A DARKER MIDDLE EAST - A COLLABORATIVE ASSESSMENT OF MIDDLE EASTERN FUTURES TO 2006

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06698268
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• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2017
• Case Number: F-2017-00737
• Publication Date: April 29, 2002

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
29 April 2002
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENC -
A Darker Middle East
A Collaborative Assessment of Middle Eastern Futures to
2006
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Summary
A Darker Middle East
A Collaborative Assessment of Middle Eastern
Futures to 2006
A panel of nongovernmental Middle East experts convened by the
Directorate of Intelligence has generated six plausible paths that the region
might take to 2006. No single factor is determinate in driving any of the six
scenarios to outcomes that harm or favor US interests, but two
predominate:
� Whether an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is found.
� If the United States pursues a ground war against Iraq, whether US forces
replicate their overwhelming victory in Afghanistan or achieve victory
only after a slow, destructive, and messy campaign
Favorable outcomes of both factors drive the future toward the
"Transformation" scenario, which advances Western interests.
Unfavorable outcomes of both, on the other hand, lead to a calamitous
"Dark World":
� In "Transformation" an interim Israeli-Palestinian accord precedes a
fast, successful US war against Iraq. An end to the violence between
Israel and the Palestinians buys Washington policy flexibility with most
Middle Eastern regimes to include a relatively free hand against Iraq.
This Arab support boosts US military effectiveness. Overall, successful
application of US military force and political suasion points the region
toward growth and stability.
� A successful but destructive and long war against Iraq in the "Dark
World" scenario, mounted while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains
intractable, costs the United States support from all levels of Arab
society. In a region that is close to a tipping point because of domestic
political repression, economic frustration, and religious fanaticism this
additional negative development leads to upheaval.
In the remaining four scenarios, the United States does not engage in a
ground war against Iraq, but the state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still
is key:
� In three scenarios, violence in the Holy Land and the absence of an
Israeli-Palestinian settlement worsen US relations with Arab
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governments. Anti-Americanism grows, and popular displeasure with
regimes that are friendly to the United States rises. Unrest prompts police
states to become harsher, decreasing prospects that governments will
embrace needed political and economic liberalizations.
� In one scenario, an Israeli-Palestinian settlement helps the region move
toward a better future
Terrorist organizations populate all six scenarios in 2006. Panelists see the
war on terrorism as a long slog, probably lasting as long as it takes to
eradicate the social, political, and economic roots of al-QMida and similar
organizations. In some scenarios, al-Qa`ida adapts to setbacks, becoming
urban based.
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Scope Not
The findings in this paper reflect the views of 17 outside experts expressed
in workshops sponsored by the Strategic Assessments Group of the Office
of Transnational Issues and the Regional Analysis Unit of the Office of
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis. The findings do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of CIA analysts. This paper examines
alternative paths for the Middle East over the next five years. The
September 2001 terrorist attacks changed perceptions of plausible regional
futures and invited reconsideration of earlier findings.1 Regional experts
from academia and the business world participated with CIA analysts in
workshops in December 2001 and February 2002. Outside Middle East
specialists first developed a range of plausible Middle Eastern political and
security futures, defined by varying outcomes of four drivers: global
terrorist activity, scale of the war against terrorism, regional support for the
antiterrorist coalition, and regional political stability. Outside regional
economists then estimated the economic implications of the scenarios. The
scenario narratives appear in the appendix. Scenario summaries and
numerical estimates of regional and global economic performance for each
scenario appear in figures 1, 3, and 5. Because of links between events in
the Middle East and South Asia since September 2001, the scenarios also
include developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. We structured
this exercise to encourage participants to think unconventionally in order to
identify problems, linkages, and choices that Middle Eastern leaders may
face over the next five years.
1 See DI Intelligence Report OTT IR 2000-158, NESAF IR 2000-40182
Future: How Much Change Is In the Offing? (U), November 2000
The Middle East's Economic
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A Darker Middle East
A Collaborative Assessment of
Middle Eastern Futures to 2006
A panel of nongovernmental Middle East experts
believes that, among a variety of outcomes for the
region, many are distinctly darker than today:
� The future of the Middle East, already an area with
little promise, has darkened further with the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism, fewer opportunities for its
large and increasingly disillusioned youth
population, tension and violence associated with the
latest intzfadah, the possibility of the spread of the
war on terrorism, and the precarious position in
which the war has placed regional regimes.
� The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence convened this
panel in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist
attacks to consider plausible paths the region might
take over the next five years. They generated six
scenarios describing the Middle East from 2002 to
2006 (see figure 1 and appendix).
No single factor is determinate in driving any of the
six scenarios to outcomes that harm or favor US
interests, but two predominate:
� Whether an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
found.
� If the United States pursues a ground war against
Iraq, whether US forces replicate their
overwhelming victory in Afghanistan or achieve
victory only after a slow, destructive, and messy
campaign
Favorable outcomes of both factors drive the future
toward the "Transformation" scenario, which
advances Western interests. Unfavorable outcomes of
both, on the other hand, lead to a calamitous "Dark
World":
� In "Transformation" an interim Israeli-Palestinian
accord precedes a fast, successful US war against
Iraq. An end to the violence between Israel and the
Palestinians alters the tenor of relationships in the
region. It buys Washington policy flexibility with
most Middle Eastern regimes�to include a
relatively free hand against Iraq, in the opinion of a
number of panelists. Arab acceptance of US action
against Iraq�ranging from "looking the other way"
to active support�boosts US military effectiveness.
The Iraqi people's positive attitudes toward their
US liberators speed the advance. Overall, successful
application of US military force and political
suasion points the region toward growth and
stability. Only the "Turning the Corner" scenario
equals the regional economic growth rate in
"Transformation.".
� A successful but destructive and long war against
Iraq in the "Dark World" scenario, mounted while
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains intractable,
costs the United States support from all levels of
Arab society. In a region that is close to a tipping
point�because of domestic political repression,
economic frustration, and religious fanaticism�this
additional negative development leads to upheaval.
In the war against Iraq, the absence of assistance
from Arab states burdens US forces, increasing
mission distances, speed of response to fresh target
information, supply chain length, and cost. Saddam
Husayn's military conducts a stubborn defense from
positions in heavily populated areas.
This assessment was prepared by the Offices of Transnational Issues and Near Eastern, South Asian, and
African Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Strategic
Assessments Group, OTT,
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In the remaining four scenarios the United States does
not engage in a ground war against Iraq, but the state
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still is a driver:
� The absence of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement
burdens three of these scenarios. The chronic
violence in the Holy Land and the plight of the
Palestinians worsen US relations with Arab
governments. It increases regional anti-
Americanism and popular displeasure with regimes
that are friendly to the United States. Unrest
prompts police states to become still harsher,
decreasing prospects that governments will embrace
needed political and economic liberalizations.
These scenarios� "Stalemate," 'Regional
Cohesion," and "Security States "�all describe a
Middle East that fails to address important
problems and is characterized by varying intensities
of popular anti-American sentiment and behavior.
� Of these four scenarios in which there is no war
with Iraq, only the "Turning the Corner" scenario
features an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. It offers
the only outcome of the four in which the region
appears headed toward a better future, with strong
economic growth and hopes for economic reform.
Themes in the Scenarios
The six scenarios run the gamut from the truly
horrific to unrest and warfare followed by improved
regional prospects by 2006. The drift of events is
mostly negative. Regimes do little to fix underl in
economic, social, and political problems.
Difficulty of Bringing the War on Terrorism to a
Resolution
None of the six scenarios depicts victory in the war
on terrorism. Organizations employing terrorist
tactics, including al-Qa` ida, populate all scenarios in
2006, even the most benign ("Turning the Corner"
and "Transformation"). Panelists see the war on
terrorism as a long slog, probably lasting as long as it
takes to eradicate the social, political, and economic
roots of al-Qa` ida and similar organizations. In some
scenarios, al-Qa`ida adapts to setbacks, becoming
urban based.
Primacy of Political Problems
In all six scenarios, strong economic growth in the
Middle East must wait for political problems to be
solved. Some panelists suggest that, if the Israeli-
Palestinian and Iraq problems were resolved, a new
era would begin as people in the region focus on
economics. Governments could address security
problems. Attitudes toward Westerners that now
discourage foreign investment and weaken
commercial ties might change.
All scenarios assume that autocratic Arab regimes,
particularly in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, face
increasing risks of upheaval the longer they continue
without political and economic liberalizations:
� The "Stalemate" and "Security States" scenarios
best portray this situation, with regimes ratcheting
up repression to delay social explosions. In the
former, Middle Eastern regimes permit and
encourage popular assignment to America and
Israel of blame for most regional ills because this
deflects and substitutes for banned criticism of
these regimes' political repression and massive
economic failings. The result is a worsening of US
relations with the region.
� In the "Turning the Corner" and "Transformation"
scenarios, Israeli-Palestinian peace settlements
afford regimes enough breathing room to try to save
themselves through cautious liberalizations.
� In "Dark World," nationalist Islamic revolutions
sweep away the old elites.
Rebuilding Iraq. Among panelists there is
uncertainty over whether Iraq would hold together f
Saddam' s regime were removed. Some panelists
suggest that damage in recent decades to Iraq's public
institutions and civic culture has been so great that
rebuilding state and society would be painstakingly
difficult and slow. In both scenarios that include a
war in Iraq, Iran insinuates itself into the postwar
political reconstruction of Iraq, fostering divisions.
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Quotations From Individual Panelists About
the Middle East Over the Next Five Years
"These Middle Eastern economies have managed
to muddle through. They fix problems on the edges
while creating a sense of stability. This may o
may not be sustainable in the long run."
"The larger problem is creating the kind of Middle
East where democratization can take place. We
have to talk about solving fundamental problems
because they are what people are really angry
about, even if they only talk about the Israeli-
Palestinian problem. We need to remove the longer
term sources of instability."
"The regional economies are in a bad situation.
The police states have kept things in check with
Band-Aids, but with lower oil prices the status quo
is more difficult to sustain. It is difficult to predict
the breaking point Government economic figures
are not credible."
"We need to hold up successful secular Islamic
states as models for those who want to harness
Arab nationalism to develop functional
governments. Turkey is the best example.
Strengthening Jordan is important."
"Getting rid of Saddam and bringing peace to
Palestine could open a new paradigm in the reg
for talking about economic reform."
"The Saudi public is very conservative. Saudis do
not talk about wanting US-style democracy (but
they do want transparency, rule of law, and curbs
on corruption). They believe that democracy
would result in a medieval society�a
Talibanesque' government, which, however,
would not view itself as an enemy of the West."
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"Economic development in Asia will cause a
commercial reorientation of the Middle East,
especially of the Gulf states. They slowly will drift
away from the United States and Europe and
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"Reduced demand for oil due to technological
advances (less thirsty cars, more efficient
extraction, alternative energy sources) can't be
done overnight, but such a trend in place would
change expectations and strategy, and lessen
Middle Eastern oil producers' faith in their
leverage over US policy."
"Al-Qa` ida will not attack oil facilities in Saudi
Arabia. A Saudi-influenced movement will not do
that. But the country can't do without water. To
bring the Saudi Arabian monarchy down, they
would hit desalinization plants. If the al-Qa` ida
leadership would ever become, for example,
mostly Egyptian then they might attack the oil
on infrastructure.'
Economic Performance
On balance, the panelists believe that it is unlikely
that events in the Middle East and the war on
terrorism will have a major impact on the global or
US economies (see figures 2 and 3). Panelists judge
the main economic effects in the United States of
Middle Eastern events to be variations in oil prices,
rising risk premiums on international trade and
investment, capital flight, the diversion of funds to
military and homeland security spending, and terrorist
damage to economic infrastructure or psychological
well-being:
� Only in the bloodiest scenario, "Dark World," do
events reach such an intensity that serious global
economic setbacks occur.
