peasant. By 1962, in talks not only with
Colby and Richardson but with his labor confidant Tran Quoc Buu, he
appeared genuinely to have accepted the notion that winning the farmer's vol-
untary loyalty was indispensable to victory over the Viet Cong. Certainly, he
impressed Richardson. The COS wrote after their late June meeting that Nhu's
"theoretical analysis seemed to me to be practical" and that his "view of
human nature, which is basic to political and social concepts, is shrewd and
realistic."" (S)
33 John H. Richardson, Memorandum for the Record, "Visit with Counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu at Gia
Long Palace on 7 June 1962," 7 June 1962
(S)
34 FVSA 13879, 28 June 1962
35 Ibid. (S)
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An Intellectual Affinity (U)
Recognition of the need for active peasant loyalty was a notion with which
no US official would argue. Oddly, Richardson was equally receptive to Nhu's
exposition of an esoteric doctrine called personalism. The COS summarized
his understanding of this theory, which Nhu had adapted from the work of the
French thinker Emmanuel Mounier, by saying that it:
places the problems of underdevelopment on a primary basis of per-
sonal liberty and a free or somewhat modified, free enterprise sys-
tem. The element of personal independence and personal
achievement, combined with appropriate community interest, was
stressed. (S)
How the conflicting equities implied in this vague formulation were to be
reconciled, Nhu apparently did not say. On a more practical level, Richardson
thought Nhu to be "expanding and perhaps consolidating his political power
behind the scenes and under the shadow of President Diem." He did not
explain his belief that Nhu's "theoretical and intellectual effort relates very
much to the practicalities of national and personal power," but made it clear
that he thought Nhu "clever and rather subtle. I would certainly not be inclined
to take him lightly for a moment."" (S)
A month later, Richardson was still impressed with the cogency of Nhu's
theoretical argument: "I found his observations on the possibilities of the Stra-
tegic Hamlet program to be quite far-reaching." Nhu was beginning, at this
point, to offer the COS some insight into the personal styles of the Ngo family,
and to contrast Diem's personality with his own. Recalling his own youthful
feelings, Nhu thought young men should be relatively easily motivated to fight
"an adventurous guerrilla war" in irregular local units. Richardson asked how
Diem felt about this, and Nhu said the President had no comprehension of the
"aspirations of youth" because he had "never been a young man."" (S)
During the first months of their association, Richardson paraphrased Nhu's
theorizing in his sympathetic accounts to Headquarters. In August, for exam-
ple, he gave Headquarters a detailed account of a meeting at which Nhu ana-
lyzed the ideological structure of the "occidental countries" and offered an
interpretation of Western society that emphasized its moral decay.38 In Sep-
tember, Nhu wrote to Richardson to introduce his "grand design" for a
36 Ibid. (S)
INSA 13943, 16 July 1962
"An exiract from Richardson's paraphrase gives the flavor of Nhu's intellectual style: "Occiden-
tal countries had for their structure: Capitalism; for their ideology: Liberalism; for their ethic: the
Hero and the Saint This complex of cultural patterns and values had been produced causally by a
combination of classical Greek mathematics and logic plus the Evangelical Message." (S)
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"guerrilla infrastructure" composed of the Strategic Hamlet program and a
guerrilla organization "compartmented from the population." Nhu was vague
about the structure and mission of the guerrilla element, describing it mainly
in terms of its members' spiritual values, but he explicitly distinguished it
from both local self-defense units and the counterguerrilla forces of the regu-
lar Army. 39 (S)
Richardson replied that he found himself "in full agreement" with Nhu's
letter. He went on to suggest, as a means to their common goal, military
options like Special Forces operations and air strikes, which Nhu had seem-
ingly excluded from his new concept. In retrospect, Nhu seems to have been
thinking more about the problem of motivating the anti-VC struggle than
about military organization and tactics. But his vague, almost mystical, lan-
guage never addressed or even acknowledged the problem of implementation,
and it is easy to see why Richardson might have interpreted the "grand
design" in a more concrete, if apparently mistaken, frame of reference.4� (S)
In any case, whatever the extent to which he understood and shared Nhu's
perception of the nature of the conflict, Richardson saw his responsibility at
this time as one of support to the US military. Referring to anticipated VC use
of the border with Laos and Cambodia to support regimental-size operations,
the COS noted that "General Harkins has consistently called attention to the
need for more counteraction along these border areas." Richardson proposed
to respond by expanding the Station's village defense program to the border
area, and by deploying larger numbers of Montagnards for intelligence and
paramilitary purposes. In so doing, he implicitly accepted responsibility for
what seems in hindsight to have been one of the genuinely military aspects of
the insurgency. At the same time, he opened the door to the militarization of
the CIDG program, in which the emphasis on consolidating the Montagnard
commitment to the Saigon government through a system of territorial defense
gradually gave way to the deployment of CIDG irregulars against regular Viet
Cong combat formations.'" (S)
Richardson seemed confident that government military operations could
start making inroads on Communist-controlled territory. He recommended
accelerated irregular operations in the Highlands and called for the recapture
of Binh Duong Province, a VC stronghold just north of Saigon: "I believe the
39 Attachment to FVST 4002, 30 August 1962; Attachment 1 to FVST 4031, 6 September 1962;
40 Attachment 2 to FVST 4031. (S)
4' Attachment 3 to FVST 4031. (S)
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time has come when we should no longer accept the thought that the Viet
Cong need to be allowed to retain more or less stable and semi-permanent safe
haven areas or bases in South Vietnam."42 (S)
In pursuit of this aggressive line, the COS sought to consolidate Nhu's
approval of the Highland programs, sending him a report in early August that
described the active commitment of 30,000 Rhade tribesmen�one-third the
total�to the government and against the VC. Richardson also occasionally
had to try to change Nhu's mind on something, usually without succeeding. In
September, meeting at Nhu's invitation, he relayed Headquarters' renewed
anxiety about Vietnamese plans to try to depose Prince Sihanouk. Nhu
rejected the US argument, although, as he had earlier done with COS Natsios,
he disclaimed any intention to interfere in Cambodia.43 (S)
The Leadership Question Renewed (U)
A meeting on 18 October 1962 illustrates Richardson's dilemma as he tried
both to indulge Nhu's increasingly grandiose thinking and to address the prac-
tical concerns of an operating CIA Station. Nhu dominated the session by lay-
ing out another strategy, proposing this time to cut VC lines to the North with
a "commando effort aimed at achieving control.. .over Viet Cong safehavens,
strong points, and routes of travel along the ridges of the Annamite mountain
chain." Richardson apparently did not question this vision of Communist
infiltrators negotiating the mountaintops of Central Vietnam but did get the
subject changed to the continuing problems with Vietnamese intelligence. He
reminded Nhu that the Central Intelligence Organization had no budget and
that its chief refused to give him VC order-of-battle information without Pal-
ace authorization. Grandiloquent on theoretical matters, "Nhu did not com-
ment" on either of these issues.44 (S)
In his meetings with the Station in October, Nhu revealed his conflicted
state of mind with contradictory talk about corruption and family rule. At one
point he insisted to Richardson that "if Diem does nothing more than to crush
corruption in South Vietnam he will have accomplished enough." But he
acknowledged that corruption was still endemic and complained two weeks
later that three-quarters of the National Police were "corrupt, ineffective, or
untrained." Far from acknowledging the possibility that family rule might
42 Attachment 2, FVST 4031. (S)
''3 john Richardson, Letter to Ngo Dinh Nhu, 3 August 1962J
FVSA 14435, 24 October 1962
14 FVSA 14405, 23 October 1962,
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foster corruption and incompetence, he claimed that "only in the midst of gen-
eral corruption" did Diem turn to the family; Nhu "flatly rejected the idea that
effective and honest Vietnamese" were being denied responsible jobs.45 (S)
At this point, in late 1962, some observers outside CIA, many but not all of
them journalists, began to impute to Nhu calculated anti-Americanism or even
mental illness. John Meeklin, the US Embassy's Public Affairs Officer,
thought Nhu was displaying overt hostility to Americans. He suggested at one
point that Nhu might be psychotic. Agency contacts did not share either per-
ception. Paul Harwood, provided a different perspec-
tive on this still-contentious topic. in the early 1960s,
The last such encounter took place in late
1962, and Harwood found Nhu discouraged and fatalistic. Nhu's comportment
did not, however, suggest to the Harwoods either any psychological imbalance
or the drug use that was later imputed to him by various American journal-
ists. 16 (S)
Richardson, for his part, had just come from a five-hour session with the
President when he described Diem and Nhu on 15 November as "tough-
minded realists with Diem perhaps having more force of personality and more
concentrated drive." The COS dismissed the notion that Nhu dominated
Diem, saying that of the President's "continued dominance as a man and as a
national leader, I have no doubt." Diem took the trouble to explain his own
role in the development of the Strategic Hamlet concept. He said that he had
vetted it with ex-Viet Minh he found them too preoccupied with fortifica-
tions�and had then personally supervised the pilot project in the onetime Viet
Minh stronghold of Quang Ngai. Otherwise, his topics would have been
familiar to any of his earlier American interlocutors; they included personal
reminiscence and gossip, the perfidious French, and the shortcomings of US
strategic thought.47 (S)
" FVS 8032, 11 October 1962; FVS 8092,25 October 1962;
" The familiarity of the relationship between the two couples is suggested by an incident a year or
so earlier, when the Nhus' daughter Le Thuy called from Rome to ask if she could stay with the
Hat-woods . They acceded, and she came. Only when the Vietnamese
Ambassador called to inquire did the Harwoods discover that the girl had not told her parents of
her destination; Madame Nhu had simply guessed she might be there and sent word that it was all
right for her to stay. Harwood interview, 27 March 1991; FR US, 196143, II, Vietnam, 1962,
p. 744. (S)
47 John Richardson, Memorandum for the Record "Meeting with President Ngo Dinh Diem on
14 November 1962," 15 November 1962,
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Unburdened by doubts about the Ngo brothers' stability and competence,
and still hoping to bolster the regime's reputation in both Vietnam and the US,
FE Division Chief Colby cabled a suggestion that Nhu write an article for the
Foreign Affairs quarterly. Richardson reacted enthusiastically, writing in late
December that, as the father of the Strategic Hamlet program, Nhu had much
of general interest to say. In the prestigious forum offered by Foreign Affairs,
he might contribute both to Vietnamese national pride and to the momentum
of the program. Such an article could answer people who wondered whether
the war was winnable, whether Diem was supplementing military means with
an "acceptable social and politico-economic program," and whether he was
"winning the people." It might counter the impression that Diem's was noth-
ing but a "right wing,' authoritarian, bigoted administration." And finally,
"we might be able to get away a little from the image of Nhu as representing
no more than a talkative intellectual or a sinister, if not malevolent,
intriguant...in my opinion a most unjustified reputation."" (S)
" EVSA 14802, 21 December 1962; FVSW 7163, 2 January 1963
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CHAPTER 12
"This Coup is Finished" (U)
It is not clear whether Richardson ever asked Nhu to do the Foreign Affairs
article, but this project, like the proposed Diem memoirs and biography, came
to nothing. In any case, Colby and Richardson seem to have overlooked that
the fading reputations of the Ngo brothers derived less from inadequate public
relations than from their government's increasingly tenuous hold on its peo-
ple. In the countryside, the Viet Cong had regained the initiative after learning
how to cope with ARVN helibome attacks. In early January 1963, for exam-
ple, the Viet Cong inflicted heavy losses on a superior ARVN force at Ap Bac,
a hamlet in the Mekong Delta near My Tho. The VC eventually withdrew
without opposition, whereupon General Paul Harkins, MACV commander,
proclaimed an ARVN victory. Ngo Dinh Nhu took a similar line with Richard-
son, insisting that Ap Bac was not a government defeat, merely a partial vic-
tory. Exuding confidence in his command of military tactics, he prescribed
down to the number of preparatory artillery rounds how ARVN should have
fought the battle.' (S)
During this same meeting, Nhu reflected an understanding of ARVN strat-
egy very different from that of American advisors in the field. He criticized
what he described as Diem's insistence on "frontal attack and constant mainte-
nance of the initiative in aggressive troop actions." This seems to be precisely
what had been lacking at Ap Bac, but Nhu did not acknowledge it. Instead, he
proceeded to lecture Richardson on the proper use of artillery and on the strat-
egy of attrition that he thought would "wear down the enemy by envelop-
ment."2 (S)
George 1\4cT. Kahin, Intervention. Hove A mavien Rpramn Invnlund0, Viptnantlaanien_rity, NY:
Anchor Books 1987), pp. 142-143;
John Paul Vann, already perhaps the most influential US advisor to the Viet-
namese military, believed in late 1962 that Diem had ordered his commanders to avoid offensive
operations that risked significant ARVN casualties. He thought Diem saw excessive casualties as
the main grievance of the officers who staged the 1960 mutiny, and that he was determined to
avoid further alienating the ARVN leadership (see Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul
Vinn and America in Vietnam New York: Random House, 1988,122-124). (S)
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Again, while Nhu theorized, implementation languished. In early January,
for example, a Station agent reported that Nhu's confidence in the Strategic
Hamlets in Lam Dong Province, in Central Vietnam, was misplaced. The
agent insisted that their inhabitants were not trustworthy, and not even civic
action cadres could circulate in them without an armed escort.' (S)
But official reporting, both Vietnamese and American, was more optimistic,
and Richardson continued to believe that the Strategic Hamlet program was
progressing well, in Central Vietnam if not in the Delta. In his own domain,
however, that of collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong, the COS was
encountering only frustration as he continued the perennial CIA campaign to
win Palace agreement to run joint operations and share VC order-of-battle
information. (S)
A Continuing Impasse over Joint Operations (U)
This issue had ostensibly been resolved in May 1962, when after months of
intensive working-level negotiations with the Station, President Diem
announced the creation of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)J
Ciiven the self-evident need for better intelligence on the insurgency and on
the North,
the Station saw reason to believe that it had finally reduced Diem's resistance
to genuine collaboration. On 10 January, Diem finally approved the first CIO
budget until 10 January, and launched a reorganization of his intelligence and
security services that incorporated several Station recommendations
John Richardson's chief of liaison, Paul Hodges, reported that the number
of joint operations, presumably with all services, had risen from seven to 25.
These seem to have represented low-level penetrations, judging by results
which the Station described in terms of arrests, combat action, and the discov-
ery of a VC refuge in a tunnel, but the quantitative improvement was encour-
aging. This modest progress encouraged Hodges to regard 1962 as a year of
training and reorganization, with its fruit to be harvested in 1963.5 (S)
FVS 8340, 3 January 1963,
4 SAIG 4743, 10 January 1963,
(S)
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Less patient than Hodges, John Richardson wrote to Nhu in mid-January.
He complained that nominally joint collection activities with the Special
Branch totaled fewer than twenty, and that the police denied having the
authority to share the product even of these. A month later, Nhu had not
replied or reacted in any way.' (S)
A frustrated Richardson now took the unusual step of having Hodges com-
plain to Ngo Dinh Can's major domo in Hue about Nhu's failure to respond.
Can relayed a cool reply to the effect that the Station would have done better
to get the Ambassador to raise the matter informally with President Diem. The
Station then suddenly found itself flooded with reporting from the services
with which it aspired to run more joint operations. Hodges recognized this as
an intentional and unsatisfactory substitute for the access to sources that joint
activity would have conferred, and in March he ruefully noted that he had
"gradually and reluctantly" come to accept that the Vietnamese were using the
CIO as a device to keep the Americans away from the intelligence activities
they really cared about, namely, those of the Police Special Branch.' (S)
Deputy Defense Minister Tran Trung Dung kept the merry-go-round turn-
ing when he assured John Richardson that the military intelligence services
would share with CIA all their reporting on the VC. At this session, probably
during the first week in April, he disclaimed any influence over the CIO and
the police, but a little later told the visiting Bill Colby that President Diem had
finally authorized joint operations with both CIO and the Special Branch. This
too came to nothing, and Paul Hodges's bleak assessment lost none of its
validity.' (S)
The Diem Regime Under Siege (U)
Agent reports of Nhu's growing anti-Americanism multiplied in February
and March, and in his contacts with the COS Nhu condemned those who had
"betrayed" the President. The traitors included former Diem confidant Wesley
Fishel of Michigan State University, now a critic whom Nhu accused of "a
woman's fickleness and inconstancy" and Nhu's father-in-law, Tran Van
Chuong. Other reporting said Nhu held the US responsible for the mutiny of
late 1960 and the Palace bombing of February 1962, and that he now
' John Richardson, "The Coup d'Etat of November 1963 and its Aftermath" (a lecture prepared
for presentation to the FSI Special Course on Vietnam on 27 October 1964) East Asia Division
Historical File, CIA History Staff; FVSA 15048, 12 February 1963
(S)
FVSA 15142, 27 February 1963, Paul
-Hodges, Memorandum to Chief of Station, "Briefing Notes for Colby's Visit," 15 March 1963,
ibid. (S)
INST 5223, 8 April 1963
(S)
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entertained the idea of replacing Diem as President. Richardson periodically
took issue with Nhu's accusations, but did not report any success in changing
Nhu's mind.' (S)
If Nhu's behavior suggested paranoia, his wife showed signs of megaloma-
nia. An intelligence report described her browbeating Diem into letting her
pick 30 candidates for the approaching National Assembly election. Diem lost
again when he tried to replace her with Vice President Tho as principal
speaker at the Trung Sisters Day ceremony; she "ranted and raved" until he
gave in. The Nhus' behavior provided an incentive for the Station to maintain
its contacts with opposition politicians. But these contacts illustrated the long-
standing problem of trying to reform the regime through oppositionists who
wanted simply to replace it. In one such effort to square the circle, the Station
described an agent's new political manifesto as "critical of the regime, but not
too inflammatory."0 (S)
The Station was everywhere in the spring of 1963. It was the only element
of the US Mission to have contacts in all the politically active non-Communist
elements in South Vietnamese society. While Richardson continued his meet-
ings with Ngo Dinh Nhu, junior Station officers were solidifying clandestine
links with the opposition. In April,
On 8 May, Buddhist crowds in Hue rioted over alleged religious discrimi-
nation by the government and launched the movement that six months later
brought down the Diem regime. Within two days, the Station had officers in
touch with dissident Buddhist leader Tri Quang. After a three-hour meeting,
they described him as self-confident, dominating, committed, and slippery,
but able to make a joke and take one at his own expense. He would neither
admit nor deny that his goal was to destroy Diem. Station officer Carroll
Ingram, hoping to learn more about his intentions, maintained periodic contact
with him at least until early September.12 (S)
9 FvsT 4964, 1 March 1963 and passim,
FVS 8864, 2 May 1963
(S)
VST 5018, 7 March 1963
" I-VSA 15634, 1/ April 1963 Douglas Bla-
ufarb, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, Lewes, WV, 16 November 1989 (hereafter cited as Blau-
farb interview, 16 November 1989). Blaufarb was DCOS in Saigon from 195610 1958, the period
in which the Station began a concerted effort to recruit among the non-Communist opposition. (S)
" SAIG 0540, 2 September 1963, (S)
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The confused state of Nhu's relations with the US at this time is reflected in
a report of an offer by a Viet Cong agent to serve as intermediary between him
and the Americans. The agent, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, was even then
widely suspected of Communist connections, but his versatile mind and pow-
erful personality overcame any doubts at the Palace, and he became Military
Advisor at the Presidency. In April, he told a Station agent that he had com-
miserated with Nhu on deteriorating relations with the US. Nhu and the Amer-
icans, he said, misunderstood each other's concepts of government. Thao
thought he understood both and offered to serve as an "interpreter of ideas."
