(EST PUB DATE) FOREWORD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01435049
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2007-00094
• Publication Date: January 1, 1973

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Foreword
The basic issues presented by the report of Senator Baker
his staff are those of possible CIA implication in the
Watergate and Fielding break-ins and the subsequent cover-ups.
These issues are presented in the form of unresolved questions
that leave the reader with the inference that in some way CIA
at least had prior knowledge of, and possibly participated in,
the various break-in plans and was similarly involved in the
cover-up.
The genesis of the investigation of CIA, carried on by
Senator Baker independently of the Senate Select Committee,
is set out in the Background section of his report. Apparently
of primary importance was a speech by President Nixon on
22 May 1973, in which the question of CIA involvement was
raised. It is now possible to put those statements in per-
spective by comparing them with the record of the discussion
between President Nixon and Robert Haldeman on 23 June 1972,
when they planned their unsuccessful effort to involve CIA
in the cover-up. The relevant portions of that conversation
are quoted below. The Background section of the Baker Report
also cited newspaper. stories that attracted the interest of
the investigators and noted questions that arose in the minds
of the Baker staff about the relationship of CIA with the
public relations firm of Robert Mullen & Company, which
provided operational cover for CIA operatives overseas.
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It should now be apparent by all objective standards that
CIA had no prior knowledge of the break-ins and did not
participate in the cover-up that later was attempted by key
public 'figures. Some key points are noted in this Foreword
as considerations to be kept in mind while reviewing more
detailed comments on the Baker Report.
(1) The conversations between President Nixon and
Mr. Haldeman of 23 June 1972 constituted a review of what
could be done to contain the crime to those immediately
involved and to conceal the connection of the burglars
with the Administration. CIA's name was invoked in a
discussion of the possibility of involving the Agency in
the cover-up:
Haldeman: that the way to handle this now is for us to
have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "stay to hell
out of this -- this ah, business here; we don't want you
to go any further on it." That's not an unusual devel-
opment, and ah, that would take care of it.
President Nixon: When you get in -- when you get in
(unintelligible) people, say, "look the problem is that
this will open the whole, the Bay of Pigs thing, and the
president just feels that ah, without going into the
details -- don't, don't lie to them to the extent to say
there is no involvement, but just say this is a comedy
2�
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� of errors, without getting into it, the president believes
that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up
� again. And, ah, because these people are plugging for
(uriintelligible) and that they should call the FBI in and
(unintelligible) don't go any further into this case
period. (Inaudible) our case....
It apparently was this conversation that led to the meeting
that same day at the White House between Messrs. Haldeman and
Ehrlichman and DCI Helms and DDCI Walters, at which CIA was
asked to have the FBI call off its investigation. It makes it
quite clear that CIA had no prior knowledge of the subject
matter -- Watergate. Otherwise the conversation would have
been quite different.
(2) In his testimony before the Senate Select Com-
mittee, John Dean described a conversation between John
Ehrlishman and himself in early 1973, in which Dean reported
the nature of documents delivered by CIA to the Department
of Justice relating to CIA's association with Hunt in the
summer of 1971. This material included copies of photo-
graphs that are now known to have been taken by Hunt at
Dr. Fielding's office in August 1971. According to Dean,
Ehrlichman requested him to try to have CIA retrieve the
papers from the Department of Justice to prevent their
leading to an investigation that would open up the fac
of the Fielding break-in, which was not yet known in the
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context of the Watergate affair. From other testimony,
it is known that on 9 February 1973 Dean phoned DCI
Schlesinger so requesting, a gambit that was rejected by
the Agency. Dean, in reporting to President Nixon on this
on 17 March 1973, described the photographs as showing
Liddy in front of Dr. Fielding's office. He said:
CIA has not put this together, and they don't
know what it all means right now. But it wouldn't
take a very sharp investigator very long because
you've got pictures in the CIA files that they had
to turn over to (unintelligible).
(3) In sworn testimony on a number of occasions, Howard
Hunt, when asked if CIA knew what he was up to, replied
that he told no one and, indeed, went to great lengths to
prevent CIA from having any knowledge of his activities.
Following is one of the exchanges:
Q. Did you tell anybody at the CIA what
was the purpose for this equipment?
A. No.
(4) Charles Colson, who was the source of continuing
rumors about CIA involvement subsequent to the issuance
of the Baker Report, testified before the CIA Oversight
Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on
19 June 1973, after he had resigned from the White House
staff and lost his inside access to developments. After
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disavowing any personal knowledge about CIA involvement,
the following exchange occurred:
Senator Young: Your testimony would seem
to indicate that your knowledge of the CIA
.involvement is mostly hearsay, then?
Mr. Colson: Yes, sir.
The Baker Report was issued on 2 July 1974. Already, key
figures in the Watergate and Fielding break-ins had confessed
fully without implicating CIA. Some of these involved in the
cover-up had also told their story, without implicating CIA.
The subsequent dramatic revelations would seem to have com-
pleted the search for the guilty, destroying the premise on
which the Baker Report based its challenge of CIA's account of
events. However, the subsequent republication of the Baker
Report in the Congressional Record, and further statements
relating its findings to the current allegations against CIA,
suggests the relevance of an analysis of it.
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BENNET AND THE MULLEN FIRM
Issue No. 1: Did CIA Ask Mullen to Hire Hunt?
The Baker Report states: "Hunt left the CIA in 1970 and
joined Mullen and Company with what founder Robert Mullen
understood to be Director Helms' blessing. Hunt's covert
security clearance was extended by the CIA, he was witting of
the Mullen cover, and on occasion he undertook negotiations
with the Agency with respect to that cover -- even after be-
coming employed at the White House (according to Agency
records)." In footnotes on this passage the Baker Report cites
dc,cumentaiy evidence provided by CIA as well as oral testimony
of Mr. Bennet, Mr. Mullen, and the former CIA Deputy Director
fir Plans.
Agency Comment:
The above passage of the Baker Report.conveys an impression
not warranted by the facts. Although it is correct to state
that the Agency did make an effort to assist Mr. Hunt in
finding non-CIA employment, there is no record of any influ-
ence being brought to bear by CIA for Mr. Mullen to employ
Hunt. Mr. Mullen did know that Mr. Helms had written to one
or more firms recommending Mr. Hunt. Mr. Mullen's own testi-
mony, however, says that it was Mr. Mullen himself who hired
Mr. Hunt: "And no, I cannot say that the Agency leaned on me
in any way to hire him. I am the one who did it."1
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There were meetings between Mr. Hunt and two Agency
officials, at Hunt's initiative. At one of these he related
reservations of the Mullen firm on its relationships with CIA.
At the other he made an operational proposal that was not
accepted. All official discussions of cover arrangements with
the Mullen firm, however, were not with Mr. Hunt, but with
Mr. Mullen and then Mr. Bennet, the man who actually succeeded
Mr. Mullen as president of the firm.2
Issue No. 2: Did the Agency Have Prior Knowledge
of Bennett's Assistance to Hunt?
