POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY DIVISION D

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01430461
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: May 7, 1973

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FROM: ,
� Chief, Division D - 7B44 Hqs - Red
7 May 1973
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REMARKS
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GROUP I
Exctuded from automotic
downgroding and declassification
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7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
Chief, Division D
FROM
�
SUBJECT
�
REFERENCE
�
Potentially Embarrassing Activities
Conducted by Division D
Your staff meeting, 7 May 1973
1. There is one instance of an activity by Division D,
with which you are already familiar, which the Agency General
Counsel has ruled to be barred to this Agency by statute: the
collection of international commercial
radio telephone conversations between several Latin American
cities and New York, aimed at the interception of drug-related
communications. The background on this is briefly as follows:
ineretore on
h eptemper 1V/G !NOR asKea it D1V1S1011 ii WOUIG take over the
coverage, and on 12 October 1972 we agreed to do
14 October a team of intercept operators from the
began the coverage experimentally.
On 15 January 1973, NSA wrote to say that the test results were
good, and that it was hoped this coverage could continue.
Because a question had arisen within Division D as to
the legality of this activity, a query was addressed to the
General Counsel on this �score (Attachment A hereto). With the
receipt of his reply (Attachment B), the intercept activity
was immediately terminated. There has been a subsequent series
of exchanges between Division D and the General Counsel as to
the legality of radio intercepts made outside the U.S., but
with one terminal being in the U.S., and the General Counsel
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has ruled that such intercept is also in violation of CIA's
statutory responsibilities.
2. We are carrying out at present one intercept activity
which falls within this trhniral 1 imitation�i.e.. of having
r
one terminal in the U.S.
Since the ).ink being monitored carries
a large number of totally unrelated conversations, the oper-
ators do intercept other traffic, frequently involving U.S.
citizens--for example, BNDD staffers talking to their agents.
I have described this situation to the General Counsel, and
his informal judgment was that, as long as the primary pur-
pose of the coverage is a foreign target, this is acceptable.
He suggests, however, that it might be desirable to inform
the Attorney General of the occasional incidental intercept
of the conversations of U.S. citizens, and thus legalize this
activity. We will pursue this with Mr. Houston.
4. An incident which was entirely innocent but is cer-
tainly subject to misinterpretation has to do with an equip-
ment test run by CIA technicians in Miami in August
1971. At that time we were working jointly to develop short-
range agent DF e ninment for use against a Soviet agent in
South Vietnam. and
a field test was agreed upon. The Miam s chosen, and
a team consisting of Division D, Commo,L Jpersonnel went
to Miami during the second week of August. Contact was made
with a Detective Sergeant f the Miami Beach Police
Department, and tests were made rom our different hotels, one
a block away from the Miami Beach Auditorium and Convention
Hall, A desk clerk in this hotel volunteered the comment that
the team was part of the official security checking process of
all hotels prior to the convention. (The Secret Service had
already been checking for possible sniper sites.) As the team's
report notes, "The cover for the use of the hotel is a natural."
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5. Another subject worthy of mention is the following:
n February 1972,
panies
contacts in U.S. telecommunications com-
for copies ot the teiepnone caii slips per
-murring�ro�urai-unina calls. These were then obtained regu-
larly by Domestic Contact Service, in New York, pouched to
DCS Washington, and turned over to Division D for passage
to FE/China Operations, The DDP was apprised of this activity
by Division D in March 1972, and on 28 April 1972 Division D
told DCS to forward the call slips to CI Staff, Mr. Richard
Ober. Soon thereafter, the source of these slips dried up,
and they have ceased to come to Mr. Ober. In a.4 advisory
opinion, the Office of General Counsel stated is .belief that
the collection of these slips did not violate the Communica-
tions Act, inasmuch as they are a part of a normal record-
keeping function of the telephone company, which does not
in any way involve eavesdropping.
Atts:
A.
B.
nrAigA71.rWitris-
Chief, Division D
26 Jan 73
29 Jan 73
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