THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00691541
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02757
• Publication Date: October 25, 1962

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CENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA
Information as of 0600
� 25 October 1962
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
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25 October 1962
SC No. 08179/62
SUMMARY CONTENTS
I. No change has been noted in the scope or pace
of the construction at the IRBM and MRBM missile sites in
Cuba. Cuban armed forces continue their alert, with mil-
itary aircraft on standdown since the morning of 23 Oc-
tober. There are indications that known and suspected
dissidents are being rounded up.
II. As of 0600 EDT at least 14 of the 22 Soviet
ships which were known to be en route to Cuba had turned
back. Five of the remaining eight are tankers. Two of
the dry cargo ships not known to have reversed course
may be carrying non-military cargo, but the BELOVODSK, ac-
cording to a late intercept message, has 12 HOUND helicop-
ters. Changes in course appear to have been executed in
midday on 23 October, before the President signed the proc-
lamation establishing the quarantine.
III. We still see no signs of any crash procedure in
measures to increase the readiness of Soviet armed forces.
Bloc media are playing up Khrushchev's 24 October state-
ment that he would consider a top-level meeting "useful."
IV. � There is as yet no reaction to the turn-around
of Soviet shipping, which had not become publicly apparent.
Attention remains centered on neutralist efforts in the UN
to find machinery for easing tension. Canada has searched
a Cubana airliner flying from Prague to Havana. Latin
American countries are beginning to offer military units
for the quarantine, and there is generally little adverse
reaction in the hemisphere.
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25 October 1962
I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA
No change has been noted in the pace of construction
activities at the identified MRBM and IRBM sites. The es-
timated dates of operational readiness for these sites re-
main as previously reported. (Two MRBM sites are believed
already operational, three others will probably become
operational today, and the sixth on 28 October. Of the
three IRBM sites, one may become operational by 1 December,
and the other two by. 15 December.)
Photography on 23 October. revealed no new missile sites,
and no additional missiles, missile transporters or erectors
at already identified sites.
There is increasing evidence of camouflage at several
sites,
Among the Soviet ships formerly en route to Cuba which
have reversed their course are three with hatches capable of
handling ballistic miseiles.
There is still no positive evidence that nuclear weap-
ons are deployed in Cuba. If nuclear warheads are not there
now, the USSR could deliver them by submarine or, more feasi-
bly, by aircraft. A TU-114 could fly non-stop to Cuba with
up to ten nuclear warheads, following a greatcircle route
which would not pass over any other country.
A recent refugee report indicates that Soviet construc-
tion equipment and material for the suspected nuclear stor-
age building at the Remedios IRBM site had arrived in Remedios
as early as 29 September.
All of the 24 identified surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites in Cuba now are operational, although there ie still
no evidence of an integrated command and control system.
Cuban naval units on the same day were
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instructed to submit daily reports on "combat morale and
measures taken to ensure political spirit." Air defense
radar tracking continues to be active. The standdown in
Cuban airforce VHF communications since the morning of 23
October indicates that Cuban tactical aircraft have prob-
ably been grounded since then. The 23 October order to
Cuban naval units not to fire except in self-defense was
repeated to several naval units on the next day.
Free World press representatives in Cuba
report the city to
be calm and the atmosphere relatively normal. Reports re-
flect none of the confusion and disorganization that ac-
companied the general mobilization just prior to the April
1961 invasion.
Cuban newspapers and
radio stations deleted the portion of President Kennedy's
22 October speech referring to offensive missile bases in
Cuba, "which was the direct reason for the steps taken
against Cuba." The newspapers and radio broadcasts
carried only the parts of the speech on the
naval blockade and claimed that this was preparation for an
attack on Cuba. Actually, at least one radio broadcast did
refer to the President's statements about offensive bases
in Cuba, which it strongly denied. This was an early re-
action to the speech. Commentaries after the 23 October
speech by Fidel Castro have followed the line he established.
He denied that any offensive weapons are in Cuba and did
not once use the word missiles.
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25 October 1962
II. SOVIET SHIPPING TO CUBA
Information available as of 0600 hours EDT indicates
that at least 14 of the 22 Soviet dry cargo ships and
tankers which were en route to Cuba on 23 October have al-
tered course and are now returning to Soviet ports. Al-
though all the Soviet vessels may eventually turn back, the
five tankers and three of the dry cargo ships appear to be
continuing toward Cuba.
There is no indication at this time of any grouping of
ships to form a convoy.
The BELOVODSK, one of the dry cargo ships which may
still be en route, appears to be carrying non-military car-
go, according to an intercepted message. Another--the E.
