NORTH KOREA-USSR:

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06711551
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2017
• Case Number: F-2018-00061
• Publication Date: March 26, 1986

Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
���
:enhal Intel! genc Agency
Washinsta D )SOS
DIRECT )RATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 Marc) 1986
North Korea-USSR: How ilcoe Can They Get?
Su nal z Ex
Tie improvement in relations between North
Korea rnd the Soviet Union since 1984 reflects
P'yongiang's determiration ttat only Moscow can
provide the critical elemert.1 of economic and
military aid needed ty the Ncrth, as well as
Kim II-song's greater tole-arce for the current
trends in Soviet--coppared with Chinese--domestic
and foreign policies. The Ncrth has increased
support for the USSR's nuclear disarmament
initiative and its cEll fo� an Asian security
conference, aril now lermit; the Soviets to use North
Korean airspace for intelligence collection flights
against US, South Korean, and Chinese forces.
Moscow has provided the f�ftst relatively modern
fighter aircraft to Enter P'yongyang's inventory in
20 years and n.lw antiaircraft missiles. More Soviet
This memorandum was prepared by th? Korea Branch, Office of East
Asian Analysis. Information avEillble as of 26 March 1986 was
used in its preparation. Commerits and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Keirei Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, 0EA, on
EA M 86-20038
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
help .:ould ircrease the Nort's military advantage
over :he South cons derably
He expect any 'urther .mprovements in bilateral
ties .o be part of , long aid gradual process, in
part I.ecause North ::orea's reeds are far greater
than ..he USSR's willingness to supply. The North is
unable to pay for a'l its economic development
needs�oil, raw materials, end plant and equipment--
and tie Soviets have not )rcvided large credits. In
addit'on, differences on cey policy issues remain.
The Scviets are relectant te bless Kim Chong-il
publicly as a succe!sor t) tis father, for example,
and Sc far have shown little sympathy for North
Korea's demand to cehost the Olympic Games.
Finally, we expect Poscow will continue to control
the arms supply spicot ca�efully. Nonetheless, we
do not expect short-term Frustrations or current
policy differences to brilg an about-face in Soviet-
North Korean relaticns.
Warming Relations
Soviet-North Korean relat.ons are the best they have been
for decades. We believe this .mprovement, which dates at least
from Kim Il-song's May 1984 vicAt to Moscow, in part reflects the
North's increasing concern over S)uth Korea's economic advantage
and its potential for cutting the North's military edge:
P'yongyatg almost certainly believes only the Soviet
Uhion cal provile technflogically sophisticated weapons
countor South Korea'; acquisition of F-16 fighters
aid its indigen)us development (however marred by
technica problems) cf the K-1 tank.
Tie North Koreaws clearly look to the Soviets for
e:onomic help Ii their :osing battle tok4ppce with
tie burgeoning iouth Ko'ean economy.
In our View, Wyongyeng's closer ties to the Soviet Union--
at the expewse of relatiols with :hina--also derive from shifts
in its atti:ude toward th! leader ;hip in Moscow and Beijing.
After the Slno-Sovet split Kim I -song identified North Korea's
own brand ot Commurism wi:h Mao's independent and indigenous line
and with Ch na's tten hos:ile pos.:tire toward the West. Soviet
claims to h!gemony in the world C4Immunist movement and Moscow's
subsequent policy cf East .West de..ente further pushed the North
toward Beij ng and reinfotced cul..ural and Korean war generated
bonds to tho Chinese. Tho econom.c reforms of Mao's successors,
however, aluost certainly have appeared considerably less
congenial Lei the Ncrth, welch conAnues to emphasize central
controls. dust as import,nt, Chiea has developed economic ties
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
to South K)rea, which. fo. P'yonvang can only call into serious
question B)i'ings! willilgness ti carry a brief for its Korean
ally.
Indee I, by tFe earl.' 1980s, the more openly adversarial
Soviet rel itionship with the Unt.ed States, and its contrast to
Beijing's .approctement fith Waslington, only underscored the
changes in the policies 'if the Nirth's one-time closest ally. We
believe thi. North is we) 'aware *hat China essentially accepts
the US prcence in South Korea a! part of a counterweight to
growing So' let power in J.sia--a ce facto Chinese position at odds
wIthP'yonyang's core sccurity .nterest for over 30 years.