� In the other scenarios the panelists believe that the
limited degree of economic integration between the
Middle East and the rest of the world would not be
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sufficient to transmit much damage, that the shocks
to the oil market would be short-lived, and that the
power of the terrorists to fundamentally alter the
international flow of goods and capital outside the
region is not great. Of course, several large terrorist
attacks on the United States or its Western allies�
not events that occur in any of the panel's
scenarios�would have greater economic effects.
� Only in the most optimistic scenarios ("Turning the
Corner" and "Transformation") is regional growth
sufficient to begin to reduce unemployment.
Oil No Answer. Consistent with outside expert
projections, in none of the scenarios do oil revenues
grow enough to enhance Middle Eastern economic
prospects:
� At a recent conferences on the geopolitics of oil,
sponsored by the National Intelligence Council and
the University of Maryland, a group of industry and
academic experts believed that global oil demand
would rise sharply in the next 20 years, with much
of the rise in demand originating in East Asia.
� However, there was consensus that over the next 10
to 15 years global oil production probably will keep
pace with increases in demand without requiring oil
prices to average much above $20 per barrel. Most
of the group felt that sufficient new supplies would
come on stream from non-OPEC producers to meet
most of the projected increase in global demand.
These projections pose a dilemma for Middle Eastern
oil-producing states. Oil prices are not likely to rise
much, if any, in real terms for the next decade�apart
from occasional short-lived fluctuations�and neither
will Middle East oil export volume rise much unless
the region tries to keep up market share by
undercutting prices. State budgets, then, especially of
key oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia, could come
under extreme pressure as the demand for funds to
continue subsidizing living standards soars with
rising populations, while state revenues fail to keep
pace because of low oil prices and modest growth in
export volume. If Iran and Iraq emerge from under
their sanctions regimes and resume exports at
volumes anywhere close to their potential, the
economic pressure on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states would intensify
Root Causes of Instability and Terrorism
Looking beyond resentment of American policies and
deeper into possible causes of regional dynamics,
panelists cite poverty and lack of opportunity as
major factors behind Middle Eastern violence,
disorder, and the rise of militant Islamism. While the
region is not particularly poor compared to other non-
OECD regions, it has not been improving much in
recent years:
� Some experts also note maldistribution of income
as a cause for violence and dissatisfaction, but the
Middle East does not seem to be particularly
disadvantaged compared to other regions. Indicators
such as infant mortality, life expectancy, and
literacy rates have continued to register substantial
improvement in most Middle Eastern countries
since 1985 despite low rates of economic growth.
Nevertheless, economic prospects for Middle Eastern
young people nearing the age of employment are not
promising:
� In the next five years additions to the work force
will outstrip overall population growth (3 percent
per year versus 2.2 percent per year).
� To keep already high levels of unemployment from
increasing further, the region's economy will have
to grow between 3.5 and 4 percent per year, far
better than it has done over the last 15 years. To
bring unemployment rates down to more politically
palatable levels would require sustained economic
growth above 4.5 percent per year.
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Table 1. Average Gini Coefficient'
(Most recent data, average of available countries
by region)
Middle East
Latin America
South Asia
East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
a A value of 0 would indicate income is evenly distributed;
a value nearing 100 would indicate that income is
concentrated in the hands of a very few. The value shown
for the Middle East is not far above the US value. Note: the
Middle East group contains data only for Iran, Egypt,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
Source: World Bank.
This table is
38.6
49.6
31.6
39.8
46.6
Less opportunity, particularly when combined with
rising expectations, leads to unemployed people who
are prime fodder for extremist groups peddling
resentment. Academic research suggests Middle
Eastern unemployment is most severe among young,
semi-educated city dwellers. These young people
have received enough education to raise their
expectations and aspirations, yet the education system
provides them with few skills to compete effectively
for the scarce "good 'jobs in the formal sector.
City life threatens family values in the Middle East,
often leading to enhanced support for religious
extremists who promise to resolve societal problems.
The Middle East has seen massive social upheavals as
largely agricultural states have become urbanized,
breaking down the traditional economic structures
and forcing massive changes in family, clan, tribe,
and community life:
� Academic researchers cite that from 1950 to 1980
the urbanized population grew from roughly 27
percent to 48 percent. Between 1980 and 1999
alone, the urban population grew from 48 to 58
percent of the total population
Panelists discussed the tension between stability and
change in the Middle East and whether we are at a
tipping point on this issue. According to press reports
echoed by panelists, many Middle Easterners assume
potentially disastrous instability will result if
autocratic power weakens, so they prefer autocracy
and stability. They do not consider democracy and
secular pluralism as realistic options:
� This stoic preference derives, in part, from failed
Arab experiments with secular ideologies�Pan-
Arabism, socialism, Communism, and secular
nationalism. (Despite disillusionment with 1950s
and 1960s Pan-Arabism, the "Regional Cohesion"
scenario resonated with some panelists because a
contemporary version of Arab nationalism provides
Arab states with an independent security solution.)
� Today, those who want stability support the Arab
autocrats, while many seeking change see no
answer other than radical Islam
Routine suppression by local regimes of Islamists�
jailing, torture, and executions�encourages the
emergence of secret, conspiratorial, and armed
groups. These dynamics appear to their greatest
degree in the "Security States" scenario. Groups
struggling for national liberation�Palestinians,
Chechens, Uygurs, Moros, and Kashmiris�play the
Islam card to bolster their cases with religious
elements. These causes have attracted a kind of
Muslim "foreign legion" of radicalized, volunteer
mujahidin, many of whom have gone on to join al-
Qa`ida:
� Panelists highlighted that Islamists have a long list
of grievances against the forces and policies that
they perceive to be holding back Muslims,
specifically Islamist movements. Many Islamists
blame the United States for much, including
supporting the status quo�which favors
authoritarian regimes�to assure the free flow of
oil. They say Washington is afraid of democracy
and change because they might bring Islamist
groups to power
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Table 2. Comparative Policy Challenges Posed in the Six Scenarios
Scenario
US Policy Challenges
Dark World
0Destructive war removes Saddam,
alienates Arab world, helps Islamist
nationalist regimes come to power.
DIsraeli-Palestinian conflict an
intractable problem.
DIndo-Pakistani nuclear war.
DEligh oil prices.
0Preserve war on terrorism (WOT) coalition.
DRestore regional stability; aid refugees.
0 Counter regional nuclear proliferation.
DAssure energy supplies.
0 Combat terrorism.
0 Deal with and develop relationships with Islamic
regimes.
DRespond to upheaval's economic effects.
Stalemate
(Baseline
Scenario)
DUS attacks Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) facilities.
DRegional coalition members oppose
targeting of Iraq, sour on the WOT.
DRegional growth insufficient to reduce
unemployment, social tensions.
0 Combat terrorism.
0 Compensate for erosion of US influence in region;
preserve and build coalition.
0 Suppress Iraqi WMD capabilities.
DFrom a weaker regional position deal with the Israeli-
Palestinian problem.
Turning the
Corner
0 Soft antiterrorist coalition blocks
attacks on Iraq.
DIsraeli-Palestinian and Kashmir
accords.
0 Stronger regional growth.
DReformers triumph in Iran.
0 Combat terrorism, especially through nonmilitary
measures; preserve WOT coalition.
0 Contain Iraq; counter proliferation.
DFind ways to strengthen coalition.
DEncourage economic and political reform in region;
promote trade and investment.
Regional
Cohesion
Olnhfadah intensifies; outrage over
plight of the Palestinians and blame for
attacks on Mecca alienate Arab states
from US.
0 Saudi-Iraqi-Iranian rapprochement
ends US-Saudi security relationship.
0Weakened US�Middle Eastern
commercial ties.
DRebuild damaged influence in region.
0 Combat terrorism.
0 Contain Iraq; counter proliferation.
0 Work for Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.
0 Develop alternative partnerships in or near region.
Security States
DAutocratic Middle Eastern regimes
stick with WOT coalition; WOT
expands; US attacks on Iraqi WMD
facilities,
DArab police states become more
authoritarian; no reform.
0Many terrorist attacks.
Mow growth; high oil prices.
0 Combat terrorism; contain Iraq; counter
proliferation.
DEncourage economic and political reforms, but
prepare for social explosions.
DMitigate economic effects of WOT, terrorism,
instability.
0 Deal with migration out of Middle East to OECD
countries.
Transformation
DIsraeli-Palestinian accord.
DUS military removes Saddam's regime.
0 Combat terrorism.
0Preserve WOT coalition.
0 Support moderate reformers in region; promote
pluralism in region.
0 Help rebuild Iraq and Palestinian areas, support new
DRegional governments focus on
domestic challenges.
0 T errorism continues.
DICashmir dispute unresolved.
governments.
0Promote trade and investment.
DAdvance Kashmir solution.
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OCounter proliferation
principally in Iran
Clearing the Deck�A Counterintuitive
Geopolitical Observation
"Transformation" (a settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and removal of Saddam' s regime
by the US military, but Kashmir festers) and
"Turning the Corner" (Kashmir and Israeli-
Palestinian peace agreements emerge, but Saddam
remains in power) appear to deliver the outcomes
among the six scenarios that best promote Western
interests. However, even in these scenarios terrorism
continues, and the region's old, inflexible, autocratic
regimes have barely begun to transform themselves
by 2006. Thus, key elements of the status quo
remain�and it was this status quo that created the
conditions that spawned al-Qa` ida:
� Consequently, a panelist suggested that the
catastrophic "Dark World" might best serve the
long-term economic and strategic interests of the
United States because it wipes away today's Arab
regimes (replacing them with nationalist Islamist
governments). Washington no longer would be
perceived as propping up local autocrats and
working to preserve the status quo against the
interests of the people of the region. America could
deal with the region at arm's length, avoiding
involvement in local disputes.
� Technological change that promotes a decrease in
OECD demand for oil, especially for
transportation�judged by one panelist as feasible
as early as 2010�would greatly facilitate such
noninvolvement.
� As for working with a region dominated by Islamist
leaders, one panelist noted, "If these people have
ideas and vision on how to turn Islam around, then
we ought to contemplate dealing with them."
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Appendix
Six Alternative Views of the
Middle East in 2006
� "Dark World'
errorzsm: Major activity.
� War on Terrorism (WOT): Large war effort beyond
Afghanistan.
� Unrest: Extensive popular unrest, violent regime
change.
� Coalition: Failed
A bloody and destructive ground war removes
Saddam Husayn's regime, but at the cost of alienating
the Arab world and abetting the overthrow of
"friendly" Arab governments by nationalist Islamist
regimes. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains an
intractable problem; terrorism has not been
suppressed. The catastrophe of a limited nuclear
exchange between India and Pakistan does not deter
several other regional states from seeking the bomb.
Production facilities are damaged in Iraq by the
coalition offensive and some terrorist attacks are
carried out on facilities in the Gulf and elsewhere, but
supply disruptions are short-lived and all producers
continue to be eager to sell their oil despite anger
toward the United States. Oil prices average about
$25 per barrel over the five-year period.
The region's people are on average worse off than
before�per capita incomes have declined over the
five years. Economic stagnation makes resentment
over corruption and wealth disparities in the region
more acute, especially because government resources
available to buy off dissent shrink. Warfare, civil
unrest, terrorism, and violent regime changes
combine to shrivel economic activity. Economic and
educational reforms are put on hold, investment
activity is dampened, and foreign investment is at a
standstill. People and capital flee the region seeking
safehaven abroad.