Nhu, he said, took the idea "under advisement."" (S)
Nhu's preoccupation with American intentions emerged again in May.
Talking to a Washington Post reporter, he proclaimed the best of personal rela-
tions with the CIA, but insisted that "some Americans" were behind the
attempted military coup in November 1960. In this context, he alluded to the
episode that ended with the departure of Station officer George Carver.
had at this time an even stronger impression of a paranoid atmosphere
in the Palace. concluded that Nhu's obsession had produced a
government more concerned with protecting itself from the US than with
defeating the Viet Cong. The source claimed that Nhu thought the Americans
had set a recent series of fires in Saigon, and that "in some matters" they
worked with the VC.14 (S)
Rumors circulated in mid-1963 that Nhu was exploring with Hanoi the pos-
sibility of a deal. Deputy COS David Smith, for one, accepted the allegation as
probably true, although no well-sourced clandestine reporting ever confirmed
it. In Smith's view, Nhu would not have been true to his own nature had he not
tried to take out insurance against a definitive break with the US. 's (S)
Despite the tension generated by US objections to Saigon's handling of
Buddhist unrest, Nhu brought a conciliatory approach to a meeting with Rich-
ardson on 25 June. Perhaps seeking to restore some semblance of a coopera-
tive atmosphere, he announced that Diem had finally approved a longstanding
Station request for combat intelligence team operations into Laos. But on the
subject of the Buddhists, Richardson found Nhu in "a state of emotional shock
and.. in a dangerous frame of mind." Nhu bitterly denounced Diem's recent
modest concessions to the Buddhists: "I don't give a damn about my brother.
...If a government is incapable of applying the law, it should fall." Nhu
'3 'Fruong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and its After-
math (Vintage Books, 1986), chap. 6; FBS 8816, 23 April 1963
H Articles by Warren Unna, Washington Post, 12 and 13 May 1963; FSS 12843, 10 May 1963; all
1" Smith interview. Smith had served with Edward Lansdale's Saigon Military Station, 1954-
1955, and returned as DCOS in mid-1962. (S)
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described the regime as ineffectually "mandarin and feudal" and said he
would rather go into opposition than accept "a servile instrument under for-
eign domination."16 (S)
Richardson left convinced that Nhu would in fact seek the presidency,
whatever the circumstances of Diem's departure, and in so doing might not
accurately assess his chances of success. But the COS also perceived a more
complicated motivation than Nhu was often granted: "There is the ambiva-
lence of desire for a modus vivendi with the Americans and a resistance to
what he considers illegitimate intervention."17 (S)
As Richardson was monitoring the atmosphere in the Palace,
tried to soften Washington's reaction to Vietnamese intransi-
gence. Attending a June meeting of the National Security Council's Executive
committee (ExComm), William Colby listened to the excoriations of Diem
and Nhu and was moved to scribble a note, the burden of which was that we
might do better to "negotiate" with Nhu rather than lock ourselves into an
adversarial stance. He slipped it to DCI McCone, who read it and passed it
around the room. Colby hoped it might stimulate someone into suggesting
him as the negotiator, but no one even acknowledged it with a comment." (S)
A Hesitant Exploration of Alternatives (U)
By late June, Station soundings of the non-Communist opposition were
producing indications of coup planning." One of these contacts highlighted in
poignant fashion the difficulty, noted earlier, of taking a policy line with oppo-
sitionists when the policy itself is painfuly ambivalent. On the 28th, Tran Kim
Tuyen, disaffected former Chief of SEPES, the Can Lao Party's intelligence
and security organ, met former Saigon DCOS and Tuyen's liaison
contact, . He reviled the Diem regime, and although he denied
any role in coup plotting, other sources reporting on the same day claimed he
was involved.20 (S)
mw him again the next day and took an uncompromising line
against a coup: the US stood firmly behind the regime and hoped to influence
it in the right direction; a "rash attempt to knock it over" would benefit only
18 FVSA 16103, 26 June 1963
17 Ibid. (S)
18 Colby interview, 16 October 1991. (S)
19 The very process of taking these soundings produced anxiety at State. Headquarters told the
Station that Roger Hilsrnan, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, worried that the Station's
"scurrying' around and frantic effort might further unbalance a delicate situation." Headquarters
said it had given the appropriate reassurances and thought it had Hilsman's implicit approval to
continue. (S)
20 Blind Memorandum, "Tran Kim Tuyen's Views of the Diem Regime," 1 July 1963, ibid. (S)
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the Viet Cong. Tuyen responded by noting how the US had stood back when
ARVN elements mutinied in November 1960 and implied that he expected the
same reaction to any future coup attempt. repudiated this notion,
asserting that there was now more at stake, and apparently suggesting that the
US might act to prevent or defeat a coup.21 (S)
Headquarters reacted by directing Saigon to get the Embassy's endorsement
or correction of this prescription. The highly equivocal Embassy response
agreed that should represent the US as "flatly opposed" to a coup. It
was judged excessive, on the other hand, to deny the existence of any alterna-
tive to Diem, or to suggest that the US might intervene against a coup.22 (S)
The Tuyen imbroglio raised a second dilemma, that of collusion with self-
proclaimed rebels when the US had not even secretly repudiated the Diem
government and still wanted to reform it. During the cable exchange on what
to tell Tuyen, Saigon Station gave Headquarters the impression it might
inform the Palace about his approach in Responding to an alarmed
query, the Station gave assurances that it harbored no such intention. Head-
quarters followed with general guidance, in which the State Department con-
curred, that sources should be protected until and unless in Station and
Embassy judgment their information "poses a clear and present danger to US
interests." Even then, Headquarters was to be advised before the Station took
any action. 23 (5)
This formula governed the Station's response to the first intimation by
Diem's generals that active coup plotting was already a fact. Breaking prece-
dent, Diem had allowed all his flag officers to attend the US Embassy's Fourth
of July reception. Lucien (Lou) Conein, a Station officer
joined several of the generals when they left the reception
for drinks at a downtown hotel. There, General Tran Van Don informed him
that he and other officers intended to to remove the President. Conein
informed John Richardson and Ambassador Lodge, who instructed him to use
the contact to monitor the generals' plans.24 (S)
The generals' conspiracy and the Tuyen group formed only two branches of
the dense tangle of plot and counterplot that sprang up in the summer of 1963.
In its efforts to trace these contorted developments, the Station used recruited
agents, informal unilateral contacts, and its official liaison counterparts.
Sources in all three categories reported on Nhu's Byzantine performance on
21Ibid. (S)
2?
(S)
" Ibid.:
24 Note to the author from Lucien Conein, November 1995. (S)
and SARI 8924, 2 July 1963, both in
(S)
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11 July, when he convoked all available ARVN generals to a session at which
he accused Diem of having lost touch with events and went on to appeal for
the support of the armed forces. As General Nguyen Khanh told it to the Sta-
tion, Nhu promised to dissociate himself and his wife from Diem and his other
brothers and assured the generals that they would all get responsible jobs in
the government. Khanh said that Nhu seemed to persuade most of the generals
of his sincerity, and General Tran Van Minh he thought
Nhu was planning a coup against Diem.25 (S)
Seeing Nhu on the 19th, Richardson inquired about the meeting with the
generals.26 Nhu said nothing about his appeal for ARVN support, but expati-
ated on his use of the session to help the "dissatisfied, confused.. .agitated"
generals through a "kind of 'psychoanalytic' procedure. .to try to surface
some of the problems they had been brooding about inwardly." Nhu said he
discussed the coup d' etat as a feature of politics in an "underdeveloped state"
and told the COS he surmised that some in his audience thought he was trying
to unmask potential rebels. Richardson accepted Nhu's own explanation�that
he was simply trying to communicate with the generals. But Nhu "would inev-
itably do this in an elliptical, ambiguous, and round-robin way," and the result
would be confusion on a scale sufficient to explain the various conflicting
accounts." (S)
Even before Nhu's seance with the generals, the Station had begun examin-
ing the constitutional propriety of Nhu's succeeding to the presidency and the
circumstances in which he might try to seize national leadership. He faced
many obstacles, the greatest being public antipathy for Madame Nhu, and the
Station was of two minds about his prospects. On the one hand, he was the
second most powerful figure in Vietnam. On the other, it seemed unlikely that
he could control the senior military in Diem's absence. The Station said it was
working on a contingency plan designed to promote Vice President Nguyen
Ngoc Tho to the presidency, should Diem fall and Washington decide to
oppose a Nhu succession.28 (S)
On 22 July, Headquarters ruled out Nhu as an acceptable replacement for
Diem. No matter the circumstances under which Diem might leave, the Sta-
tion should promote Vice President Tho as his successor, if necessary only as
a figurehead. But Washington, disillusioned with the performance of military
juntas elsewhere, hoped he would provide genuine leadership.29 (S)
25 "Tian Kim Tuyen's Views;"
(S)
2' It is not known whether the fact of the meeting had then become public knowledge and, if not,
what pretext Richardson used to raise the matter. (U)
22 INSA 16220, 20 July 1963J
28 FVSA 16116, 1 July 196 The plan has not been found. (S)
29
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Responses to Buddhist Defiance (U)
Having spread to all the major cities of South Vietnam, the Buddhist crisis
continued to preempt policy-level attention, and Washington called on the
Embassy and the Station to serve as channels of both information and
attempted influence. At a meeting requested by Nhu in early August, Richard-
son explored the Buddhist issue under instructions from Ambassador Nolting.
Nhu made the improbable claim that Ngo Dinh Can had "lost all moral author-
ity" in Central Vietnam by his excessively lenient treatment of the Buddhists.
Nhu then denied any knowledge of what Richardson told him were cases of
"terrorism" against Buddhists in Can's domain. Finally, he dismissed Richard-
son's suggestion that Diem try to defuse religious tension by meeting with a
moderate Buddhist leader, Thich Tinh Khiet.3� (S)
Nhu seems at least to have been candid in his intransigence. Diem, by con-
trast, was certainly not when he told the departing Ambassador a few days
later that he would take US advice and again declare his conciliatory inten-
tions, even though, he implied, this would in effect repudiate Nhu's wife. But
Vice President Tho had just made an uncompromising appearance at a press
conference, and the Department now told the Embassy it was on the verge of
publicly condemning Diem's intransigence on the Buddhist issue.31 (S)
Despite Diem's assurances to Ambassador Nolting, tension with the Bud-
dhists intensified, and all talk of conciliation vanished when the government
raided Buddhist pagodas in Saigon and other principal cities on 21 August.
Hundreds of monks were arrested and some were injured. The authorship of
the raids was unclear, at the time, with two Station officers on the scene at Xa
Loi Pagoda in Saigon reporting that the operation was commanded by Police
Commissioner Tran Van Tu, "dressed in a Republican Youth uniform." The
initial Embassy reporting, meanwhile, suggested that the impetus came from
the military, which was thought to have encouraged Diem in his proclamation
of martial law that took effect at midnight 20 August.32 (S)
While seeking an appointment with Nhu, Richardson cabled an interpreta-
tion similar to the Embassy's, emphasizing growing ARVN impatience with
the Buddhists as expressed by general officers including Nguyen Khanh and
Ton That Dinh. Like Nolting, he could see no potential civilian replacement
FVSA 16285, 6 August 1963,
3' Saigon Embassy Teleszram 220, 13 August 1963, and State Department Telegram to Saigon,
same date,
32 SAIG 0148, William Trueheart, Telegram to Depart-
ment of State, 21 August 1963, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-
1963, Volatile III, Vietnam, January�August 1963 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1991), p. 595. (5)
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for Diem. He doubted that the current situation implied a "witting or unwitting
(sic) takeover of the state by the armed forces." Apparently seeing no likely
effect of Buddhist unrest on Diem's authority, he recommended that the US
continue to work for "some improved continuation of Diem's administration
for at least 12 more months to allow for consolidation and further progress of
military campaigns against the Viet Cong."33 (S)
The pagoda raids took place during the introductory visit of the new US
Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, to Admiral Harry Felt, commander of US
Pacific forces, in Honolulu. During a discussion of the prospects in Saigon,
departing Ambassador Nolting maintained his long-held position that the
Diem regime was the best available, and that its overthrow would lead to
Communist victory. William Colby, accompanying Felt as the CIA representa-
tive, no longer endorsed negotiation with Nhu, suggesting rather that recent
gains by the Strategic Hamlet program would buy time for the US to "work
through a Naguib first phase" in a new government while we waited for the
emergence of a "Vietnamese Nasser."34 (S)
Nhu received Richardson on the afternoon of 22 August. He was at pains to
reinforce the impression of ARVN sponsorship of the Pagoda raids, emphasiz-
ing to the COS the generals' initiative in planning martial law. He was not
even present, he said, when an ARVN delegation led by General Tran Van
Don visited Diem on the 20th. Nhu understood that at that session Diem had
urged restraint. Nhu denied any role in planning the pagoda raids, although he
now endorsed them. Richardson was left with the impression that Nhu was not
in fact an important participant; he seemed rather to be observing events from
the sidelines." (S)
A different picture emerged from the testimony of the Station's military
contacts. The principal early witness was General Tran Van Don, who
acknowledged on 23 August that he and several other generals, including
Nguyen Khanh and "Big Minh," had planned and advocated martial law. But
he denied any prior knowledge, let alone sponsorhip, of the pagoda raids. He
intimated to Lou Conein that the orders came from Nhu, and he denounced a
Voice of America (VOA) broadcast which asserted that regular ARVN forces
had attacked the pagodas. A similar version came from a high Palace official
named Nguyen Dinh Thuan. He contacted Rufus Phillips, director of USOM's
Rural Affairs Division and an acquaintance since Phillips' service in Vietnam
" SAIG 0208, 22 August 1963
35 SAIG 0222, 22 August 1963, ibid. (S)
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as a CIA officer in the mid-1950s. He confirmed Don's account of the move
against the Buddhists, saying that Nhu had tricked the Army when he used
martial law to stage the pagoda raids." (U)
The Station was as much in the dark as the dissident generals claimed to
have been and got no advance warning of the raids. It learned only later that
Nhu had used the faithful Colonel Tung and the opportunistic Ton That Dinh
to run the operation. Smith remembered being astonished at the regime's
apparent assumption that the US could tolerate such an assault on an impor-
tant world religion. Despite the history of apparently genuine empathy
between Nhu and Richardson, and their general agreement on war policy, the
evidence of Nhu's responsibility for the pagoda raids outraged the COS.37 (S)
A Conditional Repudiation of Ngo Dinh Diem (U)
Nhu's apparent perfidy generated an emotional reaction in Washington as
well. The custodians of Vietnam policy on that August weekend�Hilsman,
George Ball, and Averell Harriman at State, and Michael Forrestal at the
White House collaborated on a cable that included an ultimatum to Diem to
dismiss Nhu, and notification to "key military leaders" of this demand. The
generals could also be told that, failing Diem's compliance, the US would
cease supporting him. If this resulted in the paralysis of central government,
Washington would give the generals direct support. Reached at the family
home in Hyannisport, President Kennedy approved this message, which went
out late 24 August after notification to CIA and the Defense Department. A
subsequent cable from Hilsman to Lodge, sent in Agency channels, referred to
"agonizing at highest levels." Hilsman acknowledged that the "course outlined
is dangerous but all agree that delaying [a] clearcut US stand is even more
dangerous." (S)
Knowing of the new State guidance, but not having seen its text, Colby
cabled Richardson on the 25th that he understood implementation was subject
to Lodge's judgment. In this context, he noted the danger of discarding a bird
in the hand before knowing the "birds in bush, or songs they may sing." He
exhorted the COS to find some way of keeping the initiative in American
hands, perhaps by getting Diem to transfer working authority to ARVN and
retire with the Nhus to Dalat. But Richardson should also look for someone to
fill Diem's shoes, as the "trend of policy is toward emptying them." Colby
SA1G 0265,24 August 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, III, Vietnam, January�August 1963, p. 611. (U)
37 CSHP 57, pp. 16-17; Smith interview, 6 October 1992. (S)
" David Smith interview by Thomas L. Ahern, Silver Spring, MD, tape recording, 6 October
1992 (S), 6 October 1992; Deptel 243, 24 August 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, III, Vietnam, January�
August 1963, p. 628 S)
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wanted the Station's ideas on a "man, team, or false face behind which we can
mobilize the necessary effort to continue the main war against the Viet
Cong."39 (S)
Both the Ambassador and Richardson objected to some of the terms of the
new guidance. Using CIA communications, presumably for enhanced secur-
ity, Lodge argued on 25 August that taking US demands to Diem would sim-
ply allow the President to temporize while Nhu took counteraction. He wanted
to use CIA to take the American demands to the ARVN leadership and let the
generals deal with Diem. Richardson agreed with Lodge about not going to
Diem but had reservations about serving as messenger to the generals. For one
thing, he worried about retaliation if the Station role were exposed. More basi-
cally, he doubted the wisdom of the entire enterprise. He replied to Colby, who
was now urging him to take the initiative, by expressing doubt about the unity
of ARVN leadership and concern about street fighting in Saigon that would
endanger American lives. He dismissed Colby's suggestion that he get Diem
to retire to Dalat, presciently contending that if the generals took over, "the
Ngo family will be lucky to get out of the country alive."40 (S)
Richardson followed with a detailed but inconclusive assessment of poten-
tial military and civilian alternatives to Diem. He said he could not discuss the
mechanics of a coup against Diem without conferring with the generals, and
suggested�apparently accepting Station involvement as inevitable�an initial
approach in Pleiku to the II Corps commander, Brigadier General Nguyen
Khanh. An important part of such an approach would be persuading the gener-
als that they should maintain a "facade of legality and civilian rule" by install-
ing Vice President Tho as President and at least temporarily retaining the
constitution.4' (5)
Colby brusquely replied, still on 25 August, that Richardson would have to
deal more forcefully with the generals than he was proposing to do. The "US
must win this affair if it goes into it, and it has already decided to do just that.