The Baker Report states: "Bennet's accessibility to the
CIA has raised questions concerning possible Agency involvement
in, or knowledge of, Bennett's activities in regard to Hunt/
Liddy, to wit: Bennet suggested and coordinated the DeMotte
interview regarding Chappaquidick; Bennett coordinated the
release of Dita Beard's statement from Denver, after contacting
Beard's attorneys at the suggestion of a Hughes executive;
Bennett suggested that Greenspun's safe contained information
of interest to both Hughes and the CRP; Bennett asked for and
received from Hunt a price estimate for bugging Clifford Irving
for Hughes, Bennet coordinated the employment of political
spy Tom Gregory by Hunt and discussed with Gregory the latter's
refusal to proceed with bugging plans on or about June 16,
1972. Bennett received a scrambler from Hughes personnel for
use on Mullen telephones; Bennet and Liddy set up dummy
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committees as a.conduit for Hughes campaign contributions;
and Bennet served as the point of contact between Hunt and
Liddy during the two weeks following the Watergate break-in.
Furthermore, Robert Oliver, Mullen's Washington lobbyist for
Hughes Tool, is the father of R. Spencer Oliver, Jr., whose
telephone was tapped at the Democratic National Committee.
Bennett met with the Olivers after the break-in to discuss
the bugging." The footnotes to this paragraph in the Baker
Report cite testimony of Mr. Hunt, Mr. Bennett, "Staff Inter-
view of Thomas J. Gregory," "Staff Interview of Linda Jones,"
and "Summarized Highlights of Linda Jones interview."
Agency Comment:
This recitation is phrased to suggest CIA involvement in,
or advance knowledge of, Mr. Bennett's activities and Hunt's.
Bennett and Hunt have both testified unequivocally about
whether CIA knew what Hunt was doing. Hunt's testimony has
been quoted in part in the Foreword to this paper. Mr. Bennett's
testimony before the Senate Select Committee, as follows, is
pertinent to the question:
Mr. Thompson: Did you have any contact at all with any
case officer or anyone else representing
CIA during this period of time when you
were aware of Hunt's activities according
to what he told you?
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Mr. Bennett:. No, only the normal contact that I have
described withRhe case office0 But this
never came up.
Mr. Bennett: ...I think I ought to be asked somewhere
along the line who asked for Howard Hunt
to go to work for the White House. And
nobody asked me that. And the answer is
Colson.
And who did Hunt work for? And nobody
asked me that. And the answer is, to the
best of my knowledge, Colson.
It should be noted specially, in the context of this
question, that the various activities of Mr. Bennett, cited in
the Report, are revealed in the testimony available to Senator
Baker and his staff as having arisen from a relationship be-
tween Mr. Bennett and Mr. Charles Colson of the White House.3
The Mullen Company is considered a Republican public relations
firm, and Mr. Bennett had his own reasons for being responsive
to White House initiatives, as distinguished from dealing with
CIA in other areas of activity.4
Issue No. 3: What Did Bennett Tell CIA, and When?
The Baker Report states: "On July 10, 1972, Bennett reported
detailed knowledge of the Watergate incident to his CIA case
officer. The case officer's report of this meeting was
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handwritten and carried to Director Helms on or before July 14,
1972, in this form because of the sensitivity of the infor-
mation. It revealed that Bennett had established a 'back
door entry' .to E.B. Williams, the attorney for the DNC, in
order to 'kill off' revelations of the Agency's relationship
with the Mullen and Company in the course of the DNC lawsuit.
He agreed to check with the CIA prior to contacting Williams.
Our staff has confirmed that Bennett did funnel information
to Williams via attorney Hobart Taylor and that this infor-
mation was more extensive than the information Bennett had
pnwiously provided the Grand Jury." Footnotes to this passage
in the Baker Report cite the 10 July 1972 memorandum for the
record by the Mullen firm case officer, a "Hobart Taylor
Interview Report, dated February 11, 1974, a "Robert F. Bennett,
Memorandum for Record, dated January 18, 1973," and oral
testimony of Robert F. Bennett and the Mullen firm case officer.
Agency Comment:
The factual recitation is mainly about Bennett, while the
implication has to do with CIA. The 10 July 1972 handwritten
report of the case officer does not say what the Baker Report
cites it as saying. It did not say that "He (Bennett) agreed
to check with CIA prior to contacting Williams." It merely
reports Bennett's unilateral statement that he would do so;
the record of all subsequent contacts with Bennett -- copies
of which have been made available to the Baker staff -- report
no such exchanges.
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1/
�
� If, in fact, Mr. Bennett did carry on some "back door"
relationship with Mr. Williams, as is alleged in the Baker
Report, it was at his own personal and uncoordinated initiative,
and he has so testified. This testimony was available to Senator
Baker and his staff, and the story seems fairly straightforward,
given the circumstances. The subject was a civil suit, in which
an individual -- Bennett -- wished to avoid being involved,
with the attendant harmful publicity. It is implicit in the
reported statements that he wished to avoid having a classified
operational relationship (cover of CIA employees overseas)
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subjected to dramatic publicity. It is therefore clear that
no sinister connotation should be attached to Mr. Bennett's
offer to keep CIA informed of his attempt to contact Mr. Williams.
Because the Baker Report has so selectively represented
the contents of the handwritten report, the relevant portion
is repeated below:
"Mr. Bennett related that he has now established
a 'back door entry' to the Edward Bennett Williams law
firm which is representing the Democratic Party in its
law suit for damages resulting from the Watergate
incident. Mr. Bennett is prepared to go this route to
kill off any revelation by Ed Williams of Agency associ-
ations with the Mullen firm if such a development seems
likely. He said that he would, of course, check with
CIA before contacting Mr. Williams for this purpose."
Issue No. 4: Why Did CIA Pay One-Half of Mr. Bennett's
Attorney Fee?
The Baker Report states: "The CIA has acknowledged paying
one-half of Bennett's attorney fee for his Grand Jury appear-
ance." A footnote at this point cites "CIA Memorandum,
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undated, .Subject: Wrap-up of Agency's Association with Robert
R. Mullen and Company."
Agency Comment:
The Baker Report cites this payment without recording the
Agency's reason for it. The document cited by the Baker Report
here reports not only the payment but also the justification
therefor:
Mr. Bennett, in anticipation of a Grand Jury appear-
ance, secured the services of a Washington law firm. In
view of his representations that he could not have handled
the questions concerning the Agency adequately without
the advice of counsel, the Agency reimbursed him for
one-half of the attorney's fee. The reimbursement was $440.
Issue No. 5: Did the "WH Flap" Have Any Relevance to Watergate?
The Baker Report states: "The aforementioned July 10 report
contains mysterious reference to a 'WH flap'. The report
states that if the Mullen cover
could not be used as an excuse.
might have to level with Mullen
is terminated, the Watergate
It suggests that the Agency
about the 'WH flap'. None-
the less, a July 24, 1972 contact report shows that the CIA
convinced Robert Mullen of the need to withdraw its Far East
cover through an 'agreed upon scenario' which included a
falsified Watergate publicity crisis. The Agency advises
that the 'WH flap' has reference to a [deletion at Agency
requestl that threatened to compromise Western Hemisphere
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operations, but has not explained sufficient reason to with-
hold such information from Mullen nor explain
cance of same to Watergate developments. This
ation is clouded by conflicting evidence. The
the signifi-
Agency explan-
Assist ant
Deputy Director of Plans has testified that he is very familiar
with the matter and that it had no unique effect on Mullen's
cover. The Mullen case officer testified that the flap.con-
cerned cover. Bennett, who thought the reference concerned
a 'White House flap,' did advise of information received from
the European cover that a [compromise] adversely affected a
former Mullen cover [deleted at the Agency request]." Footnotes
to this passage of the Baker Report cite several documents
provided by the CIA as well as oral testimony of the Mullen
firm case officer, the former Deputy Director of Plans, the
Former Assistant Deputy Director for Plan, and Robert F.