2002
The United States successfully ends its military
campaign in Afghanistan, overthrowing the Taliban
and destroying al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan. Americans
leave a limited number of troops in Afghanistan to
help with peacekeeping and nation building. Faced
with the decision of where next to take the WOT,
American decisionmakers determine that eliminating
terrorism requires toppling the regime in Baghdad.
Those supporting this decision note the performance
of the US military in Afghanistan, which, in their
view, suggests similar results can be achieved against
Saddam' s forces at bearable cost and rather
surgically. They place stock in proxies coming to the
fore in Iraq. Further, they calculate that military
success against a widely hated regime probably will
not produce unintended consequences that cancel the
benefits of a successful operation.
In response to the US-driven WOT and the prospect
that Washington will push it beyond the victory in
Afghanistan, probably to states in the Middle East,
most regional states adopt policies of damage control,
working with the WOT coalition to play for time and
influence from within. Initially they say "yes" to US
demands for intelligence sharing, cooperation, and
other forms of relatively benign support but down the
road expect to set conditions. Further, nearly every
country uses the WOT as formal vindication for
hardline policies against domestic opponents and
minorities.
2003
The United States attacks Iraq in February. US
planners intend for heavy aerial bombardment to
create safehavens for Iraqi opposition forces, which
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will move in coordination with a coup against
Saddam and his lieutenants. When Iraqi defenses
have been weakened, the opposition will advance on
the ground with assistance from US Special
Operations Forces (SOF). Pentagon officials believe
that the campaign will be swift.
After some initial successes, the coup fails, leaving
Saddam in command. However, Washington remains
committed to force Saddam from power and
continues its air assault against Iraq
The Arab League denounces the attack on Iraq. Even
Saudi Arabia and Egypt condemn the campaign. Arab
sources suggest privately that their strong
condemnation of the WOT's "Phase II" is necessary
for domestic consumption. They indicate that regional
states will tolerate a swift removal of Saddam�and
many will welcome it. But they caution against a
long-drawn-out war that would provoke the Arab
"street."
By June, four months of US bombing have failed to
dislodge Saddam' s regime. The Iraqi regime prepared
well by building impenetrable leadership bunkers.
The bombing campaign has taken a toll on the Iraqi
military, but the Iraqis learned force protection
lessons from the Gulf war. Many formations remain
intact by dispersing to hiding locations and moving
into urban areas. Kurdish forces expand their zone of
control, taking Kirkuk and Mosul, but decline to
declare an independent Kurdish state, not wanting to
invite Turkish and Iranian wrath. The northern
oilfields escape damage. More serious for the US war
effort, Kurdish forces refuse to move south�they are
uninterested in spilling Kurdish blood to liberate non-
Kurdish areas, see no reason to generate more Iraqi
Arab ill will toward the Kurds, and suspect that if
they wait the Americans probably will remove
Saddam themselves. Iraqi forces withdrawn from the
Kurdish north defend the middle and south. In
southern Iraq, the Shia "safehaven" fails to
materialize. Remembering what happened in 1991,
the Shia, at this stage, refuse to revolt. Negative Arab
popular sentiment toward the campaign in Iraq places
great pressure on US-allied regimes to further
distance themselves from Washington. The Arab
League sponsors a successful UN General Assembly
resolution calling for an immediate halt to the
bombing. Believing it to offer a necessary "pressure
valve," Gulf regimes temporarily lift censorship of
the media and Internet and tolerate virulent anti-
American reports
With the "Kosovo/Afghanistan model" not working,
Washington proposes a significant buildup of US
ground forces in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in
preparation for a full-scale ground invasion of Iraq.
Arab officials reject this, warning that their
populations will not tolerate 500,000 US troops on
their soil. They say that such a buildup would play
into the hands of Usama Bin Ladin's many followers
throughout the Arabian Peninsula, who decry the
American "occupation" of the "land of Muhammad."
However, in response to US pressure and offers of
hegemonic influence over Iraq's Kurdish regions and
access to the oil in Kirkuk, Turkey supports the war
against Saddam. Arab states mince no words in
expressing their displeasure at Ankara's decision.
Acting on credible intelligence, American SOF stage
a daring commando raid in July on an Iraqi convoy
thought to be carrying Saddam and other top leaders
through the heart of Baghdad. While two cabinet
ministers and three generals are present, "Saddam"
turns out to be one of the doubles that he frequently
uses. During a bloody firefight that kills everyone in
the convoy (about 60 people), an errant Iraqi rocket-
propelled grenade hits a nearby school. Iraqi officials
tell CNN that 232 civilians are killed in the raid. US
forces lose one helicopter. Although it really came
from the north, rumors that the Americans launched
the commando raid from Saudi Arabia or Jordan set
off massive protests in those countries. In an
unprecedented display in a country where dissent is
strictly controlled, more than 100,000 Saudis march
in Riyadh in opposition to the war in Iraq. Officials in
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In Jordan, angry
protestors carry photographs of the dead Iraqi
schoolchildren and dead American soldiers. Reports
from Zarqa in northern Jordan describe the
suppression of a small rebellion by an army unit
stationed in that largely Palestinian city.
Unable to dislodge the Iraqi regime through airpower,
persuade Arab regimes to host an invasion force, or
encourage effective internal revolts from within Iraq,
the United States is nevertheless able to develop an
invasion plan. In October, eight months after the start
of the aerial bombing, US amphibious forces land on
the now-deserted Faw Peninsula, airborne formations
drop into the southwest desert, and ground forces
move through the Kurdish areas from Turkey. The
plan is to build up the forces in the south and then
proceed on three fronts to Baghdad. The US buildup
in southern Iraq is subjected to several attacks from
Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles carrying chemical
warheads. US aircraft aggressively hunt for Irac i
missiles throughout the country.
During the US force buildup in the Gulf before the
invasion Washington goes out of its way to assure
Tehran that the US operation is directed exclusively
at Iraq. Tehran since 1991 has enjoyed having a
crippled Iraq on its western border and would prefer
that Saddam remain in power, but US determination
to remove Saddam is clear. In response to US
entreaties, the Iranian military neither repositions its
forces nor goes on highest alert, but Tehran decides to
make the best of a bad situation. Without informing
or coordinating with Washington, Iran inserts proxies
into the conflict in Iraq. It has organized a Shia
guerrilla force to move against Saddam' s power
structure in the south, ahead of the US advance. On
the ground at the tactical level, the Shia and US
forces manage to deconflict and cooperate.
Governments around the world condemn the ground
invasion, citing America's failure to provide a
convincing rationale for attacking Iraq. Street protests
erupt throughout the Arab world as well as in Iran,
but the government there does not support them, and
they soon end. However, moderate states led by
Egypt prevail at an Arab summit: governments recall
their ambassadors rather than break diplomatic
relations with Washington. Realizing that Gulf oil
flow disruptions are possible, Washington obtains
commitments from non�Middle Eastern oil
producers�especially Russia�to increase
production if needed.
A US force of 250,000 soldiers makes significant
progress in its march in October and November. It
meets pockets of resistance, primarily in urban areas,
which it overcomes quickly. Iraqi forces are most
effective hiding in densely populated areas and then
attacking at close range. US casualties are
substantial�about 7,000 to 10,000�but Washington
remains committed to continuing the campaign. The
Republican Guard repeatedly employs chemical
weapons. One Iraqi oil refinery is damaged when
Iraqi troops seek refuge in it; retreating Iraqi units
destroy another. Despite projections to the contrary,
the United States is not as successful as it was in
Afghanistan in getting locals to turn against
government forces. As a result, and in order to protect
its own soldiers, US forces employ heavy fire in
urban areas, leading to significant civilian casualties.
Pictures of the casualties are quickly posted on the
Internet and broadcast by al-Jazirah television,
prompting further outrage not only in the Arab world
but also from global human rights groups. By the end
of December, US forces are on the outskirts of
Baghdad.
2004
Trapped in Baghdad, Saddam orders the launch of
three extended-range Scud variants with chemical
warheads at Tel Aviv on 4 January. These missiles
were hidden in caves in western Iraq in areas
bypassed by US forces. The attack kills scores of
Israelis and prompts calls for immediate and severe
retaliation. Palestinian celebrations in response to the
chemical attack on Tel Aviv are widely reported to a
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repulsed Israeli public.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been hard pressed
to maintain control in the West Bank and Gaza since
the death of Yasir Arafat in his sleep in late 2003.
Local militias�Tanzim, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine�
have continued attacks against Israelis. During the
turmoil after the chemical attack on Tel Aviv, Hamas
executes its most deadly mission ever: five suicide
bombers attack the main relief staging ground in Tel
Aviv, killing over 200 relief workers. Within 24
hours, two more traumatic events occur:
� US forces enter Baghdad among heavy civilian
casualties. Remaining Iraqi forces are destroyed
with heavy loss of life. US forces kill or capture
most senior Iraqi officials.
� Israel declares war on the PA. Israeli military forces
enter all areas of the West Bank, rounding up tens
of thousands of mostly young men. They take the
men to an enormous staging area in the Jordan
valley and force them east across the Jordan River.
Israel does not attack Iraq, however. The Arab world
is rife with rumors that the United States and Israel
have a secret agreement that Israel not respond to
Iraq's attack in exchange for the United States'
turning a blind eye to Israel's "ethnic cleansing" of
the West Bank. In reality, nothing remains of
Saddam' s regime that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
can target.
In February the United States declares victory in
Phase II of the WOT. Its occupying forces face
sporadic opposition, with an average of two US
soldiers killed every week in Iraq. The need for US
peacekeeping probably will last for several years. The
provisional government set up by the American
occupiers is weak. Iran exerts significant influence
over the new government by virtue of its ties to the
Iraqi Shia. Iran appears to gain the most strategically
from Phase II. Much of Iraq's oil production of 2
million barrels per day has gone offline because of
combat damage to pumping stations, pipelines, and
terminals in southern and central Iraq, but the damage
is not extensive, and some exports from the south
resume by mid-2004.
To placate international public opinion following its
mass expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank,
Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip and announces
it recognizes an independent Palestinian state there�
but it simultaneously announces the annexation to
Israel of "Judea and Samaria."
US and Israeli diplomats and businessmen in various
European, Asian, and Latin American countries are
targeted in an assassination campaign. Several truck
bombs explode in the United States and at US
businesses and US Government facilities in the Gulf
and Egypt. Terrorist attacks on oil facilities in Saudi
Arabia cause insufficient damage to disrupt
production or deliveries. Some of these attacks are
attributed to a "second generation" al-Qa`ida, a
loosely organized body requiring little funding,
planning, or infrastructure and pursuing targets of
opportunity. The assassinations show some
Palestinian involvement as well�both Islamist and
leftist. Hardliners in the Iranian Qods pressure a
reluctant Syrian President Bashar al-Asad to permit
widened Hizballah activities as counters to Israeli
actions against the PA.
The regime in Saudi Arabia has been under extreme
pressure from both the United States and its own
population since the beginning of the WOT. Bin
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Ladin's ideas are popular across the peninsula, and
clerics speak out against the royal family.
Washington persists in its demands to Riyadh to shut
off funding to most overseas Wahhabi and Salafi
RrOUDS
They ask US forces to leave the country.
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar echo like requests. Saudi
Arabia calls for a return of the Arab boycott of
companies dealing with Israel and asks the entire
Muslim world to observe it. It continues exporting oil
but announces its determination to sustain oil prices
above $30 per barrel and warns Washington that,
unless greater balance is shown soon between US-
Israeli and US-Arab relations, Saudi Arabia will no
longer welcome US businesses. It declares its right to
support nonviolent Islamist movements and accuses
the United States of attempting to destroy Islamic
education by promoting "secularism and atheism."