...In this connection, we are confident you will keep [your] eye on this main
ball rather than window dressing of civilian leadership." Colby was presum-
ably aware, at this point, of State's acquiescence to Lodge in the matter of
bypassing Diem in order to take the US demands directly to the generals.42 (S)
DIR 63855, 25 August 1963, ibid. (S)
40 SAIG 0292, 0293, and 0296, 25 August 1963, ibid. (S)
SAIG 0296. (S)
42 DIR 63869, 25 August 1963,
Vietnam, January�August 1963, pp. 634-635. (S)
FRUS, 1961-63, In,
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General Khanh was in Saigon on 25 August and sought out the
CIA liaison officer, Al Spera, to express his dismay, and that of other
unnamed officers, with the recent course of events. He claimed to fear that the
regime might cut a deal with North Vietnam rather than accept US pressure to
accommodate the Buddhists. Khanh said that he and his friends would then
rebel, and he pleaded for a statement of the US response to such a develop-
ment. Spera asked if the generals had developed any concept of post-Diem
political arrangements. Khanh responded that they were concerned solely to
prevent a Viet Cong victory; "it was up to the United States to take care of the
political part."43 (S)
With Colby's guidance in hand, Richardson discussed the question of noti-
fying the generals at a 26 August meeting with Lodge and other members of
the Country Team. Washington had deferred this question to Lodge, and
because he was concerned about keeping the official American hand from
showing, he decided to use CIA as intermediary with the generals. After Rich-
ardson described the previous day's meeting with Khanh, and Khanh's state-
ment that Brigadier General Khiem enjoyed his full confidence, Lodge
approved an approach to these two by the relatively junior Station officers
already dealing with them. The Country Team then turned to the substance of
the new guidance. They condensed it into nine points whose key provisions
were the need to remove the Nhus and a disclaimer of any US intention to par-
ticipate in a coup. This was accompanied by a promise of "direct support [to
the generals] during any interim period of breakdown" of the central govern-
ment." (S)
Spera flew to Pleiku the same day to brief General Khanh, and Conein
approached General Khiem in Saigon. Khiem said he and the other generals
welcomed and shared Washington's views. He "concurred in contact with
General Khanh" but warned against briefing General Don on the ground that
Nhu's people had infiltrated Don's staff. He asked Conein to stand by for a
meeting with Major General Minh.45 (S)
General Kbanh's reaction was very different. He emphasized that the gener-
als were not ready to act, since they intended to wait for evidence of an
approach by Nhu to the DRY. When Spera emphasized that "Nhu must go,"
" SAIG 0291, 25 August 1963 (S)
SAIG 0304, 26 August 1963, and blind memorandum "Sequence
of CAS Contacts with Vietnamese Generals, 23 August through 23 October 1963," 23 October
1963, all in ibid. John H. Richardson, Chief of Station, Saigon, Memorandum for
the Director of Central Intelligence, "Chronology of Events, Contacts and Discussions Relating to
the Saigon Station Coup d'Etat Activities of August 1963," 28 September 1963,
hereafter cited as Richardson to McCone, "Chronology of
Events, 28 September 1963"). (S)
SAIG 0305, 26 August 1.963, 'S)
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Khanh nodded, but pointed out that "if Diem yields and fires Nhu" there
would be no need to revolt. Khanh cautioned against any approach to the
unpredictable General Dinh, and he looked "disturbed" that the Station had
briefed General Khiem without his prior approval. He also noted that a coup
might fail and asked for a US guarantee of asylum and material support for
coup leaders and their families 46 (S)
As the Station waited for the generals to act, Richardson was having to cope
with Headquarters' anxiety over his dealings with the press. An article in The
New York Times by David Halberstam had just described Richardson's meet-
ing with Nhu on 22 August and the Station's relationship with Special Forces
chief Colonel Tung. Headquarters wanted to identify the leak. Richardson
replied that he had encountered Halberstam at the airport on the 22nd and that
he acknowledged having just seen Nhu. He denied, however, that he had said
anything more about the meeting than to speculate that Nhu had played a less
central role in the pagoda raids than some people thought. The Country Team
was discreet, he was sure, and the leak must have originated in Washington
after his report reached Washington consumers. Alluding to Halberstam's alle-
gation that top Mission officials had ignored warnings of a government move
against the Buddhists, Richardson said he had been trying to ward off press
charges of Agency involvement in the pagoda raids when he told Halberstam
that they had taken him by surprise." (S)
With respect to Tung, Richardson noted that several reporters had earlier
visited and knew of
Tung's role and that of the Vietnamese and US Special Forces. Apparently
accepting these visits as unavoidable,
and suggested that these largely accounted for press access to classified
information on the paramilitary programs.48 (S)
Second Thoughts (U)
By 26 August, two days after Washington's decision to force Nhu's depar-
ture, the rush of events unleashed by the new policy was beginning to escape
its authors' control. Still using Agency communications, Ambassador Lodge
complained to State that the Voice of America (VOA) was once again out of
step when it announced that Washington might cut aid to Vietnam. In Lodge's
view, the VOA had eliminated any chance of a surprise move by the generals.
" SAIG 0330, 26 August 1963, ibid.; Richardson to McCone, "Chronology of Events,
28 September 1963." (S)
4
(S)
" Ibid. (S)
and SAIG 0325, 26 August 1963, both in
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Secretary Rusk himself drafted the cable of embarrassed apology, but he had a
more fundamental question to deal with in a meeting the same day with the
President. Back in Washington from Hyannisport, Kennedy told the National
Security Council that Diem and Nhu had accomplished a great deal, and the
US Government should not let The New York Times pressure it into over-
throwing the Diem regime. The President's doubts were echoed by Secretary
McNamara and General Taylor, and the meeting eventually adjourned on an
inconclusive note." (U)
President Kennedy's discovery that some of his most senior advisors
opposed a showdown with the Diem regime probably accounts for the sudden
effort by its authors to share the responsibility for the weekend cable encour-
aging a confrontation. Both Hilsman and Harriman claimed that other agen-
cies had "cleared" the new guidance, implying that consultation had taken
place and their concurrence secured before the decision to transmit it to
Lodge. But it was Harriman himself who, on the evening of 24 August,
phoned Richard Helms, then Deputy Director for Plans, to describe the mes-
sage and say that "he had wanted to inform the Agency about the dispatch of
this telegram and that it would be going out shortly." Colby had been in regu-
lar consultation with State during the week preceding the cable, but no one
there raised the subject with him.5� (U)
Meanwhile, still on 26 August, a Colby cable to Richardson acknowledged
Nhu's certain awareness that a coup might be in preparation and urged the Sta-
tion to move quickly but carefully to energize military figures such as General
Khanh. Colby urged Richardson to furnish order-of-battle information and
in time
for the conference with the President set for the next day.51 (S)
Events in Saigon took an apparently decisive turn on 27 August when Gen-
eral Khiem identified for Conein the other principal coup planners, mostly
49 FRUS, 1961-63, III, Vietnam, January�August 1963, pp. 636-641. (U)
" At lunch with Harriman a month later, McCone wondered about the rush, on that August week-
end, to reverse the US attitude toward Diem. "Harriman accepted no responsibility for the cable
and asked why we did not express ourselves when it was 'coordinated.� It had not been coordi-
nated, said McCone; Helms had merely been informed of its general substance and told that the
President, State, and Defense supported it. Harriman claimed to have been told that CIA load sup-
ported and coordinated the cable, McCone: "I corrected this impression." John A. McCone, Mem-
orandum for the Record, "Discussion with Governor Averell Harriman at Lunch, October 30th,"
30 October 1963; copy in History Staff files; FRUS, 1961-63, III, Vietnam, January�August
1963, p. 675n; Richard Helms, DDP, Memorandum for the Record, "Phone Conversation with
Governor Averell Harriman," 26 August 1963, and unsigned draft memorandum, "Vietnam Pol-
icy Decisions," 28 August 1963, both in FRUS,
1961-63, HI, Vietnam, January�August 1963, p. 628. References in the Helms memorandum
establish the draft memorandum as having been written by Mr. Colby. (S)
51 (S)
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general officers but including Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho. There was no
discussion of trying to get Diem to remove Nhu, and Khiem promised a coup
d'etat within one week.
Khiem displayed some anxiety about the security of the generals' contact
with the Americans. He was also uncertain about US intentions and the author-
ity of Conein and Spera to convey those intentions. Accordingly, he proposed
to use an intermediary for further contact with him; meanwhile, he said, Gen-
eral Minh's position precluded any contact with the Americans at this time.
Khiem said that Minh wanted to confirm Washington's commitment to a show-
down with Diem and would shortly have delivered to Conein's home a short
text that he wanted broadcast over VOA as proof of US bona fides." (S)
Later the same day, Colby summarized this meeting for President Kennedy
and the National Security Council. The President wondered whether a coup
was either desirable or feasible and found his doubts echoed by McNamara and
Nolting. The discussion centered on Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nolting reflected the pol-
icy dilemma when he argued the impossibility of separating Diem and Nhu.
Then, apparently not seeing the contradiction, he urged that Diem be persuaded
to send Nhu abroad as the only way for Washington to avoid supporting a coup.
Nolting observed that CIA had already given the generals US endorsement of a
coup, but Kennedy thought there was still time to draw back. The President
ended the session by "repeating Ambasador Nolting's view that the generals
interested in the coup were not good enough to bring it about."54 (U)
Despite these second thoughts, neither Kennedy nor any of his advisors
withdrew the State guidance of 24 August. Instead, a temporizing cable asked
Lodge to assess both the coup participants whom Khiem had named to Conein
and the balance of coup and countercoup forces. It gave Ambassador Lodge
an opportunity to back away from confrontation, telling him that "highest
authority" wanted to know if he and General Harkins presently favored the
generals' plan." (U)
The next day, 28 August, both Lodge and Richardson confirmed their com-
mitment to the removal of Ngo Dinh Nhu, even at the price of overthrowing
" SAIG 0346, 27 August 1963, ibid. (S)
" This was overtaken by events when Lodge later personally vouched for Conein and Spera in an
encounter with one of the generals. Smith interview, 6 October 1992; SAIG 0346, 27 August
1963. (S)
" PR US, 1961-63, III, Vietnam, January�August 1963, pp. 659-665. (U)
" Ibid., pp. 667-668. (U)
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Diem. In a cable to Washington, Lodge asserted his support for a coup, and
claimed that Harkins endorsed it, too. He ended his message by quoting that
morning's emotional appeal from Vice President Tho for unspecified US
action to prevent catastrophe. Richardson's cable was couched in even more
urgent terms, saying that things had reached the point of no return. Saigon was
an armed camp, and the Ngo family appeared to have dug in for a "last ditch
battle." But Conein's meeting with Khiem had persuaded Richardson of the
generals' unity of purpose. "If the Ngo family wins now, they and Vietnam
will stagger on to final defeat at the hands of their own people and the Viet
Cong." Accordingly, Richardson proposed to have a Station officer "explore
possibilities of our assistance" with General Khiem's intermediary.56 (S)
Colby picked up the "point of no return" theme at that day's first National
Security Council meeting. Critics of the Saigon regime agreed that a coup
must be staged and must be successful. A reluctant Secretary McNamara
thought the events of the last day had "almost pulled us along" and cautioned
against proceeding "as if we were being pushed." President Kennedy rejected
the view that it was too late to draw back, to which McGeorge Bundy
responded that every action in support of the generals reduced our freedom of
action. The second NSC session, early that evening, was equally inconclusive.
Kennedy was now aware of General Harkins' lack of enthusiasm for US back-
ing of a coup and directed that he and Lodge be given another chance to back
off. They should be enjoined against endorsing any action against the regime
merely because of a perception that Washington favored it.57 (U)
In Saigon, General Minh reversed himself in the matter of contact with the
Americans and through General Khiem set up a meeting for the morning of
29 August. Preparing to leave for Khiem's office, Conein and Spera got word
that COS Richardson wanted them. The problem was a message from Taylor
to Harkins asking him for his personal assessment of prospects for a success-
ful coup. Richardson had just seen this cable, in which Taylor said that the
State guidance of 24 August had been prepared without military participation,
and added that "authorities are now haying second thoughts."" (S)
Faced with a possible change of heart in Washington, Richardson decided
to let Conein and Spera go on to their meeting, but he instructed them in
emphatic terms to make no commitments. At Khiem's office, things got under
way in reciprocally wary fashion. Refusing to discuss the state of their plan-
ning, the generals repeatedly alluded to "steadfast" US support of Ngo Dinh
" Embassy Saigon 364, 28 August 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, III, Vietnam, January�August 1963,
pp. 668-67l; SAIG 0363,28 August 1963, (S)
" FRUS, 1961-63, Iv, Vietnam, August�September 1963, pp. 1-6, 12-14. (U)
" SA1G 0383, 28 August 1963, S); Taylor's cable is JCS
336/1-63, 28 August 1963, Department of State, FRUS, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, January�August
1963, pp. 1244. (U)
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Nhu and the Vietnamese Special Forces, his "Can Lao army." Conein and
Spera at first thought they might be caught in a government provocation, but
eventually concluded that the generals genuinely feared an American trap on
the government's behalf. Finally getting down to business, Minh called for the
suspension of economic aid as a sign of US intentions and to "force Nhu to
show his hand." But on the subject of a post-Diem political structure, Minh
and Khiem offered as little as Khanh had a few days earlier: they wanted the
"US to think what type political leadership should follow" the overthrow of
the family. 59 (S)
An Aborted Coup d'Etat (U)
Returning to the Embassy, Conein and Spera accompanied Richardson to
the Ambassador's office, where they began briefing Deputy Chief of Mission
William Trueheart. Lodge came in and asked about the meeting's results.
Nothing definitive, Conein replied, because of the restrictions resulting from
the "second thoughts" cable. Lodge demanded to know what that was and, on
being told, exploded in anger at Richardson. He accused the COS of having
"destroyed" any chance to effect a coup, to which Richardson entered a firm
dissent. He reminded the COS that he worked for the Ambassador, and the
Ambassador only.60 (S)
Frustrated by what he interpreted as Station obstructionism, Lodge got
another chance later the same day to encourage the generals. Within hours of
the Spera-Conein meeting with Minh and Khiem, two other oppositionists,
Dai Viet politician Bui Diem and Brigadier General Le Van Kim, described
the session to USOM official Rufus Phillips. It seemed the generals were still
nervous, and Kim wanted his trusted friend Phillips to get confirmation from
Lodge that Spera and Conein were speaking for the Ambassador. Phillips
returned that evening with an affiimative reply from Lodge, whereupon Kim
said that Conein should see General Khiem the next day to discuss the
mechanics of the operation and its support by the US. Lodge promptly autho-
rized this contact, telling the Station it could "volunteer" to help the generals
with tactical planning.61 (S)
" Lucien Conein interview by Thomas L. Ahern, McLean, VA, tape recording, 19 February 1992;
SAIG 0406, 29 August 1963 (5)
" Conein came to believe that this incident triggered Lodge's subsequent demand for Richard-
son's recall, described in the next chapter. As Conein saw it, wounded vanity prevented Lodge
from seeing that he had reason to be grateful to Richardson for avoiding premature action. Conein
thought Lodge was reacting to Washington's failure to advise him of its "second thoughts," and
that Lodge was also irritated because he had sent Conein and Spera out to see that a coup took
place, and they had supposedly failed him. Conein interview, 19 February 1992; Richardson to
McCone, "Chronology of Events, 28 September 1963"; Enno H. Knoche memorandum for the
record, "Meeting in the DCI's Office...7 October 1963." (S)
Richardson to McCone, "Chronology of Events, 28 September 1963." (U)
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At the same time, Lodge moved to bring Washington into line with his
determination to instigate a coup d' &at. Early in the evening of 29 August, he
sent a cable which began, "We are launched on a course from which there is
no respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government." Ameri-
can prestige, already committed, and the impossibility of winning with Ngo
Dinh Diem, required an "all-out effort" to get the generals to move without
delay. Lodge asked for a Presidential order authorizing General Harkins to
repeat to the generals what they had already heard from Spera and Conein, and
for authority for himself to announce the suspension of US aid if this were
demanded by the generals. Lodge acknowledged that Harkins still wanted an
appeal to Diem to get rid of Nhu, but rejected this as futile.62 (U)
On the evening of an already full day, in Saigon
advised the Station of a report that Nhu was about to arrest the generals he
suspected of planning a coup. This generated a frantic search for the most
secure way to warn the generals. The Station first decided to use a MAAG
officer to pass the word through his next door neighbor, an ARVN major serv-
ing as administrative assistant to "Big Minh." There was no one home, and the
MAAG officer volunteered to alert another acquaintance, Rufus Phillips'
friend General Le Van Kim. The contact succeeded, this time, and Kim prom-
ised to alert Minh. The Palace made no move against the generals, but Rich-
ardson, saying he hoped that Headquarters would not interpret his concern as
reflecting a "negative Station attitude," worried that Nhu might just be biding
his time." (S)
While all this was going on, Lodge's cable reached Washington in time for
consideration at an NSC meeting chaired by the President at noon, Washing-
ton time, on 29 August. Reserving the right to pull back at any time, Kennedy
approved both of Lodge's requests. State's message to Lodge thus included
instructions for Harkins in his proposed new role as participant in coup prepa-
rations. The only hesitation appeared in a cable from Rusk that noted Lodge's
treatment of Diem and Nhu "as a single package" and resurrected the peren-
nial hope this time, by the threatened withdrawal of US support�that Diem
might be induced to remove his brother. But Rusk put this as a suggestion, not
an order, and ended by speculating that any move to separate the Ngo brothers
was perhaps best left to the generals." (U)
0 Embassy Saigon 375, 29 August 1963, MIS, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963,
pp. 20-22. (U)
SAIG 0445, 30 August 1963 (S)
" FR US, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 26-36. (U)
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Armed with the President's approval, Ambassador Lodge met on 30 August
with the Station and General Harkins to orchestrate the next move. He had
previously noted that, once Harkins became directly involved in planning, the
US "might well have reached a point of no return." Richardson now felt con-
strained to give his judgment that the generals had no plan and were not ready
to act. Lodge nevertheless "instructed Harkins to continue coup discussions
with General Khiem." Wanting Harkins to understand the atmosphere at Joint
General Staff (JGS) Headquarters, Richardson sent him an intelligence report
that described�accurately, the COS thought�the backing and filling that still
characterized the generals' efforts to mobilize for a coup.� (S)
Ignoring Richardson's doubts, Lodge was now ready to increase the pressure
on the generals to move against Diem. But events conspired to frustrate him.
First Khiem signaled through his aide that he was "too busy" to meet that day,
30 August. Lodge then instructed Harkins to see Khiem, but that overture was
fended off as well. Meanwhile, the Station was dealing with Headquarters'
anxiety about operational security. After conferring with Deputy Chief of Mis-
sion (DCM) Trueheart the Station rejected as imnracticable a Sll CYSYegt on that it
56 (5)
On the evening of the 30th, Nhu convened the generals at JGS Headquarters
near the airport. In a review of the confrontation with the US, he demonstrated
how little he understood his American counterparts. Ignoring Richardson's
longtime support of the regime and its programs, Nhu asserted that "CIA peo-
ple do their utmost to alienate people" from the government. He was probably
right in accusing local American officials of feeding the US press infonnation
unflattering to the regime, but Nhu had clearly been victimized by the Ambas-
sador's capacity for dissimulation when he said of Lodge that "we manage
him�he will fully agree with our concepts and actions."67 (S)
When General Harkins finally got an appointment with General Khiem, on
the morning of 31 August, the results were anticlimactic. Khiem said that the
generals lacked access to sufficient forces in and around Saigon, and simply
"did not feel ready." Apparently despairing of any immediate prospect of
removing Ngo Dinh Nhu, the generals were now thinking of a compromise in
" Richardson to McCone, "Chronology of Events, 28 September 1963." (S)
" Ibid.; SAIG 0484, 30 August 1963 (S)
SAIG 0499, 31 August 1963, Richardson to McCone,
"Chronology of Events, 28 September 1963. (S) Harkins's on-the-spot decision not to reassure
Khicm of US support for a coup created some controversy in Washington, as there was disagre-
men( not only about Harkins's judgment but also as to whether he had been instructed or merely
authorized to assure Khiem of US support. Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs, "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, August 31, 1963,
11 a.m.," 31 August 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 70-71. (U)
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which some of them would take positions in a Cabinet headed by Nhu in a
prime ministerial role. In this atmosphere, Harkins decided not to affirm US
support for a coup.68 (S)
On the same day, Le Van Kim told Phillips that Nhu was clearly aware of
the plotting, which would have to become more tightly compartmented. Dur-
ing this session, Phillips received another indication of the poor coordination
that plagued the conspiracy throughout. He mentioned the Khiem-Harkins
meeting and discovered that Kim knew nothing of it Phillips then took it upon
himself to paraphrase Khiem's remarks about working with Nhu, to which
Kim "reacted violently," repudiating Khiem as a spokesman for the other gen-
erals. 69 (S)
Kim suggested that the Ambassador meet General Minh, an idea vetoed
without explanation on Lodge's behalf by his military assistant, Lieutenant
Colonel Michael Dunn. Returning to Kim with this message, Phillips learned
that Minh had also been unaware of the Harkins-Khiem meeting. Kim pur-
ported to speak for Minh in saying that Nhu was absolutely unacceptable. He
said that coup planning would continue despite Nhu's Special Forces having
been put on full alert and despite US failure to make any overt move against
Nhu. Kim apparently spoke for himself in questioning Khiem's authority as a
spokesman.7� (S)
Richardson cabled Helms that "this particular coup is finished," and turned
to an assessment of damage to the Station's security, and possible effects on
the liaison programs resulting from Station participation in the conspiracy. He
saw no choice but to try to continue working with the regime: "We did our
best and got licked." But while a particular coup might have failed, the domi-
nant perception among US officials of a terminally ailing regime in Saigon
continued to guide policy deliberations.7' (S)
SAIG 0499, 31 August 1963 (S)
" Richardson to MeCone, "Chronology of Events, 28 September 1963." (S)
70 Ibid. (S)
SAIG 0499. (S)
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CHAPTER 13
Passive Engagement (U)
Ambassador Lodge endorsed, at least for the record, Harkins' abstention at
the meeting with General Minh from conveying US support and encourage-
ment of a coup. Lodge's subsequent instructions to the Station prohibited
active encouragement of further planning: the Station was to listen to the gen-
erals without displaying more than "an open-minded or sympathetic interest."