Bennett.
Agency Comment:
The confusion of the phrase "White House flap" seems to
have been introduced into the record in the questioning of
Mr. Bennett by Mr. Thompson. Mr. Bennett was unfamiliar with
the phrase or its significance when first raised by
Mr. Thompson. The Baker Report has elected to continue that
confusion despite the fact that a thorough explanation has
been provided the Committee by CIA.
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The initial question arose from the use of the phrase
"WH Flap," in documents furnished the Senate Select Committee
by CIA. The letters "WI!" referred to the CIA Western Hemi-
sphere Division, and the "flap" referred to a disaffected
Agency officer, whose resignation from CIA had preceded the
Watergate incident by several years. This officer had been
reported associating with foreign intelligence organizations,
and there was concern over his exposing various overseas
operations of CIA. Mr. Bennett did not know the whole story,
and there was no controlling reason for briefing him on it,
involving as it did operational and security matters that far
exceeded his limited association with CIA, the cover service
provided by the Mullen firm being only one of the endangered
operational relationships. It was decided to withdraw overseas
agents under Mullen Company cover, which was explained to
Mr. Bennet on the grounds of Watergate.
The evidence seen as "conflicting" in the Baker Report
is in fact consistent. There was "no unique effect on Mullen's
cover," for there were other cover arrangements as well,
affected by the affair, as well as on-going operations in a
number of places.
As noted, the essential details of this were provided
the Baker staff. Subsequent to release of the Baker Report,
the story of the disaffected officer, one Philip Agee, has
become public knowledge, with considerable detail. This
should put this aspect of the matter to rest.
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PENN INGTON
Issue No. 1: Did CIA Conduct an In-house Investigation
Immediately Following the Watergate Break-in?
The Baker Report states: "Our investigation in this area
also produced the fact that, contrary to previous CIA
assertions, the CIA conducted a vigorous in-house
investigation of the Watergate matter, starting almost
immediately after the break-in." In a footnote at this
point, the Baker Report refers to testimony of two members
of the Office of Security.
Agency Comment:.
The Baker Report is in error here. There was no
"vigorous in-house investigation" in the CIA "starting
almost immediately after the break-in." In fact, former
DCI Helms testified at some length before the Committee
on why no such investigation was undertaken in CIA.
It is possible that the Baker subcommittee or staff
may have been misled by some of the statements in the
testimony of Office of Security personnel. The Office of
Security was actively engaged in responding to urgent
requests from the FBI for name traces and other information
because of �the involvement in the Watergate break-in of
former employees. The testimony cited in the footnote
mentioned above refers specifically to this activity in
the Office of Security, to the obvious interest of the
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"seventh floor," and to the testimony of a third member
of the Office of Security that brings out the fact that it
was unusual for the Office of Security to have to clear all
its responses to FBI requests for information with the
office of the Agency's Executive Director. Nonetheless,
none of this testimony or other evidence would support a
conclusion that there was at that time a vigorous or
extensive investigation of possible CIA involvement in
Watergate as distinguished from the responsibility of the
Office of Security to respond to FBI requests.
The testimony of one of the two Office of Security
employees stated:
The Monday after the break-in and the arrest, all
hell broke loose in our office -- I don't mean any
specific staff, which was headed by (General Gaynor) but
the entire office of security. Everyone was trying to
find out what happened and to what degree, if any, there
was any involvement. And I am pleased to state right now
that I have never found any. Everyone was checking
names. A name would appear on the radio or in the press.
And I know on one occasion I called out a name, and they
said "You are the fifth person that called to see if we
have a record of this person." It was a panic situation,
instead of a brushfire, it was an inferno. And everyone
who felt that their charter said, you should be doing
something about it there was doing it. (pg. 5)
The testimony of the other includes:
It began that Monday morning which I guess was the
19th of June, and it was to assemble data beginning with
memoranda that went out to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation over the signature of the Director of
Security. It continued very much in the same vein, just
a matter of assembling information, replying to inquiries
that we received either from the FBI or from the seventh
floor, from Mr. Colby when he was Executive Director,
Comptroller, �or up to the present time, now that he is the
Director. (pg. 2)
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With regard to testimony of former DCI Helms on the
reasons an internal investigation was not initiated following
the break-in, following are some excerpts from his extensive
discussion of this topic in his testimony on 8 March 1974:
Senator Baker spoke to me ... about why an intensive
investigation had not taken place in the Agency. And
my explanation then was what is my explanation now, and
that the Agency wasn't involved in Watergate. I was sure
of this, and therefore, I hadn't gone down, you know, in
the depths to find out any more about it. My preocCupation,
as Director of the Agency, was to try and see that the
Agency didn't get involved in something in which it was
not involved, and didn't get entangled in it, and this
was my preoccupation. (ppg. 85-86)
If there had been a question of using individuals
to break and enter the headquarters of the Democratic
National Committee, no one in the Agency would have
undertaken anything like that without my personal
authorization. I knew that nobody had been to see me
about anything like that. I couldn't understand at the
time what had happened, why it happened, or what was
behind it. I would have had absolutely no motive in the
wer1101 for wanting to do such a thing or undertake it under
any pressure or anything else. (pg. 132)
Since nobody had ever approached me about my such
operation and since I was totally unaware of this operation,
since these people involved, at least McCord and Hunt had
been retired for a couple of years, my initial inquiries,
you know, from my Deputy and others, where did you ever
hear about his, has anybody got any ideas about it and
so forth, at least among those people who would have to
�know to authorize it in the first place. I knew that the
Agency was not involved in the break-in, so I didn't have
to go all through the Agency.
Now, let's be careful about semantics again. An
organization in the Federal Government sometimes is large.
The CIA is quite large. That is not to say that I knew
what every human being employed by the CIA was doing, but
for the "Agency" in quotes, to be involved in this kind of
thing, there were certain individuals who would have to be
aware to involve the Agency. Otherwise it would be the
caper of some individual on their awn personal recognizance.
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So, after I made the initial inquiries among the
people that logically would have had to do with something
of this kind, it would seem to me that that would be all
that was necessary. (pgs. 133-134)
Issue No. 2: Was there anything unusual about the Procedures
. Followed by CIA in the Investigation it Commenced
in October 1972?
� The Baker Report states: "In November and December of 1972,
(Executive Officer to Director of Security) was specially
assigned to then Executive Director/Comptroller Colby to
conduct a very secretive investigation of several Watergate-
related matters. (Executive Officer to Director of Security)
was instructed to keep no copies of his findings and to
make no records. He did his own typing and utilized no
secretaries." A footnote at this point refers to testimony
of Executive Officer to Director of Security.