Pay-Offs Flom the Warminc Treni
For Its part, North Korea has become more supportive of
Soviet secLrity policies. P'ygnsyang, for instance, departed
from its traditional habit of ignoring superpower summits by
praising Gcrbachev's periormani:e in Geneva and supporting his
nuclear disarmament initiative. In addition, subsequent North
Korean statements noved closer to backing Moscow's proposal for
an Asian security :onference and, for the first time, expressed
solidarity with tha Soviets' c'fent regime in Afghanistan.
P'yongyang, i another important policy departure, now
permits the Soviet; to use North (orean airspace during
intelligenca colle.:tion flight:. These flights have continued on
a regular basis slice they began In December 1984.
The Economi: Dimenion
Beset tith problems Aanging :rom energy shortages to
transportatfon bottleneck;, and autious to launch its new seven-
year plan (Ilready postpoled two !ears) in 1987, P'yongyang is
looking to ioscow for he) ) in imp.oving its sluggish economic
performance. In December the Soy ets agreed to provide North
Korea with it least one niclear pnwer plant; we expect North
Korea's acci!ssion to the uclear Honprofileration Treaty the same
month was a condition for that avistance. P'yongyang clearly is
a reluctant NPT sisnatory.-it refosed to publicly acknowledge
adherence--but we telieve its pre! sing energy needs outweighed
Its desire -4) avoid placing limit on a future nuclear weapons
option.
Ncrth Korea's cfronic erergy problems were temporarily
eracerbated lasl fall, when the largest of its two
stpertankers wa! sunk ir the Persian Gulf. .
Nerth Korea alsc impoq: ChInescritdebu1tcan use it
at only one of �ts refireries.
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 006711551
Given the North's bid debt .epayment record, its limited
export potintia . and re;ultant lifficulty in importing from the
West, the lorth Kcreans :learly are hoping for additional
economic btnefits from treir imp-oved relations with Moscow.
\during Kim Il-song's trip
to Moscow n 1984, ryontyang soight Soviet agreement to postpone
debt repayment, help to .:omplete nine plants under construction,
and assistince in new prfljects--.ncluding thermal power as well
as the nuc'ear pouer plant, a factory to produce freight cars, a
textile factory, and off:hore 311 and gas exploration projects.
there projects would cost some $1.2 billion,
or about tlree times the cost 3f all equipment the Soviets
rp_royjided fcr projects doing tie 1978-84 economic plan.
We hal.e not seen much evidence so far of generosity from
Moscow. Tte Soviets have said publicly that the 1986-90 trade
agreement signed il late February calls for a doubling of
combined exports aid imperts during 1986-90 over the 1981-85
period, but they hive not given a breakdown for exports and
Imports. Moreover, most of tiro! viblicly listed projects
Involving Soviet eluipment havu been under construction for years
and are nearing completion. only two
new projects: the nuclear and thermal power pTants. We can only
conclude thit Moscow is hAdins off on other commitments because
It knows NoPth Korea cann)t aflori all it has requested and
because the Soviet!; are uiwillig to offer a large financial
assistance )ackage
We expect the Soviet; to remain tight-fisted. The USSR has
long been trugh on Its Ea;t Europitan allies and appears to be
cracking don even harder now, maAng it unlikely to take a
different ttck wit the Nrrth. Muiscow has increasingly demanded
balanced trade and repaymmts on debt obligations. And, with
production iroblems at hone, we dc not believe the Soviets ar
re
likely to bd genercus wit' their ill or other raw materials.
Military De'iveries
Despitc North Korea': econmic problems, the military
remains P'ycngyang's numbir-one priority and the area that has
shown the greatest payoff from !waved ties to the Soviets.
South Korea's most importint edie on the North--its superior air
force--is ir danger of ertding as the Soviets begin to supply
such systems as the Flogger-G variant of the MIG-23 fighter-
interceptor. The Flogger-G is ;he first relatively modern
fighter to Enter the Nortf's inventory in over 20 years, and the
first major weapons syster supp-iel by the Soviets since the
early 1970s. If Soviet deliver-es continue as we expect, the
North Koreans will lave at least a full regiment of 40 Floggers
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 006711551
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
this year. The fighters will Oinificantly improve the North's
dated air .leet.
lie strongly believe that the North's new fighters carry
ihe same, equipnent a; the Flogger-G in Soviet forces,
including the, 1A-7 A)ex air-to-air missile.