In Washington, a National Security Council meeting took place on the same
day as Harkins' meeting with Khiem. Paul Kattenburg, a State Department
expert on Vietnam who had just returned from a visit to Saigon, argued on
behalf of Lodge and Trueheart that any compromise with the regime would
put the US so at odds with a disaffected population as to ensure that it would
be "butted out of the country within six months to a year."' (S)
The Pentagon Papers historian concluded that a "rambling inability to focus
the problem" marred the deliberations at this meeting, but noted that it was the
first recorded instance of someone following "to its logical conclusion the
negative analysis of the situation�i.e., that the war could not be won with the
Diem regime, yet its removal would leave such political instability as to fore-
close success." 2 (U)
011 2 September, Nhu's English-language mouthpiece, the Times of Viet-
nam, sported the banner headline "CIA Financing Planned Coup d'Etat." An
alarmed Station proposed to suspend the funding of all joint operations
"including NVN and Laos ops from which we expect only modest results any-
way." But in a meeting with Lodge that day, Nhu maintained a conciliatory
tone while giving implausible assurances that the Buddhists would be
appeased and he himself would leave the government, if only after the depar-
ture of "certain US agents." Nhu claimed to have rejected that very day, citing
Senator Mike Gravel, The Pentagon Papers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), II, p. 241. Richardson
memo to McCone, "Chronology of Events," 28 September 1963 (5); FRUS, 1961-63, iv, Viet-
nam, August�December 1963, p. 73.
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, II, p. 241.
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his "loyalty to the Americans," an offer from the Polish member of the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC) to serve as an intermediary between Nhu
and DRY Prime Minister Pham Van Dong.3 (U)
Washington reacted skeptically. Lodge quickly declared that he had not
really taken Nhu seriously, and that he was about to dispatch John Richardson
to tell Nhu that his promises did not meet American requirements. Richardson
did in fact visit the Palace, on 6 September, but his report contains no mention
of any demands on the Vietnamese. Instead, Richardson listened to Nhu deny
again any role in the pagoda raids and any prior knowledge of the Times of
Vietnam attack on CIA. Alluding to the American editor of his paper, the wife
of a former USIS officer, Nhu said he would never "hide behind backsides of
a woman.. .referring specifically to Mrs. Gregory." Nhu devoted some time to
the effect of Palace life on his children, worrying that their isolation might cre-
ate lasting psychological wounds; this left Richardson with the impression
that he might be setting the stage for a "temporary withdrawal." But the COS
noted that other reporting contradicted some of Nhu's assertions. He calmly
accepted the possibility that Nhu was dissimulating, explaining to Headquar-
ters that "this would not be unnatural in power and politics."4 (S)
Just the day before, had reported to
Richardson a bizarre conversation with 'Iran Van Khiem, Madame Nhu's
younger brother. Khiem had displayed a list of Americans he intended to
assassinate; John Richardson was first on the list, which also included Lou
Conein. Now, Khiem telephoned, interrupting Richardson's reporting of the
meeting with Nhu. Khiem asked if the COS had heard rumors about assassina-
tion squads, and being told yes, invited him for a drink. During their hour and
a half together, Khiem denied everything, trying to portray Richardson and
himself as victims of the "endless Saigon rumor mill." The COS dispassion-
ately told Headquarters that Khiem was probably just another manipulator,
"like everybody else."5 (S)
In the midst of all this dissimulation, Lou Conein's wide range of contacts
made him witness to two revealing events. The first of these exposed the
instability of one of the key figures in the conspiracy. The other presaged
Ambassador Lodge's subsequent dismissal of John Richardson. (U)
Henry Cabot Lodge, Telegram to the Department of State, 2 September 1963, FRUS, 1961-63,
IE Vietnam, August-December 1963, pp. 84-85. (U)
4 Ibid., pp. 104-110; SAIG 0698, 6 September 1963
-(S)
(S)
SAIG 0700, 6 September 1963
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On 4 September, Conein was summoned by Brigadier General Ton That
Dinh, Military Governor of Saigon under martial law, whose direct command
of troops in the capital area made him indispensable to the success of a coup.
Conein found him in an "exultant, ranting, raving mood," flanked by body-
guards whose submachine guns pointed at Conein even during the luncheon
phase of the four-hour session. Dinh described himself as the man of the hour
who would save Vietnam from Communism and who could kill or kidnap
anyone in Saigon, including�should there be a move to accommodate the
Communists�Diem himself. Dinh violently accused John Meeklin, USIS
chief in Saigon, of being a Communist, and rushed around the room, gesticu-
lating wildly at maps on the wall and insisting that the city was surrounded by
Communists.' (S)
Dinh's behavior grew more aggressively erratic, as he first demanded to
know whether Conein had been plotting against him, then suddenly grabbed
the telephone, called Mrs. Conein, and complimented her on her opportunity
to converse with the military governor of Saigon. Dropping the phone, he
ordered an aide to rush flowers to the Conein home. Another mood swing fol-
lowed, with Dinh reproaching Conein for not having made contact since
Dinh's elevation to his current post. Conein said he had tried, only to be told
byr an aide that Dinh was busy. Dinh forthwith summoned the aide, reviled him
for his dereliction, and for emphasis spat at the officer's feet. Conein, who had
known Dinh for years, described his personality as totally changed and the
four-hour harangue as even more disjointed and incoherent than might appear
from his report. He thought Dinh might need little if any provocation to try to
seize power in South Vietnam.7 (S)
Reprisal Against Richardson (U)
This episode was followed by a social gathering at Conein's home that pro-
vided the first indication of Lodge's intent to punish John Richardson for his
perceived obstruction of a coup. Conein was almost as well connected with
the press as with the Vietnamese military, and on 6 September he hosted a din-
ner attended by several foreign correspondents, including Joseph Alsop. Also
present was Lodge aide Lieutenant Colonel Michael Dunn, who during the
course of the evening announced that Lodge had "chewed out" John Richard-
son for "disobeying orders" and would soon have him replaced. As Conein
later recalled it, Richardson was not the only one about to leave; Dunn also
named General Harkins and one or two others as on their way out.' (S)
SAIG 0618,4 September 1963 (S)
Ibid. (S)
John H. Richardson, Memorandum for the Record, "Conversation with Mr. Frank Wisner,
14 October 1963,' SAIG 1434, 5 October
1963, Conein interview, 19 February 1992. (S)
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A week later, Alsop (staying in Saigon as the Ambassador's house guest)
invited Richardson to lunch, during which he pronounced Diem and Nhu
insane. Richardson tried to moderate this view, but later judged the effort as
"in no way successful." On the same day, 13 September, Lodge wrote to Rusk
asking him to get the President to approve dispatching Major General Edward
Lansdale "to take charge, under my supervision, of all US relationships with a
change of government here." Lansdale would need a staff, he added, and
should replace Richardson as chief of the CIA Station.' (S)
DCI John McCone discussed the matter with the President and the NSC's
Executive Committee on 17 September, where a consensus emerged that
Lodge's demand for a new COS should be honored. But McCone drew the line
at Lansdale, and McGeorge Bundy acknowledged CIA's "unalterable opposi-
tion." McCone argued that it was not merely Agency experience with Lansdale
that made him unacceptable; rather, Lansdale's close association with Diem
would make his return to Saigon positively detrimental to US interests unless
the object were to seek an understanding with Diem and Nhu using Lansdale as
a "friend in court." Inasmuch as at the same meeting the President authorized
increasing Lodge's authority to give him more "leverage" over the Palace, no
one defended using Lansdale in this way, and the proposal died. '� (S)
If Lodge could not have Lansdale, he could and did contest the Station's
access to the Ngo brothers. Ostensibly skeptical of Richardson's responsive-
ness to policy guidance, but probably more concerned to defy McCone, he
explicitly prohibited further meetings between the COS and Ngo Dinh Nhu.
McCone responded by telling McGeorge Bundy that he proposed a total
restructuring of the Saigon Station. He would send a new staff, under orders to
preserve its anonymity, and in so doing maintain discreet contact with the Ngo
brothers." (S)
Bundy correctly saw this ploy as aimed at Lodge, and defended the Ambas-
sador's right to determine whom the Mission�including the Station�would
or would not see. Meanwhile, Richardson's support at Headquarters was
surely not enhanced by stories in the American press on CIA operations in
Vietnam. On 16 September, Richardson responded to a Headquarters call for
SAIG 0884, 13 September 1963, letter from Lodge to
Rusk, FRUS 1961-63, lv, Vietnam, August�December 1963, p. 205. (S)
'� John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, "Discussion�Secretary Rusk's conference
room�Tuesday evening-6:00 p.m.-16 September 1963" 18 September 1963,
(S)
" Walter Elder, "John A. McCone as Director of Central Intelligence," revised 1973 version, His-
tory Staff Job 8701032R, Box 4, pp. 276-277 (quoted in Mary S. McAuliffe, "John A. McCone as
Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965," draft manuscript, History Staff, 1994). (S)
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'better security, apologizing for what he implicitly acknowledged were leaks
from inside the Station to David Halberstam and UPI's Neil Sheehan. Three
days later, McCone wrote to Lodge, repeating his objection to Lansdale, but
agreeing, if Lodge insisted, to find a replacement for Richardson. 12 (S)
Backing and Filling (U)
Meanwhile, amid these distractions, the Station tried to follow develop-
ments on the Vietnamese side. General Khiem reported to Al Spera about
increased concern that Nhu might negotiate with the North, and about the gen-
erals' demands for positions in the Cabinet. He also recounted a claim by the
mercurial General Dinh that Dinh had reported to Nhu an offer of 20 million
piasters by an American official to overthrow Diem. This sort of backbiting
and miscommunication seems to have characterized the entire enterprise on
the Vietnamese side. General Tran Van Don, one of the plotters and an impor-
tant Conein informant, later disparaged Khiem and Khanh, who were at first
treated by the Station as the key conspirators: Khiem was "flighty" and unreli-
able, while Khanh was "the complete opportunist.., and highly deceitful."
Dinh, on the other hand, was one of the rebel group's "stalwarts." As the plan-
ning proceeded, Conein was continually startled by the conspirators' igno-
rance of each other's activity. 13 (S)
As September wore on, some US officials came to share General Khiem's
anxiety that Ngo Dinh Nhu might make some kind of accommodation with the
North. Probably seeking to intimidate his American critics, Nhu did speculate
on that topic in an interview with the ubiquitous Joseph Alsop. The French
also acknowledged talking with Nhu about it. It was widely believed that
Southern gains against the Viet Cong could make a negotiated settlement
attractive to Hanoi. At this point, many US officials in both Washington and
Saigon, taking at face value inflated Vietnamese statistics, saw continued
progress in the war in the countryside.14 (U)
John Richardson was one of these. Having dutifully responded to Colby's
enthusiasm for a coup d' &at during the last week in August, he wrote in mid-
September that the "shooting war was still going ahead well," and that the
12 SAIG 0916, 16 September 1963, McCone memo to
Lodge, 19 September 1963, pp. 1-3, Elder,
"McCone," McAuliffe, ed., p. 277. (S)
SAIG 0940, 17 September 1963, Tran Van Don, Our
Endless War: Inside Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 93-95; Conein interview,
19 February 1992. (S)
'4 PR US, 1961-63, IV Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 295, 326. (U)
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political crisis was affecting it less than might have been expected. This mes-
sage apparently helped consolidate an impression in Washington, at least at
the working level, that Richardson uncritically shared General Harkins' per-
ception of continuing military progress. When President Kennedy ordered
Defense Secretary McNamara and JCS Chairman Taylor to Saigon on
23 September for another attempt to determine Diem's prospects, someone in
McNamara's office advised CIA that Lansdale had urged the Secretary to see
village defense leader Father Hoa in Camau, plus Secretary of State Nguyen
Dinh Thuan and Vice President Tho. The purpose would be "to find out what
is really going on, probably at variance with what Jocko [Richardson] and
Harkins have been reporting." 15 (S)
Headquarters' main concern at this point was not, however, the balance of
forces in the countryside but the Station's relationship with the Ambassador.
Guidance to the Station reflected the administration's decision to beef up the
Ambassador's leverage with the Saigon government. On 19 September, Head-
quarters authorized the Station, subject to Lodge's wishes, to continue funding
those activities "directly and substantially contributing to the war effort" and
to "withhold payments for any units or activities engaged in repressive activi-
ties or otherwise politically sensitive"; this explicitly included those of the so-
called civilian airborne rangers based in Saigon.16 (S)
The disillusionment produced by the collapse of the August coup persisted,
as DCM Trueheart told Richardson that Washington wanted to be sure the
Mission did not find itself "inadvertently involved in sparking or cranking up
a coup." Richardson pointed out in this context that the "nine points" endors-
ing and even encouraging a coup that his men had conveyed to the generals in
late August had never been rescinded; for all the COS knew, the conspirators
still thought they had US support. 17 (S)
Whether for its own purposes or in response to American pressure to
remove the Nhus, the Palace now announced that Madame Nhu would travel
to Europe and the United States. Assuming that she would look up her old
friends the Harwoods in Paris, Headquarters asked them to try persuading her
to tone down her advocacy of the regime and to postpone her visit to the US.
Instead, in her customarily willful way, she commandeered the Harwoods to
'5 SAIG 0998, 18 September 1963; undated informal memorandum from the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense to C/FE, Attention Mr. Gregg/Mr. Potter; both in
The note, signed by "Frank," was probably written just before
McNamara's departure for Vietnam on 23 September 1963. (S)
9 September 1963, ibid., Box 1. (S)
"7 Richardson memorandum to McCone, "Chronology of Events," 28 September 1963. (S)
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help her edit a letter to Vice President Johnson appealing for continued US
support. She seemed not to recognize that Paul Harwood would have to report
the incident to Headquarters." (S)
As McNamara and Taylor prepared to leave for Saigon, Headquarters
instructed the Station to maintain its objectivity, and to abstain from advocating
any particular solution. There must have been continuing controversy in Wash-
ington over the US Mission's conduct during the failed coup of late August, as
this message was preceded by a curt requirement from McCone for a "buttoned
down, unequivocal, and indisputable timetable of the events and discussion
with Trueheart and the Ambassador." Colby, whom McCone was sending with
the ExComm party, would handcarry the reply to Washington. 19 (S)
Colby hoped to see a wide range of Vietnamese, in the Palace and among
the generals, in addition to various agents and Station liaison contacts. His
purposes were imprecise: "to exert influence, make possible openings, or give
some assurances for future action, both on the Diem-Nhu side and among cer-
tain figures who might serve as alternatives." Lodge had already suspended
Station contacts with Nhu, and he now vetoed this proposal; Colby would
have no contacts with Vietnamese.2� (S)
The Station did, however, make one working-level contact with the conspir-
ators during the course of the Taylor-McNamara visit. Acting on General
Minh's instructions to keep open the conspirators' communications with the
Americans, Khiem invited Al Spera to see him on 26 September. He talked
about growing VC strength around Saigon as an incentive for Diem to give the
generals more authority to cope with the threat; he purported to think that
Diem might now be ready to restrict the role of Ngo Dinh Nhu. The Station
said rather bleakly, "we do not share Khiem's belief' that Diem would curb
Nhu. Indeed, if Diem took seriously the work of his own intelligence organs,
he had other things to worry about on a day when the chief of his Special
Police was reporting that the US had targeted Diem for assassination: "An
assistant to the chief of the American CIA and about fifty sabotage and assas-
sination experts had been in Saigon for over three months."21 (S)
18
view, 16 May 1990. (S)
19 D1R 70600, 24 September 1963, and DIR 70474, 23 September 1963, both in
(S)
2(1 Ind SAIG 1290, 28 September 1963, both in ibid. (S)
2' SAID 1222, 26 September 1963; "Sequence of CAS Contacts," 23 October 1963; both in ibid.;
Harwood inter-
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The Resumption of Active Conspiracy (U)
An accidental meeting between Conein and General Tran Van Don at the
Saigon airport on 2 October sparked the resumption of an active Station role
in preparations for a coup. Don asked Conein to come see him in Nha Trang,
and after checking with the Station and DCM Trueheart, Conein flew there the
same day. Upon his arrival, Don announced that the generals now had a plan
for the overthrow of Diem which General Minh wanted to discuss with
Conein. Lodge later agreed to this, but required Conein, if asked whether the
"nine points" were still valid, to say he did not know.22 (S)
Conein saw Minh alone in Saigon for a little over an hour on 5 October.
Asking, in effect, about those nine points, Minh said that he must know the US
position on a change of government. He explicitly repudiated the notion that
the war effort could be separated from the performance of the government,
saying that popular alienation from the Diem regime was leading toward a
Viet Cong victory. Minh identified some of the other coup planners, mention-
ing Khiem but not Khanh, and said neither he nor any of the others�here he
made a joking exception of Ton That Dinh�had any political ambition.23 (S)
The conspirators did not expect any American action to support a coup,
Minh told Conein, but they needed assurances that the US would also not
move to thwart them. Finally, Minh wanted a promise of continued economic
and military aid at the existing level, which he put at $1.5 million per day.
Conein was noncommittal, promising only to convey Minh's requests to his
superiors, and Minh proceeded to outline three approaches to removing the
Ngo family. One�"the easiest"�called for assassinating Ngo Dinh Nhu and
Ngo Dinh Can while keeping Diem in office. The others involved military
action, or the threat of action, against the 5,500 troops in Saigon that Minh
thought loyal to the Palace. Again, Conein made no comment, and Minh went
on to voice his concerns about Khiem's loyalty and the danger of a "catastro-
phe" if regimental officers attempted an unsuccessful coup. Minh ended the
meeting with assurances that he understood Conein's present inability to com-
mit himself and said he would be back in touch.24 (S)
With these two meetings, Lou Conein became the exclusive channel of
communication between the US Government and the rebellious generals, who
made it clear that he was their interlocutor of choice. Perhaps they wanted to
improve security by reducing the contact points. Or they may have had doubts
" SAIG 1385, printed in FRUS 1961-63, IV Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 354-355 (U).