PUGACHEV--en route from the Soviet Far East and due to trans-
it the Panama Canal on 2 November, probably also is trans-
porting civil cargo. No information on the third dry cargo
ship--the KASIMOV--has been received since 21 October.
The tanker nearest Cuba--the BUCHAREST--appeared to
stop shortly before entering the US quarantine zone, but
now is proceeding toward Cuba. Another tanker--the GROZNY--
about two days behind the BUCHAREST, also slowed down con-
siderably, according to a 24 October position report, but it
too now is again heading toward Cuba.
Two of the dry cargo ships which have turned back were
nearing waters north of Puerto Rico when they changed course
on 23 October, but they now are back in mid-Atlantic. One
ship left the Baltic Sea on 23 October and returned on 24
October. Another was not less than a day out of the Baltic
Sea when it turned around and re-entered.
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The course changes of those ships which have turned
back were executed around noon EDT on 23 October, in response
to urgent messages from Moscow, which earlier in the day had
assumed direct control over Soviet merchant ships on the Cu-
ban run. The ships turned around well before President Ken-
nedy signed the proclamation establishing a quarantine zone
around Cuba. Thus far no Soviet ships have entered the zone
since it was established. Only two Soviet ships--one a tanker--
have arrived in Cuba since 23 October and both of these were
well within the zone prior to its establishment.
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The East German passenger ship VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT
was en route to Cuba on 20 October with some 500 passen-
gers. The ship reported its ETA in Havana as 28 or 30
October and is due to enter the quarantine zone about 26
October. The Czech dry cargo ship KLADNO is also in the
Atlantic and may be en route to Cuba with a cargo of mis-
cellaneous non-military goods. Its position and current
course are unknown.
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SOVIET SHIPS APPARENTLY STILL EN ROUTE
(Information available as of 0600 hours 25 October)
Ship
1. Bucharest (tanker)
2. Grozny (tanker
3. Karl Marx (tanker)
4. Belovodsk (dry-
cargo)
(All Times Are EDT)
Latest Position
24 Oct 1442
24:54N, 61:12W
About 450 miles
from Cuba
24 Oct 2000
25:54N, 47:18W
25 Oct 0200
25:42N, 48:42W
About 1,200 miles
from Cuba
24 Oct 1400
34:24N, 27:24W
South of Azores
24 Oct 1100
41:25N, 25:22W
North of the Azores
Remarks
Appears to have slowed
between 1212 and 1442
hours but still proceed-
toward Cuba.
Appeared to be still en
route as of this time.
Appeared to be still en
route as of this time.
According to intercepts,
ship appears to be carry-
ing civil goods: vehicles
and unspecified "equipment'
Tonnage of about 5,000 tons
suggest non-military ship-
ment. No indication of a
turnback as yet.
5.
Kasimov (dry-cargo)
21 Oct
Out of Baltic
May have turned around,
but no information as yet.
6.
Mir (tanker)
23 Oct 1400
No further information.
In the Med
7.
Emelyan Pugachev
In the Pacific
Due Panama Canal on 2 Nov.
(dry-cargo)
8.
Bakalava (tanker)
Out of the Baltic
No further information.
Sea (No specific
report)
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SHIPS WHICH WERE EN ROUTE BUT ARE NOW RETURNING TO USSR
1.
2.
Yuri Gagarin
Kimovsk
Probably had altered course by noon on
23 October and is now en route toward
the USSR. Was about 500 to 600 nauti-
cal miles from Cuba when course was al-
tered.
Probably altered course around noon on
23 October and is now en route toward
the USSR. A message indicated it was
en route to the Baltic Sea. Was 700 to
800 miles off Cuba when turned back.
3.
Poltava
Probably altered course around noon on
23 October Sand is now en route toward
the Mediterranean. Was in'mid-Atlantic
when it turned around.
4.
Metallurg Kurako
Probably altered course around noon on
23 October and is now headed in easterly
direction. Was in mid-Atlantic when it
turned around.
5.
Kislovodsk
Probably altered course around noon on
23 October and is now headed toward the
Baltic Sea.
6.
Dolmatovo
En route to the Black Sea. Probably al-
tered course around noon on 23 October.
7.
Bolshevik Sukhanov
En route back to the Baltic. Probably
altered at same time.
8.
Urgench
En route back to the Black Sea.
9.
Fizik Vavilov
Left the Mediterranean about 23 October
and re-entered on the 24th. En route to
the Black Sea.
10.
Krasnograd
Left the Baltic on 23 October and returned
on the 24th.
11.
Khirug Vishnevsky
Left the Black Sea on 23 October, re-en-
tered 20 hours later the same day.
12.
Okhotsk
Turned around in the Med on 23 October and
headed back to the Black Sea.