Hosni Mubarak's regime, largely discredited for its
cooperation with Washington, becomes more
authoritarian in response to chronic, low-level, urban,
antiregime violence mainly from students. As the
United States presses for more arrests of Islamist
elements, the military removes Mubarak and
establishes a nationalist, moderate Islamist
government with considerable Muslim Brotherhood
representation. The new government renounces the
peace treaty with Israel and declares its unwillingness
to cooperate further in the WOT.
2005-06
Pakistan was the first state to be compelled to fully
sign onto the WOT, at great risk and cost to its
internal stability. President Pervez Musharraf did a
remarkable job keeping the lid on during the Afghan
phase of the war and quelling the Kashmir crisis of
2002. But now the extremists and the Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate are determined to punish
Musharraf for his betrayal of the Islamist cause and
Pakistan's strategic interests. Army majors and
colonels sympathetic to Deobandi-style Islam
overthrow Musharraf in 2005. An Islamic-oriented
government akin to Muhammad Zia ul-Haq's in the
1980s comes to power. Kashmir again becomes the
primary focus of Islamic activism, leading to rising
tensions with India. As the crisis peaks in 2006, India
invades Azad Kashmir to wipe out terrorist bases.
Indian satellite photography reveals unusual activity
at Pakistani nuclear weapon storage facilities. India
interprets this as strike preparations and launches
preemptive conventional strikes against Pakistani
nuclear facilities. Pakistan uses its two remaining
nuclear weapons to strike Indian cities near Pakistan.
India delivers a single, larger nuclear weapon on
Rawalpindi and occupies Islamabad to complete its
denuclearization of Pakistan. The postnuclear
situation, including the humanitarian catastrophe,
incites massive instability on the subcontinent. There
are doubts about the survivability of what remains of
a Pakistani state.
By 2006 Islamist nationalist governments are in
power in most Middle Eastern states, repudiating US
policies in the region. Arabs are prepared to support
the Palestinian armed struggle indefinitely. US forces
have left Iraq, which rebuilds its military strength in
consultation with Gulf Arab states and cooperates
with Iran to achieve a Gulf that is free of US
influence. Europe, Russia, and China sell arms to the
region. Nuclear capability is not far off for Iran,
Turkey, and Egypt. Israel says that such proliferation
is unacceptable and will move to eliminate it.
By 2006 the region's people are on average much
worse off than they are today: per capita incomes
have declined, unemployment has soared, and
economic discontent has grown. Arbitrary,
authoritarian practices continue to stifle both local
and foreign investment. Natural resource degradation
has gone so far as to be virtually impossible to
reverse. Social services and infrastructure continue to
crumble. European labor markets are closed to the
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entry of labor from the Middle East, which
encourages illegal migration.
Iraq's economy is the worst hurt because of the
physical destruction and breakdown of the state. The
economy starts to recover in 2005, but it will take
many years for the disastrous economic effects of
Saddamism to disappear. The Saudi economy is also
badly hurt. The Saudi Government hesitates to take
any steps to restructure the economy, knowing that
almost any action will upset some key interest group
and provoke further unrest. Iran's economy is one of
the least hurt. It avoids war and internal terrorism and
enjoys higher oil export revenues, but it still suffers
from increased internal unrest, capital outflows, and a
heightened disinclination of outsiders to trade, travel,
or invest in the region.
This scenario also imposes significant economic costs
on the rest of the world. Higher average oil prices and
higher volatility negatively affect growth in all OECD
countries. The US growth slowdown is exacerbated
by a series of demoralizing terrorist attacks and by the
increasing shift of resources to nonproductive uses
promoting security. Growth in the Third World is
negatively affected. Higher oil prices hurt most
developing countries, but more important is a general
rise in risk aversion that leads to less trade and
foreign investment growth.
"Stalemate"
� Terrorism: Moderate activity.
� WOT: Some overt military action beyond
Afghanistan.
� Unrest: Little unrest; no violent regime change.
� Coalition: Faltering.
A gradual and cautious expansion of the WOT avoids
another ground campaign but is open ended. Arab
coalition members are exasperated by continued
targeting of Iraq, US promotion of the WOT' s
political agenda, embarrassing revelations about
sources of terrorist funding, and domestic anti-US
sentiment. They see no benefit from staying in the
coalition and gradually fall away. They wean
themselves away from US security guarantees.
There is underlying tension in the region preventing
rapid economic growth. The old state
monopoly/socialism model clearly is not delivering
satisfactory economic performance, but no regime in
the region is willing to implement sufficient policy
reforms to make a fundamental difference. The
heightened state of crisis in Palestinian areas, the
underlying threat of terrorism, and the possibility of a
much greater level of warfare all act to dampen
economic activity and keep foreign investment at low
levels. Regional growth is 3.5 percent per year,
resulting in a disappointing 1.2 percent per year
increase in per capita income. This rate of growth is
probably not enough to keep unemployment among
the soaring population of young males from rising,
thus raising social tensions as years pass. There is
consequently uncertainty whether the low rate of
regional economic growth will lead to a wave of
regime failures or will be sufficient to allow the
region to muddle along without dramatic upheaval.
Oil prices average about $20 per barrel, putting little
pressure on OECD prices, balance of payments, or
growth. With Middle East growth rates this low,
however, there will be increasing pressure to emigrate
from the region, especially to Europe. There will also
be increasing calls for monetary assistance�
particularly from Egypt�to stave off financial
collapse.
2002
The Taliban has collapsed, and US forces are
scouring Afghanistan for al-Qa` ida leaders. In the
Afghan phase of the WOT, coalition support has been
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as much as Washington might have hoped for. In
some cases regional states�Iran and now Yemen�
have contributed more to the WOT than expected but,
in other cases, less. Pakistani leadership has sided
strongly with the WOT at great risk to its own
future�though it is unlikely that any Pakistani
government can be considered to have a future
featuring low risks to its survival. All states in the
region support the WOT in principle, but some use it
as a club against domestic opposition and expressions
of discontent.
Internal politics in the region are stable, except for
chronic and disturbing Israeli-Palestinian violence. A
degree of stability has come to Afghanistan, although
there will be a long, messy political struggle over the
future of the country. No strong regime in Kabul will
soon be constituted; effective power will devolve to
regional/ethnic/tribal/warlord-dominated
principalities. Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Russia,
India, and others fish in Afghan waters. With much
publicity in the fall of 2002, Washington and London
withdraw some forces from Afghanistan. Terrorism,
however, continues. A suicide bomber attacks the
offices of a US corporation in Europe; minimal
casualties occur. An attack on US soil is thwarted.
Washington, of course, drives the war. However, US
policy often is determined through compromise, a
byproduct of struggle among competing elites and
competing perspectives. It is in this context that the
war widens, but not exactly as those who wish to
march on Baghdad prefer. The relatively easy victory
in Afghanistan gives ammunition to those who argue
that anything but a widened war will reflect
cowardice and lost opportunity. On the other hand,
the messy political aftermath of the Afghan
campaign, the tightening net of restrictions on civil
rights at home, quarrels with European allies and
Russia, fear of Saddam's use of unconventional
weapons against US troops or the Israelis, the lack of
proxies on the ground, an inability to fathom the
successor government, and arguments that the
unexpected is to be most expected push policy toward
covert operations and sanctions short of sustained
armed intervention (in Iraq or elsewhere). These
measures are tailored for specific objectives in
specific countries drawing on friends who have
helped in the past with such operations�countries
such as Britain, France, Egypt, and perhaps Saudi
Arabia, Oman, Israel, or Ethiopia. This array of
operations is similar to those the United States
sponsored in the 1980s in its effort against the Soviets
in Afghanistan. Consequently, US SOF conduct
operations against al-Qa`ida targets in Yemen and
Sudan. Both governments publicly protest but
covertly support the attacks.
2003
Arab publics see cooperation with the United States
in the WOT as tainting their governments.
Washington understands this dynamic, but it is
difficult to lessen America's regional profile. US
officials also are finding that the political agenda
associated with the WOT is difficult to advance. In
some cases, regime actions make a mockery of the
US effort to encourage more open societies in the
Middle East. Israel points to the unresponsiveness of
Arab governments as a sign of their unreliability.
In addition to the risks posed by the unpredictability
of the WOT, Washington is unable to avoid the risks
inherent in a kind of military/political "Peter
Principle." The United States is slowly widening the
war beyond its successful prosecution in Afghanistan
absent a clear set of "priors" about objectives,
acceptable costs, and exit strategies.
"No fly zone" enforcement above Iraq continues with
occasional attacks on Iraqi SAM and antiaircraft
artillery sites. New to the mix are US attacks,
launched from aircraft carriers in the Gulf and from
Diego Garcia, on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) facilities. These attacks follow repeated Iraqi
refusals to allow UN inspectors back in. The attacks
are not UN-sanctioned. Several regional states quietly
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grant overflight permission for the strikes, but
criticism of these counter-WMD missions is vocal
the Arab "street.'
By late 2003, new concerns emerge as governments
supporting the WOT see increasing signs of popular
displeasure that the WOT is really a "War Against
Islam." In Oman at a small demonstration at Sultan
Qaboos University against continued sanctions
against Iraq and the bombing, slogans call for a halt
to "America's War Against Arabs." Police enter
several campuses in Morocco to stop demonstrations.
Arab intellectuals voice similar views on al-Jazirah
television and in the Lebanese press.
The Saudi monarchy, in an effort to reduce
resentment of its unacknowledged but not concealed
support for the WOT, begins to advocate more pro-
Iraqi policies. The Saudis are walking a fine line: they
are happy with the status quo, which holds Iraq in
check, and thus do not want to help Saddam too
much. Saudi Arabia authorizes flights carrying
disabled and infirm Iraqis to Saudi medical facilities.
Saudi television plays up Iraqi children being treated
in the kingdom.
2004
The cause of Kashmiri "freedom fighters" resonates
in the Muslim world. From Morocco to Indonesia,
demonstrations call for intervention to stop "anti-
Muslim violence" in Kashmir. Dramatic video brings
the Kashmir conflict to the foreground of the Arab
media. Pakistan offers a safehaven to the freedom
fighters/terrorists. Pakistani leaders do their best to
keep them from further action, but elements of the
Pakistani security forces, sympathetic with the goals
of the freedom fighters, carry out their orders with
lassitude. India escalates punitive actions against the
freedom fighters/terrorists, conducting several hot
pursuit raids into Pakistan. India asserts that again, as
in 2002, its actions are part of the WOT. Pakistan
calls on the United States to hold India in check. The
Pakistani leadership is concerned about public
opinion and signs of dissatisfaction among the
Pakistani military. US calls for both sides to show
restraint are mocked in the Arab press, which is quick
to draw analogies to US policy on the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
US strikes on Iraqi WIVID facilities continue at the
rate of one mission every two or three weeks. The
United States also conducts two successful Special
Forces raids on covert Iraqi missile storage facilities.
Saddam, convinced he can outlast the Americans,
remains adamant in refusing inspections.
Meticulous efforts by US, European, and East Asian
financial regulators and private-sector banking
officials expose and cut off many terrorist funding
conduits. Exposed as contributors to al-Qa`ida or its
front organizations are business and government
leaders in every Gulf state. These revelations are
embarrassing and aggravate relations with the United
States but unexpectedly generate some knowing
approval from the Arab street for these autocrats who
have been hedging their bets.