SAIG 1389 4 October 1963, and "Sequence of CAS Contacts," both in
Conein interview, 19 February 1992. (S)
23 SAIG 1445,5 October 1963
" Ibid. (S)
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about Spera, after his uncoordinated approach to Tran Then Khiem in late
August. But Conein would in any case have been a natural for the role, as he
had known some of the generals since 1945, when he joined the OSS team in
Hanoi after the Japanese surrender.25 (S)
Conein had been born and raised in France and served briefly in the Foreign
Legion. Early in World War II, he moved to the US where he joined the US
Army and was assigned to the OSS in 1943. When the OSS wanted to set up
in Hanoi, Conein's native proficiency in French got him named to the team.
The young lieutenant made friends among the junior Vietnamese officers
serving the French; one of these was Tran Van Don, who became his principal
contact during the conspiracy to unseat Ngo Diem. 26 In 1954, he returned as a
member of Edward Lansdale's Saigon Military Station, and began a third tour
in Vietnam when DDP Richard Bissell sent him back in 1961 to reactivate his
military contacts.27 (S)
More action-oriented than reflective, Conein would not have been the Sta-
tion's first choice to represent the US Government in negotiating something as
important as bringing down the government of an allied country. But the gen-
erals had been explicit about their preference, and the Station proceeded to do
what it could to prevent misunderstandings. Given the ambiguous attitude of
both sides, after the debacle of late August, this required meticulous supervi-
sion of the Conein channel, and Richardson charged DCOS Dave Smith with
keeping things on track. The DCOS began by briefing Conein before each
contact and then took his reports. Concerned that conviviality with old friends
might interfere with accurate communication, Smith also instructed Conein to
go on the wagon for the duration of the crisis.28 (S)
The Departure of John Richardson (U)
While Conein was seeing "Big Minh" on 5 October, John Richardson was
leaving Saigon, ostensibly for consultations in Washington. But Lodge had
exercised his prerogative, and a successor was on the way. Two days earlier,
the COS had delivered an acerbic cable from McCone to Lodge. It summa-
rized a Richard Starnes article in the Washington Daily News which claimed
" Smith interview, 6 October 1992; Lucien Conein, interview by Thomas L. Ahern, tape record-
ing, McLean, VA, 24 June 1992 (hereafter cited as Conein interview, 24 June 1992). (S)
26 While in Hanoi, Conein met Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh. Giap once treated him to a
five-hour disquisition on the theory and practice of revolution. Ho was at the time concentrating
on winning the Americans away from their support of the French. In these efforts, he emanated an
aura of sincerity and personal commitment that even the rough-spoken and somewhat cynical
Conein found "mesmerizing." Conein interview, 24 June 1992. (S)
27 Conein interview, 24 June 1992. (S)
28 Smith interview, 6 October 1992. (S)
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that an "arrogant CIA" in Vietnam had defied Lodge, causing a "dramatic con-
frontation" between Richardson and the Ambassador. Attributing his informa-
tion to a "very high American official here... who has spent much of his life in
the service of democracy," Starnes described the Station as "totally unac-
countable" and claimed that local State and military officials were complain-
ing of CIA involvement in policymaking and its dabbling in military
operations. Choosing to ignore the correspondence on the subject in Septem-
ber, McCone said, "It is my understanding from McNamara [who had just
returned from Saigon] that a change in our Chief of Station is advisable and if
you feel this way I would appreciate your advising me promptly of your
wishes and the reasons for them. I have great confidence in Richardson."29 (S)
McCone went on to point out that Lodge's recent correspondence shared
Richardson's cautious attitude toward a coup. He asked what the Ambassador
thought of the "incredible charges... attributed to 'every State Department
aide," especially since there had been no hint of these from the "dozen or so
missions that have visited Saigon during my two years in office, including my
own trip in June of last year." Discussing McCone's message with the COS,
Lodge said that he accepted the falsity of all Starnes' charges and assured
Richardson of his personal and professional esteem. He acknowledged their
differences of opinion but said he wanted no yes-men around him. Neverthe-
less, he continued, he had heard increasing criticism of the Agency from the
US military and thought that Richardson's liaison With the maligned Ngo
Dinh Nhu had created "atmospheric disadvantages." He implied that the COS
had burned out in a demanding job and made it clear that he wanted a change.
But he also exploited the liaison with Nhu one last time when he instructed the
COS to see Nhu with a message sent by Hilsman in CIA channels.3� (S)
Richardson apparently accepted Lodge's assurances of good faith, telling
Headquarters he had no idea where Starnes obtained his material. To McCone,
the Starnes article and other bad press in Vietnam and the US looked like an
orchestrated campaign against the Agency. He told Richardson to expect a
cable from Counterintelligence Staff Chief James Angleton asking for "spe-
cific information he wishes from you bearing upon Soviet foreign intelligence
services' continuing efforts to destroy CIA, as he believes many reporters and
the Times of Vietnam are either witting or unwitting accomplices in this
effort."" (S)
29 S)
" SAIG 1378, 3 October 1963, and SAIG 1397, 4 October 1963, both ibid. Hilsman's message
has not been foun
SAIG 1397, an
3 October 1963, ibid. (S)
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In fact, and regardless of any Soviet agents in the American or Vietnamese
press, the affair clearly originated in the Embassy. In late October, CIA Exec-
utive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick interviewed Kenneth Hansen, a Bureau of
the Budget official who had been in Saigon at the time of Richardson's depar-
ture. Hansen had seen the Starnes article there and said that "it was an accu-
rate reflection of what was being said in Saigon at the time and what Lodge
had said to him" at their first meeting. Lodge, who Hansen understood had not
yet found time for a briefing on Station programs, asserted that Richardson
was "improperly dealing with Nhu who was the opposition." Lodge said that
the COS was resisting the turnover to MACV of his paramilitary operations,
and that the Station "acted on its own initiative without coordination and with-
out any control from either the Ambassador or Washington."" (S)
Whether Lodge's complaints caused or merely reflected "what was being
said in Saigon at the time" remains unclear. As we have seen, his aide, Dunn,
was already quoting him to the press in early September. But the Hansen inter-
view established that Lodge's comportment encouraged the campaign against
Richardson and the Agency, whether or not the Ambassador was the source of
the Starnes article." (S)
Tightening the Screws (U)
In the midst of this internecine conflict, McGeorge Bundy at the White
House made the Station the exclusive instrument of an "urgent covert
effort.., to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership."
The Ambassador should personally brief new Acting Chief of Station David
Smith and receive his reports directly. Lodge and Smith were also consulting,
at this point, on General Minh's demands for an unequivocal US stand on the
generals' plan to force a change in government. Smith reported having recom-
mended to Lodge that "we not set ourselves irrevocably against the
assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in
Saigon or a protracted struggle which could rip the Army and the country
asunder."" (S)
" Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, "Discussion with Kenneth Hansen of the
Bureau of the Budget on the Situation in Saigon at the Time of His Visit," 24 October 1963
" The Station also suspected Rufus Phillips, who became a bitter critic of the Diem regime during
its last months, of complaining to the press about CIA for its failure to terminate all support to
Colonel Tung and the Vietnamese Special Forces. SAIG 1434, 5 October 1963,
Kirkpatrick memorandum, "Discussion with Kenneth Hansen." (S)
31 CAP 63650, 5 October 1963, FR US, 1961-63, iv, Vietnam, August�December 1963, p. 379;
SAID 1447,5 October 1963 (S)
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Headquarters promptly countermanded this suggestion, telling Smith to
advise the Ambassador that he was withdrawing it on McCone's instructions,
because "we"�not further specified�could not actively condone assassina-
tion without "engaging our responsibility" for it. Meanwhile, Lodge had told
State that he wanted to promise Minh that the US would not try to prevent a
coup, and would continue aid to a government capable of mobilizing its peo-
ple against the Viet Cong. He would avoid dealing with the assassination
option by agreeing to review Minh proposals "other than assassination
plans."" (S)
Still looking for ways to bring Diem to heel, the State Department now
detailed the sanctions that Lodge should apply in order to generate political
reforms and to intensify military action against the Viet Cong. For CIA, this
meant suspending aid to Colonel Tung's forces "in or near Saigon." Lodge
apparently thought this should apply to all the Station's paramilitary forces.
The question was further muddied by Washington's insistence on seeing Colo-
nel Tung's forces put under JGS control. On 7 October, after Smith asked for
guidance, Colby told him to take into account the planned transfer of Station
paramilitary units to MACV. Apparently wanting to avoid an imbroglio with
Lodge over resources soon to be lost to the military, Colby advised Smith to
refrain from "vigorous presentation" of his arguments for continued funding of
the Station's paramilitary units and for their exemption from JGS control." (S)
On 9 October, a State message in CIA channels confirmed Lodge's author-
ity to tell the generals the US would not try to defeat a change of government
that promised more effective prosecution of the war. The message also poi-
gnantly illustrated the dilemma created by the desire to know the content of
the conspirators' plans without becoming identified with their actions. Conein
was instructed to tell General Minh that Washington needed "detailed infor-
mation clearly indicating that Minh's plans offer a high prospect of success."
But at the same time, the Mission should "avoid being drawn into reviewing
or advising on operational plans" or in any way associating the US with a
change of government. Washington also worried about leaks, and Lodge's
reply noted that he and Smith were considering State's proposal that they
bring in someone less well known than Conein to deal with the generals." (S)
35
(S)
36 Dean Rusk, Telegram to the Embassy in Vietnam, 5 October 1963, FRUS, 1961-63 IV, Viet-
nam, August�December 1963, pp. 373-374; SAIG 1481, 7 October 1963, and
ibid.; SAIG 1448, 5 October 1963,
S)
in FR US, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 393--
394; SAIG 1572, 10 October 1963,
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� On 11 October, Headquarters made it official: Richardson would not return
to Saigon. Lodge reacted by telling Smith that he wanted the ACOS to take
over. This prompted an anxious cable from Smith telling Headquarters that he
was not maneuvering for the job and that he had assured Lodge that Head-
quarters would send someone else. On the operational level Smith was already
preoccupied with a collection effort designed to meet Bundy's requirement of
5 October. His schedule of proposed contacts drew a nervous rejoinder from
Colby, who thought that "pregnant probes" of oldline oppositionists entailed
more risks than they were worth. The Station replied with assurances of its
discretion, and the next Headquarters communication on coup coverage com-
plained not about security but about the quantitative decline in Mission and
Station reporting. 38 (S)
Contributing to reduced Station reporting was the suspension, mandated by
Lodge, of Station contact with Ngo Dinh Nhu. The extent to which this quar-
antine may have affected Nhu's attitude cannot be known, but on 17 October
he gave a defensive interview to the Times of Vietnam. Careful to maintain a
statesmanlike tone, he recalled that he and CIA officials "had been working
marvelously together in.. .the 'winning program--the Strategic Hamlet pro-
gram�and speculated that only upon orders from their superiors had these
officials incited the Buddhists to revolt. Nhu claimed to know the identities of
six CIA agents engaged in this subversion, but hedged when asked if he would
reveal them to a UN team scheduled to investigate the government's response
to Buddhist unrest. Although he never made specific accusations he probably
had indications of US collusion with the generals, in addition to the fantasy
reporting from GVN security that alleged the presence of 50 Agency assassins
in Saigon." (U)
Nhu's failure to expose or arrest any of the real conspirators or their Ameri-
can contacts suggests that the operational security measures that Headquarters
had continually urged on the Station were serving their purpose. But the inef-
ficiencies created by these measures also contributed to the persisting uncer-
tainty about the generals' aptitude for conspiracy and even their seriousness of
purpose. One such instance arose when a courier designated by General Don
told Conein on 16 October that at General Harkins' reception on 18 October
either Minh or Don would ask Lodge to confirm that Conein spoke with his
authority. Both Minh and Don attended, but neither mentioned Conein to the
"8 SAIG 1657, 12 October 1963, SAIG 1669, 14 October 1963
SARI 1769, 17 October 1963, and SAIG 1849, 21 October 1963, all in ibid. (S)
FR US, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 416-418. (U)
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Ambassador. Don later claimed that the presence of too many MACV staff
people had prevented him and Minh from raising the question, but in the
meantime the two generals' reticence only intensified the confusion.4� (S)
On the day of Harkins' reception, ACOS Smith and Brigadier General
Richard Stilwell of MACV visited Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan to
announce that the US was terminating military and CIA support for Vietnam-
ese Special Forces units in the Saigon area; payments to units in the field
would henceforth bypass Colonel Tung's headquarters. Three days later, on
21 October, they gave the same message directly to Tung who claimed to be
hearing of this for the first time. Tung at first angrily threatened to dissolve
several units if compelled to put them under JGS command. But he then
acknowledged that he lacked the authority to do this, and the Americans sug-
gested that he might do better to ask President Diem to raise the matter of
command lines with Ambassador Lodge.41 (S)
A New Interlocutor and Crossed Signals (U)
At this point, with no explanation, Tran Van Don replaced Tran Thien
Khiem as the dissident generals' primary contact with the Station. On
23 October, Don summoned Conein to JGS for a meeting that revealed poor
security on the Vietnamese side and crossed signals on the American. In an
agitated state, Don described how General Harkins had the day before given
him "cease and desist" orders with respect to coup planning. A colonel on
Don's staff, Nguyen Khuong, had just advised an American officer that the
Army would move against Diem on or about 27 October. When word of this
reached Harkins, he called in General Don to insist that, with the war going
well, this was no time for a coup.42 (S)
Don told Conein that word of Khuong's approach had reached the Palace,
which had reacted by prolonging the current field operations of two units
essential to the coup, the 5th and 7th Divisions. With the entire enterprise in
jeopardy, Don demanded an unequivocal statement of US intentions. Conein
repeated his rather ambiguous guidance to the effect that the US "would not
thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance" to a
new government capable of winning popular support and improving the war
effort and "working relationships with the US." For his part, Don wanted
" "Sequence of CAS Contacts," 23 October 1963; SAID 1896,23 October 1963,
(U)
4' Smith interview, 6 October 1992; FRUS, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp.
403-405, 424-425; David Smith, CSHP 57, The Vietnam Coup d'Etat of November 1963 and its
Aftermath (hereafter cited as CSHP 57), p. 12. (S)
42 SAIG 1896. (S)
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Conein to assure Lodge that Khuong did not speak for the generals, and would
be disciplined.� (S)
Conein challenged Don to prove that a coup committee or any coup plans
actually existed. Don insisted that preparations were well advanced and prom-
ised to ask the committee's authority to give Conein its political organization
plan. Anticipating approval, he arranged to meet Conein the next evening in
downtown Saigon.44 (S)
Lodge lost no time in getting Harkins's version of the cautionary advice that
Don claimed to have received from him. Harkins admitted that Conein had
accurately reported Don's statements, adding that his intention was to discour-
age approaches to his officers on political matters, and to focus attention on
pursuing the war effort. Lodge briefed Harkins on the 9 October cable from
Washington that had affirmed US willingness to acquiesce in a coup and
reminded the general that he had concurred, back on 5 October, when the
Ambassador proposed recommending this stance to the Department of State.
Harkins said he had thought the US "was not now in favor of a coup," and
Lodge repeated that he had instructions "from the highest levels" not to block
a change of government. Harkins apologized for his interference and promised
to withdraw his remarks to General Don. 45 (S)
Headquarters reacted to Conein's report with another exhortation to the Sta-
tion to protect itself against entrapment. It worried about the "fuzz and loose-
ness" of Don's coup committee, and about his ambiguous role on behalf of the
Diem government.
Meanwhile, Harkins had corrected the record with Don told Conein to
arrange a brief contact at Saigon airport at 0630 hours on 24 October. Don
said that Harkins had acknowledged inadvertently contravening a "presiden-
tial directive." Don volunteered to confirm personally to Lodge, when he saw
the Ambassador that evening, the committee's desire to deal exclusively with
Conein. Don then asked Conein to meet him later that day, in a dentist's office
in downtown Saigon.47 (S)
The Ambassador's appointment schedule included no meeting with General
Don, and confusion on this point continued until that evening, when Don told
1' Ibid. (S)
11 Ibid. (S)
SAIC; 1906, 23 October 1963,
47 SATO 1925, ibid. (S)
ibid. (S)
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Conein he had expected Lodge to be present at a session with MACV.48 With
respect to coup preparations, Don said at their evening session that the com-
mittee had refused on security grounds to turn over the promised political
organization plan to the Americans. It had, however, agreed to share with the
Ambassador its entire political and military planning two days before the
coup. Conein reminded Don that any US endorsement depended on a judg-
ment of the generals' plans, and Don repeated his promise, saying that the
committee would launch the coup not later than 2 November.49 (S)
Don named some of the membership of the coup committee, including
Duong Van Minh, Pham Xuan Chieu, and Le Van Kim, but explicitly exclud-
ing Nguyen Khanh. He said Khanh was cooperating with the committee but
not a member of it, and would "take his orders like everybody else." As for III
Corps commander Ton That Dinh, he was "surrounded by committee mem-
bers" and would either "cooperate or be crushed." Conein then turned to the
committee's intentions regarding a new government. Don said it would be
entirely civilian. He expected it to free non-Communist political prisoners and
hold "honest elections." Political and religious freedom would be guaranteed,
and the new regime would be pro-Western, but "not a vassal of the United
States." Don promised to keep Conein fully informed, once the coup began,
but cautioned against any American effort like the one in 1960 to restrain the
generals from conclusive action. He assured Conein that the Ambassador
would be in no danger when he traveled with Diem to Dalat on 27 October,
but added that the committee now believed the "the entire Ngo family had to
be eliminated from the political scene in Vietnam."5� (S)
" The intensity of Washington's concern over the coup committee's authenticity and intentions is
reflected in the personal attention of President Kennedy to Station cables such as this. Before Don
could clarify the matter, McGeorge Bundy cabled the Mission, using this anomaly and Don's ref-
erence to a presidential directive to support his suspicion that the whole thing was a provocation
by Nhu. Bundy seemed to overlook, in his anxiety, Harkins' confirmation of Don's account of
their meeting, which included Harkins' reference to a presidential directive. (See SAIG 1925;
(S)
" SAIG 1956, 25 October 1963, ibid. (5)
50 Ibid. (S)
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CHAPTER 14
Execution (U)
Conein's meetings with General Don on 23 and 24 October suggested that
the conspiracy against Diem had regained the momentum of late August. In
addition, a penetration of Tran Kim Tuyen's coup committee, whose leaders
included VC agent Pham Ngoc Thao and
reported that this group would attack the Palace as soon as the needed ammu-
nition and transport had been assembled. This reporting generated a flurry of
cables on 24 October which ended anticlimactically when Thao, contacted by
a Station officer, disavowed any immediate intention to act. The Station also
determined that Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Cao Ky, on whom the
Thao-Lang group allegedly depended for air support, was still drinking beer
with American officers at 1500 hours.' (S)
Helms now sent Smith a worried query about Conein. In addition to the
usual concerns about provocation and Station officers' personal safety, Helms
said that "some doubts [are] being expressed re Conein suitability for present
role." This probably reflected Bundy's doubts about the authenticity of CIA's
coup reporting, a question which Lodge was at that moment addressing in a
cable to the White House. CIA was being "punctilious" in carrying out ambas-
sadorial instructions, Lodge said, and while the Ambassador shared Bundy's
concern about Conein's preeminent role, there was no suitable substitute.2 (S)
More generally, Lodge tried on 25 October to allay Bundy's fears of a Nhu
provocation, saying that he believed the generals to be dealing with the US in
good faith. If not, CIA was "perfectly prepared to have me disavow Conein at
any time it may serve the national interest." Smith confirmed this in a cable to
Headquarters in which he also resisted Headquarters' earlier suggestion that
the Station secretly tape Conein's meetings: this, if discovered by Diem's
' PR US, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 428-429. Tuyen, as noted earlier, had
approached former DC05.