Agency Comment:
In early October 1972 the then CIA Deputy General
Counsel met with Principal Assistant United States Attorney
Sibert and others, at Silbert's request. They were interested
in testimony on the question of whether the Watergate
defendants had been acting on orders from higher authority.
They also asked a number of questions for Agency response,
which involved primarily the CIA/TSD support of Mr. Hunt and
Mr. Liddy in late July and in August 1971, also covering
relations with the Mullen firm. Martinez., etc. The DCI
assigned Mr. Colby-the responsibility for assembling and
If
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supplying the information to the Attorney General. In order
to assist Mr. Colby in this task, the Executive Officer to
the Director of Security was detailed to Mr. Colby's office.
The work of Mr. Colby and this employee, characterized as
"secretive," was secretive only in the sense that it was not
given internal or external publicity, continuing, in effect,
the compartmentalization in CIA which is standard procedure.
The limited dissemination of information within the Agency
did not affect the prompt passage of
by CIA to proper authorities outside
procedures were observed in May 1973
appropriate information
the Agency. Similar
when the Agency first
became aware that there was a connection between the matter
of the Ellsberg profile and the break-in of the office of
Dr. Fielding.
Another reason for the procedures characterized by the
Baker Report as "secretive" was that senior Agency officials
wished to insure that the information was confined to
the top levels of the FBI and the Department of Justice. As
explained by former DCI Helms in his testimony on 8 March 1974,
Mr. Helms stated:
Because for the first time in my memory there were
definite leaks out of the Alexandria office of the FBI
after the Watergate break-in, and it struck me that there
was no need to get people from the Agency who were on
active duty involved with the agents at the field office.
So I wanted to make it clear that if anyone wanted to talk
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to either of these gentlemen then it should be somebody
from Mr. Gray's office to talk to them. In other words,
I wanted it at a level where it wasn't going to leak.
(pg. 107)
Issue No. 3: Did CIA fail to Act on Information of Actions by
Lee Pennington at the McCord home, and were
Documents Destroyed there which "which might
show a link between McCord and CIA."
The Baker Report states: "The results of our investigation
clearly show that the CIA had in its possession, as early as
June of 1972, information that one of.their paid operatives,
Lee R. Pennington, Jr., had entered the James McCord residence
shortly after the Watergate break-in and destroyed documents
which might show a link between McCord and the CIA. This
information was not made available to this Committee or anyone
else outside the CIA until February 22, 1974, when a
memorandum by the then Director of Security was furnished
to this Committee." A footnote at this point refers to the
Director of Security's memorandum of 22 February 1974
for the DC'.
Agency Comment:
Information was available within CIA in late June 1972,
after the event, that papers were destroyed at the McCord
home and that Pennington was present. That information should
have been made available promptly within the Agency and to
proper authorities outside the Agency. The fact is, however,
that senior Agency officials did not become aware of this
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information themselves until 22 February 1974, and that
when.they did become aware of it they made it available to
proper authorities immediately. The circumstances of this
were related in full to the Committee and Baker staff.
The Agency has not been given an opportunity to review
the testimony of either Mr. G2Xynor or. Mr. Pennington on this
matter, nor has it had access to other relevant information
in �the possession of the Committee. To this date it does
not have knowledge of what papers were destroyed. Additionally,
the Agency has no information whatever indicating that any
CIA employee directed or encouraged Pennington to visit the
McCord residence or had any prior knowledge that Pennington
intended to do so; all indications are that such was not the
case.
Employees of the Office of Security did err in June 1972
when information that they had about-the incident at the
McCord home was not reported within CIA immediately nor to
the FBI. The error was compounded when, in August 1972, the
FBI requested information about a "Pennington" who was
described as possibly having been a former CIA supervisor of
McCord. An Office of Security employee passed to the FBI
representative information about a Cecil Pennington who,
although a CIA employee in the Office of Security, was never
McCord's supervisor and not the person in whim the FBI was
. 6
interested at the time. Lee Pennington was never a staff
employee of CIA, nor a supervisor of McCord's.
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vP('
�
There has been detailed testimony on the realtionship
between CIA and McCord, and there is no indication that
any papers that may have been destroyed would show any
unrevealed "link between McCord and CIA."
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TAPES
The Baker Report presents two statements, emphasized by
underscoring, in the discussion of Agency handling of tape
recordings of conversations.� They are as follows:
"Shortly before Director Helms left office, and
approximately one week after Senator Mansfield's letter
requesting that evidentiary materials be retained, Helps
ordered that the tapes be destroyed."
"The evidence indicates that among those telephone
transcripts were conversations with the President, Haldeman,
Ehrlichman and other White House officials." This underscored
statement was followed directly by the following: "Helms
and Director Helms' secretary have testified that such
conversations were non-Watergate related.' We have examined
summaries of logs made available by the CIA, but it is
impossible to determine who was taped in many of the room
conversations." Footnotes refer to testimony by Mr. Helms
and his secretary.
Agency Comment:
Thy import of the passage is that the tapes were
destroyed because they were Watergate-related, rather than
because they were not Watergate-related. Available evidence
is recounted here, for consideration in the light of
subsequent developments.
7- 3
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Mr. Helms stated that he received Senator Mansfield's
letter, had it "very much in mind," had instructed his
secretary to save any Watergate-related materials, had
circulated the letter in the Agency, and had issued a
directive in the Agency concerning Senator Mansfield's
request. Following is an excerpt from Mr. Helms' testimony
on this matter:
Senator Baker. "You were acutely aware of the
vulnerability of the CIA vis-a-vis Watergate, I take it?
You have already said you were trying to put distance
between the Agency and Watergate?"
Ambassador Helms. "Yes, sir. Senator Baker, I even had
a letter from Senator Mansfield, who is a Senator I
greatly respect and has been extraordinarily fair and
decent with me over the years, and I would have never
done anything to go counter to his wishes if I was aware
of what his wishes were. And I had gotten a letter from
him talking about papers and things related to Watergate,
that they should not be destroyed, and I had that very
much on my mind. You still have the Cushman-Hunt
conversation which was not destroyed-I was very conscious
of that, and I was careful about this, of destroying
anything that had to do with Watergate." (pg. 33)
Senator Baker. "Did you in fact order Mrs. Dunlevy to
destroy all tapes and transcriptions?"
Ambassador Helms. "Well, she came to me and said, we
have got, we have got to do something about the tapes and
the transcriptions and so forth. And I said well -- and I
remember -- this was very shortly after the Mansfield
letter had come, it wasn't that long before, so I said, I
want to be sure that we don't do anything that is going to
run afoul of Senator Manfield's request."
Senator Baker. "Did you tell Mrs. Dunlevy to destroy all
tapes and transcripts?"
Ambassador Helms. "I authorized her to destroy all of them
except anything that had to do with Watergate. That's
how the Cushman tape was kept. Is there something that
runs counter to this?" (pg. 36)
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Senator Ervin. "I want to ask Mr. Helms a few questions.
Now, as I understand your testimony, after you received
the letters, the letter from Senator Mansfield asking you
not to destroy any records that might have had any
relationship to the Watergate affair, you talked -- is it
Mrs. Dunlevy?"