Apex missiles vould provide an all-aspect, medium-range
attack cepability at medium altitudes. Other North
Itorean fighters are o:apable of effective missile attack
only fron a tail-on approach at short ranges.
Flogger-3s with radar-gaided Apex missiles would give
the Norti its first true all-weather fighter
I nterceptors.
In a farther 'effort to upcat, its aging air force,
P'yongyang is estalOishing an indigenous production capability
for jet figiters--probably a ccpy of the Chinese F-7, an improved
version of the ear if-model MIG-21.-\
We can iot esttmate fsture production rates for an aircraft
industry thit has yet to woduce fighter; nor do we know how
many MIG-23; Moscov will irovide. If the Soviets provide only a
single regiient of Flogge.s and domestic production moves slowly
for the fir;t few years, ;eoul's .4vorable position would
probably renain the same :hrough :989. The Flogger-G is not
significant y better than the F-41 Phantom, the best fighter now
in the Sout:i Korean Air Force. Tie Phantom's Sparrow missile is
better than the Apex, and the F-4: maneuverability at least
compensates for the Floggfr's fesier acceleration. North Korea's
F-7s are es!entially equilalent tc South Korea's most numerous
fighter, tho F-5 E/F. Nose of these aircraft approaches the
capabilitie: the F-16s the S)ulh will begin receiving this
year.
At this point, there is some evidence to suggest Moscow will
provide only one regiment.
=����
Alter the initial fluiry of deliveries--the Floggers
came in three sfipmen:s from May to August 1985--they
ceased. It could be :hat the 26 MIG-23s constitute a
tcken Soviet contribu.:ion similar to shipments of 24
51-7 Fitters 22 M G-?.1 Fishbed-Js in the early
1570s.
Given the pattern in Soviet deliveries of SA-3 equipment--
which picked up in 1986, �-we
expect fighter deli/eries to resume. If the Soviets supply two
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
regiments about EO airc.aft) of MIG-23s and the Chinese help
North Kore.: overccme ear y hurdlps in fighter manufacture, the
South's le..d in air powe would !hrink,markedly rather than
increase a. Seoul had pinned. �
- Even !o, we do not f!xpect tie air' balance to shift to the
North's fa' or during thi: decale. Such a development would
require ccosiderably larter Soyiet deliveries of new aircraft,
such as the MIG-29--an urlikely cccurrence because the Soviets
are just beginning to dello), tilt system with their own forces.
We expect !outh Korea's iir adtartage, at best, to hold at the
current le%el or decrease somewhat by 1989. In either case,
Seoul is urlikely in thi period to compensate in the air for the
North's sitnificant advartage on the ground.
We exFect, in fact, the North Koreans will increase their
edge in ground for:e capabilit.es, but largely through their own
efforts. P'yongyalg employs its awn ingenuity and production
base--using technology suppliec by Moscow and Beijing in the
1960s and 1970s--t) arm its forces with large numbers of self-
propelled field ant antiaircraft krtillery and armored
vehicles. !tumors )ersist that th? Soviets will provide 1-72
tanks, but we have seen na evicen:e that North Korea will soon
field a modIrn tanl: to rival tte 1S-designed K-1 now being
produced in the South. Althouch re cannot rule out future
provision or the 1-72, aveilable ?vidence indicates the Nor
looking to its own indust.y for n!w armor vehicles.
No.th Kore.' is developing and fTeTdTng a
new light ttnk'based nU6Gs1tecinology imported from the Soviet
Union and Cline.
We alsi have ro evid!nce tha' Moscow is providing P'yongyang
with an offonsive chemica warfary capability, although the
Soviets hayi! supplied the North w.th chemical decontamination
vehicles.
because the Worth has a large chemical
Industry, pcssesses large quantities of decontamination
equipment, end trains Its force; in a chemical environment, the
US intelligence community belivres North Korea cifils have a
limited chenical warfare capabi ity.
Many weapons I, the itorth':. inventory that fire high
explosive spells woild be equal 'y capable of delivering chemical
munitions, includini nine to 12 FRG-7 launchers and an unknown
number of rockets cipable of reiching 70 kilometers into South
Korea from position; near the DMZ. North Korea also has at best
a few Scud-B missil:s with a 30C-kilometer range.