13.
Mednogorsk
Turned around in the Med on 23 October and
headed back to the Black Sea.
14.
Sergei Botkin
Turned around in the Med on 23 Oct and
headed back to Black Sea.
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25 October 1962
III. THE SITUATION IN THE BLOC
We have noted the following Soviet military develop-
ments; an assessment of their significance will be issued
by the USIB Watch Committee. We find no indication of sig-
nificant movements or deployments in the bloc military
forces. Activities appear generally normal although refer-
ences to "alerts" continue to be made in bloc military com-
munications.
Ground: There are no indications that Soviet or satel-
lite iFUTIEU force units are undertaking deployments to the
field for other than training purposes.
Naval: Recent increased exercise activity in the Black
Sea appears to be a reflection of general readiness training.
Large-scale training, which probably was scheduled prior to
the President's speech, has also been noted in the Pacific
Fleet. Four Northern Fleet submarine detachments are at sea,
two of them possibly in the Western Atlantic. One of the
latter is under Moscow control, suggesting it is carrying
out operations of a special nature.
Strategic Rocket Forces: Unusual activity continues
to be noted on several suspect Strategic Rocket Forces com-
munications links. Some of this kind of activity has in the
past appeared to be associated with high-altitude nuclear
testing. No air transport movements by SRI aircraft have
been noted.
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B. Bloc Statements of Position
Khrushchev's 24 October statement that he would con-
sider a "top-level meeting useful" is front paged by So-
viet newspapers and has been carried on both Moscow domes-
tic broadcasts and TASS. At least one Soviet commentary
beamed to North America has quoted from the Soviet Pre-
mier's message to Bertrand Russel in urging the US to be
reasonable on the Cuban issue. Except for these refer-
ences, however, there has been no further Moscow emphasis
on the urgency of a heads of government meeting. There
has been no mention by Soviet communication media of the
diversion of Soviet shipping from the US quarantine zone.
Moscow continues to skirt the issue of specific re-
taliatory action against the US. Yesterday's Izvestiya
maintained the Soviet charge that the US is obsessed With
the idea of some "mythical threat from Cuba."
Soviet Defense Minister. MalihovSky today reiterated.
the USSR's position that the Soviet armed forces now are
in a,state of "highest battle readiness," and declared
that at the "first signal all the might of all our armed
forces must be brought into immediate action against the
enemy."
In the first public treatment of the Sino-Indian bor-
der clashes, the USSR, in endorsing Peiping's proposals
to resolve the dispute, contrasted the Bloc's willingness
to negotiate such problems with the "aggressive actions
of the US aimed at Cuba and the whole world." Soviet Com-
mentary to its home audience continually refers to the
"false.Allegations" of the US concerning Soviet offensive
rockets. These broadcasts are again citing the 11 Septem-
ber Soviet contention that the USSR has no need for mis-
sile sites outside its own territory.
Reports from Soviet officials provide no firm evidence
as to future Soviet intentions. A Czech official in Vienna
has reportedly taken the line that there will be lengthy
discussion at the UN. The Polish ambassador to Austria dis-
missed as "ridiculous" a suggestion that the situation
might lead to war. On 24 October a Soviet diplomat in
Washington stated that Soviet ships had been ordered to
proceed to Cuba.
East European satellites are continuing their warn-
ings against any direct US intervention in Cuba. Hungary
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and Rumania now have issued statements in full support of
the 23 October Soviet statement and have urged effective
UN action to dissuade the US from its "warlike action."
Tito has also called for UN intervention. Poland charged
that US aggression was being planned at the very time ne-
gotiations on "most urgent international problems "were
already in progress. Albania, in its first monitored com-
mentary on the situation, has charged the US with "prepar-
ing another aggression against Cuba" but failed to mention
the formal Soviet statement. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
in an impromptu speech yesterday in East Berlin, omitted any
reference to the Cuban situation. His remarks on the Ger-
man situation--the first direct commentary by a high Soviet
official on this issue since the President's address on Cuba--
contained no hint of retaliatory measure againit the Western
position in Berlin. While he reiterated standard Soviet
themes on the necessity for the Western powers to withdraw
their "occupation troops" from Berlin, he repeated his con-
viction that an agreement is possible.
Communist China's first official reaction to the crisis
was contained in a government statement of 25 October ex-
pressing "great indignation" at the "serious war provoca-
tion" of the US. Peiping declared it would wage a "resolute
struggle" against the US action, but gave no indication that
it is planning any specific countermoves. The Chinese re-
ferred briefly to the 23 October Soviet statement on Cuba,
and expressed full support for Moscow.