Ambassador Helms. "Yes."
Senator Ervin. "Was she your secretary?"
Ambassador Helms. "Yes, she was."
Senator Ervin. "And when you talked to her, you told her
to destroy the records that you thought had no value, but
not to destroy anything that related to Watergate?"
Ambassador Helms. "Yes, She was clear about this. This
letter had arrived in the office, I had circulated it in
the Agency, and I want to say again, because I mean this,
that T have known Senator Mansfield for a long time. He
has always dealt very fairly with me, sometimes in some
perplexing situations, and when I got a letter from him,
which was the only letter I had ever had, as I recall, I
obviously was on my toes about it and was conscious of what
the letter said. And I want you to realize that I regret
to this day, obviously, that in that same time frame my
successor was confirmed, and therefore, I was tidying up,
and I simply went about the tidying up job that I would
have done under any circumstances, but I had had Senator
Mansfield's letter, and I realized that since I gave these
instructions within that time frame, and a week or ten
days, or two weeks later, which is what it was that makes
it look bad, but I promise you, Senator Ervin, that there
was no intention because I know what was in those papers,
I knew the people that I had had in my office and so
forth. These had to do with intelligence matters." (pgs. 45-47)
The testimony of Mr. Helm's secretary (pg. 32) in response
to a question by Mr. Thompson is direct and to the point.
He asked if there were "any matters* in any of those
conversations which directly or indirectly pertained to what
is commonly referred to as the Watergate situation." Her
reply was "Not that I ever heard or typed."
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The Baker Report blurs the fact that there are two
separate procedures for recording conversations, one having
to do with telephone conversations and one for conversations
occurring in certain executive offices. As testified, it was
not customary to transcribe telephone conversations in full,
it being more usual to make excerpts for the purpose of
insuring that specific actions were based on a specific record
of what was said. If recording of telephone conversations
were made, the tapes were not retained, but were used over and
over until worn out; such transcribed notes as were excerpted
from the tapes before they were reused were seldom retained.
There were only a handful of full transcriptions of
recorded telephone conversations, and they were not Watergate-
related. One stenographic excerpt of a telephone conversation
between John Ehrlichman and General Cushman on 7 July 1971 had
been saved and was turned over to the Committee. But there
were no tapes of Watergate-related telephone conversations to
save or destroy.
Some conversations mainly with foreign visitors, were
recorded in certain executive suites, and in such instances
the tapes were retained. It was these tapes of room
conversations that were destroyed and that were the subject
of the questioning above.7 The distinction between the
telephone and room recordings is obscured in the Baker
Report, thereby losing the significance of the Agency's
description of what was done to provide an answer to the
Committee's questions.
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CIA
-
CIA conducted a review of 740,000 visitor sign-in slips
for the period 1 January 1970 through 24 January 1973 �to
ascertain the persons visiting the Agency who might have
discussed Watergate subject matter and to ascertain the
places in the Agency visited by any of the individuals
identified publicly with "Watergate." The appointment
calendars of key Agency officials were checked generally,
and against these slips specifically, for-such meetings as
they might have had with Watergate-related personalities.
Logs kept of tape-recorded conversations in those rooms
with a recording capability were also carefully checked.8
While the results of these checks obviously are limited to
either actual verification that such conversations could
have occurred, or the negative findings that there is no
evidence of such conversations, it does, however, constitute
a rather extensive check with a strong likelihood of
discovering such conversations if they did, in fact, occur.
The findings were negative, producing nothing to contradict
the testimony of former Director Helms or his secretary. No
individuals have come forward to say that they participated
in such conversations, nor has there been any such
testimony from all those who have provided evidence on
various aspects of the Watergate affair.
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Following are some additional excerpts from the testimony
on the subject:
Senator Baker. "There was no prohibition in your office
or routine against the recording of Presidential phone
calls?"
Ambassador Helms. "I would have been the one who would
have to institute it. It wasn't for anyone else to
institute it."
Senator Baker. "I understand. Did you institute it?"
Ambassador Helms. "I don't recall it, but I am not going
to say I never did. I am only sure that I -- that I
never would record anything with President Nixon on
Watergate related matters because he never discussed
Watergate with me."
Senator Ervin. "You were familiar with your past connection
with the tapes and the transcripts that were destroyed?"
Ambassador Helms. "Yes. You see, sir
Senator Ervin. "And you also at that time did, such as you
could, survey, as time permitted, to reinforce your
recollection to the effect that none of them were related
to Watergate?"
Ambassador Helms. "Yes, sir. You see, Senator Mansfield's
thing was fresh in my memory. That had come in only a few
days before, as I recall it, and the circumstances --
let me, if I may, turn this thing around. I never had
Mr. Ehrlichman in my office during the period of time
after the Watergate to the best of my recollestion. I
never had Mr. Haldeman there ever, as far as I am aware.
I didn't have these other gentlemen in there. Therefore,
this question was not one that would have arisen, if you
see what I mean. In other words, they weren't irithe
building ever as far as I am aware..." (pg. 47)
Mr. Thompson. "Do you recall, for example, as you went
through the transcripts, your eyes catching any
conversations there with regard to the President, for
example? I believe we did go over this."
Ambassador Helms. "I want to say again, because I don't
want there to be any misunderstanding about it, I don't
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recall
-
recall having recorded any conversation with President
Nixon; but I might have. And four years is a rather long
time. The only thing I do know is that he never spoke to
me about the Watergate anyplace, on the telephone or in
private, or anyplace else, and he certainly never
telephoned me in this context. And I happen rather to be
able to say that in that election year of 1972 I got
practically no calls from him at all of any kind, anyplace
Mr. Thompson. "Would the same thing be true with regard to
say Mr. Ehrlichman? I am responding to several statements
you made, and what I mean is, is the same thing true with
regard to no specific recollection but there could be?"
Ambassador Helms. "(But) I would like to go through these
individuals one by one."
Mr. Thompson. "Yes."
I,
Ambassador Helms. "...I do not recall any conversations
on the telephone or in the Agency building with Mr.
Ehrlichman on any Watergate-related topics. I do not
even remember whether after June 17th, 1972, during that
period between then and the time I left the Agency,
whether I ever talked to him on the telephone again. I
sort of have an impression that I did not, that anytime
I saw him was on those occasions that I spoke about, or
socially, or something of this kind.
"As far as Haldeman is concerned, in that time frame
after June 17th, 1972, to the time that I left the
Agency, the only conversations that I recall having had
with him was after November the 20th, and that was on the
November 20th that I was called to Camp David by the
President and told that I was going to be leaving as
Director. Subsequently to that I had at least two, and
maybe three or four telephone conversations locause I am
just not precise about this, with Mr. Haldeman. (And)
He called me one day to tell me that the President very .
much wanted me to go as his ambassador to Iran, and we
had discussed that earlier, and this was to encourage
me to accept the position rather than saying do you want
it or not want it.
"I also recall talking to him from Florida one day
about when the announcement of my being made ambassador
and my leaving the Agency was going to be made.
"I also remember talking to Ron Ziegler about the
same thing. Now, whether this took place in one conversation
or a couple of conversations I don't know. But, they were
confined to the subject matter that I have identified,
and had nothing to do with the Watergate."