ItOR.Q.1
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
In sun, we have seer both Scviet support--and a lack
thereof--ir the North's continqirg force improvement. We do not
know how far the Soviets are willing to go in providing weapons
to P'yongyang, nor what ihey would demand or settle for in
return. Tte North clearly canuot pay for large numbers of
weapons. In our view, Mcscow night see future weapons deliveries
as insurance for c)ntinued pernission from the North for
overflights during collection nissions against China and US and
South Korean force;. The Soviuts may believe that such
deliveries eventually could leid to air and naval access to bases
In North Korea. We would expect ''yongyang to resist making any
concessions that arpeared to deniirate its sovereignty. The
North might, howevqr, be oillirg to lend more support to
policies even at further expense to its ties with China.
Defining the Relat-onship: Where Are the Boundaries?
The waiming trend in Soviet-lorth Korean relations suggests
that both cruntriet have .eassesstd and adjusted their positions
in the Sovirt-Chinuse-North Koreao triangle. There are, however,
obvious bar.iers tc more rxtensivi! improvements in bilateral
ties.
Cdreful ov1et :ontrol tver the flow of military and
eimnomic assist,:nce, in our judgment, reflects
clintinued Sovie: distrult of an unpredictable ally and
Cie constraints on su:h help imposed by North Korea's
1.mited ability to pay.
Bitter Soviet-Nirth K)rean relations have not
ftndamentally Ctered P'yongyang's fierce independence
or the almost crrtain backlash should the Soviets
aitempt to interfere in its internal affairs.
Ncr will the North conpletely discount its historical,
ctltural, and pclitical ties to China, despite the
clear drift awa) from Beijing because of the turn in
sincu the 1970s.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
7
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
(b)(3
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
The rOationship is also cop strained by substantive
difference on key polic:. issues. While the Soviets on one
occasion u!ed private ta'ks with US officials to pay lip service
to North !Cereals call fop tripariite talks with the United States
and South Ivrea, the issie was ccmpletely ignored in the
communique! after Premiel Kang Scng-san's visit to Moscow in
December aid Foreign Minster ictevardnadze's return trip to
Plyongyang the.next monti. Tha !oviets, in our view, are wary of
a forum where they are eecludei, especially if it includes the
Chinese. lhey undoubtedly are avare China has sent repeated
messages tirough US diplcmats lncouraging tripartite talks and
has even oifered to host them In Beijing.
A related potential troub e spot is the idea floated by some
Soviet officials that Moscow mAht back cross-recognition of the
two Koreas. Soviet Comunist Party International Department
Deputy Director Koralenkc last month told Japanese Socialists
that he believed cross-recogni.:ion was the only possible solution
to the Korean imbr)glio. AccoPding to South Korean officials in
Tokyo, the Soviet Embassy subscquently told the Japanese
Socialists to forget Kovalenko's remarks. But the South Koreans
speculate that the comments refle:t the private view of the
Soviet leadership. North Korea firmly opposes cross-recognition
because it Nould ligitimize thc division of the peninsula. And
we are certain tha: Plyongyang woald be troubled by a public
Soviet contradiction of a basic Narth Korean policy.
The Olympics ire another sort point. Moscow and its allies
have given lip serqice to the Aorth's cohosting demand but have
not replayel Plyongyang's threat pf a Socialist and Third World
boycott unless Nor%h Korea gets share of the Games. Only
Cuba, Nicaragua, Te.nzania, and Ettiopia so far have issued
boycott thrtats. lie expe:t the North to continue to push hard
for as much of a face-savIng comvomise on "sharing" the Olympics
as it can get, but we als) believo it underestimated Soviet
determinati)n to void anather bo:cott and ha! been compelled to
backtrack DI the cchostinj issue.
In add tion, Poscow end Plyollyang continue to disagree
about selec:ed internatiopal issues. For example, North Korea
continues t.1 recogrize Pr nce Sihinouk's disparate anti-
Vietnamese :oaliticn in Icimpuchea This position is perhaps a
residual ef'ect of Kim 11 .song's personal friendship with
Sihanouk ra:her than a ma.:ter of policy. Nevertheless, if the
North Korealls break their pattern of inviting Sihanouk to
Plyongyang, it will be a .ign thal the North is moving closer to
Soviet postions (and fur. her from China's) on yet another
Issue.