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IV. Non-Bloc Reaction
There is no observable reaction as of 0600 EDT to the
diversion of most Soviet shipping from courses for Cuba, ap-
parently because the fact has not yet become known. As a
result, the UN remains the principal arena for developments.
Neutral nation representatives in New York continued
their search yesterday for means of lowering tension, and
after consulting their governments overnight, are planning
to meet again at about 0830 or 0900.
A joint UAR-Ghana resolution requesting the principal
to refrain from actions which might aggravate the situation
failed to win widespread support. During the late after-
noon, following a UM briefing of African nations, the Ma-
layan ambassador stated he saw a significant change toward
greater "realism" in African attitudes. He reported this
would be reflected in a new draft of the UAR-Ghana resolution
now being prepared. The UN Security Council debate was
limited to several expressions of support for the United
States and a Romanian statement.supporting the Soviet res-
olution condemning the United States.
During the evening, U Thant addressed appeals to Presi-
dent Kennedy, Premier Khrushchev, and Cuban leaders. He re-
quested suspension of the blockade, halting of arms Ship-
ments to Cuba, and a peaceful attitude on the part of Cuba
itself. President Kennedy's reply to U Thant sent in the
early morning hours of 25 October, has as yet elicited no
reaction.
Official and unofficial expressions of support, sympathy,
or understanding for the US position on Cuba--either overtly
or privately expressed by government leaders--have reached
an impressive volume from all parts of the world. Nations
from which such expressions have recently been received are
Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg, Ireland, Syria, Iran, India,
Thailand, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica, and Panama.
Among the very few nations or groups expressing open opposi-
tion to the US stand was the Algerian National Liberation
Front, which termed the blockade of Cuba "an intolerable in-
terference in the internal affairs of that country." An of-
ficial Iraqi statement also says the US blockade is a "flag-
rant violation of the principle of freedom of the interna-
tional seas" and a "regression for the organization of in-
ternational society."
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In response to a US iquest that governments prevent
landings or overflights c:: Soviet aircraft carrying mili-
tary cargoes to Cuba, the Sudanese Foreign Minister said
any Soviet request for military overflights or for trans-
port flights carrying military equipment would be denied,
as would any request for "commercial" flights beyond Khar-
toum. Libya indicated it would not grant overflights to
Cuba either directly or via South America. The Moroccan
Foreign Secretary confirmed that a proposed air agreement
with the USSR had not yet been signed and that his govern-
ment would "try to do something." The Foreign Minister
of Senegal stated that, according to a cabinet decision,
Dakar would be closed for military use by either side. The
government of Jamaica will not grant regular landing or
overflight rights to Soviet aircraft bound for Tuba.
An Air Cubana plane coming from Prague made a technical
stop at Goose Bay, Labrador, on 23 October, and was searched
by Canadian authorities before being allowed to continue to
Havana. Two East German missile technicians and five Czech
technicians were on board.
Prime Minister Diefenbaker, though publicly welcoming
the US decision to take the Cuban issue to the UN Security
Council, has refused to be pinned down by opposition spokes-
men as to whether his government will give full support to
US policy on Cuba.
The press generally supports US moves regarding Cuba
but offers some criticism of the US for acting unilaterally
and sees very serious dangers in the situation.
The British government has emphasized its support for
the US position and ordered support in the United Nations,
but public opinion remains somewhat skeptical and the press
keeps up a critical tone. Gaitskell has privately told US
officials he is concerned over Washington's unilateral ac-
tion and personally doubts that the USSR has aggressive de-
signs against the American mainland.
In Latin America, military support for the quarantine
action has been offered by Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Enthusiastic
backing for the US position is reported among the Chilean
armed forces, particularly on the part of air force officers.
The Argentine government has offered two destroyers on three
days' notice, with a submarine, a marine battalion with trans-
port, and other units if required later. The Argentine air
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force commander has sent messages to Genernl LeMay and
other hemisphere air force commanders pledging readiness
to participate in any joint measures requf_-ed by the Cuban
crisis.
The Peruvian offer is qual:!ied by a requirement of
unanimous OAS approval. The Ur..4uayan government, accord-
ing to press reports, has now decided to support the OAS
resolution, but with certain reservations on the use of
armed force.
President Duvalier of Haiti and President Rivera of
El Salvador nave announced support for the quarantine policy.
President Goulart of Brazil, however, apparently seeks a
mediatory role; an intercepted message to the Brazilian am-
bassador in Havana suggests Goulart hopes UN inspection of
Cuba would afford an acceptable compromise. Demonstrations
of opposition remain scattered and ineffective. The Com-
munists appear reluctant to commit themselves to a major ef-
fort in the face of widespread official and public acceptance
of the US position.
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