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Mr. Thompson. "All right. So, it would be correct to say
then, if, in fact, there were such transcriptions, they
would not have anything to do with Watergate?"
Ambassador Helms. "Yes, sir. That is correct." (pgs. 66-68)
� 1)
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� F--2,0-t
HUNT-TSD SUPPORT-ELLSBERG PROFILE
Issue: Did CIA Have Advance Knowledge of the Break-in
of Dr. Fielding's Office?
In the first paragraph of the section under the heading
noted above, the Baker Report states: "In light of the facts
and circumstances developed through the documents and con-
flicting testimony of CIA personnel adduced by the Committee,
which are summarized below, the question arises as to whether
CIA had advance knowledge of the Fielding break-in." In this
nine-page section of the Baker Report, there are numerous
references to documents provided by CIA and to testimony
given orally by current and former employees of CIA.
Agency Comment:
There is no evidence in the Baker Report or elsewhere to
support a suspicion of prior knowledge on the part of CIA
about the Fielding break-in. In fact, the issue is raised
in the face of positive evidence to the contrary.
Those who were associated in one way or another with the
support given Hunt in the summer of 1971, or with the Ellsberg
profiles, have stated that they did not know of the Fielding
break-in until it was publicized at the Ellsberg trial a year
and a half later.9 News of the Fielding break-in was first
published in the press on 30 April 1973, based on reports in
connection with the Ellsberg trial. On 4 May 1973 the Agency
had its first official notice of the incident, when attorneys
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at the Department of Justice showed Howard Hunt's testimony
before the Grand Jury to the CIA General Counsel and his
Deputy. Materials already provided the Department of Justice
in October and December 1972, relating to the support to
Hunt by the Agency's Technical Services Division (TSD) in
1971, were prepared for submission to the Court in California
(to include copies of photographs taken by Hunt in 1971 and
delivered to the Department of Justice on .3 January 1973).
Independently, and as a result of the publicity, the
Agency psychiatrists had recognized the probable relationship
between the Fielding burglary and the Ellsberg profiles. They
raised the question with the
1 May 1973," which led to a
reporting the
the purpose of
Director of Medical Services on
review
matter
of the 1971 activity for
to management (the new
DCI, DDCI, and Deputy Director for Management and Services
were unaware of the profiles). As the profiles had not been
associated previously in the minds of any CIA employees with
the support of Hunt by TSD in 1971, this added a new dimen-
sion to the matter. When the psychiatrists reported the
matter to him, the CIA Director of Medical Services made an
appointment with the Director of Security to complete the
review prior to reporting to the DDM&S.
Meanwhile, DCI Schlesinger had been advised by the CIA
liaison officer assigned to the Executive Office Building of
possible Agency involvement in the Ellsberg profiles (having
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� r
- o - 3
deduced it, following the-publicity, from his office having
been the channel for transmitting materials from Hunt to an
Agency psychiatrist) and saw the possible tie to the Fielding
break-in. Mr. Schlesinger then assigned the DDM&S to inves-
tigate it, which led to a separate inquiry prior to the 4 May
meeting at the Department of Justice.
Thus three separate inquiries were started in CIA, soon
to become one. On 7 May 1973 the Deputy General Counsel
delivered to the Department of Justice documents relating
to the profiles, and on 9 May delivered the results of the
completed investigation. A number of CIA employees subse-
quently testified in detail on the subject.
As stated above, a number of CIA employees have testified
that they did not know of the Fielding break-in until it
appeared in the press. While the CIA psychiatrist who worked
on the profiles had met Hunt at the Executive Office Building
on 12 August 1971 at a meeting on the profiles, he knew
nothing of the TSD support of Hunt and had no reason to attach
any particular significance to Hunt's presence at the meeting.
Despite Hunt's request that his presence not be mentioned
to anyone in the Agency, the psychiatrist did report it to
his supervisor, but no particular significance was given
the fact and it was not reported to the Office of the
11
Director.
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As stated previously, in addition to the foregoing, Howard
Hunt has testified under oath a number of occasions that he
12
kept this information from CIA.
In the face of direct testimony to the contrary, a hypoth-
esis to the effect the the Agency might have known in advance
of the Fielding break-in would have to be supported by the
following circumstances: (1) those with access to Hunt's
photography of Dr. Fielding's office prior to the break-in
(the technicians in TSD) would have had to know who Fielding
was (they did not) and what his relationship was to Ellsberg
(they did not), assuming they even noticed Fielding's name;
(2) they would have had to know about the Ellsberg profiles
and Hunt's interest in the subject (they knew neither, in
fact they did not know who Hunt was, dealing with him as
"Mr. Edward" until the contact was terminated). Instead, it
was many months afterwards before both sets of activities were
known to more than one or two persons -- each having been
conducted discretely within separate components of the Agency.
The evidence against such a hypothesis is clear and unequivocal.
In addition, there is other illuminating evidence that
was available to the Baker staff, that has either been over-
looked or, if noted, was omitted from that staff's recon-
struction of what happened. John Dean testified on 25 June
1973 before the Senate Select Committee that CIA had delivered
to the Department of Justice materials concerning Howard Hunt,
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related to the 1971 period. Dean saw this material at Justice
and realized that it included copies of photographs taken
by Hunt, with Liddy in one of them standing next to the
office sign showing Dr. Fielding's name. Dean testified that
he discussed this with John Ehrlichman and Egil Krogh, the
former asking him to attempt to have CIA retrieve the papers
from the Department of Justice to avoid their eventually
leading the investigators to the Fielding'burglary.13 On
9 February 1973 Dean asked DCI Schlesinger to have CIA
retrieve the materiaiS from thelistice Department, which
CIA declined to do. John Dean's testimony before the Senate
Select Committee is corroborated by the transcript of his
conversation with President Nixon on 17 March 1973.14 In
that conversation, Dean was reporting on various issues
raised by his inquiry. After discussing Segretti, the follow-
ing exchange took place:
Dean: The other potential problem is Ehrlichman's and
this is --
President Nixon: In connection with Hunt?
Dean: In connection with Hunt and Liddy both.
President Nixon: They worked for him?
Dean: They -- these fellows had to be some idiots as
we've learned after the fact. They went out and
went into Dr. Ellsberg's doctor's office and they
had, they were geared up with all this CIA
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F
equipment -- cameras and the like. Well they turned
the stuff back in to the CIA some point in time and
left film in the camera. CIA has not put this
togetherr and they don't know what it all means
right now. But it wouldn't take .a very sharp in-
vestigator very long because you've got pictures
in the CIA files that they had to turn over to
(unintelligible).
President Nixon: What in the world -- what in the name of
God was Ehrlichman having something (un-
intelligible) in the Ellsberg (unin-
telligible)?
Dean: They were trying to -- this was a part of an
operation that -- in connection with the Pentagon
papers. They were the whole thing -- they wanted
to get Ellsberg's psychiatric records for some
reason. I don't know.
President Nixon: This is the first I ever heard of this.
I, I (unintelligible) care about Ellsberg
was not our problem.
Dean: That's right.