Finall:, we believe !oviet-Ncrth Korean relations are
directly af. ected by Moscetv's attitude toward Kim Il-song's
succession plans. The Soriets :lcarly are reluctant to give
their public blessing to urn's lesignation of his son, Kim Chong-il,
1.111.1.1=111111.111.1.1111141111
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
A
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 006711551
as his hei-. We eo not now whe:her the Soviets invited the
younger Kir to attend their receit Party Congress, but we believe
his absenc!--despite monAts of sleculation that he would attend--
indicated 'rictiors over his stvats. North Korean reports of
Schevardnalze's meetings in P'yolgyang placed the elder and
younger Kims side by sid,!. Soviot reports of the same meetings,
however, b,.rely mentioned Kim Chtng-1l. Although Schevardnadze
Invited thu elder Kim and Foreigt Minister Kim Yong-nam to the
USSR by name, the only pussible .nvitation to Kim Chono-11 was an
oblique re.'erence to "otler.iniiiations."
In pant, this Soviel attituce probably stems from Moscow's
objection to North Korea's versicn of "Socialism in One
Family." fut the Soviet may tlso be uneasy about the policy
inclinatiors of the youncer Kim. [
Moscow may perceive him as pro-Chinese. Beijing gave him the red
carpet treatment when he visitod in 1983, and the Chinese have
been far less reticent atout ag:cepting his eventual accession to
power.
Notwithstandiig these cleur limitations, both sides have
gained froff the ne4 direction e,f Soviet-North Korean relations.
We do not expect siort-term frestrations or current policy
differences to brit ut-tace in the current trend in
bilateral ties.
Implications for tIte Unitad State;
The belefits .'rom the improvments in Soviet-North Korean
relations tut have accrued to bo:h Moscow and P'yongyang work
against US Ind South Korein interlsts in several ways. Moscow's
willingness to improve the qualit: of its military exports to the
North incretses the three: to the South. While the Soviet
diplomatic mtgagement on :corm 1: sues is likely to introduce a
complicating factor in tht North-!outh Korean dialogue, we do not
know whethe- the Scviets ire coutueling P'yongyang to be flexible
in these ta ks. Gcod rel�tions vuth the Soviets could boost
North Korea lt confieence io pursuitg the dialogue. But if Moscow
judges that it should dis:Anguish its advice on the North-South
talks from ts principal lompetitCr for influence in P'yongyang--
the Chinese�the Soviets eould se inclinedtotnipcta negative
rather than positive note in the grocess.
Increa!ed Soviet influence ir P'yongyang could, however,
offer potential leverage en SOMQ troublesome issues. On the
nuclear frort, for example, the USSR has strictly enforced
international nonproliferation guidelines with Third World
recipients cf its nuclear technology. Although nothing can
guarantee acainst a determined North Korean effort to develop
nuclear weagons, we believe Soy et-North Korea nuclear
cooperation will in:rease Soy1eiliaJLdnternattonal controls over
a suspect nuclear program.
9
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 006711551
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
We al ;o believe Mos:ow's ca.efully calibrated military
assistance prOgran still indicati!s a Soviet concern with North
Korean inti!ntIons. Mind''ul of the potential for escalation in a
region whe.e the securit: intere!ts of the Chinese. the Japanese,
and the Un ted States in:ersett. wlith their own, the Soviets
continue t4. have reason :o modulite carefully their military
assistance to an already powerfu North Korean force,
We be'ieve the Nort) has noied to improve its political
relations iith Moscow paitly t) (nlist Soviet diplomatic help in
pursuit of its primary gal--ramcval of US forces from the
peninsula. We expect P'Iongyaig to continue to work both sides
of the str(et--using the Chine;e to convey its interest in direct
contacts with the United State; and the Soviets to remind
Washington that its troops in Corea threaten Soviet as well as
North Korean interests. The willingness in P'yongyang to endorse
inclusion et the, K)rean issue on the superpower summit agenda--
after years of ign)ring that option--suggests that P'yongyang may
be more hopeful that any proorfiss on this core will come through
Moscow rather than Beijing..
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
- SEP 2'9 '94 07:42141
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
P,3
Approved
-
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
� -,SEE 28 '84 07:4541
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551
P.4
'SE
Approved for Release: 2017/11/15 C06711551