Al-Qa`ida remains dangerous. Sporadic terrorist
attacks on US Government and business facilities in
the region continue. Most al-Qa` ida targets are
American
2005-06
Periodic US strikes on Iraqi WIVJD facilities continue,
as do occasional Special Forces raids and aggressive
pursuit of financial aspects of the WOT.
Increasingly concerned with their internal security,
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states judge that
overt cooperation with the Americans carries a high
price. The heads of intelligence of many regional
security forces think there is too much emphasis on
tracking down al-Qa` ida. They worry that
circumstances are ripe for the growth or creation of
parallel terrorist organizations dedicated to the
overthrow of governments in the region. The Saudi
royal family asks for a reduction in US forces in the
region and pressures other GCC members to limit US
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presence. Fearing internal unrest, the GCC, Egypt,
and Syria in essence revive the 1991 Damascus
agreement�Cairo and Damascus recognize that the
GCC states will look to them for defense in case of
internal or external attack. The pact proves popular. It
aids Syria's economic normalization and expands the
role of the Syrian military. Washington is concerned
that Israel sees the pact as a threat. Pressure from
Washington offsets urgings from Israel's hardliners to
Prime Minister Arid l Sharon to mount a preemptive
strike against Syria using Shabaa Farms or any other
flashpoint as an excuse
Israel has increasingly become an enclave society.
Shas supporters often live together. One of the few
things that brings Israelis together is the hardline
approach to terrorism. Suicide bombings continue,
together with less publicized attacks by settler
reservists against Arabs.
After the Afghan phase of the WOT, Washington
continues to support Central Asian regimes. These
governments, more confident now with US support,
increasingly challenge Russian regional hegemony.
Russia is concerned about these more independent
regimes on its southern tier. In response, Moscow
assists Central Asian opposition groups (except for
terrorist movements). These rivalries complicate US-
Russian relations.
By 2006, the US commitment to promoting pluralism
in the Middle East sounds increasingly hollow. The
idea of greater political and economic openness and
participation in decisionmaking remains a risky and
unproven one for the regimes of the region. Regional
leaders fail miserably in renegotiating the social
contract to confront questions surrounding social
safety nets, income equality, and stable family units.
Economic development is mainly a "holding action,"
designed to prevent further deterioration and the
consequent breakdown of order. Al-Jazirah television
and several other voices offer limited outlets for
public expression, but little else has happened.
Regional security services have kept simmering
antiregime discontent in check
a factor of "orderly growth."
hey see repression as
By late 2006, the WOT has expanded until Middle
Eastern regional cooperation has mostly fallen away.
Europe, East Asia, Turkey, Russia, India, and Israel
still cooperate in the war.
"Turning the Corner"
� Terrorism: Moderate activity.
� WOT: No overt military effort beyond Afghanistan.
� Unrest: Some popular unrest; no violent regime
change.
� Coalition: Strengthens
In this scenario the price for the United States of
extending the war beyond Afghanistan, with or
without cooperation from some regional
governments, is increasing political instability in most
of the region. Given this constraint, the outcome
consistent with US and regional interests is a
truncated set of US objectives. This preserves internal
political stability and cooperation within an
antiterrorist coalition. Gradually increasing US
credibility, the application of US pressure, and
changes in governments allow Israeli-Palestinian and
Kashmir agreements. Without the distraction of those
cross-civilization conflicts, governments across the
region begin to focus more on difficult domestic
problems including implementing gradual political,
economic, and educational reforms.
2002
The United States has accomplished its initial
objectives in Afghanistan. The Taliban is smashed,
and al-Qa` ida has sustained much damage. By fall the
United States withdraws its combat forces from the
Afghanistan area of operations. It supports efforts by
the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, France, and others
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to help restore internal security and, with the UN and
nongovernmental organizations (NG0s), provide
relief Traditional rivalries among leading Afghan
groups, however, lead to clashes that divide
Afghanistan into ill-defined regions under Pashtuns,
Hazaras, and the Uzbek-Tajik-dominated Northern
Alliance. Outside powers acting under the UN mantle
maintain Kabul as an open, demilitarized zone where
rival groups meet under a nominal governing council
to broker deals and avoid open civil war.
The United States refocuses its efforts in the WOT.
Al-Qa` ida cells scattered around the world remain
dangerous and are the main target of a relentless US
campaign to disrupt them. Washington cooperates
with local authorities when possible but acts
unilaterally, often covertly, when necessary. A
parallel campaign to interdict terrorist funding injures
al-Qa`ida but exposes its financial links to prominent
local figures in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf These
revelations offend national senses of honor and
contribute to cooling relations. To worsen matters,
terrorist attacks cause extensive damage and
casualties at several US facilities in the region and at
police headquarters and financial institutions. These
attacks discourage foreign investment and encourage
expatriate departures.
Iraq is a US target in Phase II of the WOT, not
because of definitive Iraqi connections to al-Qa` ida
but because of growing concern about Iraq's WIVID
capabilities and potential to supply WIVID to terrorists
who could use them against US assets or regional
friends. Voices in Washington argue that the Iraqi
regime should be toppled. To achieve this militarily,
the United States needs airpower and US ground
forces based on the territory of friendly states.
Following the Afghanistan model, this plan also
requires support from Kurds in the North and Sh as in
the south of Iraq. Washington seeks to gauge
potential support for such a mission with European
allies, Russia, and regional members of the 1990-91
coalition. The response ranges from ambivalence to
rejection. Turkey and Saudi Arabia do not want
attacks launched from their soil. The sticking point is
the absence of proof of Iraqi involvement in the
11 September 2001 attacks or Iraqi support for
al-Qa`ida. In addition, Pakistan, Europe, and the UN
ask Washington not to shift attention away from
Afghanistan�nation building will be a huge task.
The Palestinian intifadah and Israeli efforts to repress
it continue, with many casualties on both sides. Al-
Jazirah television broadcasts images of the violence
from the West Bank and Gaza. The Arab press
escalates accusations of Western indifference to
Palestinian and Iraqi suffering, casting the United
States increasingly as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.
Arab and Muslim capitals boil with protests.
Hizballah engages Israeli forces in border skirmishes,
which invite Israeli bombing of Hizballah assets in
Lebanon. Traditional regional allies of Washington
send strong signals that not only is all cooperation
with the WOT at stake, but also their stability and
long-term US interests in the region
Faced with deteriorating regional conditions, a lack of
regional interest in pursuing Iraq, and concern about
maintaining regional counterterrorism cooperation,
the United States backs down on Iraq. However,
Southern Watch reconnaissance overflights over
southern Iraq continue from US Navy aircraft carriers
in the Gulf Iran accuses the United States of an
aggressive military buildup in the Gulf but takes no
action. Washington applies additional pressure on
Saddam by toughening a mid-2002 proposal for the
return of UN inspectors and implementation of
"smart" sanctions. The coalition supports this
approach in exchange for not extending the war to
Iraq.
2003
In the third year of the Palestinian intifadah there is
always enough violence to block progress toward an
Israeli-Palestinian accord.
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President Musharraf of Pakistan emerges as a major
beneficiary of US success in Afghanistan. His
cooperation with the Untied States, in light of the
outcome, wins him respect from most Pakistanis�but
so does his strong hand in crushing domestic militants
and terrorists. Although Afghanistan remains a
troubled neighbor, Pakistan retains an acceptable
level of influence across the border. Musharraf
realizes another goal when Washington, employing
new leverage and credibility gained from its role in
encouraging Pakistan's counterterrorist crackdown, in
early 2003 successfully pressures the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi to
accept US-brokered talks over Kashmir. Increased
domestic stability and Musharraf s rising prestige
allow the Pakistani economy to begin to recover.
Increased aid and access to US markets help boost
growth.
Determined to carry on with the WOT, the United
States focuses on the financial and political side of
the war. US authorities identify hundreds of charities,
financial institutions, and individuals as suspected
conduits for al-Qa` ida, other terrorists, and militant
Islamic movements. Washington transmits to friendly
governments demands to freeze assets, suspend
operations, and apprehend individuals. The new lists
of suspected conduits include prominent individuals,
banks, and charities linked to elites in the Middle
East. The lists appear on the Internet and in the
media. Only the United Kingdom responds with
immediate cooperation; other Europeans indicate they
will investigate.
Middle Eastern cooperation with financial and
political aspects of the WOT is slow and patchy,
burdened by perceptions that the United States is on a
campaign to remake Arab culture. Young
unemployed males become increasingly politicized
through the radical Islamist message that dominates
discourse at mosques, revulsion over the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, and disillusionment over bleak job
opportunities. Governments fear the consequences of
cracking down on financial, religious, and
philanthropic entities that enjoy popular support. As a
consequence, governments punish only a few
financial contributors to violent or terrorist groups.
As preparations for 2004 Iranian elections get under
way, clashes between reform groups and security
forces increase. The public realizes that Iran's limited
democracy is unable to sustain reform. President
Mohammad Khatami and the reformist-dominated
Majlis are virtually powerless before Supreme Guide
Ali Khamenei, the clerical-dominated judiciary, and
the Council of Guardians.
2004
After no major terrorist incidents on US soil in 2002
or 2003, an al-Qa` ida attack occurs in early 2004.
Attacks also take place in Britain and Turkey. The
attacks do not cause large numbers of casualties but
jar people out of complacency. US and European
stock markets remain volatile weeks after the attacks.
With al-Qa`Kla learning to operate without camps and
safehavens, the United States seeks to renew the
WOT. Some in Washington again are ready to go it
alone against Baghdad. But while the American
public may have been willing to accept large
casualties in 2001, things have changed by 2004,
especially given the risks associated with a ground
war in Mesopotamia without regional support or
participation. The soft regional coalition forces the
United States to stay with the strategy of containing
terrorism, as opposed to literally waging war on it. As
such, the campaign focuses even more on economic
and political objectives.
Palestinian leader Arafat dies quietly at home after a
period of sharply declining health. The initial
scramble to succeed him features confrontations and
narrowly avoided shootouts, but the Palestinian
National Assembly, long undercut by Arafat as a
potential rival, arranges credible elections. A
younger, nationalist, but pragmatic leadership sees a
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chance for a tough-minded settlement with Israel. As
a final tribute to Arafat, the new leadership calls for
and receives the seven days of absolute quiet
demanded by Prime Minister Sharon, who faces his
own election campaign in 2005. Under attack from
former Prime Minister and Likud party leader
Binyamin Netanyahu, Sharon talks with the
Palestinians.
Iranian voters elect another reformist-dominated
Majlis, and the following presidential election is hotly
contested. During the pre-campaign a relatively
radical reformer emerges. His platform, calling for a
plebiscite on constitutional reform, catches the
popular Iranian imagination, and before the clerical
system can move against him his popularity gives
him virtual immunity. He overwhelmingly defeats his
opponent. Khamenei, who had long seen his role as
that of arbiter rather than ruler, moves toward the
political center to protect his institutional position in
advance of inevitable sweeping political change.
2005-06
In the spring 2005 election in Israel, Sharon�who
retained his position as Likud leader by outbidding
Netanyahu on the right�loses to a candidate of the
consolidated former Labor party coalition. The
margin of victory in the parliament, under a revised
election law, is sufficient to allow formation of a
government without Likud or the religious parties.
With US support, peace talks begin in earnest,
concentrating on the tough core issues. Gradually,
cautious confidence in the validity of the revived
peace process develops in surrounding Arab states.
Despite sporadic violence, Israeli and Palestinian
leaders lead public opinion toward accepting essential
painful compromises. Syria signals that it is prepared
to reengage under US auspices. A peace settlement
jump-starts growth in Israel and Palestine and helps
to revive growth in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon as
well. In India, an improbable grand coalition between
the BJP and Congress allows politicians to move
ahead on Kashmir talks�neither coalition partner
will be able to pin on the other compromises made to
achieve an agreement.