2 nd SAIG 1964, both 25 October 1963, in
(S)
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security forces, would confirm official US involvement in the conspiracy. In
any case, Smith said, the Technical Services Division was unable to supply a
recorder small enough for the purpose.3 (S)
Smith replied separately to Helms with assurances that he recognized all the
dangers. But, he insisted, Conein's ability to read Don's sincerity constituted an
irreplaceable asset, especially now, when action seemed imminent. The ACOS
acknowledged, without specifying them, the "many advantages" to Nhu of a
provocation. But like Lodge, he minimized the probability that Nhu could use
General Don, let alone "Big Minh," as an instrument in such a ploy.4 (S)
Lodge's telegram prompted another agonized Oval Office meeting, this
time with only the President, his brother the Attorney General, McNamara,
Bundy, and McCone present. When McNamara and McCone disagreed over
the accuracy of Conein's reporting President Kennedy used the opening to ask
why the DCI looked unhappy with current policy. McCone did not miss this
opportunity to predict that even a successful coup would probably lead to "an
interregnum and a period of political confusion"�perhaps resulting in a sec-
ond coup�or the chance that the war itself might be lost in the interim.' (S)
President Kennedy heard McCone out and directed Bundy to cable Lodge
expressing, as McCone recorded it, "our concern over the situation... [and] urg-
ing free and open talks with Diem." Bundy's five-sentence cable, as sent that
evening, read rather differently. It noted the President's concern that the US
would be blamed for a failed coup, and sought to reserve, if possible, "the
option of judging and warning on any plan with poor prospects of success."' (S)
One plan with such prospects seemed to be that of Pham Ngoc Thao. On
25 October, Huynh Van Lang reported further on Thao's tortuous efforts to
mobilize ARVN support and to maintain the commitment of participants, like
General Khiem, whom he thought too timid. Thao had succeeded, he claimed,
in bringing a tank company into Saigon from the southern Mekong Delta.
Lang's report also emphasized the various conspirators' shifting and overlap-
ping alliances, saying that the exiled Can Lao chief Tran Kim Tuyen had put
SAIG 1965, 25 October 1963, ibid. (S)
4 SAIG 1979, 26 September 1963, ibid. (S)
McCone, Memorandum for the Record, "Meeting with the President, McNamara, Attorney Gen-
eral, Bundy, myself, concerning South Viet Nam," 25 October 1963,
(S)
6 Ibid; FRUS 1961-1963, IV Vietnam, August-December 1963, p.
437. (S)
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his own coup resources at Thao's disposition.7 Lang claimed also that the Mil-
itary Security Service was trying to deceive the Palace, feeding it false infor-
mation on coup plotting.' (S)
While the anti-Diem conspirators wove their various plots, Ngo Dinh Nhu
devised one of his own. As the Station later pieced it together, Nhu instructed
Dinh to prepare a raid on Saigon by units based outside the city. The apparent
insurrection, which was to include terrorist-style attacks on Americans, would
then be put down by loyal forces commanded by Nhu and Dinh. The US
would then see that the alternative to Diem was anarchy and endorse the gov-
ernment's hard line against the Buddhists. But the dissident generals had
encouraged Dinh to request the Interior Ministry as a reward for his role in the
pagoda raids. As they expected, Diem turned him down, and wounded vanity
brought Dinh into their ranks before Nhu proposed his phony coup, which was
thus compromised from the start.9 (S)
Final Preparations (U)
On 27 October, General Don received Lodge's personal confirmation of
Conein's "bona fides." The two met at Tan Son Nhut airport in Saigon, where
ironically Lodge was about to take off with President Diem to visit the presi-
dential villa at the mountain resort of Dalat for what would prove to be fruit-
less discussions. Don emphasized the need for full Vietnamese control of the
affair and declined to say when a coup might begin. Lodge asked Don to keep
him informed, and in due course to furnish him the plans. Reporting all this to
Washington, the Ambassador added that only he and Smith would have access
to subsequent correspondence on the subject.10 (S)
Simultaneous visits to the same dentist on 28 October provided the cover
for the next meeting between Don and Conein. After pro forma ministrations,
the dentist withdrew to another part of the suite, and coup talk resumed. Don
acknowledged confirmation from Lodge of Conein's credentials and empha-
sized that all other dealings between Americans and Vietnamese on coup
arrangements should cease. Unable to determine what other dealings Don had
in mind, Conein turned to the US need for more information. Ostensibly on
The available evidence does not establish whether Than, as an agent of Hanoi, intended to
promote a successful coup or was simply trying to intensify the prevailing confusion in order to
weaken to VC advantage whatever government emerged. (See Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong
Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and its Aftermath (Vintage Books, 1986), p. 51.
(U)
SAIG 1977, 26 October 1963, (S)
9 CSHP 57, pp. 16-17. (S)
IS SAIG 2003, 28 October l963 Embassy Saigon 805,
28 October 1963; FRUS, 1961-d3, IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963, pp. 442-447. (S)
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in mind, Conein turned to the US need for more information. Ostensibly on
his own initiative, Conein asked Don to furnish the committee's plans in time
for Lodge to study them before his scheduled 31 October trip to Washington.
Don provided some order-of-battle information on the coup forces and
insisted that Lodge would eventually get the full plans�not 48 hours in
advance, as promised earlier. General Don could now offer only four hours'
notice. Nothing would happen in the next two days, but Conein should wait at
home starting in the evening on Wednesday, 30 October." (S)
Conein did get Don's agreement to tighter communications security. The
use of cutouts�Don's personal aide and a junior Station officer who lived in
Conein's neighborhood�and radio would reduce the need for personal meet-
ings between the two principals. Meetings would take place at prearranged
sites, avoiding the participants' offices and homes.
Despite his injunction to Conein about unauthorized contacts, General Don
could not prevent uncoordinated approaches to the Mission. These seem to
have been directed almost exclusively to officers in the Station, which as
noted earlier had for years cultivated a variety of contacts in the non-Commu-
nist opposition. When on 28 October Dai Viet politician Bui Diem asked his
Station contact to confirm Conein's key role, the officer did so. Bui Diem
responded by proclaiming himself a possible alternative channel to the mili-
tary conspirators, should direct contact with them be disrupted. Another oppo-
sitionist, Dr. Dan Van Sung, spent the next evening describing to another
Station officer how he and his allies visualized the structure of a new govern-
ment and their role in it. 13 (S)
Back in Washington, on 29 October, NE Division chief Bill Colby briefed
the NSC on the coup plans. His judgment that the pro- and anti-Diem forces
were roughly equal in strength provoked more argument among the Presi-
dent's lieutenants about the wisdom of backing the plot. McNamara, Taylor,
" SAIG 2023, 29 October 1963,
12 SA1G 2042, 29 October 1963, ibid.; Stuart Methven, interview by Thomas L. Ahern tape
recording, Clifton, VA, 17 June 1995. (S)
13 SA1G 2043, 29 October 1963, FR US, 1961-63, IV,
Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 488-490. (S)
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and McCone, now joined by Robert Kennedy, argued again that ousting Diem
was too risky. McCone reiterated his prediction that one coup would lead to
another and result in political chaos.14 (S)
President Kennedy asked for more information on the correlation of forces
and on the attitudes of Lodge and his team in Saigon. McGeorge Bundy wired
Lodge that evening that the Station's reporting on contacts with Don, Bui
Diem, and Sung had been "examined with care at highest levels," and that
Washington did not believe that "presently revealed plans give clear prospect
of quick results." Lodge should now share the plotting with General Harkins
and provide a "combined assessment of their views, along with those of
ACOS Smith.15 (U)
Lodge's reply did not object to sharing information with Harkins, but took
vigorous exception to the President's idea of putting Harkins in charge during
the Ambassador's proposed absence. To do this, he thought, "would probably
be the end of any hope for a change of government here." Citing the new
order-of-battle information provided by the Station, Lodge expressed confi-
dence that the planned coup would succeed. He asserted that the US could not
delay or discourage it
",16 (s)
That there was some basis for Lodge's apprehension about Harkins as coup
manager can be seen in the General's perplexed message to Maxwell Taylor
on the same day, 30 October. Harkins said he was aware that Don was
involved in coup planning, and that he could not understand why the generals
were talking to Conein and not to him. Early that evening, having seen and
refused to concur in Lodge's reply to Bundy, he cabled Taylor opposing US
participation in a coup without better evidence than he had seen that it would
succeed. Meanwhile, Smith was working on a request from Helms for an inde-
pendent assessment of the prospects for a successful coup. Avoiding any cate-
gorical prediction about the outcome of a coup, he replied that Diem seemed
unlikely to defeat the VC "in the foreseeable future," and that his regime had
"diminishing chances of survival."17 (S)
'4 Bromley Smith, "Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington,
October 29, 1963, 4:20 p.m.," 29 October 1963, FRUS 1961-1963, IV, Vietnam, August- Decem-
ber 1963, pp. 468-471; McCone, Memorandum for the Record, "Notes on Meeting at 4:00, Cabi-
net Room, re South Viet Nam," 29 October 1963, (S)
'5 Bundy cable to Lodge in CIA channels (cable number not declassified), 29 October 1963,
FR US, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August--December 1963, p. 500. (U)
16 Ibid; SAIG 2063, 30 October 1963 This is a sani-
tized version in FR US, 1961-63, Iv, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 484-88. (S)
'7 Ibid., pp. 479-481, 499. and SAIG 2080, 30 October 1963, both
it
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While Headquarters and the Station struggled to identify pro-Diem and pro-
coup forces, and determine the balance between them, Bundy used CIA com-
munications to override Lodge's resistance to Harkins as contingent Acting
Chief of Mission. Bundy also repudiated Lodge's assertion that the US now
lacked any capacity to prevent a coup even if its prospects looked poor. He
instructed Lodge to keep Harkins fully informed and consult him, along with
Smith, in framing guidance for officers in contact with coup forces. Lodge
replied curtly, "Thanks your sagacious instruction. Will carry out to best of my
ability." 18 (5)
Last-Minute Suspense (U)
In Washington, William Colby now made one last effort to ensure a blood-
less succession. He wrote to the DCI proposing that Ngo Dinh Nhu be
installed in his brother's place. Colby cited no specific issues on which he
thought Nhu would be more accommodating--the consensus of official US
opinion tended to blame Nhu for Diem's intransigence�and scrupulously
listed Nhu's weaknesses. These included the "fascist overtones" and
"Potemkin village" pretensions of the Republican Youth, and Nhu's frequent
inability to distinguish between identifying a goal and achieving it. But Nhu
was a "strong, reasonably well oriented and efficient potential successor"
whose principal liability�his "highly unfavorable public image"�we should
help him to improve.� (S)
Colby would presumably not have made such an audacious suggestion
without some hope of its being taken seriously. But he had long confronted the
prevailing distaste for Nhu in the State Department, and his catalog of Nhu's
shortcomings tacitly acknowledged some basis for it. He must also have
understood that the proposal implicitly repudiated the demand for Nhu's
removal in the 24 August telegram from Washington that sparked the anti-
Diem conspiracy. (S)
When the momentum of coup preparations had become nearly irreversible,
these factors, together with the timing of the idea, doubtless explain why
Colby's proposal generated no support.
General Khiem had just canceled the
armored support earlier promised to Pham Ngoc Thao, and Thao was now try-
ing to replace it with a unit pledged to the Tran Kim Tuyen group. But
SAIG 2094, 31 October 1963; all in
(S)
'9 William Colby, Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, "Leadership in Viet-
nain�Ngo Dinh Nhu," n.d., ibid. This document is filed with material dated 30 and 31 October
1963. (S)
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unknown to Thao, his intermediary with the armored squadron commander was
reporting to the Station
But the Vietnamese did not move, and the Station
could only resume its watch. As he waited, Conein pondered the Ambassa-
dor's recent remark that if nothing happened and he were actually to make his
scheduled trip to Washington, he would see to it that Conein never worked
another day for the US Government.2' (S)
Early in the morning on 1 November, the MACV Chief of Staff, Major
General Richard Stilwell, invited David Smith to drop by at his office. While
detailed to the Agency some years before, Stilwell had been Smith's first
supervisor, and he wanted now to offer the ACOS some friendly advice. To
save himself and the Agency from serious embarrassment, Smith should stop
disseminating coup predictions. Stilwell had conducted individual debriefings
of his key field advisors to the Vietnamese military. These men, he said,
and not one had heard a
whisper about a military coup. He could confidently assert that there would be
none in the foreseeable future; he and General Harkins were briefing the visit-
ing Admiral Harry Felt, Commander in Chief Pacific, to this effect.22 (S)
As it happened, a courtesy call on President Diem that same morning was
the last item on Felt's agenda. Ambassador Lodge was present, and Diem
complained to him about junior CIA officers, one of them named Hodges,
who were "poisoning [the] atmosphere by spreading rumors of coups about
him." Hodges, he charged, had told the general staff that the Seventh Fleet
would land troops if the government acted on its plan to stage a demonstration
against the American Embassy.23 Diem also insisted that the ARVN General
Staff had deployed the Special Forces units that raided the pagodas on
20 SAIG 2115, 31 October 1963, ibid. (S)
nemo
Conein interview, 24 June 1992. (S)
22 Smith interview, 6 October 1992. (S)
" Diem may have been referring to Paul Hodges, chief of the Station's liaison section. But no
record has been found of any Hodges contact with JGS at this time, let alone any confirmation of
Diem's accusation. (S)
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21 August; all such units were under JGS command, and the US was wrong
when it cut off aid to them. 24 (S)
The President kept Lodge briefly after the formal session with another com-
plaint, this time about American incitement of the Buddhist clergy. Lodge
promised to expel any American found guilty of such impropriety, and Diem
went on to talk about Communist subversion of university students. Reverting
to the suspension of aid to his Special Forces, he criticized some of General
Harkins' subordinates, describing the departed John Paul Vann as "very
imprudent." 25 (S)
In this meeting on the morning of 1 November, Diem went on to talk about
Cabinet changes, lamenting that when it came to candidates, "nobody could
give him any names." Then, knowing that Lodge planned a trip to Washington,
Diem begged him to ask Mr. Colby or Ambassador Notting about Nhu.
Describing Nhu exactly as he had once spoken of Ngo Dinh Can, Diem insisted
that although his younger brother had no interest in power, he so overflowed
with solutions to difficult problems that everyone asked for his advice. As for
himself, Diem wanted to be described to President Kennedy as a "good and
frank ally" who would rather try to settle questions now than "after we have
lost everything." Lodge thought that Diem, fearing a rebellion, might be signal-
ing some willingness to meet US demands. With this in mind, and perhaps not
taking it for granted that the generals would in fact move against Diem, he pro-
posed to discuss a "package deal" when he arrived in Washington. 26 (S)
Action (U)
Otherwise, the city was so quiet that the Station reported that the morning
had been "more nearly normal than at any time since May 8th [the date'of the
first Buddhist incident]." Then, at 1330 hours, it suddenly fired off a cable at
flash precedence reporting "red neckerchief troops pouring into Saigon from
direction Bien Hoa, presumably marines." General Don had just sent his aide
to inform Conein that the coup was under way, and to ask him to come to JGS
Headquarters, the coup command post,
'The dentist who had covered the 28 October meeting
with Don also showed up, bearing the same message. Don had tried all
morning to call, but Conein's telephone had failed.
" Henry Cabot Lodge, Telegram to the Department of State, 1 November 1963, FRUS, 1961-63,
IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, P. 515. (U)
" Embassy Saigon 841, 1 November 1963,
" Ibid. (S)
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Conein stayed at JGS Headquarters until the next day, relaying by phone to
the Station what Generals Don and Minh were telling him, and observing for
himself the management of the coup. Other Station officers were on the street,
describing the execution of the orders emanating from JGS. Together, Conein
and these officers supplied nearly all of the authoritative information on the
coup that Washington received in the next 24 hours. Conein, to begin with,
reported the arrest of Diem loyalists in the military, including Special Forces
chief Colonel Le Quang Tung and the commanders of the Marines, Air Force,
and Civil Guard. He added that the Navy chief had been killed that morning in
a "premature action."28 (S)
Meanwhile, Station observers downtown reported a firefight at the Palace.
One of them risked a vantage point close enough to allow a rough count of the
approximately 200 rebel troops at the Palace; another officer reported
35 armored vehicles headed that way. Conein advised that the generals were
trying, so far unsuccessfully, to reach the Palace by telephone in order to offer
Diem safe conduct in return for surrender. Determined to avoid a repetition of
Diem's manipulation of the 1960 mutineers, the generals did not intend to let
him argue: "He will either say yes or no." Meanwhile, they made preparations
for an air attack and monitored a broadcast by the government radio claiming
that the insurgents had been arrested.29 (S)
Having neutralized Diem's loyalists in the military, the committee felt con-
fident enough by mid-afternoon to start talking to Conein about political
arrangements. The principal civilian oppositionists had already assembled at
JGS Headquarters, and Conein was now told that the new government would
be exclusively civilian. But Diem and Nhu were still holed up at Gia Long Pal-
ace, and dislodging them took first priority. The Embassy, at this point,
clouded the issue when it claimed in an unsourced report that the generals
refused to deal directly with Diem, and wanted the Embassy to deliver their
ultimatum. Conein was reporting the contrary, that Minh had just spoken to
" SAIG 2111 and SAIG 2130, 1 November 19631
The following
account of the coup is drawn, except where otherwise stated, from a series of cables�SAIG
2131 through 2152 and ibid.�that are
hereafter cited as "Coup Chronology." For the situation report, see CSHP No. 9, History of the
Vietnamese Generals' Coup of 1-2 November 1963: Saigon Station Log and Analysis, October�
November 1963, p. 9. Saigon Station officers assembled the paper. (S)
28 "Coup Chronology." (S)
" Ibid. (S)
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Nhu�Diem was "allegedly not present"�and had forced Colonel Tung and
other Diem loyalists to tell Nhu that they were in rebel hands. Minh told Nhu
that he had five minutes to surrender in order to avoid a "massive air bombard-
ment."30 (S)
General Dinh got on the phone, violently threatening and cursing Diem
and Nhu. Another officer explained this display to Conein as designed to per-
suade Nhu that Dinh was no longer leading a phony coup, but had joined a
genuine rebellion. Nhu apparently wanted to believe that Dinh was still
merely playing his part in the charade designed to persuade the US of Diem's
indispensability.31 (S)
At 1630 hours Diem phoned Lodge. The President said that some units had
rebelled and asked, "What is the attitude of the US?" Lodge replied that a pau-
city of information and the absence of guidance from Washington prevented
him from having a view. Diem persisted, reminding Lodge that he was, after
all, a chief of state, and one who had always tried to do his duty. Lodge
assured Diem of his great regard for the President's courage and for his ser-
vice to his country. Now, Lodge said, he was concerned about Diem's safety.
