A COORDINATED USG APPROACH TO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF NEW SOVIET BCW EFFORTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05251767
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2017
• Case Number: F-2012-01432
• Publication Date: January 9, 1984

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National intelligence Council
The Director of Central intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
TS 843479
9 January 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : A Coordinated USG Approach to Public Disclosure of
New Soviet BCW Efforts
1. As you know, the Wall Street Journal will shortly publish an
editorial-page series disclosing new Soviet BCW (If the newspaper
holds to its present schedule, we will publish before the series -(b)(1)
appears.) The fact of coming public disclosure raises the questions of (b)(3)
whether and how the U.S. Government should respond to the inevitable inquiries
about what we know and what we intend to do. What follows is a summary of
current thinking by David Low, and STAP members (b)(3)
both of whom have reviewed the current SNIE drafts.
2. In essence, this topic is an extension, or the next phase, of the
development of chemical and biological weapons in general. It therefore must
be seen in the context of the public debate on yellow rain, where the U.S.
Government has had difficulty establishing its cases, particularly among
certain scientists who have obtained great media exposure. This difficulty
derives from a combination of skepticism and naivete on their part, as well as
our inability to disclose totally very sensitive intelligence information
which supports the case. One significant difference, however, is that yellow
rain use generated a series of legal, treaty violation and human rights issues
which are not (yet) involved here. As a result; in that case the U.S.
Government was obligated to step forward with its case.
3. Since the new agent development (using state of the art
biotechnologies) is still emerging from the R&D phase, it may be even more
difficult to win public acceptance for the conclusion that this Soviet program
exists or for the prospect of use Of those new agents in the future.
Furthermore, given the very sensitive-level evidence which supports our paper,
we have no choice but to very closely hold our knowledge and conclusions
relating to biological agent development. Distribution
will be carefully restricted.
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4. Contrasting with this concern is (a) the need to inform key
policymakers of the serious implications of our analysis, and (b) the desire
to demonstrate that the intelligence community in this case is ahead of the
issue and well informed.
5. There are additional factors to consider:
a. Much of the U.S. research community in this field, particularly
that housed at NIH, suspects that the U.S. has a classified BCW program
underway, nothwithstanding the decision by President Nixon to shut down
our program. Additional publicity which confirms the U.S. intelligence
community perception of the Soviet program as being well-along would fuel
this concern, on the theory that surely the Pentagon would not allow this
condition to go unanswered (at least from the point of view of secret
research).
b. The Soviet perception of U.S. capabilities should be
considered. Exactly how much they think we know about their program as
well as what we want them to think of our own capability (offensively and
defensively) must be carefully managed.
c. Too much public play on this issue, including implications that
the intelligence community knows more than it will tell, could push the
Soviet effort underground, i.e., further into the classified realm. At
the moment, much of the technical Soviet work is available in open
literature, and a good deal of information exchange takes place at
scientific meetings, etc. Higher classification by the Soviets would
(a) slow down their access to Western technology, but (b) make our
ability to keep track of their program much tougher.
6. Thus, there is a conflict in the approaches which we might take in
responding to the public discussion which will .ha raised by the Wall Street
Journal series. Low, all feel that, given the
background of the yellow lam woruyue, we snout� no whatever we can to avoid
getting into a position where once again we would be trying to back up claims
with evidence that cannot be unclassified. This will likely put us in a
direct confrontation with State, which probably will seek an unclassified
statement of U.S. knowledge on this issue.
7. It might be useful for members of the National Security Council --
and also HHS Secretary Heckler, whose portfolio includes NTH -- to work out a
coordinated approach to dealing with the coming disclosures. Among the
features of such an approach would be these:
-- The U.S. Government has been aware of Soviet BCW efforts.
-- We publish on these efforts, although at a classified level.
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-- We will continue to keep close watch on Soviet BCW efforts.
-- While we cannot, for security reasons, confirm or deny the accuracy
of the Wall Street Journal series, nothing in the series has come as
a surprise to the U.S.
Herbert E. Me er
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VC/NIC/HEMeyer.
Distribution:
Copy I - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - EXDIR
4 - SA/IA
5 - Executive Registry
6 - Chairman, NIC
7 - VC/NIC (HM Chrono)
8 - NIO/AL (DLow)
9 - NIC -)^""4"---
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