Egypt struggles with low growth in 2002 and 2003,
but President Mubarak keeps the lid on domestic
turmoil. With the United States gradually getting the
upper hand in the WOT with a minimum level of
violence and with things breaking right in Iran and
particularly in Israel and Palestine, the social situation
calms enough in Egypt to allow some progress on
consolidating the state budget, reducing the role of
state enterprises, and rationalizing the social welfare
scene. Foreign investment and tourism pick up as
does overall economic growth.
Lower fertility rates in the 1990s and gradually
maturing age structures in most of the Arab world
have provided the region the biggest demographic gift
in its modern history and of all developing regions in
the world in the early 21st century. This "new
demography" is characterized by declining
dependency ratios, rising savings rates, and young
Arab cohorts making ever-increasing contributions to
growth. The region, despite the pessimistic
predictions of many economists some years ago, is
able to capture some of the benefits of this
demographic "window of opportunity" for rapid
economic expansion. It still, however, faces
formidable challenges in creating millions of new
jobs to keep pace with new entrants into the labor
market. And even though private and foreign
investment has picked up, maintaining these flows
will require greater governmental accountability and
more transparent rules of the economic game.
As US credibility with Arab governments and publics
recovers, WOT cooperation expands. Regional
governments prosecute dozens of individuals under
the WOT (some are terrorists, others are political
opponents) and close some charities and financial
institutions. US military tribunals offer regional
governments an expedient way to rid themselves of
politically troublesome prisoners. Iraqi W1V1D
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capabilities remain a concern, and the coalition
strengthens to the point at which it tolerates tighter
sanctions against Iraq. US officials report having
spoiled a number of terrorist plots to attack US and
Middle Eastern facilities as a result of cooperation
with regional governments. Yet,
al-Qa`ida retains an ability to operate as an urban
underground organization based around the Gulf and
in Egypt.
As public condemnation of US policies in the region
begins to die away, official and commercial relations
between the United States and the Arab world
improve. Increased economic activity in the Middle
East has only a modest effect on growth elsewhere.
Oil prices are low and less volatile, the "terrorism
tax" the United States and other OECD countries
must pay for enhanced security is reduced, and more
opportunities for exporters and investors open up in
the Middle East. The risk premium on economic
activity in other developing countries also diminishes
as war and terrorism fears recede.
Scenario 4�"Regional Cohesion"
� Terrorism: Major activity.
� WOT: No overt military effort beyond Afghanistan.
� Unrest: Major civil disturbances.
� Coalition: Failed
Contacts and commerce between Americans and
Arabs decline. There is tighter cohesion among Arab
countries and between them and Iran. Arabs are
outraged over Israeli treatment of Palestinians and
direct their anger at the United States as well as
Israel. The Arab street is willing to believe
disinformation about US attacks on Islam. US-Arab
relations deteriorate badly as governments, especially
the Saudi royals, find security solutions that free them
from dependence on US protection. In terms of its
prestige within the region, Iraq gains significantly
under this scenario
2002
As the WOT concludes in Afghanistan, measures
applied by the United States against terrorists begin to
take a toll on US-Arab relations. Continued
bloodshed in the West Bank and Gaza along with US
support for Israel also burdens the relationship.
Travel to the United States by business people and
tourists from the region comes to a near halt,
reflecting Arab apprehensions of possible humiliation
by US immigration and customs officers, airline
pilots and crews, local police, or anti-Muslim bigots.
The US designation of Hamas, which Arabs and
Persians almost without exception regard as a
legitimate movement of resistance to Israeli
occupation, as a terrorist organization generates
acrimony. Gulf Arab investors, concerned about
political risk in America, begin to cash out. US
corporations, concerned about terrorism, downsize
their Middle Eastern operations.
In November, US forces locate and kill Bin Ladin in a
firefight with his bodyguards. Three weeks later Al-
Jazirah television receives and airs video in which
Bin Ladin calls on all Muslims to defend the Islamic
holy places in Jerusalem, Medina, and Mecca against
attempts by Israel and the United States to deny
access by worshippers as a culminating move in their
joint war against Islam. This posthumous exhortation
primes the Arab street for events during the 2003 hajj.
2003
Muslim extremists seize the grand mosque and areas
around the Ka' aba in Mecca in February. Three
million panicked pilgrims take to their cell phones.
Throughout the Islamic world rumors spread
attributing the seizures to agents of Mossad and CIA.
As Saudi forces fight their way house �to house
toward the Ka' aba, the American embassies in
Amman, Cairo, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur,
and Rabat and the consulates at Jiddah and Karachi
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are attacked by hysterical mobs. The American
Consulate General in Jiddah barely manages to
destroy classified documents and equipment before it
is overrun. The al-Qa`ida operatives who lead the
mob into the Consulate use the Internet to broadcast
video of the Jiddah captives and "proof' that
Americans and Israelis are behind the events in
Mecca. Many Friday sermons throughout the Muslim
world condemn the United States and Israel. In
Palestinian areas, Hamas announces that, given the
US declaration of war on Islam Hamas is declaring
war on the United States
As fighting continues in Mecca, senior members of
the Saudi royal family convene at Riyadh. Shortly
thereafter, the family announces that King Fand and
Crown Prince Abdullah have abdicated because of ill
health. The new King is former Defense Minister
Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz al Saud. The Crown Prince is
his brother, the former Minister of Interior, Nayif bin
Abd al-Aziz al Saud. King Sultan, assisted by his son,
Khaled (newly named as Minister of Defense and
Aviation), takes personal charge of the battle in
Mecca and pacifies the badly scarred city. Visiting
Mecca, the King declares that the prompt repair of the
mosque and city will be his priority. He awards the
contract for this
$8 billion task to a previously unknown construction
company (whose major shareholders are sons of the
new King and Crown Prince).
In May 2003, as the last US forces withdraw from
Afghanistan and Central Asia, King Sultan asks that
the US Air Force significantly reduce its activities
and number of personnel in Saudi Arabia, citing the
ongoing mayhem in the Holy Land and the increasing
difficulty of protectin, US forces from a now openly
anti-American public
The West Bank and Gaza are in a state of near
anarchy. No governmental authority remains above
the municipal level. Sooner rather than later, Israel
faces a choice between abandoning its settlements
and military installations in the lands it captured in
1967 or reoccupying them to restore a measure of
order and security.
Regional economic growth is poor. The intensified
fighting in Palestinian areas, the blood bath in Mecca,
rioting and terrorism throughout the region, and the
sense that corruption continues unabated chill
investment and entrepreneurship. Tourism in the
region, already pummeled, declines further. The new
Saudi Government focuses on lining its own pockets
rather than instituting economic reforms or attracting
foreign investors. World oil prices, already low, start
to decline further as Saudi Arabia, whose oil facilities
are untouched by rioting, begins to ramp up
production to pay for repairs to Mecca.
2004
In the UN, US efforts to craft a tightened sanctions
regime for Iraq are once again supported only by the
United Kingdom and rebuffed by other members of
the Security Council. However, in February the US
President calls in Prince Bandar (whom Bandar's
father, the new King, has kept as Ambassador in
Washington) to ask for Saudi support for military
action to replace the regime in Baghdad. With new
evidence of links between Iraq and terrorism, the
United States wants to move against Saddam. Bandar
flies to Riyadh. King Sultan tells Bandar that the
President's request requires consultation with the
royal council.
Before the royal council meets, word arrives of
Saddam' s death from cancer. Iraqi media announce
that Uday has succeeded him. Uday sends telegrams
to Arab leaders inviting them to establish new
relationships with a new Iraq in the interest of
opposing Israel. Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco,
Syria, and the United Arab Emirates accept the Iraqi
initiative. Jordan is silent. Uday's initiative passes
unreported in the Kuwaiti and Saudi press. He also
seeks to reopen contacts with Iran.
The royal council convenes in Riyadh in March. The
US and Iraqi proposals are on the table. Sultan's
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conservative instincts incline him to hold to the grand
Saudi-American bargain struck by the kingdom's
founder, Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, with Franklin
Roosevelt at the Great Bitter Lake in 1945�
exchanging assured access to Saudi energy supplies
for US security guarantees�which, Sultan considers,
has served the kingdom and its ruling family well and
can continue to do so. Religious conservatives in the
family disagree, citing the corrosive effects of close
association with the United States on Saudi society
and values. More secular-minded members of the al
Saud, most in their thirties and forties, argue for
rapprochement with Baghdad and solidarity with it
against Israel. They remember the Gulf war not as
vindicating a Saudi-American strategic partnership
but as demonstrating the rapacity with which the
Americans are prepared to exploit Saudi wealth. They
state that Saudi Arabia has little to gain by
perpetuating a relationship in which Americans
answer Saudi respect and affection with contempt for
the kingdom's governing style, customs, and religious
heritage. The kingdom, they add, cannot afford
continuing association with US policies that
demonstrate indifference to Arab opinion by
underwriting Israel's racist treatment of Arabs.
The meeting leaves the royal family divided. As
discussions continue, it is apparent that a majority
favors a strategic reorientation�but realizing it will
require changes. Members of the third generation, the
grandsons of Abd al-Aziz, especially those in senior
military positions, begin quietly to discuss how this
might be accomplished. But internal machinations
against Sultan become moot when seven weeks later
a petitioner at the King's twice-weekly majlis
detonates a suicide bomb, killing the King and many
aides. Investigation reveals that the petitioner was a
member of al-Qa` ida, which continues to view the
overthrow of the al-Saud as first among its objectives
and is determined to advertise its continued existence
despite the loss of its former leadership. Crown
Prince Nayif convenes the royal council in an effort
to gain its acclaim as king, but it is withheld. The
following day, younger Saudi royals in military
positions oust Nayif as regent in a bloodless coup.
This group proclaims as King one of their own,
Minister of Defense and Aviation Khaled, son of
King Sultan and commander of the Arab and Islamic
forces during the Gulf war. King Khaled, in turn,
appoints an obscure but religiously well-connected
great grandson of the kingdom's founder as his
Crown Prince.
In July, King Khaled privately invites Uday to visit
Riyadh. With no prior notification to foreign
governments and to the delight of ordinary Saudis,
Uday arrives in Riyadh in August. Saudi Arabia and
Iraq have both been on the receiving end of US
antiterrorist criticism and pressure, and their leaders
sense that they can gain by cooperating. The next day
Saudi Arabia and Iraq announce the reestablishment
of diplomatic relations and commit themselves
publicly to cooperate against the threat to the peace
posed by Israeli aggression and expansionism.
Separately, the Saudi Minister of Defense and
Aviation notifies the US Ambassador that the US Air
Force must completely withdraw from the kingdom
by the end of the year. After a Saudi envoy visits
Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Government informs
Washington that it has accepted an Iraqi offer to
negotiate a treaty of peace and nonaggression and that
US forces in Kuwait should plan to withdraw if the
negotiations succeed.
Sanctions withering, Iraq finds more oil outlets and
starts ramping up production. European and Asian
countries find ways to invest in Iraq and provide
much-needed equipment and know-how. The world
oil price falls to between $10 and $15 per barrel even
though demand is picking up
2005-06
The Middle East has settled into new relationships.
Iraq has been welcomed back into Arab councils. All
Muslim states, including Kuwait, have normalized
relations with Baghdad. UN sanctions against Iraq
have collapsed.