President Nixon: (Expletive deleted)
Dean: Well, anyway, (unintelligible) it was under an
Ehrlichman structure, maybe John didn't ever know.
I've never asked him if he knew. I didn't want to
know.
3
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gF-
President Nixon: I can't see that getting into, into
this hearing.
Dean: Well, look. No. Here's the way it can come up.
President Nixon: Yeah.
Dean: In the CIA's files which they -- which the Com-
mittee is asking for -- the material they turned
over to the Department of Justice.
President Nixon: Yeah.
Dean: There are all the materials relating to Hunt. In
there are these pictures which the CIA developed
and 'they've got Gordon Liddy standing proud as
punch outside this doctor's office with his name on
it. And (unintelligible) this material it's not
going to take very long for an investigator to go
back and say, well, why would this -- somebody be
at the doctor's office and they'd find out that
there was a break-in at the doctor's office and
then you'd find Liddy on the staff and then you'd
start working it back. I don't think they'll ever
reach that point.
The foregoing treats with .the central issue. Some of the
secondary points are commented on below:
The Baker Report states that "the CIA has continually
downplayed the extent of the technical support..." that was
provided to Hunt. CIA has not discounted the extent of its
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support; to the contrary, it has reported it in detail and
has acknowledged its impropriety. The support given Hunt was
in keeping with the original request to help in the limited
objective of concealing his identity for a White House security
interview. Alias documents and disguise, a voice changing
cos44
device -- or even the request for a secretary --Anot be re-
lated plausibly to a break-in. It was the introduction of a
second man and the loan of a camera in the end that indicated
he was doing more than he had said and led immediately to
the termination of the support. The Agency's reservations about
the descriptions of its support have to do with the undis-
criminating and dramatic treatment given that support by the
press, some of which seems to have been adopted by the Baker
Report, in terms of what the support could actually do to
help Hunt in the break-in.
There are instances in the Baker Report in which testi-
mony is presented in such a way as to put it in the worst
light, when there are more reasonable and accurate interpre-
tations available. One such example is found in the following:
The technician who dealt with Hunt has testified that
he received approval for each and every request of Hunt
from his supervisory officials at the CIA. He also
testified that, contrary to earlier and other CIA
testimony, Hunt informed him early in August that he
would be introducing a second man (Liddy) to the tech-
nician for the provision of disguise and false identi-
fication. CIA officials heretofore had claimed that
Hunt introduced Liddy unannounced late in August and
that this introduction had been one of the leading
causes for the CIA's ultimate termination of its sup-
port for Hunt.
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F �7,c7 � 9
The technician testified in fact that approval was not given
each and every request by Hunt; some were turned down. He did
assert his understanding that everything he did was approved,
although clearly his supervisors were unaware until the last
of some of the developments that he felt were in some way
covered by his general operating instructions.15 This pre-
sentation in the Baker Report is more a case of confusion
from trying to make responses by different persons to dif-
ferent questions fit together, than it is a conflict in testi-
mony. The evidence is absolutely clear, that when a "second
man" was given support, as well as Hunt which the case
officer feels he reported earlier -- along with additional
requests (the loan of a camera and request for backstopped
mailing and telephone addresses), the reaction was prompt.
Although the testimony seems to be cited as tending to show
knowledgeable participation by CIA beyond that acknowledged,
no note is taken in the Report of the fact that the incident
in question, when reported, is the very development that led
to the termination of the support. to Hunt.
The Baker Report states: "Finally, while previous public
CIA testimony claimed that the CIA 'had no contact whatsoever
with Mr. Hunt subsequent to 31 August 1971,' recent testimony
and secret documents indicate that Hunt had extensive contact
with the CIA after that date." The internal quotation in this
passage is a verbatim quotation from a memorandum for the
2f.
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record of Lt. Gen. Walters dated 28 July 1972 on a meeting
with the Acting Director of the FBI. Paragraph 3 of that
memorandum reads:
3. Aside from the above contact with respect to
the recorder, there were contacts with Mr. Hunt with
respect to false documents and disguise for himself
and associate. He was also loaned a clandestine camera,
which was returned. We developed one role of film for
Mr. Hunt, of which we have copies showing some uniden-
tifiable place, possible Rand Corporation. We had had
no contact whatsoever with Mr. Hunt subsequent to
31 August 1971.
That statement represented General Walters' understanding
at the time. It developed that there were other contacts, and
they were reported as they became known. In October 1971, well
before the Watergate arrests, Hunt obtained unclassified in-
formation on a French security leak in 1954; this was provided
because of Hunt's known status as a security consultant with
the White House. The name of the officer with whom Hunt dealt
was found in Hunt's papers, leading to early discovery of
the incident. A request by Hunt in December 1971 for biographic
information on a foreign national was accepted and processed,
because of his White House status, and the results were for-
warded through official
in the Executive Office
Senate Select Committee
channels via the CIA liaison office
Building. This was reported to the
on 23 July 1973 and again to Senator
Baker on 22 January 1974. Further, two senior officers testi-
fied in February 1974 about separate contacts with Hunt, at
his initiative (one in which Hunt discussed problems in
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relationships between the Mullen Company and CIA, and the
other in which he proposed an overseas operational activity
that was declined). These were not known to General Walters
in July 1972, when he made the quoted statement, and may
well have not come to his attention even though reported to
the various investigating authorities. All this information
was available at the time of the preparation and issuance
of the Baker Report.
The Baker Report also raises questions about a so-called
"Mr. Edward file," making the following statement:
Recent testimony also established that the CIA
created a file on Hunt's activities entitled the
'Mr. Edward' file. This file was maintained outside
the normal CIA filing system, and this Committee's
requests to obtain this file have not been granted.
As has been explained in detail to the Baker staff, the "Mr.
Edward file" could not be given over because it had long
since ceased to exist. In fact, the file was never more than
a working folder with a handfull of papers in it, held by
.the Acting Chief, TSD, and later by the Chief of TSD. It was
among the TSD materials that were turned over to Mr.. Colby.
He separated the papers which had been in that file, for
his own reference; copies of these had been provided to the
Special Prosecutor and the Senate Select Committee much
prior to Senator Baker's request for the "Mr. Edward file."
An attempt was made to reconstruct the file, which was de-
livered to the Baker staff on 21 June 1974 along with a
reiteration of the explanation.
4-1
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HUNT-MARTINEZ-CIA
Issue No. 1: Did CIA Have Knowledge of E. Howard Hunt's
Watergate-related Activities Prior to the
Publicity on the Break-in in June 1972
The Baker Report states that "the basic question arises
as to whether the CIA was aware of Hunt's activities early
in 1972 when he was recruiting Cubans to assist in the
Watergate break-in." The Baker Report refers to Martinez'
contact with Hunt in 1971 and to Martinez' reporting of
this fact to his case officer. He also refers to the ex-
change of messages between the Miami Chief of Station and
CIA headquarters about Hunt in March 1972. The Baker Report
states: "It is not explained why Hunt, who had 'used' the
CIA, was not of more interest to the Agency, especially
when he was contacting a current operative."