Had Diem heard that "those in charge of the current activity" were offering
him and Nhu safe conduct out of the country if he resigned? Diem said no,
then, after a pause, "You have my telephone number." Lodge begged to be
advised of anything he could do to ensure the President's safety. Diem
responded, "I am trying to reestablish order."32 (U)
General Minh succeeded in reaching the Palace by phone at about
1700 hours, but the President finished by hanging up on him. Minh told
Conein he had just ordered an air attack on the Palace. This took place in half-
hearted and inconclusive fashion, and two hours later Minh gave Diem
another ultimatum: if he did not surrender, Minh would "blast him off the face
of the earth." Meanwhile, the generals asked through Conein if they could see
dissident Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang, who had taken refuge in the
Embassy during the pagoda raids they wanted to offer him a position as
Buddhist advisor to the new government. Lodge replied in characteristically
regal fashion that the "generals will be received at the Embassy" after the
coup: "I expect to receive them myself." But he thought it best that they see
Tri Quang outside the Embassy." (S)
30 Embassy Saigon 853, 1 November 1963, "Coup
Chronology." (S)
3' Lucien Conein, interview by author, tape recording, McLean, VA, 3 February 1993 (hereafter
cited as Conein interview, 3 February 1993). (S)
32 Embassy Saigon 860, 1 November 1963, FR US, 1961-63, Iv Vietnam, August�December
1963, p. 513. (U)
33 "Coup Chronology;" FR US, 1961-63, J Vietnam, August�December 1963, p. 522. (U)
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At 2020 hours, having failed to intimidate Diem with a barrage of 105mm
artillery fire, Minh ordered a battalion of infantry supported by armor to
assault the Palace. At this point, there had apparently been no evacuation of
official Americans, as one Station employee living near the Palace called in to
report that all his windows had been blown out. By 2200 hours, Station
observers were reporting the advance on the Palace, and a confrontation with
Diem forces numbering 17 tanks and some 400 troops. During the ensuing
impasse�the coup committee apparently wanted to avoid a bloody shootout
with its compatriots�Station reporting gave renewed attention to personali-
ties and politics. Either unaware of or repudiating Minh's guarantee of a civil-
ian government, General Le Van Kim, the committee's liaison with the
civilian politicians, had "decided" that a military junta would have to precede
civilian rule. But Conein felt close enough to the proceedings at JGS Head-
quarters to be confident that General Minh was in fact in charge, with Tran
Van Don firmly established in the second position, and Tran Thien Kheim
serving as chief of operations." (S)
The generals' vacillation on political arrangements produced yet another
formula, and by 0300 hours on 2 November they were proposing a mixed gov-
ernment with Diem's Vice President, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, as the new prime
minister and several generals in Cabinet positions. Once again, however, polit-
ical deliberations were interrupted by military developments, as fighting inten-
sified around the Palace." (S)
The Demise of the House of Ngo (U)
At 0620 hours, Diem called Tran Van Don at JGS headquarters, offering to
surrender if promised safe conduct out of the country. Generals Don and
Khicm told Conein they would need a US aircraft for this, and Conein called
the Embassy, where David Smith said that France seemed the country most
likely to promise asylum, and it would take 24 hours to bring in an aircraft
with enough range to avoid any intermediate stops between Saigon and Paris.
Conein relayed this to the generals, including General Minh, who seemed
unhappy about the delay. At this point, Diem had ordered his forces to cease
fire, and Minh now left JGS headquarters headed for the Palace." At
0800 hours, a Station observer posted at the Palace reported a military escort
" "Coup Chronology." (S)
" ibid. (S)
" ibid.; blind memorandum, "The Anti-Diem Coup," n.d., prepared by Lucien Conein, National
Archives---Nixon Project, copy in History Staff files; Lucien Conein, interview by Edward
Keefer, 19 April 1984 (hereafter cited as Conein interview, 19 April 1984), copy in History Staff
files. (U)
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waiting outside for Diem and Nhu." By 1000 hours, it began to look to the
Station as if the President and his brother had escaped, and Headquarters
called for reporting in the emergency Critic channel until their fate was firmly
established.38 (S)
When General Minh left JGS headquarters at about 0630 hours, Conein
returned to the Embassy. There he got instructions to get back to the generals
to pursue the question of Diem's well-being, and to urge the generals not to
arrest labor leader Tran Quoc Buu. Conein returned to JGS around 1100 hours
to find Minh now back from his trip to the Palace. The question of safeconduct
for Diem and Nhu now became moot, as Minh acknowledged that both were
dead. He alleged that the brothers had committed suicide in a Catholic church,
to which Conein responded that someone had better construct a more plausi-
ble story." (S)
But if the Ngo brothers could no longer be helped, the Mission would still
like Buu to be left alone. Conein conveyed this to Minh, provoking a com-
plaint that the Americans were already giving orders. Despite Conein's repre-
sentations, Buu was subsequently arrested and briefly detained.40 (S)
At noon on 2 November, still lacking any facts beyond Minh's statement to
Conein, the Station told CIA Headquarters it thought Diem and Nhu were
probably dead. Whatever the brothers' whereabouts and their personal wel-
fare, Smith added, it was now clear that their regime had fallen, and people
had "poured into the streets in [an] exhilarated mood," giving fruit to soldiers
and burning down the headquarters of Madame Nhu's Women's Solidarity
Movement. Then, in the afternoon, Generals Big Minh, Don, and Kim sepa-
rately offered to let Conein view the bodies of Diem and Nhu. Conein
declined, fearing the "generals would think he [was] taking grisly relish in his
part" in the coup. Conein now accepted as fact, however, that the President
and his brother were dead.'" (S)
" In his 1979 memoirs, Tran Van Don says that the rebels captured the Palace at about
0545 hours, and found Diem and Nhu gone. He claims that when Diem called him at 0620 hours
he acknowledged being in Chalon. Unless Minh was also deceiving the rest of the coup commit-
tee, this account leaves unexplained the military escort waiting for Diem at the Palace more than
two hours later, Don's failure at the time to inform Conein of the brothers' whereabouts, and
Minh's departure for the Palace after Diem's call. (See Tran Van Don, Our Endless War: Inside
Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 107.) (U)
"Coop Chronology." (S)
" Conchs interview, 7 December 1989; "The Anti-Diem Coup." (S)
^0 Conein interview, 7 December 1989; "The Anti-Diem Coup." (S)
41 "Coup Chronology." (S)
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DCI McCone applauded Conein's restraint, but at the same time demanded
more information on the manner of the Ngo brothers' demise. Station report-
ing was to be used in a meeting with President Kennedy at 1630 hours, Wash-
ington time, and the fate of Diem and Nhu remained a matter of the greatest
concern. At this point, the Station could say only that Conein thought the bod-
ies to be at JGS headquarters, and that he believed General Minh to have
ordered the executions. Minh's "show of angry passion" when Diem at first
refused to take his phone call, and later hung up on him, was one factor.
Conein also noted Minh's earlier speculation that the Ngo brothers would
commit suicide and interpreted his removal of telephones from the command
post, after Diem's agreement to surrender, as designed to frustrate inquiries
about the brothers' fate.42 (S)
While the Station struggled to confirm the circumstances of the Ngo broth-
ers' deaths, CIA Headquarters called on it to help influence the composition
and programs of the new government. The Station should propose to the
Ambassador its favored candidates for government office and identify people
it thought should be excluded. With respect to influence on the Vietnamese,
Headquarters said nothing about direct representations to the generals
Headquarters added the names of 19 civilians it favored for
inclusion in the new government, but cautioned that it had not coordinated the
list with State, and Smith should present it to the Ambassador as his own.43 (S)
At the moment, the Station was more concerned with the aftermath of the
coup itself.
Meanwhile, the search continued for information on the deaths of Diem and
Nhu. On 3 November, an occasional Station source showed his case officer
photographs of the brothers' bloodstained bodies lying with hands tied behind
their backs on the floor of an armored personnel carrier. The source claimed to
have obtained the pictures from the ARVN photographer who took them. He
had also learned that Diem and Nhu were captured at a Catholic church in
.42 Ibid. (S)
A marginal note with Colby's
initials says, "Cleared this message in principle (no names) with Hilsman." (S)
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Cholon, the Chinese district of Saigon. Most Station reporting attributed the
assassination decision to Duong Van Minh, but some subsequent reports
blamed it variously on suspected French agent General Mai Huu Xuan, the
coup committee as a whole, and the officer in command of the detail sent to
capture the Ngo brothers. The only detail on which these reports do not dis-
agree is that the murders were carried out by an officer named Nhung, himself
variously described as Minh's bodyguard and as a devoted supporter of Mai
Huu Xuan.45 (S)
The ignominious demise of Diem and Nhu shocked and dismayed President
Kennedy, who according to Maxwell Taylor's account leaped to his feet and
rushed from the meeting which Michael Forrestal had interrupted to announce
their deaths. John Richardson and David Smith had separately warned Lodge
and Headquarters of the high risk that Diem would not survive a military
coup. But the event shocked Washington, to the extent that Smith thought
Headquarters' reaction almost hysterical.46 (S)
Dismay at the brutal treatment of Diem and Nhu generated a panicky con-
cern for the safety of the Nhu children. President Kennedy enjoined McCone
to ensure their safe conduct to their mother, then in Europe. General Don had
told Conein that he had the children in his care; he said he wanted only to be
helpful, and travel arrangements were completed at a meeting that included
Lodge and "Big Minh." But there remained some doubt about the general's
good intentions, and Lodge had one of his aides, Fred Flott, accompany the
children and a nurse to Rome. At the Saigon airport, Conein instructed the
pilot that once airborne he should ignore any orders from the tower to return to
Ton Son Nhut or to proceed anywhere else than to the first scheduled stop, at
Bangkok. No one tried to divert the airplane, and the children were safely
delivered over to Bishop Thuc in Rome. 47 (S)
" "Coup Chronology"; unsigned memorandum to William Colby, "Circumstances of the Deaths
of Diem and Nhu," n.d., and unsigned Memorandum for the Record, "Description of the Death of
President Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu," 18 November 1963, both in
unsigned Memorandum for the Record, "Colonel Anh Ba and Major General Mai
Huu Xuan," 28 July 1975 Fran Van Don, Our Endless
War, p. 112; Conein interview, 19 February 1992. (S)
" Taylor's account is quoted in FR US, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, p. 533;
Smith interview, 6 October 1992. (S)
" FR US, 1961-63, IV, Vietnam, August�December 1963, pp. 546-549
Conein interview, 19 February 1992. (S)
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Full Circle (U)
Not only the Viet Cong, but a variety of non-Communist opponents, had
always denied the legitimacy of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. Less a juridical
question than one of moral and political authority, it was finally decided in the
negative when Washington concluded that Diem's repression of Buddhist dis-
sent had irrevocably alienated too many of the people he needed to fight the
Communists. Planning for the coup thus concentrated on his removal, leaving
the shape of new political arrangements for the future. But the military junta
that the US encouraged to install itself in his place had even less claim than
Diem to any popular mandate. Along with the rest of the US Government, the
CIA thus found itself starting from the beginning again in the perennial effort
to instill in the Vietnamese leadership and the Southern population at large a
sense of common purpose. The increasing militarization of the conflict com-
plicated matters, but in its political aspect the problem remained identical to
the one first confronted by the Agency's two Saigon Stations in July 1954. (S)
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CHAPTER 15
A Doomed Experiment (U)
During his nine years as Prime Minister and then President of the Republic
of Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem could call for help on all the agencies of the US
Government represented in Saigon. Although the scale of material aid from
CIA was dwarfed by that furnished by the economic and military aid mis-
sions, it is fair to say that the Agency played a central role in preserving Diem
in power, especially during his first year. No other arm of the US devoted as
much effort to helping him prevail over his numerous enemies, and no other
agency dedicated both advice and and material support to a long term effort to
create popular government south of the 17th parallel. (U)
CIA support for the Saigon government reflected not a self-imposed policy
agenda but the energy and self-confidence of an Agency which, at the outset
of the enterprise in 1954, enjoyed the Eisenhower administration's favor as an
action instrument in the conduct of the Cold War. This confidence and energy,
abetted by a broad presidential charter for both intelligence collection and
covert action, resulted in relationships with politically significant Vietnamese
across the entire non-Communist political spectrum. The single most impor-
tant of these was certainly the relationship with Ngo Dinh Nhu, but the
Agency also dealt directly with Ngo Dinh Diem, and maintained contacts of
some degree of influence and trust with other figures ranging from Buddhist
monks to opposition politicians to military and police officers. This study of
the record of the Agency's experience with Diem's government thus reveals
both the roots of the regime's failure and the inability of CIA support, and that
of the US Government as a whole, to prevent that collapse. (U)
The principal conclusion that emerges from this study thus confirms the
judgment of the early pessimists in CIA and elsewhere who predicted that
Ngo Dinh Diem could not defeat a Hanoi-directed Southern insurgency. These
observers saw precisely the personality flaws and the reliance on foreign sup-
port the latter an anomaly that the intensely nationalistic Diem seems never
to have recognized that characterized his entire time in office. He had, of
course, no choice in the early months of his regime but to depend on his
Agency contacts to suborn his local adversaries and on John Foster Dulles to
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intimidate the French; he had, after all, been installed by foreigners without
any reference to indigenous popular preferences. Had he nevertheless pos-
sessed the vision to articulate a constructive political program, and been able
to build the administrative machinery to implement it, he might have used this
period to his long term advantage. (U)
The villagers' surprisingly positive initial response to Diem's occupation of
the Viet Minh zones in 1955 suggests that this constituted a genuine option.
To succeed, Diem would of course have had to attract the loyalty of the non-
Communist nationalists who had earlier cooperated with the Viet Minh
against the French. Then, he would have faced the need to transform the ossi-
fied colonial bureaucracy into a functioning servant of his political and eco-
nomic agenda. But Diem never tested this approach. Instead, he chose an
essentially repressive strategy for the consolidation and expansion of his gov-
ernment's control. Its effect was to "dry the grass," as Mao had put it, intensi-
fying peasant alienation from the government while it built for Diem the
image of a reactionary mandarin dependent on foreign support for the survival
of his nepotistic government. (U)
Diem's reliance on family and personal loyalists to project his authority,
together with the arbitrary quality of his governing style, reduced almost to nil
the prospects of American-sponsored institution-building and political reform.
The energetic and well-intentioned but uncoordinated efforts of the two early
CIA Stations may actually have cancelled each other out, but there is no rea-
son to believe that by speaking with one voice they would have converted
Diem to a more progressive, politically inclusive approach. (S)
For one thing, the shortage of talent that led the US to see no alternative to
Diem limited Diem's own options. Other than the non-Communists who had
supported the Viet Minh against the French, he had just three potential sources
of allies: the secular political parties, the religious sects, and his own military
and civilian bureaucracy. He and Nhu may well have been right in dismissing
all three as partners in a joint political enterprise, for the sect and party leaders
were nearly all concerned solely to advance their own parochial interests.
They wanted to replace Diem, or at least tame him, not work with or for him.
And the lethargic, city-bound bureaucracy, shaped by the French to serve
French interests, offered even less promising material for a reformist adminis-
tration. (U)
In any case, Diem's sense of entitlement to his office ruled out any sharing
of either policymaking or executive power. CIA people, even Diem advocates
like Ed Lansdale, recognized this authoritarian bent early on. Some, usually
junior officers, concluded well before 1963 that Diem's governing style, unac-
companied by the pervasive controls of a totalitarian regime, must eventually
lead to failure. But most CIA officials in Vietnam, however they might
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deplore Diem's failure to exploit his opportunities to win the consent of the
governed, reacted to Diem's rigidities with the response that dominated US
judgments until 1963: "there's nobody else." Like official Washington as a
whole, they persisted in hoping that improved organizational efficiency, but-
tressed by US advice and material support, would suffice to contain the insur-
gency. (U)
It is conceivable that this formula would have worked if Diem had appealed
to the non-Communist adherents of the Viet Minh to participate in the political
and economic development of the countryside. This would, of course, have
risked sabotage by Communist infiltrators, and the requisite land reform
would have alienated the Westernized elite, which constituted the most anti-
Communist constituency outside the government itself. Such a policy would
also have involved some devolution of authority, rather than the paternalisti-
cally hierarchical system that Diem in fact imposed. (U)
Whatever its theoretical merits, a political system conceived along these
lines held no attraction for Diem, and it might have looked dangerously
socialistic to US officials, had he ever proposed it. But Diem seems in fact to
have found Ed Lansdale's egalitarian, quasi-Jeffersonian notions simply
incomprehensible. He proceeded to follow his instinct, which was to reward
loyalty and to punish even the suspicion of disobedience. Unfortunately for
his hold on office, his rural administration failed to replace Viet Minh influ-
ence with that of Saigon. The near-destruction of the Communist apparatus in
the countryside, between 1955 and 1959, resulted not in the consolidation of
Saigon's control, but in the creation of a political no-man's land. (U)
Flawed Logic and the Influence of Ideology (U)
As the insurgency advanced after 1959, American officials looking for a
response to it framed their discussions almost exclusively in disjunctive terms.
One side insisted that Diem's continued tenure doomed the South to absorp-
tion by the Communists. The other saw his continuation in office as indispens-
able to the defeat of the insurgency. Nowhere in the records examined for this
study does any of the participating US officials acknowledge, up to 1963, that
these propositions might both be valid. Whatever the possibilities in 1955, it is
possible that by 1963 the conflict could not be won either with Diem or with-
out him. That is, it could not be won at all, or at least not at any politically sus-
tainable level of American commitment) Even after 1963, this fleeting insight
never invaded the collective consciousness of policymakers and program man-
The author served in Vietnam in the last months of the regime, and participated in numerous dis-
cussions. During none of them did anyone�himself included�recognize that both sides might be
right. (C)
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agers; it was replaced, after the demise of the Diem regime, by the renewed
conviction that American programs and American resources needed only a
responsive Vietnamese leadership to mobilize a presumptively anti-Commu-
nist population. (U)
Here one must deal with the influence of ideology on practical judgment.