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Saudi Arabia and Iran, which began to cultivate close
ties in the late 1990s, continue to grow closer, mainly
for pragmatic reasons. Both believe themselves to be
geopolitical losers in the WOT. In fact, Riyadh's
understandings with Iraq and rapprochement with
Iran reflect a common interest of all three that
developments in the region should not conform to a
US-Israeli-Turkish design.
There is a degree of Arab unity in actions against
Israel not seen since the 1970s. Arab and Iranian aid
is flowing in increasing quantities to the insurrection
in the West Bank and Gaza. Terrorist acts inside
Israel proper continue to take a high weekly toll.
Washington is braced for further acts of mass murder
from a range of organizations that conduct operations
against Israel. Israel and the United States classify
these acts as terrorist, but all Arab governments and
Tehran regard them as justifiable self-defense.
The US 5th Fleet remains headquartered in Bahrain
and the US Air Force has redeployed from Saudi
Arabia to Qatar and Oman, but all three states have
asked the Americans to draw down and be gone
within the next two years. The number of sailors and
airmen deployed to the Gulf is a fraction of what it
had been. Arab defense contracts go to European,
Chinese, and Russian suppliers. After suspending
relations with Israel and developing much closer
relations with Iraq, Cairo is considering phasing out
its military relationship with Washington.
The diminishing US presence in the region has failed
to do anything to boost economic growth. Oil prices
remain low throughout the scenario with only
occasional modest spikes related to sporadic acts of
violence and temporary global demand/supply
imbalances. The new Saudi leadership concentrates
on solidifying its power and marginalizing al-Qa`ida
It has no energy or political capital left over to launch
economic liberalization. Saudi economic growth is
very low these five years, and unemployment and
underemployment rise sharply. Exxon-Mobil still
engages in gasfield development in partnership with
Saudi Aramco, but there are now fewer than 5,000
Americans in the kingdom. The Egyptian economy is
also badly hurt. Improving political ties to other Arab
states does nothing to expand markets for Egyptian
goods nor can its new allies absorb any new Egyptian
migrant workers. Iran's economy is badly hurt by the
fall in oil prices. Europeans are interested in getting
back into the Iranian oil industry, but, with a glut
from renewed Iraqi production, not much new
investment takes place. Iraq, of course, is the solid
winner in this scenario. Oil production reaches
4 million barrels per day by 2006 and is heading up.
Iraqi economic growth is strong, and government
coffers are flooded with oil export revenue. OPEC
decides to denominate oil exports in euros as a further
way to distance the Middle East from the United
States.
Scenario 5�"Security States"
� Terrorism: Major activity.
� WOT: Warfare beyond Afghanistan.
� Unrest: Major civil disorder.
� Coalition: Holds
The war expands with scattered Special Forces
operations and strikes on Iraqi W1V1D facilities. To
keep the antiterrorist coalition together and focused,
the United States looks the other way as Arab
"security states" go after both terrorists and domestic
opponents and suppress antiregime and anti-US
dissent. For these states, moving away from political
systems based on repression will be a long process.
2002
All in all, as far as many and perhaps most people in
the Middle East are concerned, conditions in 2002 are
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as bad as
war.
f not worse than, they were before the Gulf
For much of the population, especially the young,
prospects for social mobility, a higher standard of
living, and even a job are declining. Economic growth
for the region averages only about 2 percent per year,
far below the rate needed to absorb the rapidly_
growing work force. Unemployment rises.
There is a large and growing gap between rich and
poor. The burdens of underdevelopment are not shared
equitably. Despite economic difficulties, there are
islands of affluence and privilege, often involving
luxury and excess.
There is general understanding that elite membership is
determined in most instances not by ability, dedication,
or service to society but by personal and political
cormections. The result is a system in which patronage
and clientism prevail.
There are few established mechanisms by which the
public can register complaints or participate in the
political process
Understandably, many Arabs have little good to say
about their rulers. In 1990-91 there was little
sympathy in the street for Kuwait, judged to be
arrogant and selfish. The anti-Iraq coalition included
Saudi Arabia and other "bad Arabs," as well as
foreign elements. In the view of many young Arabs
then and now, during the Gulf war the sole
motivation of the sultans of the Gulf, Mubarak, and
even Hafiz al-Asad was to remain in power, protect
personal interests, and defend themselves against
their own people, whom they feared.
Disappointment with America also characterizes
popular attitudes. After the Gulf war the American
administration talked about democratization in the
Middle East, development, resource sharing, security,
and Arab-Israeli peace. Ordinary men and women
applauded these goals, even as they wondered whether
meaningful change actually would take place. It turned
out that their skepticism was justified. Despite early
diplomatic initiatives, political and economic life in the
region never moved away from business as usual. The
Israeli-Palestinian peace process was a partial
exception�the breakthrough Oslo accords produced a
moment of optimism in 1993, but it faded.
Most of the Arab regimes that supported Desert
Storm are partners in the WOT. Many are important
partners, providing valuable information about
individuals and groups suspected of terrorism.
However, there is something new in the attitude of
these regimes. Officials of Egypt, Algeria, and
several other countries eagerly note, "We told you
so." They almost gloat over the subject of US
military courts. "How interesting that you are
following our lead. Now you understand!" they say.
As the war in Afghanistan winds down, the United
States works with the Afghans to establish a viable
coalition government. Washington continues to
provide significant amounts of humanitarian aid.
Propaganda value aside, these are important
accomplishments. The United States points with
understandable pride to the Afghan people's
celebration of their liberation from Taliban
totalitarianism. But Washington's continuing actions
under the WOT do not respond to the desires for
freedom of people in countries ruled by Arab
governments allied with the United States.
2003
The United States expands the war, inserting Special
Forces into Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Iraq and
conducting air strikes on Iraqi WIVJD facilities.
Popular anger against the attacks takes the form of
sympathy for Saddam�viewed as a "man of action"
who stands up to the superpower�and antipathy
toward the United States.
Partners in the WOT know that the United States
cannot pursue the war or pressure Iraq without their
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cooperation. They are confident that this US
dependence on their support immunizes them against
all but superficial US questioning of their internal
security and counterterrorist actions. Consequently,
many Arab states cooperating in the WOT are
emboldened to expand domestic repression in the
name of fighting terrorism. There is legitimate
concern about terrorism�no one counsels inaction in
the face of real terrorist dangers. The problem,
however, is that some Arab governments, particularly
Egypt, act against any individual or movement
perceived to threaten the state's monopoly on power.
Elites in Egypt and elsewhere in the region, many
educated in the West, sense further erosion of Middle
Eastern economic opportunity and leave for Europe
and North America, making this one of the most
dramatic "brain drain" periods in the region's recent
history.
In addition to pursuit of the war, terrorist attacks in
the United States and against US and local
government facilities in the Gulf, Egypt, and Turkey
dominate US attention. US officials have little time to
prosecute the WOT's never fully crystallized political
agenda�a program to encourage political
liberalization and expand opportunity and thus
address conditions in the Arab world that generate
willing recruits for al-Qa`ida. In many exchanges
with Arab counterparts all that US officials manage
to convey are admonishments to be tireless in the
fight against terrorism.
2004
The kinds of anti-status-quo demonstrations that
shook many countries in the 1980s again erupt in the
Middle East and North Africa. Despite rhetoric about
addressing grievances and a few tepid and calculated
reforms, Arab police and security services reestablish
order. Many incidents involve civilian casualties and
arrests in the hundreds. Finally, a tense calm prevails,
but economic growth is retarded by the violence and
the lack of government interest in pursuing change.
Washington is unsure how to respond. Debates occur
within the US Government about the reasons for the
disturbances and whether to retain or reduce ties to
Arab regimes.
Some US officials argue that opponents of the status
quo are motivated by sentiments that do not deserve
consideration, such as a hatred of Western civilization
inspired by Islamic extremism. They say that the
protesters resent the West because of its success over
the past 500 years compared with lack of progress in
the Muslim world. They judge that the protesters are
unwittingly advancing the terrorists' agenda.
Others offer a competing analysis. Addressing the
conditions that give rise to desperation and rage best
fights the war against terrorism. The United States
"lost" Iran not in spite of but because of support for
the Shah; Islamists won elections in Algeria not
because the government had been too tolerant but
because it had not been tolerant enough. Who could
blame people for being angry at unsavory,
authoritarian regimes and at the foreign powers who
support them?
Those who argue in favor of sticking with America's
traditional Arab friends admit that many governments
in the region are indeed repressive, corrupt, and hated
by their own people�but there is no clear alternative
to working with them. "Too much is at stake. The risk
is too great. With whom would we work if not the
established regimes?" are the realpolitik assessments
that carry the day. Accordingly, the United States not
only continues but also increases its military and
counterterrorist cooperation with key Arab
governments.
2005-06
The alliance between the United States and its
traditional allies in the Middle East continues intact.
The WOT continues. Many genuine terrorists or
would-be terrorists are killed, captured, or forced to
flee. There is still occasional call for Special Forces
operations and even airstrikes in odd corners of the
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world in which terrorists attempt to rebuild
indoctrination and training infrastructure�in remote
areas of the Sahel and parts of Yemen, Tajikistan, and
Indonesia poorly controlled by central governments.
But, of course, America's traditional Arab allies also
have grafted suppression of opposition onto their
interpretation of the WOT. This may or may not be a
viable long-term strategy.
Popular anger at the status quo in the Arab world
does not subside. It is difficult to tell just how close
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others are to revolution. In
some ways they resemble Iran in the late 1970s, but
perhaps these "security states" can keep the lid on for
years or decades. The economic and social penalties
encountered with this policy choice are high: lost
opportunity; noncompetitive and noninnovative
societies; exclusion from many wealth-creating
effects of globalization; and slipping further behind
not only the West but East Asia, Latin America, and
even India in meaningful measures of progress, such
as living standard, educational levels, public health,
or commercial competitiveness. But none of these
penalties affects the well-being of Arab elites�
assuming that the lid stays on
World oil prices rise in this scenario�averaging
about $22 per barrel�because Iraqi production
increases are stymied by the ongoing conflict with the
coalition. Terrorist acts and random bouts of civil
disorder cause frequent oil price spikes. Higher oil
prices do not spur higher regional growth because
they are offset by civil disorder and repression.
Scenario 6�" Tr an sformation
� Terrorism: Moderate activity.
� WOT: Major warfare beyond Afghanistan.
� Unrest: Minor civil disorder.
� Coalition: Holds
Regional transformation begins with an interim
Israeli-Palestinian accord in late 2002, attained only
with new leadership and after exhaustion of both
sides by the violence. Characterized in 2002 by
surgical special operations, the WOT transforms in
2003 into a short, bloody, and successful ground and
air war against Iraq. Anti-US demonstrations occur
throughout the Arab world but do not threaten Arab
regimes�which are emboldened to start confronting
domestic problems now that Saddam is gone, the US
security presence is diminishing, and Israel and
Palestine have reached a final peace settlement.
2002
In Afghanistan the Taliban is vanquished in the
WOT. The transition in Afghanistan from provisional
to permanent government is relatively smooth, with
the new government enjoying various degrees of
support, from strong to grudging, from regions and
ethnic groups. Aid from Western governments and
NGOs is starting to repair the damage to physical and
social infrastructure wrought since the 1970s.
Lawlessness outside the cities is a serious problem,
but construction from the ground up of police forces
and an Afghan army is proceeding with much
Western assistance. India, Pakistan, and Iran all have
their hands in internal Afghan affairs, but, in a
curious way, that is a sign of a return to the sort of
normalcy experienced by Afghanistan in the 1950s
and 1960s.