Agency Comment:
We believe that a correct and reasonable answer was
given to the basic question. The documents and testimony
provided the Committee, and cited in the footnotes of this
section of the Banker Report, definitely indicate that the
Agency was not in any way aware of the nature of Hunt's
Watergate-related activities and plans prior to the June
1972 break-in, through Martinez or otherwise. Martinez had
met Hunt in 1971 and did mention his name to his case
officer, but that name was not familiar to the case officer.
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Consequently, he did not include the name of Hunt in his
contact report on that meeting with Martinez. Later, in
November 1971, in a meeting with both the case officer and
the Chief of Station, Martinez mentioned Hunt again. The
Chief of Station knew the name, and it appears in the memo-
randum of 19 November 1971, cited in footnotes 3 and 4 of
this part of the Baker Report. That memorandum set out the
following description of the exchange:
Martinez brought up the name of Howard Hunt, a former
CIA official who, according to Martinez, presently held
the title of Counselor in the White House. Martinez said
Hunt had been in Miami on an occasion celebrating an
anniversary of the Cuban Brigade and Martinez had been
introduced to Hunt at that time. Hunt told Martinez that
he was passing through the area on a business deal in
Central America. Hunt also told Martinez that he had
known Barker in the past. Martinez then told his case
officer and the COS that he consistently tried to live
his cover of no longer working for CIA and for this
reason did not pry into Hunt's affairs.
When Martinez told his case officer several months
prior to the 19 November 1971 meeting that a Howard Hunt
had been in the area on a business deal the case officer
had never heard of Howard Hunt. The case officer did
have a name trace conducted utilizing Station indices,
with negative results. (Names of staff employees or for-
mer staff employees are not available at the Stations.)
The case officer assumed that Hunt was of no importance
and was only another of Martinez' business friends.
The Miami Chief of Station, testifying later on the
subject, gave the following summary of the first meeting, in
which Hunt's name was not reported, and the second one
recorded above:
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[Martinez' case officer] is a young officer, 32 years
of age, and was not in the Agency, nor was he familiar
with the name Howard Hunt, the Bay of Pigs and things
of that sort, and I guess now ... at that time, in a
totally innocuous way, sometime in the summer of 1971 ..
[Martinez] mentioned the name of Howard Hunt and said
he had been in town. And... this name didn't mean any-
think to him, so he just didn't mention it to me, nor
did he put it in the report ...
[Martinez said that he had] mentioned some months ago
that Mr. Hunt had been in town, and I sort of looked
at [the case officer] and I said really? I don't think
you told me that? And [the case officer] looked at me
and said, gee, I forgot it, I didn't know who the fellow
was. And he didn't know'who he was at that time either.
The Baker Report notes that in March 1972, Martinez
"advised the Miami Chief of Station that Hunt was employed
by the White House and asked the Chief of Station if he was
sure that he had been apprised of all Agency activities in
the Miami area." The actual communication, from the Chief of
Station to Washington, summarized in the Baker Report, was
dated 17 March 1972, and covered two subjects. The second
of the subjects referred to Martinez' reports of Hunt's being
in the Miami area, stating that he was indicating that:
...he is a White House counselor, trying to create the
impression that this could be of importance to his Cuban
friends. Could you quietly ascertain for me whether Hunt,
in fact, does have such capacity with the White House.":1
The reply from CIA headquarters, dated 27 March 1972, con-
tained the following statement, advising him:
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"...not to concern yourself with the travel of Mr. Hunt,
and not to nose around regarding his movements where you
are. He undoubtedly is on domestic White House business
of no interest to us. In essence -- cool it.,"
The Baker Report characterizes the exchange in somewhat dif-
ferent terms. Further, it does not note that the Committee
was provided with a letter of 20 June 1972 prepared by the
Miami Chief of Station, which speaks of that March 1972
meeting with Martinez. That letter makes it clear that the
Miami Chief of Station was confident that he knew of all CIA
activities in the Miami area, including a training activity
then being run by a component of the Agency not connected
with the Miami Station, and also confident that any other
"activities" referred to by Martinez had no connection with
CIA. There had been no reason for the Miami Chief of Station
to attach any particular importance to Martinez' report.
That the fact of Martinez' contact with Hunt prior to
June 1972 would not be considered anything of major sig-
nificance to CIA headquarters was explained to the Committee
staff by former DDP Karamessines. Following is an except from
Mr. Karamessines' testimony in which he said the contact of
former CIA officer Hunt with Martinez prior to the break-in:
"would not be a thing that would cause any particular
commotion anywhere. We've got a lot of alumni of our
Agency... . Every so often, one of them will pop up.
We just don't take an interest in their work, and we
don't encourage them to come to us and ask for our help
in their work. We don't provide it."
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Issue No. : Did the Miami Chief of Station "Deliberately"
Omit Hunt's name from a Communications to CIA
Headquarters
The Baker Report states: "On the morning of June 18, 1972,
the Miami Chief of Station dispatched a cable to CIA head-
quarters regarding the activities of Martinez but deliberately
omitting Martinez' prior reference to Hunt's activities." A
footnote at this point refers to testimony of "Case Office #2."
Agency Comment:
Thr 18 June message was sent from Miami to CIA headquarters
for the purpose of providing a resume of Martinez' association
with the Agency, subsequent to announcement of his arrest in
Watergate. The Miami Station was the organizational element
of the Agency with the most recent contact. with Martinez and
such a report from it was appropriate. In the mind of the
Miami Chief of Station, there would be nothing to conceal in
the message, as the means of communication were classified
and directed to the proper supervisory officers. In any event,
Hunt's earlier contact with Martinez had been reported to
Washington the previous November and this communication was
� only to provide background on Martinez.16 Hunt had not then
been identified publicly with the Watergate affair, and as
stated previously, his involvement was unknown to CIA officers.
Later, after Hunt's name was publicized in connection with
Watergate, when the alias "Hamilton" surfaced in connection
with the Watergate affair, the Chief of Station in Miami, as
he testified, recalled that the name was or might have been
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the same name used by Hunt when he had been employed with
the Agency. He immediately reported his suspicions to head-
quarters and suggested that the matter be checked out.17
Issue No. 3: Did CIA withhold Information from the FBI
Regarding Martinez' Car
The Baker Report states: "Despite conflicting evidence
from the FBI and the CIA, it is known that the Agency received
information on June 19, 1972, from an operative that Martinez'
vehicle was at the Miami airport and contained compromising
documents. The Agency contacted the FBI with this informa-
tion on June 21, 1972. Our staff has yet to'receive a satis-
factory explanation regarding the aforementioned time lag
and an accounting of Agency actions during the interim." A
footnote at "CIA" refers to testimony of the Miami Chief of
Station and to "report of Interview of Agent Robert L. Wilson,
dated January 11, 1974 at 4" and adds: "A comparison reveals
a discrepancy as to the manner in which the FBI was notified
and raises questions concerning what the FBI found." A foot-
note at the end of the second sentence refers to testimony
of the Miami Chief of Station and testimony of "Case Officer
#2."
Agency Comment:
The statement that CIA learned of the location of Martinez'
car on 19 June 1972 is incorrect. This date was indeed pro-
vided to the Committee by CIA, having been fixed by mistake
at an early date. It was not questioned in the course of the
hearings, being mentioned only briefly and imprecisely 18