Agency and other US officials were indeed, at the beginning, skeptical of
Diem's capabilities and prospects. But by 1957, with the residual Viet Minh
organization reduced to nuisance proportions, Diem emerged as the embodi-
ment of American faith in anti-Communism as the foundation of counterinsur-
gency in the third world. As a result, US judgment of the balance of forces, as
the Communists usefully put it, was perpetually flawed by the assumption that
Diem's citizenry saw the alternatives in much the same terms as Americans
did�either the Southern insurgents and their masters in Hanoi or the Diem
regime and its benevolent US sponsors. In his own way, Diem fell victim to
the same misperception, attributing to his people an antipathy for Commu-
nism comparable to his own, or at least a disposition to accept his wisdom in
the niatter. (U)
But up to 1963, at least, few Vietnamese of the Buddhist-Confucian major-
ity appear to have regarded the conflict as one between Communism and free-
dom, or between Communism and democracy. The politically active among
them had other concerns, among these, nationalism tinged with xenophobia,
social reform�skillfully if cynically exploited by the Viet Cong�and, even
for non-Communists among the veterans of the war against the French, simple
protection from Diem's police. CIA and other US officials' preoccupation
with Communism allowed them to underestimate the power of these concerns
and thus to dismiss Buddhist dissidence, peasant resistance to Strategic Ham-
lets, and the pervasive incompetence of the regime as either irrelevant or as
remediable by a program of military and police repression. (U)
If the ubiquity of CIA officers in Vietnam did not lead to an understanding
of the Buddhist leadership or of peasant psychology, this reflected not lack of
energy or access but rather the prevailing mindset which classified all Viet-
namese into three groups, namely, anti-Communist patriots, their Communist
adversaries, and fence-sitters�deluded, self-interested, or timid. South Viet-
namese without a personal stake in Diem's regime appear to have defined the
struggle in quite different terms. These always included the Chinese notion of
the "mandate of heaven," that is, legitimacy earned by demonstrating the
capacity to govern. This gap in perceptions of the nature of the conflict in
Vietnam prevented the Agency, and more generally the US, from recognizing
the implications of Diem's self-defeating reliance on the two instruments of
family government repression and indiscriminate repression. (U)
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Repression meant government by fear, at least where the government found
its authority directly challenged by the Viet Cong. In order to keep the disaf-
fected on the defensive, this approach required not only ruthlessness but disci-
plined effectiveness�a quality denied the Diem regime by its reliance on
nepotism and by the sycophantic incompetence of its officials. Indeed, a
theme that pervades the entire course of Agency dealings with the Ngo family
and its retainers is the regime's irredeemable ineffectiveness in all matters
except the pursuit of suspect Communists. But even in his greatest achieve-
ment�decimating the Communist stay-behind organization before 1960�
Diem's indiscriminate violence stimulated precisely the resistance he intended
to suppress. (U)
The reliance on anti-Communist ideology both to explain the insurgency
and to motivate resistance to it accounts for otherwise inexplicable idiosyncra-
sies in the Agency's approach to the Diem regime. The Station officers who
managed the never-ending experiment in political training for Nhu's National
Revolutionary Movement consistently abdicated any role in supplying its
political content. Their one-note dependence on the theme of resistance to
Communist aggression was reinforced by the absence of prospects for rural
reform, especially in the matter of land tenure. Diem's disinclination to chal-
lenge his landowning constituency left this domain to the Communists, and
neither the CIA nor other US officials ever actively questioned the sufficiency
of his occasional cosmetic reforms. As for the struahre of government, CIA
and other advocates of the regime rationalized the hollowness of the regime's
nominally democratic institutions even while they kept pressing Diem and
Nhu to allow them to function. (U)
The perennial absence of a concrete political program�Colby's quixotic
effort of late 1960, when he invited Diem to deploy his legislature against his
own executive, may be seen as an exception led to another aberration, small
but illustrative, in the Agency's efforts on behalf of the regime. This was the
substitution of appearance for substance in a series of proposals to treat the
regime's problems as the result not of incompetence or repression or corrup-
tion but of poor public relations. These began with the 1955 Headquarters
suggestion of elocution lessons for Diem, and they resumed in the 1960s with
the correspondence between Bill Colby and John Richardson on getting Diem
and Nhu to write about themselves. In retrospect, initiatives like these cannot
be seen as anything but counsels of unacknowledged desperation. (U)
Clientitis and Demonization (U)
Another issue raised by the Agency's relationship with the Diem regime is
the effect on intellectual objectivity of a commitment to achieving an opera-
tional goal. It seems likely that any such effect declines with distance from the
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operational scene, and that Headquarters was less vulnerable to it than officers
in the field. But there is little doubt that the twin perils of "clientitis"�an
uncritical commitment to one's clients, and demonization of their opposi-
tion�sometimes clouded the judgment of officers who were in direct contact
with the Ngo brothers or otherwise engaged in efforts to strengthen and
reform their government. (U)
Although constantly frustrated by Diem's intransigence, Edward Lansdale
neither wavered in his support, nor entertained the idea that the President
might be simply incapable of meeting the challenge. It is difficult to avoid the
inference that this loyalty represented an emotional commitment to the suc-
cess of his own project, to turn Diem into the revered father of his country,
rather than the fruit of detached analysis. Later Chiefs of Station, William
Colby and John Richardson, also fell victim to this clientitis, their protege
being Diem's brother Nhu. Just as Lansdale recognized Diem's reactionary
bent, Colby recognized Nhu's penchant to substitute theory for performance,
but Colby never abandoned his advocacy of Nhu's counterinsurgency pre-
scription. Richardson was even less detached, declaring his agreement with
even the more convoluted of Nhu's pronouncements. (S)
This emotional commitment contained the seeds of a serious distortion of
the intelligence process. Fortunately for the integrity of that process, such an
effect was mitigated by a_ccidents of personality and circumstance. In the case
of Ed Lansdale, unstinffrig support to Diem constituted his mandate; Head-
quarters never looked to him for a coolly balanced assessment of the regime's
prospects. Even in the crucial episode of April 1955, when Agency witness
overcame General Collins's opposition to Diem, Lansdale's advocacy was
supported by the regular Station, always less persuaded than he was of Diem's
leadership potential. (S)
By late 1960, with William Colby as COS, a balanced assessment of Diem's
staying power had become a continuous and urgent requirement. Given the
strength of their convictions, both Colby and Richardson might understand-
ably have sought to restrict the dissemination of what they regarded as wrong-
headed criticism. In fact, there is no indication that either ever succumbed to
the temptation to make the Station speak with one voice on such a controver-
sial subject. Instead, they respected the skepticism of their subordinates by
disseminating the complaints that streamed in from the non-Communist oppo-
sition�to which many of these officers subscribed. (U)
Another threat to objectivity came in the form of the impulse to find a
scapegoat for the regime's failure to effect American-sponsored reforms.
Here, Agency officers sometimes entertained the prejudice against Ngo Dinh
Nhu that many Foreign Service officers had adopted from the French. Lans-
dale's comparison of Nhu with Mussolini reflects not a sober assessment but
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the intense frustration produced by Diem's intractability. FE Division at Head-
quarters also absorbed this bias, as demonstrated over the years in a series of
injunctions to the Station to get rid of Nhu. Even when it represented no more
than a rhetorical tic, blaming Nhu allowed his detractors to avoid the unpleas-
ant implications of a judgment that Diem had failed. (U)
Finally, the Agency experience with the Ngo brothers and their entourage
demonstrated the central dilemma of any nation-building enterprise in a
former European colony during the Cold War. CIA and other US officials
always recognized the popular appeal of the nationalist pretensions of even
Communist-led Third World revolutionary movements. Lansdale and Colby,
especially, laid great stress on this point, insisting on impeccable nationalist
credentials as a condition of the legitimacy of any candidate for leadership in
Vietnam. But they and others also expected Diem and Nhu to accept US
advice on the style and substance of governance. When these clients demon-
strated their independence by pursuing patently self-destructive policies, the
dilemma prevented any decisive remedial action; the only alternative left was
to resume looking for a leadership which would accept American prescrip-
tions while preserving its own autonomy. (S)
As it turned out, the generals who overthrew Diem first tried to cut the Gor-
dian knot by abdicating the "political part" to their CIA advisors. But this led
to a confrontation on the very day of Diem's death, when General Minh dis-
covered that deferring to the Americans on political matters meant doing
things he did not want to do. We will see in the sequel to this story of Diem
family rule that the CIA continues to be centrally involved in this question of
"leverage" as the US pursues its effort to shape the policies and programs of a
client but sovereign state. (U)
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Comment on Sources (C)
The files of the Directorate of Operations comprise the single most impor-
tant source of the material used in this study. Voluminous cable and dispatch
correspondence between Headquarters and the field provides a fairly compre-
hensive record of the activities of the two Stations in Saigon from 1954 to
1956, and of the unified Station thereafter. (S)
Supplementing this are interviews with DO officers who served at the time
either in Saigon or at Headquarters. Some of these interviews were conducted
in 1963 and 1964 as part of an historical project intended to provide a record
of Agency involvement in Vietnam. Other interviews have been conducted by
the author since 1989. (C)
Studies done as part of the Clandestine Services Historical Paper series
have also been useful, especially those dealing with the Lansdale Station, the
Saigon Liaison Mission, and the secret rebellion of early 1955. (S)
Where Agency material needs to be placed in broader context, the study
draws on other sources, all unclassified. The most important of these are the
relevant volumes in the Department of State's documentary series, Foreign
Relations of the United States, with their emphasis on diplomatic correspon-
dence. Other published accounts provide additional background and fill in a
few remaining gaps. (U)
All cited CIA documents, except those declassified and printed in the series
Foreign Relations of the United States, are classified SECRET. (S)
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Index
A
Alsop, Joseph, 5, 187, 188, 189
Anderton, John, 24, 88, 97
Arellano, Oscar, 52
Ball, George, 173
Bender, Dick, 141
Binh Xuyen, 34, 69, 70, 71, 77, 78, 79, 81, 87,
88
Bissell, Richard (special assistant to the DCI),
35
Blaufarb, Douglas, 104, 107, 113, 115, 117,
122, 125
view of Diem Nhu 107
Buddhist crisis, 171
Bundy, McGeorge, 179, 188, 195, 205
Can Lao (Labor) Party, 32, 60, 107, 113, 116,
117, 131
Can, Ngo Dinh, 106, 124, 155
Cao Dai, 34, 40, 67, 68, 81, 87, 88
Carver, George, 139, 140, 142, 143
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 6
and 1960 paratroopers' revolt, 140, 143
and backing of Diem, 84, 87, 109, 115, 217
and Bao Dai, 24
and counterinsurgency strategy, 151
and Diem's Cabinet, 33, 43
doubts about Diem, 35, 73
dual role with Diem and Nhu, 56, 94, 95
early support for French, 14
ends support for Vietnamese Special Forces
units in Saigon area, 198
in Hanoi, 29
involvement in military questions, 56
joint operations with CIO, 164, 165
pessimism about Nhu, 126
presence in South Vietnam, 6
regular Station, 15, 16, 31, 37, 57, 61, 71, 88,
91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 105
reliance on anti-Communist ideology, 220,
221
Saigon stations unified, 108
suspended contact with Nhu, 197
value of Diem, Nhu connection, 59, 120
Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), 164
Citizens' Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG),
151
Colby, William E., 129, 134, 152, 168, 173,
174, 222
and 1960 paratroopers' revolt, 140, 141, 143
and counterinsurgency strategy, 145, 148,
153, 154
and NRM project, 133
and pacification program, 149, 150
becomes Chief of Saigon station, 135
effort to forestall coup, 206
urging political reforms, 137, 138
view of Diem, 144, 163
Collins, (General) J. Lawton, 18, 55, 68, 70,
71, 72, 76, 87
and replacing Diem, 77, 81
relationship with CIA and Saigon Station,
75
Communist China, and signing of 1954
Geneva agreement, 1
Conein, Lucien (Lou), 28, 169, 172, 175, 178,
179, 186, 187, 189, 192
as channel to rebel generals, 192, 193, 196,
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198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 209,
210, 211,212
Cut, Ba, 76
Dai, (Emperor) Bao, 3, 4, 24, 25, 34, 70, 79, 93
Dan, (Doctor) Phan Quang, 94, 141
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and signing
of 1954 Geneva agreement, 1
Diem, (Prime Minister) Ngo Dinh, 1,4, 5, 6,
17
and American views, 10, 19, 73
and Edward Lansdale, 28,29, 30, 52, 62, 68,
79, 80, 88, 93, 96
approves pacification program, 149
attitude toward CIA, 55, 56, 59, 60, 88
attitude toward French, 34, 130, 152
attractiveness to American patrons, 9
Binh Xuyen insurrection, 69, 70
complaints about Ambassador Heath, 47
confrontation over cabinet, 43
executed in coup, 212, 213
governing philosophy, 56, 73, 99, 104, 152
governing style, 94, 101, 106, 115, 153, 218
personal traits, 11, 13, 31
US decision to support, 1
view of Army's mission, 145
Dien Bien Phu, 2,4
Dinh, (Brigadier General) Ton That, 187, 189
Do, Tran Van, 23
Don, (General) Tran Van, 169, 192, 193
and conspiracy against Diem, 199, 200, 201,
202, 203, 204
and launching of coup, 208
as generals' link to station, 198
Duan, Le, 132
Dulles, (DCI) Allen, 47, 48, 49, 76, 77, 78, 81,
113, 115
Dulles, (Secretary of State) John Foster, 2, 15,
24, 28, 81, 84, 87, 217
Dung, Tran Trung, 119
Dunn, (Lieutenant Colonel) Michael, 183, 187
Durbrow, (Ambassador) Elbridge, 111, 121,
125, 131, 135
and 1960 paratroopers' revolt, 141, 142, 143
attitude toward Diem, 136, 138, 143
Ely, Paul (French High Commissioner), 67,
69, 70, 78
Fault, (Prime Minister) Edgar, 87
Felt, (Admiral) Harry, 172
Fishel, Wesley, 106
FitzGerald, Desmond, 151, 153
Forrestal, Michael, 173
France, and signing of 1954 Geneva
agreement, 1
Free Vietnam, 5, 6
Gardiner, John, 131
Geneva Accords, 5
Great Britain, and signing of 1954 Geneva
agreement, 1
Halberstam, David, 176
Harkins, (General) Paul, 163, 179, 181, 182,
190, 198, 205
Harriman, Averell, 173, 177
Harwood, Paul, 15, 16, 22, 23, 54, 69, 70, 72,
75, 82, 87, 106, 114, 160, 191
and hamlet militia, 38
and National Revolutionary Movement, 91,
97, 98, 99, 102
pressing Diem on cabinet, 43
relationship with Nhu, 25, 26, 30, 33, 92,95,
97, 103
view of French, 34, 35
Heath, (Ambassador) Donald, 18, 28, 29, 38,
47, 54
Hellyer, George, 27
Helms, Richard, 156, 177
Hilsman, Roger, 150, 173, 177
Hinh, (General) Nguyen Van, 45, 49
Ho Chi Minh, 3, 4
Hoa Hao, 34, 40, 67, 69, 76, 79, 88
Hoan, Nguyen Ton, 22
Hodges, Paul, 164
Hue, Buddhist riot, 166
Ingram, Carroll, 166
Ran, 5
Johnson, (Vice Pres.) Lyndon, 147
Jorgensen, Gordon, 88
Judd, (Congressman) Walter, 10
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Kattenburg, Paul, 185
Kelly, (Congresswoman) Edna, 84
Kennan, George, 3
Kennedy, (President) John F., 148, 177, 178,
190, 202, 205, 214
and support for coup, 181
decision to force Nhu out, 173
Klianh, (Brigadier General)Nguyen, 174, 175,
189
Khiem, (Colonel) Tran Thien, 142, 175, 177,
179, 180, 182, 189, 192
Kidder, Randolph, 76, 77, 78, 80
Kim, (Colonel) Le Van, 64, 183
Kirkpatrick, (Executive Director) Lyman, 195
Korn, Edward, 21, 48,49
Ladejinsky, Wolf, 92
Lansdale, (Colonel) Edward, 16, 17, 27, 39,
72, 188
and Binh Xuyen insurrection, 78, 79
antagonism toward Nhu, 43
Binh Xuyen insurrection, 69, 70
Chief of a second CIA station, 15
end of Vietnam assignment, contributions,
109
guiding philosophy, 57
impact in Washington, 83
relationship with Diem, 28, 30, 68, 80, 87,
88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 96, 102
rural pacification program, 62
view of French, 34, 44
Layton, (Colonel) Gilbert, 149
Loc, (Prince) Buu, 4, 12, 41
Lodge, (Ambassador) Henry Cabot, 169, 173,
174, 176, 192, 201
and support for coup, 175, 179, 180, 182,
196
arrives as ambassador, 172
confidence about planned coup, 205
replacing Richardson as COS, 188, 189,
194, 195, 197
Manciewicz, Joseph, 102
Mansfield, (Senator) Mike, 84
McCarthy, Emmett, 15, 35, 38, 56, 59
McCarthy, (Senator) Joseph, 2
McCone, (DCI) John, 156, 168, 188, 193, 194,
205
pessimism about coup attempt, 202, 205
McNamara, (Defense Secretary), 177, 178,
179, 190, 202, 204
Mecklin, John, 160, 187
Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG), 16, 17, 65, 71, 90
Military Security Service (MSS), 120
Miller, Russ, 141, 155
Minh, (General) Duong Van, 200
and death of Diem and Nhu, 212, 213
Minh, (General) Tran Van, 140, 170, 179, 183,
192
Minh, Ho Thong, 71
Murville, (French Ambassador) Couve de, 81
National Police, 113
National Revolutionary Movement (NRM),
91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 107, 116, 123,
124, 126, 147
NATO, 3
Natsios, Nicholas, 111, 115, 119, 125, 129,
134
Nhu, Ngo Dinh, 5, 12, 17, 19, 33, 73, 79, 87,
90, 101, 114
and 1956 National Assembly Elections, 103,
104
and hamlet militia, 38
and pacification strategy, 149, 150, 153,
155, 156, 157
and pagoda raids, 172
antagonism toward Lansdale, 43
anti-Americanism, 160, 165, 167
attitude toward CIA, 22, 25, 32, 54, 125,
167, 182, 185, 186, 197
attitude toward French, 34, 130
executed in coup, 212, 213
governing philosophy, 14, 31, 32, 92, 124,
127, 131
idea for phony coup, 203, 210
view on military strategy, 163
Washington visit in 1957, 113
Nolting, (Ambassador) Frederick, 148, 171,
178
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0
O'Daniel, (Major General) John, 45, 62, 67,
69
Operation Brotherhood, 52, 62
Orendain, Juan, 104
Parker Evan 115
rnitippines,
Phillips, (Lieutenant) Rufus, 64
Phuong, (General) Nguyen Thanh, 67, 68, 69,
70
Police Special Branch (PSB), 60
Redick, Joe, 38, 108
Reinhardt, (Ambassador) G. Frederick, 55,87,
93, 96, 105
RhadO tribesmen, 148
Richardson, John, 156, 169, 189
and support for coup, 174, 175, 177, 178,
180
and support to military, 158
becomes COS Saigon, 156
view of Diem and Nhu, 160, 163, 166, 168,
173
Robertson, Walter, 84
Roosevelt, (President) Franklin D., 2, 3
Rusk, (Secretary) Dean, 177
Saigon Station, 14
Sang, Lai Van, 77
Service des Etudes Politiques et Sociales
(SEPES), 118 125
Sihanouk, (Prince), 125
Smith, David, 149, 167, 173, 193
and assassination plot, 195, 196
and Diem's demise, 212
and Diem's offer to surrender, 211
becomes Acting COS Saigon, 195
South Korea, invasion in 1950, 3
Soviet Union, and signing of 1954 Geneva
agreement, 1
Special Branch, 95, 119
Special Coordinating Committee, 103
Spence, Virginia, 21,24
Spera Al, 175, 178, 179
Stilwell, (MACV Chief of Staff, Major
General) Richard, 207
Strategic Hamlet concept, 150, 151
Symington, (Senator) Stuart, 152
Tac, Pham Ngoc, 69
Taylor Mission, 151, 152
Taylor, (General) Maxwell, 149, 177, 179,
190, 204
Thanh, Tran Chanh, 26, 95, 106, 120
The, (General) Trinh Minh, 41,46, 67, 68, 69,
70, 79, 87, 88
Thi, (Colonel) Nguyen Chanh, 141, 142
Thieu, Nguyen, 123, 124
Tho, (Vice Pres.) Nguyen Ngoc, 170, 174, 178
Thompson, (Sir) Robert, 149
Thuc, (Bishop) Ngo Dinh, 14, 22
Trueheart, William, 180, 182, 192
Truman, (President) Harry S., 3
Tung, (Colonel) Le Quang, 119
Tuyen, (Doctor) Tran Kim, 60, 168, 169
Ulmer, Al, 60, 108, 111, 115
United States Information Service (USIS), 17,
101, 102, 103, 108
United States, and attitude toward French
Indochina, 2, 3
United States, and Geneva negotiations, 4
US Information Service, 65
US Special Forces, 149
V
Viet Cong, 61, 109, 133
Viet Minh, 4, 6, 14, 95
and US, French opposition, 1, 2
Vietnamese Army (ARVN), 133, 144, 145,
163, 174
Vietnamese Confederation of Christian
Workers, 32
Vy, (General) Nguyen Van, 79, 81
West Germany, 3
Williams, (Lieutenant General) Samuel T.,
121, 134, 136, 145
Wisner, Frank, 72, 75, 81, 90, 113, 115, 123
SECRET//X1
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Approved for Release: 2016/12/20 C01268718
Xuan, (General) Mai Huu, 120
Young, Kenneth, 84, 103
Numerics
17th parallel, 4, 5
SECRET/Al
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Approved for Release: 2016/12/20 C01268718
Approved for Release: 2016/12/20 C01268718