Al-Qa`ida was badly mauled in Afghanistan, but parts
of the organization have reconstituted elsewhere. The
geographic scope of the WOT expands, with surgical
Special Forces operations that root out al-Qa`ida
attempts to regroup in mountain, desert, jungle, and
island refuges from Africa to Southeast Asia�in
areas beyond the effective control of central
governments. These operations also target groups
allied with al-Qa`ida as well as terrorist organizations
without known al-Qa` ida connections. Where there
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are functioning national governments, they usually
are willing to cooperate, to gain US assistance and to
assert control over remote regions.
The world press never learns about some of these
counterterrorist actions; others create headlines.
Public opinion in Muslim countries is critical of the
WOT but is far more upset about the plight of the
Palestinians. There are anti-American demonstrations
from Morocco to Indonesia, but local governments
control them; they do not threaten government
stability
Among Arab elites, opinion is mixed over the WOT.
Almost all are delighted that the United States is
ridding them of al-Qa`ida, a task that they had been
unwilling to initiate on their own. Some see the WOT
as a useful excuse to tighten controls on elements
critical of their regimes. But they also are fearful of
unknown consequences of a possible expansion of the
WOT to Iraq. Other, younger members of
governments and royal families and some
intellectuals recognize the emergence of al-Qa`ida as
a wake-up call, alerting the establishment to the need
to change conditions that create terrorists
Indeed, the United States works more seriously to
create political space for a "middle way" in the
Middle East. For example, Washington builds on
Fulbright and other exchange programs (including
some military-to-military exchanges) to develop and
support reformist rather than radical discourse and to
encourage "elites" as well as the "elite masses" that
have good religious credentials. An increasing
number of US policymakers and scholars appear on
al-Jazirah television to air their views and engage on
a range of topics. Most important, Washington uses a
light touch behind the scenes to help the region's
leaders�who fear popular mobilization and where it
may lead�develop a vision for the future.
Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah finally succeeds in
giving more voice and space to reformers to counter
the appeal of Islamic radicals. There is hope of
bringing about acceptable and sustainable political,
economic, and social changes�and of coping with
crumbling infrastructure and still rising
unemployment. In what many see as a minor press
item, Abdallah receives international praise for
implementing mandatory school attendance for those
17 and younger (in mid-2002, fewer than half of
Saudi teenagers are in school despite free education).
By late 2002 the violence has exhausted Israel and the
Palestinians. The Palestinians are impoverished and
living in chaos. Antiwar protest in Israel has divided
the country. Company-size regular IDF units disobey
orders, refusing occupation duty. Unprecedented
numbers of Israelis are emigrating to the United
States and back to Russia. Further, the Israelis and
Palestinians have new leadership, in both cases as a
result of assassination. With much outside assistance
and pressure, the sides explore, internally debate, and
declare a truce�and it holds. US and EU officials
facilitate talks, which proceed surprisingly quickly
now that both sides feel they must bargain. An
interim accord is signed in six weeks. It features a
cease-fire and pullback while negotiations on an
endstate continue. The United States and the EU
provide emergency aid for Palestinian areas,
including assistance to restore basic services and
rebuild infrastructure.
2003
After no major terrorist attacks in North America or
Europe in 2002, a radiological dispersion device
explodes in the United States in early 2003, killing
several score and exposing thousands to radioactivity.
A similar attack against London is foiled. A short
time later, US officials obtain documentary evidence
and oral statements from an informant that the Iraqi
Mukhabarat provided the radioactive material used in
these devices. Washington and London agree that it is
time to rid the world of Saddam Husayn's regime.
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US and UK planners finalize their concept for a
military campaign against Iraq. Wherever possible
they will follow the "Kosovo/Afghanistan model" of
using airpower to support local insurgents on the
ground. But it soon becomes apparent that Kurdish
fighters in the north and Iraqi Shia in the south are too
poorly organized and trained to be of help. Instead,
new, light, and fast US armor formations; air cavalry;
and Special Forces will assume the battlefield role of
the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Air forces
operate from Turkish bases and aircraft carriers in the
Persian Gulf Heavy bombers fly from distant bases.
Hostilities begin in March with massive airstrikes on
Iraqi antiaircraft defenses, command centers, and
ballistic missile and W1V1D sites. Local contamination
and civilian casualties result from attacks on chemical
weapon depots. US airborne troops create a staging
point in Iraq's western desert. Light US ground
formation, move toward Baghdad from the west and
north. Although the US force is too small to engage in
fights for occupied cities, it is able to draw out Iraqi
forces, allowing them to be targeted for airstrikes.
After Iraq's military is destroyed as an effective
fighting force, regime authority collapses. Bunker-
penetrating munitions eliminate Saddam and his
family. The war is short, bloody, and successful. As
soon as the shooting stops, the first order of business
is a countrywide search to uncover all ballistic missile
and W1V1D sites and destroy them.
Most regional regimes can live with the narrow US
war objectives. Some governments quietly provide
assistance, such as granting overflight permission or
temporary use of remote desert locations. Arab
leaders shed no tears over Saddam' s demise�it is
their gain to be rid of him, and they are required to do
little to achieve that outcome. Although they have
some concern that Iran not take advantage of a
prostrate Iraq, their principal worry is for domestic
stability during the US campaign in Iraq
Demonstrations against the war in Iraq occur all over
the Arab world. They are primarily anti-American�
not against regional regimes. Some demonstrations
are difficult for the police to contain. However, as it
becomes clear that the war will be short and decisive
and will cause less damage than many expected, the
fury drains out of the demonstrations. A quick war
neutralizes opposition.
Cleanup in Iraq is far easier than in Afghanistan.
Iraqis are thankful at being released from the grip of
Saddam' s police state. US and British troops usually
are greeted as liberators. The fighting ends with the
formal surrender of Iraqi generals. The few hardcore
resisters are members of Saddam' s secret police or
elite guards. Western governments facilitate the
return of thousands of Iraqi exiles, members of the
educated middle class that suffered greatly under
Saddam. Returnees and a number of Iraqi regular
army officers make up a transitional government.
Shia and Kurds participate in this caretaker regime.
Relatively few foreign peacekeeping troops are
needed; regular Iraqi police, purged of Saddam's
thugs, are able to maintain order. As in Afghanistan,
aid from the West and from Muslim humanitarian
organizations meets the immediate needs of the
population, but Iraq's own oil revenues�wisely
spent, for a change�finance the nation's recovery.
To this end, Iraq tries to move as much crude and
petroleum products into world markets as possible.
2004
The Israeli Government and a range of Palestinian
leaders reach a final settlement in May 2004. The
borders of a Palestinian state, composed of the West
Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, are close to the 1967
demarcation. A parallel peace agreement with Syria
adopts the 1967 border, with demilitarization of the
Golan Heights and retention of observers. The
Palestinians abandon their right of return to Israel.
Jerusalem becomes the capital of both states. The
package includes pledges of extensive US, European,
Japanese, and Gulf Arab aid and investment for
Palestine. Palestinian independence is scheduled for
1 September 2004. Decades of ill will between
Israelis and Arabs will not dissipate quickly, but a
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huge irritan
removed.
n Arab relations
h the West has been
Following a successful campaign, the US occupiers
formulate an endgame that allows the last US and UK
troops to pull out of Iraq seven months after the fall
of Saddam (although special multinational teams
continue WMD location and cleanup). Many
experienced Iraqi managers return from outside the
country. They quickly are brought into the
transitional government. Many challenges remain
before Iraq can return to normalcy. Not the least of
them is overcoming the extensive damage caused by
Saddam to Iraqi political and social institutions.
Nevertheless, most Iraqis want the transitional
government and its successor administration to
succeed. This degree of support creates tolerance for
failure as the new leadership tries to build responsive
and effective government. A constitutional
convention in 2005 is expected to acknowledge in its
final document the present reality of autonomy in the
Kurdish areas. However, sentiment for an
independent state continues among some Kurds, so
this issue is far from settled. Saddam' s Republican
Guard has been dismantled, while 10 regular army
divisions and a small air force are being reconstituted
to provide some balancing against Iranian power.
Iran, for its part, has quietly observed events in Iraq,
mindful not to provoke the Americans but poised to
gain a hand in Iraqi affairs through pro-Iranian Iraqi
Shia.
The delight of average Iraqis with events confounds
anti-American commentators and opinion leaders in
other Arab countries. Indeed, with Palestine
independent, Saddam gone and Iraq recovering, and
the Americans pulling out of the Gulf, anti-
Americanism is losing its allure in some quarters.
Peace in the Levant, however, makes no impression
on al- a' ida, and its attacks continue in the region.
2005-06
Different from Palestine, a solution to the Kashmir
dispute is not found. Yet, results in dealing with this
South Asian hotspot, an irritant for now close to 60
years, are perhaps best measured simply by whether
escalation into a major war has been avoided. At this
there has been success. Threats and inducements by
Washington, Moscow, European capitals, and the UN
have enabled cooler heads in New Delhi and
Islamabad to control decisionmaking during crises.
But as conventional and nuclear military capabilities
of both Pakistan and India grow, the risks of
miscalculation increase.
Iran has grown into a regional military power of
consequence and maintains its WMD programs. But
this development is viewed with somewhat less
concern by Iran's neighbors in 2006 than it would
have been 10 years earlier because of political
liberalization in Iran. Repeated popular protest, often
violent, since 2002 has loosened step by step the grip
of fundamentalist clerics to the point that by 2006 the
press is free and the government, including the
security ministries, is in the hands of popularly
elected officials. Iran is still nationalistic and prone to
throw its weight around, but a growing middle class
that wishes to become rich by participating in the
global economy moderates its behavior. Economic
growth averages 5 percent per year, boosted by
inflows of foreign capital to redevelop the energy
sector and by unleashing the entrepreneurial spirit of
the people that the mullahs held in check.
These have been a surprising five years. Elites in
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states
are adjusting to a world without Saddam and with
peace in the Holy Land. Economic activity quickly
revives with the decline in political uncertainties
related to Palestine and Iraq. Conservative regimes
begin to feel more confident about reducing the role
of the state in their economies and opening up the
system to competition. These reforms are modest and
undertaken cautiously�no one expects the Middle
East to quickly develop capitalist institutions. It is
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worth noting that Syria is among these wary
reformers, the settlement with Israel having given it
room to experiment with new economic rules and
structures that will work only if accompanied by
some loosening of police state controls.
There is not total peace in the Middle East. Remnants
of al-Qa` ida still attempt attacks against US interests
in the region and against the Saudi regime, reminding
all that the WOT is not over. Anti-US sermons
sometimes are still heard at Friday prayers; violent
Islamic fundamentalism may be gradually losing its
relevance, as in Iran, but that trend is not yet clear. As
for the direction of political developments in the Arab
world in the second half of this decade, it is perhaps
indicative of future changes that advocates of political
liberalization are being allowed more voice. One
reform being advocated is replacing the appointed
advisory Saudi majlis with an elected body (male
suffrage) with real, although circumscribed, powers.
The US economy was badly hurt by the al-Qa`ida�
Iraqi attack in 2003. Domestic spending ramped
down sharply as Americans awaited the elimination
of the terrorist threat before feeling safe to return to
normal economic behavior. But by 2006 a calming of
Middle East tensions allows the US and world
economies to make up lost ground.
Finally, not until 2006 do US officials discover that in
2003 al-Qa`ida intentionally fed to the US
Government true information that the radioactive
material used in the radiological attack in the United
States was of Iraqi origin. By doing this, al-Qa` ida's
strategists sought to provoke the United States into
attacking Iraq, embroiling Washington in a difficult
and disruptive war against Muslims. Their plan was
for the conflict to validate al-Qa` ida's view of the
world in the eyes of Muslim populations and
governments and rally them to al-Qa` ida.
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